City of Holland, Michigan Public Safety Services · Holland, Michigan Public Safety Services ... Household Income $44,620 53,202 ... 31101 7 57 36

CityofHolland,MichiganPublicSafetyServices

AlexanderWeiss,PhD.

June16,2010

Holland Public Safety Services Alexander Weiss Consulting, LLC

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PublicSafetyServicesinHollandMichigan

Introduction

InJanuary2009,theCityofHolland,Michiganengagedaconsultanttoexaminethedelivery of public safety services in Holland. The city asked the consultants toperformanumberoftasksincluding:

• An evaluation of the management structure of the police and firedepartments to determine potential consolidation of public safetymanagementservices.

• A comprehensive look at both police and fire schedules to determinealternativeschedulesthatmaybemorecosteffectiveandproductive.

• Anevaluationofdevelopingafullycomprehensivepublicsafetydepartmentincludingtopmanagementandday‐to‐dayoperations.

• An evaluation of emergencymedical services as currently provided by thefiredepartmentandalternativestoprovidingtheseservices.

• Evaluate support services within the police and fire departments todetermineoperationalefficienciesandpotentialserviceprovidedbycivilianvs.swornpoliceandfireofficers.

• Evaluate possible cooperative public safety services delivery opportunitieswithadjacentgovernmentalunits.

• Outlineprocedureforimplementation.• Outlinecostevaluationsandsavingsofvariousalternatives.

Thisreportrepresentstheresultsofourinquiry.Itisbasedonanumberofsourcesofinformationincluding:

• Extensive interviews with management and staff of the police and firedepartments

• Reviewofperformancedatafromthepoliceandfiredepartments,andfromAMRthecommunity’sEMSprovider

• Afocusgroupofcommunityleadersandkeypublicsafetystakeholders• Acommunityforumopentothegeneralpublic• Interviewswithofficialsfromneighboringjurisdictions• SitevisitstotheKalamazooDepartmentofPublicSafety.

In addition, we were aided in our work by an outstanding advisory committeecomposedof twomembersof theHollandCityCouncil, the city’shuman resourceandfinancedirectors,theinterimpoliceandfirechief,twocaptainsfromthepolicedepartment,threecaptainsfromthefiredepartment,andtworepresentativesofthepoliceunionandthefireunion.


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Theoutlineof thisreport isas follows.Webeginby lookingat thepoliceand firedepartmentsseparately.Wethenofferasetofpolicyoptionstoconsider.Nextweevaluate the economic impact of those options. Finally we talk aboutimplementation.Evaluatingtheperformanceofpublicsafetyservicesisverycontextspecific.Thatis,anytimeyoulookatapoliceorfiredepartmentandaskaboutthequalityoftheirservice,oneislikelytoask,“Comparedtowhat?”InthecaseofHollandagoodplaceto start is to look at its neighboring jurisdiction, Holland Charter Township. Thefollowingchartillustratesthatcomparison.1 CityofHolland Holland Charter

TownshipTotalPopulation 32,030 31,955MedianAge 31 31.1MinorityPopulation 44% 49%Population25andolder 19,633 19,820High School Graduate orHigher

81.9% 85.4%

Bachelor’s Degree orHigher

32.6% 22.7%

Speak a language otherthanEnglishathome

23.2% 25.3%

MedianHouseholdIncome $44,620 53,202Families below thepovertylevel

5.2% 4.8%

TotalHousingUnits 13,059 12,958OccupiedHousingUnits 11,401 11,917Owner‐Occupied 68.2% 72.2%Renter‐Occupied 31.8% 27.8%Owner‐OccupiedHomes 7772 8,610MedianValue $139,400 151,800An examination of this data suggests that these two communities have much incommon‐theyareverysimilaronanumberofpointsofcomparison.Inspiteofthis,theyhaveremarkablydifferentmodelsforthedeliveryofpublicsafetyservices.Thefollowingtableillustratesthealternativeapproaches:

1 Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Last Revised: August 26, 2008


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CityofHolland Holland Charter

TownshipPolice PoliceDepartment

62Sworn;15non‐swornContract with OttawaCounty Sheriff ‐16 Swornshared with ParkTownship

Fire FireDepartment27 Paid Firefighters; 30Part‐Paid

Volunteer FireDepartmentPaid Part Time Chief andDeputyChiefVolunteer FirefightersPaidperservice

Emergency MedicalService

Fire Department FirstResponder/ AMRTransport

OttawaSheriffE‐UnitFirstResponse/ AMRTransport

FY 2009 Public SafetyBudget

$10.3million2 $1.7million

Annual cost perhousehold

$9033 $142

As the City of Holland considers alternative models for providing public safetyservices it is important to keep this comparison in mind. Many members of theHollandPoliceandFireDepartmentsbelievethattheservicesthattheyprovidearedemonstrablybetterthanthoseprovidedinHollandTownship.Moreover,theyalsobelieve that the residents of Holland would be reluctant to accept the level ofservices provided in the township. This is, of course, a complex question. It isdifficulttolookatpublicsafetyorganizationsandmakeobjectivejudgmentsaboutthequalityoftheirservice.OnecommonlyusedmetricfortheevaluationofafiredepartmentistheInsuranceServiceOffice(ISO)rating.ISOisanindependentorganizationthatservesinsurancecompanies, fire departments, insurance regulators, and others by providinginformationaboutrisk.ISO'sexpertstaffcollectsinformationaboutmunicipalfire‐protection efforts in communities throughout the United States. In each of thosecommunities, ISO analyzes the relevant data and assigns a Public ProtectionClassification — a number from 1 to 10. Class 1 represents exemplary fireprotection,andClass10indicatesthatthearea'sfire‐suppressionprogramdoesnotmeet ISO'sminimum criteria. Both the City ofHolland and theHollandTownshipFireDepartmentshavethesameISOrateof4. 2 Budget data from City of Holland and Holland Charter Township 3 This value is derived by dividing the total budget for police and fire by the number of occupied housing units.


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OneofthebenchmarksforevaluatinglawenforcementagenciesisthroughtheCommissiononLawEnforcementAccreditation(CALEA).TheLawEnforcementAccreditationProgramwasthefirstcredentialingprogramestablishedbyCALEA.Itwasoriginallydevelopedtoaddresswhatwasseenasaneedtoenhancelawenforcementasaprofessionandtoimprovelawenforcement.Theprogramisopentoalltypesoflawenforcementagencies,onaninternationalbasis.Itprovidesaprocesstosystematicallyconductaninternalreviewandassessmentoftheagencies’policiesandprocedures,andmakeadjustmentswherevernecessarytomeetabodyofinternationallyacceptedstandards.

Since the first CALEAAccreditationAwardwas granted in1984, theprogramhasbecome the primary method for an agency to voluntarily demonstrate theircommitmenttoexcellenceinlawenforcement.ThestandardsuponwhichtheLawEnforcement Accreditation Program is based reflect the current thinking andexperience of law enforcement practitioners and researchers. Major lawenforcement associations, leading educational and training institutions,governmental agencies, as well as law enforcement executives internationally,acknowledge CALEA’s Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies© and itsAccreditation Program as benchmarks for today’s law enforcement agency.4NeithertheHollandPoliceDepartmentnortheOttawaCountySheriff’sDepartmentisaccreditedbyCALEA.5Wearenotsuggestingthattheservicesprovidedbytherespectiveorganizationsarethesame.Forexample,theCityofHollandFireDepartmentisabletoarriveatthescene of a fire in less than 7 minutes 84% of the time. By contrast, the HollandTownshipFireDepartmentwasabletomeetthatperformancestandardonly30%of the time.6 The Holland Police Department places great emphasis on responsetime,while theOttawaCountySheriff acknowledges thatbecauseof thedistanceshis officersmust often travel, response time is not as fast as in the city. The keyconsiderationisthatwhiletheservicesdeliveredinthetownshiparedifferent,theynonethelessappeartomeetcitizenexpectations.

4 http://www.calea.org/Online/CALEAPrograms/LawEnforcement/lawenfprogram.htm 5 There are 10 accredited agencies in Michigan including Canton, Grand Blanc, Huntingdon Woods, Kentwood, Monroe, Norton Shores, Port Huron, Portage, and the Wayne County Airport Police. Four agencies are in the process of seeking accreditation including Grand Blanc Township, Traverse City, Wyoming, and the University of Michigan Department of Public Safety. 6 HFD performance 2006-2008; HTFD 2-7-2009 to 5-19-2009.


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Anotherapproachtoassessingapublicsafetyagencyistocompareitwithothersinsimilar‐sized communities. The following table illustrates the number of swornpoliceandfirepersonnelinallMichigancitieswithpopulationsbetweenthirtyandfortythousand.7Aswecanseefromviewingthischartthereissignificantvariationinthewayinwhichthesecitiesprovidepublicsafetyservices.City Population SquareMiles Police FireBayCity 39500 11 61 61Burton 30319 24 42 3Paid,63part

paidEastpointe 35000 6.2 52 29GardenCity 30000 6 36 23Inkster 31000 6 59 28Jackson 36316 10 62 47MadisonHeights

31101 7 57 36

PortHuron 32338 8 51 45Southgate 33000 7 39 26Holland 35000 17 61 27, 30 part

paidIn this group theHollandPoliceDepartment has thehighest officer to populationratioatoneofficerper573 residents.TheHollandFireDepartmenthas relativelyfewpaidfirefightersbecauseoftheiruseofpartpaidstaff.Afewcitiesinthisgroupoperateoutofonefirestationandthusrequirefewerfirefighters.

7 Police data was derived from the Michigan State Police-Fire, and population data from The Michigan Fire Service Directory.


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HollandPoliceDepartmentTheHollandPoliceDepartment(HPD)isafull‐servicelawenforcementagencywithan authorized strength of 62 sworn officers, and 15 non‐sworn personnel. Thecurrentstaffingisasfollows:Position NumberChiefofPolice 1Captain 3OfficerManager 1DepartmentAssistantIII 1PoliceDeskClerk 7Custodian 1Jailer 1Sergeants 14PoliceOfficers 43In addition the department makes extensive and effective use of police cadets(collegestudentsthatworkatthedepartmentduringthetimetheyare incollege)and police reserves (Holland citizens that provide law enforcement resources formajoreventsandtootherwisesupplementoperations).TheHPDhasanumberofspecializedunitsincluding:

• CodeEnforcement&AnimalControl8• CrisisNegotiationTeam‐CNT(descriptioncomingsoon)• DetectiveBureau• HonorGuard• K‐9Unit• PatrolUnit• RecordsBureau• ReservePoliceOfficerUnit• S.A.V.E.SchoolResourceOfficers• ServicesDivision• SpecialEnforcementTeam(S.E.T.)• TeamPolicingAreaCoordinators• TrafficUnit• VictimServicesUnit• WEMET

Thedepartment’sFY2008budgetwas$7,103,854;eighty‐fivepercentofthatcostisattributedtosalaryandbenefits.

8 This position is currently vacant.


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ResourceDeploymentintheHollandPoliceDepartmentOneofthekeytasksinevaluatingresourcesinapolicedepartmentistodeterminehowmanyofficersarerequiredtomeetperformanceobjectives,andtothenassesstheextenttowhichexistingresourcesaredeployedtomeetthoseobjectives.Todosowebeginbylookingatcallsforservice.TraditionallyHPDhasuseddatafromtheOttawaCountyCentralDispatchsystemtoobtainworkloaddata.Basedonthisdatain2008thedepartmentreported23,803incidents.However,thisnumberincludessomeofficer‐initiatedactivities(e.g.trafficstopsthatresultedinthearrestofanoffender).Becauseweareprimarilyinterestedincitizen‐initiatedcallsforservicewewereabletodisaggregatetheofficer‐initiatedactivities.After thisadjustmentweconcluded that theHPDresponded to18,807citizen‐initiatedcallsin2008.Thelargestcategoriesofcallsinclude:

• Suspicious 2,096• TrafficCrashes 1,320• Civil/NeighborComplaints 1,193

Togetsomesenseofscaleithelpstorecognizethatadepartmentthatrespondsto18,807callswill,onaverage,handleabouttwocallsperhour.Thefollowingfigureillustratesthedistributionofcallsforservicebyhourofday.


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Thispattern isverysimilartoother lawenforcementagencies.Notethat thepeakdemandtimefortheHPDisfromabout3:00PMuntil10:00PM.Inthenextfigureweseethedistributionofcallsbydayofweek.

