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CIHAPTER VI ll RELATIONS OF INDIA AND
PAKISTAN WITH OTHER SAARC: COUNTRIES
6.1 Indo-Pakistan Relations
6.2 India's Relaixons .with Nepal
6.3 India and Banglaclesh
6.4 India and Sri Lanlca
6.5 Indo-Bhutan Relations
6.6 The Treaty of 194.9
6.7 Bhutan's Interest?;
6.8 Maldives and India
6.9 Palastan's Rapport with India
6.10 The Indo-Pak War of December 1971
6.11 Farakka Issue
6.12 Nepal's Transit Problem
6.13 Pakistan-Nepal Trade
6.14 Patterns of Bilateralism
181
This chapter deals with the relations of India and Pakistan with other
SAARC countries. Therefore, it will have two parts - the first part would be
concerned with the relations of India with other SAARC countries and
second part will deal with tlie rapport of Pakistan with other SAARC
countries. Finally, it will examine its impact in South Asian region in
bringing about regional co-operation and understanding. The totality of the
experience of the extra-region21 interaction in South Asia presents a mixed
picture. There are significant trc:nds, which potentially generate tensions. We
can treat South Asia as a 'subordinate system' or 'sub system'. In spite of the
existence of tensions between India and Pakistan, South Asia can be treated
as a distinct international sub-system. The core and periphery model is very
relevant to the studies of inte~action pattern in South Asia, Intra regional
interaction in South Asia is based neither upon total integration nor total
isolation. On the other hand, the patterns of relationship between the core
and the peripheral units gves some sustenance for interaction within thls
region. The increasing power gap between the core and the periphery in
South Asia also decides the bc:haviour pattern among the various regonal
actors. This has led to the quest for a balance of power situation by the small
South Asian countries.
The role and position of infrastmctural connections in the intra-
regional relations in South Asia gives an interesting study by itself. The
South Asian Countries are brorght together by a common historical legacy
of the British colonialism and geographical contiguity. Apart from thls, other
factors like religion and language have given a composite culture to the regon.
Some common religions like Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism in these
countries, instead of integrating; them, and have contributed to intra-regonal
tension. In the midst of these unifying and diversified factors, there came
up in recent times an institution called SAARC under the initial initiative
of Bangladesh. It would be ideal to investigate the rapport established by
India and Pakistan, the two major countries in the region with other
SAARC countries.
PART I
INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER SAARC COUNTRIES
The South Asian Assoc:iation for Regional Co-operation (SAARC)
recently completed to decade!; in existence. In the second decade of its
existence, the mood among member countries is distinctly optimistic. There
is an increasing conviction among these countries that economic co-operation
among the countries of the regon can bring about better and effective
regional co-operation. "This z~ptimism stems from the present note for
SAARC in fulfilling an impon.ant task of allowing the forum to provide a
-for platf~rm~formal contact between counties in the region."' India's rapport
with Pakistan would be discus:;ed before examining India's interaction with
other SAARC countries.
6.1 Indo-Pakistan Relatioils
Indo-Pakistan relations are a significant factors in geo-political and
military-strategic situation in South Asia. A series of problems remain
unresolved after the partition of British India. The bloody clashes between
I Abha Dixit, "SAARC: Towards Ckeater- Co-operahon." Strategic Analysis - July 1997.
Hindus and Muslims at the time of partition and three wars explain the
continuing doubts between these two countries, and has its own negative
impact in the south Asian region.2 "Stability in South Asia has been achieved
only through a fragile 'balance of power' between Pakistan and ~ n d i a . " ~
Indo-Pakistan relations can be fully examined only by investigating
the military-strategic and poli1:ical situation on the global level, first of all,
relations between Russia and Republics of central Asia, U.S.A. and China
and the relations of these countries with India and Pakistan are to be studied
for a fuller understanding o:! Indo-Pak relations. The interests of these
countries and levels of involvc:ment in the conflict in South Asia have been
different and decided by their geo-strategic positions and how each of them
looks at its ~nteres ts .~
Retaining the temtorial integnty and national security of the erstwhile
U.S.S.R. needed the establishment of friendly and good neighbourly relations
with the countries of South Asia, adjoining the Southern borders of the state.
The development, strengthening and improvement of political, trade and
economic relations with the South Asian countries formally was based on the
relations with India, as for many years, Soviet leaders looked up the
-
V.Moskalenko and T. Shaumian "Conflict over Kashmir: Current situation and outlook - A new geopolitical context," Pakistan Horizon. Ibid.
4 Note: It would be worthwhile to mention here about the Indo-Pak war of 1965, and its implications for small South Asian states. India and Pakistan were involved in limited war during 1965 and at that time there took place certain changes in the foreign policy postures of the small countries of South-Asia As a land locked state, more than 95% of Nepal's international trade was either camed out bilaterally \Yith India or channelled through Indian ports. But, now new political 2nd strategic relahons for seelung opportunities for dl co-operation with other countries of the reglon, above all with Pakistan.
situations in south Asia mainly through Indian eyes.' American Interests in
South Asia contributed Amerizan global politics and to a great extent, was
based on the evolution of Sohiet-American relations. American interests in
South Asia were based upon iclose relations with Palustan, its political and
military ally. Now the American's policy in South Asia is moving towards
India. As far as China was corcerned, its South Asian policy was decided by
geo-political rivalry with India and may influenced by the state of Sino -
Soviet and Indo-Soviet relations. The main area of dispute in Indo-Chma
relations is territorial and it still remain unresolved.
Global factors play a predominant role in South Asia and this has a
great impact in Indo-Pakistan relations. If the Kashmir problem cannot be
analysed without these outside influences, the problem of nuclear non-
proliferation cannot be investi,gated without reference to the regional factors.
Pakistan and Indian positions on these issues and many other problems are
diametrically opposed. Pakistan's attempts to "counter-balance" India's
dominance in population territory and natural resources and level of socio-
economic and political development and consolidate its position especially
after the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 were based on US and Chmese
military and economic as~is tance.~ The purpose was strengthen its defence
Note: Apart from these, India was one of the major ad providing countries for the economic development of the Mountain kingdom. But the context of a war between India and Palastan, Kathmandus life-line can be blocked.
6 V.Moskalenko and T. Shaumian Op crt, p. 18.
capability and also to preserve: an internal parity in the region.' Pakistan's
foreign aid requirements were: based on American desire to involve this
strategcally important country in containing communism during the period
of cold war. Prior to 1971, the: problem of regional security in South Asia
was related ma~nly in its strategic aspects. To Pakistan, it maintain its
territorial integnty and for Indi,~, It meant to strengthen its position in South
its territorial integrity and for India, It meant to strengthen its position in
South Asia, in non-aligned mo7iement and in the international sphere. "The
Pakistani conception of national and international security with the
settlement of international conilicts with the participation of outside forces
contradicted the Indian appros.ch to national and regional security based
solving on all disputes by the interested parties themselves without outside
intervention.""
