CICLO DE SEMINÁRIOS EM ESTUDOS DE DESENVOLVIMENTOº.pdf · Ver, Williamson, J. (1990). Chapter 2 from Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Edited by John Williamson

CICLO DE SEMINÁRIOS EM ESTUDOS DE DESENVOLVIMENTO

A EUROPA E A GLOBALIZAÇÃO

António MendonçaProfessor Catedrático

Referências: Mendonça, A. (2018). “Portugal and the euro”. Working Paper CesA/CSG, nº 166/2018: https://doi.org/10400.5/14890Mendonça, A. (2017) – “The unconventional monetary policy of the ECB and the international economic and financial crisis: effectiveness versus exhaustion”, in The Euro and the Crisis: Future Perspectives for the Euro zone as a Monetary and Budgetary Union/Costa Cabral, N., Gonçalves, J. R. and Rodrigues, N. C. (Editors), Springer International Publishing Switzerland. pp. 223-247.Mendonça, A. and Tuckwell, C. (2016) – “The Global Crisis and Unconventional Monetary Policy. ECB versus Fed”. Working Paper CEsA/CSG 141/2016, Lisbon: CEsA/CSG – ISEG-Ulisboa: https://doi.org/10400.5/11718Mendonça, A. (2014). “The European Crisis and Global Economy Dynamics: Continental Enlargement versus Atlantic Opening”, Panoeconomicus, 2014, 5, Special Issue, pp.543-569.Mendonça, A. (2005). “Globalização económica, economia global e o papel da CPLP”(não publicado): https://drive.google.com/open?id=1sq2OW9q3CKqk7Ia2NcWNUC2DRs6xhaYs

https://doi.org/10400.5/14890

https://doi.org/10400.5/11718

https://drive.google.com/open?id=1sq2OW9q3CKqk7Ia2NcWNUC2DRs6xhaYs

Fonte: IMF, WEO, April, 2018. Foreward, Maurice Obstfeld

Fonte: IMF, WEO, Oct. 2017

Fonte: IMF, WEO, April. 2018





Fonte: IMF, WEO, Oct. 2017, Foreward, Maurice Obstfeld

GLOBALIZAÇÃO E ECONOMIA GLOBAL

CONQUISTA DE CEUTA PELOS PORTUGUESES: 22/08/1415

BANDEIRA DE CEUTA

DE CEUTA À GLOBALIZAÇÃO

5/10/2018 13

5/10/2018 14

DA MOEDA À ECONOMIA GLOBAL

FASES DA GLOBALIZAÇÃO:

• Proto-globalização (até 1500);

• Globalização primitiva (1500 – 1870);

• Globalização clássica (1870 – 1914);

• Globalização regressiva (1914 – 1945);

• Globalização rival (1945 – 1971);

• Globalização liberal (1971 – 1989);

• Globalização uniforme (1989 – CRISE 2008/2009)

5/10/2018 15

ONDE ESTAMOS?

• GLOBALIZAÇÃO PRIMITIVA (1500 – 1870):

• integração geográfica do globo;

• hegemonia europeia ocidental e atlântica;

• papel de Portugal;

• afirmação do Reino Unido;

• papel das tecnologias de navegação;

• organização económica superior,

• política comercial agressiva;

5/10/2018 16

GLOBALIZAÇÃO CLÁSSICA (1870 – 1914):

• adopção do livre-cambismo;• progressos nos transportes e comunicações;• papel do telégrafo (1850);• integração com a América e Índia (1870);• criação do padrão-ouro;• desenvolvimento do comércio;• fluxos internacionais de capitais;

ECONOMIA GLOBAL5/10/2018 17

A globalização clássica vista por Keynes:

(As consequências económicas da paz, 1919)

“Que extraordinário episódio na marcha económica da humanidade foi essa eraque veio a terminar em Agosto de 1914!”...