The amount of variation by day of week is very modest, suggesting that thedepartmentcanadoptaworkschedulethatresultsinequalstaffingbydayofweek.Finallyweillustratethedistributionofcallsforservicebymonth.


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Notsurprisingly,Hollandexperiencessignificantlyhigher levelsofcalls forservicein the summermonths. In fact the amount ofwork in July isnearly 50 percenthigherthaninFebruary.Usingourcallsforservicedatawecannowestimatethenumberofofficersrequiredtohandlecallsforservice.


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00000800 08001600 16002400RowOne CFS 3412 7040 8355RowTwo Hours 2730 5632 6684RowThree 25%Added 3412.5 7040 8355RowFour Officers

RequiredforCallsforService

1.17 2.41 2.86

RowFive Relief FactorX1.7

1.99 4.1 4.9

In the table shown above we outline the process for estimating the number ofofficers required.We have divided the day into three eight‐hour blocks: 0000 to0800;0800to1600,and1600to2400.Inthefirstrowweseethenumbersofcallsforservice for those timeperiods.Wedeterminedthat theaveragecall inHollandconsumed48minutes(includestraveltimeandon‐scenetime),thuswemultipliedthecallsforservicetimes.8hourstoarriveattotalhoursbyshift.Thisisshowninrowtwo.Inrowthreeweadjustedthetotaltimeconsumedoncallstocompensatefor the inability of the information system to provide time on scene for back‐upofficers.Weadded25%tothetotaltimeforthisadjustment.9Inrowfourwedividethetotaltimeconsumedbycallsforservicebythenumberofhours an officer would work if they worked eight hours a day, 365 days a year(2920).Rowfourthusshowshowmanyofficersarerequiredtobeondutyduringeachshiftjusttohandlecallsforservice.Finally,weneedtoadjustforthefactthatofficers do not work every day. The shift relief factor indicates the number ofofficersthatneedtobeassignedtoaworkgroupinordertoproduceoneofficeronduty, given regulardaysoff, vacation, sick time, etc.The shift relief factorused inthisanalysis is1.7. It is an industry standardand the sameoneusedbyHPD inarecent analysis. If wemultiply the shift relief factor times the number of officersrequiredondutywecandeterminethenumberrequiredforassignment. Inotherwords,ifofficershandledcallsforservicetheirentireshiftwewouldneed2officersassignedtothenightshift,4tothedayshift,and5totheafternoonshift.Of course, officers do many things other than handle calls for service, includingpatrol, traffic enforcement, aswell as administrative tasks like reportwriting andmeals.Soinordertocompensatefortheseotheractivitieswemustbuildastaffingmodelthataccountsforthistime.Inthefollowingtableweillustratethisapproach.Weprovidetwomodelsofhowtoallocate time. The first, assumes that officers spend 50 percent of their time oncommunity‐generatedworkloadand fiftypercent onpreventivepatrol andofficer 9 This adjustment is consistent with other studies that we have done in which the back-up officer data was actually available.


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initiated activity. In order to produce this estimate we multiply the number ofofficers required for calls for service times two. The secondmodel assumes thatofficers will spend 1/3 (33%) of their time on community generated calls forservice, 1/3 on administrative activities, and 1/3 on officer initiated and patrolactivities.InthiscasewemultiplytheCFSvaluetimesthree.ThisanalysisappearsUnder these two models the department would require 23 and 34 officersrespectivelytohandlefieldoperations.10Ifoneincludesthetrafficofficers,evidencetechniciansandschool resourceofficers in the tally, thedepartmentcurrentlyhas37officersassignedtofieldservices.

Upuntilthispointwehavebeenworkingwithamodelbasedoneight‐hourshifts.Nowweturntotheten‐hourshiftusedbyHPD.Thekeydilemmaisthatbystaffingthree10‐hour shifts, adepartment is actuallyproviding30hoursofpolicingeachday instead of 24. If the additional six hours is well managed it can improveperformance.Butif it isnot, itwillbeproblematic.Toputitsimply,assumingthatthe number of personnel remains constant, the adoption of 10‐hour shifts willnecessitateareductioninserviceinsixhourssoastoprovidethesix‐houroverlapin others. HPD has a 30‐minute overlap during the morning shift change, a 90‐minute overlap between three and four‐thirty PM (1500‐1630) and a four‐houroverlapbetweenninePMandoneAM(2100‐0100)The following chart illustrates the relationship between resources required andresourcesavailable.The firstcolumn(lightblue) illustrates thenumberofofficersrequiredunderthe50%communitygeneratedperformancestandardbyhouroftheday.Thesecondcolumn(red)illustratesthenumberofofficersrequiredtomeetthe33%percent community generated time performance standard. Finally, the ivorycolumnillustratestheaveragenumberofficersworkingaccordingtoHPDrecords.11

10 These models do not include supervisors. 11 This number is derived from the HPD Schedule. We used staffing levels of 7 for day shift, 7 for the afternoon shift, and 6 for the night shift.

Shift Officers Required100% CommunityGenerated

50%CommunityGenerated

33%CommunityGenerated

Night 1.9 3.8(4) 5.7(6)Day 4.1 8.2(9) 12.3(13)Afternoon 4.9 9.8(10) 14.7(15)


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This figure illustrates a number of important things. First, if we compare thenumber required at the 50% level we see that we have excess capacity in everyhour. If we look at the 33% level a different pattern emerges. We have excesscapacityfrom9PMuntil9AM.Fromthatpointforwardtherearetoofewofficersonthestreettomeettheperformanceobjectives.Itisclearthattheoverlaptimesareunnecessaryandthattheincreasedstaffingduringthosetimes,however,attractive,isattheexpenseoftheotherhours.Another aspect to consider in evaluating resource deployment is the policedepartment’s use of minimum staffing. In the minimum staffing approach, policedepartmentsdefinesomeminimumnumberofofficersrequiredtobeonduty.Ifthenumberofofficersondutyfallsbelowthatvalue,theagencymustfillthatvacancy,typicallythroughusinganoff‐dutyofficerpaidonovertime.12There are two key justifications for minimum staffing levels. First, in manycommunitiestheybelievethat there isaminimumneededtoensurepublicsafety.This is particularly common in small communitieswhere there are relatively fewdemandsforpoliceservice,butthecommunityfeelsthattheremustbeatleasttwoofficers, for example, on duty at all times. The second justification forminimumstaffing levels is police officer safety. Police officers are increasingly insisting(oftentimesthroughcollectivebargaining)thataminimumnumberofofficersbeonduty. 12 In some communities minimum staffing is part of the labor agreement-it is not in Holland


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These are both good reasons tomaintainminimum staffing levels, but an agencyadoptingsuchanapproachshouldunderstandthepotentialpitfalls.First, minimum staffing levels are often only marginally related to demands forservice. In fact, theminimum staffing level is typically higher than thatwould bewarrantedbytheagencyworkload.Ironically,eventhoughtheminimumstaffingisnot workload based, it is not uncommon to hear police officers suggest that anincrease in the agency’s workload should warrant an increase in the minimumstaffinglevel.Second, the minimum staffing levels are sometimes set so high that it results inincreasing demands for police overtime. It is not uncommon, for example, to seeagencies that must “hire back” officers nearly every day because the number ofofficersassignedtotheshiftsisnotenoughtoproducetheminimum,givenofficertime off, vacations, sick leave, etc. Ironically, some agencies use a very narrowdefinitionofavailablestaffing.Forexample,theymayhirebacktofillavacancyinpatrol, even though there are a number of other officers on the street, includingtraffic,schoolresource,andsupervisors.13Third,mostpoliceofficers,givenachoice,wouldprefertohavemoreofficersonthestreet, and so for that reason,minimum staffing is a popular idea. However, it isimportant to acknowledge that increasing theminimumwill not, in and of itself,improve thequalityofagencyperformance,norwill itnecessarily increaseofficersafety.Infact,whenagencieshirebackpoliceofficerstoworkextrashiftstheyarelikelytobe fatigued,andtheirpresencemayactually increasetheriskof injurytothemselvesorothers.Finally, in some agencies theminimum staffing levelmay become, by default, theoptimalstaffinglevel.Agenciesoftenusetheminimumlevelasamethodtodecide,for example, whether an officer can take a benefit day off. Others build workschedulessoastoensurethattheminimumlevelisonduty,ratherthanoptimizingtheavailableresources.WorkScheduleThesecondcomponentofpatrolresourceanalysis istheworkschedule.Theworkschedule is critical because it is a tool to ensure that resources are aligned withorganizationalobjectives.Work schedules pose issues for the management of an organization and for itsemployees.Amongtheimportantmanagementobjectivesare:

• Easeofdesignandadministration 13HPD recently took steps to correct this problem.


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• Abilitytomatchworkload• Abilitytostaffforspecialevents• Minimizeovertime• Employeesafetyandretention• Compliancewithlaw,employeecontracts,andpersonnelrules• Supportcommunication• Preserveunityofcommandandspanofcontrol.

Amongemployeeworkschedulingissuesare:

• Workloadequity• Weekendtimeoff• Predictability• Proceduresforusingbenefittimeoff• FatigueandStress• Teamintegrity• Scheduleequity• Compatibilitywithfamilyandoutsideactivities.

Policework schedules come in all shapes and sizes. Although each seems uniquethereisamethodologytoapplysothatwecancompareworkschedules.Amongtheimportantcomponentsofaworkscheduleare:

• Averageworkweek• Shiftlength• Numberofconsecutiveworkdays• Weekendtimeoff• Staffingbydayofweek.• Percentageofofficersondutyeachday.

The Holland police department uses a 28‐day work cycle, but the actual workschedulecanbeillustratedasa14‐daypattern.Thescheduleisa“4‐10“plan.Thatis,officerswork4ten‐hourdays,andthentakethreedaysoff. Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday SaturdayA Off Off OffB Off Off Off %OnDuty

50 50 50 50 100 50 50

In the Holland system there are two day off groups. One group is off on Friday,SaturdayandSunday;theotherMonday,TuesdayandWednesday.OnThursdayallemployeesareassignedtowork.OnmostThursdaysonehalfofthestaff isonthestreet, the other half in training. On days other thanThursday50percent of theavailable officers are on duty. Before drawing any conclusions about theeffectivenessofthisapproachitisinstructivetocomparethisschedulewithothers.


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Consideranagencythatworksamoretraditionalschedulewithfiveeight‐hourdaysonduty,andtwodaysoffineachseven‐dayperiod.Inthisscheduleeachofficerorgroupofofficers is assignedpermanently toadayoff group.This configuration isillustratedbelow: Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday1 Off Off2 Off Off 3 Off Off 4 Off Off 5 Off Off 6 Off Off 7 Off Off%On

71 71 71 71 71 71 71

Usingthesameapproachasaboveweobservethattheshifthasuniqueproperties:

• Fixeddaysoff• Threegroupsofofficershaveeitherafullorpartialweekenddayoff• Equalstaffingbydayofweek• Longestondutycycleisfivedays.

