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iThe Potential for a Win-win Cooperative Relationship Between China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America

The Potential for a Win-win Cooperative Relationship

Between China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East,

Africa and Latin America

No. 6

July

2015

CIIS Report

CIISii R E P O R T

About CIIS

China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) is the think tank of Chinese

Foreign Ministry. Founded in 1956, CIIS is one of the oldest research

institutions specialized in international studies in China. It conducts

research and analysis focusing primarily on medium- and long-term policy

issues of strategic importance to China, particularly those concerning

international politics and world economy. It also makes comments and

policy recommendations on major world events and hot international

issues.

About CIIS Report

Contributed by researchers at CIIS and published aperiodically, CIIS

Report brings forth a series of research papers on hot issues of international

relations as well as on major aspects of China’s diplomacy. Presented

with clear-cut views based on detailed and substantive information and

in-depth analysis, CIIS Report aims at offering a comprehensive picture

of assessment of the situation, academic studies and policy evaluation in

clear and precise language. CIIS Report is published both in Chinese and

English and downloadable on the website of CIIS (http://www.ciis.org.

cn). The views expressed in CIIS Report are those of the author(s) or their

research group only and do not necessarily reflect the official position of

CIIS.

CIIS Report

No. 6 - July 2015

Jia Xiudong

Wang Youming

Wang Hongyi

Su Xiaohui

The Potential for a Win-win Cooperative Relationship

Between China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East,

Africa and Latin America

Acronyms ii

I.Introduction 1

A.TheSignificanceofExploringthePotentialforaWin-winCooperativeRelationship

BetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates 1

B.ThePotentialforWin-winCooperationBetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesandtheWays

toAchieveit 2

II.China-U.S.CooperationintheGreaterMekongSub-region 6

A.TheFoundationforWin-winCooperationBetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesintheGMS 6

1.BothChinaandtheUnitedStatesareimportantparticipantsofGMScooperation 6

2.ThechallengesfacingChina-U.S.cooperationwithintheGMSframework 12

3.ProspectsandopportunitiesforChina-U.S.cooperationwithintheGMSframework 14

B.RecommendationstotheChineseGovernment 16

1.ContinuetoincreaseinputintheGMSsoastobenefitcountriesintheregion 16

2.Upholdtheconceptofsustainabledevelopmentandbuildagoodimage 16

3.ConductdialoguesandcoordinationwiththeUnitedStatesonthepolicytowardtheGMS 16

III.China-U.S.CooperationontheAfghanistanIssue 18

A.TheFoundationofChina-U.S.Win-winCooperationinAfghanistan 18

1.TheinterestbasisofChina-U.S.cooperation 18

2.TheconstraintsfacingChina-U.S.cooperation 25

B.RecommendationstotheChineseandU.S.Governments 26

1.China-U.S.anti-terroristcooperationinAfghanistancandrawexperiencefromthe

internationalcooperationoncounter-piracyintheGulfofAden 26

2.TheChina-U.S.cooperationcanserveasthemainchannelofChina-NATOcooperation 27

IV.ThePotentialforChina-U.S.Win-winCooperationonEnergySecurityintheMiddleEast 28

A.PositiveChangesintheFoundationofChina-U.S.CooperationonEnergySecurityin

theMiddleEast 28

1.Significantchangesinbothcountries’energyrelationswiththeMiddleEast 28

2.PositivechangesinU.S.publicopiniononChina-relatedenergysecurityissues 30

3.GrowingpotentialforChina-U.S.cooperationonenergysecurityintheMiddleEast 32

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CONTENTS

iiiiiiThe Potential for a Win-win Cooperative Relationship Between China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America

B.RecommendationstotheChineseandU.S.Governments 34

1.Chinashouldavoidbeingseenas“fillingthepowervacuum” 35

2.Chinashouldadoptanactivebutgradualapproachandactaccordingtoitscapability 35

3.ChinaandtheU.S.canincludetheircooperationonenergysecurityintheMiddleEast

intobilateralstrategicdialoguesandactivelypromotethetrilateralcooperationamong

China,theU.S.andMiddleEastcountries 36

V.China-U.S.Win-winCooperationinAfrica 37

A.ThePresentSituationandDevelopmentTrendofChina-U.S.CooperationonAfrican

Affairs 37

1.ThecommoninterestsofChinaandtheUnitedStatesoutweightheirdifferencesin

Africa 37

2.China-U.S.cooperationonAfricanaffairsisstillinitsinfancy 38

3.Thetrilateralcooperationisinlinewiththedevelopmenttrendofinternational

cooperation 39

B.PrinciplesandAreasofChina-U.S.CooperationinAfrica 41

1.Chinashouldactivelyparticipateinrulesmakingforthetrilateralcooperation 41

2.ChinaandtheUnitedStatesshouldgraduallypromotebilateralcooperationinvarious

fields 42

3.China,theUnitedStatesandAfricacanexplorelong-termtrilateralcooperationunder

theframeworkoftheFOCAC 44

VI.China-U.S.CooperationinLatinAmerica 47

A.PoliticalTrustIstheBasisofChina-U.S.CooperationinLatinAmerica 47

B.CooperationintheFieldsofFinance,Energy,Agriculture,ScienceandTechnology,

andEducationShouldBethePriorities 50

C.Counter-terrorism,DrugControlandCombatingOrganizedCrimeAreAreasThatChina

andtheUnitedStatesCanCooperateinLatinAmerica 51

D.ChinaandtheUnitedStatesShouldPromoteTheirMilitaryandDefenseCooperationin

LatinAmericainaSoundWay 53

VII.Conclusion 54

CIIS R E P O R T

Acronyms

AACF African Agricultural Capital FundADB Asian Development BankAPEC Asia-Pacific Economic CooperationAPERF Asia-Pacific Energy Regulatory ForumAPFnet Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and RehabilitationARF ASEAN Regional ForumASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASEAN-WEN ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement NetworkAU African UnionCDC Centers for Disease Control and PreventionCELAC Community of Latin American and Caribbean StatesCNOOC China National Offshore Oil CorporationCNPC China National Petroleum CorporationCSG China Southern Power GridCSR Corporate Social ResponsibilityEIA Energy Information AdministrationFBI Federal Bureau of InvestigationFOCAC Forum on China-Africa CooperationGCC Gulf Cooperation CouncilGMS Great Mekong Sub-regionIDB Inter-American Development BankIEA International Energy AgencyIMF International Monetary FundINSARAG International Search and Rescue Advisory GroupISOCORE Indian Ocean Southern Climate Observation, Reanalysis, and PredictionLEAF Lowering Emissions in Asia’s ForestsLMI Lower Mekong Initiative

iv

v

MCC China Metallurgical Group CorporationMOU Memorandum of UnderstandingMRC Mekong River CommissionNDN Northern Distribution NetworkNGO Non-governmental organizationNOAA U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationOAS Organization of American StatesPLA People’s Liberation ArmyR&D Research and DevelopmentS&ED Strategic and Economic DialogueSHADE Shared Awareness and DeconflictionSOA State Oceanic AdministrationUAE United Arab EmiratesUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUSAID U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentUSAR Urban Search and Rescue

The Potential for a Win-win Cooperative Relationship Between China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America

vi CIIS R E P O R Tvi

1The Potential for a Win-win Cooperative Relationship Between China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America

I. Introduction

A. The Significance of Exploring the Potential for a Win-win Cooperative Relationship Between China and the United States“Win-win cooperation” is an important concept arising from the innovation of China’s diplomatic theory and practice. It remains a core component of China’s peaceful development. It is also a new idea about international relations proposed by China to promote the building of a harmonious world. The Chinese Government and Chinese leaders have elaborated on the principle and spirit of “win-win cooperation” in foreign policy statements and speeches on major international occasions.

The China-U.S. relations can be described as the world’s most important bilateral relationship with ever increasing global implications. As China continues to rise and the balance of power between the two countries evolves, their strategic choices and interactions will develop into the most important factor making for changes in the international situation. For quite a long time to come, the common interests of China and the United States will expand, with greater need and willingness on both sides to cooperate with each other for their own interests. Meanwhile, the issue of China-U.S. strategic mutual trust or the lack of it will also become more prominent. Mutual suspicion and the ensuing guarding and containing actions against each other will continue to prevent the bilateral relationship from achieving greater development. Thus the two countries need to build a new model of major-country relationship.

Building a new model of major-country relationship between China and the United States is not only in the common interests of both sides, but conducive to the peace, stability and prosperity of the world. It is crucial for building such a new model to apply the diplomatic notion of “win-win cooperation” to the practice of China-U.S. relations. Though different in their strategic goals and diplomatic ideas, China and the United States have extensive common interests, which can serve as

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the basis for a win-win cooperative relationship between the two countries. Besides, win-win cooperation is an indispensable means for building strategic trust. Through win-win cooperation and sustained dialogue and consultation, China and the United States will get into the habit of cooperating with each other, and strategic trust will be gradually built up during the process.

To build a new model of major-country relations between China and the United States, it is imperative to explore the potential for Sino-U.S. win-win cooperation and the conditions and means to achieve the potential so as to help the two countries shape their future policy priorities and specific plans. Actually, building a new model of major-country relations between China and the United States will be an incremental and sometimes tortuous process in which the two countries adapt to each other and build towards strategic mutual trust. While it is important to explore the potential for Sino-U.S. win-win cooperation in bilateral fields, such as trade and economic relations, it is equally important to probe into the potential for win-win cooperation between the two countries in some important regions. This report focuses on the potential and problems for achieving Sino-U.S. win-win cooperation in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, as well as the ways to solve the problems. The aforementioned five regions have special strategic importance to both China and the United States, and an in-depth research into these regions will help explore how the two countries can enhance their mutual trust and expand cooperation so as to build up a new model of major-country relations.

B. The Potential for Win-win Cooperation Between China and the United States and the Ways to Achieve itAlthough China and the United States are in competition with each other in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, the potential for a win-win cooperative relationship between the two countries does exist in these regions.

Southeast Asia, as a close neighbor of China, is equivalent to China’s south gate strategically, while at the same time, the region has become a top priority in the U.S. “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” strategy. Increased American input in the region will help boost the economic development of countries in the region and


create conditions for China to benefit from the region’s development. However, it will also bring forth greater strategic pressure on China from the southern direction. Considering the strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. in the region, it is easier to pursue win-win cooperation in those projects that are less sensitive but complex to some extent, for instance, “the Greater Mekong sub-regional cooperation”.

South Asia is a key area in U.S. strategy against terrorism, and China shares common interests with the United States in combating terrorism in the region. The phased withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan will lead to new changes in the situation of the country, and the interaction between China and the United States in the region will affect the security and economic interests of western China. Due to financial constraint, the United States has to temporarily put aside its ideological differences with China and seek a constructive role to be played by the latter after the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. Therefore, Afghanistan is likely to become an area of productive cooperation between China and the United States as well as NATO in the next few years.

The Middle East is one of the key areas with strategic input from the United States for a long time, while the region’s importance is rising in China’s energy strategy and “going out” strategy. China recently surpassed the United States temporarily to become the world’s largest net importer of oil, and China’s energy dependence on the Middle East has long been greater than that of the United States. As a result, there are and will continue to be subtle changes in China’s role in the Middle East as well as the strategic interaction between China and the United States in the region. This trend provides a new opportunity for win-win cooperation between the two countries in the Middle East.

Africa is viewed internationally as a ground for rivalry between China and the West, and the rapid development of the new China-Africa strategic partnership has caused some suspicions and vigilance from the United States and other Western countries. At the same time, China and the United States have engaged in certain forms of cooperation in Africa. But the potential for further cooperation between the two countries remain huge. As global powers and with common interests outweighing their differences in Africa, China and the United States have a shared responsibility in such aspects as maintaining peace and development, safeguarding

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investment and energy security, and promoting environmental protection in Africa.

Latin America has long been regarded as the U.S. “backyard”, but in recent years the “China factor” has become more prominent in Latin America, sparking great attention and even concerns of American politicians and interest groups. In fact, the growing Chinese presence in Latin America does not constitute a substantial challenge to the United States, nor is it China’s foreign policy to do so. In Latin America, China and the United States have every reason to build a mutually beneficial and complementary relationship, as well as a new model of triangular relationship.

The China-U.S. cooperation in the aforementioned regions is by no means a G-2 (the Group of Two) arrangement, instead it is meant to be complementary with each playing a unique role. China is willing to assume international responsibilities in line with its national strength and conditions, and work together with the United States to provide more high-quality public goods to the international community. In their cooperation in these regions, China and the United States should adhere to the principle of “being proactive, proceeding in an orderly and gradual manner, and starting from those areas that are easier to succeed”. The two countries should strengthen their communication on regional affairs, respect the independent choice of each country and do not impose their wills on other nations. The two sides should also support, not sabotage, each other in handling regional affairs. As to the UN initiatives, such as peacekeeping, the two countries should actively participate and strengthen coordination.