“O habitante de Londres, podia encomendar por telefone, enquanto sorvia o chámatinal na cama, os vários produtos da terra inteira na quantidade que lheaprouvesse, e esperar razoavelmente que lhos trouxessem com celeridade aodomicilio; ao mesmo tempo, e pelos mesmos meios, podia arriscar a sua riquezanos recursos naturais e nas novas empresas dos quatro cantos do mundo e, semesforço nem sequer incómodo, comungar dos seus frutos e vantagens potenciais;ou poderia casar a segurança dos seus haveres com a boa fé dos cidadãos dequalquer importante municipalidade de qualquer continente que a fantasia ou oconhecimento lhe recomendassem. Se o desejasse, podia reservar imediatamentemeios de transporte baratos e confortáveis para qualquer país ou clima sempassaporte ou outras formalidades, enviar um criado à agência bancária da esquinapor uma provisão de metais preciosos que achasse oportuna e partir para longesparagens sem lhes conhecer a religião, a língua ou os costumes e sentindo-segravemente ofendido e surpreso ao mínimo empecilho.

5/10/2018 18

Mas, e sobretudo, encarava este estado de coisas como normal, certo epermanente, salvo eventual melhoramento, e qualquer desvio dele comoaberrante, escandaloso e evitável. Os projetos e políticas do militarismo e doimperialismo, das rivalidades raciais e culturais, dos monopólios, restrições eexclusões, fadados para desempenhar o papel da serpente neste paraíso,puoco mais eram do que divertimentos do jornal que lia diariamente, epareciam não exercer quase nenhuma influência no curso normal da vidaeconómica e social, cuja internacionalização estava quase consumada naprática.”

Keynes, J.M. (2009). A grande crise e outros textos, Lisboa: Relógio D’ÁguaEditores, pp. 36-37.

Ver, também:

• Temin, P. e Vines, D. (2015). Keynes, uma teoria útil à economia mundial, Lisboa: Dom Quixote.

• Davidson, P. (2010). John Maynard Keynes, Lisboa: Actual Editora.

5/10/2018 19

GLOBALIZAÇÃO REGRESSIVA (1914 – 1945):

• fim do padrão-ouro;

• mudança nas condições económicas;

• ausência de hegemonia clara;

• crise da moeda internacional;

• crise de 1929;

• mudança de paradigma económico;

• protecionismo;

• 2ª guerra mundial.

5/10/2018 20

GLOBALIZAÇÃO RIVAL (1945 – 1971):

• dupla lógica de integração económica global;• sistema de Bretton Woods:

- potência hegemónica;- moeda internacional;- instituições internacionais;

• integração regional;• integração versus desintegração económica global;• globalização controlada e condicionamento

recíproco;• recuperação das dinâmicas da economia global;• esgotamento do modelo e crise internacional;

5/10/2018 21

GLOBALIZAÇÃO LIBERAL (1971 – 1989):

• fim do sistema monetário de Bretton Woods;

• crise económica internacional de 1973 – 1975;

• nova mudança de paradigma económico:

demand pull versus supply push;

• crise das economias socialistas;

• desenvolvimento da integração europeia.

5/10/2018 22

GLOBALIZAÇÃO LIBERAL E “CONSENSO DE WASHINGTON”

5/10/2018 24

NOVO PARADIGMA ECONÓMICO: O CHAMADO “CONSENSO DE WASHINGTON”

SIGNIFICA, CONSENSO EM TORNO DE 10 INSTRUMENTOS DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA:

Ver, Williamson, J. (1990). Chapter 2 from Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Edited by JohnWilliamson. Published April 1990. Peterson Institute for International Economic

① DÉFICES FISCAIS② PRIORIDADES DA DESPESA PÚBLICA③ REFORMA FISCAL④ TAXAS DE JURO⑤ TAXA DE CÂMBIO⑥ POLÍTICA COMERCIAL⑦ INVESTIMENTO DIRETO ESTRANGEIRO⑧ PRIVATIZAÇÕES⑨ DESREGULAÇÃO⑩ DIREITOS DE PROPRIEDADE

5/10/2018 25

O CHAMADO “CONSENSO DE WASHINGTON”SIGNIFICA, CONSENSO EM TORNO DE 10 INSTRUMENTOS DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA:

Ver, Williamson, J. (1990). Chapter 2 from Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?Edited by John Williamson. Published April 1990. Peterson Institute for International Economics

1. DÉFICES FISCAIS

“Despite the significant differences in the interpretation of fiscal discipline,I would maintain that there is very broad agreement in Washington thatlarge and sustained fiscal deficits are a primary source of macroeconomicdislocation in the forms of inflation, payments deficits, and capital flight.They result not from any rational calculation of expected economicbenefits, but from a lack of the political courage or honesty to matchpublic expenditures and the resources available to finance them. Unlessthe excess is being used to finance productive infrastructure investment,an operational budget deficit in excess of around 1 to 2 percent of GNP1 isprima facie evidence of policy failure. Moreover, a smaller deficit, or evena surplus, is not necessarily evidence of fiscal discipline: its adequacyneeds to be examined in the light of the strength of demand and theavailability of private savings.”

