HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO J. HABALUYAS, petitioners vs. JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPZON ,Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO NODA & CO., LTD. and SHUYA NODA, Respondents.

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 82-3305 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, Shugo Noda & Co., Ltd., et al. vs. Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc., et al., the plaintiffs received on October 1, 1984 a copy of the order of September 3, 1984, denying their motion for execution of a judgment based on a compromise.

On October 16, the fifteenth day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an extension of twenty days within which to submit their motion for reconsideration.

On October 23, the plaintiffs filed their motion for new trial and their "notice of appeal (conditional)".

Petitioners or defendants Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. and Pedro J. Habaluyas opposed the motion for extension of the time for filing a motion for reconsideration and they moved the dismiss the conditional appeal

Judge Maximo M. Japzon in his order of April 29, 198 granted the motion for new trial.

ISSUE: WON the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.

RULING: NO

We hold that the trial court erred in granting the motion for new trial. The fifteen- day period for appealing or for filing motion for reconsideration cannot be extended Even under the existing Rules of Court the thirty-day period cannot be extended (Roque vs. Gunigundo, Adm. Case No. 1664, March 30 1978, 89 SCRA 178, 182; Gibbs vs. Court of First Instance Manila, 80 Phil. 160,164).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Judiciary Revamp Law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is designed to avoid the procedural delays which plagued the administration of justice under the Rules of Court which were originally intended to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. That is why (with some exceptions) the record on appeal was dispense with and the thirty-day period was reduced to fifteen days.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The questioned order is reversed and set aside. No costs.

Victoriano Salazar v Cayetana Salazar

Motion for new trial or reconsideration - Rule 37

FACTS:

1907 case on loss and damages between Parties. The court decided in favor of Cayetana, plaintiff declaring Victoriano in default because no answer was filed by him. A month after this decision has been rendered, Victoriano filed a complaint alleging that he has been unjustly deprived of the right of defense asking the that the judgment by default be annulled and an order of new trial be given.

Victoriano was undoubtedly cited and served with the complaint in accordance with law and that this as proven and evidenced by a copy of the pleading filed by Attorney F.E. Dominguez, presenting Victoriano. However, victoriano explains that the reason that he did answer the complaint was because of a compromise agreement between Parties. That Victoriano engaged the services of his counsel to show the compromise agreement in court and to do whatever is required by law to end the case. So he believed that due to this agreement there was no need to answer.

ISSUE:

WON Victoriano’s erroneous belief is excusable and van be grounds for new trial

HELD:

Victoriano’s belief that the case has ended due to the compromise agreement is technically erroneous but it was, without doubt, excusable and the causes were reasonable why he did not answer

Rule 37 Sec 1 (then under Sec 513) provides for mistake or excusable negligence as grounds for new trial. Such belief excusable and having prevented the plaintiff herein from making a defense that would have been good and efficacious, SC sets aside the judgment by default and orders a new trial to ensue.

National Shipyard and Steel Corp. vs. Asuncion

Facts:

On March 31, 1955, Referee Erudito Luna of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission rendered a decision ordering the petitioner to pay to Salvador Asuncion compensation, fees and costs. On April 26, 1955 the petitioner filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, all documentary and allegedly not discovered at the opportune time. Finding no error in the referee’s decision, the Chief of the Referee Division elevated the case to respondent Commissioner for review. The latter did not consider the evidence presented in support of the motion for new trial as newly discovered within legal contemplation, and accordingly affirmed the decision of the referee. The petitioner has appealed by certiorari. Respondent Asuncion was first employed by the petitioner on January 27, 1950, was laid off on April 30, 1950 due to lack of funds, and was reinstated on January 22, 1951. He worked as rigger and his assignment was to carry steel and other materials from the landing barges to the bodegas. On December 6, 1951, while shovelling gravel and sand, he vomited blood and was given first aid treatment at petitioner’s infirmary. He was physically examined and referred to the San Lazaro Hospital for X-ray examination. Found to have pulmonary tuberculosis in a moderately advanced stage, and upon advice of the doctor, he was confined in the Quezon Institute from December 17, 1951 until July 11, 1952, when he was discharged as clinically and radiologically improved. He sought reinstatement, but allegedly for lack of funds, he was not re-employed by the petitioner. The petitioner now contends that had respondent Commissioner taken into consideration the newly discovered evidence which shows that respondent Asuncion had already been afflicted with and was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis as early as January, 1946 (while he was not yet employed by the petitioner), the decision complained of would have been greatly changed. The petitioner’s motion for new trial was based on newly discovered evidence showing that respondent Asuncion, after

confinement in Quezon Institute beginning December 17, 1951, was released as cured on July 11, 1952, and that the physical examination made by petitioner’s medical officer showed that said respondent was physically fit for work. Accordingly, it is urged that no compensation and medical expenses after July 11, 1952 should have been awarded in his favor.