Importantlyweobservethatoneveryday71percentoftheofficersareonduty.This is,ofcourse,considerablyhigher thanwhatwewould find in4‐10plans.Wecanalsomodifythisscheduletoprovideenhancedstaffingonweekends. Let’ssaywehaveaworkgroupwithnineofficers.Eachisassignedadayoffgroup,butgroupstwoandthreeeachhavetwoofficers.Thisallowsthereductionofstaffingonsomedays, and the increase on others. This schedule is particularly attractive toemployees that want fixed days off. It works well for officers that are going toschool, and may be beneficial for those that assist in childcare. This schedule isillustratedbelow:


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Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday1 Off Off2(2) Off Off 3(2) Off Off 4 Off Off 5 Off Off 6 Off Off 7 Off OffOnduty

6 5 6 7 7 7 7

Offduty

3 4 3 2 2 2 2

%Onduty

66% 55% 66% 77% 77% 77% 77%

Even if Holland seeks to maintain its 4‐10 plans, as we see below there arealternative4‐10plansthatdobetter.TheRockford,IllinoisPoliceDepartment,forexample,usesa4‐10planinitspatroldivision.Thescheduleisillustratedbelow. Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday1 Off Off Off 2 Off Off Off 3 Off Off Off 4 Off Off Off Off5 Off Off Off6 Off Off Off7 Off Off %On

57 57 57 57 57 57 57

Assumingthatthenumberofofficersassignedisamultipleofseven,thisschedulewillresultin4of7(or8of14)officersondutyoneveryday.Thus,weknowthatthescheduleproducesequalstaffingbydayoftheweek,andthat57percentoftheofficers in a work group are assigned to work each day. If we were to assign a


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numberofofficerstothegroupthatwasnotamultipleofseven,itwouldresultindifferentstaffingbydayofweek.Therearesomealternativestrategiesforthedepartmenttoconsider.Aninterestingschedulewithashortdutyweekisthe4on–2offschedule.Itisillustratedbelow: Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday1 Off Off 2 Off Off 3 Off Off 4 Off Off 5 Off Off Off6 Off Off Off%Onduty

66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66%

Thisschedulehasasix‐weekdutycycleanddaysoffrotateeachweek.Duringthecycle each officer receives three full or partial weekends off. Two thirds of theofficersworkeachday.Thisschedulerequiresthatofficershaverotatingdaysoff.Theinterestingaspectofthisscheduleisthatiftheofficerworksaneighthourdayitresultsin37.33hourworkweek.Normallythissituationrequirestheofficerto“payback”thattime.Therearethreepossiblevariationspossible.If theshift length iseighthours, theofficerwouldhavetopaybackonedayeverythreeweekstoachieveafortyhourworkweek.Iftheshiftlengthwereincreasedto8¼hourstheaverageworkweekwouldbe38.5hours,andtheofficerwouldhavetoprovide6paybackdaysevery33weeks.Iftheshiftlengthwereincreasedto8½hours the averageworkweekwould increase to 39.67 hours, and officerswouldonlyberequiredtopayback2daysevery51weeks.While this shift schedule would clearly add some administrative challenges thedepartmentcouldincreasepatrolstaffing,andtheycouldconductbriefingsduringthe extra thirty minutes, thus permitting officers to begin patrol promptly. Inaddition, itmay be possible to use the “payback” days for training, an alternativeapproachtotheHFDtrainingdaymodel.

Clearly, theHPDschedule is lessefficient thana4‐2,5‐2 scheduleandother4‐10schedules.Thedepartmentmakesastrongcasethattheirworkschedulefacilitatestraining and team cohesiveness. They argue that because virtually all employeesworkonThursday,theycantrainasateam.Further,theysuggestthatthescheduleprovides a unique opportunity to bring personnel together and not disrupt


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operations.Moreover, theyargue that this schedulehelps themmanageovertime,becauseofficerscanbetrainedduringon‐dutytime.It is difficult to measure return on investment from training; benefits are oftenintangible, and difficult to quantify. TheHPD feels strongly that the loss in patrolcapacity that results from this work schedule is justified by the enhancedperformanceofitsofficers.Thedepartmentdoesaverygoodjobinoptimizingthiswork schedule. In spite of this, it is important for the city policy‐makers tounderstandthattherearerealcostsassociatedwiththisstrategy.AncillaryServicesWhile the greatest opportunity for efficiency will likely be found in the patroldivision,thereare,webelievesomeotherareasthatdeservecloserscrutiny.

1. The HPD uses a labor‐intensive system for completing case reports.Currentlypatrolofficersandinvestigatorsdictatereportsforsubsequenttranscriptionbynon‐swornemployees.Thisapproachwasapopularnewtechnology in the 1970’s, but has long since replaced by officerspreparing reports on computers. This approach would significantlyreduceworkloadfornon‐swornstaff,withnoreductioninquality.14

2. TheHPDdetective division has an unusual staffing structure. Earlier inthis reportwe reported that thedepartment staffs14 sergeantsand43policeofficers.Thatisaratioofonesergeantforthreepoliceofficers.Thereasonforthisimbalanceisthattherearefivedetectivesergeants,mostof whom have no supervisory duties. While one can find otherdepartments with similar staffing, the clear trend in policing is thatpeople that hold supervisory rank should be supervisors. In fact, thetrendinpolicingisthat investigatorsshouldhavethesamerankandbepaidthesameaspoliceofficers.15

3. The department currently uses police officers to serve as crime scenetechnicians.Whilemanypolicedepartmentsusethisapproach,thecleartrend nationally is to use non‐sworn personnel to fill these positions.Consider the position description for a crime scene technician for theDurhamNCPoliceDepartment.16

14 HPD currently has the capacity to complete traffic accident reports on in-vehicle computers. However, we were told that the computer system is so slow that officers will generally complete these reports at the station. 15 Mary Ann Wycoff and Colleen A.Cosgrove. Investigations in the Community Policing Context. National Institute of Justice. 2001. 16 http://www.durhampolice.com/units/id_cst_job_desc.cfm


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CrimeSceneTechnicianSalaryRange

$30,812–46,443

PositionSummary:

A responsible civilianpositionwith the responsibilities involvingdetection,collection and preservation of physical evidence found at crime scenes,fingerprint processing and analysis, photography, physical evidenceexamination and analysis; in cooperation with sworn officers and courtofficials involved in the investigation and prosecution of criminal casesthroughout Durham County; and other forensic duties pertaining to casesunderinvestigation.

DutiesandResponsibilities:

• Processes crime scenes to include the search and recovery of latentfingerandpalmprints,trace,DNAandotherphysicalevidence.Takesphotographs, prepares sketches and documents the search andcollection for physical evidence. Responds to area hospitals andautopsiestodocumentandcollectevidenceincriminalinvestigations.Preparescrimescenereportsforpresentationincourtandgivescourtroomtestimony.

• Maintains issued equipment and follows safety protocols at crimescenesandinthelab.

• PreparesevidenceforsubmissiontoSBI,FBIandprivatelaboratoriesfor examination and assists Police Officers with criminalinvestigations. These tasks may include photo arrays, videoreproductionandphotography.

• Maintains fingerprint card records of Durham City and Countyarrestees.

• Conductslatentfingerprintandpalmprintexaminationsforcriminalidentification and elimination purposes using the AFIS (AutomatedFingerprintIdentificationSystem)andmanualcomparisons.

• Attends trainingona varietyof Forensic andCriminal Justice topicsannually.

• Conducts training of new employees and other police departmentemployeesasneeded.Providesdemonstrationstooutsideentitiesasrequested.

HollandFireDepartment

TheHollandFireDepartmentiscurrentlybudgetedfor27fulltimepositions. Theoperations group consists of 24 full time staff members at various ranks fromfirefighters tocaptains. Thepersonnelareassignedtothree24‐hourshifts. Dailyshift level supervision,maintenancemanagement, trainingand logistical functionsare delegated to three captains, who also serve as command officers and firstrespondersasneeded.SixLieutenants,scheduledoneateachoftwostaffedstationseachshift,providestationsupervisionandmakeinitialincidentresponsedecisions.The remaining full time personnel are firefighters who are dual‐trained asEmergencyMedicalTechnicians(EMT).Thereisacadreof30part‐paidfirefighterswho are the department’s primary support personnel for large or complexemergencyincidents.Thesefirefightersareassignedspecificallytostations,andarecalled‐inbystationwhenneeded.The firechief,onecivilianassistantanda firemarshalmanage theadministrative,communityoutreach,andsupportfunctions.Thefirechiefisresponsibleforoveralladministrationofthedepartment,andreportsdirectlytothecitymanager.Thefiremarshalprovidesmanagementoversightforthedepartment’sfireinspection,publiceducation and initial fire investigation programs. The administrative assistantprovidesavarietyofsecretarial,clericalandreportingsupport.TheFY09departmentbudgetis$3,035,6.699.Thisbudgetrepresents29.35%ofthePublicSafetyServicesbudget,andapproximately14.3%oftheGeneralFundbudget.Within the annual budget, personnel costs represent about 81% of annualexpenditures. The department provides a range of services similar to otherdepartments inmunicipalities of similar size,with emergencymedical services astheprimarydriverforemergencycallvolume.EMSandfalsefirealarmcallsarethetwohighest calls for service categories. These two service categories account for83.6%ofallservicedemandin2008.American Medical Response (AMR) an authorized service provider also servesHolland. It is important to note, however, this authority does not grant AMR anexclusiverighttooperateadvancedlifesupportandambulancetransportservices.InHolland,whena911EMScall isdispatched,bothAMRandthe firedepartmentresponds. Thepriority ofAMR’s response is dependentupon the initial triagebycentraldispatchstaff.Priorityonedispatchesarethosecasesconsideredtoinvolvehigh or extremely high life risk. Priority Two calls are ones where there is noimmediate life threat, but the patient is likely to require immediate transport formedicalevaluationatthehospital.17 17 HFD only responds to Priority One and Two EMS calls.


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Part‐time firefighters are paid an annual stipend plus contribution to a pensionprogram. A proportion of the part‐time staff is assigned to each of three firestations; twoof thesestationsarealsostaffedby full time firefighters. Except fortworequiredtrainingsessionseachmonth,theparttimefirefightersarepagedforresponsewhen requested. In 2008, therewere 67 assignments for the part timefirefighters. The number of incidents towhich part‐time staff responds is highlyvariableandisbasedonthediscretionoftheon‐scenecommandofficer,mostoftentheshiftcaptains.Approximately70%ofallfiresresultedinaresponsebythepart‐timefirefightersfromatleastonestation.WorkScheduleThevastmajorityoffirefightersintheUnitedStatesandCanadawork24‐hourshifts.Thatis,thefirefighterwillwork24hours,andthentypicallywillhaveforty‐eighthoursoff(oftenreferredtoasthe24/48schedule).Thesesystemstypicallyrequirethreegroups(oftencalledshiftsorplatoons).Whenoneoftheplatoonsisondutytheothertwoareoff.IfwelabelthegroupsA,B,andCwecandepicttheschedule:

ABC….Anotherapproachisthe“24/96”schedule.Inthisscheduleeachfirefighterwillwork24hours,andthenhave24hoursoff.Herepeatsthispatterntwice.Hewillthenworka24‐hourshiftfollowedby4daysoff:

ABABCBCACABA….Finallysomedepartmentsareadoptingsocalled48/96schedules.Inthisapproachthefirefighterworkstwo24‐hourshiftsinarow,followedby4daysoff.Itcanbediagrammedas:

AABBCCAA….Alloftheseschedulesresultinthesamemanninglevels.Theyallpartitiontheforceintothreeequalcomponents.Theprincipaldifferenceintheseschedulesisthetimingofdaysoff.


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TheHollandFireDepartmentusesthefollowingscheduleforoperationspersonnel:

• 24hourson• 24hoursoff• 24hourson• 24hoursoff• 24hourson• 96hoursoff

TheFairLaborStandardActcontainsexemptionsforfirefighters.Thisexemptionallowsforfirefighterstobescheduledforupto56hoursperweekwithoutincurringovertimecosts.18In Holland there are 24 people assigned to staff the fire stations (3 captains, 6lieutenants, and 15 firefighters). There are eight people assigned to each of threeshifts.Oneachdaytheeightmuststafftwostations.Becausetheminimumstaffingforeachstationisthree,sixfirefightersmustbeondutyatalltimes.Inpracticethetworemainingmembersareutilizedtofillshiftsvacatedbysickleave,vacation,orpersonaltimeoff.Somefiredepartmentsworkamodified24‐hourshiftcalledthe10/14plan.Inthisapproachfirefightersworka10‐hourdayshiftora14‐hournightshift.Thereareanumberofdifferentconfigurationsofdaysonanddaysoff,butatypicalscheduleis:

• 2dayshifts(10hours)• 2nightshifts(14hours)• 2daysoff• 2dayshifts• 2nightshifts• 6daysoff

Some see this approach as a more effective utilization of resources because it iseasiertoreplacepersonnelfortheseshortertimeperiods.19Asa general rule24‐hour firefighterwork schedules result inbetterutilizationofresources than 8, 10 or 12‐hour work schedules (assuming that the departmentprovides24/7service).Considertakingthe24personnelcurrentlyassignedtoHFDoperationsand thenreassigning themto two12‐hourshifts.Rather thanstaffoneshiftperdaythedepartmentwouldhavetostafftwo‐with12firefightersassignedtoeach.Theschedulebelowillustratesstaffingforone12‐hourperiod.