….

2. PRIORIDADES PARA A DESPESA PÚBLICA

“Policy reform with regard to public expenditure is thus perceived toconsist of switching expenditure from subsidies toward education andhealth (especially to benefit the disadvantaged) and infrastructureinvestment. I would add that, for my taste, the hostility toward subsidiestends to be too general. I fully sympathize with the hostility towardindiscriminate subsidies, but I also believe that there are circumstances inwhich carefully targeted subsidies can be a useful instrument. Thus, myown test of a country's policies would not be whether it had abolished allsubsidies, but whether it could provide a convincing explicit justificationfor those that remain in terms of improving either resource allocation orincome distribution.”

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3. REFORMA FISCAL

“Despite this contrast in attitudes toward the merits of increasing taxrevenue, there is a very wide consensus about the most desirable methodof raising whatever level of tax revenue is judged to be needed. Theprinciple is that the tax base should be broad and marginal tax ratesshould be moderate.

…

A particular issue that arises in the Latin American context is whether anattempt should be made to include within the tax base interest income onassets held abroad ("flight capital").

…

Achieving effective taxation of the income from flight capital is bound totake a long time, but it would be interesting to know whether anycountries have embarked on the effort.”

5/10/2018 27

4. TAXAS DE JURO

“Two general principles about the level of interest rates would seem tocommand considerable support in Washington. One is that interest ratesshould be market-determined. The objective of this is to avoid theresource misallocation that results from bureaucrats rationing creditaccording to arbitrary criteria (Polak 1989). The other principle is that realinterest rates should be positive, so as to discourage capital flight and,according to some, increase savings. Many, including myself, wouldqualify this statement to say that interest rates should be positive butmoderate, so as to promote productive investment and avoid the threatof an explosion in government debt.”

5/10/2018 28

5. TAXA DE CÂMBIO

“Like interest rates, exchange rates may be determined by market forces,or their appropriateness may be judged on the basis of whether their levelseems consistent with macroeconomic objectives. Although there is somesupport in Washington for regarding the former principle as the moreimportant (a view held in particular by those who deny the possibility ofestimating equilibrium exchange rates), the dominant view is thatachieving a "competitive" exchange rate is more important than how therate is determined.

…

A competitive real exchange rate is the first essential element of an"outward-oriented" economic policy, where the balance of paymentsconstraint is overcome primarily by export growth rather than by importsubstitution. There is a very strongly held conviction in Washington thatoutward orientation and expanding exports—essentially growth innontraditional exports—-are necessary for Latin American recovery (see,for example, Balassa et al. 1986).”

5/10/2018 29

6. POLÍTICA COMERCIAL

“The second element of an outward-oriented economic policy is importliberalization. Access to imports of intermediate inputs at competitiveprices is regarded as important to export promotion, while a policy ofprotecting domestic industries against foreign competition is viewed ascreating costly distortions that end up penalizing exports andimpoverishing the domestic economy. The ideal is a situation in which thedomestic resource cost of generating or saving a unit of foreign exchangeis equalized between and among export and import-competingindustries.”

7. INVESTIMENTO DIRETO ESTRANGEIRO

“As noted above, liberalization of foreign financial flows is not regardedas a high priority. In contrast, a restrictive attitude limiting the entry offoreign direct investment (FDI) is regarded as foolish. Such investment canbring needed capital, skills, and know-how, either producing goodsneeded for the domestic market or contributing new exports. The mainmotivation for restricting FDI is economic nationalism, which Washingtondisapproves of, at least when practiced by countries other than the UnitedStates.”