Kashmir has been the main cause of friction between India and
Pakistan. Kashmir has geopolitical and s t r a t e ~ c significance due to its
location and the centre of Asia, where the borders of the Central Asian
Republics of the former Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, Afganistan and China
meet. The issue has created the balance of forces on the regional as well as
on the global level. Since the mid 1950's in difference platforms including
7 Note: Although the South Asian states shared a common concern for complete and general disarmament, Pakistan, for quite some time was under the influence of the USA due to its security arrangements aput from that, Pakistan, during the first decades of its existence being a party to the organisation like SEAT0 and CENT0 was influenced by the behaviour of the Western block. The purpose was to strengthen its defence capabilities and also to preserve an intemal parity in the region. At the same time it also wanted to ensure political stability ill the country
x Ibid. p. 18.
the UNO the USSR took the position that Kashmir issue, if any should be
solved within the framework ~f the Indian Republic. It also hold the view
that Pakistan's occupation is il: egal.
The physical proximity of Kashmu to the Soviet border and its
strategc significance encouraged the US to back Palustan and treat Kashmir
issue as an open one. Washington stated that the people of Kashrnir be
granted the right to self determination through the process of plebiscite
under international auspices in accordance with UN Security Council
Resolution of 21 April 1948. Hence in South Asia the cold war between the
super powers and the east we:jt confrontations including the attitude of the
third parties have shaped the relations between India and Pakistan. By the
late 1950's the situations becsune more complicated and China failed to fit
into the rivalry between the two super powers and China took its own
position even in the relations E etween India and Pakistan. During that period
China was in confrontation with Soviet Union and tried to prevail over India,
its geo-political rival in Asia and the third world. Chma achieved mutual
understanding and co-operation with Pakistan - an ally of the US,^ which was
one of China's main enemies. The alliance became beneficial to Pakistan
from the geopolitical perspe1:tive because China supported Pakistan on
Kashrnir and began to provid: Pakistan with military economic assistance
coupled with political and diplomatic support. Though China has asserted
Pakistan that it would suppor on all important issues, including assistance
Note: The involvement of Pakistan in American military and strategic designs and the fwther developments and expans on of US-Pakistan military and economic operation did not enable to resolve the suspicio~~ and contradictions between Palustan and India.
for the nuclear programme, China did not go any further during the war
between India and Pakistan, apart from delivering arms and protesting to
India in a threatening manner. Military conflicts between India and Pakistan
have not brought any results. I ~ I 1972, a diplomatic solution was tried through
Simla Agreement. The agreement stands for solving outstanding issues and
disputes only through peac~:ful means at bilateral negotiations. The
agreement also wants to prevent frictions, conflicts etc. which could destroy
the establishment of peaceful and friendly relations and wants to respect
national unity, territorial integyity, political independence and sovereignty
of each other and refrain from making any hostile propaganda against the
other party.
6.2 India's Relations with Nepal
India considers South Asia as its geopolitical reGon of influence and
expect that its smaller neighbours pay due regard to its sensitivities. Pakistan
becomes angry when India pr:sumes 'the right' to prescribe what kind of
weapons system are sufticieni: for Pakistan. The Nepal's ruling class are
equally resentful at how India over runs Nepal, politically, culturally and
economically. Bangladesh has deep grievances over water arrangements,
India's 'big brother' attitude creates suspicion and hostility. They look at
India's policy of bilateralism as a method of coercive diplomacy.
In turn, India feels tha: its rights and security sensitivities are not
respected. 'India has not the pclitico-military and economic power to compel
acquiescence, except in the case of the land-locked states of Nepal and
Bhutan. India may have failed in its effbrts to block arms transfer to Pakistan
but it has been much more successful in preventing US arms sale to Nepal in
1983 - 84 or in discouraging US plans to Sri Lanka to set up high power
transmission facilities or build ;m oil tank complex in Trincomallee.l0
However it is an accepted fact that India has played a sigruficant role
in creating balance in order ro ensure stability in the south Asian state
system, by invitation in the Maldives, by forces of circumstances in East
Pakistan and by agreement in Sri Lanka. The politico-military backlash
against the role of the IPKF in Sri Lanka has created a poor image and also it
adversely affected the relations between Sri Lanka and India and that of
LTTE and Government of India. It has also brought home to the Indian
ruling class the limits of Indiiin power to shape the regional environment.
'India's move to merge the Protectorate of Sikhlm, was an object lesson in
the ability to use a politically rlon-dominant ethnic community the Nepali in
Sikkim to change the politico-demographic reality there."'
India's conflict of interest with these smaller countries comprises minor
disputes over temtory llke Kachchativu with Sri Lanka, Kalapani with Nepal,
Tin Bhlga and New More Island with Bangladesh. More serious and important
problems are over sharing of resources, cross border population movements,
ideological and nation-state identity politics. These small neighbouring nation
states base their identity by asserting there differences with India.lZ
LO hta Manchanda, "India in comprehensive and co-operatlve security m South Asla", edited by Dipankar Banerjee (New Delhi: In::titute of Peace and Conflict Stumes, 1998) p.44
1 1 Ibid. p. 45. 12 Note: Cross border ethnic, religious and lingustic connection have made mutually vulnerable
all the countries of South Asia, including India. India's small neighbours feel threatened and in secure by Inma's size and :ts growth potential. India's political connections with democratic forces in these countries have been a matter of great concern
189
Just like Pakistan, the other neighbours Nepal and Sri Lanka have
invited extra regional powers 1.0 counter Indian power. Nepal sought to play
off China against India. India':; relationship with Nepal began when India set
up its embassy at Kathmandu. Bhabani Sen Gupta and others in their study
on, Regional co-operation and Development in South Asia explain how in
1951, after the liberation of Tibet by Communist Chma, Government of
India placed Nepal within Inha's security orbit. Nepal is perceived as a
buffer state between India and China and its overtures were seen as
threatening and punished for chat. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi showed his
unhappiness at an Arms Agreement between Nepal and China by closing the
transit points and thus bottling up land locked Nepal.
Before that, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi did not approve Nepal's
proposals for International rec:ogn~tion as a 'Zone of Peace'. According to
Bhabani Sen Gupta, India's acceptance of the zone of peace concept would
not have affected on the Indo - Nepal Treaty, but its impact on the Nepalese
elite would have been effective. He further says that it would not make a
least change in the geo-political realities of the Himalayas or in Nepal's
relation with India and China. Twenty years later, in the context of the
Gujral doctrine's new responsiveness towards the sensitivities of neighbours,
India has agreed to review the Indo - Nepal treaty. There is public opinion in
Nepal against unequal agreeinents on the sharing of waters of the rivers
Gandak and Kosi. Nepal like other neighbours, looks at Indian bilateralism
as euphemism of for hegemonic diplomacy.
