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This article was downloaded by: [197.27.40.47] On: 01 May 2012, At: 21:40 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Architectural Theory Review Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ratr20 Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project In Architecture Elie Haddad Available online: 30 Mar 2010 To cite this article: Elie Haddad (2010): Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project In Architecture, Architectural Theory Review, 15:1, 88-101 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13264821003629279 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

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Page 1: CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’S

This article was downloaded by: [197.27.40.47]On: 01 May 2012, At: 21:40Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office:Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Architectural Theory ReviewPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscriptioninformation:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ratr20

Christian Norberg-Schulz's PhenomenologicalProject In ArchitectureElie Haddad

Available online: 30 Mar 2010

To cite this article: Elie Haddad (2010): Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project In Architecture,Architectural Theory Review, 15:1, 88-101

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13264821003629279

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantialor systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that thecontents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, anddrug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liablefor any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoevercaused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Page 2: CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’S

ELIE HADDAD

CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ’SPHENOMENOLOGICAL PROJECT INARCHITECTURE

This paper will examine the theoretical

work of one of the major proponents of a

phenomenological approach in architecture,

the historian-theoretician Christian Norberg-

Schulz, examining the development of his

ideas across 30 years. While Norberg-Schulz

started out with Intentions in Architecture

(1963), a work that was clearly influenced

by structuralist studies, he soon shifted to a

phenomenological approach with Existence,

Space and Architecture (1971), and then with

Genius Loci (1980) and The Concept of Dwelling

(1985). He attempted through this trilogy to

lay down the foundations of a phenomen-

ological interpretation of architecture, with

an underlying agenda that espoused certain

directions in contemporary architecture.

This paper will examine the major writings

of Christian Norberg-Schulz, critically evalu-

ating his interpretation of phenomenology in

architecture in its ambiguous relation to the

project of modernity.

ISSN 1326-4826 print/ISSN 1755-0475 onlineª 2010 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/13264821003629279

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It is paradoxical that the phenomenological

discourse appeared on the architectural scene

after the decline of structuralism and semiotics,

while in philosophy and the humanities, it was

the decline of phenomenology in the 1960s

that prompted the development of structural-

ism. This ambiguous situation may be explained

by the time-lapse between the moment

philosophical ideas are articulated and their

translation into the architectural field.

Phenomenology owes its main thrust to

Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Husserl

launched the phenomenological movement

in philosophy with the intent of developing

it into a method of precise philosophical

investigation—that is, a comprehensive new

‘‘science’’, but it was his student Heidegger who

took it into another direction and turned it into

one of the major philosophical movements of

the twentieth century, influencing all subse-

quent developments in philosophy from Sartre

to Foucault and Derrida. Heidegger trans-

formed Phenomenology into a means for the

questioning of philosophical traditions, a radical

dismantling to be followed by a reconstruction,

with the intent of founding a new fundamental

ontology that looks at the way in which the

structures of ‘‘Being’’ are revealed through the

structures of human existence.1

The main thrust of Heidegger’s philosophy was

developed in his major work, Being and Time

(1927), which constitutes the basis of his

phenomenological approach. Yet, as scholars

of Heidegger remark, his later works, especially

the series of essays ‘‘The Origin of the Work

of Art’’ (1935), ‘‘Building, Dwelling, Thinking’’

(1952) and ‘‘The Question concerning Tech-

nology’’ (1949),2 reflected a turn in his orienta-

tion from the earlier Being and Time towards a

mythopoeic approach that privileges a direct

reflection on the nature of elements, common

to poetic or artistic practice.3 It was this later

Heidegger who would become influential

among a number of architectural theorists,

namely Christian Norberg-Schulz, who was

among the first to attempt to translate this

phenomenological approach in architecture.

Christian Norberg-Schulz’s first theoretical

work was very much influenced by the

structuralist tendencies of the 1960s,4 without

being specifically anchored to any single source

or reference. Intentions in Architecture appeared

in 1963 and constituted an ambitious project

to develop an overarching ‘‘system’’ that would

account for the various poles of architectural

activity. The framework for this study included

a combination of scientific ideas derived

from sociology, psychology and semiotics.