18 Under Michigan fair labor wage laws, the City pays time and a half for hours over 53 hours. 19 http://firechief.com/leadership/management-administration/firefighting_shift_change/


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Employees Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday6 Off Off 6 Off Off Off Off OffNumberonDuty

6 6 6 6 6 6 6

As can be seen, this schedulewill result in 6 firefighters scheduled towork. Anyabsenceduetoillness,orothertimeoffwilldropthestaffinglevelbelowsix.StaffingTherearemanywaystoevaluatetheadequacyandeffectivenessofthecurrentstaffdeployment scheme. One common method is to compare the numbers offirefightersrelativetopopulationprotected. Itappears thatHollandreliesonthisratio tosomeextent. In theHollandFireDepartmentannualreport, thismeasurealong with the same measure for three other area communities is presented.However,thisbenchmarkmethodologydoesnotconsideruniquecharacteristicsofacommunity,suchasage,demographics,roadnetworksandtrafficpatterns,historyoffrequencyandseverityoffireandmedicalemergencies,orqualityandvarietyofservicedemandsfromthecommunity.Thesefactorsresultinactualratiosthatarehighly variable. ICMA reports show an average of about one firefighter perthousand persons served, with similarly high variability as the benchmarkcommunities selected by Holland. Within the three comparison communitiesaroundHolland, theratiosvary from .41per thousand for theCityofWyoming to1.39 for Kentwood; A variation of over 100% in this relatively small geographicarea.Another strategy for deployment is more indirect, where a fire departmentconsidersfirestationlocationsfirst,andthendeploysresourcesthatcorrespondtothedemandforserviceexpectedinthesub‐communitythosestationsaretoserve.Thiscanbethoughtofasastandardallocationstrategy.Thisschemeofcalculatingstaffing based primarily by geographic location is at its roots a corollary to thestandard set by the Insurance Services Office (ISO). In the simplest form, a firedepartmentwillbuildafirestationeverythreemilesorlesstoachievethe1.5mileradiusprescribedbyISO,andthenthosedepartmentsusetheirpastexperienceorcontractually mandated vacation, sick leave, and other benefits to arrive at thenecessarystaffingforeachtypeofapparatusallocatedtothestation.


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Themostrecentlynationallyrecognizedstandarddeploymentstrategy,andtheonefavoredbylargeurbanmunicipalities,focusesonresponsetimeforfirefighters(effectiveforce)toastructurefire.ThismethodologyisdescribedintheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)Standard1710(StandardfortheOrganizationandDeploymentofFireSuppressionOperations,EmergencyMedicalOperations,andSpecialOperationstothePublicbyCareerFireDepartments).Generallythisstandardrequiresaminimumoffourfirefightersarrivingatafireinlessthanfiveminutes,80%ofthetime,oragroupof14firefightersastheminimumnumberforeffectivefiresuppressionofstructurefires,arrivingwithin9minutes,in80%offires.Formostsmalltomediumcommunities,compliancewiththisstandardwouldbefiscallyprohibitiveandunrealistic.20Anothercommonstrategyistostaffanddeploytoaccommodatethe“TwoIn/TwoOut” rule. This requirement is found as part of NFPA #1500 standard, and isadopted as part of the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health AdministrationOccupationalHealthStandard.21Thestandardprovidesthatbeforefirefighterscanenter an environment deemed to be “immediately dangerous to life and health(IDLH)”, theymusthaveadequate respiratoryprotection, enter inpairs, andhaveanother pair of firefighters outside of the hazardous environment prepared toperformrescue.CurrentHollandFireDepartmentstaffing,wheretheminimumperstation staff is three firefighters, allows for compliance once a second responsevehicle,with at least one additional firefighter or commandofficer, arrives and ispreparedtowork.22Departmentresponsetimesarecurrentlyreportedforthefirstarrivingunit;thismaynotrepresenttheactualnumberoffirefightersonscene.Inour interviewwithdepartmentstaff,wefoundthat inmost fire incidents, twofiretrucks, a ladder truckor commandofficers are immediatelydispatched; thereforewebelieve that the initial arrival times and the timeof arrival of the four‐personminimumisprobablysimilarinmostcases.Firedepartmentsacrossthecountryoftenstrugglewithbalancingserviceprovisionwithcostofservice. Asdiscussedintheprevioussection,thereisnota“one‐size‐fits‐all”methodtocorrelatecommunityservicedemandtotherightnumberofstaff.Itisessentialtodeterminewhetherafireagencyispreparedtoprovidethelevelofservice commensurate with its mission while minimizing risk to firefighters andcost.TheappropriatestaffinglevelforfirefightersfortheCityofHollandmuststartwithconsiderationofthefollowing:

• Citizenexpectationforqualityofservice• Actualorperceivedriskinherentintheresidential,commercial

andindustrialmix• Currentworkload

20 www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/tr_02vw.pdf 21 http://www.michigan.gov/dleg/0,1607,7-154-11407_15368_23451---,00.html 22 This standard could also be met upon the arrival of part-paid staff.


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• Availability and effectiveness of aid from neighboringcommunities

• CostandbenefitofalternateserviceoptionsCommunityFireRiskAnalysisEventhoughtheHollandFireDepartmentrespondstoavarietyofcommunityrisks,the events that drive personnel allocation and budget is fire response. For thisreason this studywill focusmuchof thediscussiononevaluating theadequacyofstaffingforthismission.Communityfireriskanalysiscanbethoughtofasaproductoftwofactors.Thefirstoftheseisthelikelihoodofanemergencyoccurring(frequency);thesecondisthedegreeofdamageas theresultofsuchanevent(consequence). Acomprehensivecommunity risk analysis breaks these two key factors down to associated factorssuch as local history of fires, prevention and code enforcement effectiveness,occupancycharacteristics,conditionofoccupants,andlevelofabuilding’sinternalprotection. Fire department operations staff can make immediate and positiveimpact to the “consequence” portion of the equation. They do this by beingwelltrained, well equipped, and located to respond quickly and aggressively. In thelonger term, proactive public education and rigorous code enforcement caninfluencefirefrequencyandconsequence. Foranycommunity,long‐termfocusontheseprogramswillyieldthegreatestlong‐termbenefit.23FrequencyAnalysisWeusedhistoricalfireincidentsastheprimaryproxytounderstandthefrequencycomponent of fires in theHolland community. Holland’s fire experience suggeststhat fires resulting in heavy damage or injuries are relatively infrequent. During2006to2008,therewere,onaverage,111fireseachyear. Nearly40%ofthefirecallsarecategorizedasrefuse,vegetation,outsidefires,ornotclassified.Theseareunlikelytoresult in largedollar lossor injuries. Tohighlightthispoint,ourstudyhas identified5 fires in2008 that accounted for60%of thatyear’sproperty loss.Structure fires represent less thanone‐half of the reported fires in the three‐yeartimeframe,orlessthantwopercentofalldemandforserviceforthedepartment.

23 Noureddine Benichou. FIERA system: A Fire Risk Assessment Tool to Evaluate Fire Safety in Industrial Buildings and Large Spaces. Journal of Fire Protection Engineering, Vol. 15, No. 3, 145-172 (2005). Mallett-L, Brnich-MJ. Focus on Prevention: Conducting a Fire Risk Assessment. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 99-155, 1999 Oct :1-6


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ConsequenceAnalysisFire frequency does not tell the entire story. It is important to consider fireconsequence. In theCityofHolland16%of fire responses resulted in littleornodamage toproperty. Trash fires andvegetation fires areexamplesof this typeofevent.Infact,60%ofthereportedfiresresultedinon‐scenetimesof30minutesorless, suggesting that these were relatively small fires to control. Of the firesreportedin2008,aboutone‐thirdwasclassifiedasbuildingfires.Inthosefires,thetimeonsceneistypicallytwicethatofothertypes.Inanextremeexamplein2008,one fireaccounted for56%of the fire lossdollars for theentireyear. A fire thatoccurredinearly2009resultedinpersonnelcommitmentsofmorethansixhours.Thistypeofscenarioisuncommonbutwill,nonetheless,significantlyskewaverageresultswhenevertheyoccur.Empiricalstudyoffiregrowthpatternsdemonstratesthatthereisapointatwhichafiregrowthbecomesextreme.Mostresponsetimesarebuilttoavoidarrivingafterthiscriticalpoint.The“flashoverpoint”istheeventthatservicelevelobjectivesareintended to prevent fromoccurring. It is also important to recognize that as firegrowth occurs, the ability to safely rescue any trapped or unconscious occupantsbecomesmoreandmoredifficult.Inmostcases,oncethefireispasttheflashoverpoint, rescuing and resuscitating a patient from the immediate fire area is highlyunlikely. It is also critical to remember that conditions within a structuredeteriorate extremely quickly past this point, creating untenablework conditionsforfirefighters. TimeandfiregrowthstudieshaveresultedinthefollowingReflexChartResponseModel.


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ResponseTimesResponse timesare typicallymeasured from the time the first responders receivethealarmtothetimetheyarriveonscene.Thefollowingfigureillustratesresponsetimeforallfiresfortheperiodof2006‐2008(n=231).24Aswecansee,49%ofthetime the department arrives in less than fiveminutes. 25 This falls short of NFPA1710 standard (minimum of four firefighters arriving at a fire in less than fiveminutes80%ofthetime,oragroupof14firefightersastheminimumnumberforeffective fire suppression of structure fires, arrivingwithin 9minutes, in 80% offires),butisnotunusualforsuburbancommunitiesofsimilarsize.

24 Data from HFD provided May 5,2009 25 On this chart the “5” category represents response times between five and six minutes.


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Thenext figure illustratesEMS(priorityoneandtwo)response forHFDandAMRAmbulance26.Aswesee,thetwoagencieshavesimilarresponseperformance.Theprincipal difference is in the first four minutes after notification. NFPA Standard1710 establishes that in an emergency medical response, a unit with a firstresponder should arrive within 4 minutes (240 seconds) or less. The prevailingresearch shows that brain damage due to oxygen deprivation begins soon after apatient stops breathing. Once the brain is oxygen deprived beyond about fiveminutes, full recovery of brain function for the patient is unlikely. Initialmedicalresponse to the most serious injuries or medical conditions is conducted jointlybetweenAmericanMedicalResponseandtheHollandFireDepartment.Firefightersare dual‐trained as Emergency Medical Technicians, capable of providing initialassessment,basic life support treatmentandstabilizationofpatients. Paramedicsfromtheambulanceserviceprovideadvancedcaresuchasadministeringmedicine,starting intravenous lines, and assessing patient condition through electronicdiagnostictools.AMRprovidesallpatienttransport.In2008,HFDarrivedunder4minutesfor23%ofthesecalls‐AMRarrivedunder4minutes 33% of the time. There are two important caveats to consider whenexamining this data. First, AMR has a slight advantage here. They sometimesmonitorHFDcommunications,andasaresulttheycanbegintheirresponsepriortothe notification by their dispatcher. Second, HFD often downgrades priority oneEMScallstoalowerpriority.Thisprocesswasexplainedinacommunicationfromtheinterimfirechief.27

26 Data provided by HFD and AMR. HFD reported 2119 calls-AMR 1952. 27Afterreviewingthedatainthedraftreportandarunofalldispatchedpriority1&2calls,Ibelievethetotalnumberofcallscomparedtothatoftheannualreportiswithinapproximately3‐4calls.Thedataprovidedon6/4isabout500callslessthanthatoftheannualreport.Asstated,thisisduetothefactthatwesortedthesecallsbasedona1&2‐dispatchpriorityandapriority1responsepriority.Inshortwhatthismeansisthatoutofthetotalnumberofpatientpriority1&2dispatchedcallsapproximately500ofthemwererespondedtowitharesponsepriorityotherthan1.(Mostlikelypriority3)Toclarifythereisnosuchthingas"responding"priority2.Thelightsandsirensareinuse(priority1)ornotinuse(priority3).E‐mailsent6‐15‐09.


