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15 14 © CITY SECURITY MAGAZINE – WINTER 2017 www.citysecuritymagazine.com © CITY SECURITY MAGAZINE – WINTER 2017 www.citysecuritymagazine.com T he heightened threat of terrorism is a pan-European problem and there is no question that our security co-operation with the EU will continue after Brexit. Giving evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee earlier this year, Europol’s British Director, Rob Wainwright, stressed that other EU nations were concerned to make sure “British expertise and leadership is not lost” because “the UK is a very important partner in the security field”. Wainwright estimated that 40 per cent of all Europol cases have some level of British involvement, and Europol data indicate that in 2015 British authorities initiated 2,500 cases for cross-border investigation and operational support with Europol. Currently only EU member states are entitled to full Europol membership. States outside the EU have negotiated ‘strategic agreements’ (limited to the exchange of general intelligence as well as strategic and technical information) and ‘operational agreements’ (which have been established with Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, for example) and allow for the exchange of information, including financial and personal data. The House of Lords European Union Committee stated in their December 2016 report that they found ‘considerable consensus’ among British law enforcement agencies that the following capabilities should be retained or adequately replaced: Europol, Eurojust, the Second Generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), the Prüm Decisions (providing for the automated exchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration data) and Passenger Name Records (PNR). This is unsurprising as the UK has been one of the leading contributors to the development of these measures. Wainwright has argued that any alternative police cooperation arrangement would only be ”partially as good” for the UK since we would become a “second-tier member… still useful but not, for example, having direct access to our database, not being able to lead any of our operational projects, not having the influence in our organisation that they do at the moment”. On the other hand, if the EU recognises that “the UK is a very important partner in the security field”, a mutually acceptable arrangement may be possible if it wishes to avoid reduced access to UK expertise and resources. In September, the Department for Exiting the European Union and the Home Office published a policy paper on Security, Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, which suggested that, “with threats evolving faster than ever before”, the UK and EU should “work together to design new, dynamic arrangements as part of the future partnership”, to a degree that “goes beyond the existing, often ad hoc arrangements for EU third-country relationships”. The fact that the UK’s commissioner, Sir Julian King, is the European Commissioner for the Security Union with oversight of the EU’s internal security arrangements will surely help both sides identify a mutually beneficial arrangement. In August he said on BBC Radio 5 live: “Europol has a series of relationships with countries that aren't in the European Union at the moment, the United States, for example. And those close relationships work very well.” The UK is a principal player in the international arena, with its wider contribution including active memberships of the United Nations, Interpol, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (as one of just a few member countries that contribute the agreed 2% of GDP), and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The UK is one of the G7 member countries that founded Financial Action Task Force, which is recognised as the international standard setting body in the field of anti- money laundering, providing a basis for international co-operation. We also maintain strong bilateral partnerships with EU and non- EU states, most recently announcing a strengthened defence and security relationship with Japan. As both parties come together to determine what our post-Brexit security cooperation arrangements will look like, it must be noted that there is currently no precedent for access by non-EU or non-Schengen countries to the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) or the Schengen Information System II (SIS II), respectively. Equally, however, there is no precedent for negotiations with a former member state that is such a significant contributor to European security arrangements, with its wider capabilities including the significant element of the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence alliance. This led the House of Lords European Union Committee to conclude in their December 2016 report that there was a strong case to support the government pursuing a wide- ranging bespoke arrangement. Countries’ national interests will continue to drive closer bilateral security relationships, and arguably there is room to bolster the capabilities of Interpol and other international mechanisms. Business-to-business security information-sharing will continue to cross national borders and may become a growing aspect of the bigger European business picture. In short, the increasing threat to European countries of international terrorism, cyber crime and organised crime and the need to collaborate means that it is in the interests of both the UK and the EU to pursue more, not less, security cooperation. Hopefully, this will ultimately drive both parties in the Brexit negotiations to set apart security from economic deliberations. But as practitioners, we should not rest on our laurels and merely hope for the best. In these uncertain and challenging times, security practitioners in the public and private sectors need also to be working to establish the best possible security networks and partnerships for mutual and societal benefit. FOOTNOTE: Alison Wakefield will take over as Chairman of the Security Institute in January 2018. Peter J French MBE CPP Fsyi Managing Director SSR Personnel T he UK security profession has a broad reliance on EU nationals. We now need to attract applicants, technically qualified to UK standards, from countries outside the EU. The UK economy has been super fuelled by giving opportunities to barista, hospitality staff and receptionists on zero hours contracts. This gig or sharing economy developed by Airbnb and the platform economy in the shape of Uber, Deliveroo and home cleaners, will continue in the UK. Such flexibility is possible in non-technical security service sector roles. On leaving the EU, companies will attract skilled people from a multiplicity of countries as long as the UK visa rules are clear and uncomplicated. We could attract more multi linguists,important for global business and for removing ourselves from the drug of creating mainly low-paid jobs. David Mundell Managing Director Axis Security T here has been much comment about us leaving the EU security “club” of Europol and the European Defence Agency. Such a move (if it transpired) would unilaterally weaken all parties (remaining EU members and the UK) in the ongoing fight against crime and terrorism and would serve no positive purpose – and this at a time when terrorist atrocities across the globe are on the increase. I would therefore like to think that any Brexit agreement would incorporate a sensible and pragmatic approach to security and that the communication and sharing of information would continue for the common good. There is still ongoing uncertainty over what Brexit will actually look like and this uncertainty breeds nervousness and fear both in individuals and business. From a private security perspective, the EU has been a driver for much of the regulation through the SIA since 2003 (for example TUPE) and we must ensure that post-Brexit, the private security industry does not go backwards towards a state of deregulation, but continues on its positive journey of raising standards and increased contribution to the wider security family in its fight against crime and terrorism. What are the implications for security of Brexit? How will we continue to work closely with our European colleagues and ensure security information continues to flow freely? > Dr Alison Wakefield FSyI Vice Chairman and Chairman Elect Security Institute and Stephen Massey MSyI Director of Member Services, Security Institute