5/10/2018 30

5/10/2018 31

8. PRIVATIZAÇÕES“Debt-equity swaps involve no monetary pressure when the equity purchased bythe foreign investor is bought from the government, in the course of an enterprisebeing privatized. This is one attraction seen in privatization. More generally,privatization may help relieve the pressure on the government budget, both in theshort run by the revenue produced by the sale of the enterprise and in the longerrun inasmuch as investment need no longer be financed by the government.However, the main rationale for privatization is the belief that private industry ismanaged more efficiently than state enterprises, because of the more directincentives faced by a manager who either has a direct personal stake in theprofits of an enterprise or else is accountable to those who do.”…My own view is that privatization can be very constructive where it results inincreased competition, and useful where it eases fiscal pressures, but I am notpersuaded that public service is always inferior to private acquisitiveness as amotivating force. Under certain circumstances, such as where marginal costs areless than average costs (for example, in public transport) or in the presence ofenvironmental spillovers too complex to be easily compensated by regulation (forexample, in the case of water supply), I continue to believe public ownership to bepreferable to private enterprise. But this view is not typical of Washington. “

9. DESREGULAÇÃO

“Another way of promoting competition is by deregulation. This wasinitiated within the United States by the Carter administration and carriedforward by the Reagan administration. It is generally judged to have beensuccessful within the United States, and it is generally assumed that itcould bring similar benefits to other countries.”

10. DIREITOS DE PROPRIEDADE

“In the United States property rights are so well entrenched that theirfundamental importance for the satisfactory operation of the capitalistsystem is easily overlooked. I suspect, however, that when Washingtonbrings itself to think about the subject, there is general acceptance thatproperty rights do indeed matter. There is also a general perception thatproperty rights are highly insecure in Latin America (see, for example,Balassa et al. 1986, chapter 4).”

5/10/2018 32

Washington's Practice:“Washington does not always practice what it preaches, as a moment's reflectionon the most embarrassing subject mentioned above—corruption—will surelyreveal. This paper was, after all, written during the weeks when a massive scandalat the US Department of Housing and Urban Development came to light—a caseinvolving fraud and irresponsibility on a scale large enough to erode the credibilityof Washington's preaching.”

One final reflection:

“A striking fact about the list of policies on which Washington does havea collective view is that they all stem from classical mainstream economictheory, at least if one is allowed to count Keynes as a classic by now. Noneof the ideas spawned by the development literature—such as the bigpush, balanced or unbalanced growth, surplus labor, or even the two-gapmodel—plays any essential role in motivating the Washington consensus(although I would fortify my preference for varying the pace of importliberalization depending on the availability of foreign exchange by appealto the two-gap model). This raises the question as to whether Washingtonis correct in its implicit dismissal of the development literature as adiversion from the harsh realities of the dismal science. Or is theWashington consensus, or my interpretation of it, missing something?”

5/10/2018 33

GLOBALIZAÇÃO UNIFORME (1989 – 2007 ?):

• fim das duas lógicas rivais de globalização;

• evolução da integração europeia – prioridade ao

alargamento;

• emergência da China e sua integração na

economia global;

• o sistema de Bretton Woods II

5/10/2018 34

Peg ao dólar

Défices americanos

Crescimento da China e das

economias asiáticas

Acumulaçãode reservasem dólares

Financiamentodos déficesamericanos

Crescimento da procurainterna dos EUA

Crescimento da economiaamericana

Sistema de Bretton Woods II

5/10/2018 35

Thoughts(from(the(Frontline!is!a!free!weekly!economics!e0letter!by!best0selling!author!and!renowned!financial!expert!John!Mauldin.!You!can!learn!more!and!get!your!free!subscription!by!visiting!www.mauldineconomics.com! !

!Page!2!

!

The US Trade Deficit Turns Positive

The US trade deficit (a key component of the current account deficit – see chart on next

page) fell to an unprecedented percentage of GDP during the last decade, a development that

normally heralds a significant drop in a currency. Fortunately, the "exorbitant privilege" of

controlling the world's dominant currency in reserve holdings, international trade, and financial

transactions has helped shield the US dollar from a hard correction; but that status quo is in danger.

After flooding the world with US dollars for more than twenty years, the US has reduced its

current account deficit by 58% since the 2007-2008 financial crisis began. Looking ahead, I and

many other observers believe this measure can continue to improve, due two surprisingly positive

factors:

1. The US energy boom in shale oil and gas. The US has caught an incredibly well-timed

"lucky break" made possible by the combination of new exploration, production, and

processing technologies (such as horizontal drilling and fracking) and by the

serendipitous discovery of massive supplies of oil and gas, often in areas that already

have significant infrastructure and/or are accessible at reasonable costs. This energy

renaissance is part of the reality that has made Houston, Texas, the number one port in

the United States, with even more growth coming in the near future when the Panama

Canal expansion is completed in 2014. US manufacturers are turning less-expensive oil

and gas into value-added fossil fuel products and exporting them to the world. This

trend will become ever more important. Indeed, when the first LNG export terminal is

opened in a few years, the additional exports will approach $80 billion a year, I am told.