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StationLocationA key component in efficient response to an emergency is the location of firestationsandtherelatedroadnetworksavailableforemergencytravel.Firestationsshouldbecentrallylocatedtoofferthebestuseofroadstorespondinalldirections.Whenmorethanonestationisplanned,considerationshouldincludetheabilityforone station to provide back‐up to other stations and personnel in the area,particularforareasoftheserviceareaexpectedtohavehighandpossiblyduplicateemergency demands. These might include areas that have older homes, wherehomesorapartmentsarerelativelydense,orwhereotherdemographicfactorssuchas schools, shopping centers, or nursing homes increase the risk for human loss.Thisdistributionofstationsisnodifferentthanthe“HubandSpoke”deliverymodelusedbypackagedeliveryservicesandairlines.Currently both Holland fire stations staffed by full time firefighters are near theperipheryofthecity,onenexttoalake,andtheotheronthecity’seasternborder.Theselocationsdonotfullyexploittheabilitytoprovidethebestresponsetimestothesouthandnortheastportionsof thecity. In thecaseof theKollenStation, thenatureofthearearequiresfireapparatustomaintainasafespeedofabout20MPH.This limit greatlydiminishes the truck’s ability toquickly reacha largeportionofthecity.Movingthisstationfarthertothesouthwilldramaticallyimproveitstraveltimes, while still keeping response times to the northern boundaries of the citywithin reasonable limits. HFD response is also hampered by the regular railroadtraffic thatbisects thecityandoftencauses trafficcongestionandroadblockages.


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Basedoninterviewswithdepartmentpersonnel,itappearsthatitmaybepossibletoprovidefireservicesfromonebetter‐locatedstation.28WorkloadThe primary reason to maintain a ready force for community protection is tomitigate the devastation caused by fires. However, the majority of incidentsrequiringfiredepartmentresourcesareemergencymedicalcalls.InHolland,asinmostcommunitiesofsimilardemographicprofile,theseaccountfor70%ormoreofthetotalcallvolumeTocalculateaverageworkload,weusedannualaveragesforthelargestshareoftheresponses, EMS calls and false alarm calls. About 84%of all of the department’sdemandforservicein2008areinthesetwocategories.TheproportionateshareofEMS calls to overall calls has been increasing over time. Both categories of callsrequire20to25minutesofacrew’stime. EMScallsseemtoaverage25minutes,calculatedfromthetimeofinitialdispatchtothetimepersonnelclearthesceneoftheincident,whereasfalsealarmcallstendtoaverage19minutestoresolve.Thesetimestonotincludeadditionaltimerequiredforfirefighterstoreturntothestationortoothersupplementalassignments.Anotherway to describe thisworkload is that the department experiences abouteightemergencycallseachday,withanaveragetotaldailydemandofaboutthreehours. Of course, these estimates do not include time spent in direct supportactivitiessuchasreportwritingaftereachincident,andmaintainingequipmentandsuppliesreadyforsubsequentcallsforservice. Nordothesenumbersaccountforindirectsupportsuchastraining,andconductinginspectionsandfirepre‐planningactivities. The department recently embarked on an effort to pre‐plan targethazards,withthestatedgoalofdoublingthenumberofoccupanciesinspectedinayear. Also, since the lossof a trainingofficer, all of the training coordinationanddeliveryhavebeendelegatedtoon‐dutycrews.Thisincludesorganizing,preparinganddeliveringtrainingtothepart‐paidfirefightersaswellasdrillstokeepfulltimestaffskillssharp.Unfortunately,thereisnotasystemtoaccountforthetimespentontheseancillaryservicesandactivities.

28 GIS for Fire Station Locations and Response Protocol An ESRI ® White Paper • January 2007


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Hollandreportedatotalof72fireeventsin2008.Buildingfiresaccountedfor23ofthese fires, or about a third. Building fires in residential homes are the mostcommonfireproblemintheUnitedStates,leadingtothegreatestdollarlossaswellasthemost instancesofdeathandinjurytooccupants. Buildingfiresarealsothemostcomplexandresourceintensivefirestocontrol.HollandFireDepartmentdatademonstrates thatbuilding fires require77minutes,onaverage, tomanage. Thiscompares with an average on‐scene time of 31minutes for all other fires. Evengiventhesecaveats,wereturntothefactthatoverthelastseveralyears,firesoccuraboutonceevery80hours,andthatmanyofthemresultinlowloss.It is important tonote that thecityhasbeenparticularlyeffective in reducing theriskoffire,particularlythroughitsrentalinspectionprogram.Thelowdollarlossescanalsobeattributedtoaggressiveanddisciplinedfirefightingefforts.Toevaluateperformance,theHollandFireDepartmenttrackspropertylostversusproperty saved. This can provide another important perspective regarding thedegree to which firefighter efforts result in limiting loss. We caution that thereneedstobeadisciplinedapproach ingatheringthisdata. Forexample,even ifanentirebuildingislost,thereisrationaletoincludetheexposedbuildingsnearbyinthepropertysaveddata,butcurrentdatacollectiondoesnotaccountforthis.Whentheoverallfrequencyoffiresislow,thesevariationsinpropertyvaluecandiminishtheusefulnessofdata for trendanalysisor tohelpmake short‐termmanagementdecisions.Thesecondmost importantcomponentof fireserviceworkloadisthedistributionofcallsbytimeofday.ThefollowingfigureillustratesthisdataforHolland.


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Inthelastthreeyears,84%offiredepartmentcallsforserviceoccurredbetween8amand11pm.The three‐year average for fires andhazardous conditions calls is285incidentsperyear.Thisequatestoabout9.8%ofallfiredepartmentresponses.A final consideration when evaluating workload is to analyze the likelihood ofmultipleresponsesduringthesameperiod.TheHollandFireDepartmentwasableto identify 320 times in 2008 that emergencies occurred concurrently. In 82%ofthesecasesasecondcallwasreceivedwhiletheotherstationwasalreadybusy.Intheremaining18%threeormorecallsoccurredinthesameperiod.However,itisnotknownif theseadditionalcallsresulted in longerresponsetimeordiminishedservice. Since this data collection effort is relatively recent, it is important tomonitoritclosely.


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PolicyOptionsOurobjective in conducting this studywas toprovideHollandwith severalpolicyoptions.Theseoptionsarepresented individually,but it is important to recognizethat elements of each can be adopted for usewith another. There are five policyoptionsdescribed:

• Retainseparatepoliceandfiredepartmentswhileintroducingorganizationalandoperationalefficiencies

• Re‐thinkthecommunity’sresponsetoemergencymedicalservices• Create a department of public safety that provides opportunities for

administrativeconsolidation,whilekeepingoperationsseparate• Createadepartmentofpublicsafetywith full integrationofpolice, fireand

EMS• Createregionalpoliceandfiredepartments

OptionOne.ImprovingEfficiencyintheHollandPoliceandFireDepartmentsItiscleartoustheHollandenjoysexcellentpoliceandfireservices.Theemployeesare highly motivated, and they work hard to make Holland a safer city. Bothdepartmentsenjoystrongcommunitysupport.Thatsaid,thereareopportunitiestoreducecostsintheseorganizations,whilemaintainingqualityservicedelivery.Thepolicedepartmentshouldcriticallyevaluateitscurrentworkschedule.HPDstafffeelsverystronglythatthereisastrongcorrelationbetweenitsperformanceanditsabilitytoconductextensivetraining.ThiscapabilityistiedtoaworkschedulethatschedulesallemployeestoworkonThursday.Itisdifficulttodirectlyquestionthisassertion,buttherearealotofreasonstothinkaboutthiscritically.First,the4‐10workscheduleslimitthedepartment’scapacitytorespondtoitsworkload.Thatis,atsometimesofdaythedepartmenthasmoreofficersonthestreetthanitneeds,whileatothersithastoofew.Second,thisworkschedulesignificantlyreducesthepercentageofofficersavailableforassignmenteachday.Finally,whileweagreethattrainingiscritical,mostpolicedepartments, includingsomeverygoodones,findawaytoprovidetraininginthecontextofamoreefficientworkschedule.29The police department should eliminate the practice of using sergeants asinvestigators and replace these positionswithpolice officers.Bestpractices suggestthatsergeantsshouldbesupervisors,andnottechnicalspecialists.Moreover,many

29 We, for example, question the use of training time for practice sessions for the honor guard. While the guard is certainly a very special aspect of the department, it seems that participants would be glad to use their off-duty time to perform these services.


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departments are now assigning police officers to investigative units, thuseliminating“detective”positions.Thisapproachaddsflexibilitybecauseit iseasierto rotate officers through assignments, and it helps to break down barriers tocommunicationbetweenpoliceunits.Thepolicedepartmentshouldconsiderreplacingswornevidencetechnicianswithnonsworn staff. Evidence from many communities suggests that should such anapproach would be beneficial. First, these non‐sworn personnel often haveeducational backgrounds that are more in line with the needs of the position.Substantialnumbersof criminal justice students, forexample, areas interested inthese types of positions as they are in a positions as a sworn officer. Second,evidence suggests that the salary for these non‐sworn positions is considerablylowerthanforswornofficers.Atthepresenttime,evidencetechniciansarepartoftheuniformedservicespool.Thechoiceastowhetherornottheseswornpositionsshould be retained or simply converted will depend, in part on other decisionsabout police department mission and performance standards. If the departmentchooses the 50% obligated time model, it only will need 23 officers assigned topatrol;some13lessthanthecurrentavailability.Thusitcouldeasilyabsorbthelossofthesepositions.Iftheychoosethe33%obligatedtimestandardtheywillneed34officers,so itwillbenecessary tomaintain theevidencetechniciansaspartof thefieldforce.The police department should stop the practice of dictating reports. A substantialpercentage of time for the department’s clerical staff is devoted to typing policereports. This is both costly, and it introduces the chance that critical errors intranscription will make their way into police reports. HPD officers alreadymakeextensiveuseofcomputersintheirwork‐thetransitiontoreportwritingshouldberelativelystraightforward.There isnoreason tobelieve that thiswill significantlyimpact police officer obligated time. In fact, there may be significant efficienciesbecauselesstimewillberequiredforqualitycontrol.Belowisatypicaldataentryscreen.30

30 http://www.visiontekinc.com/products/fl_screen3.aspx


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Therearemanycommerciallyavailableapplications.Bywayofexample,onesuchprogramwilldothefollowing:31

• Anofficerisonlypromptedtoenterinformationrelevanttotheincident.• Seamlesslyintegratestechnologytomimictraditionaldataentryformsinan

intuitiveenvironmentforconsistentdatacollectionthroughouttheapplication.

• Officerscanusethecentralindexmasterrecordtoqueryandaccesscrucialfilesforpeople,propertyand/orentities.

• Designedwithofficersinmind;refinedandimproveduponbyinputfromfieldofficersoverthepast20years.

• Writteninalanguagelawenforcementprofessionalsunderstand.• Straightforwardandintuitiveuserinterfacemakesitsimpleandnaturalfor

officerstolearnthetechnology.• Ensuresoptimalproductivitythroughitsabilitytofunctioninbotha

connectedanddisconnectedenvironment,thusenablingofficerstocreateandworkcaseswhileoutinthefield.Justliketakinganactualcasefolderoutintothefield,detectivescanbringcaseinformationtothescene.

• Officersonpatrolcansendandreceiveworkflowmessages.

31 http://www.motorola.com/business/US-EN/Motorola+Cruiser


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• TheOfficers'Notesfeaturereplacesthetraditionalloose‐leafnotepadwithanelectronicnotepad,providingthemobileofficerwithasimplemethodfortakingnotesanddocumentingdailyactivities.

• OfficerscanelectronicallyfilecorrespondingfieldinterviewnotesorsummarynarrativesaboutacasewiththeVirtualCaseFolder.

