EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

 

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection

of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of

action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.

The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would

amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the

executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by

providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has

actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

 

 

 

Separate Opinions

 

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

 

 

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of

this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

[G.R. No. 144934. January 15, 2004]

ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA, petitioners, vs. FIDELA DEL ROSARIO (deceased and substituted by her co-respondents), and her children, OSCAR, ROSITA, VIOLETA, ENRIQUE JR., CARLOS, JUANITO and ELOISA, all surnamed DEL ROSARIO,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals decision[1], dated November 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60552, which affirmed the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 151-M-93. The RTC granted respondents complaint for nullity of contract of sale and annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in favor of petitioners.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Respondents Fidela (now deceased), Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Carlos, Juanito and Eloisa, all surnamed Del Rosario, were the registered owners of Lot No. 1083-C, a parcel of land situated at Lolomboy, Bulacan. This lot spanned an area of 15,029 square meters and was covered by TCT No. T-50.668 (M) registered in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.

On May 16, 1983, Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Juanito, and Eloisa, executed a Special Power of Attorney[3] in favor of their mother and co-respondent, Fidela, authorizing her to sell, lease, mortgage, transfer and convey their rights over Lot No. 1083-C.[4] Subsequently, Fidela borrowed P250,000 from Mariano Rivera in the early part of 1987. To secure the loan, she and Mariano Rivera agreed to execute a deed of real estate mortgage and an agreement to sell the land. Consequently, on March 9, 1987, Mariano went to his lawyer, Atty. Efren Barangan, to have three documents drafted: the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage[5], a Kasunduan (Agreement to Sell)[6], and a Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]

The Kasunduan provided that the children of Mariano Rivera, herein petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, would purchase Lot No. 1083-C for a consideration of P2,141,622.50. This purchase price was to be paid in three installments: P250,000 upon the signing of the Kasunduan, P750,000 on August 31, 1987, and P1,141,622.50 on December 31, 1987.[8] It also provided that the Deed of Absolute Sale would be executed only after the second installment is paid and a postdated check for the last installment is deposited with Fidela.[9] As previously stated, however, Mariano had already caused the drafting of the Deed of Absolute Sale. But unlike the Kasunduan, the said deed stipulated a purchase price of only P601,160, and covered a certain Lot No. 1083-A in addition to Lot No. 1083-C.[10] This deed, as well as the Kasunduan and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage[11], was signed by Marianos children, petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, as buyers and mortgagees, on March 9, 1987.[12]

The following day, Mariano Rivera returned to the office of Atty. Barangan, bringing with him the signed documents. He also brought with him Fidela and her son Oscar del Rosario, so that the latter two may sign the mortgage and the Kasunduan there.

Although Fidela intended to sign only the Kasunduan and the Real Estate Mortgage, she inadvertently affixed her signature on all the three documents in the office of Atty. Barangan on the said day, March 10, 1987. Mariano then gave Fidela the amount of P250,000. On October 30, 1987, he also gave Fidela a check for P200,000. In the ensuing months, also, Mariano gave Oscar del Rosario several amounts totaling P67,800 upon the latters demand for the payment of the balance despite Oscars lack of authority to receive payments under theKasunduan.[13] While Mariano was making payments to Oscar, Fidela entrusted the owners copy of

TCT No. T-50.668 (M) to Mariano to guarantee compliance with the Kasunduan.

When Mariano unreasonably refused to return the TCT,[14] one of the respondents, Carlos del Rosario, caused the annotation on TCT No. T-50.668 (M) of an Affidavit of Loss of the owners duplicate copy of the title on September 7, 1992. This annotation was offset, however, when Mariano registered the Deed of Absolute Sale on October 13, 1992, and afterwards caused the annotation of an Affidavit of Recovery of Title on October 14, 1992. Thus, TCT No. T-50.668 (M) was cancelled, and in its place was issued TCT No. 158443 (M) in the name of petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose Rivera.[15]

Meanwhile, the Riveras, representing themselves to be the new owners of Lot No. 1083-C, were also negotiating with the tenant, Feliciano Nieto, to rid the land of the latters tenurial right. When Nieto refused to relinquish his tenurial right over 9,000 sq. m. of the land, the Riveras offered to give 4,500 sq. m. in exchange for the surrender. Nieto could not resist and he accepted. Subdivision Plan No. Psd-031404-052505 was then made on August 12, 1992. Later, it was inscribed on TCT No. 158443 (M), and Lot No. 1083-C was divided into Lots 1083 C-1 and 1083 C-2.[16]

To document their agreement with Feliciano Nieto, the Riveras executed a Kasulatan sa Pagtatakwil ng Karapatan sa Pagmamay-ari ng Bahagi ng Isang Lagay na Lupa (Written Abdication of Rights over a Portion of a Parcel of Land)[17] on November 16, 1992. Four days later, they registered the document with the Registry of Deeds. Two titles were then issued: TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the name of Nieto, for 4,500 sq. m. of land, and TCT No. T-161785 (M) in the name of petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose Rivera, over the remaining 10,529 sq. m. of land.[18]

