CISDL 4 -Daniel Schueppert - The United Nations Convention ......Working(Paper(Editor!of!the!series:!Dr.(Robert(Kibugi,(University!of!Nairobi! No4/2015(Climate!Change,!theUN!Convention!toCombat

Working Paper

Editor of the series: Dr. Robert Kibugi, University of Nairobi No 4/2015

Climate Change, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification and Multi-‐Level Governance

Par / By: Daniel Sullivan Schueppert

Climate Change, the UNCCD and Multi-‐level Governance

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About the Working Paper Series

The CISDL, in cooperation with the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge, the Centre for Research on Climate Resilience at the Universidad de Chile, and the Centre for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy at the University of Nairobi, held an International Legal Essay Competition for students and recent graduates on the topic of “Climate Change, Sustainable Development and the Law: Governance Challenges and Innovations.” The winners were announced during the Law, Governance and Climate Change International Law and Policy Workshop, in the context of the UNFCCC COP20 in Lima, Peru, by Markus Gehring and Tony La Viña.

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CLIMATE CHANGE, THE UN CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION AND MULTI-‐LEVEL GOVERNANCE

By Daniel Sullivan Schueppert*

Centre for International Sustainable Development Law

I INTRODUCTION

1. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification1 (“UNCCD”) is a legally binding

international agreement meant to bridge the gap between the environment, economic

development, and sustainable land management (“SLM”).2 The Convention generally defines

desertification as the transformation of dryland into desert through overexploitation and improper

land stewardship.3

2. This article intentionally covers a broad scope of topics because its purpose is twofold: to present a

programmatic and operationally centric snapshot of UNCCD and, on a deeper level, to delve into a

critical analysis of why the Convention has struggled to effectuate its goals despite many indicators

of success. The Convention’s heavy reliance on a bottom-‐up participatory model has been a

common thread between these problems. This alone is not, however, the only reason why UNCCD is

where it is at today. Ultimately, just like desertification itself, many factors have influenced this odd

juxtaposition of UNCCD’s objective successes and failings. The key takeaway is not that any one

thing has defined the accomplishments of UNCCD. Instead, the point is that UNCCD addresses an

incredibly complex issue on an exceptional scale through an imperfect method, which is perhaps the

best choice among a limited number of imperfect alternatives.

3. Part I of this article provides a brief background to the UNCCD. Part II presents information about

the nature of desertification and provides specific examples of areas that face greater desertification

* Daniel Sullivan Schueppert, J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, Winner of a Silver Medal. 1 Officially titled United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (with annexes), 1954 U.N.T.S. 33480, 33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994) [hereinafter UNCCD]. 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION WEBSITE, About the Convention Tab, http://www.unccd.int/en/about-‐the-‐convention/Pages/About-‐the-‐Convention.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) 3 UNCCD, supra note 1.


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risk. It also describes some of the causes, effects, and attempts to combat desertification within

those regions. Part III introduces the bottom-‐up operational structure of the Convention and

compares the UNCCD’s participatory model to the alternative top-‐down operational structure of

some other conventions. Part IV turns to criticisms of the Convention arising out of limitations of the

bottom-‐up model. These criticisms look to structural conflicts between UNCCD’s bottom-‐up policies

and the ambitions of its Secretariat, as well as the related impact upon a historically important

member Party.

II A SHORT BACKGROUND OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION

4. This section provides general context for UNCCD and describes its creation. First and foremost,

UNCCD differs from many other sources of international environmental law because UNCCD does

not operate on a “topdown” model that would characteristically place rigid compliance schedules

upon member Parties.4 Instead, one of UNCCD’s notable features is that it addresses desertification

through “bottom-‐up” methods meant to cultivate UNCCD’s goals through stakeholder participation.5

5. Desertification is not about the expansion of existing deserts, it is about the human caused

transformation of good land6 into bad land.7 Desertification is often disastrous to the livelihood of

people and the environment where it happens.8 Many factors are believed to contribute to

desertification, and other international actors already have programs in some of those areas. For

example, the United Nations Environment Programme9 and other novel sources of international law,

4 E.g. Rafael Leal-‐Arcas, Top-‐Down Versus Bottom-‐Up Approaches for Climate Change Negotiations: an Analysis, VI(4) IUP J. GOV & PUB. POL’Y 7, 7 (2011) (critical analysis of the differences between bottom-‐up and top-‐down methods of international treaty implementation, arguing that each method has positive and negative traits in given situations). 5 See infra Part IV.i 6 Broadly defined as economically or ecologically important or productive. See Jeffrey A. McNeely, Applying the Diversity of International Conventions to Address the Challenges of Climate Change, 17 MICH. ST. J. INTL. L. 123, 128 (2008). 7 Land that has undergone desertification usually becomes unproductive or regionally invasive. Id. 8 See UNCCD, supra note 1 (UNCCD statement of purpose and the preface to each of Annex I-‐V describes how desertification may impact affected countries). 9 United Nations Environmental Programme, Environmental Governance 1, (undated), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/brochures/EnvironmentalGovernance.pdf (UNEP environmental governance priorities include sustainable national development policies and poverty alleviation which are two main goals of UNCCD).


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such as the Great Lakes-‐St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact,10 address some of the

many environmental issues linked to desertification regionally and worldwide.11

6. UNCCD is largely a product of ideas leading up to and presented at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit,

which identified desertification as one of the “greatest challenges” to sustainable international

development during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.12

Desertification was one primary concern identified prior to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit as a “Pre-‐Rio

Ambition” that the summit hoped to address before the participants even convened however,

UNCCD was not negotiated at Rio.13 What did come out of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit was an official

request to the United Nations General Assembly to establish a convention to combat

desertification.14 On December 22, 1992, the International Negotiating Committee chaired by

Sweden’s Ambassador Bo Kjellen was thereby established by the United Nations General Assembly

in resolution 47/188.15 In addition to one organizational negotiating session in New York,

substantive negotiating sessions were held for two weeks apiece in Geneva, Nairobi, New York, and

Paris.16 By the middle of June 1994 the advanced text of UNCCD had, for the most part, been

completed in the final substantive negotiation in Paris, France.17 On October 14, 1994, the

10 GREAT LAKES-‐ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCE COMPACT WEBSITE, http://www.glslcompactcouncil.org/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2014 2:01pm) (An innovative agreement between eight States that border the Great Lakes and Canadian Provinces, ratified by State legislatures and the United States Congress. The Compact Council was established to jointly manage and protect one of the largest freshwater resources in the world. Water is integrally linked to desertification. The north-‐central United States and central Canada are classified as drylands and thus at risk of desertification if important resources like water are mismanaged. 11 See Caroylne Daniel for United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, A Visual Synthesis of Global Drylands, Oct. 24, 2011, available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Publications/Desertification-‐EN.pdf [hereinafter Visual Synthesis]. 12 UNCCD, supra note 1. 13 Stephanie Meakin, THE RIO EARTH SUMMIT: SUMMARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, UNITED NATIONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, (Nov. 1992), available at http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-‐R/LoPBdP/BP/bp317-‐e.htm#(6)txt (citing A Greener Commonwealth: Special Earth Summit Edition, COMMONWEALTH CURRENTS, (June/July 1992) at 3). 14 UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/unccd/unccd.html (last visited April 23, 2014). 15Id.; G.A. Res. 47/188, ¶1-‐3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/188 (Dec. 22, 1994). 16 G.A. Res. 47/188, ¶4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/188 (Dec. 22, 1994). 17Id.