The fire department should examine its use of senior leadership. Fire departmentcaptainscurrentlyserveasshiftsupervisorsandworkthesameschedulesasotherfirefighters. Whenever a dispatch report indicates a high‐risk incident, captainsrespond to the scenewith engine companies. Captains also respondwhen otherpersonnelarealreadycommittedtoothercalls. Becausetheirprimaryfocus isonday‐to‐day operations, they have less time to spend onmatters such as planning,strategy, analysis, and community outreach.We recommend that the departmenteliminateshiftcaptains.Insteadthedepartmentshouldhavetwocaptains;onethatdirectsoperations,andtheotherthatdirectsadministration.Stationlieutenantscancoordinatedailyworkactivitiesat thestation level,withcaptainsprovidingbroadoversight. Irrespective of how the fire department should be reorganized, wesuggest that theybuild amanagement team that can shift their focus fromday todayoperationstootherissues.Atthepresenttimethecaptainsarepartoftheoperationsdeployment.Thatistheyare part of the eight members assigned to each shift. Under this proposal thenumberofpersonnelassignedtoeachshiftwilldroptoseven.Thiswillstillprovideadequatelevelsofpersonnelforreliefrelatedtounexpectedabsence,particularlyiftheminimumstaffinglevelswerereducedafter11:00PM.Thedepartmentshouldalsoconsiderusingpart‐paidstafftofillvacantslots.Thepoliceandfiredepartmentsshouldexaminetheiruseofminimumstaffinglevels.Both departments rely on this approach to establish the minimum number ofpersonnelonduty.Forthefiredepartmenttheminimumissixpersonsonduty;thepoliceminimumisvariable(duringFebruaryitwaseitherfiveorsix).Thefiredepartmentcouldreducetheminimumbetween11:00PMand7:00AM,ortheycouldusepart‐paidstafftofillvacantpositions.In thepolicedepartment there isastrong linkbetweentheminimumstaffingandtheworkschedule.Forexample,inordertohaveaminimumofsixofficersworkingonthedayshift,at least12officersmustbeassignedtothatshift(recall thatonly50%areassignedtoworkeachday).Ifanyofthesixassignedtoworktakesadayoff,itmustbefilledfromanothershiftorfromoff‐dutypersonnel.Bycontrast,if12officersworkeda5‐2schedule (8hourday)onanygivenday8officersof the12would be assigned to work (71%). Thus two officers could be off before thedepartmentreachedtheminimum.


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OptionTwo.ReengineerEmergencyMedicalServicesinHollandThe next three options address two fundamental questions about public safety inHolland.Tobeginweneedtodefinewhatservicesthecitywantstodeliver.Next,wehavetodecidethebestwaytodeliverthoseservices.Formuchofthe20thcenturyAmericanfiredepartmentswerenotinvolvedinmanyservicesbeyondfireprotection.Inthe1970’stherewasheightenedinterestinpre‐hospital emergency medical care and transportation. EMS (emergency medicalservice)emergedasanewfield todescribe theservicesprovided.Newterms likeemergency medical technician (EMT) and paramedic emerged. HFD adopted thisindustry‐wideapproach.Likemany fire departments, theHollandFireDepartment performs the basic likesupportrole(BLS).Theyrespondtomedicalcallsandwhennecessaryprovidecaretopatients.InsomecasestheyassisttheAMRcrewwithtreatment.As we have pointed out EMS calls constitute a significant portion if the firedepartment’swork. In fact,whilethenumberof firecallscontinuestodecline, thenumbers of EMS calls has been increasing. The critical issue is that the firedepartment is primarily organized for firefighting, but itswork is primarily EMS.Moreover, the brunt of EMS work is being done well by AMR at no expense totaxpayers.Given thesecircumstances,wecanconsider threeways toapproach thisproblem.First,thecitycouldassumeallresponsibilityforEMSinHolland,includingresponse,patient care and transportation. Because insurance companies typically cover thecostofemergencytransportation,thecitycouldbegintocollectthatrevenue32.Eventhoughthereisapotentialforrevenueinthisstrategy,implementationcostswouldbe very high because at the present time firefighters are rated as EMT’s and notparamedics.Inorderforthecitytoprovideadvancedlifesupporttheywouldneedtostaffambulanceswithparamedics,andthustherewouldbeasignificantandlong‐terminvestmentintrainingandequipment.Another possible approach is to shift EMS first response duties to the policedepartment. In this model police officers would be trained as Medical FirstResponders (MFR).This is considerably less training that that required forEMT’s.UponnotificationofapriorityoneortwoEMScall,apoliceofficerwouldrespondandprovideaiduntilthearrivalofAMR.Thereareanumberofreasonstobelievethatthisisagoodapproach:

32 The percentage of patients that pay these bills tend to vary by community-it is largely a function of the percentage of patients with health insurance.


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• Therearegenerallysixormoreofficersonpatrol inHolland. Inmostcasestheycouldarrivemorequicklythana firetruck,particularlygiventhetimenecessarytoloadthetruckandmaneuverthroughtraffic.

• This optionwould increase the police department’sworkload by about 10percent; there is enough excess capacity in the department to absorb thiswithnoadditionalresources.

• EMS first responsewould be providedwith a police vehicle, rather than afiretruck,thusreducingcostsforvehiclewearandtear.33

• The HPD provided these services previously. Many members of thedepartmentbelieveitwouldbegoodforthemtoresumethisservice.

• This approach works well in Holland Township where the Ottawa CountySheriffprovidesEMSfirstresponse,butdoesnotdotransportation.

Thefollowinggraphillustratesthedistributionofpoliceandfirecallsforservicebyhourofday(thepoliceactivityistheupperseries).

In2008therewere2112medicalcallsassignedtotheHFD.UsingtotalHFDcallsasaguideweestimatedthattheyweredistributedasfollows:

33 Holland sends a fire truck to EMS calls about one third of the time.


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Usingthesameapproachusedearlierwecanestimatetheeffectonpolicestaffing34. 00000800 08001600 16002400Calls 3412 7040 8355 TotalHours 2730 5632 6684 25% 3412.5 7040 8355 EMSHours 250 528 470 Total 3662.5 7568 8825 OffRequired 1.25 2.59 3.02 X1.7 2.5 4.4 5.1 50% 5 9 12 2633% 8 13 16 37By adding this workload35 wewill need an additional three officers under eitherperformance standard. The department currently has 37 officers in uniformedpatrol.36

34 We used data from HFD that suggested the typical EMS call consumed 25 minutes, although we believe that if the police were to assume these responsibilities the on-scene time might be less. 35 We included priority I and priority II EMS calls in this analysis. This workload can be reduced if the police are only dispatched to priority I calls. 36 Even if the department assumed EMS responsibilities they could still eliminate evidence technician spots as long as they adopted the 50% obligated time performance standard.


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A third possible approach is for the city to turn over EMS services to the privatesector. AMR is a fine company‐everyonewe interviewed reported that they do agreat job. AMR has assured us that they can provide all of the EMS services inHolland.Theyareunabletodoheavyrescue,andwould,onoccasion,requiresomesupportinpatientcare.AsaresulttheywouldhavetocallontheHFDonoccasion.Therearesomegoodexamplesofthisapproach.ThecityofCarbondaleIllinois,forexample, has a full time fire department that does firefighting and heavy rescueonly.AllEMSservicesareprovidedbyacounty‐wideambulanceservice.IfthecityweretochoosetoremoveEMSservicefromthefiredepartmentitwouldprovideasignificantopportunitytoreducestaff.Theremainingworkloadcouldbehandledwithfewerpersonnel.Underthesecondorthirdscenariosthestaffingforfireservicescouldbereduced from2 lieutenantsand5 firefightersonashift to2lieutenantsand3firefightersonashift.Inotherwords,underthismodelwewouldcontinuetostafftwostations.Each24hour shift would have 2 lieutenants and three firefighters. This would permit atleast twopersonnel onduty at each station; and on someoccasions therewill bethree.Intheeventofafirecallthedepartmentcoulddispatcheitheronetruck,onetruckandthepart‐paidforthatstation,twotrucks,twotrucksandthepartpaidforthe incident’s station, or two trucks and all the part‐paid. This model could bestrengthenedbyusingpart‐paidstaffatthefirestations,andbydevelopingamorecomprehensivesystemofmutualaidwithneighboringjurisdictions.Finally,thecitymayimproveperformancebydispatchingpoliceofficerstofirecalls.Inthiswaythepoliceofficer(who is likely toarrive first)candeterminethenatureandextentofthefire.Giventhesechangesinprocedure,thefireresponsewouldbeadequatetomeetconventionalresponseandsafetyobjectives.37Option Three. Consolidate theManagement and Administrative Activities ofthePoliceandFireDepartments.Onecommonapproachtoorganizingforthedeliveryofpublicsafetyservicesistore‐thinkhowthoseactivitiesarerelated.Inthetypicalcitygovernmentpolice,fire,andEMSactivitiesareviewedasuniquedomainsthatoccasionallycometogether.An alternative approach is to re‐think that notion; rather than think of them asseparateentities,considerthemasseparate,butrelatedpartsofthesamefunctionalarea.

37 U.S. Dept. of Labor reaffirms 2-in, 2-out rule for structural fires: OSHA requires a minimum of four individuals, consisting of two working as a team in the hazard area and two outside the hazard area (for assistance or rescue). The four need not be assigned to the same rig. Open letter of Asst. Secy. Joseph Dear to Int. Assn. of Fire Chiefs (Mar. 1997) citing Respiratory Protection Standard, 29 C.F.R. 1910.134. {N/R}


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Cities often use this “umbrella” approach to organizing diverse services. ConsidertheDepartmentofPublicWorksofColumbiaMissouri.Itsactivitiesinclude:

• Administration• Airport• BuildingMaintenance• ColumbiaTransit&Para‐Transit:BusServices• Engineering• FleetOperations• ParkingUtility• GetAboutColumbia:NonmotorizedTransportationPilotProgram• ProtectiveInspection• PublicWorksVolunteerProgram• SewerUtility• SolidWasteManagement• StormwaterManagement• StreetsandSidewalksMaintenance• Traffic

All of these units report to the same manager who is responsible, in part, forintegratingtheiractivities.

ItwouldbepossibletousesuchanapproachforpublicsafetyservicesinHolland.Inthismodel police and fire activitieswould remain distinct operationally, but bothunits would be part of the same organization and report to a director of publicsafety.Thisapproachisrelativelycommon.Forexample,inJanuary2006thecityofWashington,Utahbeganproviding services throughanewly formedPublic SafetyDepartmentthatconsistsoftheexistingFireDepartment,AnimalWelfareServices,Code Enforcement and the creation of a new Police Department. The director ofpublic safety also serves as chief of police. In Columbus Ohio the department ofpublicsafetyconsistsofthedivisionofpolice,divisionoffire,supportservicesandlicenses.

Adopting this type of public safety umbrella organization has several advantages.First,itwillprovideanopportunitytoeliminateoneormoreseniorlevelpositions.Moreover, it is an opportunity to consolidate the administrative activities of thepolice and fire departments. For example, administrative tasks like budgeting,human resources, labor relations, training, and resource deployment would bestreamlined. Finally, those activities that involveboth entities, such as emergencyplanning andmanagement, code enforcement, and community outreachwould becoordinatedinoneagency.Alloftheseimprovementscouldoccurwhileleavingthepolice and fire operations separate. Importantly, this strategy may lay thegroundworkifthecitydecidestoconsolidateoperationsatafuturetime.

For this approach to be successful it is important that the lines of authority areclearlydefined.Thatis, it is importantthatthedirectornotbecomea“figurehead”


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whileothersrunthepoliceandfiredepartments.Ifthisoccursthecitywillhavenotaccomplishedmuch.Infact,thisextralayerofbureaucracymightjustmakethingsworse.Belowwehaveillustratedapossiblemodelforsuchintegration.38

OptionFour.CreateaFullyIntegratedDepartmentofPublicSafety

Whenthisprojectbegan,therewasagenerallyheldbeliefthatthecitywasmovingtowards the creation of a department of public safety in which “public safetyofficers”wouldprovidelawenforcement,firefighting,andEMSservices.Therewas,of course, good reason to believe that this might happen, because manycommunitiesinMichiganhaveadoptedthisapproachwithgreatsuccess.Inspiteofthis,wefoundthatmostpoliceandfirefightersinHollandwereopposedtosuchaplan‐somehavebeenoutspokenintheiropposition.

InordertoassesswhetherthepublicsafetyconsolidationmakessenseforHollandit is important to understand how this model provides efficiency. Traditionally,police and fire departments manage resource deployments differently. For mostcommunitiesfiresuppressionresponsetimeisofcriticalimportance.Asaresult,thetypical approach to resource deployment is to strategically locate equipment andpersonnel, so as to ensure an optimal response. Ideally, at the moment that thealarmsoundsthedepartmentwantstohaveitsresourcesavailable.

In the 1950’s police officers began to patrol primarily in cars. As communicationsystemsmadeiteasiertokeepincontactwithofficers,policedepartmentsshiftedtheir emphasis. Whereas their mission had always been “watching” to ensure 38 This organizational chart is only meant to be illustrative or an alternative organizational structure.


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community safety, they began to focusmore on “waiting” to respond to calls forservice.Thewidespreadimplementationofthe9‐1‐1emergencytelephonesystemresultedintheinundationofpoliceresources.