The 1996 agreement on Wahakali River symbolises the problems of
suspicion and mistrust and the promise of co-operation. "At stake is the
development of the whole of Nc'rth-East and the costs of under development
in the form of political unrest and destabilising population movements across
the border."I3 The 1950 Treaty established the unique open border between
India and Nepal. The Indian security believes that the theory about a greater
Nepal across the Trans-Himalayan region has again been revived,
particularly in the context of tlie politico-demographic shifts in Darjeeling
and Sikkirn. The Greater Nepiil concept is manipulated to give political
legitimacy to Bhutan's expulsion of 1,10,000 people of Nepalese orign.
Nepal wants to Involve India to pressurise Bhutan to take back the
Lhotsampas. Bhutan says that )hey are Nepalee citizens. "Increasingly, the
management of the challenge of population movements - refugees, migrants
and stateless peoples - requires a co-operative regional responds. A r e ~ o n a l
regime will de-politicise the i,ssue of giving refugee and build up group
pressure on states not to make their citizens stateless."14
The encroachment of Indian territory by the Nepalese citizens is
another irritant in the relationshlp between these two countries. Over 5839
acres of land along river Gandak in West Champaran district is presently
reported to be under illegal occupation by the Nepalese citizens.15
India's Border with Nepal is not only open but has become insecure
by the militants, criminals and anti-India elements. It is relevant to be noted
13 Ibid, p. 46. l4 Ibid, p. 47. I S The Hindustun Tinres, New Delht July 23, 1993
here that to curb the menace fr3m the militants and criminals, India has been
engaged in modemising the Nepal1 defence structure by providing assistance
in accordance with the 1950 Treaty and Arms Assistance Agreement 1965,
provides an important military link between the two countries.
A militarily stronger Kepal would reduce Chinese threat to India
through Nepal becoming a more effective buffer.16 Only in an atmosphere
of peace and fiendship, th~: security arrangements are effective and
implementative. Even if one signatory makes a half hearted attempt to accept
the treaties and arrangements then the effect of the same is diminished. One
of the biggest criticisms agai:ist India, according to the Nepalese, is the
Indian bureaucracy and its mindset to rule Nepal with a carrot and stick
policy. There should be attitcdinal change amongst the policy makers in
India who would be sensitive to Nepal's sovereignty and adhere to good
neighbourliness. The draft pro?osal sent by India in 1989 shows the Indian
minds as to treat Nepal with suspicion who, it is said can harm India's
security interests, India's draft proposal tried to dominate ~ e ~ a 1 . l ' The trade
relations between India and Nepal requires special attention. The
government of India cannot look after the economic needs of Nepalese
because of its own compulsior~s. India is hard pressed for its resources and
its economy for its developme~it. On each and every issue Nepal talks about
its sovereignty and independence being under constant threat and India talks
about its security interests. It a,ould be in the interest of both the countries to
strike a balance between the two.
The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, November 23, 1994 17 The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu, D xember 22, 1990
One has to observe security and co-operation from a holistic approach.
Small state Nepal can feel secure if it develops economic political and
cultural dimensions. On the o.:her hand India should stress on developing
confidence building measures ( CBMs) with Nepal in order to strengthen its
security interests.
Indo-Nepalese relations have also been occasionally strain over the
form of government operatin;; in Nepal (The communist could assume
power in Nepal only on anti-India plank) and certain trade related and transit
problems. For eg: the trade bloc:kade of 1989. Moreover, it has been said that
bureaucracy and proclaimed stringency on the part of Indian authorities is
hampering in Indo-Nepal trade ventures. It must also be noted here that the
controversy between Nepal anli Bhutan regarding the Nepalese refugees in
Bhutan and the use of Nepal t ~ y extremists and secessionist elements fiom
North-East India are some other problems that could assume significant
dimensions in the coming years.
6.3 India and Bangladesh
The problem of Bangladzsh migrants is a major tension between India
and Bangladesh. What is sigmticant to note here is that it is engulfed in the
fundamentalist political discourse in India. It is a fact to remember here is
that the political parties like B.J.P. are targeting Muslim Bangladeshi
migrants. Incapability of Bangladesh to provide food and security to its
citizens, makes it unavoidable that people will cross the border for a
livelihood. Apart from that, Irtdia should take some of the responsibilities
for the making of environmen:al I-efugees in Bangladesh as a consequence
193
of the degradation caused by the Indo-Bangladesh Farraka agreement,
fencing the border is not an alternative.
An integrated economic de\relopment of the regon is essential for
more regional co-operation, despite of natural gas in Bangladesh whlch can
transform the economy of the region. Foreign investors are looking at India
as the natural market for piped natural gas from Bangladesh. This would
remove the hlstory of distrusi: and suspicion, which has been preventing
co-operation, especially after the emergence of Bangladesh. Anti-India
propaganda is being launched by the ruling elite of Bangladesh. The Farraka
Water Barrage Agreement is looked at as the symbol of India's hegemonic
bilateralism. The revised 1997 Ganga Water Agreement represents an
approach more responsive to sensitivities of Bangladesh. For India and
Bangladesh, the denial of san1:tuary to militants across the border is very
essential. If done so, this can )bring about better relationship between India
and Bangladesh. India has been backing militant, Chakma groups llke the
Shanti Bhahini while Bangladesh has been providing sanctuary to insurgent
groups like the Bodos and ULFAS.
Indo - Bangladesh relations suffered due to the persisting disputes like
the problem of illegal rnigratim from the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the
demarcation of boundaries involving fertile island and enclaves. Moreover,
both the countries frequentl:! each other in their respective troubled
territories. The bilateral talks and negotiations are not yet reached in the
desired destination of amicable settler~ient in the issues like sharing of Ganga
water, Farrakka Water Barrage, Electric wire felicing across the borders,
surprised attacks from Bangla.desh rifles against India's Border Security
Forces and the anti-India sentiments and all other forms of insurgencies. To
illustrate this, Bangladesh has repeatedly accused India of supporting the
militant wing of the Chakma insurgency of Bangladesh, where as India
believes that Bangladesh ercourage various subversive and guerrilla
activities in the North Eastern states of India such as Tripura and is or am.'^
6.4 India and Sri Lanka
The Tamils are a minority in Sri Lanka. The majority Slnhalalites
have followed a policy of discrimination against the Tamils. Thls has led to a
civil war between Tamil groups and Sri Lanka. Thousands of Tamil refugees
have come to India since the beginning of civil war in Sri Lanka. India has
provided humanitarian relief of the refugees. Emotional solidarity with their
persecuted ethnic kin encouraged the state government in Tamilnadu to find
the militants. It is alleged that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi armc:d and trained the militants." Sri Lankan
President Julius Jayawardane's close proximity with the USA, UK and Israel
were looked by the Indian government as complicating India's security
interests. This was the time when India was building up its regional muscle
and wanted no extra regiona! power to get involved in its neighbourhood.