In practice, China and the United States should establish principles, priorities and means of cooperation in the aforementioned regions through bilateral mechanisms, including the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and counterpart diplomatic consultations on regional affairs. The two countries should also instruct their respective national authorities to implement their consensus. To be specific, the two sides may proceed on dual tracks, i.e. Track I (governmental mechanisms) and Track II (semi-official mechanisms). On Track I, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and U.S. State Department could engage in counterpart consultations (for instance, China-U.S. consultations on Asia-Pacific affairs, South Asian affairs, Middle East affairs, African affairs, Latin American affairs, etc.). On Track II, the think tanks recommended by the two governments (e.g. China Institute


of International Studies, the Brookings Institution, etc.) could join hands with some other research institutions and enterprises to set up joint teams to study specific issues concerning China-U.S. cooperation in the aforementioned regions. The two tracks can interact with each other in order to form a final report to be presented to the China-U.S. S&ED for consideration and possible implementation.

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II. China-U.S. Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Sub-region

The “Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS)” cooperation mechanism is an important platform for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. As a member of the GMS cooperation mechanism, China has played an important role in such fields as enhancing regional connectivity. The United States, with its “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” strategy, now pays greater attention to the GMS and has increased its input to the region. Since the two countries have common interests in the development of the sub-region, they can cooperate under the GMS cooperation framework, though there are problems and challenges ahead.

A. The Foundation for Win-win Cooperation Between China and the United States in the GMS

1. Both China and the United States are important participants of GMS cooperationCurrently, both China and the United States attach importance to the development of the GMS cooperation mechanism and have played a important role in the process.

(1) The GMS mechanism has become an important platform for regional cooperation

The GMS Economic Cooperation Program (GMS Program) was launched by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1992 and involves six countries, namely Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, specifically Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. The GMS is a natural economic area


bound together by the Mekong River, with an area of 2.6 million square kilometers and a combined population of about 333.8 million.1 The GMS Program is a project-based sub-regional cooperation mechanism, covering such key areas as transport, energy, telecommunication and environment. By the end of 2010, the participating countries of the GMS Program had engaged in 227 cooperation projects, with a total investment of about $14 billion. Among the $14 billion of investment, $13.8 billion was used on 55 infrastructure projects, and $200 million on 172 technical assistance projects that supported participating countries in their research and capacity-building activities.2

At the Fourth GMS Summit in 2011, the GMS leaders adopted a 10-year Strategic Framework to guide the GMS from 2012 to 2022. The Strategic Framework builds on the member countries’ commitment and national development plans to promote regional cooperation and integration within and beyond the GMS.3 In December 2013, the GMS Ministers endorsed the GMS Regional Investment Framework (RIF), which operationalizes the Strategic Framework by identifying a pipeline of priority investment and technical assistance projects from 2013 to 2022. The RIF contains more than 200 projects across 10 sectors with an estimated investment of over $50 billion. The RIF Implementation Plan adopted at the 5th GMS Summit in 2014 identified a robust pipeline of 92 high-priority projects for 2014-2018 and set a realistic implementation plan and monitoring system over the medium-term.4

Infrastructural connectivity is a priority in the GMS Program. A major result of the GMS Program in land transport is the establishment of a sub-regional road network comprising of east-west, north-south and southern transport corridors. The east-west land transport corridor starts from Da Nang in Vietnam, runs through central Laos and northern Thailand, and ends at Mawlamyine in Myanmar. The north-south corridor includes three lines: Kunming (China) - Namtha (Laos) - Bangkok (Thailand); Kunming (China) - Nanning (China) - Hanoi (Vietnam); and Kunming (China) - Hai Phong (Vietnam). The southern corridor includes two lines: Bangkok (Thailand)- Phnom Penh (Cambodia) - Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam) -

1　 Asian Development Bank, “Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Program: Overview”, May 2015. <http://www.adb.org/publications/greater-mekong-subregion-economic-cooperation-program-overview>2　 Liu Zhi (ed.), Da Meigonghe Ciquyu Hezuo Fazhan Baogao (2011-2012) (Report on Cooperation and Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion (2011-2012)), Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), June 2012, p.2.3　 Asian Development Bank, “Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Program: Overview”.4　 Ibid.

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Vung Tau City (Vietnam); and Bangkok (Thailand) - Siem Reap (Cambodia) - Quy Nhon City (Vietnam). A railway connectivity program, which is an integral part of the pan-Asian railway network, is also proceeding and expected to cover six countries by 2020.

In terms of waterway transportation, an international shipping pattern has been formed along the Lancang-Mekong River. By August 2011, there were 98 ships operating on the Lancang River for international shipping business with over 40 million tonnes of cargo annually. The navigational conditions have improved along the Lancang-Mekong River with the tonnage of ships increasing to 300 tonnes and the navigable guarantee rate of the Lancang River reaching 90%.5

In terms of the “software” construction for connectivity, the GMS Program has not only simplified customs clearance, inspection and quarantine procedures, but facilitated border entry and exit of business professionals by implementing the GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreement, the Strategic Framework for Action on Trade Facilitation and Investment in the GMS and other related agreements.

Substantial progress has been made in enhancing the connectivity of energy infrastructure as well. When the GMS Program was launched in 1992, the only significant power transmission links in the region were those between the Laos and Thailand for the export of Laotian hydropower. After the launching of the GMS Program, the ADB has provided financial support, totaling $699.42 million of loans from 1992 to 2011, to the energy cooperation projects in the sub-region. It had also provided $21.1 million in technical assistance in partnership with other sponsors in the same period. With loans from the ADB, countries in the GMS have built a number of power generation and transmission facilities leading to rapid expansion of regional electricity trade: Laos has been importing electricity from Thailand since the late 1990s and Yunnan Province of China since 2009; Vietnam has been importing electricity from Yunnan Province of China since 2004; Yunnan Province of China has been importing electricity from Myanmar since 2008; and Cambodia has been importing electricity from Vietnam, Thailand and Laos since 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively.6 Thanks to the GMS Program, a regional power coordination center will soon be established to enhance regional power trade and implement

5　 “Lancangjiang – Mekonghe Guoji Hangyun Geju Yi Xingcheng” (An International Shipping Pattern Formed Along the Lancang-Mekong River], CRI Online, August 13, 2011. <http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2011/08/13/782s3337309.htm>6　 Asian Development Bank, “Great Mekong Sub-region Power Trade and Interconnection: 2 Decades of Cooperation”, September 2012, p.11. <http://www.adb.org/publications/greater-mekong-subregion-power-trade-and-interconnection>


regional power interconnection in the GMS.7

In the field of telecommunication, a backbone network connecting all GMS countries has been built. And tourism in the GMS is developing rapidly, with the number of inbound tourists increasing from 9.6 million in 1995 to over 30 million in 2011.8

(2) China has made important contributions to the GMS Program

The GMS Program is one of the key areas of cooperation between China and ASEAN. China’s contribution to the GMS Program is mainly reflected in the building of transport infrastructure, interconnection of power grids and power trade. In the construction of the pan-Asia railway, China has developed a program consisting of three lines (the eastern, central, and western lines) inside the country to connect itself with ASEAN countries, and has incorporated the program into its Mid- and Long-term Plan for Railway Networks. On the eastern line, the Yuxi-Mengzi Railway and the Mengzi-Hekou Railway have been completed. On the central line, the Kunming-Yuxi Railway is undergoing capacity expansion. And on the western line, the Kunming-Guangtong Railway and the Dali-Ruili Railway are increasing traffic capacity and under construction respectively. In addition, China supports the construction of the pan-Asia railway in other countries. In 2010, China and Laos reached an agreement that China would invest $7 billion in the China-Laos high-speed railway project. At its own expense, China completed the feasibility study on the missing section between Bat Deung and Snuol in Cambodia in 2010 and on the missing sections between Vientiane, Laos and Mohan, Yunnan Province, China as well as between Muse and Lashio in Myanmar in 2011.9

In electricity cooperation, via a 110 kV power line from Hekou, Yunnan Province to Lao Cai in Vietnam, China officially began to export electricity to Vietnam in September 2004. By the end of August 2011, China Southern Power Grid (CSG) had accumulatively supplied 20.9 billion kWh of electricity to Vietnam

7　 The Intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding for the Established of the Regional Power Coordination Center (RPCC) in the GMS was signed by six member countries in December 2013. See “Summary of Proceedings: 17th Meeting of the GMS Regional Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC-17)”, December 2014, Asian Development Bank.8　 Liu Zhi (ed.), Da Meigonghe Ciquyu Hezuo Fazhan Baogao (2011-2012) (Report on Cooperation and Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion (2011-2012)), p.5.9　 Xinhua News Agency, “Country Report on China’s Participation in Greater Mekong Sub-region Cooperation”. December 16, 2011. <http://www.gov.cn/misc/2011-12/16/content_2022595_3.htm>

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and 136 million kWh of electricity to the north of Laos.10

To enhance the traffic capacity of waterways, the Chinese government provided funds and joined hands with the governments of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand to carry out the project of revamping the shipping lanes on the Upper Mekong River from 2000 to 2004. As a result, the tonnage capacity of the Upper Mekong River had increased from 100 tonnes in the navigable seasons to 150 tonnes for the whole year and 200 tonnes in high water seasons, and the length of navigable seasons in a year has increased from 6-7 months to 10-11 months.11

The Yunnan and Guangxi branches of China Telecom have engaged in active cooperation with Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam in the deployment of international optical fiber cables, international voice services, Internet services and cross-border call transfer services. Their services have covered all GMS countries.12

(3) The U.S. puts emphasis on environmental protection and human development

The United States has participated in the GMS Program primarily through the ADB. Since it accelerated its return to Southeast Asia, the United States has increased investment in the Mekong sub-region with education, environment, culture, health and other livelihood projects as priorities.

A big move of the U.S. is the launching of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) together with four Lower Mekong countries in July 2009, which is a new framework for “U.S.-Mekong cooperation”. According to the U.S. State Department, the U.S. assistance in the area of education to the lower Mekong sub-region would total over $3.25 million in 2011, including International Visitors Leadership Program, Lower Mekong Initiative English for Specific Purposes Program, and other innovative programs.13 In the area of environment, the United States would spend over $69 million on environmental programs in the lower Mekong region in 2011, including Forecast Mekong, Mississippi River Commission-Mekong River Commission Exchange, Surface Evaluation Tables

10　 Ibid.11　 “Zhong Lao Mian Tai Shangmeigonghe Hangdao Gaishan Gongcheng Quanmian Jungong” (The China-Laos-Myanmar-Thailand Upper Mekong River Shipping Lane Revamping Project Is Completed), Xinhuanet, May 12, 2004. <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/HIAW/563109.htm>12　 Ibid.13　 U.S. Department of State, “Lower Mekong Initiative Progress 2010/2011”, July 22, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168944.htm>


and Marker Horizons Network Component, Lowering Emissions in Asia’s Forests (LEAF), ECO-Asia Water and Governance Program, and Planning Approaches for Water Resource Development in the Lower Mekong Basin. In the health field, U.S. assistance to the lower Mekong countries would total over $140 million in 2011, which includes Pandemic Threats Workshop, Drug Quality Monitoring, etc.14

At the 5th LMI Ministerial Meeting and the 2nd Friends of the Lower Mekong Ministerial Meeting held in July 2012 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the U.S. would provide $50 million in new U.S. programs supporting the LMI over a three year period, and that these new programs were intended to complement and dramatically expand existing efforts to bolster regional capacity to address specific cross-border challenges and promote institutional and people-to-people connectivity in the Mekong sub-region.15 It was also announced that the U.S. would grant $2 million to support the fisheries program of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and that the U.S. was prepared to commit up to $1 million, along with other donors, to support a MRC’s study on the sustainable management and development of the Mekong River, including the research on the impacts of building dams along the main stream of the Mekong River on fisheries, agriculture, livelihoods, environment and health.16

The U.S. assistance in infrastructure also focuses on people’s livelihood. For instance, in its plan for the year 2011, the United States intended to spend more than $9 million in areas relating to infrastructure development, including Lower Mekong Disaster Management Workshop and Humanitarian Assistance Construction Projects, which focused on the building and repairing of clinics, schools, emergency shelters, roads, bridges, and operation centers in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.17

14　 Ibid.15　 U.S. Department of State, “Statement on the Fifth Lower Mekong Initiative Ministerial Meeting”, July 13, 2012. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194959.htm>16　 Ibid. LMI, “Remarks from the Fifth Lower Mekong Initiative Ministerial Meeting”, July 13, 2012. <http://lowermekong.org/news/remarks-fifth-lower-mekong-initiative-ministerial-meeting>17　 U.S. Department of State, “Lower Mekong Initiative Progress 2010/2011”, July 22, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168944.htm>.

