Citizen Participation in BudgetingAuthor(s): Fremont James LydenSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1977), pp. 194-195Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/974335 .

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

ment, a top-down pattern of legal authority for decision and appointment, and relatively perma- nent tenure in management positions. In commu- mity systems, differentiation of labor and manage- ment is less strict, legal authority for decision and appointment rises from the bottom, and manage- ment tenure is based on periodic elections.

These differences between enterprise and community types are reflected in the substantial differences in the magnitude of participation encouraged for the general membership. For the enterprise type, such participation is largely limited to determining means for achieving managerially established policies and goals. In the community type the general membership role in goal and policy decisions is more dominant.

It appears, then, that the pattern of organiza- tional participation possible depends heavily upon the organization's accepted role in the larger society. In countries such as the United States where the enterprise model prevails, participation is necessarily limited by the segmental role of work institutions in the larger society. By and large, work places are not seen as vehicles for meeting the full range of human needs, but as providing certain specific services or goods to the larger society. Their success and survival depend largely upon the efficiency and effectiveness with which they are perceived to have provided services or goods.

If this perception applies equally to public sector organizations, it has important implications for the American public service. The evidence is that it does so apply, that government also is seen as the provider of specific services to the society, and its efficiency in doing so is the primary factor in the society's appraisal of it. In this context, what are the real boundaries of worker participa- tion in the public bureaucracy? Is there the discretion that seems to be assumed in contempo- rary management movements? A recent issue of the Public Administration Review devoted substantial attention to management by objectives (MBO). The opening piece by Jong S. Jun defines MBO "as a process whereby organizational goals and objec- tives are set through the participation of organiza- tional members in terms of results expected" ("Management by Objectives in the Public Sec- tor," Public Administration Review, Vol. 36 (January/February 1976), p. 3). If the industrial model fits the public service in the United States, how extensive can participation be in setting objectives?

ment, a top-down pattern of legal authority for decision and appointment, and relatively perma- nent tenure in management positions. In commu- mity systems, differentiation of labor and manage- ment is less strict, legal authority for decision and appointment rises from the bottom, and manage- ment tenure is based on periodic elections.

These differences between enterprise and community types are reflected in the substantial differences in the magnitude of participation encouraged for the general membership. For the enterprise type, such participation is largely limited to determining means for achieving managerially established policies and goals. In the community type the general membership role in goal and policy decisions is more dominant.

It appears, then, that the pattern of organiza- tional participation possible depends heavily upon the organization's accepted role in the larger society. In countries such as the United States where the enterprise model prevails, participation is necessarily limited by the segmental role of work institutions in the larger society. By and large, work places are not seen as vehicles for meeting the full range of human needs, but as providing certain specific services or goods to the larger society. Their success and survival depend largely upon the efficiency and effectiveness with which they are perceived to have provided services or goods.

If this perception applies equally to public sector organizations, it has important implications for the American public service. The evidence is that it does so apply, that government also is seen as the provider of specific services to the society, and its efficiency in doing so is the primary factor in the society's appraisal of it. In this context, what are the real boundaries of worker participa- tion in the public bureaucracy? Is there the discretion that seems to be assumed in contempo- rary management movements? A recent issue of the Public Administration Review devoted substantial attention to management by objectives (MBO). The opening piece by Jong S. Jun defines MBO "as a process whereby organizational goals and objec- tives are set through the participation of organiza- tional members in terms of results expected" ("Management by Objectives in the Public Sec- tor," Public Administration Review, Vol. 36 (January/February 1976), p. 3). If the industrial model fits the public service in the United States, how extensive can participation be in setting objectives?

Peter F. Druker in another article in the same PAR symposium suggests that, through the partici- patory process of objective setting in MBO, conse- quences will be to increase "responsibility and commitment within the organization; [and] ... make possible self-control on the part of mana- gerial and professional people" ("What Results Should You Expect? A Users' Guide to MBO," Public Administration Review, Vol. 36 (January/ February 1976), p. 18), It is fair to ask, if the cul- tural and political enviornment of the community organization is not present, can there be "self-con- trol" in a public bureaucracy? Perhaps the con- temporary emphasis in the management literature on self-control and development is misleading and frustration-producing, colliding as it does with the enviornment of public bureaucracies which demands efficiency in the production of specific public boals and services.

The policy role of administration in the public sector is recognized in the United States. But the idea that the public bureaucracy could, or should, have autonomy in defining its mission has never been seriously discussed. Widely accepted doc- trines of accountability and responsibility have always required that public bureaucracies act primarily in the interests of the citizenry at large, as these interests are externally defined. The ideals of public service and selflessness would appear to be largely incompatible with worker participation in the civil service.

Significantly, Adizes' discussion of the com- munity organization is limited to the non-govern- mental sector. An intriguing analysis would be the doctrine of self-management in the Yugoslavian public service.