On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint[19] in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, asking that the Kasunduan be rescinded for failure of the Riveras to comply with its conditions, with damages. They also sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of fraud, the cancellation of TCT No. T-161784 (M) and TCT No. T-161785 (M), and the reconveyance to them of the entire property with TCT No. T-50.668 (M) restored.[20]

Respondents claimed that Fidela never intended to enter into a deed of sale at the time of its execution and that she signed the said deed on the mistaken belief that she was merely signing copies of the Kasunduan. According to respondents, the position where Fidelas name was typed and where she was supposed to sign her name in the Kasunduan was roughly in the same location where it was typed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. They argued that given Fidelas advanced age (she was then around 72 at the time)[21] and the fact that the documents were stacked one on top of the other at the time of signing, Fidela could have easily and mistakenly presumed that she was merely signing additional copies of the Kasunduan.[22] They also alleged that petitioners acquired possession of the TCT through fraud and machination.

In their defense, petitioners denied the allegations and averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale was validly entered into by both parties. According to petitioners, Fidela del Rosario mortgaged Lot No. 1083-C to their predecessor in interest, Mariano Rivera, on March 9, 1987. But on the following day Fidela decided to sell the lot to petitioners for P2,161,622.50. When Mariano agreed (on the condition that Lot No. 1083-C will be delivered free from all liens and encumbrances), the Kasunduan was consequently drawn up and signed. After that, however, Fidela informed Mariano of the existence of Feliciano Nietos tenancy right over the lot to the extent of 9,000 sq. m. When Mariano continued to want the land, albeit on a much lower price of only P601,160, as he had still to deal with Feliciano Nieto, the parties drafted the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to supersede the Kasunduan.

Petitioners likewise argued that respondents cause of action had been barred by laches or estoppel since more than four years has lapsed from the time the parties executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to the time respondents instituted their complaint on February 18, 1993.

Petitioners also filed a counterclaim asking for moral and exemplary damages and the payment of attorneys fees and costs of suit.

After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1987 as null and void;

2. Annulling TCT No. T-158443 (M) and TCT No. T-161785 (M) both in the names of Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, all surnamed Rivera;

3. Declaring the plaintiffs to be the legitimate owners of the land covered by TCT No. T-161785 (M) and ordering defendant Adelfa, Cynthia, and Jose, all surnamed Rivera, to reconvey the same to the plaintiffs;

4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel TCT No. T-161785 (M) and to issue in its place a new certificate of title in the name of the plaintiffs as their names appear in TCT No. T-50.668;

5. Declaring TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the name of Feliciano Nieto as valid;

6. Ordering the defendant Riveras to pay the plaintiffs solidarily the following amounts:

a) P191,246.98 as balance for the 4,500 square-meter portion given to defendant Feliciano Nieto

b) P200,000.00 as moral damages

c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages

d) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees

e) costs of the suit.

7. Dismissing the counterclaim of the defendant Riveras;

8. Dismissing the counterclaim and the crossclaim of defendant Feliciano Nieto.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The trial court ruled that Fidelas signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was genuine, but found that Fidela never intended to sign the said deed. Noting the peculiar differences between the Kasunduan and the Deed of Absolute Sale, the trial court concluded that the Riveras were guilty of fraud in securing the execution of the deed and its registration in the Registry of Deeds.[24] This notwithstanding, the trial court sustained the validity of TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the name of Feliciano Nieto since there was no fraud proven on Nietos part. The trial court found him to have relied in good faith on the representations of ownership of Mariano Rivera. Thus, Nietos rights, according to the trial court, were akin to those of an innocent purchaser for value.[25]

On the foregoing, the trial court rescinded the Kasunduan but ruled that the P450,000 paid by petitioners be retained by respondents as payment for the 4,500 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 1083-C that petitioners gave to Nieto.[26] The trial court likewise ordered petitioners to pay P191,246.98 as balance for the price of the land given to Nieto, P200,000 as moral damages,P50,000 as exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.[27]

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial courts judgment was modified as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1987 is declared null and void only insofar as Lot No. 1083-C is concerned, but valid insofar as it conveyed Lot No. 1083-A, that TCT No. 158443 (M) is valid insofar as Lot No. 1083-A is concerned and should not be annulled, and increasing the amount to be paid by the defendants-appellants to the plaintiffs-appellees for

the 4,500 square meters of land given to Feliciano Nieto to P323,617.50.

Costs against the defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.[28]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

While this petition was pending, respondent Fidela del Rosario died. She was substituted by her children, herein respondents.

In this petition, petitioners rely on the following grounds:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS, GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING LOT 1083-A IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS AND FELICIANO NIETO WHICH IS ADMITTEDLY A PART AND PORTION OF THE EXISTING NORTH LUZON EXPRESSWAY AND AS SUCH ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

II

RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PAY THE CORRECT DOCKET, FILING AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES WITH THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT OF THE COURT A QUO (RTC, MALOLOS, BULACAN) AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT IN 1993 PURSUANT TO THE SIOL[29] DOCTRINE.