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2. The challenges facing China-U.S. cooperation within the GMS framework

(1) The U.S. diplomacy in the GMS is partly intended for balancing China’s influence

The U.S. engagement in the GMS is part of its “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific” strategy, which aims at balancing China’s influence. The former U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Yun and some other U.S. officials said that the LMI plays an important role in U.S. policy to restore balance in Asia.18

When the United States tried to expand its influence over the five Lower Mekong countries, it deliberately excluded China, an Upper Mekong country. The U.S. Mississippi River Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the MRC in May 2010, which would foster research and improve water resources development.19 On the surface, the move was to help Mekong countries to improve their governance and enhance their capabilities in trans-boundary river management, but in essence, it was intended for strengthening U.S. role in the water resources development and management of the Mekong River so that the United States could balance China’s influence in the region.

To exert influence on Myanmar, the United States accepted Myanmar as a full member of the LMI and deliberately lifted its status. In 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton invited Myanmar, which marked a breakthrough of the U.S.-Myanmar relations. During that visit, Hillary Clinton invited Myanmar to join the LMI. At the 5th LMI Ministerial Meeting held in 2012, the United States added to the LMI a new pillar called “Agriculture and Food Security” which would be co-chaired by Myanmar and the Untied States.20

The U.S. increased input has resulted in positive responses from some countries in the region. In May 2013, the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington and the U.S. State Department co-organized a forum entitled “LMI: Broadening Cooperation”. At the forum, the Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Pham Quang Vinh acknowledged the increasing diversification and expansion of the LMI and its positive contribution to the planned establishment of the ASEAN Community

18　 Tuoitrenews, “US to boost cooperation under Lower Mekong Initiative”, February 5, 2013. <http://tuoitrenews.vn/politics/9220/us-to-boost-cooperation-under-lower-mekong-initiative>19　 U.S. State Department, “Mississipi River Commission agreement creates unique partnership a world apart”, June 14, 2010. < http://www.state.gov/p/eap/mekong/143272.htm>20　 U.S. Department of State, “Statement on the Fifth Lower Mekong Initiative Ministerial Meeting”.


by 2015 and the narrowing of development gaps among ASEAN countries. He also spoke highly of the positive attitude of the U.S. government and business community towards the forum and the efforts they have made to advance the LMI.21

(2) Issues relating to environment and water resources have become the focal points for U.S. criticism of China

Hydropower and other environment-related projects have always been the bones of contention between China and Lower Mekong countries. The Lower Mekong countries have all formulated ambitious plans for hydropower stations construction with the hope of accelerating the development of agriculture, forestry and industry as well as enhancing people’s living standards. At the same time, these countries pay close attention to China’s construction of dams and irrigation works along the Lancang River (the upper reaches of the Mekong River), with the concerns that China might control the amount of water flowing into the Mekong River and cause environmental degradation, which will induce losses in their fisheries and agricultural production, threaten the life and property of their people, and leave them in a disadvantageous position in the bargaining of hydroelectricity prices in power trade with China. The Lower Mekong countries have misgivings over “China’s assertiveness”, thus tend to accuse China for causing all the problems.

The United States has taken the opportunity to get deeply involved in the Mekong River water resource issue and hype it with various means. It has lent support to Lower Mekong countries’ criticism and opposition to China’s major water conservancy projects in Lancang River basin, and made efforts to politicize China’s cooperation with Lower Mekong countries on hydropower development. During her historic visit to Laos in July 2012, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton purposefully discussed environmental concerns over a proposed dam on the Mekong River and included environmental protection into the U.S.-Laos Joint Statement issued on the day of her visit.22

21　 “Yuenan Yu Meiguo Chengnuo Tuijin ‘Meigonghe Xiayou Changyi” (Vietnam and the U.S. Commit to Implementing the Lower Mekong Initiative), Nhân Dân, May 2, 2013. <http://cn.nhandan.org.vn/society/environment/item/755701>22　 Associate Press, “Hillary Clinton Visits Laos in Historic Visit”, July 11, 2012. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/11/hillary-clinton-laow_n_1665494.html>; U.S. State Department, “Joint Statement on Secretary Clinton’s Official Visit to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR)”, July 11, 2012. < http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194835.htm>

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3. Prospects and opportunities for China-U.S. cooperation within the GMS framework

(1) The United States need take China’s influence into account while increasing its input in the GMS

Countries in the GMS welcome increased U.S. input, but do not want to see their cooperation with China being affected in a negative way. With the rapid development of Chinese economy, countries in the region have higher expectations of China. Therefore, the five GMS countries, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, have adopted the strategy of “balancing major external powers”. They hope to get benefits from both China and the United States to promote their own development, and do not want to see the tensions between China and the United States escalating because it will prompt them to take sides.

China has considerable advantages in the GMS in terms of geography, economic and trade relations, as well as historical and cultural connections. Besides, it has made some progress in its cooperation with GMS countries. With its growing overall national strength and influence in the sub-region, China has possessed more means and greater leverage to induce cooperation from the United States in the GMS.

(2) China and the United States have the intention to cooperate in several fields

In July 2012, the U.S. State Department released a statement saying that the United States and China pledged at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to enhance and initiate collaborative efforts in the Asia-Pacific region, including in the areas of science and technology, climate change, disaster warning and response, energy policy, forest management, fisheries management, disease detection and control, and wildlife protection and conservation.23

In terms of disaster response, China and the United States co-hosted the ARF Seminar on the Laws and Regulations on Participation in International Disaster Relief by Armed Forces in Beijing on June 10-12, 2012. The two countries jointly funded and participated in an urban search and rescue (USAR) training exercise aimed at improving USAR capacity of Indonesia and other ASEAN member states.

23　 U.S. State Department, “U.S.-China Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region”, July 12, 2012. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194891.htm>


Hosted by the Government of Indonesia National Search and Rescue Agency, the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) Asia Pacific Regional Earthquake Response Exercise, jointly funded by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the China Earthquake Administration, was held in Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia from May 29 to June 1, 2012.24

In terms of environmental protection and climate change, China and the United States have decided to sign a Letter of Intent for a Collaborative Oceanographic Scientific Research Pilot Project for the Development of South Sea Real-Time Tsunami Forecasting Capabilities between the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and China’s National Marine Environmental Forecasting Center in the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). The two countries have also signed the Framework Plan for Ocean and Fishery Science and Technology Cooperation between NOAA and SOA. In addition, the two countries are developing the Indian Ocean Southern Climate Observation, Reanalysis, and Prediction (ISOCORE) Program.25

In energy policy, the two sides are participating as partners in the Asia-Pacific Energy Regulatory Forum (APERF) to facilitate sharing of information on energy regulation as well as policy practice and experience in the Asia-Pacific, and China attended the APERF hosted by the United States in Washington, D.C. in August 2012.

In ecological protection, China and the United States participated in a Special Investigations Group meeting led by the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) in Nanning, China, in June 2012. The two countries are strengthening cooperation and exchange through the Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and Rehabilitation (APFnet). They are also collaborating on wild tiger conservation, including in the Asia-Pacific.26

In disease detection and control, China and the United States intend to expand collaboration between the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and China’s CDC to strengthen disease detection and control capabilities and networks in the Asia-Pacific.27

24　 Ibid.25　 Ibid.26　 Ibid.27　 Ibid.

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B. Recommendations to the Chinese Government

1. Continue to increase input in the GMS so as to benefit countries in the regionChina should continue to promote progress of the GMS cooperation in such aspects as roads, airports and railways, telecommunication, energy, urban development, tourism, environmental protection and the prevention and control of infectious diseases, including the implementation of the GMS Economic Cooperation Program Strategic Framework 2012-2022. China should also provide funds for the medium- and long-term planning of international shipping development along the Lancang-Mekong River, trans-boundary prevention and control of infectious diseases, and capacity-building of the institutions in the GMS member countries. In this process, the Chinese firms, institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be encouraged to discuss cooperation with their U.S. counterparts on specific projects.

2. Uphold the concept of sustainable development and build a good imageChina should correctly handle the relationship between development and environmental protection. When implementing projects in the GMS, the country should pay attention to the ecological balance and take remedial measures to reduce the adverse impacts of the projects on the environment to the minimum level. The Chinese firms should attach importance to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and carry out the work on such aspects as compensation for damages, resettlement and community building. The Chinese firms and NGOs should be encouraged to exchange with their American counterparts the experience and lessons on environmental protection, CSR, human development as well as other aspects of project implementation in Southeast Asia.

3. Conduct dialogues and coordination with the United States on the policy toward the GMSChina should take advantage of the U.S. positive response to its proposal of building a “new model of major-country relationship” to conduct dialogues with the United States on the GMS cooperation, so as to seek common interests and


create favorable conditions for the bilateral cooperation in the sub-region. In view of the fact that China-U.S. cooperation in the GMS is still in the initial stage, the two countries can choose the protection of cultural heritage as their first area of cooperation. In addition, since recent years have witnessed the suffering of some countries in the sub-region from floods and the offer of disaster relief by China and the United States to them, China can choose these countries as pilot areas for its cooperation with the United States in terms of disaster prevention and reduction.

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III. China-U.S. Cooperation on the Afghanistan Issue

Factors leading to instability and uncertainty in Afghanistan are increasing due to NATO’s plan of withdrawing its troops from the country. The United States and NATO are working to respond to the risks of unrest in Afghanistan, but have found it difficult to secure the sources of funding for this purpose because of their bad economic situation. Meanwhile, China has been increasing its investment in Afghanistan, playing a positive role in maintaining the country’s security and promoting its development. Therefore, despite many challenges ahead, Afghanistan is likely to become the pilot area for China and the United States to build a new model of major-country relations featuring cooperation and win-win outcomes.

A. The Foundation of China-U.S. Win-win Cooperation in Afghanistan

1. The interest basis of China-U.S. cooperationAfghanistan remains a key country in U.S. strategy toward the region despite the end of NATO combat mission in the country in December 2014. Subject to financial constraints, the United States and NATO are forced to take a more pragmatic attitude towards Afghanistan. Specifically, the United States has to downplay ideological differences with China and expect China to play a constructive role in Afghanistan. Recent years have witnessed China’s increased investment and expanded interests in Afghanistan, and China has become a positive factor for maintaining Afghanistan’s stability and promoting its development. Therefore, there is a foundation for China and the United States to cooperate in Afghanistan.

(1) Although NATO has ended its combat mission in Afghanistan, it still maintains a presence in the country.

In December 28, 2014, NATO formally ended its combat mission in Afghanistan.


However, according to the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) signed by the United States and Afghanistan, nearly 10,000 American troops are allowed to remain in the country to conduct training and advising of Afghan security forces, as well as counterterrorism operations against remnants of al-Qaeda.28

Attaching great importance to the strategic location of Afghanistan as a “crossroads” of Central Asia, West Asia and South Asia, the United States hopes to maintain its influence and presence in the country, and to implement a regional strategy centering on Afghanistan.

In fact, the United States and NATO are employing multiple means to ensure that Afghanistan can maintain stability and domestic security, and that its economy can still develop after the withdrawal of American and NATO forces.

First of all, the United States seeks to maintain a long-term military presence in Afghanistan while launching the troop withdrawal process. It claimed that the Afghan forces have been enhancing its combat capability and will be able to take over the security control smoothly and play a leading role in military operations. But at the same time, the United States insisted on leaving some troops in Afghanistan after ending the war in order to continue to fight the remnants of al-Qaeda and provide training and equipment to the Afghan forces.

Secondly, the United States proposed the “New Silk Road” initiative in 2011, which aims at linking Central Asia and South Asia through regional energy markets, trade and transport routes, improved customs and borders, and connecting businesses and people.29 The U.S. New Silk Road initiative is focused on Afghanistan as a main hub for economic integration and transportation, and it is expected to help provide the much-needed support to Afghanistan after the withdrawal of American troops in 2014. The initiative also aims to provide economic boost for Afghanistan’s neighbors, including Central Asia republics.30 With the implementation of the phased withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, economic and trade cooperation will become a key link between the United States and Afghanistan as well as other countries in the region.

28　 “U.S. and Afghanistan sign vital, long-delayed security pact”, The Washington Post, September 30, 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-afghanistan-sign-security-pact-to-allow-american-forces-to-remain-in-country/2014/09/30/48f555ce-4879-11e4-a046-120a8a855cca_story.html>29　 Fatema Sumar, “The New Silk Road Initiative in Action”, April 29, 2014. <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2014/04/20140430298545.html#axzz3aZdhAGGI>30　 Vladimir Fedorenko, “The New Silk Road Initiatives in Central Asia”, Rethink Paper 10, Rethink Institute, August 2013, pp.4-5. <http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/files/Fedorenko%20-%20The%20New%20Silk%20Road.pdf>

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Thirdly, the United States has been actively seeking international assistance for Afghanistan. In July 2012, the Japanese and Afghan Governments jointly held the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan and adopted the Tokyo Declaration, in which the international community committed to providing over $16 billion through 2015.31 The United States is one of the biggest donors to Afghanistan, and its portion is expected to be in the decade-long annual range of $1 billion to $2.3 billion from 2003 to 2012.32

(2) Fiscal austerity has forced the United States and NATO to temporarily downplay their ideological differences with China.