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Convention was deposited for signature with the Secretary General of the United Nations.18 By

December 26, 1996, UNCCD had gained the requisite fifty signatures to enter into force.19

7. The negotiations that helped to shape UNCCD were guided by “understandings of desertification as

locally contingent and arising from a complex mix of social, biophysical and economic factors . . .”20

This ground-‐up model is not only a cornerstone of the treaty structure (for example regional

implementation Annexes I-‐V), but also of the operation of the treaty, as evidenced by the numerous

scientific and economic advising organizations under the Conference of Parties.21 Because of this

“bottom-‐up” model it is sometimes difficult to accurately track the implementation of UNCCD

derived work because they are often dependent upon local application, which is not always

truthfully reported, even to the national government that is a Party.22 This is something that the

convention has struggled with and is one of the main driving forces behind UNCCD’s implementation

of state of the art web-‐based programs.23

8. UNCCD remains somewhat exceptional because it is the only agreement of its type and purpose that

is legally binding.24 Today the Convention has a membership of 195 Parties, a secretariat, and offices

spread all over the world – most within one of UNCCD’s five annex zones.25 The bulk of UNCCD’s

activities are targeted towards these annexes insofar as they overlap with desertification affected

developing country Parties.26

18Id. 19Alon Tal &Jessican A. Cohen, Bringing “Top-‐Down” to “Bottom-‐Up”: A New Role for International Legislation in Combating Desertification, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 163, 175 (2007) (UNCCD required 50 country signatures to become effective, a goal which it reached fairly quickly) (citations omitted). 20 NORICHIKA KANIE ET AL, IMPROVING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR ARCHITECTURE AND AGENCY 73 (2013) (emphasis added). 21E.g. UNCCD, supra note 1 at Part I art. 24 (“Committee on Science and Technology.”). 22See infra Part II.a.ii (“Desertification in China: perspectives on afforestation”) 23 Performance Review and Assessment of Implementation System, UNCCD -‐ User Manual for the PRAIS Portal (Aug. 2012), http://www.unccd-‐prais.com/Content/usermanual/PRAIS%20user%20manual%20v2.0.2.pdf (the Performance Review and Assessment of Implementation System (“PRAIS 2.0”)). 24Id. 25Id. 26 UNCCD, supra note 1 (noting that developing country parties are the primary beneficiaries of the Convention and that, in particular, the “least developed” of that group must shall be an even high priority of UNCCD implementation activities – African parties in particular. See id. at art. 4 GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES & art. 7 PRIORITY FOR AFRICA.


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III DESERTIFICATION AT THE INTERSECT BETWEEN INCREASING POPULATIONS AND DECREASING USABLE LAND

9. The key to understanding UNCCD begins with recognizing that desertification refers to land

degradation -‐ a broad term -‐ that can occur all over the world.27 The scale of the environmental and

social issues that UNCCD attempts to combat colors its goals, programs, and ability to realize those

goals. Desertification is a complex and dynamic issue with impacts on the environment, society, and

economies at multiple levels. It is therefore essential to understand the magnitude of what the

UNCCD does when looking at the reality of its activities and policies.

i. What is desertification?

10. Generally speaking, desertification is degradation. This phrasing captures nuanced elements in the

process of desertification; namely, that it is a process of negative transformation. Desertification

almost always decreases the usefulness of the land and any resources that would otherwise be

derived from or through the use of that land. UNCCD defines desertification as “the reduction of

productivity and nutrients, reduction of both above-‐ and below-‐ground biomass for carbon

sequestration, accelerated soil deterioration, and decreased plant and soil organic species

diversity.”28Desertification can occur in arid, semi-‐arid and dry sub-‐humid areas, not just regions

near deserts, and often results from anthropogenic activity or natural climate variation or both.29

11. Desertification disproportionally occurs and affects developing countries and the rural poor that live

within them, who are often the least capable of changing land use and development practices to

more sustainable methods because of the harsh realities of smallholder and subsistence

agriculture.30 In Africa, for example, subsistence pastoralists are also subject to non-‐climate related

stressors like increasing populations, armed conflicts, enclosure of viable land as preserves, large

scale farming operations by outsiders, misunderstandings about changes to traditional communal

ownership, and an education gap between traditional and alternative SLM practices.31 Many of

these problems are compounded by environmental feedback loops32diminishing a given area’s

27 Visual Synthesis, supra note 11 at 4. 28 Jeffrey A. McNeely, supra note 29. (citing H.E. Dregne, Desertification of Arid Lands, in Physics of Desertification 6-‐7 (Farouk El-‐Baz and M.H.A. Hassan eds., 1986)). 29Id. At 4. 30 John F. Morton, The Impact of Climate Change on Smallholder and Subsistence Agriculture, 104(50) PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 19680, 19680 (2007). 31 Id. at 19681. 32 See Paolo D’Odorico et al., Global Desertification: Drivers and Feedbacks, 51 ADVANCES IN WATER RESOURCES 326 (2013).


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climatic resilience and capacity to support people, agriculture, or economic activity while the

demand for those things is increasing.33

12. For years scientists have been trying to quantify the relative effects of human activities and climate

change that act as the driving forces of desertification.34 Independent researchers and UNCCD’s

expert Committee on Science and Technology seldom agree on details; however, the consensus is

that global desertification is quickly approaching ‘crisis level’ and it has at least some measurable

causal factors.35Some of these factors, such as changes in “environmental resilience,”36 are more

difficult to assign a quantitative number than other factors. For example, due to differences within

even the same environmental biosphere it is quite difficult to accurately track changes in the

amount of organic carbon stock (living or previously living matter) above or below ground in a given

area.37

13. Regardless of exact quantitative measures, dryland environments are under the most pressure.

Drylands are most likely to be affected by desertification because of existing environmental factors

such as climate and geography, as well as because of human stressors that affect environmental

resilience. Desertification in drylands already occurs the most rapidly and stands to cause

irreparable harm to at risk populations.38 Drylands support a population of over 2 billion people,

with over 90% of those people living in developing countries.39 Drylands cover approximately 41% of

the earth’s total land surface area and support about 35% of the world’s population.40 China and the

continent of Africa, especially those countries in sub-‐Saharan Africa, are of special concern to

33 Visual Synthesis, supra note 11 at 12. 34 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ELEVENTH SESSION, REFINEMENT OF THE SET OF IMPACT INDICATORS ON STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 1, 2, AND 3 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS, (July, 10, 2013), available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/OfficialDocuments/cop11/cst2eng.pdf; Xu Duanyang, Li Chunlei, Zhuang Dafang, Pan Jianjun, Assessment of the Relative Role of Climate Change and Human Activities in Desertification: a Review, 21(5) J. Geogr. Sci. 925, 935 (2011). 35 Text of supra note 35. 36 Paolo D’Odorico et al., supra note 33 at 329 (analysis of biophysical feedbacks of desertification and arguing that a natural amount of environmental resilience can be destroyed by human activities, thus irrevocably changing environmental carrying capacity at several levels). 37 REFINEMENT OF THE SET OF IMPACT INDICATORS ON STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 1, 2, AND 3 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS, supra note 35 at 10 (this measurement is one of the proposed refinements to the Secretariat’s benchmarking system for desertification impact indicators). 38 See text accompanying supra note 30-‐34. 39 Paolo D’Odorico et al., supra note 33 at 328. 40Id. At 327.