There was a fear percipitatec, that the partition of Sri Lankans would take
place due to the acute ethnic crisis. India went for a peace agreement with
Sri Lanka and sent IPKF to implement it. Three years later, Sri Lankan
18 Partha S. Ghosh, "Co-operatio11 and Conflict In South Asla," (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989) pp. 73-86.
l9 Rita Manchanda, "India in comprc:henslve and co-operatwe security in South Asia", edited by Dipankar Banejee (New Delhi: Ir~stitute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 1998) p.49.
government forced India to withdraw its Forces from the Island and learned
a lesson from this humiliating exit. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi
created a situation, wherein India stopped its moral support to Tamil
militants. Successive Sri Larkan governments have been cautious in
respecting India's sensitivities about a foreign presence in its backyard.
Indo-Sri Lankan relations go deep into history, which is shrouded in
myth, mystery and miracles. From pre-historic times there has been a flow of
people firom the Northern and Southern India in to Sri Lanka. "The Buddhist
Sinhalese derived their spiritu;ll strength from the north of India and the
Hindu Tamils derive their spiriiual sustenance from their ancestors of South
India. Sinhala Buddhists and Hindu Tamils were involved in historical
rivalry and antagonism after the advent of South Indian invaders on the
Island. During the colonial rule, India and Sri Lanka did not have
independent interaction except in late 18 '~ and 1 9 ' ~ centuries when mass
indented labour from South India was recruited on tea and coffee
plantations. After its independence, Sri Lanka began to have a fairly
independent course in its foreign policy and yet maintained cordial and warm
relations with India. This rela.tionship, which became cordial during the
period of Bandarnakes, declined in the late 1970's. The question of the
stateless Indian Tamils in the island nation and the militant demands of
the Sri Lankan Tamils for a separate Elarn State embittered Indo-Sri Lankan
relations.
The problems arising out of divided communities spread across the
South Asian countries are particularly intractable when open borders
encourage constant interaction between the populace of these countries.
Indo-Sri Lankan relations also remain strained over the discrimination and
occasional mistreatment meted out to Tamils in Sri Lanka. Indeed, relations
between India and Sri Lanka have also not improved much due to the
withdrawal of the IPKF following the break of 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord
and the hectic democratic efforts of President Kumaratunge for restoring
peace in the island. Both ccuntries continue to view each other with
suspicion regarding the LTTE crisis, while Sri Lanka battles as against the
increased hostility of Tamil Tgers who are disrupting the stability of the
Island with wide connotations for the entire region. Recent reports have
repeatedly suggested that India is keeping a cordial relationship towards Sri
Lanka, even Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga has lost much of
shine in so far as her peace proposals to end the bloody ethnic war in the
island remained just a packag:. Meanwhile, attacks by the LTTE at soft
targets in the capital city have :urned Colombo into a 'nightmare' - security
checks, blocks and arrests of minorities have disgruntled the Tamils and
eroded much the goodwill the President once commanded.20
6.5 Indo-Bhutan Relations
Both India and Bhutan have been to maintain good and cordial
relations without any mistrust and suspicion. The Treaty of 1949 between
India and Bhutan in very significant in terms of the interests of both the
countries. Bhutan has changed today in all respects, including the economy
20 K.M. De Silva, ''Fifty Years of S n Lankan Independence; The Past Holds the Clues," The Indian Express, Baroda, Januiuy 29, 1998,
and international stature since 1949. In the words of Dawa Tsering, the then
Foreign minister of Bhutan. "The Indo-Bhutan ties are a model in
International relations today. India is a big power and Bhutan is a small land
locked kingdom. Still, we get along very well. What can be more satisfying is
this model r e l a t i~nsh i~ . "~ '
6.6 The Treaty of 1949
The Treaty of 1949 talks of the basic framework for carrylng out
relations between the two cour~tries. The Treaty of 1949 has 10 articles. The
first Article attempts to perpetuate Indo-Bhutanese friendship for all time.22
"There shall be perpetual pea1:e and friendship between the government of
India and the govemment of hut an."^^ The most important provision of the
Treaty is its Article 2. "The Government of India undertakes to exercise no
interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the
Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the government
of India in regard to its external relations."24 Certain kind of criticism came
up in regard to this second part, other Articles of the Treaty are concerned
with the annual payment of lZs.5 lakh by the government of India to the
govemment of Bhutan in conrinuance of the compensation which was paid
by the British India. Independent India has increased the amount to Rs.5 lakh
form Rs. 1 lakh earmarked earlier. To strengthen the friendship between the
two countries, India agreed to return to the government of Bhutan about
21 Dawa Tsenng in an interview to rhe Yiibune, March 11, 1996 22 See, Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1949. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid,
32 square miles of temtory in Devanpri and the same was mentioned in the
Treaty, which also talks of a fiee trade regime between India and huta an.^'
Apart from that, the citizens of both the countries living in each other's
territory will be treated at par with own citizens. "The Treaty also has
provisions for extradition of Ind~an citizens in Bhutan and of Bhutanese
citizens in India when required, and the procedure for the same has been
spelt out. The mechanism of settling disputes arising out of differences in
interpretation or application of the treaty is also mentioned."''
The Treaty also says that i t will continue to operate unless terminated
or modified by mutual consent. Another significant Article in the Treaty,
which refers to Bhutan impo~ting arms and ammunitions, machinery, war
like materials, or stores for the strength and welfare of its country. The
clause further states that such imports will be carried out with the assistance
and approval of the Government of India from or through India into Bhutan.
"The Government of Bhutan, according to the Treaty, agrees that there shall
be no export of such arms and ammunition etc across the frontier of Bhutan
either by the Government of Bhutan or by private individual^."^' Article 2 of
the Treaty of 1949 is to be examined from the perspective of its operation
and function. When the controversy is in regard to Sino-Bhutan boundary
arose, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Chinese;" under the treaty, relationship
with Bhutan, government of lnd~a is the only competent authority to take
2S PadmaJa Murthy, "Indo-Bhutan F~elahons: Serving Mutual Interests:" Strategic Analysis, April 1999, p. 122.
26 Ibid., p. 122. 27 Ibid., p. 125.
199
matters concerning Bhutan's cxternal relations and in fact, we have taken
up with your government a lumber of matters on behalf of the Bhutan
government.28 Since 1984, thl: Government of India has not objected to
Bhutan and China having direct bilateral negotiations in regard to the border
dispute on the northern side of the border.