Affected by the international financial crisis, the United States and its NATO allies have shouldered heavy financial burden and as a result have to adopt a “smart defense” approach to deal with security challenges. The “smart defense” requires that NATO pools resources together to cut cost, as well as seek new partners to share the cost of operations.

With respect to partners who do not share similar values with NATO members, NATO believes that it is useful to use the analogy of the marketplace to define the terms of the partnership. When two competing firms are in the marketplace, sometimes due to high sunk costs of research and development (R&D), they would enter into a joint venture or strategic partnership on that particular product area, while still remaining competitors in all other aspects in the marketplace.33 Similarly, although China, as a significant actor in international security, does not adhere to NATO principles, NATO could enhance confidence building measures with it.34

(3) The United States expects China to play a constructive role in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO forces.

Although the United States has made efforts to maintain its commitment in safeguarding Afghanistan’s security, the situation in Afghanistan may get out of

31　 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Tokyo Declaration – Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan: From Transition to Transformation”, July 8, 2012. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/tokyo_declaration_en1.html>32　 “Afghanistan Aid: Donors Offer $16 Billion in Development Aid”, Associate Press, July 8, 2012. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/08/afghanistan-aid-donors-offer-16-billion_n_1657131.html>33　 Christina Lin, “NATO-China Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges”, ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, the Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy Issue No. 189, Institut für Strategie-Politik-Sicherheits-und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW), April 2012. < http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=141148>34　 Masako Ikegami, “NATO and Japan: Strengthening Asian Stability”, NATO Review, Summer 2007. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/Partnerships_Old_New/NATO_Japan/EN/index.htm>


control once the U.S. transfers all security responsibilities to Afghan security forces. The United States is aware that the Afghan government has weak control of the domestic situation and that corruption is rampant across the country. At the same time, the U.S. believes that the Afghan militants now hiding in neighboring countries will make trouble after the withdrawal of NATO troops. The Taliban is still powerful in Afghanistan, and it has become a security threat to the Afghan government.

On the economic front, there is little reason to be optimistic due to the withdrawal of international investors from Afghanistan. Although the United States intends to promote Afghanistan’s economic development by exploiting its advantages in natural resources, the results are not encouraging. At present and in the foreseeable future, Afghanistan will remain highly dependent on foreign assistance.

In the area of drug control, Afghanistan’s drug problem has attracted increasingly great attention from various countries in the world as well as related international organizations, and the grave consequences of this problem are worrying. First, the problem has seriously affected the health of Afghan people and led to decreasing, and even loss of the labor force’s ability to work. At the same time, the spread and abuse of drugs is an important cause of such diseases as AIDS, having a negative impact on the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Second, the drug problem affects Afghanistan’s domestic security situation, which constitutes a major obstacle to the peace and reconstruction of the country. The south and south-west parts of Afghanistan are not only the country’s most important bases for drug plantation, but the areas where the Taliban and al-Qaeda are active. The Taliban and al-Qaeda have been using drug production to get steady funds for their terrorist activities. The United States has invested human and material resources to help the Afghan government fight drug trafficking to no avail.35

Due to the aforementioned reasons, the United States and NATO want China to play a positive role in Afghanistan. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told Chinese media that Afghanistan would need greater support from its neighboring countries after NATO withdrew its forces from the country.

35　 Cao Wei and Yang Shu, “Meiguo Zai Afuhan De Jindu Xingdong Ji Chengxiao Fenxi” (An Analysis of U.S. Anti-drug Operations in Afghanistan and Their Effects), Xinjiang Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) (Journal of Xinjiang Normal University (Social Sciences)), Vol.32, No.4, July 2011.

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In terms of promoting stability and security in Afghanistan, China has not deployed security forces in Afghanistan, thus not playing a big, direct role in this regard, but it has contributed to Afghanistan’s security in other ways. Since 2006, soldiers from the Afghan security forces have received anti-drug training in China, using facilities of the Chinese armed police, and Afghan officers have been trained in the colleges and universities affiliated to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In September 2012, China and Afghanistan reached agreements relating to security and economic cooperation, including a deal to “train, fund and equip Afghan police”.

In addition, the United States and NATO have long sought to secure China’s constructive involvement, in particularly urging China to provide more economic aid and to encourage Pakistan’s cooperation with anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan.36

With regard to economy, increased Chinese involvement in the development of Afghan mineral resources will help promote Afghanistan’s economic growth. China’s investment has increased the Afghan government’s revenues and helped it maintain a high level of security expenditure, including the funds needed for the large-scale Afghan security forces being trained by NATO.

In fighting narcotics, China, with its business operations in Afghanistan, helps the country provide more lawful jobs for Afghan people, thus preventing some unemployed Afghans from practicing drug trafficking. China possesses some experience in promoting the cultivation of poppy-substitute crops. For instance, since the beginning of the 21st century, the Chinese government and Yunnan provincial government have rendered support to northern Myanmar, northern Laos and northern Thailand in their large-scale cultivation of poppy-substitute crops. According to a survey done in 2013, the area of opium poppy cultivation in the Golden Triangle region has shrunk substantially to about 10 percent of the acreage in its peak year.

At the fifth round of China-U.S. S&ED held in July 2013, the two countries decided to expand coordination in advance of the 2014 drawdown in support of

36　 Elizabeth Wishnick, “The Constraints of Partnership: China’s Approach to Afghanistan”, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 219, September 2012. <http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_219_Wishnick_Sept2012.pdf>


their shared interest in political stability and economic revitalization in Afghanistan. The two sides decided to continue the joint diplomatic training program for Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, which began in 2012, and to pursue other joint assistance projects in health. The two countries also intend to continue to work together in support of regional cooperation efforts such as the Istanbul Process, and the United States welcomed China’s decision to host the next ministerial meeting in 2014.

(4) Expanded interests in Afghanistan drive China’s increasing attention to Afghan security situation.

China is one of the largest foreign investors in Afghanistan. Its total investment amounts to € 5.95 billion in 2014.37 In 2007, the Afghan government announced that the China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper Company outbidded other foreign competitors for a 30-year lease of the copper resource in Aynak, Logar Province in exchange for $3 billion and additional deal-sweeteners – a railroad, a 400-megawatt power plant, a smelter, and a coal mine.38 In late 2011, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) won the rights to drill three oil fields in the Amu Darya river basin in northern Afghanistan for 25 years. These fields are estimated to hold around 87 million barrels of oil.39 In terms of development aid, China has provided RMB 2.02 billion of free assistance to Afghanistan by 2014, and committed to offering another RMB 1.5 billion of free assistance to Afghanistan in the period 2015-2017.40 As its interests become increasingly intertwined with those of Afghanistan, China will certainly pay greater attention and render more support to the maintenance of Afghan domestic security.

(5) China is willing to cooperate with all parties concerned to promote the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

China has important economic and security interests in Afghanistan, but does not seek exclusive interests.

37　 “Afuhan Shang Le ‘Zhongguo Che” (Afghanistan Has Got on the Board of “China Train” ), Guoji Jinrong Bao (Interna-tional Finance News), November 10, 2014. <http://paper.people.com.cn/gjjrb/html/2014-11/10/content_1496839.htm>38　 Kendrick Kuo, “Aynak Copper Mine: Case Study of Sino-Afghan Dreams, Interrupted”, Registan, July 8, 2013. < http://registan.net/2013/07/08/aynak-copper-mine-case-study-of-sino-afghan-dreams-interrupted/>39　 Steve A. Zyck, “The Role of China in Afghanistan’s Economic Development & Reconstruction”, Civil-Military Fusion Centre, March 2012. <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3590.pdf>40　 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, “Zhongguo Tong Afuhan Shuangbian Guanxi” (The Bilateral Relations Between China and Afghanistan), updated in March 2015. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/gjhdq_603914/gj_603916/yz_603918/1206_603920/sbgx_603924/>

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During his visit to Afghanistan on February 22, 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that “China hopes to see a united, stable, developing and amicable Afghanistan” 41 and hopes the country to “go through its current political, economic and security transitions smoothly”.42 He also said that “the Chinese side hopes to pool consensus from all parties by holding the fourth Foreign Ministers’ Conference of the Istanbul Process on the Afghan Issue and make concerted efforts to assist Afghanistan in realizing the triple transition, so as to achieve a true and lasting peace and bring more substantial benefits to the Afghan people”.43

China supports Afghanistan in strengthening its ties with countries in the region and beyond, and it is willing to join hands with other countries to contribute to the peace, stability and development of Afghanistan and the region.

(6) China and the United States are promoting their cooperation in Afghanistan.

The two countries have launched and engaged in a project to train Afghan young diplomats since 2012. Young Afghan diplomats selected by the Chinese and the U.S. embassies in Afghanistan will attend a four-week training course in Beijing and Washington.44 Co-organized by the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State Department, this joint training program is a classic case of China-U.S. cooperation on the restoration of peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Both countries have gained experience from implementing the program, which would be useful for exploring other cooperation projects relating to Afghanistan.

2. The constraints facing China-U.S. cooperationDespite the aforementioned basis for cooperation, China and the United States have to properly handle the following challenges in their cooperation in Afghanistan.

41　 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, “Wang Yi: China Hopes to See a United, Stable, Developing and Amicable Afghanistan”, February 22, 2014. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1131887.shtml>42　 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, “Wang Yi Holds Talks with Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Zarar Ahmed Moqbel Osmani”, February 23, 2014. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1131891.shtml>43　 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, “Wang Yi: China Calls for Joint Efforts to Assist Afghanistan’s Triple Transition”, February 22, 2014. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1131886.shtml>44　 “Zhongmei Lianhe Peixun Afuhan Waijiaoguan Xiangmu Zai Meiguo Kaiban” (The Project of China-U.S. Joint Training of Afghan Diplomats Was Launched in the U.S.), CRI Online, October 21, 2014. <http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2014/10/21/6071s4734506.htm>


(1) China is wary of the increased U.S. and NATO’s military presence in its periphery during and after their operations in Afghanistan.

China is concerned about NATO’s promotion of “global partnership” in Asia, especially the U.S. efforts to contain China by building a global network of allies via NATO. China has noticed that NATO has enhanced its cooperation with India, Japan, Australia and other Asian countries to balance China’s growing military strength. Therefore, China has doubts and misgivings about the U.S. and NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan, fearing that they might have a permanent military presence near China’s border.

(2) China is unwilling to exert pressure on Pakistan as the U.S. requests.

Although the United States wants China to exert influence on Pakistan so that Pakistan would support Afghanistan’s counter-terrorist operations, it is hard for China to grant the U.S. request. The reason is that China insists on playing its international role prudently and adhering to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs, though its international status and influence have grown continuously. Therefore, China has distanced itself from the U.S. and NATO in foreign policy. The United States believes that China refused to be involved in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) because of its reluctance to join supply routes that bypass Pakistan and to stand with the United States to act against Pakistan.

(3) The United States accused China of having reservations on counter-terrorist operations.

China’s position on counter-terrorism is consistent. It holds the view that terrorism is the common enemy of the international community and as a victim of terrorism, China stands against all forms of terrorism. However, the United States believes that China has failed to give its full support to counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and instead has tried to put some distance between itself and the Afghan government to avoid bringing trouble to itself and endangering its own security. China fears that if it helped NATO to increase input in Afghanistan and to strengthen the Afghan security forces, the Islamic militants within the country would be irritated and might incite the ethnic sentiment of ethnic minorities

CIIS26 R E P O R T

in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and, worse still, the Taliban insurgents might point their guns directly at China.

(4) NATO member states have different perceptions of China.

Since European countries do not have direct security interests in Asia, NATO’s European member states tend to perceive China from the economic perspective, while the United States and its Asian allies incline to see China from the security perspective. The two sorts of countries differ in their perceptions of China, so do their policies toward China and China-U.S. cooperation.

(5) The United States has misgivings about the information security risks brought by its cooperation with China.

The U.S. believes that its cooperation with China will provide the PLA with more chances to have close contacts with the U.S. military and NATO, which will result in greater risks of intelligence and defense technology leakage. What’s more, China-U.S. joint counter-terrorist operations requires both sides to share intelligence or confidential information, to conduct joint surveillance and investigation, and even to transfer military technologies, which probably will violate some provisions of the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act of the United States.