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UNCCD because they are already subject to the effects of desertification and either have, or will

have, high populations that are affected by desertification.41

ii. Desertification in China: perspectives on afforestation

14. Researchers in China recently issued a report declaring that “[d]esertification is one of the most

severe global social-‐economic-‐environmental issues for our time, which threatens human survival

and development.”42 This is particularly true for China, which has internally determined that over

18% of its total land area is already affected by desertification.43 According to China’s Minister of

Forestry, more than 400 million people are impacted by desertification feedback values like “water

shortages, unproductive land and the breakdown of ecological systems caused by rising

temperatures, overgrazing and poor land management.”44 Because China is already experiencing

some of the consequences of desertification like expanding deserts, unnatural dust storms, dispersal

of toxic substances, and localized climate change, it has produced some of the more tangible

policies to combat desertification45The efficacy of these projects in combating desertification in

meaningful ways is somewhat doubtful;46 however, China is well positioned to utilize its notoriously

strong central planning capabilities and volunteer initiatives to promote desertification combating

activities.47

15. China is somewhat unique because it is extraordinarily large and thus less likely to face the same

type of trans-‐border disagreements regarding Convention activities that African countries do.48

41 See Visual Synthesis, supra note 11 at 1-‐5 42 Xu Duanyang, Li Chunlei, Zhuang Dafang, Pan Jianjun, supra note 35 at 926 43Id. at 926 (citing a study by China’s State Forestry Administration in 2007). 44 4 Rita AlverezTudela, Fighting Desertification in China: Beijing Launched an Ambitious Plan a Decade Ago, but the Desert Continues to Swallow up Large Tracts of Green Land, ALJAZEERA (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/12/2012126123056457256.html. 45Id. at 927. 46 6 X.M. Wang, C.X. Zhang, E. Hasi, & Z.B. Dong, Has the Three Norths Forest Shelterbelt Program Solved the Desertification and Dust Storm Problems in Arid and Semiarid China?, 74 J. ARID ENVIRONMENTS 13, 22 (2010) (in response to the question posed in the title of the article, the authors conclude that it has not). 47 Abigail Trafford, Let a Billion Trees Bloom: Can a Great Green Wall of Trees Stop China’s Spreading Desert?, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-‐science/let-‐a-‐billion-‐trees-‐bloom-‐cana-‐great-‐green-‐wall-‐of-‐trees-‐stop-‐chinas-‐spreading-‐desert/2013/11/22/12908e0e-‐2d13-‐11e3-‐b139-‐029811dbb57f_story.html. 48 Africa is estimated to have 80 transboundary water basins comprising 93% of the continent’s water resources and supporting 77% of the population. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, TRANSBOUNDARY NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN A CHANGING CLIMATE – THE CASE OF SHARED WATERSHEDS IN AFRICA, CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES 18 (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/GenericDocuments/Transboundary%20Natural%20Resources%20Management%20in%20a%20Changing%20Climate%20%E2%80


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Furthermore, China is home to two deserts, the Gobi and the Kubuqi, that are expanding as land on

their edges degrade.49 With the coordinated efforts of UNCCD, NGO’s, volunteers, and multiple

governments in China, an area equivalent in size to the state of Massachusetts was reportedly

planted with new trees between 2000 and 2010.50 This process of planting forests or other

vegetation where it did not previously exist for the purpose of combating desertification is called

afforestation.51

16. The biggest ecological afforestation project in China, and the world, is officially called the “Three-‐

North Shelterbelt” and colloquially dubbed the “Great Green Wall” by UNCCD.52 It has been in

operation for the past 35 years and in that time has resulted in “about 178,000 people [being]

relocated from grasslands and forests near Beijing and Tianjin as part of regional authorities’ anti-‐

desertification efforts.53

17. China’s Three-‐North Shelterbelt afforestation program has not been well managed according to

researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences.54 They note that few of trees and shrubs that

actually get planted survive for very long and that efforts have not been tailored to regions

undergoing the most severe desertification.55 The Three-‐North Shelterbelt costs the central

government billions of renimbi each year and imposes human costs – such as forced relocation of

whole villages.56 Perhaps the most troubling information is that China’s afforestation programs tend

to be operated by local governments that have patently misrepresented their actual compliance

when official reports are compared to studies about actual participation.57

%93%20The%20Case%20of%20Shared%20Watersheds%20in%20Africa%20-‐ %20%20CoP%C2%AD%E2%80%9018%20Side%20Event%20Concept%20Note.pdf. 49Id. At 2. 50Id. 51UNCCD WEBSITE: CHINA AFFORESTATION, http://www.unccd.int/en/media-‐center/Feature-‐Stories/Pages/ChinaAfforestation.aspx (last visited April 20, 2014). 52Id. 53Id;Rita AlverezTudela, Fighting Desertification in China: Beijing Launched an Ambitious Plan a Decade Ago, but the Desert Continues to Swallow up Large Tracts of Green Land, ALJAZEERA (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/12/2012126123056457256.html. 54 X.M. Wang, C.X. Zhang, E. Hasi, & Z.B. Dong, supra note 47 at 13. 55 Id. at 21. 56Tudela, supra note 54 (the counterargument is that people relocated by afforestation programs would have to move anyway as soon as the land degraded so much as to render it useless to them). 57Id. at 20.