The same way, as Bhutan expands it relations with the outside world,
it is interesting to study that thr: strict executions of the 1949 Treaty does not
take place. In 1971, Bhutan was the second country after India to recognize
Bangladesh. The important point. in this context, is that Bhutan took an
important decision, which it could not do again on any other issue. One of
the bilateral foreign policy issues presently facing Bhutan is its negotiations
with the Nepalese government on the refugee issue. Bhutans interactions
with Nepal came withm the frsmework of Bhutan's external relationship. In
spite of 1949 Treaty, India's position is that it will not interfere in the
bilateral issue of the two countries. The context of the changing regonal and
international environment and also Bhutan's own desire to assert its
independent sovereign status have created a situation wherein a flexible
interpretation of Article 2 of the Treaty of 1949 is to be perceived. It is
significant to stress that the aun of Article 2 of the Treaty is not to bind
Bhutan but to ensure India's se1:urity interests.
** Ibid., p. 127
200
At present, India and Bhutan have cordial relationship and the
Bhutanese do not have any coniplaints over the provisions of the Treaty. At
the same time there have been occasions when there were controversy
over its provisions, especially in connection with the interpretation of the
word "guidance."
6.7 Bhutan's Interests
As far as Bhutan is concerned, its relation with India have been
beneficial on three specific area:;; the domestic, international and economic.
6.7.1 Domestic Affairs
Even during "the period sf British India there was no interference by
India in the internal political struggle and the ongoing civil war in Bhutan.
The Monarchy in Bhutan came into existence only in 1907. British, through
its recognition, additional legthnacy to the monarchy and contributed to its
stability. The treaty of Punakha, which came into existence in the year 1910,
incorporated the clause that there would be no interference in the internal
affairs of Bhutan. They ensured the primacy of the new r e p e . T h s
continued even after the withdrawal of the British from India. The advent of
democracy in India created fear that monarchy in Bhutan will have to face
problems. Even at present, when Bhutan is faced with a movement for
change to democracy India stands by the clause of non-interference in its
internal affairs. It means that the changes taking place in Bhutan are the
results of problems in Bhutan and not from outside,
20 1
6.7.2 International
In the past Bhutan had apprehensions that after S i k h s merger into
the Indian Union, the somethir~g would happen to Bhutan also. But, India
assured that its territorial integrity would be respected at any costs. Bhutan
has also the fear that Nepalese ~vould accelerate the local population just like
Sikkim where the minorities were overtaken by the Nepali population.
Bhutan's problem at present, revolve around the concept of "Greater Nepal."
This is linked with the problem of refugees from Southern Bhutan who are of
the Nepalese origm. The movement for Goorkhaland launched by Nepalese
in India and the consequenl: autonomous council have made Bhutan
concerned about its people of Nepali origin and their intentions. India's
official position of non-interference has ensured Bhutan a free hand to deal
with its centrifugal tendencies according to its wishes. From the very
beginning Bhutan has followed a policy of isolation. It did not trust the
British too. Following the threet from China it was the purpose of the British
government that Bhutan shoul~i come out of its isolation. To some extent it
was successful, but the consequent world war second later, the British
withdrawals in 1947 created isolation for Bhutan again. Bhutan became
suspicious of independent India's intentions after the Chinese action of
1958-59, it soon realised that it had to come out of isolation for its own
survival during the time when its territorial integrity was in danger, India
ensured its security though thcre was no provision in the Treaty of 1949 for
the defence of Bhutan by India. After that, Bhutan had tried to assert its
sovereign existence at every l~latform India has stated that Bhutan's desire
for an international role does not go against Article 2 of the Treaty of 1949.
Its international quest started after i t became a member of the Colombo plan
in 1963. Bhutan's membershp of the Clolombo plan was sponsored by India.
"Bhutan said that its adrnissi'sn to the Colombo plan had considerable
bearing on its sovereign and modem status and regstered its first entry into a
regional group of sovereign stiites. As a result of its membershp, Bhutan
received financial assistance from Japan, Australia, India, Canada, New
Zealand and ~ n ~ l a n d . ' ~ Later: in the year 1969, Bhutan entry into the
Universal Postal Union was c;ponsored by India. In 1971, Bhutan was
admitted to the United Nations with the full help and support of India. In
1972, Bhutan became a member of the Economic and Social Council for
Asia and Pacific (ESCAP). The process continued and in 1985, Bhutan
became a member of the South Asian Association for Regonal Co-operation
(SAARC), giving it another forum to expand and canyout its foreign relations.
6.7.3 Bhutan's economic concerns and India
Apart from Bhutan being a landlocked country, it is extremely
backward. After coming out oj' isolation, India financed the first two five
year plans. At present, the Indim government is involved in many projects,
which comprise hydro- power plants, cement plants and roads etc and 40%
of external revenue that Bhutan obtain is from the sale of electricity to India.
In this sphere, Bhutan has greatly benefited from ~nd ia .~ ' "Most important,
of the total aid given by Indis. to other developing countries in 1996-97,
29 Ibid., p. 127. 30 Padmaja Murthy, "Indo- Bhutan Rc:lations - Serving Mutual Interests," Op cit. p. 128
the share of Bhutan was 52% which amounts to Rs. 18 1 crore. There is a
fiee trade regime between Indi,a and Bhutan not requiring even customs post
on the Indian, side of the bcrder."" Being a land locked country, India
provides it with about 13 transit routes. At present, Bhutan is very keen
on sub regonal co-operation through the growth quadrangle, which
encompasses Bangladesh, Nepal and the North Eastern parts of India.
It emphasises on the economic context in its relation with the SAARC
countries.
6.8 Maldives and India
As an extremely weak and vulnerable country, Maldive's main objective
of survival as an independent: entity is faced with many difficulties and
challenges.32 The state has inbuilt structural weakness and deficiency, whch
create many limitations on its ability to manage its National Security
problems. This raises the question in regard to alternative security options,
which are avadable to Maldves. "Maldwe's pecdar geo-physical configuration
- again a coral chain of 1 190 small islands throng like a garland in the central
Indian Ocean - conjures up the image of a paradise for International tourists.
For the Maldivians, however t h s is the fundamental cause for their
vulnerability and in security. Much of the threats to the atoll island stem
fiom non-military sources.33 At the same time military threats merely creates
peripheral security concerns. I.: has a relative merit over other South Asian
3' Ihid., p. 128. 3Z P. Sahadevan, "Maldives - Search for Security - in Comprehensive and Co-operative
Security in South Asia." Edited I)y Dipanker Baneqee (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 1998) p.206
33 Ihid., p.206.
Countries as far as Internal pcllitical dimensions of security are concerned.