B. Recommendations to the Chinese and U.S. Governments

1. China-U.S. anti-terrorist cooperation in Afghanistan can draw experience from the international cooperation on counter-piracy in the Gulf of AdenIn counter-piracy cooperation, China refused to join the U.S.-led Combined Task Force. Instead, it is willing to discussed related issues in such multilateral forums as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE). Participated by China, the United States, the European Union (EU), India, Russia, INTERPOL and a number of oil companies, the SHADE forum has become the main mechanism for China-U.S. cooperation on counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The China-U.S. cooperation in Afghanistan for combating terrorism can draw experience from the SHADE mechanism.


2. The China-U.S. cooperation can serve as the main channel of China-NATO cooperation China has no formal relations with NATO, and the two sides can enhance their cooperation on the Afghanistan issue in a parallel and complementary manner using China-U.S. cooperation as the main channel.

China should further emancipate its mind and maintain close dialogues and consultations with the U.S. side, taking into account the security of its northwestern region, its economic interests and the development of China-U.S. relations. Besides, China should make efforts to reach consensus with the United States on the areas and ways of cooperation. The areas in which the two countries can cooperate include security affairs (such as joint training of Afghan army and police), anti-drug campaign, trade and economic issues (for instance, joint investment in the exploitation of mineral resources), etc.

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IV. The Potential for China-U.S. Win-win Cooperation on Energy Security in the Middle East

The Middle East has been a key region with strategic importance for the United States, in which the United States has been investing lots of resources for a long time. It has also become increasingly significant in China’s energy strategy and “Going Out” strategy. China has recently surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest net importer of oil, and its energy dependence on the Middle East has long been greater than that of the United States. China’s role in the Middle East and the strategic interaction between China and the United States in the region are undergoing subtle changes, and these changes have provided new opportunities for China and the United States to conduct win-win cooperation.

A. Positive Changes in the Foundation of China-U.S. Cooperation on Energy Security in the Middle East

1. Significant changes in both countries’ energy relations with the Middle East

Statistics from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and China Customs show that on several occasions in 2012 and 2013, China’s oil imports in a single month surpassed those of the United States, leaving China the world’s largest net importer of oil. In terms of the total import of oil for the whole year of 2012, the United States remained the world’s largest net importer of oil, with import of about 371 million tonnes of oil (including crude oil and refined oil), while China’s net oil import stood at 284 million tonnes.45 In 2014, U.S. crude oil production

45　 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Imports by Country of Origin”, <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbbl_a.htm>; General Administration of Customs fo the People’s Republic of China, “2012 Nian 12 Yue Quanguo Jinkou Zhongdian Shangpin Liangzhi Biao” (The Volume and Value of China’s Key Import Items in December 2012 and in 2012), “2012 Nian 12 Yue Quanguo Jinkou Zhongdian Shangpin Liangzhi Biao” (The Volume and Value of China’s Key Export Items in December 2012 and in 2012), <http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab49666/module175903/page29.htm>


rapidly rose to 432 million tonnes, the highest level in 26 years, while its imports of crude oil hit a new low since 1987, with only 364 million tonnes, and its exports of refined oil products reached 137 million tonnes.46 China, in contrast, imported a total of 308 million tonnes of crude oil in 2014, with a year-on-year increase of 9.5%, and China’s total export of crude oil amounted merely to 0.6 million tonnes, down 62.9% compared with 2013.47 Taking into account the trend of development, China is likely to overtake the United States to become the world’s largest net importer of oil in the next few years, and the country will face a graver energy security situation.

In 2014, the ten largest sources of China’s crude oil imports are Saudi Arabia, Angola, Russia, Oman, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Colombia. Among the ten largest sources, six are Middle East countries, which account for 51.1% of China’s total crude oil imports, totaling 157.7 million tonnes.48 Compared with 2013, the proportion of Middle East oil in China’s total oil imports has increased 9.6%. Considering that China is still undergoing the process of industrialization and urbanization, its reliance on the Middle East oil will not decline soon. And compared with Latin America and Africa, the Middle East is nearer to China, hence lower cost of energy transportation. However, due to great uncertainty of the Middle East security situation, China’s energy imports from the region faces serious challenges.

In contrast, there are only three Middle East countries among the ten largest sources of U.S. crude oil imports in 2014 – Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait. The three countries in aggregate exported 91 million tonnes of crude oil to the United States in 2014, accounting for 25% of U.S. total imports of crude oil. Compared with 2013, U.S. imports of crude oil from the aforementioned three countries have decreased 8%, and the proportion of Persian Gulf oil in U.S. total oil imports

46　 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Crude Oil Production to 2025: Updated Projection of Crude Types”, May 28, 2015. <http://www.eia.gov/analysis/petroleum/crudetypes/>; “Petroleum & Other Liquids – Exports”, < http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_exp_dc_NUS-Z00_mbbl_a.htm>47　 General Administration of Customs fo the People’s Republic of China, “2014 Nian 12 Yue Quanguo Jinkou Zhongdian Shangpin Liangzhi Biao” (The Volume and Value of China’s Key Import Items in December 2014 and in 2014), Jan. 13, 2015; “2014 Nian 12 Yue Quanguo Chukou Zhongdian Shangpin Liangzhi Biao” (The Volume and Value of China’s Key Import Items in December 2014 and in 2014), Jan. 13, 2015. <http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab49666/module175903/page7.htm>48　 Tian Chunrong, “2014 Nian Zhongguo Shiyou He Tianranqi Jinchukou Zhuangkuang Fenxi” (China’s 2014 Oil and Gas Import/Export), Guoji Shiyou Jingji (International Petroleum Economics), No.3, 2015, p.60.

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has declined by 0.63%.49 With the development of U.S. shale oil and its “energy independence”, further improvement of its energy efficiency as well as the increase of oil imports from the Atlantic region, the strategic importance of Middle East oil to the United States will decline further.

According to U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates, the United States remained the world’s top producer of petroleum and natural gas hydrocarbons in 2014. The country’s hydrocarbon production continues to exceed that of both Russia and Saudi Arabia, the second- and third-largest producers, respectively.50 The United States is likely to achieve energy self-sufficiency by 2030 due to the application of new exploitation technologies and alternative energy as well as decreasing energy consumption. By 2035, nearly 90% of Persian Gulf oil exports will be transported to Asia.51 Energy independence will have an impact on U.S. strategy toward the Middle East, and the aforementioned trend has already brought forth debates inside and outside the United States on the adjustments of U.S. Middle East strategy and the strategic interaction between China and the United States in the Middle East.

2. Positive changes in U.S. public opinion on China-related energy security issues

(1) The once rampant “China Energy Threat” theory is on the wane.

Before the mid-1990s, due to its small economic scale and energy import volume, China did not have a conspicuous impact on the international energy market, let alone pose any “threat” to the energy security of Western countries. However, as its economic scale expands, China has been importing increasingly large volume of energy resources from abroad and its companies have been seeking energy supplies in foreign countries. This new trend of development has stimulated the “China Energy Threat” theory in the United States. Some Americans believe that China’s investment in the oil industry of Middle East countries will change the region’s power structure, and threaten U.S. oil imports from the region. The “China

49　 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “U.S. Imports by Country of Origin”, June 30, 2015. <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbbl_a.htm >50　 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “U.S. remained world’s largest producer of petroleum and natural gas hydrocarbons in 2014”, April 7, 2015. <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=20692>51　 Tom Gjelten, “U.S. Rethink Security As Mideast Oil Imports Drop”, NPR, November 14, 2012. <http://www.npr.org/2012/11/14/165052133/u-s-rethinks-security-as-mideast-oil-imports-drop>


Energy Threat” theory gained its greatest influence when the U.S. government and Congress blocked the acquisition of Unocal by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in 2005. At that time, China’s energy cooperation with such countries as Iran, Sudan and Venezuela was considered to be antagonistic to the U.S. foreign policy.

Recent years have witnessed the declining influence of the “China Energy Threat” theory. For example, when CNOOC acquired Nexen Inc., a Canadian oil and gas company, though there was uproar in the U.S. media, the criticisms had not been strong enough to disrupt this U.S.-related acquisition.

(2) The opposition to China’s investment in the energy sector of Middle East countries is decreasing.

As a dominant force in the Middle East, the United States is very sensitive about the involvement of external powers in Middle Eastern affairs. At the early stage of China’s investment in the energy sector of Middle East countries, the United States was wary of it and made efforts to exclude China in that regard. However, after 10-odd years of interactions with China, the United States has come to realize that China does not seek competition with it nor challenge its predominance in the Middle East, instead, the two countries can complement each other and conduct mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy field.

The United States enjoys a relatively secure and stable energy supply in the Western hemisphere, with reduced dependence on energy imports from the Middle East, but due to the special nature of international energy trade, energy supply of the Middle East still has a huge impact on the energy price, the global crude oil market as well as the U.S. and world economy. Therefore the United States remains convinced that it has a vital interest in the energy of the Middle East. As the United States becomes increasingly self-reliant in energy supply, China can play a constructive role in maintaining the stability of the energy market and the security of energy transport routes in the Middle East.

(3) The voices advocating China’s provision of “public goods” relating to energy security in the Middle East are becoming louder.

U.S. officials and think tanks have been of the view for a long time that China has benefited probably the most from the current international system over the past

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three or four decades and has been a “free rider” on American security presence in the Middle East.52

This view has at least two meanings: first, as a beneficiary of the current international system, China will not attempt to overthrow, but try to maintain the current system, which is in the U.S interests; second, the United States expects China to assume the obligations of a “responsible power” and make contributions to the existing international order.

Such thinking can help lower the influence of the “China Threat” theory in U.S. public opinions, reduce Americans’ doubts and misgivings about increased Chinese investment and presence in the Middle East, and enhance the support for China-U.S. cooperation in the region. In recent years, the views advocating China-U.S. cooperation in the Middle East have been on the rise in the United States, and a number of eminent American scholars have published articles calling for increasing U.S.-China cooperation so as to enhance China’s sense of energy security and recognition of the importance of stability in the Middle East to itself.53

3. Growing potential for China-U.S. cooperation on energy security in the Middle East

(1) Energy security relates not only to the energy sector.

It is in the common interest of China, the United States and countries in the Middle East to ensure stable supply, safe transport and reasonable price of energy in the Middle East. However, the Middle East energy security is not an isolated issue; it depends largely on the peace and stability of the whole region. There are differences between China and the United States in the specific ways and means to achieve and maintain peace and stability in the Middle East, but these differences do not necessarily prevent the two sides from strengthening their cooperation in areas of common interest, such as counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, the Iranian nuclear issue, the reconstruction of Iraq, anti-piracy, and the Palestine-Israeli peace

52　 See John S. Tanner, “China’s Role in the WTO: From Beneficiary to the Need for Leadership – Testimony at the Hearing on ‘Evaluating China’s Present and Future Role in the World Trade Organization’ Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission”, June 9, 2010. <www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/6.9.10Tanner.pdf>; Robert A. Manning, “U.S. Counterbalancing China, Not Containing”, East Asia Forum, July 9, 2013. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/09/us-counterbalancing-china-not-containing/> ; “China as a Free Rider – President Obama on how the United States is a different sort of superpower from China”, Website of The New York Times, August 8, 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000003047788/china-as-a-free-rider.html>53　 See, for instance, Zachary Keck, “Time for a U.S.-China Partnership in the Middle East?”, Website of The National In-terest, September 21, 2014. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-us-china-partnership-the-middle-east-11318>


process. The two sides have reached important consensus and conducted fruitful cooperation on the aforementioned issues, and there is much room for deepened cooperation.

(2) China-U.S. dialogue on energy security goes beyond the realm of bilateral relations.

The strategic dialogues between China and the United States have covered the bilateral energy cooperation, and government departments, enterprises and research institutions of the two countries have established forums and cooperation channels to deal with energy issues. The Chinese Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State Department held their first round of consultation on the Middle East affairs in August 2012, focusing on the situation in the Middle East, with energy security as an important topic.54 These dialogues and consultations have generated positive impacts on enhancing mutual trust and removing misgivings between the two countries, promoted bilateral energy cooperation and cultivated a habit of thinking that stresses dialogue and cooperation as the best means to resolve contradictions. If these dialogues can be extended to cover tripartite cooperation on energy security issues among China, the United States and Middle East countries, the connotation and significance of China-U.S. S&ED would be enhanced.

(3) The energy security cooperation should involve private sector and civil society.

Given the strategic significance and sensitivity of China-U.S. energy security cooperation in the Middle East, the two governments need to offer guidance and even play a leading role in some specific areas of cooperation. However, the governments should not and can not monopolize the cooperation, because energy security cooperation involves not only governments, but energy companies and NGOs. In terms of the links of cooperation, energy security cooperation includes such aspects as exploration, mining, transport, and smelting of energy resources, R&D of energy technologies, environmental protection, as well as investment and finance. To deepen energy security cooperation between China and the United States requires active participation by enterprises and NGOs in both countries, and there is huge space for cooperation and a need for expanding ways of cooperation. In fact, the Chinese and American companies have already conducted cooperation in the energy sector of Iraq and other Middle East countries.