Currently many communities face two challenges. First, as the numbers of firescontinuestodecline,peoplequestionthecostassociatedwithfirefighterswaitinginstations for relatively infrequent events. Second, in spite of ever‐increasingdemandsontheirpolicedepartments,communitiesareunableorunwillingtoaddmoreofficers.

The public safety officer idea is a logical solution to this dilemma. It can be bestunderstoodbyexaminingtheKalamazooDepartmentofPublicSafety(KDPS).Theconsolidateddepartmentwasformedin1982.Priortoimplementation,thecityhad160 police officers and 140 firefighters. Upon integration 21 positions wereeliminatedlargelythroughincentivesforearlyretirement.

Todaythedepartmenthas243swornpublicsafetyofficers.Theoperationsdivisionis primarily responsible for response to calls for police and fire services, whichincludes initialcriminal investigations, firesuppressionactivities,medical rescues,traffic control measures, and accident investigations. Additionally, Operations isresponsible for specialized functions, such as Traffic Enforcement, Canine (K‐9)Unit,HonorGuard,SpecialWeaponsandTactics(SWAT)Team,CommunityPublicSafetyUnit(CPSU),BombSquad,FieldTrainingOfficerProgram,andExplorersPost.

Thereare191officers in theoperationsdivision,39ofwhomchoose through thebidselectionprocesstoworkfulltimeinthestationstodofirefightingandEMS.Intheeventofa fire,personnelat thestationsdrive theapparatus to thescene,andofficersinpatrolvehiclesareassignedtorespondtothescene.Underthisapproachthedepartmentcansendbetween18and24officerstoafire.Interestingly,becausetheofficersincarsoftenarriveonscenefirst,theycanadviseaboutthenatureoftheincident‐they can either slow down or escalate the response. All public safetyofficers have four‐year degrees, Michigan police officer and firefighter II and Icertifications. They are certified as Medical First Responders. Coincidentally,Kalamazoo also uses a private ambulance company for EMS. KDPS dispatchesofficers to assist, but they recently stopped dispatching fire trucks to these callsbecauseofthecost.39

39 Kalamazoo utilized Ford Explorers for EMS response vehicles. A KDPS captain reported that dps officers actually provide medical care in less than one half of one percent of all EMS cases.


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ThefigurebelowillustratestheorganizationalstructurefortheKalamazooDepartmentofPublicSafety.

DuringourdiscussionsinHollandmanyindividualshaveraisedquestionsaboutthepublicsafetyapproach.IposedsomeofthosequestionstothestaffoftheKDPS.

1. Policing and firefighting are really different professions. They requiredifferent skills andabilities tobe successful. InKalamazoo therewassomeresistanceinthetransitionperiod,butitwasmodest.Overtimetheyhavefoundthat“firefightersdoagreatjobaspoliceofficers,”andthat police officers “love firefighting”. Of course, new officersunderstandthatthejobentailsbothresponsibilities.

2. Itwillbehardtofindpeoplethatwanttodobothjobs. Thelasttimetheygaveanexamination forpublic safetyofficer they received300applicationsforsixpositions.

3. Whenabigfireoccursallpoliceactivitiesareinterrupted.Firesofthisscopeareveryinfrequent.Iftheydooccurthedepartmentcancallin


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another shift early, or use some of the officers in administrative orinvestigativepositions,allofwhomaretrainedasfirefighters.

4. If you combine these functions neither will perform as well as if theywereseparate. KDPShasasophisticatedorganizationwiththesamedegree of knowledge and expertise you would find in mostcommunities.Intheareasofemergencypreparednessandhomelandsecurity thepublic safety conceptworksmuchbetter,because thereare fewer barriers to communication and less conflict related todifferentmissions.

AnotherexampleofafullyintegratedpublicsafetydepartmentistheGrandHavenDepartment of Public Safety (GHDPS). We interviewed senior leadership in theagency concerning their department. TheGHDPSwas created in the early 1990’s.They currently employ 36 fully cross‐trained public safety officers and twopersonnel that do firefighting only. All public safety officers (including seniorleadership) are certifiedpolice officers, complete Firefighter I and II training, andare certifiedmedical first responders. The department operates fromone station.The station is staffed24hours aday so as to ensure that someone is available todrivethefireapparatustoafirecall.40

Intheeventofafirethefiretruckissenttothescene,andtwoofthefouron‐dutypublicsafetyofficersaredispatched.Ifthereisanactualfiretheeight“paidoncall”firefighters are notified. The department also maintains a strong mutual aidagreementwithGrandHavenTownshipsoastoprovideadditionalresources.Whenit is appropriate todoso, thedepartmentwill release thepublic safetyofficers toreturntopatrolduties.Thisisonlydonewhenthereareadequatenumbersofpaidoncallstaffonscene.41

LikeHolland,aprivateambulanceservesGrandHaven.GHDPSwillrespondtoEMSpriorityonecallstoassist.TheyhavestoppedthepracticeofsendingafiretrucktoEMScallsbecauseofthecost.

TheGHDPShashadnodifficultyfindinghighlyqualifiedapplicantsforpublicsafetyofficerpositions.Manycomewithbothpoliceandfirefightercertifications.

ThepublicsafetyapproachiswellacceptedinGrandHaven.Thechiefreportedthatthebiggestproblemtheyhaveisthatbecauseoftheirtwo‐disciplineapproachtheyarenotwellregardedbyother firedepartments. Ironically, thechiefsuggests thathispersonnelareactuallybettertrainedthanotherfirefighters.

40 This can be formal or informal. That is, if the chief or captain is at the station, that meets this requirement. 41 We were told that Grand Haven will release public safety officers and let other township fire departments do clean-up work. The chief strongly denied this assertion.


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IntermsofHollandtherearetwoquestionsaboutpublicsafetyconsolidation.Thefirst is whether the department could do it? The answer to this is clearly yes.Although there would be costs associated with such an effort, and there iswidespreadoppositionfromemployeegroups,itseemsclearthatthepublicsafetyleadershipinthecityhastheabilitytomakethiswork.Therearegreatmodelsforemulation in Michigan, and I believe that many of the problems encountered byotheragenciescouldbeavoided.

It is harder to say whether the city should adopt the public safety approach,particularly if theprincipalobjective istosavemoney.Themainadvantageofthismodelisthatitpermitsacommunitytoreducestaffinginfirestations,andtransferallorpartof thoseresources topatrol.Thereare tworeasonswhy thismightnotmake sense forHolland. First, because the fire department uses part‐paid staff, ithas already eliminated some of the excess capacity thatwould be required if thevolunteers were not available. Second, it does not make much sense to addresourcestothepolicedepartment,becausetheyhavesufficientcapacity.


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Itdoesappearthat,inthelongrun,theconsolidatedapproachismoreefficient.InOakParkMichigan(population30,000),forexample,theDepartmentofPublicSafetyisstaffedby66full‐timeofficers,whoarecross‐trainedasbothpoliceofficersandfirefighters.Allofficersperformdutiesofeachdiscipline.TheDepartmenthas11police‐markedpatrolunits,andfourfiretrucks.ThePublicSafetyDepartmentrespondstomorethan19,000callseachyear,includingpolice,fireandemergencymedical.Holland,withasimilarworkload,employs88swornemployees.

Option Five. Adopt Regional orMetropolitan Forms of Public Safety ServiceDelivery

TheHollandareahasremarkablemixofcommunitiesandgovernmentalstructures.Theyinclude:

• Coopersville• AllendaleCharterTownship• OliveTownship• Ferrysburg• BlendonTownship• ParkTownship• GrandHaven• ChesterTownship• PolktonCharterTownship• Holland• CrockeryTownship• PortSheldonTownship• Hudsonville• GeorgetownCharterTownship• RobinsonTownship• SpringLake• GrandHavenCharterTownship• SpringLakeTownship• Zeeland• HollandCharterTownship• TallmadgeCharterTownship• JamestownCharterTownship• WrightTownship• ZeelandCharterTownship

Moreover,asignificantportionofHollandislocatedinAlleganCounty,thusmakingregional cooperation even more complicated. Given the demographics andgeography of the region, it seems that there are opportunities for the sharing ofpublicsafetyservices.

There are good examples of cooperation. The Ottawa County 9‐1‐1 center is anoutstanding example of pooling resources to improve resources.Holland also has


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introduced successful district library systems, aWestMichiganAirport Authority,andtheMAXPublicTransitSystem.

TheHolland area also uses extensive use of contract policing, principally throughthe Ottawa County Sheriff. The sheriff provides contract deputies at a rateequivalenttothedirectcostsforthedeputyandavehicle.Costsforinvestigations,supervision and other indirect costs are borne by the county. This is extremely“gooddeal”forthecontractingagencies.Theyreceivehighqualitypolicingservicesatacost that theycouldnotbegintomatch if theyweretoprovidetheseservicesthemselves.Forexample,iftheOttawaSheriffweretoprovidepolicingservicesforthe city ofHolland (under the samemodel described above) he could do sowithbetween23and34 contractdeputies, dependingon theexpected level of service.Using an estimate of $100,000 annual cost per deputy, the total cost would bebetween $2,300,000 and $3,400,000. The current HPD budget is in excess of$7,000,000.

It isclearthattheHollandregioncouldbenefitfromsharingofservices.Theexactformoftheserelationshipsshouldbethesubjectofdiscussionbetweentheparties.Inourdiscussionswithotherregionalstakeholderstherewasconsiderableinterest,butadmittedly,therewasmoreinterestonthefiresidethanonthepoliceside.

ArecentanalysisbyMichiganStateUniversityprovidesalegalanalysisofthecreation of fire (and police) districts. It is available on‐line through theuniversity.42

42 http://www.aec.msu.edu/government/firedist.htm


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CostAnalysis

In this section we outline the potential costs and savings related to the policyoptions.

OptionOne:DepartmentEfficiencies

Convert5detectivesergeantstopoliceofficerpositions

Salary Benefits(40%)

Total X5 Savings

Sergeants 66310 26,524 92,834 464,170 49,938PoliceOfficer 59176 23,670 82,846 414,232

Replace6policeofficersassignedasevidencetechnicianswithnon‐swornstaff.


Total X6 Savings

EvidenceTechnicians

32,000 12,800 44800 268,800 228,27643

PoliceOfficer 59,176 23,670 82,846 497,076

Eliminate dictation of police reports‐probable reduction of 3 FTE clerical supportstaff.


Total X3 Savings

DeskClerk 41,134 16,453 57,587 172,762 172,762

Eliminateonefirecaptain


Total Savings

FireCaptain 68,441 27,376 95,817 95,817

43 This savings would only occur if the police officer positions were eliminated and replaced by non-sworn staff.


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OptionTwo:AnewapproachtoEMS

1. Reducefiredepartmentstaffingfrom2lieutenantsandfivefirefighterspershiftto2lieutenantsand3firefighterspershift.


Total X6 Savings

FireFighter 60,039 24,015 84,054 504,327 504,327

MedicalFirstResponderTrainingfor25policeofficers:48hours(Canbedoneon‐line)cost$800.00=$20,000.

OptionThree:AdministrativeConsolidation

1.Eliminateonechief,threepolicecaptains,andtwofirecaptains.Addthreedeputydirectors.44


Total Savings

Chief 102,406 40,962 143,386 143,396PoliceCaptain

72,030 28,812 100,842 X3 302,526

FireCaptain 68,441 27,376 95,817 X2 191,634DeputyDirector

80,000 32,000 112000 X3 336,000

NetSavings 301,556

OptionFour:CreateaFullyIntegratedDepartmentofPublicSafety

Webelievethatthesavingsidentifiedinoptionstwoandthreewouldcarryoverinthismodel,although,uponfull implementation,itmaybepossibletomakefurtherreductions in staff required toman fire stations. The biggest costs for thismodelwouldbe related to training.The citywouldbe required to certify all the currentpoliceofficers (62) as firefighter (I and II), and, in addition,wouldbe required toobtainpoliceofficercertificationforapproximately20firefighters.45

There are many institutions in Michigan that provide certification training. TheGrandValleyStateUniversityhasapoliceacademyinAllendale.Theprogramlasts16weeksandcostsapproximately$5800.00.Atypical fireacademyprogramlasts 44 I utilized $ 80,000 as a salary for these positions. It may be necessary to add a lieutenant’s position to the police department, thus reducing some of the savings. 45 At this time the Holland Police Department requires two years of college as a minimum requirement. It is unclear, how many HFD staff would meet this requirement.