From one terminal! There are four in the process of being approved and more on the

planning boards. The math is there for anyone to do. Spot prices in the US natural gas-

producing areas are under $4. The Japanese are paying more than $14. Even I can do

that arbitrage. Just for fun, the next graph, from the Energy Information Administration,

shows the rise in spot gas prices over the last six months, from a level that had been far

too low. It also shows the arbitrage potential that exists right here in the US.

5/10/2018 36

BALANÇAS CORRENTESEUA E CHINA

Fonte: IMF, WEO Database, April 2015

Unidade: Mil milhões de US $

Estimativas5/10/2018 37

-1000

-800

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

600

19

80

19

81

19

82

19

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20

China United States

BALANÇAS CORRENTESEUA E CHINA

Unidade: % PIB

Fonte: IMF, WEO Database, April 2015 5/10/2018 38

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

19

80

19

81

19

82

19

83

19

84

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20

China United StatesEstimativas

5/10/2018 39

Os EUA foram os grandes criadores de liquidez internacional

Unidade: US$ Milhões

5/10/2018 40

Fonte: IMF, WEO Database, April 2013 (USA: 1980-2000); April2015

SALDOS ORÇAMENTAISEUA E CHINA

5/10/2018 41

-16

-14

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

19

80

19

81

19

82

19

83

19

84

19

85

19

86

19

87

19

88

19

89

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20

China United States

5/10/2018 42

5/10/2018 43

Unidade: % do PIB

DÍVIDAS PÚBLICAS BRUTASEUA E CHINA

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

19

80

19

81

19

82

19

83

19

84

19

85

19

86

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87

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90

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19

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99

20

00

20

01

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02

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03

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20

16

20

17

20

18

20

19

China USA

Fonte: IMF, WEO Database, April 2013 (USA: 1980-2000); April20145/10/2018 44

Thoughts(from(the(Frontline!is!a!free!weekly!economics!e0letter!by!best0selling!author!and!renowned!financial!

expert!John!Mauldin.!You!can!learn!more!and!get!your!free!subscription!by!visiting!www.mauldineconomics.com! !!

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!!

What may speed the process up is increasing cooperation between Chinese officials and the UK

government to support RMB internationalization through London's FX markets. Gregory Clark,

Financial Secretary to the UK Treasury, was in Hong Kong this past week and wrote an op-ed in

the South China Morning Post. Let's look at a few telling sentences:

Over 50 percent of UK investment in Asia is in or flows through Hong Kong. That is a

tremendous vote of confidence in Hong Kong by UK companies….

Bilaterial trade in goods between Hong Kong and the UK rose by 13.5% between 2009 and

2012, to a total value of £12.1 billion in 2012. This makes Hong Kong the UK's second biggest export market for goods in Asia Pacific….

According to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications

(SWIFT), London now accounts for 28 per cent of offshore RMB settled transactions.

In London, the volume of Renminbi-denominated import and export financing has increased 100 per cent since 2011. This is delivering real benefits and savings for business.

It is estimated that firms can reduce their transaction costs with China by up to 7 per cent by denominating their trade in Renminbi.

The Renminbi’s rise is being enabled not just in Hong Kong and London. Chinese banks

have established clearing banks and accounts in more than 80 other countries in the last four years.

But the story runs even deeper. It appears to me that China is getting ready to create another Hong

Kong in the traditional financial center of China, Shanghai. My good friend and decades-long

China expert Simon Hunt notes:

The proposed development of the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in Shanghai, covering 28sq km,

Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank Share Rank

US#Dollar#(USD) 86.8% 1 89.9% 1 88.0% 1 85.6% 1 84.9% 1 87.0% 1

Euro#(EUR) + 32 37.9% 2 37.4% 2 37.0% 2 39.1% 2 33.4% 2

Japanese#Yen#(JPY) 21.7% 2 23.5% 3 20.8% 3 17.2% 3 19.0% 3 23.0% 3

UK#Pound#(GBP) 11.0% 3 13.0% 4 16.5% 4 14.9% 4 12.9% 4 11.8% 4

Austrailian#Dollar#(AUD) 3.0% 6 4.3% 7 6.0% 6 6.6% 6 7.6% 5 8.6% 5

Swiss#Franc#(CHF) 7.1% 4 6.0% 5 6.0% 5 6.8% 5 6.3% 6 5.2% 6

Canadian#Dollar#(CAD) 3.5% 5 4.5% 6 4.2% 7 4.3% 7 5.3% 7 4.6% 7

Mexican#Peso#(MXN) 0.5% 9 0.8% 14 1.1% 12 1.3% 12 1.3% 14 2.5% 8

Chinese#Yuan#(CNY) 0.0% 30 0.0% 35 0.1% 29 0.5% 20 0.9% 17 2.2% 9

New#Zealand#Dollar 0.2% 17 0.6% 16 1.1% 13 1.9% 11 1.6% 10 2.0% 10

*/Because/two/currencies/are/involved/in/each/transaction,/the/sum/of/the/percentage/shares/of/individual/currencies/totals/

200%/instead/of/100%./In/the/interst/of/space,/we/only/show/the/top/10//out/of/more/than/35/currencies.

China#is#Quickly#Internationalizing#Its#Currency*(Top-10-Currencies,-Percent-Shares-of-Average-Daily-Currency-Trading)

Source:-Mauldin-Economics;-Bank-for-International-Settlements,-September-

2013-Triennial-Central-Bank-Survey

1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013

5/10/2018 45

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!Page!7!

!

Australia. Nobody talks about what you don't see. And what you don't see is that China is slowly but surely internationalizing its currency. It's slowly freeing capital controls. It's

creating deep and liquid capital markets, and this is going to change the way that

companies and individuals finance themselves among emerging markets. It's going to make

for more stable emerging markets and hopefully for higher growth.

Just as Louis predicted years ago, the Chinese RMB has continued to quickly climb the

ranks from an internationally non-existent currency to number nine on the list!

This process is happening at lightning speed by historical standards, but we can still expect

it to progress over the next 5-10 years. The renminbi is still only involved in 2.2% of foreign

currency transactions, but this number can take a big jump when the RMB floats freely, though

there is a big difference between the RMB and the true reserve currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, GBP)

today. (Note that the renminbi is also called the yuan, abbreviated as CNY in the chart below.) As

Louis mentioned, China stands alone among the emerging markets as having the only mature and

credible financial center with deep and liquid capital markets, in Hong Kong. The building of a

true global financial center typically takes about 50 years, so China is taking advantage of its lucky

break to fast-track its currency to reserve status.

5/10/2018 46

5/10/2018 47

IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015

PIB (PPP): REPARTIÇÃO DA ECONOMIA MUNDIAL

5/10/2018 48

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

19

80

19

81

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CRISE CRISECRISE


PARTICIPAÇÃO NO PIB MUNDIAL(PPP)

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Unidade: %

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Advanced economies Euro area European Union Emerging market and developing economies United States China World

9/ 21/ 13 2:24 AMThe Lehman anniversary: Five years in charts | The Economist

Page 1 of 1http:/ / www.economist.com/ news/ finance- and- economics/ 21586333- f ive- years- charts/ print

The Lehman anniversary

Five years in charts

Sep 14th 2013 | From the print edition

The world of banking has changed dramatically, if not radically, in the five years since September

15th 2008, the day Lehman Brothers went bust. American and European banks used to dominate

the list of the world’s biggest banks (see chart 1); the Chinese have since scaled the charts. The

balance-sheets of Europe’s behemoths have got quite a bit smaller (chart 2); consolidation has

made America’s giants bigger than ever. Western banks are generating much lower returns on

equity than they did in the years before the crisis (chart 3), in part because the industry is being

forced to fund itself with higher levels of equity than in the past (chart 4). So cost-cutting is much

more important than it was: compensation ratios at investment banks have fallen (chart 5). But

those who want a complete reshaping of finance can still argue that change has not gone far

enough: more people work in finance in London in 2013 than did in December 2007 (chart 6).