Unlike Sri Lanka, Maldives has a cohesive and homogeneous social structure
with unique hstorical antecedcmts that constitute a source of strength of to
its internal security. However its vulnerability is deep rooted in geography
and this position creates a shor g structure of insecurity. Some recent studies
point out that problems of man
succession at the behest of some of the expatriate Maladivians who were
dissatisfied with the existing political systems. The 1988 coup was a crucial
and powerful military development, wh~ch the Maldivian government
without a regular army, could foil only with India's prompt military
assistance. There are no major dispute between India and Maldives. Yet,
there are certain internal political pressures stemming from peculiar political
situation where a President has been in power for a long time.'4
PART I1
PAKISTAN'S RAPPORT WITH OTHER SAARC COUNTRIES
Emergence of Pakistan is a recent development in history. However,
the whole sub-continent shared almost a common culture within its
diversities. The partition of unified India in 1947 in to two independent
sovereign states had led to wide spread blood-shed and bitterness. Since
partition, India and Palustan hate not had good and cordial relationship there
have been bitter struggles, rivaries and problems between these two. Let us
examine Pakistan's rapport with India.
6.9 Pakistan's Rapport with India
Immediately after i11depl:ndence Pakistan and the tribes from North-
West Pakistan, encouraged by it, invaded Kashmir, Palustan disowned the
responsibilities of invading Jzunmu and Kashmir. Instead it blamed the
Dogra ruler Hari Singh, Pakistan incited and inflamed communal passions
in Kashrnir. Calls for Jehad against India, the infidel became more and
34 Refer to Kaushik Mahan and Rarnakant (eds), "India and South A s k " (New Delhi: Asian Publishers, 1991) pp. 121-25.
more inflammatory. Terrorisation and violence against Hindus and border
provocations against India became a matter of policy and tactics for
Pakistan. Migration of Hindus j?om East Pakistan to lndia assumed alarming
proportions in 1956. Pakistan':; war in 1965, was well planned and had the
backing of USA. Thls war, which is known as the invasion of Kashmir came
in two forms; infiltration and through conventional operations. The Indo-
Palustan war of 1965 proved 77ery disastrous. The main axis of conflict in
South-Asia is the Indo-Pak ccnfrontation. Since 1947, India and Pakistan
have been demonstrating each 3ther in writing a subjective history based on
confrontational policies and building a negative state identity. Disputes over
territory and ideology have locked the two countries in a regional cold war,
which has thrice emerged in the fonn of full scale wars.
Besides this, Indian and Pakistan troops are locked in confrontation at
the hlghest battlefield in the world - Siachan. Palustani Rangers and the
Indian B.S.F are in confrontation in the line of control in Jammu and
Kashmir, resulting in sporadic outbursts of deadly fire and casualties.
Another is proxy war in Kashlnir and also Pakistan supported militants in
Punjab and even it supports in every way possible, the militants in the North
East India. There is clear ev:dence behind terrorist activities across the
country. Initially the Kashmir dispute arose out a limited war over the
territory of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmlr. It has now become
a clash of ideologies between India and Pakistan and the most dangerous
obstacle to peace in South Asia. Palustan emerged out of Two Nation
Theory, it advocated that tt.e Hindus and Muslims are two nations.
This strengthened Palustan's claim that Kashrmr, a Muslim majority province
should be given to it.35
The Kashmir dispute hiis effectively aborted successive efforts to
work out a no war pact or a ?.Jon-Aggression Treaty. As early as in 1945
Nehru offered a "No war Agr:ementn to Pakistan in the form of a joint
declaration condemning the resort to apply force and committing the two
peaceful settlement of disputes. Palustan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan
rejected Nehru's offer. His suc:cessor General Ayub Khan and Z.A.Bhuto
also refused to sign a no war pact with India. The centrality of the Kashmir
problem was evident when Z.A. Bhutto, then foreign minister defended
Ayub Khan's decision to refer the Rann of Kutch to arbitration, instead of
fighting on when Pakistan had t:le upper hand.j6 During Zia Ul Haqs regme,
the No war pact- Treaty of friendship proposal was revived as part of Zia's
diplomatic offensive in the early 1980's. In 1981, the Bajpai study group
rules out talung Pakistan's offer of a No war Pact, seriously. It has only a
symbolic value unless Pakistan had a democratic government and further
study group also argued that as matter of fact, Pakistan should abandon two
nation theory as a fust step toivards no war pact. The Bajpai study group
further expressed the view that India's initial reply to the Palustan's offer
was clumsy and short sighted. Pihstan was not keen to go for negotiation.37
" Th~s theory has no value after the emergence of Bangladesh. "Today's nation state is a pluralistic one, which can accommotiate my number of nationahties." For Inma, Palastan's interpretation on Kashrmr represents the negation of the Inman State's Secular foundation.
36 Bhutto said, in the Palustan National Assembly: "Pakistan should not fight in the Rann of Kutch, but fight, where the problem lies, ie, in the Jammu and Kasbmr.
37 Even Prime Minister LK Gujral sli~lped up when Prime Mmister Navaz Sharif, spea!ag before the U N General Assembly in 1997 offered a Non Aggression Treaty It had a propaganda value and the purpose Tvas to score points with international community.
208
The 1972 S~rnla agreement with111 a non-use of force and peaceful
settlement of disputes framework, in a sense, was a watershed confidence
and security building measure (CSBM) In fact, it placed the K a s h
dispute on a back-burner. Nearly two decades later, international instability
in Kashmir, has given Pakistan the opportunity to precipitate it as a core
issue again. Immediately after assuming power, Nawaz Sharif in March 1997
talked of dernilitarising Siachan Glacier. But, public opposition to the move
from the army Chef General J a h a n p Karamat forced him to back track on
it. A hardline policy towards india, centred on the Kashrnir dispute, is rooted
in the structure of power relations in ~akis tan .~ ' In 1997 a study sponsored
by the Pakistani government has clearly stated that the benefits of opening
up trade with India far oritweigh its negative consequences. Pakistani
response was that, political d~sputes must be settled first before entering into
any commercial or trade pact
Since the relationship:;, issues and developments has been portrayed
in the previous chapter and the first part of the present chapter between India
and Pakistan, this attempt here is, to have a profile of the rapport of Pakistan
with other SAARC countric:~, except India; Pakistan's relationship with
other five South Asian nations are not that much eventful, turbulent and the
bilateral compulsions and pr'3blems are insignificant. Their common hidden
agenda has been to gang up themselves in order to create a balance
against India in this region. W~th the outbreak of the Indo-Pak war in
38 A transfornabon of the power structure in Pak~stan holds the key to a rneanlngful secunty dralogue Trll then, the core Issue of Kashmr ~ssue blocks pragmahc moves to co-operate on the trade front between the two countries
September 1965, the official reaction of Nepal and Sri Lanka were that of
"calculated neutrality.39 Later in .4ugust 1965, according to the confirmed
reports in the Indian Press, then Foreign Minister of Nepal, Kirti Nidh B~sta,
before leav~ng for hls C h ~ l a vls~t "supported the princ~ple of self-
determination in ~ a s h m d ' . . . . . a pro-Pakistan stands. But, after a
perceptible change in Nepal's attitude one can notice a slight change with
cautious neutrality in the dailq- under a caption, "Kashmir Dilemma": wrote
that" Nepal could do nothing else than wishing that the crisis would come to
a speedy and through peaceful negotiation^.^'
Broadly speaking the Nepalese stand on the Indo-Pak War of 1965 in
general and its view on Kashn~ir in particular was largely determined by its
major concern for r e ~ o n a l balance of power in South Asia. Nepal was
apprehensive of the fact that the Sino-Pak collusion agalnst India during
1965 might change the balanc: of' power m the sub continent in favour of
Chma, whch in long run would be detrimental to the interests of the South
Asian states. This must have heen the reason of Nepal to threw its weight . slightly in favour of India with a pro-Indian stand on Kashmir issue.