ISSUE: won the respondent commissioner erred in not reconsidering the newly admit evidence.

Held: The respondent Commissioner did not err in declaring that the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been produced at the trial if the petitioner had exercised due diligence, because the records referring to respondent Asuncion had always been in petitioner’s possession. Moreover, the medical finding that respondent Asuncion on July 11, 1952 as clinically and radiologically improved, was explained by the attending physician in Quezon Institute as merely meaning improvement in the physical condition. Indeed, Annex "I" of the motion for new trial shows that as of July 3, 1952, prior to his official discharge on July 11, 1952, said respondent was still positive with pulmonary tuberculosis. Therefore, with respondent Commissioner in his observation that, unless a miracle played an important part, it is highly inconceivable for said illness to have been completely arrested or cured within the short span of two weeks.

HONORABLE ARMANDO B. CLEDERA vs. HONORABLE ULPIANO SARMIENTO

FACTS:

The private respondents herein were employees of the provincial government of Camarines Sur and paid under the plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund budget.

The provincial board of the province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 176, series of 1968, which approved the road and bridge fund budget of the province for the fiscal year 1968-1969 and abolished the positions of herein private residents, who as a consequence filed a civil case for prohibition and/or mandamus with damages seeking their reinstatement and payment of back salaries as well as the restoration of their respective positions previously occupied by them in the plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund budget.

Private respondents filed a motion to re-open the cases and to allow them to present additional evidence consisting of the budget and plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund for the fiscal year 1969-70 to which herein petitioners filed an opposition.

Respondent Judge denied the said motion of herein private respondents seeking to reopen the two cases.

Herein private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order which motion does not contain any notice at all setting the time, date and place of hearing.

Herein private respondents filed a request addressed to the clerk of court to set for hearing on November 24, 1969 their aforesaid motion for reconsideration, expressly stating that a copy of the same was delivered to the Provincial Fiscal that same day, November 20, 1969.

Herein respondent Judge set aside its order, re-opened the two cases and allowed respondents to present additional evidence consisting of the budget and plaintiff of personnel for the fiscal year 1969-70 of the road and bridge fund to further substantiate the claim herein private respondents that their items were abolished in bad faith.

Respondent Judge rendered a decision in both cases in favor of herein private respondents declaring as null and void Resolution No. 176, series of 1968 of the herein petitioners provincial governor, governor and members of the provincial board abolishing the positions of herein private respondents, as well as directing their immediate reinstatement and the payment of back salaries from July, 1968 until actual reinstatement together with such amounts as may be necessary to pay the contribution of the province of Camarines Sur to the G.S.I.S. in connection with the private respondents' insurance and/or retirement, and the costs.

Provincial Fiscal, as counsel for herein petitioners, received a copy of the aforesaid decision of April 27, 1970.

On June 8, 1970, the herein petitioners, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique A. Amador, filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, together with a notice of hearing address to the clerk of court.

Both the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and said notice of hearing were personally delivered to and received on the same day June 8, 1970 by the counsel of herein respondents whose office is in Naga City itself.

Herein private respondents filed a motion for execution on the ground that the decision had already become final since no appeal therefrom had been interposed and perfected by herein petitioners within thirty (30) days from their receipt of the aforesaid decision.

In the said motion for execution, herein private respondents expressly admitted that herein petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration dated June 6, 1970 of the aforesaid decision of April 27, 1970, claiming however that the same motion was "fatally defective, pro forma, and should not be considered ... because it failed to comply with the mandatory and elementary provisions of See. 2 of Rule 37 in relation to Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; consequently, the filing of such motion for reconsideration ... did not and should not toll the running of the period for appeal."

Herein petitioners filed their opposition dated June 17, 1970 to the aforesaid motion for execution on the ground that they had complied with Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court; and that their motion for reconsideration is considered as a motion for new trial.

Respondent Judge granted herein private respondents motion for execution. He also issued an order denying herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the notice accompanying the motion for the reconsideration of the decision complies with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 in relation to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.

RULING:

NO.

The rule that the requirements of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court are mandatory and non-

compliance therewith renders any motion as a useless scrap of paper, which does not merit the attention of the court. Said sections read thus —

Sec. 2, Rule 37: — Contents of motion for new trial and notice thereof. — The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. ... (Emphasis supplied).

Sec. 4, Rule 15: Notice. — Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the court may dispose of on its own motion.