City Security Mag 30 P/2 copy · member sta tes are entitled to full Europol membership. States outside the EU have negotiated ‘str ategic agreements’ (limited to the exchange

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1514 © C I T Y S ECUR I T Y MAGAZ I N E – W IN T E R 2 0 1 7 www. c i t y s e c u r i t ym a g a z i n e . c om© C I T Y S ECUR I T Y MAGAZ I N E – W IN T E R 2 0 1 7 www. c i t y s e c u r i t ym a g a z i n e . c om

The heightened threat of terrorism is apan-European problem and there is no

question that our security co-operationwith the EU will continue after Brexit.Giving evidence to the House ofCommons Home Affairs Committee earlierthis year, Europol’s British Director, RobWainwright, stressed that other EUnations were concerned to make sure“British expertise and leadership is notlost” because “the UK is a very importantpartner in the security field”.

Wainwright estimated that 40 per cent of allEuropol cases have some level of Britishinvolvement, and Europol data indicate that in2015 British authorities initiated 2,500 casesfor cross-border investigation and operationalsupport with Europol. Currently only EUmember states are entitled to full Europolmembership.

States outside the EU have negotiated‘strategic agreements’ (limited to theexchange of general intelligence as well asstrategic and technical information) and‘operational agreements’ (which have beenestablished with Norway, Switzerland andIceland, for example) and allow for theexchange of information, including financialand personal data.

The House of Lords European UnionCommittee stated in their December 2016report that they found ‘considerableconsensus’ among British law enforcementagencies that the following capabilities shouldbe retained or adequately replaced: Europol,

Eurojust, the Second Generation SchengenInformation System (SIS II), the EuropeanArrest Warrant (EAW), the European CriminalRecords Information System (ECRIS), the PrümDecisions (providing for the automatedexchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicleregistration data) and Passenger NameRecords (PNR). This is unsurprising as the UKhas been one of the leading contributors tothe development of these measures.

Wainwright has argued that any alternativepolice cooperation arrangement would onlybe ”partially as good” for the UK since wewould become a “second-tier member… stilluseful but not, for example, having directaccess to our database, not being able to leadany of our operational projects, not havingthe influence in our organisation that they doat the moment”. On the other hand, if the EUrecognises that “the UK is a very importantpartner in the security field”, a mutuallyacceptable arrangement may be possible if itwishes to avoid reduced access to UKexpertise and resources.

In September, the Department for Exiting theEuropean Union and the Home Officepublished a policy paper on Security, LawEnforcement and Criminal Justice, whichsuggested that, “with threats evolving fasterthan ever before”, the UK and EU should“work together to design new, dynamicarrangements as part of the futurepartnership”, to a degree that “goes beyondthe existing, often ad hoc arrangements forEU third-country relationships”.