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Figure 158

18. UNCCD has not directly addressed these alleged reporting problems in China’s Three-‐North

Shelterbelt afforestation program.59 The fact that local governments do not officially report to

UNCCD (only countries may be Parties) may indicate that this type of false reporting concerning

desertification mitigation could be an inherent structural flaw in the Convention’s bottom-‐up

approach.60 However even these problems are merely a gloss on the positive benefits derived from

afforestation efforts which may not exist at all absent guidance from UNCCD. Regardless of specific

program failings in some provinces the “general status of desertification in China is still serious.”61

Former UNCCD Executive Secretary Luc Gnacadja explained that China was doing good work to

combat desertification and poverty but that China had “huge untapped potential” and was taking

steps in the right direction – while clearly suggesting China could do more to outweigh ongoing

desertification.62

iii. Desertification in Africa

Aggravating an impending population crisis

19. More than 66% of Africa, and particularly areas near the Sahara, are drylands that are either at

severe risk of desertification or already desertifying.63 African countries are undergoing rapid

population growth in conjunction with factors contributing to desertification and diminishing

reserves of crucial resources like water.64 The expected desertification risks in Africa are

58Id. 59See UNCCD WEBSITE: CHINA AFFORESTATION, supra note 52 60 See infra Part III.i (comparisons between bottom-‐up and top-‐down United Nations organizational models). 61 Xu Duanyang, Li Chunlei, Zhuang Dafang, Pan Jianjun, supra note 35 at 926. 62Tudela, supra note 54. 63 Milton H. Saier, Jr., Desertification and Migration, 205(1) WATER AIR SOIL POLLUT. S31, S31 (2010). 64Id.


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compounded according to estimates that the populations in these economically struggling,

vulnerable drylands will grow exponentially in less than forty years. The Population Reference

Bureau predicts that between 2013 and 2050 the population of Africa will grow by 1.3 billion, more

quickly than any other region in the world, and that “[v]irtually all of that growth will be in the 51

countries of sub-‐Saharan Africa, the region’s poorest.”65 Niger currently has a fertility rate of 7.6,

almost six times higher than fertility rates in Asian countries like Taiwan, Singapore, and South

Korea.66 In comparison, Uganda has a fertility rate of only 6.2, but the slightly lower fertility rate is

offset by disproportionally more lifetime births per woman in the “poorest fifth” and the “poorest”

segments of the Ugandan population; 7.9 and 7.1 births per woman, respectively.67 A graph

depicting global population estimates for 2013 and expectations for 2050 is below:

Figure 268

20. Thus we see that current population trends in areas of Africa, and particularly sub-‐Saharan Africa,

are indicative of a profound increase in those regions’ population in just a few decades from now.69

65POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 2013 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET 6, available at http://www.prb.org/pdf13/2013-‐ population-‐data-‐sheet_eng.pdf (citing Carl Haub& Toshiko Kaneda, 2013 World Population Data Sheet, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (2013)). 66Id. 67Id. at 4. 68Id. at 6. 69 See supra Figure 2.


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These changes in population exist concurrently with overlapping desertification factors that will and

already have reduced the total amount of usable land in these same regions. Worldwide, drought

and desertification is already estimated to claim 12 million hectacres (46332.3 square miles)70 of

productive land annually.71 If production practices do not change, UNCCD estimates that agricultural

yields in some African countries will fall by up to 50% by 2050.72 At the same time, worldwide

demand for food will require at least a 70% increase in food production.73 In Africa alone, the

number of people living in areas affected by desertification creates the problem of what will happen

to these people when their livelihoods have, as is frequently the case for subsistence farmers in a

desertified area, been rendered impractical.74

21. In Part I article 2 of the Convention, UNCCD makes special provisions for Africa. It states that “[t]he

objective of this Convention is to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought in

countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertification, particularly in Africa . . .”75 Africa is

therefore clearly a priority for the Convention. Population modeling data produced by UNCCD and

the Population Reference Bureau strongly indicate that African countries, and especially sub-‐

Saharan African countries, are going to see a population explosion more than doubling existing

populations in the coming decades.76 These are the same countries that are generally poorer, home

to more drylands, and have limited access to education to learn alternative SLM practices.77 The

question is, then, what will happen to people in desertification affected developing country Parties

in Africa when all these forces converge?

iv. Responding to desertification

Managing population growth

22. Desertification is a broad and dynamic issue that is related to, inter alia, population.78 UNCCD

estimates that globally as many as 700 million people could be forced to migrate by 2050 because of

70 See WOLFRAMALPHA UNIT CONVERSIONS, https://www.wolframalpha.com/ (last visited April 20, 2014). 71 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION, DESERTIFICATION: THE INVISIBLE FRONTLINE 2, Jan. 23, 2014, available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Publications/Final_Security_second_issue_7_march_14%20low%20res.pdf. 72Id. 73Id. 74 Visual Synthesis, supra note 11 at 1. 75 UNCCD, supra note 1 at Part I art. 2 subd. 1 76 See text accompanying supra notes 64-‐75. 77 DESERTIFICATION: THE INVISIBLE FRONTLINE, supra note 72 at 1-‐6. 78Saier, supra note 64 at S31.


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desertification.79 In 2008 the Convention adopted its first ever 10 year strategic plan to address

desertification and migration.80 The 10 year plan addresses environmentally induced migration by

promising to bridge partnerships between UNCCD, United Nations agencies, and human rights

organizations.81 Joint reports have been created, but due to the nature of the Convention’s bottom-‐

up approach,82 national and regional action on the issue of desertification, population, and

migration is up to the Parties.

23. In 2012 Malawi, a small African country, took the lead in addressing its expected high population

increase directly though UNCCD mechanisms.83 According to the national action plan filed by

Malawai, the nation’s total fertility rate is 6.7 and 85 percent of its total population is rural, 98

percent of whom rely upon low productivity smallholder agriculture, with 55 percent having so little

land that it is “inadequate to meet their food needs.”84 Malawi’s high total fertility rate is “due to

several reasons, which include early marriage, early age at first pregnancy, relatively short birth

intervals, and little knowledge of and access to modern contraceptive practices.”85 This total fertility

rate means that most Malawian mothers have between six or seven children in their lifetime. This

has led to a situation where the country’s population density is doubling every twenty-‐eight years,

despite offset effects caused by reduced life expectancy due to pandemic rates of HIV/AIDS among

adults.86

24. Unfortunately this alarming situation in Malawi is very much like other countries in Africa.87 What

sets Malawi apart is the fact that it is actively using its UNCCD national action program to solicit

funding for, and raise awareness about, Malawi’s intent to reduce its high rate of population

growth.88 It has made getting population growth under control its number one desertification

intervention strategy for the community level.89 Its plan includes proposals ranging from improving

79UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION, UNCCD THEMATIC FACT SHEET SERIES NO. 3: MIGRATION AND DESERTIFICATION, (2013), available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Publications/Desertificationandmigration.pdf 80Id. at 1. 81Id. 82See infra Part III. 83NATIONAL ACTION PROGRAMME FOR MALAWI FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION (2012), available at http://www.unccd.int/ActionProgrammes/malawi-‐eng2001.pdf. 84Id. at 4. 85Id. 86Id. at 18 (14 percent of adults have HIV, and growing). 87See DESERTIFICATION: THE INVISIBLE FRONTLINE, supra note 72 at 1-‐6. 88NATIONAL ACTION PROGRAMME FOR MALAWI FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION (2012), supra note 84 at 39. 89Id.