Interestingly, this views had b~:en generated suspicion from the occasional
statements by the Nepalese 1:aders of a so-called "neutral posture" on
Kashmir. Incidentally, Bhutan 1:otally sided with India during Indo-Pak War
while on the other hand Sri Lanka and Male took a pronounced neutral stand
vis-a-vis the two belligerents.42
39 The Indian Express, Nov, 12 196: 40 The Indian Express, Aug 20. 196:s 41 See, The Commander Wathrnandu), 6 Sept 1965 42 Times of India, New Delhi, December 20, 1965
6.10 The Indo-Pak W a r of :December 1971
With exception of Bhutan, the rest of the South Asian States
maintained a calculated neutrality during the Indo-Pak War in 1971. In order
to justifL its neutral stand, it ernphasised that Nepal had "excellent relations
with both the belligerents" and apprehended a shortage of essential
commodities due to the dislocsition of Nepal's trade with India and through
Indian temtory. The Nepal-P;~kistan Friendship and Cultural Association
declared that the Bangladesh problem was an internal problem of Pakistan
and blamed India as the In the UN General Assembly Debate on
the Indo-Pak War on December 7, 1971, Nepal participated actively but
abstained from voting on the I!esolution asking for an immediate ceasefire
by fully realising its limitations as a small country surrounded by bigger and
powerful neighbours.44 In spite of this. the pro-China forces in Nepal
criticized the government of Nepal and consistently took a pro-Pakistan line.
The Maoist elements treated the liberation War in Bangladesh as "an
insurgency hatched by the re;ictionary forces". An observer cited in the
Mathrubhoomi, the weekly nevispaper patronised by them, which published
a series of articles, condemning India for trying to create a new country in its
sphere of influence.
It criticised that Indian was bent on destroying the temtorial integrity
of another country in violation of the principles of international law and
mortality, the weekly more o\.er, came out sharply with a comment that
43 "Bangladesh: Inspiration for Demccracy", No. 67, p. 12. 44 GAOR, Session 26, Provisional V~:rbat~m Records, 7 December 1971
morally and politically Indiz. had been defeated and Pakistan had won
international sympathy.45 During the War, the official propaganda from
Nepal has been neutral but on? cannot side line the major segment's opinion
in favour of Pakistan with sympathy and very much apprehensive of India's
dominating effort by strengthening its power base in this reg~on.~ ' Outwardly
the stand of Sri Lanka and Maldives except Bhutan was in favour of
neutrality but the anti-India sentiments has been conspicuous to a great
extent in these countries.
6.11 Farakka Issue
The emergence of Bangladesh and the personal rapport between
Indira Gandhi and Mujib-ur-Rahman to a certain extent helped the Farakka
issue not so vulnerable as u i the climate before 1971. But when Indo-
Bangladesh relations suffered a setback after the assassination of Mujib, the
new leadership in Dhaka lost no opportunity to denigrate India over the
Farakka issue in general international fissions and quite often with full
support from Palustan, Nepal, Srl Lanka and Maldives. However, Bhutan
maintained a neutral stand. For Instance. in May 1976, the late Zia-ur-
Rahman, at the Islamic Fcaeign Ministers Conference in Islamabad
succeeded in winning the unanimous support of all the forty-two Muslim
nations including Pakistan on this issue.47 This shows, Palustan's vested
interest in exploiting the difference between India, the core state of South
45 "Bangladesh: An Inspiration for Democracy", No. 67. p. 13. 46 Rising Nepal, Kathmandu, Feb 2, 1972. " A.W.Bhuiyan, "Farakka; A six-year Dead lock," Ill~rsrrafed Weekly of India, Bombay,
Vo1.7-13, June 1981, p.14.
Asia on one hand and those in the periphery states on the other. Former
President H.M.Ershad lost no lime to revive the Farakka issue after his take
over, with India apparently in bid to stall any possible Indo-Nepal accord.
Begum Khalide Zia is equally critical of India over the Farakka issue.
Palustan, could re~onalised the Farakka issue, manipulated the other
SAARC nations, garnered thcr support and projected against Indla, when
India as a matter of policy has prefemed to solve its problems of sharing and
harnessing the Ganga waters with Bangladesh and Nepal bilaterally.
6.12 Nepal's Transit Problem
After the 1960 Trade Treaty with India, one can notice an attempt by
Nepal for trade diversification in order to rninimise its independence on
~ndia .~ ' The other SAARC nations especially Pakistan, Sri Lanka and
Maldives and Bangladesh could combine very well and extended support to
Nepal and have been often ciitical of India's reluctance to provide transit
facility on liberal terms. To substantiate this point, Pakistan signed a Trade
Agreement with Nepal in October 1962, which the former assured the latter
about the port and transit facil ties for its trade with other overseas combines
through Pakistani t e r r i t o ~ y . ~ ~
The Late Z.A Bhutto, white making an observation in November
1964, was critical of India's so-called, "policy of economic blockade against
landlocked ~ e ~ a l . " ~ ' Pakistan was not getting any substantial gain from its
--
48 See, Pashupati Shumshere J.B.liana, "India and Nepal; The Political Economy of a Relationship", Asian Survey (Be~kley), July 1971, Vol.E, No.7, pp.645-60.
49 Text of Nepal-Palastan Trade A,greement and its Protocol, Ministry of External Affairs, Archives, HMG, Nepal, Kathmiuldu, Document No.42. The Patriot, New Delhi, 28 December 1964.
trade with Nepal but Nepal's anxiety to diversity its trade and economic
relations would obviously get Pakistan's deepest sympathy and active support.
6.13 Pakistan-Nepal Trade
The ruling elites in Islamabad have hardly shown any enthusiasm to
increase Pakistan's bilateral trade with Nepal substantively. However, Phstan's
diversionary tactics to blame India for blocking the diversification attempts
of Nepal has been a regular exc:rcise.