Sec. 5, Rule 15: Contents of notice. — The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall directed the time and place for the hearing of the motion.

See. 6, Rule 15: Proof of service, to be filed with motion. — No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected.

The provisions of the aforequoted rules are clear and are couched in simple language, understandable to any college student, even if he is not a student of law. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 require that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion, which notice shall also be served to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion and other supporting documents. Section 4 of Rule 15 does not state that such notice shall be directed to the clerk of court, much less to the judge himself. Neither does it allow that the notice shall be served any time before or on the day of the hearing, for the rule requires that the adverse parties should be served with such notice at least three days before the hearing, to give them an opportunity to contest the motion and be heard thereon. There is no ambiguity nor vagueness in the rules. Failure to give at least three days notice prior to the hearing vitiates the notice.

To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court are as mandatory as they are clear and simple; and non compliance therewith is fatal to the cause of

the movant, because the mere filing of the motion for reconsideration, without the requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running of the period for appeal. Unless the movant has the time and place of hearing in the notice and serves the adverse party with the same, the court would have no way to determine whether the party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which to file his reply or opposition.

The rules commanding the movant to serve of the adverse party a written notice of the motion (Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of hearing "shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall estate the time and place for the hearing of the motion" (Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less exceptions. To deviate from the peremptory principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the cases aforecited in, and to exempt from the rigor of the operation of said principle, the case at bar would be one step in the emasculation of the revised rules and would be subversive of the stability of the rules and jurisprudence thereon — all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested persons as well as the general public who would thereby be subjected to such an irritating uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the rule and when their requirements may be ignored.

FERRER VS. SEPENG

FACTS:

In the action below for recovery of a sum of money, trial on the merits was set for November 8, 1967. At the hearing, plaintiff-appellee and counsel appeared while only counsel for defendant-appellant was present. The trial proceeded and plaintiff introduced his documentary evidence supporting his claim against defendant, all of which were admitted without objection by defendant's counsel. After plaintiff rested his case, defendant's counsel moved for postponement on the ground that defendant was not present in court. The trial court denied the motion and declared the case submitted for decision. On the same day, it rendered judgment against defendant.

Three weeks thereafter on December 2, 1967, defendant filed a motion for new trial allegedly on the ground of "accident, mistake or excusable neglect" in that defendant "early in the morning of said November 8, 1967 ... had stomach trouble and consequently I was not able to go to the court for said trial" as per defendant's affidavit annexed to the motion.

Plaintiff duly opposed the motion for new trial for several grounds. The latter alleged that the stomach "trouble" does not constitute excusable negligence since it is merely one which could not physically prevent him from appearing in court and that the motion for new trial did not allege any statement of fact constituting the valid defense which the defendant may prove if given the chance to introduce evidence;

The trial court per its order of December 14, 1967 denied the motion for new trial for the reasons stated in plaintiff's opposition. Hence, defendant's appeal to the appellate court assigning as sole error "that the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial."

ISSUE:

WON the stomach trouble of defendant-appellant was sufficient to prevent him from appearing in court is a question of fact" and that the appellate court should have retained the appeal.

RULING:

Defendant-appellant's averment of "stomach trouble belatedly presented after three weeks, without any specific statement of its nature and gravity was patently inadequate to show to the trial court's satisfaction the existence of "accident, mistake or excusable neglect" which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against by reason of which his substantial rights have been materially affected, as required by the Rules of Court.

But even if it were to be conceded that defendant-appellant did in fact suffer from serious stomach trouble which physically prevented him from appearing and giving his testimony at the scheduled trial, his failure to submit in addition an affidavit of merits showing the valid defense which he may prove as against plaintiffs case in case a new trial is granted is fatal to his cause.

The reason is fundamental and elementary. The rule requires that motions for new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence must be accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e. affidavits showing the facts (not mere conclusions or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action or defense which the movant may prove in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would serve no purpose and would just waste the time of the court

as well as the parties if the complaint is after all groundless or the defense is nil or ineffective. 3

The decisive undisputed fact is that no affidavit of merits to support his motion for new trial as required by Rule 37, section 2 was submitted by defendant-appellant. Such failure is fatal to his cause and is decisive on the question of law presented by his sole assignment of error.

The Court accordingly rules that the appeal has no merit since the failure to submit an affidavit of merits is fatal to appellant's cause and the trial court therefore committed no error in law in denying his motion for new trial.

Ganaban vs. Bayle

This case was instituted by the heirs of the plaintiff to recover sums of money from the defendants to whom the deceased entered into several and different transaction.