III

[THE] TRIAL COURT AWARDED RELIEFS NOT SPECIFICALLY PRAYED FOR IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT REQUIRING THE PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET, FILING AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES.

IV

THE COURT A QUO HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVER THE RES CONSIDERING THAT FELICIANO NIETO IS AN AGRICULTURAL TENANT OF THE RICELAND IN QUESTION.

V

RESPONDENTS[] MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION [IS] FOR RESCISSION OF CONTRACT WHICH IS SUBSIDIARY IN NATURE[,] AND ANNULMENT OF SALE[,] BOTH OF WHICH HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLES 1389 AND 1391 OF THE CIVIL CODE.[30]

Petitioners assignment of errors may be reduced into three issues: (1) Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case, despite an alleged deficiency in the amount of filing fees paid by respondents and despite the fact that an agricultural tenant is involved in the case? (2) Did the Court of Appeals correctly rule that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid insofar as Lot 1083-A is concerned? (3) Is the respondents cause of action barred by prescription?

On the first issue, petitioners contend that jurisdiction was not validly acquired because the filing fees respondents paid was only P1,554.45 when the relief sought was reconveyance of land that was worth P2,141,622.50 under the Kasunduan. They contend that respondents should have paid filing fees amounting to P12,183.70. In support of their argument, petitioners invoke the doctrine in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion[31] and attach a certification[32] from the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City.

Respondents counter that it is beyond dispute that they paid the correct amount of docket fees when they filed the complaint. If the assessment was inadequate, they could not be faulted because the clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment, respondents argue. Respondents also add that since petitioners failed to contest the alleged underpayment of docket fees in the lower court, they cannot raise the same on appeal.[33]

We rule in favor of respondents. Jurisdiction was validly acquired over the complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[34] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment.The party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost.

Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, where they filed the complaint. If petitioners believed that the assessment was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court. Instead, petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees through this petition, attempting to support their position with the opinion and certification of the Clerk of Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such certification has no bearing on the instant case.

Petitioners also contend that the trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case because it involves an agricultural tenant. They insist that by virtue of Presidential Decree Nos. 316 and 1038,[35] it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) that has jurisdiction.[36]

Petitioners contention lacks merit. The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.[37] However, the cause of action in this case is primarily against the petitioners, as indispensable parties, for rescission of the Kasunduan and nullification of the Deed of Sale and the TCTs issued because of them. Feliciano Nieto was impleaded merely as a necessary party, stemming from whatever rights he may have acquired by virtue of the agreement between him and the Riveras and the corresponding TCT issued. Hence, it is the regular judicial courts that have jurisdiction over the case.

On the second issue, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the Deed of Absolute Sale is void only insofar as it covers Lot No. 1083-C, we find that the said deed is void in its entirety. Noteworthy is that during the oral arguments before the Court of Appeals, both petitioners and respondents admitted that Lot No. 1083-A had been expropriated by the government long before the Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into.[38] Whats more, this case involves only Lot No. 1083-C. It never involved Lot 1083-A. Thus, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on Lot 1083-A, as it was never touched upon in the pleadings or made the subject of evidence at trial.[39]

As to the third issue, petitioners cite Articles 1383,[40] 1389[41] and 1391[42] of the New Civil Code. They submit that the complaint for rescission of the Kasunduan should have been dismissed, for respondents failure to prove that there was no other legal means available to obtain reparation other than to file a case for rescission, as required by Article 1383. Moreover, petitioners contend that even assuming respondents had satisfied this requirement, prescription had already set in, the complaint having been filed in 1992 or five years after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in March 10, 1987.

Respondents counter that Article 1383 of the New Civil Code applies only to rescissible contracts enumerated under Article 1381 of the same Code, while the cause of action in this case is for rescission of a reciprocal obligation, to which Article 1191[43] of the Code applies. They assert that their cause of action had not prescribed because the four-year prescriptive period is counted from the date of discovery of the fraud, which, in this case, was only in 1992.

Rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code should be distinguished from rescission of contracts under Article 1383 of the same Code. Both presuppose contracts

validly entered into as well as subsisting, and both require mutual restitution when proper, nevertheless they are not entirely identical.[44]

In countless times there has been confusion between rescission under Articles 1381 and 1191 of the Civil Code. Through this case we again emphasize that rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 is different from rescissible contracts under Chapter 6 of the law on contracts under the Civil Code.[45] While Article 1191 uses the term rescission, the original term used in Article 1124 of the old Civil Code, from which Article 1191 was based, was resolution.[46] Resolution is a principal action that is based on breach of a party, while rescission under Article 1383 is a subsidiary action limited to cases of rescission for lesion under Article 1381 of the New Civil Code,[47] which expressly enumerates the following rescissible contracts:

ART. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:

(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;

(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated in the preceding number;

(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them;

(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority;

(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.

Obviously, the Kasunduan does not fall under any of those situations mentioned in Article 1381. Consequently, Article 1383 is inapplicable. Hence, we rule in favor of the respondents.