Already at that time, he attributed the con-

dition of ‘‘crisis’’ in architecture to the failure

of modern architecture to take account of

some of the essential factors that give signi-

ficance to the built environment, primary

among those the role of perception, in addition

to the importance of history as a source of

meanings.5

Norberg-Schulz’s discussion of perception was

largely influenced by Gestalt psychology, to

which were also added the socialization of

perception and the process of ‘‘schematiza-

tion’’, that is the way in which perception leads

to the construction of an understanding of the

world, based on the pioneering studies of

Jean Piaget in child psychology. From this, he

proceeded to outline a theoretical framework

which would include all the semiotic dimen-

sions. This theory, influenced to a large extent

by Charles Morris’s interpretation of semiotics,

constituted a similar attempt to develop a

comprehensive structure—that is, an ‘‘archi-

tectural totality’’ that would account for all

the dimensions of architecture: the technical

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structure, environment, context, scale and

ornament.6 It is worth noting that this work

did not list any single reference to Heidegger in

its bibliography, only mentioning him in a single

footnote.7

A few years later, Norberg-Schulz published a

work with a very indicative title, Existence,

Space and Architecture (1971), followed by

Genius Loci (1980) and The Concept of Dwelling

(1985) which constitute his phenomenological

trilogy in architecture. Existence, Space and

Architecture marked a turning point in Norberg-

Schulz’s theoretical project. While his first

work was based on a structuralist approach

blending semiotics and Gestalt theories,

this work betrayed a shift which would be

translated later into a move towards a

phenomenological approach. In the foreword,

Norberg-Schulz announced, in fact, a ‘‘new

approach to the problem of architectural

space’’, attempting to ‘‘develop the idea that

architectural space may be understood as

a concretization of environmental schemata

or images, which form a necessary part of

man’s general orientation or ‘being in the

world’’’.8 This reference to ‘‘being in the world’’

is indicative of this new shift, supported by

several quotations from Heidegger. Still, in this

transitional work, Norberg-Schulz stood on a

middle ground between the structuralist posi-

tions of Piaget, Arnheim and others, and the

phenomenological position represented by

Heidegger and Bollnow.9 This attempt at

reconciling structuralism with phenomenology

may also be traced in his subsequent works

and never seemed to pose any problems for

Norberg-Schulz.

The major concept in Existence, Space and

Architecture is ‘‘space’’. The discussion of ‘‘space’’

was motivated by what the author perceived

as a reductive reading of that concept, first

given currency by Giedion and later used by

others, particularly Bruno Zevi.10 Norberg-

Schulz qualified space as ‘‘existential space’’,

structured into schemata and centres, direc-

tions, paths, and domains; concepts that he

illustrated by concrete examples derived from

multiple sources, from Mircea Eliade to Otto

Bollnow, Gaston Bachelard, Claude Levi-

Strauss and Kevin Lynch. The centre, for

instance, was illustrated by the image drawn

from Eliade’s discussion on mythology, a

mythical origin traversed by a diagram of the

axis mundi, which represents a connection

between the different cosmic realms.11 Simi-

larly, the path was related to the idea of

departure and return home, and the division

into the ‘‘inner’’ and ‘‘outer’’ domains of

existence, as explained by Bollnow. Norberg-

Schulz also introduced a new concept that

would be expanded later, that of genius loci,

literally the ‘‘spirit of a place’’.12 He identified

four levels of ‘‘existential space’’: geography and

landscape, urban level, the house and the thing.

In discussing the house, Norberg-Schulz re-

ferred to Heidegger’s essay on dwelling and the

etymological roots of ‘‘building’’ which go back

to ‘‘dwelling’’, stressing the role of the house as

the ‘‘central place of human existence’’:

The House, therefore, remains the

central place of human existence, the

place where the child learns to under-

stand his being in the world, and the

place from which man departs and to

which he returns.13

The last chapter discussed the concept of

‘‘architectural space’’ which he defined as a

‘‘concretization of existential space’’, illustrated

by a historical survey of various architectural

works, from villages and towns to specific

architectural artefacts, subjected to a classifica-

tion in terms of the spatial concepts of centre,

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path and domain, as well as a qualitative

description in terms of their phenomenological

attributes. Existential space was thus defined as

a qualitative space, manifest in the monumental

architecture of the Parthenon as well as that of

the medieval towns, in the dynamic architec-

ture of Borromini as well as in that of the

Renaissance, in the work of Le Corbusier, La

Tourette (Fig. 1) being a favoured example, as

well as in Louis Kahn’s and Paolo Portoghesi’s

works.