- Leon ganaban died intestate in 1952, being single, survived by plaintiffs in this case his brother and sisterand some niece

- Aug.24 1952, leon delivered to bayle, the sum of 5k for which bayle signed a receipt, stating that said amount was to be invested in a loan secured by a mortgage on an agricultural land. Said delivery took place took place and receipt was signed in the presence of Fernandez who likewise affixed his signature thereto as a witness. Despite repeated demands bayle did not refund the money of leonen despite the promise to do so.

Lower court- amunt sought to be collected (25K) is below its jurisdiction, by reason of ganaban’s testimony that the 25k would be divided between the plaintiffs, that the lower court deduced from these circumstances that each and everyone of plaintiff has different and distinct interest over the estate of leon. Holding that the claim of each plaintiff is below to the original jurisdiction of CFI.

MR- denied

ISSUE:WON the MR in this case must be verified or supported by an affidavit of merits( R.37 sec.2)

RULE:no. inasmuch as said verification and affidavit of merits are not required by section 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court except when the motion for reconsideration is based either upon "(f)raud, accident, mistake or

excusable negligence," none of which was the ground relied upon by plaintiffs herein. Their motion for reconsideration was predicated upon the theory that the lower court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, for which neither a verification of the motion nor an affidavit of merits was necessary, because the facts and the law invoked in support thereof appear on record.

In these three cases, it is clear that the cause of action of each one of the plaintiffs was distinct, separate and independent from that of the other plaintiffs, so that the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation, insofar as it was dependent upon the amount involved, should be determined by the sum claimed by each one of the plaintiffs, not by the aggregate amount of their claims put together. In the case at bar, plaintiffs herein sued, as heirs of the deceased Leon Ganaban, to enforce a right of the latter, thereby setting up no more than one cause of action against the defendant. As a consequence, the sum total of the judgment prayed for in plaintiffs' complaint, which lies within the competence of the lower court, not of a municipal or city court, is determinative of the jurisdiction over the case.

FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, as Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch VII, and PABLO SAN MIGUEL, Respondents.

FACTS: Sometime in 1962, Pedro San Miguel, 1the predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioners, commenced a "Complaint for Partition of Real Estate" before the Court of First Instance against private respondent Pablo San Miguel.

The complaint, sought the partition of Lot No. 4543 of the Lolomboy Estate

respondent Pablo San Miguel disclaimed co-ownership and asserted exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543

Subsequently, trial judge, Ricardo C. Puno, ordered the dismissal of the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court for "apparent lack of interest in the prosecution of the respective claims of the litigants."

Eleven years thereafter, another complaint for partition, was instituted by the same Pedro San Miguel against private respondent Pablo San Miguel.

This time, the complaint prayed for the partition of Lot No. 4543 and Lot No. 3269

In due time, Pablo San Miguel filed his answer, pleading therein the defense of res judicata. For him, the same subject matter and cause of action had already been litigated upon and resolved in the previous Civil Case.

After preliminary he "insofar as Lot 4543 is concerned" in view of the principle of res judicata caring, the respondent Judge issued an order dismissing Civil Case

Respondent Judge approved petitioners' corrected record on appeal but "insofar only as Lot No. 3269 is concerned ... because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL, cannot be appealed anymore, and therefore any record on appeal thereon will be useless, moot and academic

ISSUE: Whether an order is final and appealable or is merely interlocutory.

RULING: respondent Judge did not abused his discretion when he issued the order of December 9, 1974, approving petitioners' corrected record on appeal "insofar only as Lot 3269 is concerned ... because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL.

Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal." Interlocutory or incidental judgments or orders do not stay the progress of an action nor are they subject of appeal "until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other." The

test to determine whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is this: "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, if is final." 2 A court order is final character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, 3 such that no further questions can come before the court except the execution of the order. 4 The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or direction for future determination. 5 The order or judgment may validly refer to the entire controversy or to some definite and separate branch threof. "In the absence of a statutory definition, a final judgment, order decree has been held to be ... one that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the

rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside.6The central point to consider is, therefore, the effects of the order on the rights of the parties. A court order, on the other hand, is merely interlocutory in character if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. 7The word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." 8