May the contract entered into between the parties, however, be rescinded based on Article 1191?

A careful reading of the Kasunduan reveals that it is in the nature of a contract to sell, as distinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; while in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. [48] In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition,[49] the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.[50]

Respondents in this case bound themselves to deliver a deed of absolute sale and clean title covering Lot No. 1083-C after petitioners have made the second installment. This promise to sell was subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive condition that petitioners pay P750,000 on August 31, 1987, and deposit a postdated check for the third installment of P1,141,622.50.[51] Petitioners, however, failed to complete payment of the second installment. The non-fulfillment of the condition rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. It must be stressed that the breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligors failure to comply with an obligation already extant, not a failure of a condition to render binding that obligation.[52] Failure to pay, in this instance, is not even a breach but an event that prevents the vendors obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force.[53] Hence, the agreement of the parties in the instant case may be set aside, but not because of a breach on the part of petitioners for failure to complete payment of the second installment. Rather, their failure to do so prevented the obligation of respondents to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.[54]

Coming now to the matter of prescription. Contrary to petitioners assertion, we find that prescription has not yet set

in. Article 1391 states that the action for annulment of void contracts shall be brought within four years. This period shall begin from the time the fraud or mistake is discovered. Here, the fraud was discovered in 1992 and the complaint filed in 1993. Thus, the case is well within the prescriptive period.

On the matter of damages, the Court of Appeals awarded respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages for the loss of the land that was given to Nieto, P200,000 as moral damages,P50,000 as exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorneys fees and the costs of suit. Modifications are in order, however.

Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully causes injury to property, or in cases of breach of contract where the other party acts fraudulently or in bad faith. [55]Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,[56] when the party to a contract acts in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.[57]Attorneys fees are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.[58]

While it has been sufficiently proven that the respondents are entitled to damages, the actual amounts awarded by the lower court must be reduced because damages are not intended for a litigants enrichment, at the expense of the petitioners.[59] The purpose for the award of damages other than actual damages would be served, in this case, by reducing the amounts awarded.

Respondents were amply compensated through the award of actual damages, which should be sustained. The other damages awarded total P300,000, or almost equivalent to the amount of actual damages. Practically this will double the amount of actual damages awarded to respondents. To avoid breaching the doctrine on enrichment, award for damages other than actual should be reduced. Thus, the amount of moral damages should be set at only P30,000, and the award of exemplary damages at only P20,000. The award of attorneys fees should also be reduced to P20,000, which under the circumstances of this case appears justified and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The Deed of Absolute Sale in question is declared NULL and VOID in its entirety. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162109. January 21, 2005]

LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (L.S. VENTURES, INC., ALREADY MERGED WITH LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.), petitioner, vs. MAXIMO ESTITA ET AL and/or MEMBERS OF THE DAVAO DEL SUR FARMERS ASSOCIATION (DASURFA), respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

In this verified petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation assails and seeks the annulment of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71230, to wit:

1. Decision dated September 3, 2003,[1] declaring as valid an earlier decision dated January 17, 2001 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 8117, which, in turn, affirmed with modification the resolution dated October 20, 1997 of the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur in a land dispute involving the vast agricultural land of the late Orval Hughes at Malalag, Davao del Sur; and

2. Resolution dated January 19, 2004,[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

We lift from the decision under review and reproduce hereunder the factual backdrop of the case, thus:

The instant petition involves a vast tract of an agricultural land with an area of 716 hectares located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. On July 28, 1924, this land was leased by the Government to Orval Hughes for a period of twenty-five (25) years under Lease Application No. 815 (E-172). The lease actually expired on May 25, 1952, it having been extended for three (3) years. Orval Hughes died and was survived by his five (5) heirs who then filed their Sales Application Nos. V-11538, V-12992, V-13837, V-14586 and V- 15003 with the Bureau of Lands. Teodulo Tocao, et al., filed a protest against the sales application.

On August 20, 1957, the Office of the President gave due course to the applications to cover only 317 hectares at 63 hectares per heir as per OCT No. P-4712 but awarded 399 hectares to 133 protesters [led by Teodulo Tocao] at three (3) hectares each.

On September 17, 1981, the Ministry of Natural Resources issued an Order implementing said decision (Annex N, Rollo, pp. 160-164). However, the 133 petitioners listed in the said Order were not in possession of the land allotted to them. So, they formed the Malalag Land Petitioners Association, Inc. (The Association) headed by one Cecilio R. Mangubat Sr.

On the other hand, those in possession of the land sought the assistance of the Malalag Ventures Plantation Inc., in its development into a viable banana production project to which the corporation acceded.

Meanwhile, on November 12, 1987, the Supreme Court in Minister of Natural Resources vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, 155 SCRA 566, sustained the OP decision and it became final and executory.

On December 12, 1991, the association, through its president Mr. Mangubat, sent a letter to the management of Lapanday Group of Companies, Inc. manifesting that they were no longer interested in the government grant under the Order of the Ministry of Natural

Resources and offered to transfer and waive whatever interest they have over the subject land for a monetary consideration (Annex O, Rollo, p. 165).