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education and family planning, promoting sterilization of men, encouraging contraceptive use,

discouraging teen pregnancies, banning polygamy, and passing laws limiting the number of children

families can have and “empowering women to decide on how many children the family should

have.”90 Within the context of a poor developing country, any of these measures would be viewed

as significant steps towards preventing desertification through sustainable population management,

and clearly as measures meant to empower women.

Environmentally induced migration

25. If desertification-‐affected countries, particularly those in Africa, are unable to change current

population growth and thereby offset expectations of future population levels, UNCCD and some

scholars believe that those populations will be forced to migrate.91 These “overspill” populations

from rural drylands would likely end up in urban cities within their region or conceivably in

developed countries adjacent to them.92

26. The overspill migration hypothesis is controversial because it is nearly impossible to predict with any

certainty and it raises sensitive human rights concerns.93 Some scholars believe it is certain to

happen unless things change, while others believe it is no more than a “myth” arising out of

circumstances that will selfcorrect.94 On one hand, this somewhat dystopian vision of the future

tends to paint a picture of desertification that places the blame entirely upon those peoples forced

to flee their homelands because of their own unsustainable practices. Such a view detaches

environmentally induced migration from the culpability of all Parties to UNCCD. On the other hand,

the potential scale and environmental or human casualties of environmentally induced migration

arguably requires a more rigid system of enforcement than the UNCCD can ever offer unless

substantially amended.95

90Id. at 39 (emphasis added). 91Saier, supra note 64 at S31; UNCCD THEMATIC FACT SHEET SERIES NO. 3: MIGRATION AND DESERTIFICATION, supra note 80. 92Saier, supra note 64 at S32. 93Compare Id. and Giovanni Bettini & Elina Andersson, Sand Waves and Human Tides: Exploring Environmental Myths on Desertification and Climate-‐Induced Migration, 23 J. ENVT’L DEV. 160 (2014). 94See text of supra note 94. 95See Bettini & Andersson, supra note 94.


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VI PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT: “BOTTOM-‐UP” AND “TOP-‐DOWN” COMPARED96

27. The following section examines the operational philosophy that the UNCCD uses to develop and

administer its programs. The purpose of this section is to briefly look at how UNCCD operates in

practice, and to compare and contrast how two different models work. This is meant to contribute

to the reader’s perspective of, among other things, development and implementation of UNCCD

programs presented in supra Part II and criticisms of the Convention found at infra Part IV.

i. The Bottom-‐up approach

28. The text of UNCCD does not actually use either of these somewhat vernacular phrases, each of

which has increasingly become something of a term of art.97 Bottom-‐up refers to the UNCCD’s

operational preference for fueling action plans through “active and productive participation in civil

society” on a local scale, with international coordination.98 This approach is called participatory

development by the UNCCD and as one might expect, input from stakeholders – not just Parties –

helps to guide capacity building and sustainable development on the national level.99

29. Under a bottom-‐up approach UNCCD looks to encourage local participation in both the origination

and implementation of programs to combat desertification.100 This concept brings in people or

organizations that are more likely to actually be affected by desertification or those with on-‐the-‐

ground experience about how resources are being used or how land is being developed in a given

area.101 The bottom-‐up model is particularly well suited to UNCCD’s objectives because it essentially

creates a multi-‐level system of governance and implementation that makes it more difficult for a

single member of the Convention to block implementation of a National Action Program (“NAP”)102

it might not want to happen.103

96“Bottom-‐up” is used by UNCCD to describe its own method of implementation as well as in critical analysis of UNCCD. “Bottom-‐up” is distinguishable from how other conventions operate. See, e.g., Tal & Cohen, supra note 19. 97Id.; See UNCCD, supra note 1 98See id. 99Participatory Development: A Bottom-‐up approach to Combating Desertification, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION FACT SHEET 6, 1, available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Publications/Fact_sheet_06eng.pdf/ [hereinafter UNCCD Factsheet 6]. 100Id. at 1. 101Id. 102See UNCCD, supra note1 at Art. 10. 103See Rafael Leal-‐Arcas, supra note 4 at 6.


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30. The Conference of the Parties requires member Parties to submit individual NAPs tailored to specific

conditions.104 These NAPs must be coordinated with concurrent regional and sub-‐regional programs

to combat desertification or mitigate the effects of drough.105 UNCCD also mandates that “[s]uch

programmes shall be updated through a continuing participatory process on the basis of lessons

from field action, as well as the results of research” and must be linked to any other existing “efforts

to formulate national policies for sustainable development.”106

31. These same principles apply mutatis mutandis107 to Sub-‐regional and Regional Action Programs

(“SRAP”) because they are operationally the same as NAPs, with the exception of requiring

enhanced coordination and cooperation obligations due to the complexity of trans-‐boundary

implementation.108 In theory, UNCCD’s practice of funneling NAPs and SRAPs up to the Conference

of the Parties allows for the Convention to move forward with innovative solutions to desertification

without being bulwarked by, for example, specific unpopular or binding commitments that might be

attached to unrelated109 action programs to reach a benchmark that has proven untenable.110

32. This ability to evolve UNCCD policies concerning identification of local, national, or regional causes

of desertification empowers the Convention to more effectively combat desertification because

qualitative and semi-‐quantitative assessments found in scientific reports are notoriously abstract

when applied to dynamic regions.111 It is also unrealistic to expect that the same strategies for

combating a dynamic environmental issue like desertification could be simplified for wholesale

application on the scale UNCCD contemplates.112 The myriad of interrelated causes and effects of

desertification are not nearly as forthright an environmental issue as elimination of a chemical

104UNCCD, supra note 1 at Art. 5, 9 105UNCCD Factsheet 6, supra note 100 at 1. 106Id. at Art. 9(1). 107Applying with the necessary changes that have been made, which in the case of SRAP and NAP are fairly limited because of preexisting expectations of mandatory cooporation between member Parties. See UNCCD, supra note 1 at Art. 11; MERRIAM-‐WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-‐webster.com/dictionary/mutatis%20mutandis. 108UNCCD, supra note 1 at Art. 11 (“The provisions of article 10 [NAPs] shall apply mutatis mutandis to sub regional and regional programs.”). 109UNCCD structurally separates desertification zones into Annexes I-‐V, which are each capable of operating independently of each other. See UNCCD, supra note 1 at Annex I, II, III, IV, V. 110Id. at 16 (discussing how the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has struggled to achieve any significant gains in C02 reduction policies because states have been unwilling to submit to legally binding programs that are sometimes ill-‐suited to the concerns of specific member countries). 111E.g., Duanyang, Chunlei, Dafang, &Jianjun, supra note 43 at 928 (critical analysis of a scientific review of China’s regional desertification problems concluding that “’driving force effect-‐dynamic response of desertified land’ into several scenarios” was logical. Id. at 925.). 112SECRETARIAT, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION, THE UNCCD: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR FUTURE SECURITY (2014-‐2015) 16 (2014).