For Norberg-Schulz, there exist multiple varia-

tions to the concept of ‘‘architectural space’’,

but its essential aspects had been obliterated

by some modern works, especially at the level

of urbanism. There, the figural quality of the

street and its variations, the centrality of the

town square and its existential role have all

been ignored by architects, which led to

deficient urban environments. In this respect,

he joined Venturi, Jacobs, and Rossi in criticizing

Modern Architecture for its shortcomings,

especially at the level of the urban environ-

ment. As in the case of Venturi, but using a

different approach, Norberg-Schulz returned

to history in its wider sense to give compara-

tive examples of buildings, towns and land-

scapes as examples that naturally incorporate

these qualities of ‘‘existential space’’, creating

meaningful and wholistic environments.

Norberg-Schulz reiterated the necessary re-

cognition and understanding of the different

levels of architectural space that ‘‘form a

structured totality which corresponds to the

structure of existential space’’.14 This under-

standing of ‘‘existential space’’, ignored by

‘‘orthodox modernism’’ reappeared, according

to him, in the work of Louis Kahn, Robert

Figure 1. La Tourette. Photo: courtesy of David Rifkind.

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Venturi and Paolo Portoghesi. Portoghesi was

singled out for his supposed mastery through

the application of geometry of the interaction

between different levels of space, resulting in a

balanced relation between the building and its

environment. Norberg-Schulz concluded with

a quote from Heidegger : ‘‘Mortals dwell in as

much as they save the earth’’, as a confirmation

of the necessity of re-appropriating the

elements of existential space into the founda-

tion of architecture.15

Genius Loci

Norberg-Schulz introduced his major opus,

Genius Loci,16 as a sequel to his previous two

works in architectural theory, despite the

radically different direction that this work took

in relation to the first. Genius Loci was perhaps

the most influential of Norberg-Schulz’s writ-

ings, as it came out at a time when questions of

meaning, history, and mythology assumed

greater importance in architectural discourse,

in a post-modernist climate that gave back

credibility to these themes. And unlike his

previous studies, this one was more explicitly

concerned with the interpretation of phenom-

enology in architecture as its subtitle indicated,

and as clearly stated in the introduction that

acknowledged the debt to Heidegger’s ideas,

particularly his essays gathered in Poetry,

Language, Thought.17 The book cover was quite

indicative as well; in clear contrast to the plain

white cover of his first book, it featured a

panoramic photograph of the medieval Italian

hill town of Vitorchiano, in the region of Latium

(Fig. 2).

In this photographic essay on architecture, with

its illustrations ranging from the macroscopic

scale of landscapes to the microscopic scale of

architectural details, Norberg-Schulz proposed

to elaborate the constituting elements of a

‘‘phenomenology of place’’, using as a keynote

the poem of Georg Trakl, ‘‘A Winter Evening’’,

quoted in one of Heidegger’s essays. The main

lesson of this poem, as explained by the author,

is the importance of ‘‘concrete images’’ that

constitute our experiences, represented by

poets, architects and artists. The phenomen-

ological challenge lies therefore in reviving

Figure 2. Vitorchiano. Photo: Author.

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this poetic dimension of things and in re-

establishing the lost connection between the

various elements that constitute our world.

Specifically, Norberg-Schulz stressed the con-

nection between the man-made world and the

natural world, historically evident in various

places and environments from around the

world. This relationship is established through a

three-point process of visualization, comple-

mentation, and symbolization.18 This process

was attributed to Heidegger’s concept of

‘‘gathering’’. Its last phase, symbolization, plays

a more crucial role in the concretization of

meaning in a place, and in the realization of

the concept of ‘‘gathering’’. Norberg-Schulz’s

main thesis rested therefore on the marriage

of these two concepts, Heidegger’s concept of

‘‘gathering’’ and the old Roman concept of

genius loci:

The existential purpose of building (ar-

chitecture) is therefore to make a site

become a place, that is, to uncover the

meanings potentially present in the given

environment.

Genius Loci is a Roman concept. Accord-

ing to ancient Roman belief every

‘‘independent’’ being has its genius, its

guardian spirit. This spirit gives life to

people and places, accompanies them

from birth to death, and determines their

character or essence. Even the gods had

their genius, a fact which illustrates the

fundamental nature of the concept.19

In what amounts to a mixing of mythology with

philosophy, Norberg-Schulz proceeded to de-

velop his theory, supported by a litany of well

chosen photographs that depict various condi-

tions and sites, from the historic towns

of Europe to the landscapes of Tuscany,

Switzerland, Finland and Sudan, and from the

characteristic images of people walking in the

Nordic winter snow to barefoot children

posing in their desert village in Sudan. This

‘‘photo-historiography’’, as pointedly analysed

by Jorge Otero-Pailos,20 also encompassed

select examples of historical periods from

Greek to Baroque and Modern Architecture.