54　 The Chinese Embassy in the U.S., “China, U.S. Hold Consultations on Middle East Affairs in Beijing”, August 15, 2012. <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgxss/t961163.htm>

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(4) Energy security is more than about the present needs.

The oil and gas resources in the Middle East are rich but not inexhaustible. A single-product economy with over-reliance on oil and gas resources in Middle East countries has many disadvantages. Having realized this many years ago, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf countries have taken measures to diversify their economy. If China and the United States take advantage of their rich capital and advanced technology to promote the development of renewable energy in the Middle East countries via trilateral cooperation, the economy of Middle East countries will more sustainable, and due to increased use of renewable energy, the consumption of oil and gas by Middle East countries will decrease, and these countries’ energy export potential will become greater accordingly.

B. Recommendations to the Chinese and U.S. GovernmentsAt the fifth round of China-U.S. S&ED held in Washington in July 2013, the two sides reaffirmed the commitments made in the China-U.S. Joint Statement on Energy Security Cooperation, which noted that the two countries, as the world’s largest producers and consumers of energy, share common interests and responsibilities to ensure energy security and face common challenges. The two countries decided to strengthen dialogue and cooperation in this regard. The United States and China discussed ways to diversify their sources of supply and further develop domestic energy resources to meet growing demand. Both sides recognized their shared goal of working to strengthen global energy security. In addition, the two countries commit to continuing to discuss Chinese concerns about energy security and energy demand, and both sides pledged to strengthen cooperation and increased dialogue and exchange of information in several areas including stabilizing international energy markets, emergency responses, ensuring diversified energy supply, and a rational and efficient use of energy.55 The aforementioned outcomes have reflected the strong desire of China and the United States to strengthen energy cooperation on a global scale, and they are important guidelines for China-U.S. cooperation on energy security and energy supply in the Middle East.

On the issue of Middle East energy security, China need not only meet its own

55　 “Di Wu Lun Zhong Mei Zhanlue Yu Jingji Duihua Kuangjia Xia Zhanlue Duihua Juti Chengguo Qingdan” (China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track), People’s Daily, July 13, 2013. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-07/13/c_116519631_5.htm>


energy demand, but maintain the stability of its relations with the United States. To fulfill the two objectives, China has to choose dialogue and cooperation as the solution. The United States will not easily give up the hegemony of the U.S. dollar and its power over access to oil resources. The public opinions inside the United States on China-related energy security issues are quite diverse. Moreover, many countries and people in the Middle East do not like the overbearing manner of the United States, nor do they want to see a joint monopoly of Middle East affairs by China and the United States.

It is both necessary and feasible for China and the United States to conduct win-win cooperation on Middle East energy security issues. However, such cooperation is also complex and sensitive. To achieve it, the two countries should adhere to the following principles and stick to the following priorities.

1. China should avoid being seen as “filling the power vacuum”China does not intend to fill the “power vacuum” created by U.S. readjustments of its Middle East strategy, nor is it willing to play a role in line with the “roadmap” formulated by the West and get bogged down in the chaos of the region. Instead, China should show to the world through specific projects that its cooperation with the United States does not aim to form a “G2” (Group of Two) governance structure in the Middle East, but aim at achieving a win-win situation in the region.

2. China should adopt an active but gradual approach and act according to its capabilityChina should encourage and guide its enterprises to carry out various forms of cooperation with American multinational companies in the energy field of Middle East countries, including all links of energy security as well as renewable energy, with the purpose of creating a situation in which the interests of China and the United States are intertwined. The two countries should also strengthen cooperation in providing international public goods. In addition to joint anti-piracy naval exercises, the two sides can explore the possibility of exchanges between the PLA Navy and the troops under the U.S. Central Command, and increase dialogues and cooperation between the two forces in maintaining the security of sea lanes and the freedom of navigation on the high seas. China can also discuss with the

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U.S. the ways and means of cooperation with the IEA before its accession to the organization.

3. China and the U.S. can include their cooperation on energy security in the Middle East into bilateral strategic dialogues and actively promote the trilateral cooperation among China, the U.S. and Middle East countriesChina and the United States can conduct in-depth discussions on energy security cooperation in the Middle East in their consultation on Middle East affairs under the framework of S&ED, so as to establish guiding principles and identify priorities as well as pathways for relevant government departments to implement. The two countries can explore the possibility of trilateral cooperation among China, the United States and Middle East countries through multilateral organizations or mechanisms, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China-Arab Cooperation Forum, and the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Ministerial Meeting.


V. China-U.S. Win-win Cooperation in Africa

A. The Present Situation and Development Trend of China-U.S. Cooperation on African AffairsAs global powers, China and the United States assume common historical missions and international responsibilities in Africa. The two countries need to work together to maintain peace and promote development in the continent, safeguard investment and energy security, and promote the improvement of business environment in Africa. Although the common interests of China and the United States outweigh their differences in Africa, the two countries should prevent the Africa factor from having a negative impact on the bilateral relations. Besides, the two sides need promote the healthy development of their relationship by enhancing trilateral cooperation together with African countries.

1. The common interests of China and the United States outweigh their differences in AfricaFirstly, the maintenance of peace and security in Africa is in the common interests of China and the United States. Africa has been suffering from long-term turbulence and unremitting wars, and currently it faces a new threat - terrorism. Such a situation is not only a disaster for African people, but a negative factor for global security and world economy, which constrains the common progress of mankind. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, China and the United States have shared moral and legal obligations in maintaining peace and stability in Africa, and leaving their differences and contradictions to grow will only result in serious consequences. Therefore, it is incumbent upon China and the United States to enhance cooperation on African affairs.

Secondly, China and the United States need strengthen communication and coordination when they work together to promote development in Africa. Economic growth in Africa will lead to reduced African reliance on foreign aid and

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it is conducive to expanding the global market so as to promote world economic development. Since China and the United States have accumulated rich experience in promoting Africa’s development, they should further strengthen communication and coordination.

Thirdly, China and the United States need make joint efforts to safeguard their economic interests in Africa, especially their investments. Both countries are among the most important trading partners and foreign investors of Africa, owning large numbers of investment projects in the continent. Although there is competition between the two countries in the fields of energy and mineral resources in Africa, they should further strengthen their cooperation so as to maintain their respective energy security and interests in trade and investment.

Fourthly, both China and the United States need help African countries improve their business environment and maintain order in their markets. The trade and investment volumes of China and the United States with Africa have been growing rapidly, leading to increased Chinese and American interests in the continent and higher demand for African countries to improve their economic systems, enhance administrative capacity of governments and better business and investment environment. Currently, both countries are promoting the improvement of Africa’s trade and investment environment in different fields, and in the future they could achieve even better results by conducting cooperation and coordination with each other.

2. China-U.S. cooperation on African affairs is still in its infancyAt present, the trilateral cooperation among China, the United States and Africa is still in an initial stage in terms of scale and level. Firstly, the China-U.S. cooperation in Africa is often manifested by their coordination and collaboration within multilateral frameworks, and China has engaged in more trilateral cooperation with Africa and UN agencies than that with Africa and the United States. Secondly, the areas of China-U.S.-Africa trilateral cooperation are still limited. For instance, development cooperation is confined to the fields of health care and the training of practical techniques; peace and security cooperation is either lacking or confined to the exchange of opinions in the process of mediation and negotiation facilitation. Thirdly, the trilateral cooperation is still at a low level,


with limited means to achieve the end. Cooperation projects are mainly joint training programs, or the U.S. providing funds or technical support for China-African projects.

The main reason for the slow development of China-U.S.-Africa trilateral cooperation is that the United States has misgivings about the rapid growth of China-Africa ties. Although Africa is not an area of strategic importance for either country and the two sides do not have major differences in their interests in Africa, the rapid development of China-Africa relations during the 21st century has given rise to suspicions of some American scholars and politicians. The inappropriate policies adopted by the U.S. government in Africa afterwards, which are directed against China, have to some extent hindered the development of China-Africa relations and produced a negative impact on the results of the trilateral cooperation promoted by China. Although the Chinese and U.S. governments have conducted regular communication on African issues for years, they have not reached agreement on many specific projects of cooperation. And for that reason, some American political forces have lost their patience and turned to incite the U.S. government to take confrontational measures against China.

It is noteworthy that there are many political groups in the United States, with different issues to care about, and their views and opinions are varied. Their statements on China-Africa relations and proposed countermeasures are also distinct from one another. In recent years, the Chinese government has taken the initiative to communicate and exchange views with the U.S. side and its sincerity for cooperation has won understanding of an increasing number of neutral groups in the United States. Moreover, the actual results of China-U.S. cooperation in Africa also help dispel Americans’ doubts and misgivings.

3. The trilateral cooperation is in line with the development trend of international cooperationBecause of the political and economic vulnerability of the African continent, African countries themselves have been unable to mitigate the negative impacts of external forces, and historically, great power competition has caused long-term damage to Africa. During the colonial period, Africa suffered from the conflicts between suzerains, with lingering problems still visible today, such as the Somalia

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issue, the conflict between North and South Sudan, and the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. During the Cold War, civil wars and inter-state wars were abound in Africa due to the rivalry between great powers, and some of the conflicts have not ended till today.

Based on this understanding, the international community wants to put an end to the rivalry and conflicts of big powers in Africa and avoid the repetition of historical tragedies. Within the framework of the United Nations, the Security Council encourages multi-stakeholder participation and in-depth exchange of views in the process of discussion and resolution of conflicts in Africa so as to reach consensus in a gradual manner and avoid tensions arising from the differences between parties. In other international organizations, multilateral cooperation has also won universal support from member states. The IMF, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and other institutions, though recognizing that multilateral cooperation may result in inefficiency and a waste of resources, have laid more emphasis on the positive role of multilateral cooperation in promoting international exchanges and enhancing mutual understanding as well as trust.

The African countries have also gradually realized the positive role of multilateral cooperation, and there are more voices advocating multilateral cooperation in Africa. In the past, African countries had reservations about multilateral cooperation projects, fearing that they might lose the right to choose cooperation partners and some bargaining chips. However, history has shown that African countries often lose more than what they gain when they balance great powers or take advantage of their contradictions. For example, in the Republic of Congo Civil War that broke out in 1997, the political unrest in Chad in 2006, and Côte d'Ivoire’s Civil War in 2011, we can all see the struggle between France and the United States for oil resources.

Currently, there are more voices in the international community calling on China to participate in multilateral and trilateral cooperation in Africa. Countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, France and some international organizations have expressed their willingness to cooperate with China. Since the United States has huge influence in Africa, and China needs to improve its relations with the United States as well as other Western countries, China has become more


active in participating in multilateral or trilateral cooperation initiated by the United States, on the condition that related African countries support such cooperation.

B. Principles and Areas of China-U.S. Cooperation in AfricaChina need handle the issue of rules making for trilateral cooperation prudently. On the basis of fully respecting the will of African people, China can start with the cooperation in noncompetitive and politically less sensitive areas and gradually expand to all-round multilateral cooperation under the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

1. China should actively participate in rules making for the trilateral cooperationFirstly, China ought to actively seek the power of making rules for multilateral cooperation. For a long time, China has laid its stress on bilateral cooperation, either in its diplomacy or in economic cooperation. As a latecomer, China does not have much experience in multilateral cooperation, whereas the United States has a long history in conducting multilateral cooperation. As the chief maker of most existing international rules, the United States is keen on making rules and maximizing its interests through it. As a less experienced country in multilateral cooperation, China need take a prudent approach toward the formulation of rules, and strive for greater leverage in rules making. In case that consensus cannot be reached at the moment, China should engage in specific cooperation projects through flexible provisional agreements so that its freedom and room for cooperation with Africa will not be negatively affected by its difference with the United States.

Secondly, China should take the initiative to set the agenda for trilateral cooperation, which is of great importance to the positioning and development trend of the cooperation and to the effect and influence of various projects. In setting the agenda, China should choose those areas that it has expertise and experience, for instance, infrastructure building and interconnectivity.

Thirdly, China should fully respect the will of African people and make efforts to safeguard Africa’s interests. China-U.S.-Africa cooperation may have an impact on Africa, and African countries, as a weak party, are likely to have many misgivings and encounter the problem of inadaptability. Therefore, in

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proposing initiatives for trilateral cooperation, China must get the consent of African countries. To prevent Africa from falling into a disadvantageous position, China should let African countries play a dominant role in the trilateral cooperation and make it a guiding principle. At the same time, the trilateral cooperation should be based on the full respect for the will of African nations and ensure their participation during the whole process so as to better safeguard Africa’s interests.