1. We find that the order of dismissal entered by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 4300-M on December 10, 1973, is a clear final and appealable order. The said order is a final disposition of the whole controversy between the parties with respect to the ownership of Lot No. 4543. It is absolute and conclusive on all questions in regard thereto. 9 The trial court's order is not a mere narrow acceptance of private respondent's plea of res judicata. It has more the far-ranging effect of confirming private respondent's claim of exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543, as previously adjudicated in the prior Civil Case No. 2624. It imports that private respondent is the sole owner of this specific lot; as a result of which, the deceased Pedro San Miguel or his succesors-in-interest for that matter stand to suffer the loss of what they claim is their rightful share thereto. 10 After the issuance of this order, nothing more was left for the trial court to try or decide, as the conflicting claims of the parties over the subject lot have already been resolved. As a matter of fact, the final order of dismissal cannot even be assailed by certiorari. The remedy is appeal, which petitioners herein have failed to undertake. 11The fact that the other lot, Lot No. 3269, remained under litigation and the respective claims of the parties thereto yet to be settled by the trial court would not affect the final nature of the subject order, because a decree, is nonetheless final although some independent branch of the case is reserved for future consideration . 12

2. Reason lies in the order of the respondent Judge, dated December 10, 1973, foreclosing the relitigation of Lot No. 4543 because of the March 19, 1964 order of the then trial Judge, Ricardo C. Puno, in Civil Case No. 2624, which involves the same lot, dismissing the case for lack of interest to prosecute. This dismissal order of the said trial Judge has the effect and consequences of a dismissal on the merits under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court since it was neither without prejudice nor based upon lack of jurisdiction. 13It is worthy to note that the deceased Pedro San Miguel interposed no appeal therefrom. Instead, he attempted to revive the subject matter of that Civil Case No. 2624 (Lot No. 4543) eleven years

thereafter, when he commenced Civil Case No. 4300-M, praying for the partition of Lot No. 3629 and Lot No. 4543. This, the deceased Pedro San Miguel could not do so. Litigation on this particular Lot No. 4543 must reach a terminal point. The principle of estoppel by judgment, on of the aspects of the doctrine of res judicata, precludes the re-litigation in another action of a specific question actually litigated and determined in a former one. 14The second case, Civil Case No. 4300-M, is barred by the prior judgment in the first case, Civil Case No. 2624, insofar as it relates to Lot No. 4543. For, thre is Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred as far as Lot No. 4543 is concerned. Likewise, the judgment in the first case is a final one rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits. 15c

3. There is no doubt that access to the courts is a constitutional guarantee. This is, however, subject to limitation s. Once the rights of a party-litigant have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, the party-litigant can no longer litigate the same again. 16A right, question or fact distinctly placed in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the firs suit remains unmodified. 17Public policy and sound practice jdemand that "at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law." 18Reipublicae ut sit finis litium.

UNIVERSAL MOTORS V CA & VERENDIA, GALICIA

Issues to be raised on appeal

FACTS:

Respondents bought Mercedes Benz trucks from Petitioners. They defaulted in payment. They issued a promissory note but they still failed to complete their payment. After repeated demands, Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of unpaid balance. Respondents in their Answer with Counterclaim admitted the principal allegations of the Complaint, except that they insisted that their outstanding account was only the amount of P28,911.10 not 74K.

Petition for summary judgment by Petitioner denied. Both parties failed to appear during the hearing thus Petitioner was allowed to present evid ex-parte upon motion. Judgment was in favor of Petiitoner.

On April 8, 1968, after re-hearing the case on motion filed by private respondent Rafael Verendia, the court rendered a decision which reiterated the first judgment by the court.

CA: reversed trial court. Dismissed the complaint and ordered Universal Motors to return amount in excess of the amount due to them.MR denied

Petitioner raises the following grounds: CA erred in a) allowing Respondents to make a complete turnabout by denying liability when they have already admitted that they are liable b) in allowing change in defense without amending their pleadings c) not holding respondents estopped d) in exonerating respondents e) that respondents overpaid petitionr and f)that the appeal of one of the respondents have inured to the benefit of the other respondents who did not appeal

ISSUE:

Won the issues presented by Petitioners are within the exceptions where the Supreme Court can review on appeal the final and conclusive findings of fact of the Court of Appeals

HELD:

Denied.

Jurisprudence dictates that as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided, they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. However, this rule admits of certain exceptions, as when the findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; or the appellate court's findings are contrary to those of the trial court. Absence any proof that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand for the Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.

Neypes vs CA

Facts:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.

ISSUE: WON receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration

WON petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.