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component like chlorofluorocarbons (“CFC”).113In this respect, NAP and SRAP serve a critical

function of UNCCD because these proposals and their implementation are by their nature produced

on a local level.114 They are facilitated and evaluated by UNCCD administrative mechanisms, but the

on-‐site application is largely in the hands of the program originator.115

33. This process is integral to the bottom-‐up model. NAPs, in particular, are one of the driving forces

behind UNCCD’s bottom-‐up approach because each NAP shall “provide for effective participation at

the local, national and regional levels of non-‐governmental organizations and local populations,

both women and men, particularly resource users, including farmers and pastoralists and their

representative organizations, in policy planning, decision-‐making, and implementation and review of

national action programs.”116

34. Leading up to the Rio+20 Conference of 2012, former Executive Secretary of UNCCD Luc Gnacadja

provided insight into how the Convention views different types of stakeholders and why UNCCD

finds it desirable to participate with these stakeholders.117 In a video statement Mr. Gnacadja

revealed that under his guidance the Secretariat would push UNCCD to further its involvement with

actors within private economies, and he encouraged private business worldwide to use more

sustainable methods to grow a green worldwide economy.118 To implement these or any other

activities, UNCCD taps into the financial, technical, or research capacities of its developed country

Parties.119 Roughly one year after Rio+ 2012, at the Eleventh Session of the Conference of the Parties

113Montreal Protocol on Substances the Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-‐10(1987), 1522 U.T.S. 3 (CFCs were commonly used during the 1970s and 1980s in aerosol spray cans. CFCs were found to be causing damage to the Ozone Layer. In response, the Montreal Protocol was developed to regulate the use of CFCs. The Montreal Protocol is largely a success story because now CFCs are almost never used, and the Ozone has partially recovered. The success of the Montreal Protocol could also be attributed to factors aside from the protocol itself, such as the fact that ready alternatives would soon be more profitable for key producers. 114UNCCD, supra note 1 at Art. 10(1). 115Id. at Art. 13 (“Support for the Elaboration and Implementation of Action Programmes”). 116Id. at Art. 10(2)(f). 117UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION, WEBSITE EVENTS & MEDIA, Executive Secretary Luc Gnacadja for Rio+20 (internet message), available at http://www.unccd.int/en/mediacenter/Multimedia/VideoGallery/Pages/ES-‐Rio-‐plus-‐20.aspx (last accessed April 15, 2014 5:54pm). 118See Id. 119UNCCD, supra note 1 at Art. 5; cf. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, Consultancy to Provide Technical Advice on Climate Change Finance for Sustainable Land Management in West and Central Africa (Dec. 2013), available at http://www.unccd.int/en/about-‐the-‐convention/The-‐Secretariat/Vacancies-‐andconsultancies/Documents/Technical%20advice%20on%20climate%20change%20finance%20for%20sustainable%20land%2 0management%20in%20West%20and%20Central%20Africa.pdf [hereinafter Executive Secretary Video].


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(“COP 11”),120 Namibia echoed these ambitions but also framed empowerment of women affected

by desertification in developing member countries as a “key component” of SLM.121

ii. The Top-‐down approach

35. UNCCD’s bottom-‐up model is in contrast to traditional United Nations development planning that

characteristically involves a distant organization, or its experts, defining a given organizational

process in terms of objectives, specific activities, or outputs.122 Those programs are then delivered

to where they are meant to be implemented, and left to local organizations to carry out.123 This

approach is essentially the opposite of how UNCCD operates and is, as one might guess, called top-‐

down development. Top-‐down development traditionally imposes clear-‐cut organizational

benchmarks and expectations on agreement members – sometimes regardless of the actual

conditions that those members are facing. The resulting plans are more likely to be ineffective in a

topdown model when the organization attempts to top-‐down plan across more diverse

implementation regions.124

V CRITICISMS OF UNCCD

36. This section does two main things. First, it looks back roughly ten years to one of the Convention’s

major stumbling points. Second, it provides a case study of Canada and arguably one of the more

interesting changes that the UNCCD has undergone in the last year. The aim of Part IV is to identify

these two specific instances where the bottom-‐up approach made it difficult for the UNCCD

Secretariat and at least one developed country Party to achieve their intended outcome under the

Convention. When these criticisms are considered in light of UNCCD’s development, negotiations,

programs, and operational strategy, the overall effectiveness of the Convention gains a realistic

perspective.

120Compare Executive Secretary Video, supra note 120 with Statement by Namibia at UNCCD Conference of Parties 11, NAMIBIAN DECLARATION ON A STRONGER UNCCD FOR A LAND DEGRADATION NEUTRAL WORLD (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/COP/COP%2011/Namibian%20declaration%20-‐ %2027%20sep%202013.pdf 121Namibian Declaration on a Stronger UNCCD, supra note 121 at 2-‐3. 122UNCCD Factsheet 6, supra note 100 at 1. 123Id. 124See id.


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i. Pushback Against UNCCD’s Bottom-‐up Model: Failures at Conference of Parties (“COP”) 6

37. The bottom-‐up model used by the UNCCD leaves participants feeling like they were part of

implementing an international convention and cultivates the type of group cohesiveness essential

for what often begins as grassroots organizing.125 In this respect bottom-‐up planning helps to further

the development of UNCCD activities in a manner consistent with how the Convention utilizes NAPs

and SRAPs and divvies up the globe into compartmentalized regional Annex zones. However, the

bottom-‐up model does have its failings when it comes to actual enforcement. One notable example

occurred a little over a decade ago in 2003 at UNCCD COP 6 in Havana, Cuba.126

38. At COP 6 the Secretariat pushed hard for a “high-‐level segment” of highly developed member

Parties to elevate the media status of the Convention to a more authoritative political level enjoyed

by other international agreements.127 Critics consider it a failure because the donor countries that

finance UNCCD were, perhaps rationally, disinterested in singling themselves out as lone financial

champions of combating desertification at an enhanced level beyond what the Convention already

requires, as proposed by the Secretariat.128 Not a single industrialized country meaningfully

participated in COP 6 and a mere 12 Heads of State and Government attended – although 170

Parties, 147 NGOs, and 33 UN agencies or international organizations were present at least once

during the conference.129 The Secretariat viewed COP 6 as the year marking “the [UN]CCD’s

transition from awareness raising to implementation.”130 The Secretariat did not achieve these

results, and in the most recent 2012-‐2015 multi-‐year workplan of the Secretariat, it has deferred to

less ambitious primary operational objectives of advocacy, awareness raising, education, policy

counseling, and financial transfer assistance.131

39. Thus, despite the participatory intent of the bottom-‐up approach, COP 6 vividly reveals that

sovereign nations have nevertheless retained the capacity to strong-‐arm UNCCD’s Secretariat

125KANIE ET AL., supra note 20 at 71. 126Id. 127Id. at 75. 128Id. 129Id. (in addition to limited participation, COP 6 also brought about a tangible confrontation between member Parties in the Northern and Southern hemispheres). 130Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the Convention to Combat Desertification: 25 August – 6 September 2003 (Int’l Inst. Sustainable Dev. Vol. 04 No. 173, Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol04/enb04173e.html. 131See UNNCD SECRETARIAT, Multi-‐year Workplan for the Secretariat (2012-‐2015), available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/10YearStrategy/2012%202015%20workplan%20of%20the%20secretariat. pdf.