The fact that the UK’s commissioner, Sir JulianKing, is the European Commissioner for theSecurity Union with oversight of the EU’sinternal security arrangements will surely helpboth sides identify a mutually beneficialarrangement. In August he said on BBC Radio5 live: “Europol has a series of relationshipswith countries that aren't in the EuropeanUnion at the moment, the United States, forexample. And those close relationships workvery well.”

The UK is a principal player in theinternational arena, with its widercontribution including active memberships ofthe United Nations, Interpol, the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (as one ofjust a few member countries that contributethe agreed 2% of GDP), and the Organisationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE).

The UK is one of the G7 member countriesthat founded Financial Action Task Force,which is recognised as the internationalstandard setting body in the field of anti-money laundering, providing a basis forinternational co-operation. We also maintainstrong bilateral partnerships with EU and non-EU states, most recently announcing astrengthened defence and securityrelationship with Japan.

As both parties come together to determinewhat our post-Brexit security cooperationarrangements will look like, it must be notedthat there is currently no precedent for accessby non-EU or non-Schengen countries to theEuropean Criminal Records InformationSystem (ECRIS) or the Schengen InformationSystem II (SIS II), respectively.

Equally, however, there is no precedent fornegotiations with a former member state thatis such a significant contributor to Europeansecurity arrangements, with its widercapabilities including the significant elementof the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence alliance. This ledthe House of Lords European UnionCommittee to conclude in their December2016 report that there was a strong case tosupport the government pursuing a wide-ranging bespoke arrangement.

Countries’ national interests will continue todrive closer bilateral security relationships, andarguably there is room to bolster thecapabilities of Interpol and other internationalmechanisms. Business-to-business securityinformation-sharing will continue to crossnational borders and may become a growingaspect of the bigger European businesspicture.

In short, the increasing threat to Europeancountries of international terrorism, cybercrime and organised crime and the need tocollaborate means that it is in the interests ofboth the UK and the EU to pursue more, notless, security cooperation. Hopefully, this willultimately drive both parties in the Brexitnegotiations to set apart security fromeconomic deliberations. But as practitioners,we should not rest on our laurels and merelyhope for the best.

In these uncertain and challenging times,security practitioners in the public and privatesectors need also to be working to establishthe best possible security networks andpartnerships for mutual and societal benefit.

FOOTNOTE: Alison Wakefield will take over as Chairmanof the Security Institute in January 2018.

Peter J French MBE CPP FsyiManaging DirectorSSR Personnel

The UK security professionhas a broad reliance on EU

nationals. We now need toattract applicants, technically qualified toUK standards, from countries outside theEU. The UK economy has been super fuelledby giving opportunities to barista,hospitality staff and receptionists on zerohours contracts.

This gig or sharing economy developed byAirbnb and the platform economy in theshape of Uber, Deliveroo and homecleaners, will continue in the UK. Suchflexibility is possible in non-technical securityservice sector roles.

On leaving the EU, companies will attractskilled people from a multiplicity ofcountries as long as the UK visa rules areclear and uncomplicated. We could attractmore multi linguists,important for globalbusiness and for removing ourselves fromthe drug of creating mainly low-paid jobs.

David MundellManaging DirectorAxis Security

There has been muchcomment about us leaving

the EU security “club” ofEuropol and the European Defence Agency.Such a move (if it transpired) wouldunilaterally weaken all parties (remaining EUmembers and the UK) in the ongoing fightagainst crime and terrorism and wouldserve no positive purpose – and this at atime when terrorist atrocities across theglobe are on the increase. I would thereforelike to think that any Brexit agreementwould incorporate a sensible and pragmaticapproach to security and that thecommunication and sharing of informationwould continue for the common good.

There is still ongoing uncertainty over whatBrexit will actually look like and thisuncertainty breeds nervousness and fearboth in individuals and business. From aprivate security perspective, the EU hasbeen a driver for much of the regulationthrough the SIA since 2003 (for exampleTUPE) and we must ensure that post-Brexit,the private security industry does not gobackwards towards a state of deregulation,but continues on its positive journey ofraising standards and increased contributionto the wider security family in its fightagainst crime and terrorism.

What are the

implicationsfor security of Brexit?

How will wecontinue towork closelywith ourEuropeancolleaguesand ensuresecurityinformationcontinues toflow freely?

>

Dr Alison Wakefield FSyI Vice Chairman andChairman Elect Security Institute

and Stephen Massey MSyIDirector of MemberServices, Security Institute