HELD: The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and

accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

II. Yes. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45 but does not apply to Rule 64(Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. CA

Facts:Petitioner-lessor, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and private respondent-lessees, spouses Ernesto and Lorna Reyes entered into a lease agreement over a parcel of land. Private respondent lessees were given the right of pre-emption, with first priority to purchase the property if the owner, herein petitioner, offered it for sale. Intending to have a fire wall constructed, private respondents allegedly had the property relocated. As a result, they discovered that the adjacent owner's concrete fence abutted on and encroached upon 30.96 square meters of the leased property. Private respondents requested petitioner to make adjustments in order to correct the encroachment problem. The spouses Reyes claim that despite repeated follow-up, petitioner has failed to take any action on their demand. Consequently, they decided to withhold rental payments as "leverage" against petitioner and to force the latter to make corrections or adjustments in the area of subject land. Petitioner informed private respondents in a letter of its intention to sell the leased property. Although the Reyeses conveyed their interest in buying the property, no deal was finalized. Private respondents reiterated their desire to purchase the property in response to petitioner's demand for the payment of P68,000.00 in unpaid rentals for the period October 1986 to January 1989. In the same letter, private respondents countered that they intend to pay as soon as the proper correction with respect to the encroached area is made by petitioner.No agreement was reached. Private respondent spouses filed an action for specific performance and damages before the RTC. The correction or adjustment of the encroached portion of the property constituted their first cause of action. For their second cause of action, the spouses Reyes prayed that petitioner be compelled to sell the leased premises to them at P1,600.00 per square meter, claiming that there was already a contract of sale between the parties. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss was not immediately resolved by the trial court. It later filed its Answer with Counterclaim for rental payments owed by private respondents. Petitioner also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings for unpaid rentals on 439.34 square meters of the 470 square meter leased property. TC denying motion to dismiss insofar as the first cause of action but granted it for the second cause of action. The following day, TC rendered partial judgment as regards to the rentals in favor of

petitioner.Private respondent spouses filed a notice of appeal and elevated the case to the CA. They raised three issues: the lawfulness of dismissing the second cause of action; the propriety of holding that there was no contract of sale between the parties; and ordering the payment of rental arrearages without any hearing on the merits. Petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the case raises only pure questions of law and that respondent appellate court had no jurisdiction over the same. CA denied motion to dismiss. CA ruled that the case before it is a single appeal and does not necessitate multiple appeals even if it involves an Order and a Partial Judgment. Hence, even if only a notice of appeal was filed without a record on appeal, the appeal was effectively perfected.

Petitioner insists that this case involves multiple appeals which, therefore, necessitates the filing of a record on appeal for the perfection of the appeal. It notes that while the motion to dismiss was granted for the second cause of action (to compel sale), the case was left to proceed in connection with the encroachment issue. With the filing of the notice of appeal, the entire records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, leaving the trial court bereft of any record with which to continue trial. Petitioner adds that when a partial judgment is rendered in the case, the original record of the case should not be transmitted to the appellate court in case of an appeal from such partial judgment. Without the records of the case, trial on the unresolved issues cannot proceed — a situation "hardly conducive to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business." It further alleges that as more than one appeal is permitted in this case, a record on appeal is required and the period to appeal should be thirty days. In the instant case, private respondents failed to file the record on appeal, hence, their appeal should have been dismissed.Issue: Does this case involve multiple appeals, where a record on appeal is necessary to perfect the appeal?

Ruling:The case at bar is not one where multiple appeals can be taken or are necessary. Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of

mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.The disputes in the case below for specific performance have arisen from the demand to make adjustments on the property where the adjacent owner is alleged to have usurped a part thereof, the exercise of the right of pre-emption and the payment of rental arrearages. A ruling on the issue of encroachment will perforce be determinative of the issue of unpaid rentals. These two points do not arise from two or more causes of action, but from the same cause of action. Hence, this suit does not require multiple appeals. There is no ground for the splitting of appeals in this case, even if it involves an Order granting (and denying) a motion to dismiss and a Partial Judgment granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The subject matter covered in the Order and in the Partial Judgment pertain to the same lessor-lessee relationship, lease contract and parcel of land. Splitting appeals in the instant case would, in effect, be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.The conclusion is irresistible that since a case has not been made out for multiple appeals, a record on appeal is unnecessary to perfect the appeal.

GAMIAO VS. PLAN (FULL TXT- di ko na dinigest sobrang iksi)

Certiorari to review an order of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch II, at Cauayan, which dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. Procedurally, counsel for the petitioners invoke Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Said rule governs ordinary appeals from Courts of First Instance to the Supreme Court. The correct vehicle is R.A. No. 5440 which was approved on September 9, 1968 but which, according to Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, is not well-known to lawyers, especially provincial practitioners. Accordingly, as part of the continuing legal education of some members of the bar, quoted hereunder is the pertinent provision of the aforesaid Act, to wit:

Sec. 3. The Supreme Court shall provide by rule for the procedure governing petitions for writs of certiorari to review judgments mentioned in Section seventeen of Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, as amended by this Act and the effect of the filing thereof on the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed. Until the Supreme Court provides otherwise, said petitions shall be filed within the period fixed in the rules of court for appeals in criminal or civil cases or special civil actions or special proceedings,

depending upon the nature of the case in which the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed, was rendered; the filing of said petition shall stay the execution of the judgments sought to be reviewed; and the aforesaid petitions shall be filed and served in the form required for petitions for review by certiorari of decisions of the Court of Appeals.