From the print edition: Finance and economics

5/10/2018 51

5/10/2018 52

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European Union15 Euro area 12 Spain Portugal USA Japan

Fonte: AMECO

PIB (Volume): Taxas médias de variação anual

Períodos: 1961-1974; 1975-1985; 1986-1998; 1999-2017(2016 e 2017: Projeções)

PORTUGAL NA ECONOMIA GLOBAL: ALGUNS DADOS

Fonte: AMECO, nov. 20175/10/2018

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European Union (15 countries) Euro area (12 countries) Spain Portugal Linear (Euro area (12 countries)) Linear (Spain) Linear (Portugal)

Euro

Chart 1: Real GDP: 1961 – 2019, % annual changes

(2018 and 2019: Forecasts)

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Chart 2: Real GDP: Annual average rates, Periods: 1960 - 1974; 1975 – 1985; 1986 – 1998; 1999 – 2014; 2015, 2017, 2018 and

2019, 2018 and 2019: Forecasts

Fonte: AMECO, nov. 2017

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Chart 3: Real GDP: 1960 – 2019, Annual Index - 1999 = 100, (2018 and 2019: Forecasts)


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Chart 4: Unemployment rates: 1960 – 2019

(2018 and 2019: Forecasts)


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Chart 6: Gross fixed capital formation (Volume): 1960 – 2019, Annual Index - 1999 = 100 (2018 and 2019: Forecasts)


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Chart 7: Gross fixed capital formation /GDP (%): total economy (2010 prices), 1960 – 2019 (2018 and 2019: Forecasts)


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Chart 8: Gross fixed capital formation/GDP (%): general government (current prices), 1960 – 2019 (2018 and 2019: Forecasts)


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Chart 13:Balance on current transactions with the rest of the world (National accounts) (Percentage of gross domestic product at current prices)



ALEMANHA: BALANÇA CORRENTE(% DO PIB)

5/10/2018 67

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ALEMANHA: BALANÇA CORRENTE (MIL MILHÕES US$)

IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014 5/10/2018 68

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ONDE ESTAMOS?

5/10/2018 72

Fonte: Rodrik, D. (2006).” Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of theWorld Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform”. Journal of Economic LiteratureVol. XLIV (December 2006), pp. 973–987 .

5/10/2018 73

Novas preocupações:

Papel das Instituições

Ajuda Externa (United Nations Millenium Project 2005)

Instrumentos:

• aumento do investimento público;• construção de capacidades;• mobilização de recursos internos.;• Ajuda Pública ao desenvolvimento;• Reforço da governance;• Direitos humanos;• Reforço do papel da sociedade civil;• Promoção do sector privado;

5/10/2018 74

METODODOLOGIA DE APLICAÇÃO (AGENDA PARA A FORMULAÇÃO DE ESTRATÉGIAS DE CRESCIMENTO):

PASSO 1: DIAGNÓSTICO DOS CONSTRANGIMENTOS AO CRESCIMENTO –IDENTIFICAÇÃO DOS PROBLEMAS

PASSO 2: DESENHO DAS POLÍTICAS ADEQUADAS, ORIENTADAS PARA OS ALVOS ESPECÍFICOS

PASSO 3: INSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DAS REFORMAS

QUESTÃO CENTRAL: ECONOMIA OU IDEOLOGIA?

5/10/2018 75

A CIMEIRA DO G20 DE LONDRES (2 DE ABRIL SE 2009)

3. We start from the belief that prosperity is indivisible; that growth, to be sustained,has to be shared; and that our global plan for recovery must have at its heart the needsand jobs of hardworking families, not just in developed countries but in emergingmarkets and the poorest countries of the world too; and must reflect the interests, notjust of today’s population, but of future generations too. We believe that the only surefoundation for sustainable globalisation and rising prosperity for all is an open worldeconomy based on market principles, effective regulation, and strong global institutions.(The official comunique)

Grandes objetivos:

4. We have today therefore pledged to do whatever is necessary to:• restore confidence, growth, and jobs;• repair the financial system to restore lending;• strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust;• fund and reform our international financial institutions to overcome

this crisis and prevent future ones;• promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism, to

underpin prosperity; and• build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery.

(idem)

5/10/2018 76

GORDON BROWN:

"Global problems will need better global solutions. In the wake of the second worldwar, we managed to create an IMF [International Monetary Fund], a World Bank, aWTO [World Trade Organisation], a Marshall Plan. We had the capacity with vision anddetermination to create institutions based on the principle that for prosperity to besustained it had to be shared and we had to have mechanisms by which we brought thewhole world into this enterprise.

"I think we need the same vision now to say the IMF was built for the days when youwere dealing with balance of payments problems of individual countries in essentially anational set of economies. Now we've got a global market place, global competition,global flows of capital, global sourcing of goods.

"The institutions you need to deal with these problems are going to be quite differentfor this new era, so we must shape them.”