The reference to Greek examples, such as the

iconic Tholos and Theatre of Delphi was

somewhat legitimized and necessitated by the

appeal to the concept of genius loci, with its

mythological aspects that invoke the specific

appropriations of different places by specific

gods, a theme that also brings back Heidegger,

specifically his essay on ‘‘The Origin of the

Work of Art’’.21 As for landscapes, Norberg-

Schulz again drew on Heidegger in calling for a

‘‘phenomenology of natural place’’ which recalls

the different topological contexts and re-

examines their etymologies in the hope of

uncovering their original meanings:

Whereas valleys and basins have a macro

or medium scale, a ravine (cleft, gorge) is

distinguished by a ‘‘forbidding’’ narrowness.

It has the quality of an ‘‘under-world’’ which

gives access to the ‘‘inside’’ of the earth. In a

ravine we feel caught or trapped, and the

etymology of the word in fact leads us back

to rapere, that is to ‘‘seize’’.22

Norberg-Schulz’s personal religious affinities

played a significant role in the articulation of his

ideas. Thus, it is not only landscape in general that

stimulates a phenomenological understanding of

the world, but specific sanctuaries within the

landscape that create a favourable condition for

‘‘intimate dwelling’’. These ‘‘sub-places’’, such as

the Carceri of St Francis near Assisi or the Sacro

Speco of St Benedict near Subiaco, offer

‘‘archetypal retreats where man may still experi-

ence the presence of the original forces of the

earth’’.23

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Yet what is most surprising in this interpreta-

tion of the environment was Norberg-Schulz’s

reductive categorization of landscapes into

three basic types: Romantic (the Nordic region

being its main illustration), Cosmic (defined as

an environment that makes an absolute and

eternal order manifest, represented best by the

infinite desert), and Classical (varied yet

orderly, an example of which is the Greek

landscape). Yet these landscapes do not simply

present abstract topological conditions; they

appear intimately connected to certain social

or cultural characteristics, which take the form

of historically determined judgments. Thus, the

Romantic landscape encourages an intimate

relation with the earth where dwelling takes

the form of a refuge in the forest, while the

desert seems to act as a natural framework for

the unifying message proclaimed by religions

like Islam, and the Classical landscape appears

like an in-between condition, a condition of

equilibrium that generates a meaningful order,

and fosters a ‘‘human fellowship’’ where the

individual is neither absorbed by the totality

(the cosmic order) nor forced to seek his

private hiding place (the romantic world). This

last case offers, accordingly, the best possibility

for a ‘‘true gathering’’—for dwelling in the

Heideggerian sense.24 These three types of

landscape constitute ‘‘archetypes’’, which do

not always present themselves in the ‘‘pure’’

form of the examples mentioned, and some-

times lead to ‘‘complex’’ landscapes, according

to the author—that is, composite landscapes

such as Naples or Venice, or Brandenburg

where ‘‘extension is squeezed in between a

sandy moor and a low, grey sky, creating a

landscape which seems saturated by the

monotonous, cheerless rhythm of marching

soldiers’’.25

The same reductive approach that was

followed to categorize the various landscapes

was also used to categorize ‘‘man-made’’

place, meaning architecture, into ‘‘Romantic

architecture’’, ‘‘Cosmic architecture’’ and ‘‘Clas-

sical architecture’’. While Classical architecture

offers itself more easily to categorization, as

it is historically recognized, it is interesting to

note the selective reading of the author

regarding the other categories, which pro-

ceeds from the same geographical determina-

tion applied to landscape. Thus, ‘‘Romantic

architecture’’ does not indicate a specific style

or period, but an architecture ‘‘distinguished

by multiplicity and variety’’, ‘‘irrational and

subjective’’, ‘‘phantastic and mysterious but

also intimate and idyllic’’.26 This strange

definition brings together disparate examples

from the medieval towns of Germany to the

vernacular architecture of Norway, even

extending to the work of Guimard and Aalto

in our times. In the same vein, cosmic

architecture applies to works characterized

by ‘‘uniformity and absolute order’’ and

supposedly finds its best manifestation in

Islamic architecture.27

The concluding chapters were dedicated to

a selective study of three settlements that

best illustrate these three categories, a study

which, in reality, translates into something in

between a travel guide and an architectural

survey of these three cities: Prague, Khartoum

and Rome. While Prague exudes a romantic

sense of mystery confirmed by the novels of

Kafka and supported by its rich architectural

heritage, the ‘‘cosmic’’ Khartoum offers the

opposite feeling of an infinite landscape

defined by the movement of the sun and

the Nile River. And while Rome was probably

selected to illustrate the third case, upon

closer scrutiny its genius loci appears to

escape any strict definition, and thus emerges

as a ‘‘complex’’ case which ‘‘contains every-

thing’’.