Mr. Mangubat was the first to relinquish his right for P54,000.00 (Annex P, Rollo, p. 166). The individual respondents allegedly followed suit. He facilitated the relinquishment in the Office of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) (Annex Q, Rollo, pp. 167-169).

It therefore came as a surprise when, on January 17, 1995, the individual respondents filed [against Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., the Heirs of Orval Hughes, the DENR/COSLAP and Cecilio Mangubat, Sr.] the following cases: forcible entry, reinstatement, nullification of affidavits of quitclaims, relinquishment, waiver and any other documents on disposition of lands before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Digos, Davao, del Sur. They alleged that since 1947, they had been the share tenants-tillers, openly and continuously, of the late Orval Hughes and his heirs and they remained as such on the 317 hectares land (Annexes A & B, Rollo, pp. 40-72).

They further averred that on February 11, 1991, petitioner-corporation, Hughes heirs and Cecilio Mangubat Sr., conspiring together, misled them to receive P54,000.00 each as rentals on their respective landholdings and deceived to sign receipts in English which turned out to be affidavits of quitclaims in favor of the petitioner (Annex E, PARAD Decision dated July 9, 1997, p. 3; Rollo, p. 111).

Petitioner [Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation] opposed said actions for being factually and legally baseless, there being no entity by the name of Lapanday and L.S. Ventures Inc. which has agricultural operation in Davao del Sur. The fact is that said company had already merged with Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (Annexes C & M, Rollo, pp. 73-79 & 159, respectively).

In a decision dated July 9, 1997,[3] the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur, Mardonio L. Edica, rendered judgment in favor of the Malalag Ventures Plantation, Inc. and declared the entire 716-hectare property as covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program or CARP. More specifically, the decision dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is hereby rendered declaring that the entire 716 hectares shall be covered by CARP. The portion planted to bananas by the Malalag Plantation Ventures shall be governed by Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 in favor of Malalag Land Petitioner Association. The Operation Division of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office shall implement this decision in accordance with existing guidelines, rules and regulations.

The heirs of Orval Hughes are hereby ordered to reinstate the Malalag Land Petitioners Association. Leasehold tenancy shall be observed collectively, pending recommendation by the PARO Operations Division, without prejudice to the outcome of the cases still pending with the administrative agencies and the regular courts.

SO ORDERED.

Upon motion for reconsideration, Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Mardonio L. Edica, in a Resolution dated October 20, 1997,[4] modified his aforequoted decision of July 9, 1997 by specifically directing Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc. to turn over the area involved for CARP coverage, and ordering the Hughes heirs to reinstate the members of the Davao del Sur Farmers Association (DASUFRA) as leasehold tenants of the subject land. We quote the dispositive portion of the same Resolution:

WHEREFORE, the decision of 9 July 1997 is hereby modified to read:

Declaring that the entire 716 hectares shall be covered by CARP. The portion planted to bananas by the Malalag Plantation Ventures, Inc. shall be governed by Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No.

6657 in favor of qualified members of the Malalag Land Petitioners Association (MLPA), and the remaining portion shall be allotted to all deserving and listed members of the Davao del Sur Farmers Association (DASUFRA). The LAPANDAY, L.S. Ventures and/or the Malalag Plantation Ventures, Inc. is hereby mandated to turn over the area involved for CARP coverage. The Operations division of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao del Sur is likewise mandated to implement this resolution in accordance with existing guidelines, rules and regulations.

The heirs of Orval Hughes are hereby ordered to reinstate the members of the DASUFRA. Leasehold tenancy shall be observed collectively pending documentation of the area by the PARO Operations Division regardless of the outcome of the cases still pending with the administrative agencies and the regular courts.

The local National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of the component units are hereby directed to assist the DAR in the enforcement and/or implementation of this resolution xxx.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

From the aforequoted resolution of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., went on appeal to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), at Quezon City where the appeal was docketed as DARAB Case No. 8117.

In a decision dated January 17, 2001,[5] the DARAB, ruling that the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to declare the entire 716-hectare landholding as covered by the CARP and that the only issue within his competence is to find out whether sufficient grounds exist to warrant respondents dispossession from the 317-hectare portion thereof which was earlier awarded to the heirs of Orval Hughes, modified the appealed resolution of Provincial Adjudicator Edica, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Resolution of October 20, 1997, is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

1. Ordering respondents heirs of Orval Hughes to vacate the premises of the 133 (sic, should be 399) hectares which were long ago awarded to 133 awardees who were identified in the Order of Natural Resources Minister dated September 17, 1981, and turn over the peaceful possession thereof to the said 133 awardees or their heirs;

2. Ordering respondents Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures and Hughes heirs to restore petitioners Maximo Estita, et al., to their respective farmlots within the 317 hectares owned by the Hughes Heirs; and

3. Declaring the nullity of the quitclaims allegedly executed by petitioners.

The matter of placing the 317 hectares under CARP shall be pursued in the proper forum which is the Office of the Honorable DAR Secretary.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

With their motion for reconsideration of the same decision having been denied by DARAB in its Resolution of March 15, 2002, Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., this time under the name Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation (the herein petitioner), elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71230.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated September 3, 2003,[6] denied petitioners recourse thereto for being merely dilatory and accordingly upheld the validity of the aforementioned DARAB decision of 17 January 2001 and resolution of 15 March 2002, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in consonance with the Supreme Courts directive not to further delay the implementation of the August 20, 1957 Decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for being dilatory. The assailed Decision of the DARAB dated 17 January 2001 and Resolution dated 15 March 2002 are declared VALID.