Richard Chackerian Florida State University

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

IN BUDGETING

More than ten years have gone by since Congress mandated "maximum feasible participa- tion" of the poor in OEO-sponsored Community Action Programs. Most government agencies now try, in one way or another, to include citizen participation in their policy decisions. Some have been at least moderately successful, especially

Peter F. Druker in another article in the same PAR symposium suggests that, through the partici- patory process of objective setting in MBO, conse- quences will be to increase "responsibility and commitment within the organization; [and] ... make possible self-control on the part of mana- gerial and professional people" ("What Results Should You Expect? A Users' Guide to MBO," Public Administration Review, Vol. 36 (January/ February 1976), p. 18), It is fair to ask, if the cul- tural and political enviornment of the community organization is not present, can there be "self-con- trol" in a public bureaucracy? Perhaps the con- temporary emphasis in the management literature on self-control and development is misleading and frustration-producing, colliding as it does with the enviornment of public bureaucracies which demands efficiency in the production of specific public boals and services.

The policy role of administration in the public sector is recognized in the United States. But the idea that the public bureaucracy could, or should, have autonomy in defining its mission has never been seriously discussed. Widely accepted doc- trines of accountability and responsibility have always required that public bureaucracies act primarily in the interests of the citizenry at large, as these interests are externally defined. The ideals of public service and selflessness would appear to be largely incompatible with worker participation in the civil service.

Significantly, Adizes' discussion of the com- munity organization is limited to the non-govern- mental sector. An intriguing analysis would be the doctrine of self-management in the Yugoslavian public service.

Richard Chackerian Florida State University

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

IN BUDGETING

More than ten years have gone by since Congress mandated "maximum feasible participa- tion" of the poor in OEO-sponsored Community Action Programs. Most government agencies now try, in one way or another, to include citizen participation in their policy decisions. Some have been at least moderately successful, especially

MARCH/APRIL 1977 MARCH/APRIL 1977

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ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

when they have elicited response on an issue-by- issue basis. Determining citizen preferences in constructing and enacting program budgets, how- ever, is a more complex problem. Not only must one ascertain the different preference weights citizens assign to each program, in addition it is necessary to determine how strong a citizen's preference is for each program when differing amounts of resources are available. Small wonder that most government agencies have made little progress in effectively incorporating citizen partici- pation into the budget process.

Thomas Stewart and Linda Gelberd now assert they have developed an approach for accomplish- ing this end ("Analysis of Judgment Policy: A New Approach for Citizen Participation in Plan- ning," Journal of the American Institute of Plan- ners, Vol. 42 No. 1 (January 1976), pp. 33-41). They ask citizens to indicate their relative spend- ing preferences for several different budgets, each budget showing variations in dollar allocations for each budget category. Using regression and correla- tion techniques, they categorize the nature and strength of the preferences of each respondent for each budget category. They may find, for exam- ple, that a respondent has a high preference for community development up to a certain spending level, after which the relative preference for this program over other budget programs decreases. Or perhaps the preference for community develop- ment remains high in relation to other budget programs regardless of the spending level.

The authors tested this approach by construct- ing a budget which allocates funds among five spending categories - community development, greenbelts, sewer and water expansion, and public information. It is assumed that a fixed amount of money is available to be distributed among the five categories. Using a table of random numbers, the authors generate 30 different allocation plans for distributing funds among the five categories. Each of the 30 different spending plans represents a different combination of levels of spending in the

five categories. Then each member of the city council of Boulder, Colorado, and the officers of several citizens' groups were asked to rate each of the 30 plans on a 20 point scale of desirability. Two weeks later the councilmen were asked to predict how the officers from two of the citizen groups had rated the 30 plans.

On the whole, the councilmen turned out to be poor predictors, in spite of the fact that the citizens' groups were well known and had regular interactions with the council. Correlations be- tween the councilmen's predictions and the actual responses of the officers of the citizens' groups ranged from -.08 to .75, with a median of .44. The pattern of consistency of the officers' choices, on the other hand, was such that the Stewart-Gelberd instrument could have predicted their judgments with an accuracy (correlation) ranging from .71 to .94, with a median of .81.

Use of this method would appear to improve significantly the ability of administrative agencies and legislatures to understand the budget prefer- ences of citizens' groups. Whether such groups would be happy with the governmental activity efforts generated by their preferences is another matter. If the 30 plans had included outputs as well as inputs (dollar expenditures), one could perhaps be more confident about what citizen expectations would be. There is no reason, of course, why such information could not be in- cluded, except that it would add to the complex- ity of the instrument.

On the whole, the Stewart-Gelberd method of including citizen participation in the budget pro- cess is promising and may prove operational. With the advent of zero base budgeting where usually three alternative budgets are considered, the Stewart-Gelberd instrument would appear to be a particularly appropriate means for generating citi- zen participation. At any rate, the technique merits further experimentation.

Fremont James Lyden University of Washington

MARCH/APRIL 1977

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