2. China and the United States should gradually promote bilateral cooperation in various fieldsAlthough covering many fields, China-U.S. cooperation on African affairs is still in its infancy. The two sides should start from the improvement of bilateral consultation mechanisms and noncompetitive areas, such as training and technical cooperation, to gradually conduct concrete, practical and long-term cooperation projects.

Firstly, China and the United States can identify projects for initial cooperation through their bilateral consultation on African affairs. By the end of 2014, the two countries had held six rounds of consultations on African affairs, and on the strategic level China and the United States had conducted exchanges and coordination on Africa affairs for several times. Topics that had been discussed during these consultations and exchanges include peace and security, UN peacekeeping missions, climate change, humanitarian assistance, the situation in Sudan, Somalia, the food crisis in the Horn of Africa, and the Ebola crisis. However, since China and the United States have not identified specific areas for cooperation, let alone concrete projects, the practical cooperation between the two countries in Africa has not been put on the agenda yet. Therefore, it is necessary to identify some concrete projects for trilateral cooperation within the framework of China-U.S. Consultation on African Affairs so as to create a new situation for future cooperation.

Secondly, China and the United States could start their cooperation in Africa from noncompetitive areas such as training and technical cooperation. Both countries have organized various training programs in Africa, and they have accumulated rich experience in the fields of agriculture and health care. By July


2014, there were 43 China’s medical teams working in 42 African countries, and China had assisted the construction of 30 hospitals and 30 malaria prevention and control centers, provided 800 million yuan worth of medical equipment and supplies and anti-malaria drugs, and trained over 3,000 medical staff for African countries.56 In March 2011, the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator Ambassador Eric Goosby announced in Johannesburg that the United States would fund training for 140,000 African health care workers in an initiative to “transform and dramatically increase” medical education on the continent.57 Considering that health care is not a sensitive area, it is advisable to make use of the hospitals and malaria prevention and control centers assisted by China to promote China-U.S.-Africa trilateral cooperation in training local medical staff.

Thirdly, there are favorable conditions for China-U.S. cooperation in the agro-training field. From 2010 to 2012, China established 14 agricultural technology demonstration centers, and launched the planning or construction of another eight centers.58 These demonstration centers, fully equipped, are suitable for organizing various training and planting demonstration activities. However, since China only provides funding for these demonstration centers for the first three years, and afterwards they will be handed over to African governments, these centers may face the problem of inadequate follow-up funding. Recent years have witnessed the U.S. concerns about food security and agricultural development in Africa. In 2011, USAID, together with six partners, announced a first-of-its-kind effort to invest $25 million in the African Agricultural Capital Fund (AACF) which will deliver growth capital to boost the productivity and profitability of Africa’s undercapitalized agriculture sector.59 In 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a new $3 billion effort to boost food security and farm productivity in Africa.60 Take Zimbabwe as an example, since 2010, the USAID has assisted over 61,000 smallholder farmers each year, and sales by USAID-related smallholder beneficiaries have also grown in the past four years by over $62 million, including

56　 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s Foreign Aid (2014)”, July 2014. <http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592.htm>57　 The Associate Press, “U.S. funding to train 140,000 African health workers”, March 8, 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/08/AR2011030801771.html>58　 Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s Foreign Aid (2014)”.59　 Feed the Future – the U.S. Government’s Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, “The African Agricultural Capital Fund”. <http://www.feedthefuture.gov/model/african-agricultural-capital-fund>60　 BBC, “Obama unveils U.S. food security plan for Africa”, May 18, 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-18119024>

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agricultural products such as bananas and chili peppers.61 The United States has become an important partner of Africa in agricultural development. Therefore, China-U.S.-Africa agricultural cooperation can start from the joint training of African agro-technicians and gradually expand to the discussion of follow-up funding for the aforementioned demonstration centers.

Fourthly, in the field of infrastructure building, China and the United States need coordinate with each other and explore the possibility of joint implementation of some projects in Africa. During his visit to Africa in March 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that China will follow through on the commitment of providing a $20 billion credit line to African nations from 2013 to 2015.62 And during U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Africa in June 2013, he announced Power Africa, a new initiative to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States commits itself to more than $7 billion in financial support to this initiative from 2013 to 2018. Power Africa will also leverage private sector investments, beginning with more than $9 billion in initial commitments from private sector partners.63 Since both China and the United States focus on infrastructure building in Africa at present, they need to strengthen communication and coordination so as to avoid duplication of projects and unnecessary competition. In the long run, the improvement of infrastructure in Africa is in line with the strategic intent of China and the United States to expand their interests on the continent. Therefore, the two countries can explore the possibility of joint implementation of some projects. In particular, in the field of private financing, Chinese projects can attract U.S. capital, and Chinese capital can also participate in U.S. projects. In the field of construction and contracting, the United States should allow Chinese companies to bid for U.S. projects, and Chinese projects should also be open to U.S. enterprises.

3. China, the United States and Africa can explore long-term trilateral cooperation under the framework of the FOCACThe FOCAC is a decision-making mechanism at the highest level with lasting effect for the development of China-Africa relations. It adheres to the principles

61　 USAID, “Zimbabwe – Agriculture and Food Security”, updated on January 2, 2015. <http://www.usaid.gov/zimbabwe/agriculture-and-food-security >62　 Xinhua New Agency, “Chinese president speaks on Africa policy, pledges assistance”, March 26, 2013. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/26/c_124501781.htm>63　 Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, “FACT SHEET: Power Africa”, June 30, 2013. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/30/fact-sheet-power-africa>


of equity and practicality, respect for the ownership of African nations and giving full play to their initiative. As a multilateral cooperation mechanism with Africa that has received most attention from the international community, the FOCAC boasts of such features as multiple cooperation fields, high efficiency and great influence. Although the FOCAC’s main mission is to promote the multilateral cooperation between China and African countries, it can also function as a platform for China-U.S.-Africa trilateral cooperation.

Firstly, we can promote China-U.S. cooperation on peace and security affairs in Africa through the FOCAC. China and the United States should not only strengthen their cooperation on African peace and security issues within the UN framework, but enhance their communication under the frameworks of the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations. The FOCAC should consider granting the United States and other Western countries the observer status so that they can participate in some parts of the mechanism. Because the AU has good working relations with both China and the United States, the two countries can identify their common concerns relating to the situation in Africa by using the FOCAC framework. In particular, China and the United States can explore the possibility of sharing African security information so that the Chinese and American citizens in Africa could be better protected. The two countries should also take the opportunity of joint operations against piracy off the Somali coast to gradually promote military exchanges in Africa.

Secondly, China should promote the improvement of Africa’s market and investment environment through the FOCAC. Given that FOCAC’s mission is to make plans for the development of China-Africa relations, it should aim at promoting the improvement of Africa’s economic environment and facilitating China-Africa trade and economic cooperation so as to reduce the institutional, legal, policy and financial risks faced by Chinese companies. As the largest investor in Africa, the United States has been making efforts to improve the market and investment environment in Africa and to promote the formulation of unified laws and regulations by the AU and other regional organizations as well as regional integration in tariffs and finance. Since China and the United States have common interests in improving Africa’s market and investment environment, the two countries should strengthen communication and cooperation by using the platform

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of the FOCAC.

Moreover, the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the FOCAC can serve as a standing platform for China-U.S. cooperation on Africa affairs. As the communication and cooperation among China, the United States and Africa becomes increasingly frequent, China may consider the expansion of this Committee when it is appropriate and turn it into a permanent institution for promoting China-U.S.-Africa trilateral cooperation.

Finally, China and the United States should exchange experience in the innovation of cooperation mechanisms. The U.S. idea of hosting a U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014 was undoubtedly inspired by the success of the FOCAC. The advancement of China-Africa cooperation mechanisms have contributed to the progress of the bilateral cooperation. And the United States, as a traditional partner of Africa, has accumulated rich experience in developing cooperation models. Therefore, the exchange and communication between China and the United States on cooperation mechanisms will certainly be conducive to enhancing their cooperation with Africa and to eliminating doubts, misgivings and confusion between the two countries on African issues.


VI. China-U.S. Cooperation in Latin America

Conducted in various ways, the China-U.S. cooperation in Latin America covers a wide range of fields. It is not only conducive to maintaining regional stability and prosperity, but helpful for binding their interests in Lain America together, which might be an important part of the new model of major-country relations between the two sides.

A. Political Trust Is the Basis of China-U.S. Cooperation in Latin AmericaFor the United States, Latin America is a region of special geopolitical significance. To cooperate in the region, China and the United States need first and foremost enhance their political trust, and the top priority is to address U.S. concerns.

As China’s relations with Latin America become increasingly warm, some American politicians and scholars have become anxious. They believe that China attempts to set up an “alliance of developing countries” with Latin American countries in order to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere and do harm to U.S. interests and values. As a result, they regard China’s rapidly increasing presence in the region as a “threat” and conclude that China’s actions in Latin America pose a direct threat to the United States. They believe that China not only aims to reap legitimate commercial profits through economic means, but intends to undermine the “democratic alliance” between the United States and Latin America through political and diplomatic means.

Those who believe in the “China Threat Theory” conclude that China’s actions in Latin America are an important part of its global strategy which is clearly intended to counter the U.S. strategy of “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific”. They assume that China has found opportunities in the U.S. “backyard”, and these opportunities are the very ones that the United States have overlooked in recent years. They argue that the salient China factor in Latin America has offered

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countries in the region an opportunity to balance U.S. influence or to rival the United States, and that the “choice of China” has provided some Latin American countries with greater space for political maneuver and economic development as well as an effective means to handle their relations with the United States. Those who believe in the “China Threat Theory” think that among these countries, Cuba and Venezuela hope to build a political and ideological alliance with China most eagerly, and that they even expect China to take the lead in establishing an “anti-U.S. alliance” on a global scale. These American politicians warn that the United States must pay attention to China’s every move in Latin America, and urge this “new neighbor” to become a “responsible stakeholder” and refrain from seeking an alliance with some Latin American countries in the security field, thereby posing a potential threat to the United States. U.S. diplomats have communicated to the Chinese that their behavior must take care not to undermine U.S. and multilateral efforts to safeguard the region’s democratic progress and to advance high standards in transparency, clean energy, and labor rights.64

The aforementioned suspicion and unease are a result of over-interpretation by some American politicians of China’s policy toward Latin America. In fact, China-Latin America relations are well within the normal scope of activities between states. China’s intention toward Latin America is clear and the methods it has used to develop the relations are appropriate. And for that reason, China’s growing presence in Latin America has not caused strong opposition from the United States, and the “China Threat Theory” relating to Latin America has not prevailed in the United States till now. Despite that, most U.S. politicians still believe that the rapidly increasing China factor in Latin America has had an impact on U.S. influence in the region, although it has not yet shaken U.S. hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

In view of the above, China-U.S. political cooperation in Latin America should focus on trust-building mechanisms. The two sides can use the existing mechanism of bilateral consultation on Latin American affairs to better understand each other’s strategic intent in Latin America and to address the other side’s concerns in the region so as to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation. Apart from institutionalization and normalization of their consultation on Latin American affairs, China and the United States need to build more dialogue platforms and

64　 Richard Feinberg, “China, Latin America, and the United States: Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence?”, Latin American Research Review, Vol.46, No.2, 2011, p.224.


mechanisms. With a variety of mechanisms for dialogue, China ought to work toward enhanced mutual trust, indicating to the U.S. that China follows a strategy of peaceful development, and that it will neither establish a political or ideological alliance with any Latin American country, nor build a security alliance with any of them, because it is not in China’s interests to set up an anti-U.S. alliance with Latin American countries at the expense of China-U.S. relations. In addition, China and the United States should exchange their views and coordinate their stances on major events and emergencies that occur in Latin America in a timely manner so as to deepen mutual understanding, enhance mutual trust and avoid miscalculation, which might lead to conflicts.

As for the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) proposed by China, American politicians and scholars have different opinions. Those who view the proposal positively believe that China will use the platform to further expand the breadth and depth of its cooperation with Latin America and as a result the burden and pressure on the U.S. side to help Latin American countries to develop economy will be reduced. But those who view the proposal negatively are of the opinion that China avails itself of the success of the FOCAC and intends to copy it in the U.S. “backyard”, which will further squeeze the geostrategic space of the United States and become another strategic move of China to counter and balance U.S. hegemony on a global scale. To alleviate U.S. doubts and concerns about the Forum of China and the CELAC, China should step up communication with the United States while promoting the initiative, explaining to the latter its intention of developing an overall relationship with Latin America. China should also strengthen its two-track diplomacy in this regard. For instance, Chinese think tanks can organize relevant seminars or workshops with U.S. counterparts to discuss the impact of the Forum on China, the United States and Latin America. Moreover, China ought to enhance its public diplomacy relating to the Forum. For example, it can introduce the background, significance and prospects of the Forum through media, the Internet and other channels, stressing that the Forum will bring far more opportunities than challenges to China, Latin America and the United States as well. All these actions have one common objective, i.e. to cultivate and enhance political trust between China and the United States, thereby laying a solid foundation for their cooperation in Latin America.