The facts recited in the petition have not been controverted in the comment which was submitted by the respondents. They are the following:

On September 22, 1979, the petitioners filed a complaint with the respondent trial court which was denominated as an action for reconveyance, annulment of deeds of sale and damages. With prior leave, the complaint was amended on November 21, 1979. The amendment consisted merely in the addition of three (3) more plaintiffs.

After issues had been joined, the petition recites that "respondent judge issued the dismissal order motu proprio without conducting a pre-trial conference of the parties on June 22, 1981, the date set for pre-trial purposes, and for which this petition likewise seeks from this Honorable [Court] to declare as void the questioned dismissal order." As aforesaid, this factual statement remains uncontradicted in the comment of the respondent.

The order which We are asked to set aside was given in open court on June 2, 1981 and reads as follows:

The land according to both parties was originally a public land and that this land had been disposed by the Bureau of Lands and culminated into a certificate of title in the name of Santiago Cadelinia against the protest of the plaintiffs which was dismissed by the Bureau of lands. The law on the matter is that the Director of Lands has control over the disposition of Public Lands.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is dismissed without costs.

Since there is a counter-claim, the court sets the hearing of the same to July 6, 1981 at 8:30 a.m.

Parties are notified in open court.

The respondents, in their comment, pray for the dismissal of the petition for the following reasons:

(1) For being filed prematurely and/or unseasonably, contrary to the provisions of Rule 65, Section 1, of the Rules of Court; and

(2) The error allegedly committed by the respondent Judge is an error of judgment, which can be reviewed by means of an appeal, and not by certiorari.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The reasons adduced by the respondents for the dismissal of the petition are not well-taken for they assume that the instant petition was filed as a special civil action pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Substantially, however, counsel for the petitioners has filed a petition pursuant to R.A. No. 5440 albeit he did so unknowingly. It is to be noted that the petition was filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days for civil cases.

Going to the merits of the petition, We have to grant relief for the following reasons:

1. The respondent judge dismissed the complaint without conducting a pre-trial thus violating Sec. 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court which stipulates that a pre-trial is mandatory.

2. The petitioners are not questioning the issuance of the certificate of title to Santiago Cadelinia although they could have done so. The relief which they seek is that the certificate of title notwithstanding, Cadelinia and his co-defendants have a legal duty to convey the land to the plaintiffs and pay damages in addition. Thus the ratio of the dismissal order to the effect that, "The laws on the matter is that the Director of Lands has control over the disposition of Public Lands." is irrelevant to the claim of the plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the order of the respondent judge dated June 2, 1981 is hereby set aside; he is directed to conduct a pre-trial as mandated by the Rules of Court and thereafter to proceed accordingly. No special pronouncement as to costs.

GRACE A. BASMAYOR, Petitioner, v. LOIDA B. ATENCIO, Respondent.

FACTS:

In a Memorandum TESDA through its director, Juanito C. Cueva, informed petitioner Grace A. Basmayor, a computer operator, that she had accumulated a total of thirty-one and a half days of absence without official leave in violation of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 41 s. 1998. Accordingly, Regional Director Cueva advised Basmayor to personally appear before or explain in writing to the TESDA Regional Office, the reason for her absence, with a warning that failure to take the proper action within the period would mean her implied resignation, and consequently she would be dropped from the rolls.

A few days later, Basmayor received another memorandum, from the TESDA Regional Office informing her that her service in the government shall be considered terminated.

Basmayor sent a letter-complaint to the Civil Service Commission Regional Office, charging respondent Loida B. Atencio, Administrative Officer V of TESDA Regional Office, for falsification of official document, gross neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, and dishonesty. According to Basmayor, when she went to the TESDA Regional Office as instructed, Director Cueva was not there. Basmayor claimed that she called the TESDA Regional Office several times, but Atencio always informed her that Director Cueva was not around. When Basmayor called again on October 23, 2000, she was informed that the director was in Australia. Basmayor now alleges that Atencio has forged the signature of the TESDA Regional Director in the memorandum, to make it appear that Director Cueva, who was at that time in Australia, issued the aforementioned memorandum.

Atencio denied the allegations and explained that Director Cueva instructed her to issue the memorandum through a facsimile machine. Atencio submitted a certification by the director that the latter indeed instructed the former to issue the aforementioned memorandum.