King Birendra's hlstoric visit to Pakistan in Sept. 1961 earmarked the
official level trade lies betwe4:n Nepal and Pakistan. After ths, President
Ayoobkhan's visit to Kathmandu paved the way for the necessary spade
work in this regard in a big way. A comprehensive Trade Agreement was
formally signed between these two countries in January 1963. The agreement
provided several avenues for .:he expansion of economic contacts between
the two nations. During 1972, Pakistan's total imports fkom the rest of
South Asia showed an increase valued at $25,300,00. But in 1974, the import
figure went up to $ Scrores, which indicate an increase of 90%. By 1976,
Palustan's imports regstered a sharp increase over 1976 totalling $ 13 crores."
This meant an increase of nearly one hundred and fifteen percent.
Thus, while one finds certain amount of fluctuations and uncertainty in
Palustan's imports from Nepal, its imports from the rest of South As~an
states show a consistent rise.
*' Source - Direction on Trade Tour Book. IMF, 1980, pp.297-9
6.14 Patterns of Bilateralism
The pattern of exchange of visits between Pakistan and Bangladesh
has been started after Palustan's recowtion of Bangladesh on 22 February
197 1. The initial bilateral antipathies were blocked the exchanges of visit for
three years since the emergence of Bangladesh. Mutual visits by ZA Bhuto
and Mujib-ur-Rahrnan, resulted in a partial solution of some of the
outstanding disputes.
Palustan, Sri Lanka and Nepal in their bilateral exchanges have been
critical of India's policy toward; smaller South Asian neighbours. There is a
frequent emphasis on India's alleged interference in the internal affairs of
Nepal and New Delhi's intervention during the civil war in Pakistan.
In the case of Pak-Bangla meetings, India figured quite prominently
but in a different perspective. For instance, during the early phase when the
late Bhutto visited Dhaka, he had never concealed his displeasure of India's
role in South Asia. The post Mujib phase, marked the anti-Indian postures of
Dhaka and Islamabad were much more overt. Between Palustan and Nepal, it
has been a fnendly bilateralism all through. It is clear that, India remained
the major dominating factor between the two sides. The installation of new
regime in Bangladesh with pronounced anti-Indian feelings, the interactions
between the two South Asian na:ions has been improved dramatically.
The bilateral relationship in the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh was
rather tense in the initial phase During this period, thelr national leaders
were negotiating under pressure: and had to assure at some viable solutions
of than outstanding problems like repatriation of persons on both sldes,
division of assets etc. In fact, their political interaction during t h s phase was
moving in a negative direction. But with the change of regime in Dhaka in
August 1975 the tense b~lateralis~n was changed to positive bilateralism.j2
Indla's relations with most of the South Asian neighbours with the exception
of Bhutan and Maldives, has remained topsy-turvy
Pakistan has been activc:ly engagmg herself in the region to project an
image against India by keeping cordial relations with other SAARC
countries. This tendency has Jeen very conspicuous in almost all issues in
South Asia. When India cond~~cted its peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokhran
in May 1974, there was a negative reaction in all other South Asian
countries. The Palustani gove:rnment officials in particular ventilated their
feelings of agony and suspicicn more prominently. In fact, that was the tlme
in the UN General Assembl~f, the zone of peace proposal for the Indian
Ocean area was actively pur:;ued. Pakistan with the support of Sri Lanka
manoeuvred to sidetrack the major issue by introducing the concept of
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia (NWFZSA). According to the
representatives of these countries, instead of declaring Indian Ocean as a
zone of peace, the foremost step in that direction would be to declare South
Asia as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone ' m i l e the discussions on the
Pakistan's draft for the concept of N WFZ in the UN General Assembly Pakistan
could very well gamer the support of Sri Lanka and Nepal against India.
- 52 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Oct.26. 1976. 53 Zafar Iqbal, " South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone." Strategic Analysls (Inshtute
of Strategic Studies, Islamabad) Vo1.4. No.2, Winter 1981. pp 33-34.
In 1976, the Political Secur ty Committee of the General Assembly.
reaffirmed Palustan's resolutiorl of N\YFZ and called upon the South Asian
states to begm consultations among themselves to establish such a
denuclearised zone. At the tirne of voting on the Palustan draft, Nepal,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka voted for it where as India and Bhutan voted
against it. It is to be noted here, that the tendency of combining well against
India by other SAARC countries in all forums and its manipulations are very
well organised and guided by Palustan, has become one of the major factors,
which are hampering the smooth and tension free political climate in South
Asia for better co-operation and integration.
In the content of NPT as well, by projecting the "fear-psychosis", it
has also kept in mind that Paki:;tan could establish constant connections and
good rapport to the other countries in the South Asia against India, even
though Islamabad have not signed the NPT like India. While raising common
concern for regional peace ant1 security in the light of the acquired power
status by India, they appreciated each other's perceptions vis-a-vis India.
Once Nepal mooted the peace zone proposal mainly on the plank of
countering the Indian influence in South Asia, Pakistan lost no time in
extending its whole-hearted suppolt. The late Z.A Bhutto, as the then PM of
Palustan in his interview to a Katmandu daily (Herald) declared." I g v e great
emphasis on our fiendshlp with Nepal because small countries having the
same problems and the samc: ne~ghbours must appreciate each other's
difficulties in order to maintain its ~nde~endence. '~ As reviewed in Palustani
54 7be Sfafesrnan, New Delhi, March 1975
217
press, "both Nepal and Pakistani found themselves placed in a similar
position in South Asia" and had "identical views on regional matters." Thus,
Nepal's peace zone proposals has found wholehearted support fiom
Pakistan, just as Nepal has sh~3wn sympathy with the Palustani idea of a
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South ~ s i a . ' '
Bangladesh was not enthusiastic about these developments, but it was
after Mujib Rahman's exit, the new rulers in Dhaka displayed the changed
outlook by supporting the Palsistani line on the Nepal's initiatives. As
regards the responses of Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives and
Bangladesh to the peace zone proposal, it seems that a major deciding factor
to determine the reaction of Islamabad and Dhaka to such a proposal, has
been India, which has not supported it so far. In fact, the zone of peace
proposal has been initiated by the peripheral state of South Asia mainly out
of a fear psychosis in the mincls of its governing elites that India with its
power potential, technical skill and enhanced international prestige, is likely
to dominate.
It is to be noted here that along side their own threat perception, those
states, in place of supporting the stand takes by the core (India), on some
of the issues, and peace propos;lls for the regon, have joined hands to take
a divergent stand. This might be viewed as an effort, weak though it may
appear, on the part of the peripheral states of South Asia to create an
- b;. "#'Q*;. ,
.-.- .. .+ * > 5 5 The Dawn, Pakistan, 15 Januay 19'77.
, ,. ~/' ' ;'
.:. . .
-'
218
intra-regional balance of power situation in the region by taking a united
stand on issues pertaining to regional security.
Such manipulative strate1,ries pursued by Pakistan with the support of
the other small members of South Asia have at times united themselves vis-
a-vis the core state (India) but in the long run, it has hampered the process of
political integration in South A:;ia and naturally SAARC has been the victim
of a strained bilateralism in South Asla.
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