Petitioner and its counsel are warned not to further resort to measures of this nature, otherwise, they shall be dealt with severely for having abused the processes of the courts.

The individual respondents who received the amount of P54,000.00 are ordered to return the same to the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

In time, petitioner moved for a reconsideration, which motion was denied by the same court in the herein equally assailed Resolution dated January 19, 2004[7] for being merely pro forma.

Hence, this recourse by petitioner Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation on its basic submission that the Department of Agrarian Reform thru its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, the DARAB and the Court of Appeals all erred (1) in assuming jurisdiction over an issue covering a public land; and (2) in rendering judgment against it even as it is not a real party-in-interest in the case.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Before going any further, however, we shall first address respondents concern as to what remedy petitioner has resorted to in coming to this Court: whether by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, wherein only questions of law may be raised, albeit jurisprudence extends this remedy even to questions of fact in exceptional cases,[8] or by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, whereunder the main inquiry is whether there is grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.

While the petition raises jurisdictional issue, it is apparent from our reading thereof that the same is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. For one, the very recourse itself is captioned as a petition for review on certiorari. For another, even as petitioner came to this Court from a final decision of the Court of Appeals, the latter is not impleaded as a nominal party-respondent in the petition thus filed, as in fact the ones impleaded as respondents in the caption thereof are only the very same original parties to the case while still in the offices a quo.

We shall then deal with the petition as one filed under Rule 45 and treat the alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the DARAB and the Court of Appeals as allegation of reversible error.

Petitioner first contends that the subject landholding is still part of the public domain, hence, still under the jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and, therefore, beyond the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

There can be no debate at all that under the Public Land Act, the management and disposition of public lands is under the primary control of the Director of Lands (now the Director of the Lands Management Bureau or LMB) subject to review by the DENR Secretary[9]

The hard reality in this case, however, is that the land in question has ceased to be public, as in fact it is already titled. As found by both the DARAB and the Court of Appeals, the 317-hectare land awarded to the Hughes Heirs is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4712, the existence of which was never refuted by the petitioner. Specifically, the DARAB decision of January 17, 2001,[10] partly states:

On August 20, 1957 the Office of the President gave due course to applications to cover only 317 hectares at 63 hectares each heir as per OCT No. P-4712 but awarding 399 hectares to 133 awardees at three (3) hectares each (Emphasis supplied),

a finding reechoed on page 3 of the CA decision of September 3, 2003.[11]

With the above, and bearing in mind that the CARP covers, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all public and private agricultural lands,[12] with the DAR vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate, through its adjudication boards, agrarian reform matters, and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program,[13] we rule and so hold, contrary to petitioners assertion, that the DAR, thru its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator at Digos, Davao del Sur correctly took cognizance of the case in the first instance.

Petitioner next argues that the DARAB decision, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, ordering Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures Inc. to restore [respondents] Maximo Estita et al. to their respective farm lots within the 317 hectares owned by the Hughes Heirs, has no valid force and effect against petitioner because it is not a real party-in-interest, pointing out that Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., are separate and distinct from petitioners corporate personality. Petitioner asserts that Lapanday has no juridical personality, while the corporate life of L.S. Ventures Inc. has ceased when said entity merged with petitioner in 1996. Moreover, petitioner points out that it has no business operations in Davao del Sur where the land in question lies.

We are not persuaded.

To begin with, it is basic in the law of procedure that misjoinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as are just[14]

Then, too, there is the rule that objections to defects in parties should be made at the earliest opportunity, that is, at the moment such defect becomes apparent, by a motion to strike the names of the parties wrongly impleaded. For, objections to misjoinder cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[15]

Here, aside from unsubstantiated denials that it is not the party referred to in the complaint for forcible entry, etc., commenced by the respondents before the office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur, petitioner did not even file a motion to strike its name in all the proceedings below. Quite the contrary, and as correctly found by the Court of Appeals in the decision under review, petitioner corporation -

x x x filed an Answer (Annex D, Rollo, pp.91-96) thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the Board. The same answer bears the name LAPANDAY AND/OR L.S. VENTURES, INC., signed by its representative Caesar E. Barcenas and assisted by its counsel Jose V. Yap (Ibid, Rollo, p. 96). This alone negates the petitioners stance that there is no entity by the name of Lapanday and that L.S. Ventures, Inc. is seperate and distinct from any company (see Annex M Rollo, p. 159 on Merger of Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation and L.S. Ventures, Inc.). And such admission made by the petitioner in the course of the proceedings in this case, does not require proof (Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence).