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agenda because it does not invoke the fear of top-‐down non-‐compliance sanctions.132 After COP 6

the reputation of UNCCD and especially the reputation of the Secretariat had been harmed so

severely that some would go on to call it a “second class convention’’133 that suffers from

“institutional and policy fragmentation.”134 But on the bright side, others point out that the

Convention “hasn’t actually done [any] harm.”135 The root cause of the problems at COP 6 are

derived from the main deficiency of the bottom-‐up approach – the inability to compel member

Party action in a particular direction.136 Top-‐down planning could arguably suffer from similar

problems, and has, especially in the context of United Nations top-‐down administration of

infrastructure and social stability promoting activities in post-‐conflict countries.137

40. Whether it was the strategic planning behind COP 6 or the Convention’s weak bottom-‐up structure

dependent upon NAPs and SRAPs that caused the lack of participation at or support for COP 6 is

largely a question that cannot be answered. The fact remains that in the wake of COP 6 the

Secretariat’s reputation was substantially diminished and it has not yet been able to recover.138 The

Secretariat is still criticized for reaching beyond the “significant autonomous authority” it has

exerted in the past by pushing too hard for certain agendas at the expense of others and

ineffectively “bandwagoning” onto the causes of other United Nations Conventions.139

41. The Secretariat has unfailingly promoted climate-‐change related causes because those traditionally

garner more support from developed countries (i.e. those that financially support almost all of the

UNCCD core budget)140 for two reasons: first, because climate change potentially has tangible141

132KANIE ET AL., supra note 20 at 71; UNCCD, supra note 1 at Art. 28 (dispute resolution over disagreements about interpretation of the Convention or compliance are effectively optional despite provisions making UNCCD legally binding). 133Alexandra Conliffe, Combating Ineffectiveness: Climate Change Bandwagoning and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, 11:3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 44, 44 (2011) (quoting Agarwal et al. 1999 in Adil, Najam, Dynamics of the Southern Collective: Developing Countries in Desertification Negotiations, 4(3) GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 128, 129 (2004)). 134AdilNajam, Mihaela Papa, NadaaTaiyab, Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda (Int’l Inst. Sustainable Dev., Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mapping Global Environmental Reform Proj., 2006), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/geg.pdf. 135Margaret Wente, The UN drought program did Africa no good. Canada was right to withdraw, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (April 4, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-‐debate/the-‐un-‐drought-‐program-‐did-‐africa-‐no-‐good-‐canada-‐wasright-‐to-‐withdraw/article10645044/. 136When the desired activity does not result from a natural evolution up from the Parties, e.g., bottom-‐up participation. 137E.g., OTHMAN O. MAHMOOD, THE ROOT CAUSES OF UNITED NATIONS’ FAILURE IN SOMALIA: THE ROLE OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN THE SOMALI CRISIS 19 (2011). 138Conliffe, supra note 134 at 49-‐50. 139Id. at 49-‐50. 140UNCCD, supra note 1 Part I art. 6; See also text accompanying infra note 157.


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local impacts, unlike desertification in developing country drylands resulting from unsustainable

land development, and second, because the Secretariat is able to represent climate change as an

environmental “linkage driver” of desertification that is already addressed by more successful

United Nations Conventions like UNFCCC and thereby prioritizing different desertification entry

points along the desertification prevention-‐mitigation-‐adaption spectrum against the wishes or best

interests of UNCCD’s affected member Parties.142 Thus we see that by following even this meekest

of bandwagon strategies the Secretariat nevertheless is criticized for attempting to take a more

active role in guiding a quintessentially bottom-‐up Convention.143

ii. Canada’s Withdrawal from the Convention in 2013

42. The bottom line of Canada’s withdrawal from the Convention is that it was a result of dynamic

forces that made it fiscally or politically untenable for a country affected by desertification to

continue to make sizeable contributions to UNCCD but receive no financial assistance in return.

43. On March 28, 2013, Canada informed the UNCCD Secretariat and the United Nations Secretary

General that it would withdraw from the Convention.144 Canada’s withdrawal was effective on the

same day one year later (March 28, 2014) pursuant to article 38, paragraph 2, of the Convention.145

This came as somewhat of a shock to the international community because Canada was one of the

original signatories of the Convention in 1994, and in a 2008 speech Canada’s representative to the

United Nations stated that “’Canada has been a strong supporter’ of the UNCCD.”146

141Economic migration might be considered a secondary product of desertification. 142Id. at 50-‐51 (characterizing the Secretariat’s strategy as ineffective because it focuses heavily upon climate change rather than 143See KANIE ET AL., supra note 20 at 70-‐73. 144News Editor, Canada Turns Its Back on International Drought Treaty, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS SERVICE (April 2, 2013), http://ens-‐newswire.com/2013/04/02/canada-‐turns-‐its-‐back-‐on-‐international-‐drought-‐treaty/ 145SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION, UPDATE ON RATIFICATION OF THE UNCCD AS AT 28 MARCH 2014, available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/convention/ratificationeng.pdf; UNCCD, supra note 1 at art. 38

Withdrawal:1. At any time after three years from the date on which the Convention has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from the Convention by giving written notification to the Depositary. 2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the fate of receipt of the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal. Id.

146Canada Only UN Member to Pull Out of Droughts and Deserts Convention, CTV NEWS (Mar. 27, 2013 11:13 PM EDT), http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/canada-‐only-‐un-‐member-‐to-‐pull-‐out-‐of-‐droughts-‐and-‐deserts-‐convention-‐1.1214065.