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B. Cooperation in the Fields of Finance, Energy, Agriculture, Science and Technology, and Education Should Be the PrioritiesFor historical and realistic reasons, Latin American countries, especially those ruled by left-wing or left-center governments, are wary of the excessive intervention of the United States in their internal affairs. Therefore, China-U.S. cooperation in Latin America should begin with those areas that are less sensitive and acceptable to countries in the region, such as finance, energy, agriculture, science and technology, and education.

First of all, multilateral mechanisms in which both China and the United States have participated, for instance, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), can serve as cooperation platforms. The OAS is a regional political organization of the American continent, with 35 member states, and the United States is a founding member of the OAS. The aims of the OAS include strengthening the peace and security of the continent and promoting, by cooperative action, the economic, social and cultural development of member nations. In May 2004, China was formally accepted as a permanent observer of the OAS. As a specialized agency of the OAS and the world’s largest regional development bank, the IDB aims to provide financial and technical support for economic and social development of Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States is a founding member of the IDB, and China joined the bank in January 2009.

Secondly, there is much potential for China-U.S. cooperation in the aforementioned areas. Currently, China has lent more money to Latin American countries than the United States through the IDB, which shows that China is sincere in helping Latin American countries to develop their economy. China and the United States can strengthen their cooperation within the IDB. For instance, the two countries could establish a coordination mechanism in granting credits to Latin American countries, and explore such lending means as mutual funds and bonds. Credits should first be extended to such fields as infrastructure building and the exploitation of energy and natural resources in Latin America. China and the United States should also take advantage of other specialized agencies of the OAS to conduct cooperation in agriculture, science and technology, and education.


China, the United States and Latin America all have their own advantages and characteristics in agricultural development, which provides a good opportunity for the three parties to cooperate. The three sides may organize an international seminar on the trilateral cooperation on agricultural development at an appropriate time, and afterwards set up a tripartite forum of provincial/state governors on agricultural cooperation, the ultimate goal of which is to establish a long-term mechanism of trilateral cooperation on agriculture so as to promote modernization of the agricultural sector in Latin America. If the trilateral cooperation on agriculture turns out to be successful, the experience can be borrowed to apply in the fields of energy, science and technology as well as education.

Finally, in carrying out cooperation in the above-mentioned areas, the three parties should follow the principle of “full consultation and proceeding in an orderly and gradual way”. In particular, China the United States need take into account the concerns of Latin American countries and conduct full communication and consultation with them before making important decisions so as to ensure the feasibility and effectiveness of the trilateral cooperation. Given that Latin American countries are ruled by different governments, including left-wing, right-wing, left-center and right-center administrations, and their attitudes toward cooperation with the United States are varied, it is better to push forward the trilateral cooperation in a holistic way, i.e. to promote cooperation with regional or sub-regional organizations in Latin America instead of individual countries.

C. Counter-terrorism, Drug Control and Combating Organized Crime Are Areas That China and the United States Can Cooperate in Latin AmericaDrug control and cracking down on illegal immigration and organized crime have always been occupying an important position in U.S.-Latin American relations. Besides, the two sides have also conducted effective cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. In anti-drug cooperation, Latin American countries have been increasingly critical of the United States. They attribute the growing number of drug-related crimes in Latin America to U.S. liberal drug policies and believe that legalization of the use of marijuana in some U.S. states has increased the difficulty

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for Latin American countries to eliminate drugs. Since the beginning of the new century, South American drug cartels have started to engage in drug trafficking in China. Besides China’s traditional source of drugs - the Golden Triangle, an increasing amount of cocaine sold in China comes from Latin America, which adds difficulty to the country’s anti-drug campaign. Therefore, there is a growing need and urgency for enhancing China-U.S.-Latin America trilateral cooperation on drug control. The immigration authorities of the three sides should strengthen their cooperation in joint enforcement of anti-drug laws, information and intelligence sharing, and exchange of the experience in inspecting and managing immigrants.

Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of China-related organized crimes in Latin America, such as illegal immigration, stealing into another country and human trafficking. China needs to strengthen international cooperation on this issue. In particular, the country should enhance its cooperation with the United States and Latin American countries in cracking down on illegal immigration and crimes targeting legal immigrants. The three sides should strengthen cooperation in building immigration management capacity, exchanging experience in cracking down on illegal immigrants, improving legal immigration channels, and making concerted efforts to effectively manage immigration and reduce the number of illegal immigrants. At the same time, the three sides should take effective measures to protect the legitimate interests of legal immigrants.

The rampant terrorist activities highlight the importance of international cooperation against terrorism. China, as one of the victims of terrorism, has intensified international cooperation against terrorism unremittingly. The United States has signed anti-terrorist cooperation agreements with most Latin American countries, and its exchange and cooperation with China in counter-terrorism has made encouraging progress. For example, some practical measures, such as intelligence sharing and the opening of China office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have been implemented. To effectively prevent and control terrorist activities, China, the United States and Latin American countries can take joint actions, exchange experience, and provide technical support and financial assistance to each other.


D. China and the United States Should Promote Their Military and Defense Cooperation in Latin America in a Sound WayTo conduct military and defense cooperation in Latin America, China and the United States should proceed prudently so as to avoid backlashes from relevant countries. In recent years, China and Latin American countries have carried out military exchanges and defense dialogues as well as cooperation. There has been frequent exchange of visits by military leaders and officers, and good results have been achieved in such fields as military training, personnel training and peacekeeping. The United States has become less comfortable as the military cooperation between China and Latin American countries proceeds smoothly. Therefore, it is better to limit the scale and speed of China-Latin America military cooperation to avoid provoking the United States and leading to its strategic miscalculation. Over the years, the United States has signed defense cooperation agreements with some Latin America countries and hopes to renew these agreements. However, at a time when most Latin American countries are ruled by left-wing governments, signing a new military cooperation agreement or renewing the existing one will make leftist Latin American governments edgy and have a negative impact on the security situation in Latin America. A typical example in this regard is the signing of U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement, which caused an uproar among South American countries. Therefore, the Sino-U.S. military and defense cooperation in Latin America should follow the principle of “prudence, soundness and small steps”, maintain the current scale of bilateral cooperation, and try to establish a trilateral cooperation mechanism when the time is ripe and on condition that Latin American countries fully understand and support it. The purpose of doing so is to avoid misjudgment and misinterpretation of such cooperation by countries in Latin America.

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VII. Conclusion

History tells us it is never easy for major powers to get along with each other, and it is even so for the relationship between established powers and rising ones. Conflicts of interests and lack of trust are common phenomena between the two sorts of powers. Likewise, the biggest obstacle to the building of a new model of major-country relations between China and the United States is lack of strategic trust. The United States is concerned that its international dominance would be challenged and its presence be pushed out of some key regions in the world by China, while China is worried that the United States might obstruct its peaceful development process and undermine its domestic political and social stability. Some U.S. officials often say that the United States does not pursue a containment strategy against China, but some actions taken by the United States make the Chinese people skeptical. Similarly, the Chinese officials always claim that China’s rise will not pose a threat to the United States, however the momentum of its development make Americans feel uneasy.

In essence, a new model of major-country relations is a normal relationship between big powers. What is “new” in the new model of China-U.S. relations is that this relationship is not only different from the hegemonic rivalry and confrontation between the former Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War era, but different from the alliances that the United States has maintained after the Cold War. In other words, this is a normal state of relations that China and the United States as two major world powers should have established in the new situation. The basic connotation of the new model of major-country relations between China and the U.S. is “no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation”. In today’s world, neither a “zero-sum game” nor a “cowboy style” is consistent with the trend of the times and in the long-term strategic interests of China and the United States. Conflicts and confrontation will lead only to damages to both countries, while respect for each other’s major concerns and core interests will


create a favorable environment for win-win cooperation. And that is exactly how China and the United States should have done to get on well with each other.

A win-win cooperative relationship between China and the United States can only be achieved through solid and accumulative work, including dialogue and communication at all levels and pragmatic cooperation in various fields. The two countries should give full play to the existing 90-odd dialogue and cooperation mechanisms between the two governments. In addition to bilateral fields, China and the United States are fully capable of conducting win-win cooperation in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. In these regions, there is still great cooperation potential for the two countries to tap into. By tapping into the potential, China and the United States are less likely to obstruct the other side’s initiatives, and for those countries that attempt to take advantage of the different stances of the two countries for their own benefit, they have fewer chances to succeed. And that is in the common interests of China, the United States as well as relevant countries and regions.

(This report was written in Chinese and translated into English by the lead author Jia Xiudong.)

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List of Published CIIS Reports

No.1 Ruan Zongze et al.: Toward a New Type of Major-Country Relationship Between China and the US: Challenges and Opportunities, 58 p., Beijing, December 2013.

No.2 Chen Xulong: In Pursuit of the “World Dream”: The Progress and Prospects of China’s Promotion of a Harmonious World, 70 p., Beijing, December 2013.

No.3 Teng Jianqun / Xu Longdi: Cyber War Preparedness, Cyberspace Arms Control and the United States, 56 p., Beijing, August 2014.

No.4 Cui Hongjian / Jin Ling / Wang Yi: Changes of the EU’s International Status and Influence, 70 p., Beijing, October 2014.

No.5 Shi Ze / Yang Chenxi: China’s Diplomatic Efforts to Promote Energy and Resources Cooperation Along the “One Belt and One Road”, 65 p., Beijing, May 2015.

No.6 Jia Xiudong et al.: The Potential for a Win-win Cooperative Relationship Between China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, 55 p., Beijing, July 2015.


About the AuthorsJia Xiudong is a guest researcher at CIIS. Before doing guest research at the institute since March 2011, he was a senior official of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, serving as director for U.S. affairs in the Ministry and counselor for political affairs in the Chinese Embassy in Washington successively. His major research areas include Sino-American relations, U.S. foreign policy, security affairs in the Asia-Pacific and public diplomacy. Mr. Jia received his BA in English language and literature and MA in American studies from Beijing Foreign Studies University.

Wang Youming joined the CIIS in 2005 after graduation from School of International Studies, Peking University with a doctorate. Currently, he is director of Department for Developing Countries Studies and an associate research fellow at the institute. Before taking the current post in 2011, he was deputy director of Department for International and Strategic Studies, CIIS. From January 2010 to June 2010, he participated in the advanced training and dialogue program “Managing Global Governance (MGG)” in Germany. Dr. Wang’s research areas include global governance, Latin America, and European politics.

Wang Hongyi is an associate research fellow at the CIIS specialized in African studies. He joined the CIIS in 1997 after graduation from Wuhan University with a BA in French language and literature. He served as a diplomat in Chinese Embassy in Cameroon from 1998 to 2002, deputy director of Department for Developing Countries Studies, CIIS from 2002 to 2007 and a political affairs officer in the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) from 2008 to 2010. Mr. Wang’s main research fields include African affairs, China-African relations, and Sino-Africa energy cooperation.

Su Xiaohui is deputy director of Department for International and Strategic Studies, and an associate research fellow at the CIIS. She joined the institute in 2004 after graduation from School of International Studies, Peking University with a Bachelor’s Degree in Diplomacy. In 2009, Ms. Su received her Master’s Degree in International Relations from China Foreign Affairs University. Her major research fields include international security, China’s diplomacy and energy strategy.

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China-U.S. relations can be described as the world’s most important bilateral relations with increasing global significance. As China continues to rise and the balance of power between China and the United States evolves, their strategic choice and interaction will grow to be the most important factor making for changes in the international situation. For quite a long time to come, the common interests of China and the United States will expand, with greater need and willingness on both sides to cooperate with each other for their own interests. Meanwhile, the issue of China-U.S. strategic mutual trust or the lack of it will also become more prominent. The two countries need to build a new model of major-country relations.

To translate the diplomatic notion of “win-win cooperation” to practice in Sino-U.S. relations is crucial to the building of the new model of major-country relations. A win-win cooperative relationship between the two countries is premised on their common interests and serves as an indispensable means to build towards strategic mutual trust. To build such a relationship, it is imperative to explore the potential for Sino-U.S. win-win cooperation as well as the conditions and means to realize the potential so as to help shape future policy priorities and specific plans in this regard.

Although China and the United States are in a state of competition in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, the potential for the two countries to cooperate and achieve win-win results in these regions does exist. These five regions are of special strategic importance to both China and the United States, and an in-depth research into these regions will help explore the ways for the two countries to enhance mutual trust and expand cooperation so that a new model of major-country relations could be gradually built up. This report focuses on the potential, problems and possible solutions for achieving a win-win cooperative relationship between China and the United States in the aforementioned regions.

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