Brown also claimed that two achievements had already been chalked up. In the firstplace the "Washington consensus" - the view that the financial world should beregulated lightly and at a mainly national level - has gone. In the second place, the veryfact that the summit is taking place is already producing concrete results as tax havenscough up. (The Guardian, 28.09.2008)

5/10/2018 77

CIMEIRA G20 SEOUL 2010: UM NOVO CONSENSO BASEADO EM 6 PRINCIPIOS “CORE” E 9 PILARES CHAVE:

“CORE PRINCIPLES”:

Focus on Economic Growth Global Development Partnership Global or Regional Systemic Issues Private Sector Participation Complementary Outcome Orientation

“KEY PILLARS”:

1) Infrastructure, 2) Privat investment and job creation, 3) Human resource development, 4) Trade, 5) Financial Inclusion, 6) Resilient growth, 7) Food Security, 8) Domestic resource mobilization, 9) Knowledge share.

G 20: The Hangzhou Consensus4-5, September 2016

Vision. We will strengthen the G20 growth agenda to catalyze new drivers of growth, open upnew horizons for development, lead the way in transforming our economies in a more innovativeand sustainable manner and better reflect shared interests of both present and cominggenerations.Integration. We will pursue innovative growth concepts and policies by forging synergy amongfiscal, monetary and structural policies, enhancing coherence between economic, labor,employment and social policies as well as combining demand management with supply sidereforms, short-term with mid- to long-term policies, economic growth with social developmentand environmental protection.Openness. We will work harder to build an open world economy, reject protectionism, promoteglobal trade and investment, including through further strengthening the multilateral tradingsystem, and ensure broad-based opportunities through and public support for expanded growthin a globalized economy.Inclusiveness. We will work to ensure that our economic growth serves the needs of everyoneand benefits all countries and all people including in particular women, youth and disadvantagedgroups, generating more quality jobs, addressing inequalities and eradicating poverty so that noone is left behind.

35. We launch the G20 Initiative on SupportingIndustrialization in Africa and LDCs to strengthen their

inclusive growth and development potential through voluntary policy optionsincluding: promoting inclusive and sustainable structural transformation;supporting sustainable agriculture, agri-business and agro-industry development;deepening, broadening and updating the local knowledge and production base;promoting investment in sustainable and secure energy, including renewables andenergy efficiency; exploring ways to develop cooperation on industrialproduction and vocational training and sustainable and resilient infrastructureand industries; supporting industrialization through trade in accordance withWTO rules; and leveraging domestic and external finance and supporting equitableaccess to finance - with a focus on women and youth; and promoting science,technology and innovation as critical means for industrialization.

Perspectivas para o futuro:

A crise está a exercer a sua função saneadora;

Reconfiguração do modelo económicointernacional;

Regulação internacional;

Reforma das instituições internacionais (FMI, Banco Mundial, OMC, outras);

Recuperação do papel da política económica?;

Recuperação da referência nacional?

Novo paradigma económico?5/10/2018 80

."""""""""""

"""" "

Scenario IV Global Europe I I

! Europe as an anchor of Global

Economy.

! Euro as international currency.

! Political integration adjusted to

the level of integration.

! Strengthened international

institutions.

! National political autonomy.

"

Scenario I Economic and Monetary Union

! Operation of binomial uniform

integration-continental

enlargement.

! Creation of the euro as the

culmination.

! Exhaustion of original dynamics:

· Identity Crisis;

· Malfunctioning of the euro;

! International Crisis;

! Crisis"of"the"integration"model."

Scenario I I Continental Europe

! Exclusionary Integration:

· Detachments ;

· Exclusions;

· Dissolution;

· Implosion;

! Hegemonic Centre.

! Opposition centre-periphery /north-south.

! Assymetric Federalism.

"

Scenario I I I Global Europe I

! Flexible Integration.

! Multicentre Europe.

! Reconfiguration of the eurosystem.

! Limited political integration.

! Openness to other spaces of integration.

"

Uniform(Integration(

Multiform(Integration(

Atlantic(Opening(

Continental(Enlargement(

Europe: Future Scenarios of the Identity Crisis

Documents

CICLO DE SEMINÁRIOS EM ESTUDOS DE DESENVOLVIMENTOº.pdf · Ver, Williamson, J. (1990). Chapter 2 from Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Edited by John Williamson