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Norberg-Schulz concluded by a discussion of

the ‘‘loss of place’’ in the contemporary world.

This is, in essence, the second thesis of the

book, and presents the underlying project of

Norberg-Schulz, which is similar to that of other

theorists who were preoccupied by the dis-

integrating urban condition around the world.

Here Norberg-Schulz presented a pragmatic

assessment of the problem, from the destruc-

tion of the ‘‘urban fabric’’ to the loss of character

and place. Yet once again, his conciliatory

approach left the issue unresolved, as he did

not take any firm stand regarding it. While the

illustrations accompanying this part showed the

Federal Center in Chicago by Mies van der

Rohe and the Green City by Le Corbusier as

examples of this deficient urbanism, the text

reads more like an apology for the Modern

Movement. The author saw this movement, in

fact, as an attempt to give form to a ‘‘new spirit’’,

which reflects a new genius loci, with the aim of

helping people ‘‘regain a true and meaningful

existence’’, even going as far as suggesting that

some of its early manifestations such as Neue

Sachlichkeit, effectively meant a ‘‘return back to

things’’.28 Accordingly, this return to things may

be observed in some of the masterpieces of

modern architecture, such as the Villa Savoye

and the Haus Tugendhat which, despite their

‘‘lack of substance and presence’’, satisfy modern

man’s search for freedom and identity. It is only

when moving to the urban dimension that

modern architecture fails to ‘‘gather’’ and to

create significant environments.29

In what amounts, then, to a confirmation of

the theses of his teacher Giedion, Norberg-

Schulz concluded that the underlying basis

of the Modern Movement was ‘‘profoundly

meaningful’’ and that only at the hands of

some imitators the movement had lost its

objectives. These objectives were again being

rediscovered in this second phase which

proposes to ‘‘give buildings and places indivi-

duality, with regard to space and character’’, as

manifested in the works of Aalto, the late

works of Le Corbusier, and most significantly in

the work of Kahn whose poetic descriptions

come close to Heidegger’s.30 A third genera-

tion of architects, composed of Utzon, Pietila,

Stirling and Bofill, appeared to him on the right

path towards an architecture that concretizes

this recovery of place.31

The Concept of Dwelling

The Concept of Dwelling constituted the third

part of Norberg-Schulz’s phenomenological

trilogy, still supported by a framework of

semiotic, behaviorist and other studies.32 In

this work, Norberg-Schulz directly addressed

the issue of ‘‘dwelling’’, a concept that was

singled out by Heidegger’s famous essay. Here,

surprisingly, the subtitle indicated a movement

towards ‘‘figurative architecture’’.33 In the fore-

word, the author announced the basic premise

of the book as the rediscovery of ‘‘dwelling’’ in

its comprehensive totality, leading towards a

final overcoming of functionalism and a return

to figurative architecture.34 The keynote to this

work is given by the Norwegian story of Knut,

a youngster who recognizes, through a sort

of spiritual revelation, his presence in the

forest as a fundamental aspect of his exis-

tence. Two illustrations, a Norwegian forest

and a farmhouse, accompany this introduction,

further evoking this idea of dwelling as a return

to the sources.35

The Concept of Dwelling was organized into a

structured study that proceeded from the

general outline to the development of the

concept, and again from the macro level of

the settlement to that of the individual

house, passing by the intermediary ‘‘modes’’

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of dwelling, urban space and institution. These

four basic modes of dwelling are organized

through two ‘‘aspects’’: identification and

orientation. Mingled in the text are various

quotations from Heidegger, but also from

Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, to give a phenom-

enological flavour to an otherwise structuralist

work that revives the same concepts derived

from Gestalt psychology, from Kevin Lynch, in

addition to references to the work of Mircea

Eliade on mythology. In focusing his attention

on laying down the foundations of an archi-

tectural ‘‘language’’, Norberg-Schulz in fact

returned to the earlier phase of his Intentions

in Architecture, coloured by his more recent

discovery of phenomenology. In this work,

the author re-examined the four categories of

dwelling under the structuralist template

of ‘‘morphology’’, ‘‘topology’’ and ‘‘typology’’,

which constituted the organizing structure that

was applied onto the dimension of ‘‘being’’:

Man’s being-in-the-world is structured,

and the structure is kept and visualized by

means of architecture.36

And further :

The meaning of a work of architecture

therefore consists in its gathering the

world in a general typical sense, in a local

particular sense, in a temporal historical

sense, and, finally, as something, that is as

the figural manifestation of a mode of

dwelling between earth and sky.37

Once again, the selection of ‘‘particular’’

examples of dwelling at the level of the

individual house is quite revealing of the

author’s selective interpretation. The first

example mentioned was the Hill House by

Mackintosh, lauded for its fulfilment of the

task of dwelling: to ‘‘reveal the world, not as

essence but as presence, that is as material and

colour, topography and vegetation, seasons,

weather and light’’.38 After the Hill House, the

author turned to vernacular architecture,

particularly to the types of dwelling common

in northern European countries, which were

mentioned by Heidegger (Fig. 3). In addition to

these, Gesellius, Lindgren and Saarinen’s Hvit-

trask complex (Fig. 4), Behrens’ house in

Darmstadt, Hoffmann’s Palais Stoclet and

Wright’s prairie houses, which share little in

common, were seen as good examples of this

interpretation of dwelling.

Yet this time, the critique of the ‘‘modern

house’’ was more explicit, and the author

recognized its failure to arrive at a satisfactory

solution to the problem of dwelling, for it

lacked the ‘‘figural quality’’; it did not look like a

house. Hence, what seems to be the problem

is simply the inability of the modern house to

look like a house, and not, as Heidegger had

alluded to, the inability of modern man to

dwell. Norberg-Schulz expressed here the

hope that the revival of this figural quality, as

evident in many post-modern projects, will

again make dwelling possible.39 Despite a

cautionary remark against the fall into eclecti-

cism, the book ends on an optimistic note that

this recovery of the figural quality would lead

to a recovery of dwelling, in which pheno-

menology would play a major role as the

catalyst for the rediscovery of the poetic

dimension in architecture.40

Conclusion

Despite its wide dissemination in architectural

circles during the 1980s, Norberg-Schulz’s

phenomenological interpretation received re-

latively little critical overview, apart from the

usual book reviews, most of which were

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Figure 4. Hvittrask. Photo: Author.

Figure 3. Traditional House in southern Germany. Photo: Author.

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generally positive.41 The strongest attack

against this interpretation of phenomenology

came indirectly from Massimo Cacciari,

who criticized the naıve interpretations of

Heidegger’s concept of dwelling.42 Cacciari, in

clear opposition to Norberg-Schulz, read in

Heidegger’s essay a recognition of the ‘‘impos-

sibility of dwelling’’, rather than a desire for a

nostalgic return to pre-modern conditions of

dwelling:

No nostalgia, then, in Heidegger—but

rather the contrary. He radicalizes the

discourse supporting any possible ‘‘nos-

talgic’’ attitude, lays bare its logic, pitilessly

emphasizes its insurmountable distance

from the actual condition.43

The difficulty of interpreting Heidegger’s later

writings has been raised by some critics. Hilde

Heynen, for instance, saw in these different

interpretations of Heidegger an opposition

between two ideological positions, utopian-

nostalgic and critical-radical, represented re-

spectively by Norberg-Schulz and Cacciari. In

this opposition, Heynen recognized the defi-

ciencies of both positions, the first for its

simplistic reduction of the problematic to a

question of architectural form, the second for

its assimilation of the condition of anxiety as a

generative principle.44

It is precisely this aspect that constitutes the

weakest point in Norberg-Schulz’s theoretical

proposition: his desire to translate phenomen-

ological discourse into a tool for the genera-

tion of architectural forms that recreate a

semblance of meaningful environments. In his

interpretation of Heidegger, Norberg-Schulz

did not go beyond the surface, satisfying

himself with the later works of Heidegger,

without attempting to answer some of the

problematic issues raised by its critics. Further-

more, phenomenology, in Norberg-Schulz’s

understanding, was continuously supported

by a structuralist framework, which puts into

question the very possibility of overcoming the

duality of mind/body as phenomenologists

claim, using this structuralist framework as a

pretext for one of two possibilities: a return to

vernacular architecture as an archetype for an

idealized dwelling on the one hand, or an

espousal of a ‘‘figurative’’ post-modernist

architecture as a second option. Even in his

last publication, Norberg-Schulz did not pro-

pose anything beyond a synthesis of these

various concepts from structuralism to phe-

nomenology into yet another work that

attempts to give a ‘‘comprehensive’’ account

of architecture from all periods and regions.45

Heidegger’s later reflections on art and

architecture—and the mythopoeic turn that

he took—may also be partly responsible for

this particular interpretation of phenomenol-

ogy, which was translated by some as a

nostalgic return to an ‘‘authentic dwelling’’

and, consequently, as a retreat to certain styles

or periods. The later developments in archi-

tecture and the various appropriations of the

‘‘figurative’’ have shown that the crisis of the

object, of which Tafuri had spoken, cannot be

simply resolved by such artificial measures. It is

questionable whether other phenomenological

interpretations would be more successful in

resolving the problematic condition of con-

temporary architecture, without addressing the

current conditions of its production. A phe-

nomenological approach, in the real sense of

the term, cannot be reduced to a formal

manipulation of specific parameters such as

tactility or vision.46 And despite the occasional

masterpieces which can bring forth intense

spatial experiences that distinguishes them

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from ‘‘ordinary’’ productions, such as the work

of Peter Zumthor, it is questionable whether it

is possible to raise architecture as a whole to

this level of aesthetic resolution, within a

practice that continues to separate architecture

from its social and political dimensions, which

was the historic condition for the generation of

‘‘meaningful’’ environments.47

Notes

1. Dermot Moran, Introductionto Phenomenology, London/NY: Routledge, 2000, ch. 6.

2. Martin Heidegger, Being andTime, Harper, 2008; ‘‘TheOrigin of the Work of Art’’and ‘‘Building DwellingThinking’’ are included inthe collection of essays pub-lished as Poetry, Language,

Thought, Harper, 2001;‘‘The Question ConcerningTechnology’’ in The Question

Concerning Technology, and

Other Essays, Harper: 1982.

3. Moran, Introduction to Phe-

nomenology, p. 209.

4. Structuralism largely devel-oped out of linguistic stu-dies, the branch ofknowledge concerned withthe study of language itself.Initially, the main source ofinfluence was the Swisslinguist Ferdinand de Saus-sure, who left no work ofhis own, other than thecollected notes publishedby his students after hisdeath, as the General Course

on Linguistics, a work thatwas first translated to Eng-lish in 1959. Saussure in-itiated a major change inthe study of language, in-sisting on a synchronic ap-proach rather than theusual diachronic approachby looking at the structureof the language and its rulesof operation. He also pos-ited that language is a ‘con-

structed’ system, and notnaturally inherited or meta-physically inspired, thusopening the way for adeeper probe into the veryfoundations of this system,which directly affects theway we construct our real-ity and the world. Althoughin his collection of notes,the term ‘structure’ wasnever used by Saussure,but rather ‘system’, laterreaders of Saussure cameup with this terminologywhich became a standardbearer for other studies,and first among those, thework of Claude Levi-Straussin anthropology. For moreon this see Francois Dosse,Histoire du Structuralisme,Vol. 1, Paris: La Decouverte,1991; and John Sturrock,Structuralism, London: Black-well, 2003.

5. Christian Norberg-Schulz,Intentions in Architecture,Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1965, pp. 21–22.

6. Norberg-Schulz, Intentions

in Architecture, pp. 101–102.

7. Peter Collins wrote a sharpcritique of this early workof Norberg-Schulz, warningagainst the dangers ofassimilating architecturewithin overwhelming ‘‘the-ories’’ of philosophical orlinguistic nature. See hisbook review of Intentions

in Architecture in the Journal

of Architectural Education,21, 3, 1967: 8–10.

8. Christian Norberg-Schulz,Existence, Space and Archi-

tecture, NY: Praeger, 1971,p. 7.

9. Otto F. Bollnow, author ofMensch und Raum, 1963 aswell as a number of workson German existential phi-losophy and hermeneutics,among others.

10. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,

Space and Architecture, p. 12.

11. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,

Space and Architecture, p. 21.

12. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,

Space and Architecture, p. 27.

13. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,

Space and Architecture, p. 31.

14. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,

Space and Architecture, p. 96.

15. Norberg-Schulz, Existence,

Space and Architecture,p. 114.

16. Christian Norberg-Schulz,Genius Loci: Towards a Phe-

nomenology of Architecture,New York: Rizzoli, 1980.The book was first pub-lished in Italian as Genius

Loci-paesaggio, ambiente, ar-

chitettura by Electa in 1979.It is interesting to note herethat the Italian subtitle dif-fers from the one chosen

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for the English edition anddoes not include the refer-ence to Phenomenology.

17. Martin Heidegger, Poetry,

Language, Thought, NewYork: Harper & Row, 1971.

18. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 17.

19. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 18.

20. For a critique of Norberg-Schulz’s visual approach,see Jorge Otero-Pailos,‘‘Photo[historio]graphy: Chri-stian Norberg-Schulz’sDemotion of Textual His-tory’’, Journal of Society of

Architectural Historians, 66,2, 2007: 220–241. Otero-Pailos argues that theauthor created a newtype of history book, onewhich relies on images as an‘‘alternate narrative’’ whichwas paradoxically anti-historical, in that it avoidedcritical reflection by conceal-ing its own historical con-struction.

21. In this text, Heidegger re-ferred to the Greek templeas a major example of thesignificance and role of awork of art. Norberg-Schulz dedicated one ofhis essays to discuss thistext by Heidegger, pub-lished as Christian Norber-Schulz, ‘‘Heidegger’s Think-ing on Architecture’’, Per-

specta, 20, 1983: 61–80.

22. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 37.

23. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 40.

24. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 46.

25. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,p. 47.

26. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 68–69.

27. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 71–73.

28. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 191–192.

29. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 194–195.

30. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 195–198.

31. Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci,pp. 198–200.

32. This work did not concludethe series on this topic, asthe author published an-other work, titled Architec-

ture: Presence, Language and

Place, which reiterated thesame themes discussed inthe previous books.

33. Christian Norberg-Schulz,The Concept of Dwelling: On

the Way to Figurative Archi-

tecture, New York: Rizzoli,1985. Again, the originalpublication came out firstin Italian, under Electa, oneyear prior.

34. In another essay titled ‘‘Onthe Way to Figurative Archi-tecture’’, Norberg-Schulzsheds further light on hisinterpretation of the ‘‘figura-tive’’, using this concept tosupport recent post-moder-nist projects by Venturi,Graves and Botta, amongothers. See ChristianNorberg-Schulz, ‘‘On theWay to Figurative Architec-ture’’, in Norberg-Schulz,Architecture: Meaning and

Place, New York: Electa/Rizzoli, 1988, pp. 233–245.

35. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, pp. 9–12.

36. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 29.

37. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 30.

38. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 89.

39. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 110. Two draw-ings were used to illustratethe ‘‘figural quality’’: the firsta drawing by Louis Kahn,the second by MichaelGraves, titled ‘‘On theWay to Figurative Architec-ture’’, pp. 132, 134.

40. Norberg-Schulz, Concept ofDwelling, p. 135.

41. See for instance: HarrisForusz, ‘‘Review of GeniusLoci’’, Journal of ArchitecturalEducation, 34, 3, 1981: 32;one of the critical reviewsof Norberg-Schulz is byLinda Krause, ‘‘Review ofArchitecture: Meaning andPlace’’, The Journal of the

Society of Architectural Histor-

ians, 50, 2, 1991: 197–199.Also, a critical yet cursorydiscussion of Norberg-Schulz’s concept of dwellingcan be found in DavidLeatherbarrow, Roots of

Architectural Invention, Cam-bridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1993.

42. Massimo Cacciari, ‘‘Eupali-nos or Architecture’’,Oppositions, 21, 1980: 106–116. This article was writ-ten as a review of Tafuri &Dal Co’s Architettura con-

temporanea, for the journalOppositions. Architettura con-

temporanea appeared in1976, and was translated

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as Modern Architecture in1979. Cacciari’s essay inOppositions coincided withNorberg-Schulz’s originalpublication of Genius Loci inItalian.

43. Cacciari, ‘‘Eupalinos or Ar-chitecture’’, p. 107.

44. Hilde Heynen, Architecture

and Modernity, Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1999.

45. Christian Norberg-Schulz,Architecture: Presence,

Language, Place, Milan: Skira,2000.

46. This appears to be the casefor instance of Steven Hollwho, despite the stimulatingexperiences that his archi-tecture creates, can not claimto resolve the contradictionsborn out of operating withina certain economic modethat determines a priori theconditions for experiencingand using these buildings.This reduction of phenom-enology to a ‘‘sensory’’ or‘‘embodied’’ experience ofspace is advocated for in-stance by Fred Rush in hisbook On Architecture, NewYork: Routledge, 2009.

47. Botond Bognar articulateda similar position in hisessay ‘‘Toward an Architec-ture of Critical Inquiry’’,Journal of Architectural Edu-

cation, 43, 1, 1989: 13–34in which he came to theconclusion that the recentphenomenological appro-aches in architecture arelegitimate in insisting on ameaningful dimension, yetthey lack the strategies forcritically evaluating thegiven social reality whichdetermines the realms ofintentionality and intersub-jectivity (p. 22).

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