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44. Canada is now the only country in the world that is both a United Nations member and at the same

time not a member of UNCCD.147 When Canada withdrew it was under the control of the same

notoriously conservative political party that prominent Canadians like Neil Young now accuse of

exploiting Alberta’s tar sands in violation of environmental treaties with First Peoples.148

45. Other than the United States, Canada was one of the only developed country Parties to the

Convention that UNCCD recognized as being affected by desertification.149 According to a report

Canada filed with the UNCCD on its domestic activities relevant to the Convention, Canada has two

large areas of dryland ecoregions that are at risk of desertification. The larger of these two areas

encompasses 46.7 million hectacres and accounts for “60% of Canada’s cropland and 80% of its

rangeland.”150 These areas are primarily used for agricultural use and are roughly 97% of Canada’s

prairie ecozone and are essentially an extension of the United States’ Great Plains.151 Below is a

topographical map of these desertification affected ecozones in Canada:

46. Since the early 1900’s Canada has recorded a general loss of topsoil, increased erosion, poor

drainage, reduced fertility, and lower soil productivity relative to changes in farming technologies.152

These changes have yet to result in landscape desertification because Canada administers a

veritable alphabet soup of provincial and federal programs which generally report that Canada’s

prairie drylands have been recovering.153 These programs, and Canada as a whole, were not eligible

to receive assistance from UNCCD despite the fact that Canada met the criteria for an affected

country because it was also defined as a developed county Party.154 According to Part II article 6 of

147Id. 148Sean Michaels, Neil Young: Canada’s Conservative Government Exploit Alberta Tar Sands, THEGUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/jan/14/neil-‐young-‐canada-‐conservative-‐government-‐alberta-‐tar-‐sands (in thesimplest terms, Frist Peoples are aboriginal groups that inhabited regions of the world before they were colonized by Europeans). 149UNCCD WEBSITE, OTHER AFFECTED COUNTRIES AND AREAS, http://www.unccd.int/en/regional-‐access/OtherParties/Pages/default.aspx (last visited April 19, 2014 3:32 PM CST). 150CANADA’S REPORT ON DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES RELEVANT TO THE UNCCD (2002-‐2006), UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION, available at http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/otherParties/canada-‐eng.pdf (this may be found on the official UNCCD website because it has not yet been updated to reflect that Canada is no longer a party to the Convention) [hereinafter Canada’s UNCCD Report]. 151Id. at 6; David J. Wishart, Breadbasket of North America, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT LINCOLN -‐ ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE GREAT PLAINS, http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/encyclopedia/doc/egp.ii.006 (last visited April 19, 2013 at 3:55 PM CST). 152Id. at 8. 153Id. at 6. 154UNCCD WEBSITE, OTHER AFFECTED COUNTRIES AND AREAS, supra note 150; UNCCD, supra note 1 at Part I art. 1, Part II art. 6. See also id. at Annex IV art. 9 (exclusion of developed country parties in the Mediterranean Annex zone overlapping with some developed European states leaves no room for ambiguity that developed


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the Convention, developed country Parties are obligated to inter alia “provide substantial financial

resources and other forms of support to assist affected developing country Parties . . .” but not to

their peer developed country Parties regardless of whether they, too, are affected by

desertification.155

Figure 3156

47. Despite the fact that the Convention did not require desertification mitigation financial aid to any

developed country Party, Canada and other desertification affected developed country Parties made

contributions to UNCCD. Between 2008 and 2014 the Convention received payments valued at

€1,389,566 from Canada.157 This amounts to roughly 3.097 percent of the total payments toward

UNCCD’s core budget actually received during the same period of time.158 Only nine of the 196

desertification affected Parties are ineligible for financial assistance under UNCCD: “[i]n implementing national, subregional, regional and joint action programmes, affected developed country Parties of the region are not eligible to receive financial assistance under this Convention.”). 155UNCCD, supra note 1 at Part II art. 6. 156Canada’s UNCCD Report, supra note 151 at 6. 157See UNCCD SECRETARIAT, STATUS OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CORE BUDGET FOR THE YEARS 2008 – 2014 AS OF 28 FEBRUARY 2014 1-‐6, available at http://www.unccd.int/en/about-‐the-‐convention/TheSecretariat/Documents/OUTSTANDING%20CONTRIBUTION%202008-‐ 2014%20AS%20OF%2028%20FEBRUARY%202014.pdf. 158See id. (between 2008 and 2014 UNCCD’s core budget received a grand total of €44,864,879 of payments).


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Parties that were members of the Convention made a grand total contribution larger than

Canada’s.159 Canada even made contributions to UNCCD for its partial membership through March

28, 2014, and remains one of the only major contributors that has no indicative contributions

outstanding as of 2014.160

48. The domestic response to Canada’s withdrawal from UNCCD has understandably been mixed. It was

a decision made by the ruling political party, so one side of the fence believes that the decision to

withdraw was merited because the Convention is a waste of Canadian money in light of the

country’s own desertification problems and because the Convention has failed to deliver tangible

results to Parties.161 The other side of the fence voraciously criticizes Canada’s leadership for opting-‐

out of the Convention because, among other things, it is the only country on the planet that is not a

member.162

49. Canada’s yearly contributions to the Convention made it consistently a strong player in shaping

UNCCD’s core budget and policies.163 For perspective it is worth noting that the grand total of these

contributions are absolutely dwarfed by the C$ 3.56 billion in Alberta tar sands royalties that were

generated by Canada in 2012-‐2013 alone.164 In this light withdrawal could be no more than a

political statement. The possibility also exists that the Canadian government was fed up with making

obligatory165 contributions to a legally binding international framework from which it received no

tangible benefits.166 Furthermore, it may be reasonable to conclude that if China’s afforestation

programs set any type of example for UNCCD desertification combating or mitigation measures –

and the UNCCD is quite proud of the Three-‐North Shelterbelt167 – false reporting by China’s local

governments is a deeper failure of the Convention’s bottom-‐up participatory model.168

159See id. (the nine that contributed more than Canada come from a predictable selection of major industrialized countries like the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel). 160See id. 161Wente, supra note 136

The UNCCD took 13 years to come up with a 10-‐year plan. Its documents are full of urgent calls for more synergy, more interlinkages and more networking with stakeholders. But if it has ever saved a single farmer or redeemed one hectare of drought-‐stricken land, there’s no evidence of it.

162The Canadian Press, Canada quietly pulls out of Un anti-‐droughts convention: Canada is now the only country not a party of the agreement, CBCNEWS CANADA (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-‐quietly-‐pulls-‐out-‐of-‐un-‐antidroughts-‐convention-‐1.1388320. 163See text accompanying notes 158-‐161. 164ALBERTA GOVERNMENT WEBSITE, ABOUT THE OIL SANDS: ECONOMIC BENEFITS (2014), http://oilsands.alberta.ca/economicinvestment.html. 165UNCCD, supra note 1 at Part II art. 5 (“Commitments and obligations of developed country Parties”). 166Wente, supra note 136 167UNCCD WEBSITE: CHINA AFFORESTATION, supra note 52 168See supra Part III.i.a (discussing the grassroots mentality behind UNCCD’s bottom-‐up approach).


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VI CONCLUSION

50. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification set out ambitious goals when it was first

drafted and adopted by every country in the world. Realizing these goals has been difficult because

of the complexity of the many factors which contribute to and result from desertification.

Desertification prevention, mitigation, or remedial activities fashioned by the Parties through NAPs

and SRAPs have proven that the Convention’s bottomup approach can be at times both overly

stifling with respect to the Secretariat’s evolving priorities and too indulgent with respect to

administration and oversight of local programs. The result is a Convention that has widespread

appeal but only mediocre success when it comes down to the brass-‐tacks of delivering tangible

change while keeping major financial backers of the Convention satisfied. The reality is, however,

that the successes of UNCCD in garnering near worldwide support outweigh many of the problems

with the Convention.


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