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10weeksandcosts$3500.00.Thusthecost forthetrainingalone(excludingtimelost and possible overtime) is $217,000 to certify the police as firefighters and$116,000tocertifythefirefightersaspoliceofficers.

We can also anticipate a number of expenses incidental to the implementationincluding:

• Equipment• Uniforms• NewBranding• Integrationofrecordkeeping• PossibleLitigation


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Implementation

TheCityofHollandMichiganengagedourfirmtoconductarigorousexaminationofpublicsafetyservicesinthecity.Inadditiontostudyingthepoliceandfiredepartments,wewerealsochargedwithexploringalternativemechanismstoprovidetheseservices.

Inreviewingthisreportitisimportanttorecallthatoneoftheunderlyingpremisesofthisstudywasthatthelevelofspendingforpublicsafetyservicesisnotsustainable,giventhecurrentfiscalenvironment.Becauseofthatassumption,mostofourworkfocusedonwaystoreducecostswithoutdemonstrablyreducingservices.Webelievewehavedonethat.

Inconsideringtheimplementationofthesepolicyoptionsitisimportanttorealizethatmanyofthesechangeswillbelabor‐intensive,requiringsignificantsupportfromcitystaff.Moreover,thereislikelytobesignificantresistancefromemployeegroups.Asaresult,itisimportantthatanyimplementationstrategyshouldfocusontransparencyandinclusiveness.

Werecommendthatanimplementationworkinggroupshouldbeestablished.ThisgroupshouldbemodeledafterthePublicSafetyStudyCommittee,withamplerepresentationofcitystaff,policeandfiredepartmentseniorstaff,employeegroupsandelectedofficials.

Eachpolicyoptionhasuniqueimplementationchallenges.Forsimplicitywewilldescribethemseparately.

OptionOne.IncreaseEfficiencyinthePoliceandFireDepartments

Insomerespectsthisistheleastdifficultsetofrecommendations,butwill,nonethelessbedifficult.

• Theadministrationofthepolicedepartmentisresistanttochangingthedepartment’sworkschedule.Theybelievethattheyaremakingtheoptimaluseoftheiruniformedpersonnel.Fromananalyticalstandpoint,webelievethatresourceallocationcouldbeimproved,butthecitymaydecidethatitiswillingtoacceptsomedegreeofinefficiencyinfavorofotherbenefits.

• Thepolicedepartmentagreesthatitisnotappropriatetousesupervisorsasinvestigators.Itisclear,thatasdetectivesergeantpositionsareeliminatedthesepositionsshouldbereplacedbypoliceofficers.Thecitymaydecide


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thattheyshouldprovideincentivesfordetectivesergeantsnearingretirementtodosoaheadofschedule.

• Thedepartment’suseofincidentreportdictationislaborintensive,andhasthepotentialtointroduceerrorsintopolicereports.Thedepartmentshouldinvestigateupgradingitsinformationtechnologytopermitofficerstocompletereportsinthefieldoncomputers.Asthattechnologybecomesintegrated,thedepartmentshouldre‐examinetheclericalsupportstaff,andmaketheappropriatereductions.

• Usingnon‐swornstaffasevidencetechniciansmakesgoodsense.During2008,thesixevidencetechnicianofficersspenttheirtimeasfollows:46

o 480.25HoursinBookingo 683.75HoursinCrimeSceneProcessingo 404.50HoursinHPDLab

Thus,theentirespecializedresponsibilityforthisgroupwas1,568hoursorlessthanoneFTE.Itseemsclearthatthisworkcouldbeeasilydonebyasmallnumberofnon‐swornpersonnel.

• TheHollandFireDepartmentshouldre‐thinkitsapproachtoorganizationalstructure.Thefirechiefneedsseniorleadershiptoassisthimwithboththeday‐to‐dayandlong‐termmanagementofthedepartment.Thedepartmentshouldceasetheuseofcaptainstooverseetheshifts.Twonewsenior‐level,exemptpositionsshouldbecreated,onetooverseeoperations,theothertooverseeadministration.Thiswillrequirethepreparationofjobdescriptions,andthedevelopmentofatestingprocedure.

OptionTwo:ANewApproachtoEMS

Wehaveillustratedseveralalternativeapproachestothedeliveryofemergencymedicalservices.Inordertomoveforwardthecity’spolicy‐makersmustaddressthreecorequestions:

• Isthecitypreparedtoreducethenumberoffull‐timepaidfirefighters?• ShouldthecitytransferEMSfirstresponsedutiestothepolicedepartment?• Shouldthecity“getoutof”theEMSbusiness;transferringthese

responsibilitiestoAMR?

Ofcourse,thekeyissueinthisarenaiswhattodoaboutthefiredepartment.Ifthecityisnotpreparedtomakethefiredepartmentsignificantlysmaller,itprobablymakessensetomaintainthestatusquo.If,however,theyarepreparedtodosotheymustdecidewhethertheresponsibilityforfirstresponseshouldbeshiftedtothepolicedepartment.Thepolicedepartmentiswillingtotakeonthatresponsibility, 46 HPD Annual Report, 2008. These officers also worked in patrol.


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andtheyhavesufficientcapacity.ThecitycouldalsoallowAMRtotakeovertheEMSactivities.OnewaytoensurecontinuedoutstandingperformanceistostructureanagreementthatallowsAMRexclusiveauthorityforEMSworkinHollandinexchangeformeetingperformanceobjectives.Iftheyareunableorunwillingtomeettheseobjectives,thecitycouldopentheprocesstootherfirms.

OptionThree:AdministrativeConsolidation

ThisoptionoffersauniqueopportunityfortheCityofHolland.Tobegin,itisachancetomakethecity’sorganizationmoreefficientbyreducingbyonethedirectreportstothecitymanager.Itmakessensefromafunctionalperspective,becauseithelpstoestablishthestrategicrelationshipbetweenlawenforcementandfireactivities.Thismodelalsostreamlinesthetwodepartmentsbyeliminatingduplicationofservices.Finally,themorethatthecityintegratespublicsafetyservicesatthetop,theeasieritwillbetobegintheprocessofintegrationatoperationallevels.Atfirst,theseniorstaffofthedepartmentwillbetheonlymembersconcernedwithbothpoliceandfire.Overtime,thatinterestwillcertainlyworkitswaythroughouttheorganization.

Tobeginthisprocessthecitymusthireadirectorofpublicsafety.Aspartofthatprocessthecityshouldprepareastrategicplanforthenewdepartment.Thiswillhelpguidethechoiceforadirector.Thecityshouldthenhirethreeassistantdirectorpositionstocompletetheseniorstaff.

OptionFour:CreateaFullyIntegratedDepartmentofPublicSafety

Thisoptionrepresentsasignificantchangeinthewaypublicsafetyservicesareprovided.Itembracesastrategythatsaysthatallofthedutiesthatareperformedbythepoliceandfiredepartmentsasseparateorganizationsandbydistinctgroupsofpersonnelcanbeperformedbyoneorganizationandonegroupofemployees.Becauseoftheenormityofthischange,itissafetoassumethatimplementationwillbecomplexanddifficult.Nonetheless,giventherelativesuccessofthismodelforservicedelivery,thisseemsverydoable.Infact,experiencesuggeststhatagenciesthathaveadoptedthisapproachareenthusiasticaboutsharingtheirexperiences.

Ifthecitydecidestoadoptthisapproach,theywillbewellservedtofirstimplementoptionthree.Thatis,muchcanbelearnedandaccomplishedbycreatingtheadministrativestructuretosupportaphased,incrementaladoption.Byadoptingoptionthree,thecitycanbegintheprocessofdevelopingstrategy,budgets,andprotocolsthatsupportfurtherintegration.


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Ifthecitydecidestocreateafullyintegrateddepartmentofsafety,therearewaystominimizetheimpactsofthislevelofchange.Forexample,ifastaffreductionisindicated,asystemoffinancialincentivescouldbeusedtoencouragememberstoseparate.Oncethecityreachedthedesiredstaffingleveltheycouldbegintheprocessofcrosstrainingforpoliceofficersandfirefighters.Thiscouldbedoneincrementally,soastonotdisruptoperations.Importantly,asvacanciesoccurpublicsafetyofficersshouldfillthem.

OptionFive:SharePoliceandFireServicesintheRegion.

Thesharingofpublicsafetyservicesremainsproblematicinmostareas.Inmostcasesitmakesgoodsensetoformthesecollaborations‐theUnitedStatessurelydoesnotbenefitfrommaintaining16,000policedepartmentsandsome30,000firedepartments,buteffortstoconsolidatethesegroupshavebeenrelativelyunsuccessful.

Findingopportunitiestoshareservicesrequiresstrongleadershipandthewillingnesstoworktowardsacommongoal.Oneofthebestapproaches,MABAS(MutualAidBoxAlarmSystem)hasrecentlycometoMichigan.

MABASisamutualaidorganizationthathasbeeninexistencesincethelate1960s.HeavilyrootedthroughoutnorthernIllinois,MABASnowincludesover750memberfiredepartmentsorganizedwithin75divisions.MABASfirstcametoWisconsinin1987upontheadmissionoftheVillageofPleasantPrairieinKenoshaCounty.MABASdivisionsgeographicallyspanthestatesofIllinois,Wisconsin,Indiana,Missouri,andMichigan.OtherstatessuchasMinnesota,Iowa,andOhio,areconsideringjoining.Thereare16establishedWisconsindivisions(asofMay2008)whoshareMABASwiththe62divisionsestablishedinIllinois.

MABASincludesover25,000+firefightersanddailystaffedemergencyresponseunitsincludingmorethan950firestations,1100+enginecompanies,375+laddertrucks,800+ambulances(mostlyparamediccapable),150+heavyrescuesquads,135+lightrescuesquads,and275+watertankers.Fire/EMSreserve(back‐up)unitsaccountformorethan600additionalemergencyvehicles.MABASalsooffersspecializedoperationsteamsforhazardousmaterials(HAZMAT),underwaterrescue/recovery(DIVE)andabovegrade/belowgrade,trenchandbuildingcollapserescues,a.k.a.TechnicalRescueTeams.Additionalelementsofresourcearethecertifiedfireinvestigatorsthatcanbe"packaged"asteamsforlargerincidentsrequiringcomplicatedandtime‐consumingeffortsforanysingleagency.

AnothergreatopportunityforHollandwouldbetheshareduseofpart‐paidfirefighters.Acommoncomplaintofthefiredepartmentsisthatitisdifficulttoensurethatadequatenumbersofvolunteerswillrespondtoafire.Giventheproximityofthecityandtownships,itseemsthatitwouldgoodsensetopoolthoseresources.Inotherwords,createalargegroupofwell‐trainedfirefightersthatcanmoveeasilybetweenthecommunities.


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Recenteventssuggestthatopinionaboutsharingofservicesmaybechanging.Considerthefollowing:

WestchesterCounty,NewYork,PromotesSharingOfServicesToSaveMoney.

TheNewYorkTimes(5/3/2009)reported,"Inthefaceofincreasinglyangrytaxpayers,publicofficialsinWestchesterarescramblingtoshrinktheirbudgets.Thefinancialcrisishasgivennewurgencytoamunicipalconsolidationmovementthathassputteredinthecountysincethe1970s.Somemunicipalitiesareconsideringtheirowneliminationormergingwithothersandmanymoretownsandvillagesareconsideringsharingservicesmorewidely."NewYorkGov.DavidA.Paterson"haskeptpressureonmunicipalitiestofindwaystosavemoney."Yet"fordecades,proposalstomergepoliceandfiredepartmentsinWestchesterhavefacedoppositionfromtaxpayerswhoprefercommunity‐basedservicesandunionsthatwanttoprotectjobs."Thatissaidtobechangingand"WestchestergovernmentisactivelypromotingcountywidecollaborationandissponsoringaconferenceonsharedservicesonJune2forlocalgovernments,schoolsandspecialdistricts.

TheprincipalchallengetosharingofservicesinHollandistocreatetheatmosphereamonglocalpoliticianstobeginthatdialogue.Giventheeconomicenvironmentthetimemayberight.

Documents

City of Holland, Michigan Public Safety Services · Holland, Michigan Public Safety Services ... Household Income $44,620 53,202 ... 31101 7 57 36