Petitioners filing of an Answer has thereby cured whatever jurisdictional defect it now raises. As we have said time and again, the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court or a quasi judicial body, is tantamount to a recognition of that courts or bodys jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the courts or bodys jurisdiction.[16]

But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Lapanday does not have a juridical personality, it may nonetheless be sued under such a name considering that respondents commonly know petitioner by the name Lapanday Group of Companies, as shown in their alleged letter of intent to relinquish their rights over the subject land.[17] This brings to mind Section 15, Rule 3, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:

SEC. 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. - When two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known (Emphasis added).

Aware of the hopelessness of its cause, petitioner invariably posits that the herein respondents are not real parties-in-interest and are bereft of any legal personality to file and initiate the complaint for forcible entry, etc. before the office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur because they are not tenant-tillers of the land in dispute. Consequently, so petitioner argues, respondents are not entitled to be restored thereto.

Petitioners posture cannot hold water.

Both the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator and the DARAB affirmed and confirmed the tenancy status of the respondents. We see no reason why the Court of Appeals should not rely on such a finding in upholding the respondents right to be restored to their respective farmlots as leasehold tenants thereof.

For sure, the evidence adduced by the respondents clearly indicate that they were tenant-tillers of the 317-hectare land owned by the heirs of Orval Hughes. Indeed, documents[18]showing that the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Orval Hughes had filed cases in court against the respondents for their failure to deliver the Estates share in the harvests, are unmistakable proofs that a tenurial arrangement exists regarding the agricultural produce of the land.

Besides, the heirs of Orval Hughes as former landlords of the respondents, never denied the tenancy status of the latter, as in fact they did not even bother to answer respondents complaint for forcible entry, etc., before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator.

In any event, it need not be stressed that the question regarding the respondents tenancy status is factual in nature, which is not proper in a petition for review. [19] More so must this be where, as here, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, the DARAB and the Court of Appeals were one in upholding the tenancy status of the respondents.

Moreover, it is axiomatic that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts[20] In Corpuz vs. Sps. Grospe,[21] we categorically held:

As a rule, if the factual findings of the CA coincide with those of the DARAB an administrative body which has acquired expertise on the matter such findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal

As tenant-tillers of the 317-hectare land owned by the heirs of Orval Hughes, respondents are undeniably parties-in-interest to this controversy. As such, they have the legal personality to institute the action in the office a quo, namely, the office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator at Digos, Davao del Sur.

But then, there is petitioners contention that respondents interests over the subject land have already been waived when quitclaims to that effect were allegedly executed and signed by them.

The submission is equally puerile.

Waivers of rights and/or interests over landholdings awarded by the government are invalid for being violative of the agrarian reform laws. To quote from our decision in Torres vs. Ventura,[22] as reiterated in Corpuz vs. Sps. Grospe: [23]

x x x As such [the farmer-beneficiaries] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the government to him and no other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1429. October 4, 2002]

FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL, complainant, vs. Judge EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Alcala, Pangasinan, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Municipal trial court judges ought to be familiar with the Rules on Summary Procedure governing ejectment cases. Failure to observe them constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Statement of the Case

The sworn Administrative Complaint,1 filed by Francisca P. Pascual, charged Judge Eduardo U. Jovellanos of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Alcala, Pangasinan with gross ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, abuse of discretion and neglect of duty.2

The Antecedents

The facts in the present case are summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its January 28, 2002 Memorandum3 addressed to this Court as follows:

Complainant x x x alleges that she filed a complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. 730 against a certain Lorenzo L. Manaois. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice for being insufficient in some material allegations (Order dated 13 October 1999). On 15 November 1999, she filed a corrected complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. 740.

Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out arguing that the new allegations in the complaint are false. After the period to answer lapsed and no answer was submitted, complainant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated 15 December 1999. Defendant opposed the motion.

On 30 May 2000, defendants motion to strike out was granted by respondent Judge. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order.

Based on the foregoing, complainant accuse[d] respondent Judge of Neglect of Duty anchored on the following grounds:

a. Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to Strike Out. Inspite thereof, respondent Judge granted the motion 120 days after its filing, thus defeating the summary nature of the case;

b. The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any findings of fact because no hearing was conducted relative thereon;

c. Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the defendant in his Order granting the motion to strike out when he pointed out x x x that the complaint in this case is virtually a rehash

of the complaint in Civil Case No. 730 x x x. Complainant asserts that the same is to be expected because the defects or insufficiency in the first complaint were just being rectified in the later one;

d. Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present, unacted upon.

Meanwhile, defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the proceedings, started the construction of a one-storey building on the subject land. To protect her interest, complainant filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction dated 8 May 2000. Acting thereon, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated 9 May 2000 and set the hearing on the Injunction. On said date, complainant was able to present evidence in support of her application while defendant chose not to present controverting evidence and to just submit a memorandum.

On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO (29 May 2000), complainant filed an Extremely Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to grant her application for injunction. On 7 June 2000 defendant filed his memorandum. However, until the present, respondent Judge has not ruled on her application on preliminary injunction.

Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with the construction of the building and even started with a new one. Hence, a contempt charge was filed by herein complainant on 8 May 2000. Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt charge on the ground that it was filed in the same proceedings ([C]ivil [C]ase No. 740) and the filing fee was not paid. The court, however, motu propio docketed the complaint for contempt as Civil Case No. 744 while the required docket and other fees were paid by defendant on 31 May 2000. On same date, the court issued an Order furnishing anew the defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge. These, complainant claims, cured the defect cited by defendants/respondents in their motion to dismiss. However, respondent Judge still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to the prejudice of herein complainant.4

In his Comment5 dated September 30, 2000, respondent denied the allegations in the Complaint. He accused Atty. Alejandro V. Peregrino, complainants counsel in the forcible entry case, of having a penchant for filing administrative cases against him instead of appealing decisions before the proper court. Respondent added that none of the charges had any factual or legal bases. He insisted that his Decision in Civil Case No. 730 had been rendered with utmost good faith, honesty and sound discretion.6

The OCAs Recommendation

After investigation of this case, the OCA found that respondent failed to apply the Rule on Summary Procedure, which he ought to have been very conversant with, because it was a common procedure in municipal courts. Accordingly, it recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 and warned that the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.7

This Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the penalty, taking note that this is respondents second infraction.

Administrative Liability

Judges are the visible representations of law and justice.8 They ought to be embodiments of competence, integrity and independence.9 In particular, municipal judges are frontline officers in the administration of justice.10 It is therefore essential that they live up to the high standards demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct.11 To be able to render substantial justice and to maintain

public confidence in the legal system, they are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence.12 Judicial competence requires no less.13

Moreover, judges are bound to dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide cases within the required period.14 For it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Procrastination among members of the judiciary in rendering decisions and in acting upon cases before them not only causes great injustice to the parties involved, but also invites suspicion of ulterior motives on their part.15

It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law.16 The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated precisely to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. Failure to observe the period within which to render a judgment subjects the defaulting judge to administrative sanctions.17 For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for extension.18

In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of the relevant provisions on ejectment.19 He has evidently been remiss in resolving the forcible entry case, pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.20 Verily, judgment should have been rendered based on the allegations of the Complaint and the evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to file his answer after the lapse of ten (10) days from the service of the summons.21 Section 6 of the Rule allows the trial court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.22 Moreover, under Section 10 of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render his decision within thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing them.23 This notwithstanding, he has not yet ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment24 dated December 15, 1999, filed in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Furthermore, respondent failed to apply these very basic rules when he granted the defendants Motion to Strike Out which was in reality a motion to dismiss, a prohibited pleading.25 In his Order26 dated May 30, 2000, he ruled that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 740 was a mere rehash of the dismissed Complaint in Civil Case No. 730. He cited Section 1227 of Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure as basis for this ruling. In doing so, he committed an obvious mistake showing gross ignorance of the law. This is because the civil case assigned to him is for forcible entry, which is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.28 In fact, all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by this Rule.29

It must likewise be underscored that respondent dismissed Civil Case No. 730 without prejudice, on the theory that the date of the dispossession had not been initially indicated in the Complaint. Thus, it would reasonably be expected that the allegations in that civil case would be reiterated in Civil Case No. 740. Needless to state, what also contributed to the delay in the resolution of the main case was the grant of the Motion to Strike Out based on misplaced reasoning.30

Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure reflects a serious degree of incompetence.31 When the law is so elementary, as in this case, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.32 A member of the bench must be constantly abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments, bearing in mind that this learning process never ceases. It is indispensable to the correct dispensation of justice.33

Delay

Respondent claimed that if there was any delay on his part in resolving the incidents, it was not intentional but merely brought about by pressure from work.34

We are not convinced. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Canons on Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge should dispose of the courts business promptly and decide each case within the period prescribed therefor.35 We have held in numerous cases that failure to

decide within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.36

In the present case, the heavy caseload in respondents sala, though unfortunate, cannot excuse him from due observance of the rules. We reiterate that judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads that prevent them from deciding cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time from this Court. Indubitably, respondent has failed to do so.37 He ought to know that the speedy resolution of forcible entry cases is a matter of public policy. His inaction for almost three years on complainants Motion for Summary Judgment practically rendered nugatory the whole purpose of summary proceedings -- to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.38 By tarrying too long in deciding this forcible entry case, he failed to live up to the mandate of the Code of Judicial Conduct to maintain professional competence.39 Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties.40

In determining his administrative liability, we note that this is not the first infraction of respondent.41 In Espiritu v. Jovellanos,42 he was found guilty of gross misconduct for his partiality to one of the parties, for which he was fined P20,000.

Indeed, it seems that he has remained undeterred in disregarding the law and the Code which he has pledged to uphold.43 He appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings meted out to him.44 Since this is his second infraction, he deserves a sanction heavier than that recommended by the OCA.

WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is FINED in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000). He is further warned that a repetition of this or similar offenses will be dealt with even more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., abroad on official leave.