Basmayor's complaint was dismissed by the CSC Regional Office for failure to include a certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner filed an amended complaint but was again dismissed for the same inadvertence. Hence, Basmayor filed an Appeal Memorandum with the CSC Chairman, CSC Central Office.

On July 18, 2001, Basmayor filed a separate petition before the CSCRO seeking her reinstatement, which was dismissed in an Order, for lack of primary jurisdiction. Based on an earlier resolution by the Civil Service

Commission, the CSCRO held that the proper forum for her reinstatement was the grievance committee of the TESDA.

Basmayor appealed the Order to the CSC Central Office, which dismissed her complaint against Atencio, and in the Order it dismissed her petition for reinstatement. The CSC Central Office held that the CSCRO No. XI should take cognizance of the petition for reinstatement because it was related to the administrative complaint against Atencio.

Basmayor filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order, assailing the CSC Resolution No. 021559. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright. - the Civil Service Commission should have been impleaded as a respondent in this case.

ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission should have been impleaded as a respondent in this case

RULING: Anent the question of whether or not the Civil Service Commission should be impleaded as respondent in this case, the correct procedure, as mandated by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, is not to implead the lower court or agency which rendered the assailed decision.26 Hence, we agree with the petitioner that it is not necessary to implead the Civil Service Commission as respondent in her petition.

WHEREFORE, as contended by petitioner, we rule that the Civil Service Commission need not be impleaded as respondent pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In any event, there being no other reversible error committed by the appellate court, the instant petition is PARTIALLY DENIED for lack of merit.

Annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions - Rule 47Islamic Da’Wah Council v. CA

FACTS:

Sps. Da Silva mortgaged a parcel of land to Petitioner. Sps. Unable to pay thus the Real Estate mortgaged was foreclosed. Subsequently, parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein Petitioner shall pay additional consideration and the Spouses will transfer title of the Lots to Petitioners. This was acknowledged by the Court and was fully executed upon order of

the court. TCT was now under Petitioners name. This foreclosure is the subject of this case.

A few months later, Araneta filed with the Register of Deeds an affidavit of adverse claim in connection with the foreclosure. Araneta seeks to recover possession of the lots transferred to the Petitioners by Sps. Silva. This was opposed by the filing of quieting of title by Petitioner.

The heirs of Araneta claim that the lots were only entrusted to Sps. Silva for some unknown reasons. That Parties have already decided to terminate this trust agreement by executing a Deed of Sale. the heirs of Araneta alleged that that the Da Silvas, with the connivance of the Council, executed a purported promissory note secured by a real estate mortgage the terms and conditions of which were made very onerous as to pave the way for the foreclosure of the property by virtue of a confession of judgment; and, the Council had always known of the Araneta's claim of ownership over the land. Due to this allegation Araneta filed for an annulment of judgment (in the foreclosure case) with TRO of the transfer of lots to the Petitioner by Sps. Da Silva. This TRO was opposed by Petitioners through an MR but MR denied. Later on the Council filed a Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss questioning the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to hear the petition for annulment of a judgment that had already been fully executed. The Council also invoked the additional grounds of lack of cause of action because the Aranetas are not valid claimants of the property; lack of legal capacity to sue because the Aranetas were not parties to the foreclosure case; litis pendentia because of the pendency of the quieting of title case between the same parties; and, abandonment, waiver and unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds.

CA - denied MR and MD of Petitioners

ISSUE: WON CA erred in hearing the petition for annulment of judgment since it is already fully executed

WON heirs of Araneta can institute an annulment proceeding over a case to which they were not parties/ WON they have a cause of action against the Council

HELD:

DISMISSED.

In Garchitorena u. Sotelo, the Court affirmed the trial court's annulment of the judgment on foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that ownership of the house and lot subject of the mortgage had passed from the mortgagee who foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the property at public auction to a person who bought the same and finally to another individual in whose name the Torrens certificate of title stood by the time the case reached this Tribunal.

In view of the foregoing the Court finds that the Court of Appeals neither acted without jurisdiction nor committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment as would warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari in this case

It is beyond dispute that it is only the Court of Appeals that can take cognizance of the annulment of judgment in Civil Case No. Q-43746(foreclosure)rendered by the Regional Trial Court

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 introduced a new provision conferring on the Court of Appeals exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts. Sec. 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 expressly provides that:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. -The Court of Appeals shall exercise: ... (2)Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts;

(2) Jurisprudence dictates that, “There can be no question as to the right of any persons adversely affected by a judgement to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and to have it declared a nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in the very matter of obtaining the judgment when such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the issues raised at the trial which resulted in such judgment. It is therefore clear from the foregoing that a person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby