a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v i e w o f p e a c e i n i t i a t i ve s

Issue Editor Robert Ricigliano

Armed groups and peace processes

Choosing to engage

Choosing to engage: armed groups and peace processes

Non-state armed groups are central figures in many of theworld’s internal armed conflicts.Their objectives and use ofviolence spark deep controversy about appropriate responses totheir actions,particularly in the context of the global ‘war onterror’.Yet in the last two decades armed groups have participatedin peace processes on every continent, resulting in a wealth ofexperiences of dialogue and peace negotiation involving stateactors,civil society groups, foreign governments and multilateralorganizations.

This Accord issue draws on these experiences to explore the casefor engagement with armed groups and lessons learned frompeacemaking practice.Highlighting both the opportunities andchallenges of this approach, it suggests that the diversity ofengagement options and potential interveners makes a strongargument for greater commitment to engagement by allstakeholders.The publication combines the voices of armedgroups,governments and intermediaries for a rich and varied setof perspectives on five key issues: the challenge ofunderstanding armed groups; armed groups’choices aboutpeacemaking; political and humanitarian engagement options;the roles of governmental and non-governmental actors; andthe impact of asymmetries in a state-based international system.With case studies from twelve countries complementinganalytical overviews of these issues, Choosing to engage: armedgroups and peace processes highlights important lessons andgood practice for future peacemaking efforts involving armedgroups.

Conciliation Resources and the Accord programmeConciliation Resources (CR) is an international non-governmental organization,which supports people working toprevent violence,promote justice and transform armed conflict.CR’s Accord programme aims to inform and strengthen peaceprocesses,providing a unique resource on conflict andpeacemaking.Working collaboratively with locally basedorganizations,we document peace processes, increaseunderstanding and promote learning from past and comparablepeacemaking experiences.

“Accord is an incredible source of valuable insight andinformation, indispensable for any peace or conflict worker.”

Johan Galtung,Professor of Peace Studies and Director of TRANSCEND.

“Accord offers very interesting and informative reporting. It willgreatly contribute to our own knowledge and wisdom as wework in this complex field of peacebuilding and conflictresolution in Africa.”

Joseph W.Butiku,Executive Director,The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation,Tanzania

The full text of all issues in the Accord series can be found on theConciliation Resources website at http://www c-r org

Issue 16 2005

ISSN 1365-0742£17.00

Accord 16

Conciliation ResourcesC

hoosing to engage:armed

groups and

peace p

rocesses

Conci l iat ion Resources

Conciliation Resources

London 2005

Choosing to engage

Armed groups and peace processes

Issue Editor: Robert Ricigliano

Commanders of the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoireparticipate in a meeting with the Economic Community of

West African States contact group at Bouake, October 2002.

Source: PA Photos/EPA

Acknowledgements

Accord Series Editor Celia McKeonIssue Editor Robert RiciglianoAccord Editor/Researcher Aaron GriffithsAccord Communications Coordinator Sarah WheelerAccord Distribution Coordinator Nathalie WlodarczykAccord Programme Supervisor Andy Carl

The focus of this thematic project was developed through a consultation process in early 2004 and further refined during an international joint analysis workshop in June that year.Conciliation Resources would like to extend grateful thanks to our authors, peer readers,photographers, translators and those who contributed to these consultation and analysisprocesses, especially: Natalia Aiello, Ilyas Akhmadov, Lam Akol, Mehmet Balci, Pascal Bongard,Dan Borjal, Peter Bowling, Mark Bradbury, Jimmy Carter, Jaime Casas, Diana Chigas, Alastair Crooke, Majak D’Agoot, Teresita Quinto Deles, Tom De Waal, Sarah Douglas-Pennent,David Fairman, Austin Fernando, Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Vicenç Fisas, Frances Fortune, Jean-Pierre Gontard, Claudine Haenni, Tore Hattrem, Fink Haysom, Kristian Herbolzheimer, Bryn Higgs, Fiona Hill, Matt Hodes, Julian Hottinger, James Hughes, Chris Hunter, Bruce Jones, R. Nimalan Karthiksyan, Stephan Klingebiel, Steven Lanjouw, Miriam Lanskoy, Kim Maynard, Clem McCartney, Brian McQuinn, Mo Mowlam, Terence Nahimana, Reuven Paz, David Petrasek,Liz Philipson, Pablo Policzer, Magnus Ranstorp, Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey, Hans Romkema,Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, Kris Ruggiero, John Ryle, Rashid Sandi, Pakiasothy Saravanamutu, Rene V. Sarmiento, Onno Seroo, Alan Smith, Steve Smith, Saw David Taw, Yonatan Touval, Jan Van Eck, Joaquín Villalobos, Stein Villumstad, Janine Voigt, Terry Waite, Sue Williams.

The publication was made possible thanks to the financial support of the UK Department forInternational Development (DFID), the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and theSwedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

Published by Conciliation Resources173 Upper StreetLondon N1 1RGUnited Kingdom

Telephone +44 (0)20-7359 7728Fax +44 (0)20-7359 4081E-mail accord@c-r.orgWebsite http://www.c-r.org

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Permission is granted for reproduction and use of these materials for educational purposes.Please acknowledge your source when using the materials and notify Conciliation Resources.

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ISSN 1365-0742

Contents

Introduction 4Robert RiciglianoThe case for engagement 10An interview with President Carter

Understanding armed groupsUnderstanding armed groups 14Sue Williams and Robert RiciglianoAssessing groups and opportunities: a former government minister’s perspective 18An interview with Mo MowlamAttempting to understand: an intermediary’s perspective 22An interview with Terry WaiteChechen resistance: myth and reality 26Ilyas Akhmadov

Armed groups’ choicesFrom armed struggle to political negotiations: Why? When? How? 30Clem McCartneyThe Salvadorean insurgency: why choose peace? 36Joaquín VillalobosChoosing to engage: strategic considerations for the Karen National Union 40Saw David Taw

Humanitarian and political engagementVive la différence? Humanitarian and political approaches to engaging armed groups 44David PetrasekThe struggle against landmines: an opening for peace talks in Colombia 48Elisabeth Reusse-DecreyOperation Lifeline Sudan: war, peace and relief in southern Sudan 52Lam Akol

Track one - track two interactionThe relationship between track one and track two diplomacy 56Julian Thomas HottingerCeasefire negotiations in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 60Steven A. SmithBuilding links and sustaining momentum: reflections on track two roles at the Lomé peace talks 64Rashid Sandi and Frances Fortune

The impact of asymmetriesEngaging armed groups: the challenge of asymmetries 68Liz PhilipsonFacilitating dialogue with armed insurgents in the Philippines 72Rene V. SarmientoIn search of respect at the table: Hamas ceasefires 2001-03 76Alastair CrookeAsymmetries in the peace process: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 80Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran

Engaging armed groups in peace processes: lessons for effective third-party practice 8 4Nicholas (Fink) Haysom

Key texts and agreements 90Further reading 96Glossary 98Acronyms 100About Conciliation Resources 101Accord series 102Order form 104

3Contents

Introductionengaging armed groups in peace processes

Robert Ricigliano

For people living in the Darfur region of westernSudan, the jungles of Colombia, the eastern partsof the Democratic Republic of Congo, and for

millions of others around the world, the presence ofnon-state armed groups and the conflicts that oftensurround them are all too familiar. Over the last twodecades, whether in the context of a peace process or ahumanitarian initiative, armed groups have come to beseen as key actors in efforts to ease suffering and rebuildconflict-torn societies. In a September 2004 report, theUnited States Air Force Institute for National SecurityStudies concluded that, “armed groups are no longerminor players in a world once dominated by states”.

However this increased awareness of the importance ofarmed groups has caused problems. In particular, since11 September 2001, armed groups have been looked atin a different light – as potential terrorist organizationsand possible new cells in an ever more menacinginternational terrorist network. Thus, engaging, or moreaccurately, not engaging with them has taken on awhole new meaning. The result has been a pronouncedincoherence in policies of governmental and non-governmental actors toward whether and how toengage with armed groups. Pablo Policzer, of theArmed Groups Project and the University of Calgary,puts the challenge succinctly: “Armed groups arewidely recognized to be of paramount politicalimportance, but there is far less consensus over how to deal with them than there was even a decade ago.”Meanwhile, the suffering of local populations continuesunabated and gives urgency to sorting through thispolicy incoherence and increasing the successfulengagement of armed groups in the cause of peace.

Of course, for internal or external third parties to aviolent conflict, the behaviour of armed groups raisessome very serious and sensitive questions, fromconcerns over criminal or terrorist activity to the

4 Accord 16

Robert Ricigliano is the Director of

the Institute of World Affairs at the

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

He is the former Executive Director of

the Conflict Management Group and

Associate Director of the Harvard

Negotiation Project.

Filipino Muslim and Christian students march in Jolo to callfor the resumption of negotiations between the government

and the armed group Abu Sayyaf, August 2000.

Source: Reuters/Romeo Ranoco

imperative to condemn the killing of civilians and otherhuman rights abuses. However, these concerns do notcontradict, and nor should they forestall, efforts todevelop a new, more nuanced understanding of armedgroups and the opportunities and risks connected withtheir engagement in political dialogue.

The purpose of this Accord issue is to remedy thedeficit in our understanding of what we have learnedabout the engagement of armed groups in peaceprocesses, and the challenges to be addressed. At aminimum, we hope to focus attention on the topic andestablish a norm of creating an inclusive conversation.In an effort to consider the broad and sometimesstarkly contrasting views on this question, the volumecontains voices of armed groups, state actors,academics and interveners (both governmental andnon-governmental).

It is worth stressing the importance of including theperspectives of armed groups in this process. While thismay be uncomfortable for some, and many will findpieces in this volume to be provocative at the least, it is

important to understand, though not necessarily agreewith, their perspectives. All too often armed groups’voices are left out of the conversation on improvingpeacebuilding practice. One strong theme that hasemerged over the course of this project is that the viewsof armed groups are necessary parts of the process ofcreating a more effective peacebuilding system.

More importantly, by identifying some important issues related to armed groups’ engagement in peaceprocesses, we hope that this volume sets the stage forfuture dialogue and policy discussions. The publicationis structured around five main thematic sections. Eachof these begins with an analytical overview of theissues arising, followed by two to three case studiesillustrating how these issues have played out inparticular contexts. We hope that each reader –whether state actor, armed group or third party – willfind insights or details in the articles that act as a catalystfor new ideas about opportunities for engagement. Tostart that process, what follows are some themes thatcut across the various sections of this volume.

5Introduction: engaging armed groups in peace processes

Definitions matterPoliczer argued in his 2005 essay ‘Neither terrorists norfreedom fighters’ that how you define what constitutesan armed group influences your decision on whether to engage. Terrorist groups, criminal organizations,informal militias and paramilitaries strain traditionaldefinitions of armed groups as having effectiveleadership, control of territory, or a defined politicalagenda. For the purpose of this volume, our focus –similarly to Policzer’s – will be on armed groups withthe following characteristics: (1) they challenge thestate’s monopoly on coercive force; (2) they operateoutside effective state control; and/or (3) they arecapable of preventing, blocking or endangeringhumanitarian action or peace initiatives.

This relatively broad focus channels our attentionprimarily towards armed groups who struggle inrelation to a particular state party. However, whileinternational terrorist networks like Al Qaeda or criminalorganizations are therefore beyond the immediatefocus of our inquiry, it is possible that insights from this volume might be relevant to these groups.

Engagement is also a broad term that can have many different meanings, explored below. At this point, it is sufficient to adopt an inclusive definition of engagement, meaning generally to ‘interact with’ or ‘participate in’. As with other Accord publications, the term ‘peace process’ refers to myriad vehicles that are generally intended to advance the creation of apeacefully functioning society out of a situation ofviolent conflict. Most commonly, this includesnegotiations and other forms of dialogue at varioussocial and political levels.

Why engage?It is frequently argued that to engage with armed groups is to legitimize violence, or give credibility tounreasonable or non-negotiable demands. Moreover, we live in a time when engaging with armed groups,especially those that are branded as terrorists, isbecoming less and less the norm. But, as President Carterand others note, the terrorist label is overused. In the name of security policy and the ‘war on terror’, the preferred course of action for dealing with manyarmed groups is to proscribe and shun them in the hopesthat they will somehow wither away or be eradicated by military force. Several critical arguments are madethroughout this volume that push for the opposite policy– one that takes as a given the critical importance ofengaging with armed groups and making some form of engagement the norm rather than a concession. Mo Mowlam argues that, “you don’t fight terrorism withweapons and bullets. You fight it by talking to them.”

There are several lines of argument that emerge fromthe volume on why engagement, per se, is important:

The need to protect the local population While engagement with armed groups by states caninvolve complex issues of international law, statesovereignty and national interest, the issue isfundamentally about improving the lives of the localpopulations who are the victims of conflict. As StevenSmith notes in his case study about ceasefire talks in theeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, notwithstandingthe political tug of war between Congolese andinternational political actors over the peace process, the one certainty was that the local population wouldbear the brunt of continued fighting. Across the casestudies, whether in Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Burma, Sudan,Colombia or elsewhere, the one constant is the perilfaced by the local population and the humanitarianimperative to protect them. While this imperative doesnot provide a blanket justification for engagement in allcases, it does establish a default presumption that atleast minimal levels of engagement are often warranted.Local communities’ attitudes to engagement –including their capacities to act as third-parties in theirown conflicts – are a good barometer against which totest proposed interventions.

Armed groups hold the key to ending violence President Carter raises the simple yet powerful questionof whom you would engage with to stop a conflict orhuman rights abuse if not the people involved in theconflict or perpetrating the human rights violation. It is sometimes argued that armed groups shoulddemonstrate adherence to international humanitarianlaw as a precondition for any kind of dialogue. However,reality on the ground may make this an unrealisticdemand. Clem McCartney points out that some groupsmight see violence as a tactic while others may see it asa valid statement and possibly the only statement theycan make. Indeed the responsibility to protect canprovide a compelling argument to explore every optionfor ending the violence. Further, several case studiesdocument the negative consequences of engagingwith certain armed groups but not others. Lam Akolattributes shortcomings in one of the phases ofOperation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) to the failure to includeall the affected armed groups in the negotiationprocess. Ilyas Akhmadov describes the negative impactof the international community working with theRussian-backed Chechen administrator over leaders of the Chechen resistance. Lastly, Alastair Crookedescribes the negative consequences for the MiddleEast peace process of the international community’sreluctance to deal with Islamist as opposed to secularPalestinian groups.

6 Accord 16

Engagement increases the chance of a settlement processInternal armed conflicts frequently end throughdialogue and political negotiations. Even conflicts suchas the Angolan civil war, which ended with the effectivedefeat of the armed group, had benefited from pastpeace negotiations on which the parties were able tobuild as they formalized the end of hostilities. Howevermuch opponents or external actors may prefer militaryforce to pacific engagement, there will always be aneed to come to the table at some point.

As a metaphor for the constant choice before armedgroups, McCartney uses the image of a scale thatweighs the factors that favour militancy on one side,and those that favour conflict transformation on theother side. The Karen case study presented by SawDavid Taw is a vivid illustration of the dynamic interplayof the forces that favour political dialogue versus thosethat favour continued armed struggle. As McCartneypoints out, engagement can alter the decision-makingscales. For example, Joaquín Villalobos points out that in El Salvador the international community’sengagement with the Farabundo Martí NationalLiberation Front (FMLN) “facilitated the hegemony ofmoderate groups and leaders.” This in turn made theFMLN more willing and able to participate in politicalnegotiations. Sandi and Fortune explain how civilsociety groups helped bring the Revolutionary UnitedFront to the negotiating table in Sierra Leone. Akoldescribes how the engagement of the SudanesePeople’s Liberation Movement in the OLS process was a “turning point” for the movement in terms of itsinvolvement in political dialogue.

Lack of engagement can strengthen hardliners Just as engagement can have a positive influence on the choice of an armed group to opt for politicaldialogue, isolation or sanctions can in somecircumstances make an armed group less inclined or able to participate in a peace process. Liz Philipsonargues that the listing of the Communist Party of Nepal(the Maoists) as a terrorist organization by the US hashad little practical impact other than to strengthenthose among the Maoists and the Nepalese army whofavour fighting over negotiation. VisuvanathanRudrakumaran provides a forceful account of thenegative impacts of proscription from the perspectiveof the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in SriLanka. Lastly, Akhmadov, speaking from a Chechenperspective, presents his analysis of the positiveimpacts of engagement versus the negative impacts of non-engagement. He explains that engagement inthe sphere of interstate relations stimulated theChechens to observe international standards, while thefeeling that the international community was ignoringthe moderate Chechen political leadership swelled the

ranks of those who saw terrorism as the only way toadvance their objectives.

Think creatively about engagement optionsFor state actors, armed groups or third parties, thedecision about whether to engage in the context of apeace process is not a fixed or static choice. While thereare several important considerations that weigh infavour of engagement as a general concept, thedecision to engage is different in each situation and for each party.

How you combine several variables – type of group,purpose of engagement, substance of engagement,type of interlocutor – changes the calculus of thedecision of whether to engage or not. It also raises lotsof options for combining these different variables inways that might be more appropriate for specificsituations. For any actor, the decision to engage is neveras simple as ‘should I engage or not?’. The question ismore accurately framed as who should engage, withwhat group and about what issues. While it may not beappropriate for a given intervener to engage in everysituation, the diversity of engagement options raisesthe potential that there may always be somecombination of intervener, armed group andengagement type that is appropriate.

Identifying who should engage For external actors, the choice to engage is criticallyinfluenced by who would do the engaging. JulianHottinger outlines some important distinctions betweentrack one (governmental) and track two (non-governmental) actors and the distinct advantages anddisadvantages each has when engaging with armedgroups. Further, Hottinger points out that there is really aplethora of potential interveners across what is, in fact, amulti-track system – from business leaders to educatorsto religious figures.

Identifying engagement options There are two important dimensions along whichengagement can be defined: the purpose of theengagement and the issues to be addressed whileengaging. Engagement can have rather modestpurposes such as simply establishing communication orgathering basic information. Hottinger argues for theimportance of engagement that simply keeps the linesof communication open and lets an armed group knowthat when “they do want to sit down and talk there areorganizations…that are willing to help.” A step beyondsimple communication is to seek a fuller understandingof an armed group as described by Williams andRicigliano or what President Carter terms “pre-mediation”

7Introduction: engaging armed groups in peace processes

work to see whether a group is committed to participatingin political dialogue. A more ambitious purpose is toengage in order to persuade or influence the behaviourof a group, such as Smith’s work to persuade leaders ineastern DRC of the value of a ceasefire. Lastly, thepurpose of engagement could be to negotiate with agroup, as was the case with Mowlam’s experience inNorthern Ireland. As you work toward more significantoutcomes, the criteria for engaging become moreexacting. For example, the threshold for whether toengage for the purposes of understanding a groupmight be quite low, but the threshold for negotiationsmight entail a credible commitment on the armedgroup’s part to reach a peaceful settlement, the group’sadherence to respecting humanitarian principles, etc.Ideally, the process of engagement will generate greaterinterest in these options on all sides, in turn making thecase for dialogue and negotiations more compelling.

The subject matter of the engagement also affects third parties’ choices about whether to engage. DavidPetrasek makes the distinction between humanitarianand political engagement. Engagement on humanitarianissues can positively affect political negotiations, and it isoften easier for state actors and armed groups to engagearound these questions even when they would notengage in political negotiations. Elizabeth Reusse-

Decrey’s description of Geneva Call’s work in Colombia isa good example of when a state actor (the Colombiangovernment) expressed some willingness to engage with an armed group on a humanitarian issue when theywere not willing to engage on political issues. Further,engagement that addresses purely process issues, likedefining process ground rules or providing training asdetailed in Fink Haysom’s article, is qualitatively differentfrom engagement on substantive political issues like aceasefire, confidence-building measures or a formalpeace accord.

Contact with armed groups as the norm As noted above, there are clearly cases where non-engagement or disengagement makes sense. However,the case for engagement generally, and the myriad ofengagement choices in any specific context, make theargument that at least minimal engagement witharmed groups, or basic contact with them, should bethe default norm rather than the exception. Contact, asopposed to negotiations or other more involved formsof engagement, is essential if for no other reason thanto determine if these other forms of engagement arewarranted. Rather than erecting more barriers to evenbasic contact with armed groups, we should be makingit easier so that making contact does not entail the costof granting the armed group some privilege that itwould otherwise not be entitled to.

While information about armed groups can begathered without direct contact, or through proxies,there is some critical information that requires directand tactful engagement. McCartney stresses theimportance of understanding how armed groups view violence – whether as a tactic or a statement untoitself. Williams and Ricigliano argue that critical tounderstanding a group is to know how the groupaccounts for the fact that it is armed. Understandinghow leaders of an armed group see such sensitivequestions cannot be learned from a book or bywatching the BBC. It takes engagement. Moreover, an armed group’s words and actions have to beunderstood in light of their cultural context, asdemonstrated by Mowlam’s experience of meetinginmates at the Maze prison in Northern Ireland.

Terry Waite makes a strong statement about theimportance of personal contact and sensitivity:

what really counts is your ability on the ground tohave a degree of sensitivity to people in situations,to be able to get yourself onto the wavelengths of the people with whom you’re working ordiscussing…what is it you’re saying, and why is ityou’re doing what you’re doing?

8 Accord 16

US Secretary of State Colin Powell with Sudan People'sLiberation Army leader John Garang (centre) and Sudan'sFirst Vice-President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha (right) at theNaivasha talks, Kenya, October 2003.

Source: Reuters/Antony Njunga

Both Waite and Mowlam confirm that all informationhas its slant, and the best you can do is to recognizethat, keep an open mind and talk to as many of theinvolved actors as possible.

Lastly, face-to-face contact with an armed group canchange the narrative of the conflict. Williams andRicigliano point out that an intervener can influencethe way the group sees itself, can affect internaldynamics, and can change how the group relates to the conflict. Of course, this kind of contact can havepositive or negative consequences, but without it apotential lever to affect the course of a conflict is lost.

Creating an environment conducive toengagementThe success of a peace process is the responsibility ofthe parties involved – state actors, armed groups andthe local population. Nevertheless, the internationalcommunity, consciously or not, affects the environmentin which a peace process takes place. As many authorshave pointed out, the international community canstrengthen the constituencies for war or strengthen theforces in favour of political dialogue. Rudrakumaranargues that the international system needs to play adecisive role in creating a commitment by state actorsand armed groups to reach a negotiated settlement.

While one might challenge this expectation, it raisesquestions about the international community’sobligations vis-à-vis a particular peace process. As an ideal, there may be an argument that internationalactors should “do no harm,” as understood in thehumanitarian field in the sense of not making theengagement of armed groups and state actors in peaceprocesses more difficult. Certainly this norm would runsquarely against the reality of often conflicting stateinterests in the success of a particular peace process.However, the collective arguments of Philipson, Crooke,Rudrakumaran and Akhmadov document the ways inwhich international proscription and other asymmetriesbuilt into the state system make it more difficult forarmed groups to engage in peace processes (and forinterveners to engage with armed groups). Mitigatingthe negative effects of anti-terrorist legislationspecifically and the systemic bias in favour of states moregenerally is an urgent question for future governmentaland non-governmental work on peace processes.

International instruments such as sanctions andproscription are rather blunt tools and it is time toconsider more subtle, nuanced approaches. ReneSarmiento’s description of the Joint Agreement onSafety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) provides acompelling example of a creative instrument that

establishes “the equal terms under which theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front enter into peacenegotiations.” The JASIG itself did not deliver a peaceagreement to the Philippines, but it did manage toovercome a central obstacle to the peace process – the asymmetrical status of a state actor and an armedgroup. The “deed of commitment” pioneered byGeneva Call for engagement with armed groups onhumanitarian issues also stands out as a modality thatmakes engagement more possible and productive.Both these examples provide inspiration that othersuch modalities can be found to make engagementwith armed groups easier.

Another avenue for facilitating engagement is to creategreater cooperation or at least consultation betweenvarious actors engaged with armed groups. Severalauthors note the importance of boundaries betweenhumanitarian and political engagement (Petrasek), andbetween track one and track two actors (Sandi andFortune). However, this should not obstruct appropriatecommunication between track one and track two, andit is essential to prevent conflicts between the tracksfrom negatively impacting the engagement of armedgroups in political dialogue (see Smith). Another areafor future work is to engage actors from the differenttracks to develop a code of conduct or ‘rules of theroad’ to minimize the damage of conflicts and increasethe chances of productive cooperation.

Conclusion: engagement for learningIf this volume stands for anything, it is that we can learnfrom our collective experiences of engagement, andthrough continued engagement with each other bringnew clarity to the nettled questions of whether andhow to engage. Haysom’s article on effective practice inengaging armed groups provides a rich example of this,containing advice from managing the decision aboutwhether to engage, to the finer points of structuring asuccessful peace process. It is a testament to theproposition that there is a science to the endeavour ofengaging successfully with armed groups. The variousarticles in this volume each in their own way provideinsights into how to foster armed groups’ effectiveengagement in peace processes. Whether you agree ordisagree with their perspectives, our hope is that theyspur on additional thinking and conversation. Eventhough difficult policy choices remain, there is oneform of engagement that we hope is settled: the needfor continued engagement by all concernedstakeholders – including armed groups – for thepurpose of learning how to make the system workbetter for all, especially those millions of peopleaffected by violent conflict.

9Introduction: engaging armed groups in peace processes

The case forengagement an interview with President Jimmy Carter

Jimmy Carter was President of the United States from 1977 to 1981 and is founder and Chair of TheCarter Center, a non-partisan and not-for-profit

organization that advances peace and health worldwide.The Carter Center has engaged in conflict mediation inmany parts of the world, and President Carter wasawarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002.

Accord: How would you make the case for why it isimportant to engage with armed groups?

President Carter: Well, the basic answer to that basicquestion is: with whom are you going to discuss aconflict if you don’t discuss it with the people who areinvolved in the conflict, who have caused the conflictfrom the beginning, and who are still engaged in tryingto kill each other?

Often it would be quite impossible to get third parties,or fourth parties, to represent the people who areactually in combat. So in every case that I’ve everaddressed, I’ve attempted to go directly to the peoplewho instigated and are continuing the conflict to see if and when they might be able to attempt to bring anend to the war and have a peace agreement that wouldbe either temporary in nature (a ceasefire) or perhapslead to a permanent resolution.

So, when there’s a terrible human rights abuse quiteoften the abuser may be a dominant dictator or aninternational pariah with whom very few people wantto relate. But they’re the only ones who – if approachedproperly and forcefully – will change their policies andreduce the human rights abuses. The same thingapplies, in my opinion, to an ongoing civil war.

It’s sometimes surprising how many of the issuesparties to the conflict do agree on. It’s usually just a fewitems on which they cannot agree – they are obviously

10 Accord 16

Jimmy Carter (second from left) with Sandinista guerrilla leader and presidential candidate Daniel Ortega in

Nicaragua, 1996.

Source: PA photos/EPA

significant, very significant. But that permits me toconcentrate on the issues that have brought aboutthe conflict.

Another very important factor that can only beascertained if you know the country well is the pressurebeing exerted by the subordinates on the leaders of thetwo sides. Sometimes revolutionaries whom I havegotten to know well don’t really want to see an end tothe conflict. But their subordinates are tired of the war.

What are some of the criteria for whom you wouldengage with, and when and how?

The first premise that I’ve imposed on myself ever sinceleaving the White House is that before we go into asensitive area of the world we get approval from theWhite House.

Sometimes it has been somewhat reluctant, andsometimes it’s just tacit approval – they just agree tolook the other way. But I don’t inject myself into apolitically sensitive arena if it might conflict with thepolicies of the United States. That’s the first thing.

The second thing is, there needs to be some identifiableleaders in the ‘battle zone,’ usually within a country,that can speak effectively for the groups at war. Andthis is sometimes not possible.

A third criterion is that both sides in a conflict need tobe willing to attempt a peaceful resolution. And quiteoften this occurs after a matter of long waiting for thatpropitious moment to arrive.

Would you hold off from engaging if one side wasinterested in a settlement but, say, the governmententity was not interested?

Yes, if we are approached by one side. Of course inevery case we have to make a political judgment, since every case is different from others – but we try tomonitor all the conflicts in the world every day. If we doget an inquiry that’s substantive from either side in acivil war, then we would immediately make plans toconsult the other side: “Would you be willing to have anintermediary explore a resolution?”

11The case for engagement

I have done it in two stages. Quite often to talk tosomebody about negotiation or mediation raises a redflag. So we do what I call “pre-mediation work.” Withoutself-anointing ourselves as mediator, we just explorewith both sides what the chances are that they wouldtake the next step in approving some kind ofmediation effort.

We say, “We’re just exploring the ideas to see what wecould do to help you end this conflict successfully.”

In a sense, you’re engaging to decide whether youwant to engage.

It’s not so much a matter of whether we want to or not,but whether we have an adequate opening that wouldat least give us a chance of success. And I’ve never beenafraid of failing in the effort, you know, if I think we havea reasonable opportunity at the beginning. I think youcan be too timid about going into a controversial arena.

So if we see a glimmer of hope, we explore, and if bothsides – even if one side is somewhat reluctant –approve us as the mediators then we proceed moreaggressively. One thing to remember is that almostinvariably in a civil war, the last thing the ruling party inparticular wants is for the United States or the UnitedNations or some highly identifiable mediation group tocome in, because that in effect gives the imprimatur oflegitimacy to the revolutionary people in their country.

But since The Carter Center has no authority, and sincewe are completely non-governmental in nature and we are already involved in about 65 nations around the world in other kinds of programmes – diseaseprevention, election observation, agriculture, projectsof that kind – quite often we are known by both sides.So it opens up doors to us as a third party much morereadily than would be the case for a nationalgovernment or an international agency.

What about the argument against engagement thatsays that by engaging with an armed group – whomight be guilty of human rights violations – you are ina sense legitimizing that group and their violence?

Well, I’ve been accused of that – or maybe sometimescriticized or condemned for that – during the life of The Carter Center. In each case, the decision I had tomake was: should I reject this person who is contactingme and let the war or the human rights abuse orwhatever continue? Or should I get approval from theWhite House and meet with those people to see if theyare amenable to ending the war or ending the humanrights abuse?

And I made the decision to go ahead and negotiatewith these international outcasts, or reprobates, inorder to try to end the conflict.

You met with the Bosnian Serbs at a time when no oneelse would. I imagine that was a pretty tough decision.

It was very tough. But as a result of that engagement, Iworked on an agreement both sides accepted. It was acomplete ceasefire for four months. And it was out ofthat ceasefire that the Dayton Accords eventually grew.But I met with some people that were later branded asinternational criminals, and they’re still being hunted.

What about other arguments that as a governmentalentity you look weak if you engage with an armedgroup?

In most cases the ruling party is reluctant to deal withrevolutionaries on an equal basis. The first time I wasable to break that impasse was in Sudan when I wentthere in 1989. I finally got President Bashir’s approval tonegotiate between him and John Garang of theSouthern People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), but itwas very difficult for the officials in Khartoum to treatthe revolutionaries in the south on an equal basis – tosit down across the same table – as they did with me.

In fact, we orchestrated a place with the help ofProfessor Moi in Nairobi, Kenya that we called ThePeace House. We actually had 14 representatives fromthe Sudanese government and 14 representatives fromthe SPLM, and they sat across the table from each otherwith me mediating.

But that kind of thing is very difficult for an incumbentruling party to accept because it does tend to legitimizethe others who have been branded not only asrevolutionaries, but now as terrorists.

But you’ve been successful, in many of these cases, ofultimately getting them to do just that.

That’s true. The first time I had an actual breakthroughin Sudan was through dealing with Guinea Wormdisease. The two sides were hard at war at that timeand wouldn’t have a day of ceasefire, because for oneside it would be advantageous in the dry season andfor the other side in the wet season. I explained that wewanted to get into the southern part of the country tohelp eradicate Guinea Worm disease, and since bothleaders were thoroughly familiar with the devastatingeffect of this disease on their people, they reluctantlyagreed – after a lot of negotiating – to have atemporary ceasefire. At first it was only six weeks, buteventually I got them to extend it to six months.

12 Accord 16

What about the difficult case of engaging withterrorist organizations? Some would say terroristshave no interest in peace so they shouldn’t be engagedwith. How do you think about whether to engage witha terrorist group?

Well, I’ll have to be frank about this. These days I wouldbe reluctant to get involved in negotiating withterrorists who are internationally branded as such, andabout whom there’s no doubt that they are terrorists.

But, let me step back for a minute slightly and say thatin many cases, over the last quarter-century there’s anincreasing inclination on the part of any ruling party tobrand as “terrorists” anyone who disagrees with them.

When I was negotiating, for instance, with Israeli PrimeMinister Menachem Begin at Camp David in 1978, henever referred to any Palestinian as anything other thana terrorist. Obviously, we see that his successors arenegotiating directly with Palestinians. Back then therewas a prohibition against any American having directdealings with the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Right now President Putin makes it clear that allChechens who oppose him are terrorists. In Liberia 15 years ago, the warlords and their troops were allknown as terrorists. As a matter of fact, last yearZimbabwean President Mugabe identified my staff –who were there to help put together a proper election– as terrorists. So the epithet “terrorist” is now usedexcessively, though some obviously deserve thatcondemnation. But I think that in a number of cases Ihave had to make my own judgment about whether ornot a group is worthy of our involvement with them.

And does that follow a lot of the same criteria wetalked about before?

It would involve the same criteria, yes. Obviously, ifsomeone like Osama bin Laden sent word to us that hewanted to negotiate – which would be impossible toconceive – I wouldn’t do it.

One of the most interesting times that I did negotiate,though, was when we were involved indirectly inSomalia. The United States was trying to hunt downand kill a general, and he contacted us, and we workedout something between him and the US governmentindirectly. That’s one of the rare occasions that we’venegotiated between the US government andsomebody else.

But The Carter Center is available, and I would say that if we make an error, it would be in taking on things forwhich there isn’t much chance of success, instead of

being more cautious. On the other hand, we err on theside of at least talking to people who are pariahs in theinternational community when no one else will talk tothem. The advantage of talking is that when I think ourintercession might end a conflict or eliminate threats oractual human rights abuses, we engage more fully.

Does introducing the “terrorist” label unnecessarilycomplicate things because we can’t agree on what it means?

Well, it does. It depends on the degree to which itdeters outside mediation. For example, President Putinhas convinced the rest of the world that all Chechenswho disagree with him are terrorists.

Since the United States has adopted the frequent use of“terrorism,” and since we’ve passed some very stringentlaws and restraints on human freedom under the aegisof combating terrorism, this has opened a Pandora’sBox for actual persecutors and human rights violatorsto claim, “We’re just dealing with terrorism.” And that’shappened in a number of countries.

Finally President Carter, can I ask about the decision todisengage. Is there anything that would weigh on youto say, “It’s time to pull out or end our involvement?”

If I’m personally involved in a mediation, and itbecomes obvious to me that despite my best effortseither side is not acting in good faith, and that theydon’t genuinely seek a resolution of their differences,then I very quickly withdraw.

And I reserve the right to have a press conference atthat point with both leaders present (if they will come),and say, “This is the situation. I’ve done the best I could.These are the proposals I’ve made. One side hasaccepted them, the other side has refused,” and then I withdraw. I’ve done that a few times.

13The case for engagement

Understandingarmed groups

Sue Williams and Robert RiciglianoIn the world of violent conflict, parties in dispute do

not usually have a shared system for resolving theirdispute and consequently there is generally an

accepted need for what is referred to as a ‘peaceprocess’. Authority and legitimacy are contested, and no judge, court, tribunal, or bargaining process isacceptable to all sides. Hence, there is often an assumedneed for a ‘third party’, an individual or organizationoutside of the combatant groups, to assist in theestablishment and management of the process. Theseassumptions bring us to the central question for thisarticle: how can a third party understand an armedgroup well enough to be able to assist constructively inthe establishment of a peace process? ‘Understanding’such a group means more than merely havinginformation about them. It means developing a deeperknowing, an awareness of their experiences andperceptions, an understanding of their logic or way ofreasoning, and some ability to predict or explain whatthey do. This kind of understanding is dynamic, notstatic: rather than the gathering of information, this isthe development of a process of communication andnegotiation, out of which may come a peace process.

The question of understanding armed groups involvestwo kinds of variables: substantive (the informationrequired) and procedural (the process of interactionwith groups in order to gather the information). If an intermediary manages the procedural variablespoorly, then there is little chance that the informationobtained will have sufficient depth, trustworthiness orusefulness. So before detailing what information anintermediary should look for, it is necessary to flesh outthe variables that affect how the intermediary acquiresthat information.

14 Accord 16

Sue Williams is an independent

consultant who has lived and worked

for most of her professional life as a

mediator and a trainer in conflict

transformation and development.

Understanding armed groups

Variables that affect ‘how’ to go aboutunderstanding The trust factorThe first key variable that affects how an intermediaryapproaches the task of understanding an armed groupis trust. Trust is the ‘bandwidth’ of the connectionbetween an intermediary and the armed group. Intechnological terms, high bandwidth means that lots of information can flow over a computer network whilelow bandwidth means that information flows slowly andunreliably. In the same way, if there is a high degree oftrust between an intermediary and an armed group, theamount, quality and honesty of the informationexchanged is much greater.

Building trust is an incremental process. Often the firstlevel of trust is implied by the fact that an intermediaryis meeting at all with an armed group. In order to securea meeting, an intermediary usually needs to addresssome basic questions that the armed group will expectto be answered. These include: who is the intermediary(are they trusted by someone we trust)? Who invitedthem? What is the purpose of the meeting? What arethey going to do with our answers? What is their futurerole? Trust is more likely to be built if the initial meetingsare confidential, focus solely on understanding theindividual’s perspective (as opposed to arguing with it),and allow the individual (or group) to have a say in what,if any, future role the intermediary will play.

Assuming that an intermediary can overcome this initialhurdle of ‘gaining entry’ to the armed group, theintermediary needs to be true to their word. Ultimately,trust grows and contact continues if the armed groupsees it as in their interests to keep talking. Further,groups may decide to use an intermediary to testwhether they can build trust in a negotiation process.The intermediary may strive to gain the trust of thegroup’s leaders, in the hope of transferring that trust toother parties or to a specific process. If there are severalintermediaries, multiple armed groups, governmentpoliticians, plus neighbouring countries or interestedinternational parties, building and sustaining trustamong them becomes very complex indeed.

The intermediary as participant in the conflictA second variable that affects how an intermediaryunderstands armed groups is the fact that, onceengaged with the combatants, the intermediarybecomes an actor in that conflict system and has animpact (consciously or not) on the conflict dynamics. As Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle tells us, observersinfluence what they observe. An intermediary bringsattention to the conflict and, depending on their profile,

may bring prestige and offer a potential conduit to otherresources such as important governments, individuals, orfunds. Contact also entails risks for the interlocutor fromthe armed group. If the group is declared illegal, then it isrisky for anyone to speak for the group or be identifiedwith it. Even if not declared illegal, members of an armedgroup may feel that talking to outsiders can be a threatto their personal safety.

The intermediary also needs to be aware that in theprocess of understanding a group, he or she may alsochange the armed group itself and how the group relatesto the conflict. The intermediary may be the first to seekexplicitly to understand all sides of the conflict, and thearmed group may, for the first time, decide to participatein an inclusive process. The process may change howthe group thinks about its positions, needs, hopes andfears, and bring internal differences to the surface (oreven resolve them). It may be one of a few times thegroup is in discussion with someone who is neither asupporter nor an opponent. The process of makingthemselves clear and gaining a basic understanding ofthe other combatants has potential to influence thegroup’s structure, internal and external communications,and even their understanding of themselves.

Information does not flow in only one direction, fromthe armed group to the intermediary, but from orthrough the intermediary to the armed group. Just asthe intermediary engages with an armed group in orderto develop a better understanding of them, the armedgroup is seeking to further their understanding of theintermediary, the motivations of other parties and thebroader context. All sides in a conflict generally pursuemore than one strategy. They prepare for negotiationsand for the next offensive at the same time. Theirquestion is: are other parties really interested innegotiations? If they do negotiate, are they able to deliveron their agreements? To be effective, intermediaries mustbe aware of what their words and actions are telling thearmed group in relation to these critical questions.

What information to gather More than wordsIntermediaries need to pay attention to more than thespoken or written positions of the parties. They mustalso be adept at reading actions and the context withinwhich armed groups operate. Armed groups oftencommunicate in non-verbal ways. They operate in theworld of politics, where words are the commoncurrency, yet they often do not trust words used byothers, and do not feel that words alone suffice toconvey their own meaning and intent. Armed groupsare usually closed to outsiders, to control bothmembership selection and information. An armed

15Understanding armed groups

group makes choices about what to reveal about itself,and what to hide. Of course, as with any group, it may‘reveal’ information that is exaggerated or misleading in order to make itself appear larger, better-supportedor more powerful. A group may create a public imageby being mysterious, for example the intent of themasks of the Mexican Zapatistas. A hidden leader suchas Prabhakaran of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE) may appear mythic, powerful or charismatic. A group may strive to seem very ordinary, just likeeveryone else, both as camouflage and to give theimpression of broad support. Or it may choose theopposite tactic and place itself out of the realm ofordinary human life, particularly by persistentlyviolating taboos or extending the limits of its actions.Thus, the Lord’s Resistance Army of northern Ugandaengages in mutilation and some LTTE members carrycyanide pellets, all to demonstrate that their cause andcommitment go beyond the normal. These choicesmay be seen, and even dismissed, as tactics. However,

each choice is also a piece of information about thegroup, and as such will reward careful study. What thegroup does and says about itself begins to describe and locate at least its aspirations or what it believessuits its interests.

General information Intermediaries generally need to know similar thingsabout the various groups in the conflict, including: 1) their political profile, including their history, ideologyand allies; 2) their military capabilities, including theeffective size of each grouping, their arms, degree oftraining and territorial influence or control; 3) theirdegree of constituency support, including anygeographic or ethnic limits to their support; 4) theireconomic activities, including funding from abroad,from neighbouring states, from trade or from illegalactivities such as drugs, kidnapping or extortion. Theanswers to these questions can give some early

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Figure 1. Indicators regarding opportunities for and constraints on armed groups’ engagement.

Positive indicators

• Are or have been in political power

• Respect rules of law, provide services

• Have political institutions, agenda, candidates

• Hold territory over time

• Set up systems within the territory

• Allow freedom of movement

• Enjoy support of public constituency

• See settlement of conflict as deliveringeconomic benefits to their region orconstituency

• Possess without necessarily using force

• Observe humanitarian law, proper treatment of civilians

• Troops disciplined

Negative indicators

• Disregard for rule of law and elections

• Political assassinations

• Intolerant of differences, change

• Engage in ethnic cleansing, destruction

or

• Have no territory or control over it

• Isolate themselves from wider society

• Derive substantial profit from the wareconomy

• Indiscriminate, high civilian casualties

• No or little effective command and control

• Troops undisciplined

• Troops, force used to sustain illegal activities

Political power

Territory

Social and economic support

Use of military force

indications of the opportunities for and constraints onpolitical engagement, as the matrix (figure 1) suggests.

When analysing such information it is of course crucialto factor in the profile and behaviour of the otherconflict protagonists; this will play a significant role inshaping the group’s strategies and attitudes towardspolitical engagement. It is also important to considerhow any future process of engagement will fit into thebroader history of attempts at political dialogue. Finally,perhaps the most obvious and revealing area of enquirycan be to explore the group’s understanding of thecurrent conflict and its possible solutions.

Groups usually want everyone to know what they thinkis wrong and what should be done about it. This topichas the added advantage that one can begin discussingit with anyone, without needing to know whether theinterlocutor is actually a member of the armed group, asympathizer or an analyst. Asking for suggestions ofpeople who can help one to understand a given groupgenerally progresses imperceptibly from those who say‘they’ to those who say ‘we’. The group’s analysis of theproblem and their range of possible solutions reveal agreat deal about them, their aims, and how they wish to be seen.

One critical factor linked to the group’s perception ofthe origin of the conflict is how the group accounts forthe fact that it is armed (an area of discussion requiringconsiderable tact). Has it been an armed group since itsinception, or did it begin with political campaigns orsocial organizing before it took up arms? Has it causedmany casualties, and are they steadily increasing? Doesit limit the use of arms to specific situations? This helpsto clarify its aims and priorities, and also helps others tointerpret its actions. If an armed group is to engage in apeace process, both the group and the society will needto understand whether, how and when it might decideto prioritize strategies other than arms.

Are they willing and able to negotiate? It is not clear that all armed groups want to participate inpeace processes or can bring themselves to do so. At thesame time, it is likely that many other groups will resistincluding armed non-state actors in negotiationprocesses. As with building trust, the understanding ofwhether a group is serious about negotiating may needto develop over time, based on actions rather than words.

In general, what a group does is the best predictor ofwhat it will do. When this is extended to become aprocess of communication of intent and interpretationof events, it offers the best chance to understandwhether a given group will engage in a peace process in good faith. Even at an early stage, however, the

following questions can reveal indicators of likely futureactions (positive replies suggesting that fruitfulnegotiation may be possible):

• Does the group have a positive vision for a peacefulfuture or just a vision of what they do not want tohappen? Do they have a realistic understanding of the value of negotiating versus the value of notnegotiating? Do they have a nuanced understandingof their own group’s needs, interests, hopes and fears– and those of the other side? Do they have a clearvision of what it means not to negotiate a solution,and do they think that scenario is better than anyconceivable negotiated solution?

• Do they feel it is legitimate to talk to the other side(s)?Believe that it is in their interests to talk? Do theyenvision possible negotiated solutions?

• Do they have the resources (finances, expertise,communication channels) and ability to negotiate –including the ability to manage internal divisions,deliver on commitments, problem solve, understandthe other side(s), etc?

ConclusionFor all parties to a peace process, the development ofunderstanding about and between all the actors is anessential prerequisite for political progress. Withoutunderstanding it is difficult to identify common interests,build confidence, or resolve differences – all of which arevital steps in reaching an agreement capable of endingviolence and addressing the causes of conflict.

Much of an intermediary’s success comes down tointerpersonal and contextual factors, which will bedifferent in each conflict setting and even eachinteraction. Above all, it is crucial to remember thatarmed groups are dynamic organizations whosestrategies change in response to evolving circumstances.Different elements in the group will enjoy prominence atdifferent historical moments, in response to internaltensions or external influences. Intermediaries need toremember that their assessment of a group and itsattitude to political engagement is not definitive; at adifferent moment, possibly with a different interlocutor,an intermediary with a different approach may findopenings that were previously undiscovered.

Despite attempts to define or systematize the task ofunderstanding armed groups, it is still a healthy mix ofart and science. The issues outlined above, and thoseraised in the following case studies, can provide someuseful starting points and helpful signposts thatintermediaries can use in the difficult but essential taskof understanding armed groups.

17Understanding armed groups

Assessinggroups andopportunities a former governmentminister’s perspective

Marjorie (Mo) Mowlam was appointed the Britishgovernment’s Secretary of State for NorthernIreland by newly elected Prime Minister Tony

Blair in May 1997. A process of talks chaired by formerUS Senator George Mitchell was underway to enddecades of violent conflict in Northern Ireland, butwithout Sinn Féin, the political party closely associatedwith the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Shortly afterwardsBlair announced that Northern Ireland Office (NIO)officials could talk to Sinn Féin officials as long as the IRAwere preparing to stop violence and declare a ceasefire.The IRA restored its ceasefire in July and Sinn Féin joinedthe peace talks in October. After intensive negotiations,the Belfast Agreement (Good Friday Agreement) wassigned in April 1998. Mowlam continued in her postuntil October 1999.

Accord: When you took office as the Secretary of Statefor Northern Ireland, how did you build yourunderstanding of the various armed groups operatingin Northern Ireland?

Mo Mowlam: I read what I could, I talked to everybody I could: civil servants, people in the public, journalists,authors, and I think I got a reasonably rounded pictureof the various groups. I managed to get reasonablebriefs on both sides and didn’t have any particularproblems. I always made a note of where the informationcame from, so I knew that if there was any bias towardsor against Sinn Féin I’d be aware of it from knowingwhat the source was.

You say there were no problems, but one challenge fora government representative is to try and avoid havingan overly partisan perspective. Within the structures ofthe British state there must have been many differentunderstandings of and approaches to the armedgroups, especially the Republican ones.

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Mo Mowlam is confronted by a member of thepublic during a walkabout in Belfast , May 1998.

Source: Reuters/Dylan Martinez

Understanding armed groups

There were some individuals more able to comprehendthat we were going to talk to Sinn Féin face-to-face andpublicly, and others who found it harder, particularly if they had lost loved ones. I would listen to all myadvisors, the civil service, the security services,everybody – but I made the final decision. I evaluatedthe information I was getting – as well as the source –and I put it in context and decided which way I wentnext. That was what it was to be the Secretary of State.

The possibility that some people might try to obscureyour (and other people’s) understanding of theRepublicans especially must have been something youhad to deal with. A report in the Irish Sunday Tribune inJuly 1997 alleged that the IRA’s newly announced‘complete and unequivocal’ ceasefire would in fact belimited to only four months, and some believe this storywas the result of an attempt by Northern Irelandsecurity forces to scupper developments in the peaceprocess.

In the case of the newspaper article, all I could do wasnot join the doubters and stick to what I knew. I didn’tknow if the ceasefire was serious or not, I didn’t knowwho was not telling the truth. I just went alongassuming it would last.

From the stuff I’d read on Bloody Sunday [13 January1972 when British soldiers shot dead a number ofprotestors] it was clear that not everybody would beplaying it straight. And so I took that into account onevery piece of information I got, whether it was fromGerry Adams and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Féin,which would be biased towards their aims, or whether it was from the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) or thesecurity forces. I always used to bear in mind that thesecurity forces’ information was being filtered throughRUC officers on the desk. So I took that into accountwhen understanding the value of that information.

Did you try to change the way security or intelligenceservices worked at all?

Why should I? It was safer for me to interpret than totake them on and try and change them or questiontheir whole being. I was after progress don’t forget. I wasn’t after reform, I wasn’t after change, I wantedprogress in the peace talks.

19Assessing groups and opportunities

How did the previous government’s experiences affect your approach?

I will never forget the moment when Patrick Mayhew[Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 1992-1997] hadto come to the House of Commons in 1993 and say thegovernment and the IRA had been talking secretly forseveral years. There was outrage – more on thegovernment benches than our opposition ones. Iactually felt sorry for him having to admit they had beentalking in private while using very different rhetoric inthe Commons. I think it made both Tony Blair and I clearthat we wouldn’t talk in secret: if and when we got intogovernment we’d do it quite openly. Which we did.

Did you try to engage the IRA directly during your timeas Secretary of State?

Why would I? Sinn Féin and IRA were much the samething.

Is there any sense in which they can be consideredseparate as opposed to one organization?

I considered there to be two organizations but somepeople overlapped. There were clearly people who weremembers of both.

How did you perceive the IRA’s decision-making processin relation to Sinn Féin’s activities at the negotiatingtable?

Sinn Féin clearly had to consult with the IRA before theyreached decisions on matters they discussed in the talksprocess. They always agreed or objected ‘in principle’and would have to go back and consult with the rest ofSinn Féin and with the IRA before they would announcea decision. We had to give them the space to do that.

I don’t think they were ever overruled by the IRA. I didn’t really perceive any divisions nor did I see thatrelationship change much. There must have beendifficulties as with all sides in the talks process, but theywere never brought to the fore. Martin McGuinness andGerry Adams knew pretty much what the IRA werethinking anyway.

So you gave them room to deal with their own internaldynamics as long as the peaceful dialogue wasprogressing. Did you learn more about their ways ofworking as the talks progressed?

They clearly had an efficient communication systemwithin the party and to the IRA. I came to respect theirstructure and their organization, particularly in relationto the press. They always got their press releases out

quicker than us, and I thought we had an efficient pressoffice. However quickly I moved, Sinn Féin were alwaysfirst. I eventually learned that they had a desk forAmerica, a desk for Ireland, a desk for the north, a deskfor Britain, all well-structured. Occasionally I used to goto their room at the talks process and it was full ofpeople working away. So I learned how efficient theywere and how we couldn’t beat them on the press side.

A hallmark of your style was the willingness to talk topeople face-to-face. You tried to prevent the talksprocess from collapsing in January 1998 by visiting theMaze Prison and talking to prisoners from both sides.

I talked to prisoners from both sides because if you talk to one side and not the other they feel cheated.Because they distrusted each other so badly if you didn’tgive the same to both sides they would think they’dbeen done down.

I was asked to go to the Maze by Loyalists. When GaryMcMichael [leader of the Ulster Democratic Party, whichhas links to the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association]came across to London with two associates, I knew itwas serious because the Loyalists don’t have that muchspare money and they had made the effort to bringthree people to London. Gary said his people in theMaze didn’t think there was any point in continuing withthe peace process. That was serious because if theypulled out, Sinn Féin-IRA would pull out and they wouldreturn to fighting. So I checked with the head of the myDepartment, I checked with the head of the civil service,I checked with my mum (she always had a commonsense view of these things) and it made sense to go in.

How did this kind of contact assist your understandingof the armed groups?

It made me understand quite a lot about their hierarchyand motivation, and a little of how they were structured.They treated me with respect. Because of the heat in theprison they all wore shorts and t-shirts, but when I wentin they put on long trousers and gave me one of theonly chairs in the prison with arms (because they canbreak off the arms and use them as weapons), so thatmeant they were making an effort and considered themeeting important. They talked quite clearly about howthey believed they weren’t getting enough out of thetalks and didn’t see much point in staying in. I tried toconvince them that there was a point and theyshouldn’t feel disillusioned, that their side was doingvery well and that McMichael was a very goodnegotiator. They went back and reported to the rest ofthe Loyalists in the prison and after two hours theyreturned and the message came out that they weregoing to stay in the peace process.

20 Accord 16

You clearly understood the importance of actions,context and unspoken signals. Did you have a clearsense of exactly who the prisoners were in terms ofwhere they stood within their various groups?

Well, I knew they were important – because they hadlost their freedom and the people on the outside doingthe negotiations hadn’t, and so that was a cleardistinction and why they were so important to folksoutside. That’s why you had to go in and talk to themand convince them not to break, because they wereclearly important to the Shinners or the Loyalistsoutside. I think I found it easier to talk to people in all political parties because of my class. Unlike manyprevious Secretaries of State, my roots were similar tothose of many people I was talking to. I also foundhumour very useful in the talks and I do have a goodsense of humour.

They weren’t difficult to talk to. I’d talked to a fairnumber of Loyalists outside the jail and the onlydifference is the ones inside had been caught doingsomething and the ones outside hadn’t. So, it was quiteeasy to talk to them, and to the Republicans too whowere very similar but with a different perspective. Boththe Shinners and the Loyalists were the same inside andoutside the jail, but some of them had been caught andsome hadn’t – that was the only distinction in theirminds, so I took this into account all the time.

Was this kind of initiative something you considered anew and bold step?

No. I thought it was the common sense thing to do andthe necessary step to hold them all in the process. I onlyrealized how much of a risk it was perceived as when I went to the prison gym afterwards to meet the pressand it was packed. I realized then it was perceived as anodd thing to do, which I can’t understand becausewithout doing that the talks would have broken down. I wanted the talks to keep going.

One of the biggest challenges to understanding allsides in the conflict must have been the various attacksand atrocities that were committed during the peaceprocess. To cite just one case, two RUC officers werekilled by the IRA quite soon after your appointment.What did you understand about the meaning ofgroups’ violent actions during this time?

Like most actions on both sides, they weren’t trustingwhat was happening, they didn’t know where we weregoing. They didn’t know us well enough to know wewere going to play it straight, and they were testing us.

They wanted to be sure we knew they would continueviolence if we didn’t play straight. I basically understoodthem as a group of people willing to talk, but there hadto be more trust. I was prepared to shake hands andtreat them as human beings, because otherwise youwon’t get a good relationship for talking. I believe intalking rather than shooting. That’s my basic philosophyon how to bring people to peace. But it helps if theyknow you have the means to use force which was whatprevious governments had done.

But this must have been quite difficult. There are manycases where governments do refuse to talk to peopleengaged in violent activities.

Well we said if they went onto ceasefire we’d talk. Theywent onto ceasefire and we talked. We did in factexclude Sinn Féin from the talks for seventeen days inFebruary 1998 after it appeared the IRA had beeninvolved in the deaths of two men. The IRA’s definitionof a ceasefire was different to everyone else’s, and theyprobably didn’t see the killings as breaching a ‘cessationof military activities’, but rather ‘disciplinary’ attacks.

In conclusion, what advice would you offer to othergovernment officials, elsewhere in the world, who areattempting to understand and engage with armed groups operating in their country?

I wouldn’t give a blanket recommendation and wouldbegin by saying every conflict is different. But I thinkthere are lessons on specifics we did that worked. It isimportant to consult with people and be inclusive. Youmust include the whole of society not directly involvedin talks, and so bread and butter issues, particularly theeconomy, are important. Involve all the various groupsin society so they know what is happening and youhave to keep the people with you if you’re going to havesocial change. I worked hard to keep all the parties inthe talks. Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern [the Irish PrimeMinister] talked only to Sinn Féin and the Ulster UnionistParty, and I went around everyone else who would bewondering what was happening (i.e. why weren’t theybeing included? What was going on?) making sureeverybody felt good about what was happening. That’swhere I got the “tea lady” reputation from!

On governments engaging armed groups, all I wouldsay is you don’t fight terrorism with weapons andbullets. You fight it by talking to them. That’s the overallmessage I think I have.

21Assessing groups and opportunities

Attempting tounderstand an intermediary’s perspective Terry Waite was appointed as an advisor on

international affairs to the Archbishop ofCanterbury in 1980 and became known for his

humanitarian efforts to negotiate the release of Westernhostages in the Middle East. His first experience was thesuccessful negotiation of the release of hostages held inIran (1980-81), followed by the freeing of four hostagesin Libya (1984-85).

In 1987 he was himself taken captive while attempting tonegotiate the freedom of British and American hostagesheld in Beirut. The hostage-takers, linked to Hizbollah (an Iranian-backed armed group from the Lebanese Shia Muslim community), were demanding the release of prisoners held on terrorist charges in Kuwait.

Waite, who was known to have met Colonel OliverNorth, was seized soon after the exposure of the Iran-Contra affair in which North and other members of theUS administration were revealed to have been sellingarms to Iran. Waite spent 1,763 days in captivity beforehis release in November 1991.

Accord: As a humanitarian actor intervening in Iran,Libya and Beirut, how important was it to you tounderstand hostage-taking groups’ political aims,strategies and relationships, and how did you try to do this?

Terry Waite: I tried to do as much background work as Icould, but looking back I realize I was learning as I wentalong. In the case of Iran, a country I had never been tobefore, I consulted a lot of people on Iran’s perceivedpolitical aims, but I depended more on getting on theground, listening to people and picking up what theywere saying to me. I tried not to go in over-prejudicedone way or the other, keeping an open mind andlistening to what was said to me.

22 Accord 16

Terry Waite guarded by Druze militia as he speaksto reporters in Beirut, January 1987.

Source: AP

Understanding armed groups

In a sense I was working highly intuitively rather thanaccording to a set formula. I have to say I did have apattern of working – which was extremely risky and onethat I wouldn’t recommend for every situation at all –and that was seeking a face-to-face meeting, which isobviously very dangerous in these situations. If such ameeting could be established, then I would try to builda relationship of trust, and if that could be done, then tryand explore the root issues, i.e. why are you doing whatyou are doing? I would try and resolve issues in a face-saving manner, by which I mean in a manner in which allparties can walk away with their dignity intact, insofar asis possible. In the process of following that strategy, it isimportant not to behave in ways that would be illegal orwould mean engaging in exchange or ransom-paying –I’ve never believed in that and stuck by that throughout.That was the sort of model that was in my mind, but itwas treading one step at a time largely using intuition.

In trying to build your understanding of the hostage-takers in Beirut, we understand British and Americangovernments were not sharing any intelligence, butyou had publicized your efforts and a number ofcontacts provided information. Can you say somethingabout that process of information-gathering?

The problem was where to begin. When hostages weretaken, the different groups had different names. Theproblem for me from the outside was: is it one groupusing different names to confuse, or are there differentgroups competing with each other or not necessarilyliaising with each other?

Information came in from different contacts, frompeople who had high level contacts in Lebanon, but I cannot think of any information that really was a great deal of use. Walid Jumblatt [leader of the Druzecommunity] did provide me with protection by hismilitia when I came in from the airport, but I dismissedthem when I got into town. I went to see Jumblatt when I was in Lebanon, but I can’t think of any reallyinteresting information anyone provided, aside from the usual sort of things said about Hizbollah (about theinvolvement of Syria and Iran and so on) – nothing thatwould help me in terms of an intervention strategy.

It shows that you can surround yourself with thoughtsand understandings and analyses, but what reallycounts is your ability on the ground to have a degree of sensitivity to people in situations, to be able to getyourself onto the wavelengths of the people with whom

23Attempting to understand

you’re working or discussing, not to be harsh in yourjudgments and to try and understand and listen topeople – what is it you’re saying, and why is it you’re doingwhat you’re doing? And where can we find some point ofagreement, even if it’s a very simple point of agreement,to agree to sit down together and talk to each other ashuman beings. We may have different perspectivesbecause of our different backgrounds, religiousupbringings and cultural heritages, but we share thesame planet and have the same hopes and desires forour children and our families. Sensitivity is a misusedterm, but, sensitivity and intuition, coupled with acertain degree of hard-headedness are some of thequalities that are necessary in that situation.

If I were to criticize myself, I suppose I was fairly weak ondetailed analysis because it was a totally complex fieldand I don’t speak Arabic. If I wanted to have completeanalysis I would have to speak Arabic.

It is one thing to see what a group is saying to you interms of language but there is probably a lot that canalso be learned from their behaviour.

There were so many real difficulties. They recognizedthey were extremely vulnerable. When I eventually metthem, they would be concerned about whether I wasbeing followed. Was I wearing a locator device? They’dsearch me for that. In some respects it almost took asmuch courage for them to come and meet me as for meto meet them. Of course it was easier for them becausethey had people all over the place and were certainlyobserving me as I went to meet them, and in theirminds would be: where are the Americans or Britishobserving us observing him? So you’re walking througha hornet’s nest, coupled with the fact that there was acivil war in Lebanon at the time.

Another obstacle was that when I met them I had to beblindfolded. As a negotiator you depend on the signalsgiven out by body language. When that is denied toyou, you are put in a more difficult position. The degreeof rapport and understanding you can have is limited.

How did you identify their objectives?

They had a very specific agenda as far as I was concerned,and it was about the release of some prisoners held inKuwait. But I almost made a fatal mistake trying to findout. I’d been to the US, and I was asked to try and get ameeting and clarify what it was the kidnappers wanted,and whether it was money or not. I said I would clarifytheir demands because I too wanted to know, but if itwas money I wouldn’t be a conduit.

I went to see the kidnappers in Beirut at the consultingroom of a doctor who was acting as an intermediary,who I believe was acting in good faith as a member ofthe Shia community. I had to be blindfolded when theothers came into the room, whoever they were. I first ofall asked to see the hostages, and they wouldn’t havethat. I asked them to take a Polaroid camera and bringme pictures of the hostages, which they did. Then Iraised the question of money, and it nearly wrecked thewhole discussion. They said, “You know very well it isn’tmoney.” I said I didn’t know what it was. They said, “TheAmericans know very well what it is,” but I didn’t know if the Americans knew or not – whether they’d had any other direct contact with America. Publicly theAmericans were saying they would not negotiate withterrorists. Anyway, I was able to get over that hurdle, but it was a very nasty moment, and it almost wreckedthings right from the beginning, and I regret evenasking that question.

They said they had blood relatives in Kuwait being held on a variety of terrorist charges under appallingconditions, some facing the death penalty. They askedme to look into this situation, to take letters from theirfamilies, and to generally see what could be improved. I said I had no power at all to spring people from prison,but as a humanitarian I believed that all people detainedby legal process were entitled to be treated fairly andproperly according to due process. I offered to see if the prisoners were being treated properly, and if I could take letters.

These were the specific demands and they neverstrayed from them. There undoubtedly were broaderpolitical objectives, but in this specific instance in mydealings they never raised them whatsoever.

You were eventually taken hostage yourself. What went wrong, and did you make mistakes as a third-party intervener?

I think it is reasonable to surmise that one of the reasonsthey took me was that when Iran-Contra broke it cameas a surprise to the Lebanese Hizbollah who werereceiving guidance and arms from the Iranians. I thinksome of them said, “We’ll take Waite and see what heknows about this whole business,” because they knew I was in touch with the Americans and the British – I wasn’t trying to keep that secret – and I think they werealso concerned that I might have given away somethingthat would lead the Americans or British close to them.

I still believe if I had been able to get to Kuwait and seethe prisoners and do something to alleviate theirconditions it would have done wonders for easing the

24 Accord 16

situation. But I can see why I didn’t get there, becausepolitically there was an entirely different agenda: theIran-Contra business, which was all about trying to getIran to pressurize Hizbollah in Lebanon. I think this is theimportant point. An independent mediator/negotiatorin that situation is faced with a very great dilemma. Onthe one hand you want to cooperate with those – let ussay a government or government agency – you believeare trying to obtain the release of innocent people. Onthe other hand, you’ll know it is possible – in some caseshighly likely – that governments will also have anotherpolitical agenda that will be playing out over and abovethe hostage issue. How far do you cooperate and howfar do you stand apart? Cooperate too much and youare compromised; your position as an independentnegotiator is gone. But standing back from them totallyis sometimes almost impossible because you need them for access, etc. It puts the humanitarian negotiatorin a very vulnerable position, where you almost can’ttrust either side.

What advice would you give to somebody engagedwith armed groups for peacemaking or humanitarianpurposes?

Don’t necessarily imagine that formulas for negotiationare going to work. It’s not a bad thing to have a generalidea in your mind as to the process that is possible, but try and work with intuition, an educated intuition. Don’t depend on intuition alone because alone it willsometimes lead you astray, but don’t despise it – that’swhat I mean by educated intuition.

There may be times you have to work alone becauseperhaps you are the only one who has access or istrusted, but always try and refer back and debrief in adebriefing team when you come back from a situation – as quickly as possible. The debriefing team must alsoobserve the same rules you observe – absolutediscretion. You must not pass on anything to do with the groups you are working on without theirpermission. In other words you’ve got to be impartialand discreet.

In summary, would you have any particular advice onthis whole process of how you understand armedgroups?

Be very careful about any analysis you make, and checkit, check it, check it. And most importantly you mustestablish personal contact with key decision makerswithin the groups, and if you establish contact with alower level decision maker, you’ve got to get them toget you to the person who is the key decision maker. Itmay take time, you may have to work up, or around, but

never be satisfied until you get to a key decision maker,and when you get there – and if you are the right person– you’re in a very strong position.

And I would also say, if for any reason you realize you’renot the right person for the job for whatever reason, getout. Get somebody else in instead. Don’t be so proudand stubborn to say, “Hang on, I’m failing, and thereforeI have to try even harder.” If you’ve got a good reason,and you share that with your team, then no fault, noshame. Not everyone’s right for every situation.

Hostage-taking in the Middle East is once again in theheadlines. What does your experience tell us about howthis should be dealt with, and what is different aboutthe hostage-taking in Iraq today?

I think it is totally different in Iraq. The strategy that Ifollowed as a Westerner all those years ago could not be followed. I don’t believe I could go into Iraq and talkdirectly with the head of a group that has kidnapped aWesterner. Why not? Because I believe the pre-emptivepolicies and heavy-handed military methods adopted in the West have polarized the situation. In such apolarized situation you can’t work the same way. Theonly ones who stand a remote chance are the Islamicleaders on the ground, and they’re fighting a losingbattle in such a polarized situation. Perhaps if the allieseventually withdraw and a UN force goes in, things canstart to be put back together.

25Attempting to understand

Chechenresistance myth and reality

Ilyas Akhmadov

From my personal experience as Foreign Minister ofChechnya – in which capacity my main duty is toexplain to outsiders the nature of the Chechen

conflict – I would say that the biggest obstacle to beingunderstood is ignorance of the history of the conflict.The Russian effort to classify the war as a classicseparatist conflict between a rebel territory and acolonial centre obscures the fact that in the long andtragic history of relations between Russia and Chechnya,the tiny Chechen nation has at least four times been on the brink of total annihilation. It is a mistake torepresent this war as only a war for independence –independence is not a goal in itself, but a guarantee ofthe survival of the Chechen nation. Even a cursory lookat the last five years shows that the conflict is bestcharacterized as ethnic warfare, where Chechens aretargeted because of their nationality. In one famousincident at the beginning of the war, the RussianCommander General Shamanov said that the killing of civilians is justified because, “the wife of a terrorist is a terrorist; and the child of a terrorist is a terrorist.”Similarly, recent statements by the Russian FederalSecurity Service (FSB) routinely refer to arrests ofpersons “suspected of being relatives of terrorists.”

The Kremlin represents the Chechen resistance as asingle terrorist network spreading throughout the northCaucasus, which has its centre in Chechnya but relies ondirection and financing from foreign sources. In reality,there is a wide spectrum of groups fighting againstRussia in the north Caucasus that have different goalsand motivations and are to different degrees involved in the war in Chechnya. The complexity and variety ofarmed groups throughout the north Caucasus as awhole prohibits neat classification. Describing it iscomplicated not only for outside experts but also forparticipants. For this reason the classification offeredhere should be seen as a schematic outline.

26 Accord 16

Ilyas Akhmadov was appointed

Foreign Minister of Chechnya in

1999. He is currently a Reagan-

Fascell Democracy Fellow at the

National Endowment for Democracy

in Washington DC.

Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov in talks with RussianPresident Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin, 12 May 1997.

Source: Reuters

Understanding armed groups

Who we areThe structure of the Chechen resistance can be brokendown into several groups. Without a doubt, after thedemise of President Aslan Maskhadov in March 2005 theconflict will pass into a new and qualitatively differentphase, which will to a certain degree alter thecomponents of the structures I am describing. Untilrecently, the political leadership was headed byMaskhadov and is comprised of Ministers in Chechnya,several Ministers who represent Chechnya abroad, andMembers of Parliament who continue to carry out theirduties. There is no Chechen ‘government in exile’; rathersome members of the government remain in Chechnyawhereas others represent Chechnya abroad. ThePresident and the Parliament were elected in 1997 inelections which were certified as free and fair by theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE). In contrast, the pro-Russian administrator AluAlkhanov was chosen during wartime in a process thatwas roundly denounced as fraudulent. Another type ofpolitical resistance consists of individuals and groupswho carry out actions of civil disobedience withinChechnya: marches, protests, anti-war actions andexpressions of support for the resistance. For instance,over 3,000 Chechen residents signed my peace plancalling for conditional independence under aninternational protectorate (30,000 people worldwidesigned). By putting their names and addresses on thispetition they took great personal risks to demonstratetheir support for peace.

The fighting strength of the Chechen resistance consists of units formed on the basis of squads of the army of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria thattransformed themselves into guerrilla units when they withdrew from the capital Grozny when it fell in February 2000.

A significant portion of these units remains constantlyactive and is based in the mountainous parts of theRepublic. The remainder is oriented exclusively todiversionary tactics, carrying out operations againsttactical targets in lowland Russian-controlled areas. Thesecond type of armed resistance is comprised of groupswho did not fall under Maskhadov’s control and whopropagate the most radical methods of fighting the war.The main leader of this element is Shamil Basaev, whowas responsible for both the Nord-Ost and Beslanhostage takings. The third type of armed resistance isrepresented by small temporary formations that unite fordifferent purposes, usually vendetta and revenge. Theseare persons who come together for a particular missionand then return to civilian life. This would include someof the ‘black widow’ and suicide attacks that have beencarried out over the last two years.

Finally, there are the various units that have beenformed on the territories of neighbouring northCaucasus republics like Ingushetia, Dagestan andKabardino-Balkaria. Some were formed in solidarity with the Chechen resistance while others were formedin response to the overall militarization of the northCaucasus. For Russia, the north Caucasus is the stagingground for the war in Chechnya, where the army, thesecurity services, and federal law enforcement havegreater authority than the local civilian officials. Thesevarious Russian forces have engaged in massivelawlessness and violence against the local civilianpopulation, thereby inspiring local forms of resistance.

While the outside world might be content to view themas terrorists, the men and women on the ground arefighting for survival. When they lose faith that the warwill ever end – that there is any civilized solution – theyturn to terrorism. To understand this conflict it is

27Chechen resistance: myth and reality

important to note that the only demand made by theterrorists has been the withdrawal of Russian forces fromChechnya and the start of negotiations. Even the mostradical wing of the Chechen resistance usually calls foran end to the war, although they question whether anend can ever be brought about through negotiations.That the international community and Russia ignore themoderate political leadership and its persistent efforts tofind a political resolution contributes to the sense offutility on the ground and therefore to an enlargementof the ranks of those who see terrorism as the only wayof stopping the war.

How we are perceivedParticularly since the tragedy of 11 September 2001, it iscommonplace for nearly all outsiders to view the masskilling of Chechens as a natural and excusable corollaryto the global war against terrorism. As a result,international involvement in regulating, observing ormitigating the consequences of the war for the civilianpopulation has been minimal.

The first Russian-Chechen war was viewed as a typicalpost-Soviet conflict, like the war over Nagorny-Karabakhor Abkhazia. Although international actors emphasizedRussian territorial integrity, they also condemnedRussian human rights abuses and actively soughtavenues to end the war through mediation. Moreover,due in large part to the relatively unrestricted Russiantelevision and other media that reported from bothsides of the front lines and gave a reasonably balancedview of events, the Chechen resistance had a certainromantic public image, particularly in Europe. But since11 September 2001 we are viewed through the lens ofanti-terrorism: pretending that the mass killing ofChechens contributes to the war against terrorismpermits the West to maintain close relations with Russiaand absolves its collective conscience for ignoringatrocities. Viewing this war as one of the fronts in thewar against global terrorism frees the West from itsobligation to uphold standards of human rights andinternational law.

Without a doubt one of the major obstacles tounderstanding this conflict is the Kremlin-imposedinformation blockade. The creation of this blockade is afundamental component of the Kremlin’s propagandastrategy. It seeks to prohibit any independentobservation of the conflict by internationalorganizations such as the OSCE, by foreign or domesticindependent media, or by staff of internationalhumanitarian organizations. The monopoly on the flow of information from Chechnya permits the Russiansecurity services to distort the picture considerably. When he first came to power, President Vladimir Putincommented that lessons had been learned from the

first campaign. I believe that the most significant lessonlearned was to control foreign and Russian journalistsreporting from Chechnya. Parallel to the groundoffensive on Chechnya there was an attack on theRussian media. A clear example of efforts to preventindependent journalism was the case of Radio FreeEurope / Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky,who attempted to report from both sides of the lines.He was kidnapped by Russian security services, held for roughly a month, beaten and tortured, while Russian spokesmen claimed to know nothing of hiswhereabouts.

Other types of independent organization have tocontend with similar problems. Humanitarian agenciessuch as Médecins Sans Frontières, the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross and others are systematicallyharassed. Some international staff have been killedduring bombardments of humanitarian aid convoys,and others kidnapped under circumstances thatstrongly suggest the involvement of Russian securityservices. Currently humanitarian organizations operatein Chechnya only through Chechen staff; theirinternational staff are not permitted to travel there. Ofcourse, the conditions for Chechen journalists and NGOsare even more risky. The Society of Russian-ChechenFriendship, which reports daily on human rights abusesin Chechnya, has lost four of its staff in political killingsby federal forces. The head of the organization has been harassed by the FSB, kidnapped, tortured and hisproperty – including lists of correspondents inChechnya – confiscated.

Unrecognized statehood We believe that we constitute a state in every aspectexcept international recognition. Therefore our strategyis to persuade outsiders that we can behave like anormal state and should be treated as such. During thefirst war and at the beginning of the present war wefought with the strategies and tactics of a conventionalarmy. We tried to maintain command and control, holda front line, hold territory and hold onto the capital foras long as possible. This strategy was almost suicidal inview of the unequal size of the forces. Guerrilla warfarewould have been to our advantage but we sacrificedmany of our best fighters to fight as a conventional forceprecisely because we wanted to demonstrate ourcapacity for statehood. Our constant lack of personnel,weapons and supplies was compensated only bytremendous force of will. For many observers thisconnoted heroism, for others fanaticism, but for us itwas necessity. We had to maintain the norms that wouldallow outsiders to perceive us as a state. And even sincethe guerrilla war began, the Chechen resistance has heldon tenaciously to all possible attributes of statehood. It isimportant to note that until summer 1995, our resistance

28 Accord 16

was exclusively fighting conventional warfare. There was strict subordination to the President, who was the commander-in-chief and who supervised the headquarters of the armed forces, and four commandersresponsible for different fronts or directions, who hadresponsibilities in their sectors and whose duties werecarefully delineated. From December 1994 until June1995, we held a front line and despite the hugesuperiority of Russian forces they moved that front linein the direction of the mountains very slowly and at thecost of high casualties. Our foreign policy is orientedtoward persuading international institutions – the UN,OSCE, European Parliament, and the ParliamentaryAssembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) – to paygreater attention to the war and ultimately regulate it.Despite our status as a party to the conflict and ourconstant efforts to be understood, we often meet arefusal to talk to us. For instance, the PACE held aroundtable to discuss Chechnya in March 2005 thatincluded only the Russian government, Russian NGOsand the Russian-installed government of Chechnya. This was counter-productive. If the Russian delegationcannot sit at the same table as representatives of theChechen warring side, then PACE should organizeseparate meetings. But PACE should not act as if all thesides are represented or progress is being made if thereis only a pretence of multilateral discussion. This isparticularly disappointing for us, because the PACE isone of very few international organizations that hasbeen even marginally involved in trying to observe and resolve the conflict.

This is indicative of a fundamental error in the Westernperception of the conflict and of Russia: namely, thehabit of making unilateral concessions to Russia andhoping that it will reciprocate. Typically, Westernpoliticians focus on utterly superficial improvements –such as new internet cafes or cell phone use – inChechnya and pretend that these are indicative of alower level of violence, which of course they are not.Proceeding from such illusory “improvements,” the Westmakes small concessions to Russia and then hopes thatRussia will reciprocate with substantive concessions. Thisapproach can never work, because the Russian side isgetting everything it wants without having to make anysubstantive improvements.

The most damaging concession that PACE and manyother international actors have made is to follow theRussian line of “Chechenization.” Russia pretends thatthere is internal conflict between different Chechengroups and poses as the mediator. In fact, one of theChechen “sides” comprises ethnic Chechens appointedby Russia and who should not be seen as anindependent actor. Hence PACE pretends that AluAlkhanov, a Russian appointee, is a “side” in the conflictand utterly ignores the warring side.

The representatives of Chechnya abroad try to resolveissues of state without access to any of the resources of a state, such as diplomatic immunity. My mostelementary need is to be granted visas to enter differentstates, but every application process is a major battle.Western bureaucracies fear Russia’s hysterical responsesand invent the most absurd obstacles. For instance, inNovember 1999, I was invited by Noel Mamer of France’sGreen Party to speak to the National Assembly, but theFrench Foreign Ministry would not issue a visa.Eventually Pax Cristi invited me to Holland, which gaveme the opportunity to go to France. Mamer secretlytook me into the parliament and in front of the PrimeMinister publicly demanded to know why I was denied a visa. There was a huge furore but ultimately ForeignMinister Uber Vedrin apologized on behalf of thegovernment and the following day I was given a visa. I wish I could say that every time I applied for a visa itended with such a success, but I have missed manyimportant forums and events because I could not obtain the proper documents.

Last but not least, Russia’s use of Interpol is a hugeproblem. As many human rights groups have noted,Russia uses its Interpol membership not to combatorganized crime but to harass political opponents. TheRussian ‘Procuracy’ fabricates cases against Chechenrepresentatives such as Deputy Prime Minister AkhmedZakaev and myself in the crudest manner. These cases,although blatantly false, damage our image, waste ourresources and impede our ability to travel.

There was only one period in recent history when theway we were perceived corresponded to the way weperceive ourselves. This was during the negotiations of1995-1997, which were conducted with OSCE mediationand ended the first war. The negotiations demandedthat the Chechen side become unified and that thevarious armed units demonstrate loyalty andsubordination to the political authorities. Only by sodoing could we persuade the other parties of our abilityto carry out the obligations we were undertaking. Wefelt we were being included in the sphere of inter-stateor inter-government relations which stimulated us toobserve the standards of that community. The ceasefirewhich Maskhadov announced and the Chechen fighterskept in February 2005 showed that this subordinationand loyalty were still in place. What was lacking was asimilar degree of international involvement. The tragicdeath of President Maskhadov turns a new page in thisconflict and at present we can only speculate about itsalgorithms, its duration, and its geography. What is clearis that with his passing there seems little possibility of acivilized end to this conflict in the near future.

29Chechen resistance: myth and reality

From armedstruggle topoliticalnegotiationsWhy? When? How?

Clem McCartney

When intermediaries and analysts think aboutarmed conflict they often consider violence anobstacle to a negotiated settlement and thus

that one of the keys to unlocking a peace process is thecessation of violence. A corollary of that thinking is thatviolence is simply a tactic and that armed groups needto be helped to recognize the benefits of a non-violentstrategy. However, while the importance of ceasefiresshould not be under-estimated, the assumption thatviolence is a tactic that can be replaced by anothertactic reflects a partial analysis of the nature of armedgroups. Armed groups themselves will often say thatthey believe in peace and they are struggling for a justpeace. In other cases they will say that the violence isan expression of their situation and valid even if it willnot bring about change. Therefore to really understandhow there can be a transition from military force topolitics we need to understand the nature of armedgroups. We also need to understand the communitieswhich support them, either explicitly or implicitly, asthey too are involved in the thought process discussedin this article and their attitudes are significantinfluences on the armed group.

Most armed groups have an analysis of their situation inwhich armed action seems an inevitable, if unfortunate,component. Their existence is often a challenge to thestate monopoly on force or its use of terror against theircommunity or class. Some militant groups begin with atheoretical analysis of the state that argues that changecan only come through violence, but this is often notthe case. Many militant groups have grown out of non-violent democratic movements for change which havebeen crushed by the state and in some cases the statehas consciously preferred the transfer of popularprotest into a terror it feels it can control more easily.Ironically, but not surprisingly, armed groups haveadopted a cult of force and a power/coercion paradigmfrom states, imbued with the sense that nations arebuilt through force and the attendant assumption thatthere is an acceptable level of violence.

30 Accord 16

Clem McCartney is an independent

consultant from Northern Ireland

where he has worked with the main

protagonists. Recent involvements

include the Sri Lankan and Georgian-

Abkhaz conflicts.

Lord's Resistance Army representatives talk with Uganda'schief negotiator Betty Bigombe (right) in Palabek, near the

Uganda-Sudan border, 28 December 2004.

Source: Reuters

Armed groups’ choices

The armed group and its supporters will not necessarilyhave a fully worked out sense of these matters but theywill have grasped them intuitively and internalizedthem as basic aspects of their orientation. So whenintermediaries explore with militant groups an end totheir violence, they may treat violence as an optionalelement in the repertoire of options that the group has,when in fact it is an integral part of their raison d’etreand needs to be approached as such.

However, the armed group is open to tacticaladjustments in its methods if it sees an opportunity and will manage its military campaign to achieve thebest advantage for itself. A ceasefire could give theopportunity for regrouping militarily, presenting a morepositive public image and so on. This kind of shift doesnot imply a deeper change of orientation. But at somestage the military option will have to be replaced by anegotiation process. Even if the military campaign issuccessful, a process for an orderly handover of poweris preferable and this requires some capacity tonegotiate the end of the war. So whether dealing with

the state or armed groups we can distinguish threepossible positions:

• Militancy which believes that military force is the only option

• Dual strategy which still believes in the primacy offorce but will use other approaches for tacticaladvantage

• A conflict transformation strategy

The question for the group is when a transition to aconflict transformation paradigm is appropriate andwhether it can manage that transition effectively.

While we can accept that the issue of violence is onlyone part of the militant mindset, which needs to beappreciated as an integrated whole, we can identifysome of its component elements and consider howthey may change either as a result of the passage oftime or through deliberate interventions which aredesigned to make dialogue and negotiations attractive.

31From armed struggle to political negotiations

We might think of a set of weighing scales on one sideof which are stacked a series of elements tendingtowards militancy. They include:

• Lack of alternative option – council of despair

• Militant mindset

• Commitment to the campaign

• Avoidance of compromise

• Control of one’s own destiny

• Avoidance of splits

There are also material factors which will encourage the continuation of the armed conflict, such as theinfluence of external sponsors of the conflict or thebenefits that the leaders gain from the war economy,but this paper focuses on the internal politicaldynamics which influence the continuation orcurtailment of the military campaign.

On the other side of the scales are other elements that might tend towards a conflict transformationapproach, including:

• Real opportunities for change

• Framework document on possible outcomes

• Inherent weaknesses of the military option

• Legitimacy and recognition

• Capacity to minimize risks and concerns

• Guarantees and mutual dependence

• Third-party intermediaries

Can the armed group, with the balance tendingtowards militancy at a certain point in the conflict,change the balance of forces so that there is a tendencyand then a commitment towards a peaceful resolutionof the conflict? In turn, the considerations thatdetermine a government’s response to a militantchallenge inhibit it from changing its own approach so as to encourage the move to the negotiation table.How can an armed group shift from its struggle-sustaining approach, and can its opponents orintermediaries facilitate that shift? A movement withincivil society can influence both the government andthe armed group towards an awareness thatnegotiations and dialogue can provide a betteralternative to violence but it too needs to understandthe factors that maintain the armed confrontation andnot be naive about the dynamics at work. Let us look atsome of the elements on the scales.

Towards militancyAs noted above, armed groups often feel that violenceseems to be an inevitable aspect of their struggle. Itcould be described as a council of despair – used bothby states and armed groups. It seems that there is nooption when faced with the militancy and obduracy of their opponents. This could be a political stance to justify violence but more often it is a genuineexpression of the belief that other options such asdemocracy, dialogue and negotiations will achievenothing and conversely undermine the struggle.

So a militant mindset emerges, often with justificationfrom the actions of their opponents. It incorporates a belief that the state and the establishment have nointerest in sharing power – but maintains itself usingthis power and capacity to oppress. The state mayrecognize democratic processes but only for certainprivileged sections of society, and it responds only toforce and coercion. In turn the armed group relies onmilitary force and is suspicious of the power of reason,moral imperatives or conflict resolution processes inthe absence of some equality of military power. It alsorejects the value placed on stability, which is the pointat which it differs in its orientation from the state. Itrecognizes that stability is often accepting the statusquo and is rather impervious to the arguments of well-meaning intermediaries that they should think aboutthe suffering of their people and that it is only throughending the violence that a new society can be created.They are well aware of the cost of the conflict but seeno hope that stability will bring justice and find thosewho argue this naïve or even disingenuous.

Beyond that, ideology is not necessarily a definingcharacteristic of militant movements, nor can it be used as a determinant of the commitment of the groupto armed action. As shown by the case studies, a groupcan contain within itself a wide range of positions –from the right to the left, from a nationalist analysis to a class analysis – if all are against the status quo.

Certain characteristics develop during the course of the campaign, which in themselves help to sustaincommitment to the campaign. It is seen as crucial thatthere are no compromises, no retreat, no turning backand no doubt. Any of these can undermine thecampaign. Banishing doubt in turn means maintainingdiscipline so that there is no challenge to the leadershipand no questioning or rethinking. Armed groups willoften hold fast to maximalist goals including the break-up of the state even though observers might thinkthese impossible for their opponents to concede. Thismay in part be a sign of political naivety but it also

32 Accord 16

demonstrates the perceived need to be uncompromisingand not to weaken one’s demands.

A common explanation for how the struggle will bringvictory in the face of superior strength is based on thedetermination of the armed group and the people whosupport them. The rhetoric that captures this sentimentis, ‘he will prevail who can bear the greatest suffering,not he who can inflict the greatest suffering.’ This logicallows the campaign to continue even when it appearshopeless. It is ironic that sometimes both sides, in amirror image of each other, try to influence theiropponent by inflicting suffering but are aware that theirown response to more suffering is continued resistance.

A powerful motivator of continued struggle is thedistrust of both friends and enemies. The group willargue that they can only rely on themselves and theycan only do that while the struggle continues. Oncethey enter into negotiations they are at the mercy ofboth their opponents – who clearly do not share theirgoals and want to undermine them – and their friends– who do not share their commitment and will bewilling to compromise on core issues, not realizing theirfundamental importance. This distrust underpins anavoidance of compromise and supports the belief thatone is in control of one’s own destiny. Even if thestruggle fails, they will know that they persisted andbelieve that nothing more could have been done.

The cumulative effect of these concerns is the armedgroup’s acute awareness of the risks involved in movinginto negotiations. It is also believed that a change ofstrategy or the making of compromises exposes thegroup to the danger of internal splits. The folklore ofarmed groups is that they must remain united to win.While the group maintains consistent intransigencethere is little space for alternative factions to emerge,but introducing new ideas can disrupt that unity. If they do start to contemplate new possibilities, theleadership will need to be very sure of their authority if they want to lead their group in a new direction thatalmost inevitably challenges some of the old certaintiesthat have been central tenants of the movement. A militant once said that you become aware of theeffectiveness of your propaganda when you try topromote a new direction and you find your group and supporters wants to hold on to the old argumentsand now use them against you.

All of these considerations will often make it almostimpossible for a group to change its approach in spiteof good arguments that show how the strategy is notworking or the costs are too high. The group may wellfeel the force of these arguments and know that their

campaign is proving counterproductive but can dolittle to change. The more the group has suffered andthe greater the sacrifices made, the harder it is toexplain why all that effort is now to be put to one sideand a new approach adopted. They will also be facedwith the problem of the law of diminishing returns: thelonger the conflict continues the less impact they haveunless they can find some way to escalate the struggleand that may be very difficult to do. So continuing asbefore in effect leads to a loss of momentum.

Towards a conflict transformation approachIn order to change direction, the group has to besatisfied that there are likely tangible benefits and realopportunities for change. They need to be able to showthat more could be gained from negotiations anddialogue than from the continuation of the struggle.They need signs that their analysis of their opponent’sintransigence may be limited and that there is space for alternative ways of relating to their opponents. Thesigns may be small but must be enough to allow aninternal debate to develop. For example the IrishRepublican movement was helped by the statement by the United Kingdom government that they had noselfish or strategic interest in Northern Ireland andwould leave if the people of Northern Ireland askedthem to leave. The Naga leadership in northeast Indiawere helped by the Indian government’s statementthat it recognized their special history.

It is not surprising that in preparing for talks the partiesmay be unduly optimistic in looking for opportunitiesfor change. For example, the armed group will oftenwant some agreement for the interim government ofthe areas they control and they will want to use thesearrangements to try to advance their legitimacy, whiletheir opponents will resist conceding such points asthey will want to bargain over such recognition andsafeguard their own interests. It seems attractive todecide on interim arrangements before protractednegotiations start but experience suggests that partiescan only enter into negotiations when they have someidea of the parameters of a settlement. A frameworkdocument outlining these parameters has often beenan effective element in bringing about a ceasefire andpeace process.

If such indications are forthcoming they may then beable to evaluate the impact of their present militarycampaign and it may then be possible to explore someof its inherent weaknesses. Armed groups are normallyvery secretive and reluctant to interact with peopleoutside their movement, but at this point they oftenreach out to potentially sympathetic observers or

33From armed struggle to political negotiations

individuals from their community. In such dialogues it has been possible to help the group to reflect onalternative analyses and strategies, letting the groupsee how violence may often alienate constituencieswhose support is necessary, or how opponents’ and the general public’s resolve is strengthened. This is an argument that the new Palestinian leadership is trying to develop in relation to the impact of suicidebombings. They can argue that as a result of thebombings the Israeli people are more afraid andtherefore support more oppressive policies. The end of the bombings may also make the internationalcommunity more amenable.

Not only is there the possibility of more support butalso there is the possibility of more legitimacy andrecognition. A ceasefire is often demanded as aprecondition for allowing militant groups to enter intotalks. In Sri Lanka the ceasefire in the conflict betweenthe Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government allowed direct talks to beginbetween the parties and over time a number of stateswere willing to deal with the LTTE. An alternativescenario can also be demonstrated from the Sri Lankanexperience. One of the reasons the talks broke down(though the ceasefire remains more or less intact) was the US government’s refusal to allow the LTTE to attend a donor meeting because it is still a proscribedorganization in the US. The negotiations are still stalled,the scepticism of the LTTE has increased. It continues todemand a clear framework for renewing negotiationsand it is careful not to be seen to respond to threatsand inducements.

The issue of recognition and leadership is notstraightforward. Recognition of the validity of its claims– if not its legitimacy – is important for armed groupsgiving powerful impetus to the shift from violence tonegotiations. But on the other hand it means that themilitant group is recognizing, if only implicitly, thelegitimacy of its interlocutors to represent the state. It isinteresting that in the Karen case study we see that atcertain points the Karen were more willing to engagewith the State Law and Order Restoration Council thanwere other pro-democratic forces within Burmesesociety. This was presumably because their strugglewas secessionist and they were more ready to deal with the power brokers within Burma, while the othergroups in their struggle were questioning the verylegitimacy of the government. The government tried to use that difference in orientation to split the ethnicmovements away from the Democratic Alliance of Burma.

Even when there are potential benefits of a newnegotiation-based strategy, such as relief from superiormilitary force or recognition of the concerns of themilitant group, on the other side of the balance will bethe risks and concerns that follow from a ceasefire andinvolvement in talks. Can splits be avoided? Can therebe a return to war if necessary? How will the morale ofthe cadres or volunteers be maintained during theceasefire and are there ways to integrate them into apolitical movement? The group will have to consider if the risks can be minimized or neutralized. This willprobably require a sustained period of consultation and political education within the movement and itssupporters. Many such changes originate among

34 Accord 16

prisoners who are removed from direct involvement inthe struggle but are living it out in their captivity andtherefore have the interest, credibility and opportunityto begin a process of rethinking. Often the group’sopponents will not help this process, trying to delayserious negotiations because they believe that thelonger a ceasefire holds the more difficult it will be forthe armed group to return to war and maintain thatthreat. But the opposite reaction may well occur. Thearmed group will be acutely aware of the pressure toreturn to war, and if there are no obvious benefits fromor progress in the negotiation process they may endtheir ceasefire to show that the threat of violence needsto be treated seriously.

The armed group may ask for guarantees and theiropponents or third parties may offer these. However, asthe rationale of armed groups is partly based on lack oftrust and the need to control their own destiny, it is verydifficult for the group and its members to believe thatthese guarantees will be meaningful. On the otherhand, guarantees may be useful in justifying a changeof position after it has been decided upon. Developingan analysis that can demonstrate that opponents arelikely to meet their commitments because it is in theirown interests to do so is more helpful. In this way onemay reach a stage of mutual dependency and that maybe a more comfortable prospect for the armed group inthat it equalizes the balance of power to some degree.There are other examples where networks and allianceshave been forged which can provide mutual protectionand security and avoid the influence of wider globalpolitics, such as the Esquipulas process in Latin America.This can create space in which deals can be made.

A third-party intermediary may also provide guaranteesin some situations, but this may not be their mostuseful role in facilitating the shift from military action to political engagement. Intermediaries can provide aframework for negotiations and invite the parties totake part. The conflicting parties can then cometogether under the sponsorship of the intermediaryrather than one or other party being seen to be takingthe lead. This is particularly important when one partyis an armed group without the same status as a stateparty. Problems of protocol and status can then beavoided if a third party is willing to play an intermediaryrole. The Norwegian government has played this role inrelations between Israel and Palestine, in Sri Lanka andelsewhere. In the Sri Lankan case they also tried to playthe role of a guarantor and ‘referee’ and it has beenargued that in trying to fulfil the latter roles they madetheir task more difficult.

Conclusion: the shifting balance ofargumentsThis discussion has concentrated on the substance ofthe concerns that have to be dealt with in order for anarmed group to enter into a negotiation process. Thecase studies provide insights as to how those issues aredealt with within the organization, where decisions aretaken, by whom and through what process. While theseshifts vary considerably depending on the nature of theorganization, they generally do not follow from explicitreasoned analysis or expression of underlying principles,nor do they necessarily originate in one element of thegroup’s command structure. Of course there will oftenbe leadership figures who have enormous personalauthority such as Veluppillai Prabakharan in the LTTE or, in a very different way, Joseph Kony in the Lord’sResistance Army. In some cases it appears that they cantake independent decisions while in others they haveto be sensitive to potential reactions within the ranks.But in either case the considerations mentioned abovewill be at the heart of the thinking behind a changeunless they are totally nihilistic leaders.

The process of internal debate is often presented as an argument between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ with eachtendency trying to win over the other side. The casestudies bear out a different dynamic. Shifts inmovements seldom come from a change of attitude on the part of individuals but rather because thebalance of arguments at any one time favours theanalysis of one or other group within the movement.Perhaps the most significant influence on the credibility of any set of arguments is the inferencesdrawn from external events. When those circumstancesfavour maintaining the war then the doves will be silentbut when circumstances favour negotiations then thehawks will be silent. For example, the El Salvador casestudy shows that the reforms before the peaceagreement were partial and imperfect but they “gavecredibility to the idea that working politically in thecontext of peace was more beneficial than continuingwar.” Opponents often try to expose differences inopinion within the armed group but this may have theeffect of closing ranks. But ultimately, if the state orintermediary, or indeed the armed group itself, wants to promote negotiations, it is necessary to strengthenthe trends that give a peace process credibility.

35From armed struggle to political negotiations

A National Socialist Council of Nagaland guardoutside headquarters in Hebron, India.

Source: Reuters/Utpal Baruah

The Salvadoreaninsurgency why choose peace?

Joaquín Villalobos

When the Peace Agreement in El Salvador wassigned in January 1992, it was commonly saidto be a consequence of the end of the Cold

War. Conspiracy theorists went even further and saidthat the peace in Central America was the result of adirect agreement between Ronald Reagan and MikhailGorbachev. However, this is belied by the fact thatinternal conflicts have since become more predominant.Harris and Belly’s research suggests that of the 101armed conflicts identified in the world between 1989and 1996, 95 were internal disputes. The ‘end of theCold War’ explanation of peace in Central America istherefore too superficial and mechanical. A conflict asbloody, long and complex as El Salvador’s in the 1980scould not have been so abruptly and successfullysolved by external factors. The external factors played a role, but were not as important as is thought. Thecrucial question about how peace was reached in El Salvador is how and why the protagonists of theconflict changed.

Understanding the caseIn its effects, duration and dimensions, the war in El Salvador and Central America more broadly was LatinAmerica’s Vietnam. Between the armies and guerrillagroups of Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador,400,000 people were involved, 250,000 died andmillions were displaced in a conflict spanning morethan a decade. During that time, the United Statesremained silent in the face of genocide in Guatemala,installed military bases in Honduras, supported thegovernment of El Salvador both militarily and financially,armed the Contras, mined Nicaraguan ports andinvaded Panama.

The conflict in Central America was connected to thestruggle to overturn the authoritarian political modelsthe US had long supported. With the exception ofCosta Rica, democratic life was unknown in CentralAmerica. The reasons why these societies chose

36 Accord 16

Joaquín Villalobos is a former leader of the

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front.

A consultant on peacemaking and security

matters, he is also a visiting scholar at Oxford

University and is on the Colombia Working Group

at Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC.

FMLN delegates at a political rally,La Palma, El Salvador, 1984.

Source: Susan Meiselas/Magnum Photos

Armed groups’ choices

violence as the path towards change are morecomplicated; the question here is how they stopped it and, specifically, how changes inside the Salvadoreaninsurgency took place.

Some answersThe Salvadorean insurgency was a pluralist political coalitionThe Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)comprised five armed groups, all of which had politicalwings that were as important as their militarystructures. This means that even when they were underintense pressure, they had organized social groupingsfunctioning openly. The FMLN had a close alliance withtwo non-armed political movements that were infavour of the democratic process: one social democratand the other ‘social Christian’. This alliance was knownas the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR). Despiteseeming relatively weak in comparison to the FMLN’sorganizational strength, these two movements andtheir leaders, together with the moderate guerrillagroups, created a correlation of forces that favoured anegotiated settlement. The FMLN-FDR alliance agreedon a strategy of finding a negotiated solution to theconflict in 1982, ten years before the peace agreementwas signed.

All the guerrilla groups defined themselves as Marxist-Leninist, but only the Communist Party and somemilitants active in other organizations could beconsidered Marxist in the fullest ideological sense. The other groups adopted ideological extremism inreaction to the authoritarian regime. Even though the conflict pitted an authoritarian reality against a potentially authoritarian project, part of theinsurgency’s legitimacy came from its unmistakablepotential to substitute its project with a democraticone. The political life of the FMLN was always intense,influential and never isolated or unconnected from the reality of the country, which made it politicallypragmatic in spite of the ideological rhetoric andradical use of violence. When the four guerrilla groupswere created during the 1970s, they adopted theMarxist-Leninism typical of the Latin American left atthat time. However, towards 1980 they joined forcesand created an alliance with the FDR based on a liberaldemocratic programme. With the continuation of the war between 1984 and 1985, they again took upMarxist programmatic ideas. Towards 1990, when theywere in a strong position again, the more moderatetendency was again able to promote a liberaldemocratic project, and this programme madenegotiations viable and helped bring peace to El Salvador.

37The Salvadorean insurgency

A context of democratic influences prevailedFor reasons of legitimacy, choice and self-interest, theFMLN-FDR was in contact with a broad spectrum ofnon-Marxist countries, forces and political leaders;however, those contacts were also possible becausethere was enough tolerance of the insurgency andbelief in its potential transformation and the viability of negotiations. The Franco-Mexican declaration, whichrecognized the FMLN-FDR as a representative force in 1981, placed the insurgency in a position whereagreements, language and strategies were different to the doctrinal ideological project that had made any agreement unfeasible. Mexico, Paris, Madrid,Stockholm, Caracas, Panama and the contacts with the US that always existed facilitated the politicalhegemony of moderate groups and leaders. Mexicobecame more important than Havana, and it could besaid that many FMLN leaders identified more with theMexican Institutional Revolutionary Party than withMarxism. Relations with Moscow and the socialistcountries were important only for one of the fivegroups with the FMLN, the Communist Party.

Each group within the FMLN took a different stance on prolonged warfare, insurrection, strategic offensives,revolution, democracy and negotiation. Many of themore doctrinaire groups within the guerrilla coalitionwere militarily conservative, with more interest inpreserving and accumulating power than pursuingbold military strategies. Conversely, those with lessambitious political goals tended to propose moreoffensive military strategies. Thus the Communist Partywas always the weakest militarily while the People’sRevolutionary Army (ERP, a social Christian guerrillagroup) was the most liberal politically and the strongestand boldest militarily. This created a preferentialrelationship between the ERP and the NicaraguanSandinistas, who had similar tendencies. Havana, whichwas instrumental in providing support for waging warbecause it saw the conflict in Central America as a lineof defence against Reagan’s policies, thus also came to favour the ERP without taking into account theirideological dissimilarities. In this way, material supportfavoured the same moderate insurgent groups that sawEurope and Mexico as their political rearguard. Thisdemonstrates another reason not to see the CentralAmerican wars and their resolution purely though thelens of the Cold War. The Central American governmentssigned the Esquipulas regional peace agreements in1987, 1988 and 1989 against the wishes of Reagan’sgovernment, and the coalition of the Salvadoreanguerrillas signed the Peace Agreement without Cuba’s blessing.

The violence had rules and it gave clear messages Some scholars refer to violence as a model of exchangethat the protagonists choose rationally out of arepertoire of options built from the history and cultureof a society. Political violence can be thought of as atype of communication mechanism (or language)between two actors. For this article, this is a very usefultheoretical tool and a crucial point of debate. A largepart of the discussion about violence understandablyfocuses on ethical issues, but it is often forgotten thatviolence is a real act and that the way it is used opensor closes spaces to ideas and possible understandings.

An actor that has greater legitimacy and moral andpolitical advantage is more inclined to use violence in a way that transmits messages so that the exchangebecomes constructive. Terrorism, massacres and torturetransmit messages that impede understanding, whilenoble acts and compassion transmit constructivemessages. It is less a matter of which actor using force ismaterially stronger, but who has the moral advantagein the use of force. In the Salvadorean case, it was theinsurgency that held greater legitimacy, not theauthoritarian regime, which reacted disproportionatelyto resistance to its political model in a way that onlyescalated the violence. While it did make seriousmistakes, the insurgency used violence as a politicalmechanism to consolidate its moral advantage. Thistranslated into treating prisoners well, shunningrevenge and respecting humanitarian law. For example,when the army committed the most awful massacresand killings in 1980-81, the insurgency reacted bytreating its thousands of prisoners well. If they haddecided to take revenge, the conflict could not havebeen resolved.

The guerrilla’s regulated use of violence caused thegovernment army to respond. This change emerged ininformal local agreements, on issues such as respectingeach side’s supporters and sometimes acceptingimplicit territorial limits. In November 1990, USAmbassador William Walker dared to visit a guerrilla-controlled area and speak with FMLN combatants. This led the FMLN to approve an unconditional andunilateral ceasefire that, though rejected by the army,sped up the signing of the peace agreements a fewweeks later. While there were serious human rightsviolations in El Salvador, there were also many efforts at self-regulation of violence. The political defeat of thearmy took place when it murdered six Jesuit priests inNovember 1989; while in 1980 this would have beencelebrated, in 1989 it just undermined morale. The firstagreement signed was on human rights. Reactive andvengeful violence runs counter to messages ofpeacemaking and democratization.

38 Accord 16

The coalition of the guerrillas was strong andconsidered itself soIn 1984-85, the US provided its most significant militaryassistance to the Salvadorean army. However, within a few months the moderate sectors of the insurgencyhad found a military response that preserved theexisting balance of power. If the FMLN had beenweakened militarily, the most doctrinaire groups would have gained the upper hand, because their idea of aligning the final result with their ideology and pursuing a maximalist outcome made more sensein a situation of weakness. In 1984, there were massivedesertions from all the armed groups, so they decidedto teach Marxism on the fronts to reintroduce the ideasof a Cuban-style socialist revolution or a CommunistParty like Vietnam’s. A sector of the National Resistancegroup put forward a democratic programme, but itsproposal was rejected and copies of the documentwere even burnt. This ideological upsurge evenaffected the ERP, but its military capability enabled that ideological stage to pass, and the group proposeda strategic offensive to create the basis for negotiation.This offensive took place in November 1989, and itincluded battles in the capital and in the mostimportant cities for two weeks. Then, in November1990, the guerrillas launched another offensive, usingsurface-to-air missiles to defeat the army’s air capability.The negotiations took place after these two offensives.

In El Salvador the FMLN was strong both militarily andpolitically. This gave the FMLN a position of strengthduring negotiations and the capacity to run in electionsduring peacetime. However, the fact remains thatpeace cannot only be negotiated with political andmilitary strength. The nature of the group is asignificant factor in its choice of options. It is arguablethat any kind of weakness tends to privilege ideologicalrigidity over pragmatism.

Before the signing of the peace accords, there were realpolitical changesBetween 1931 and 1982, El Salvador was ruled by sixgenerals, four colonels and seven civil-military juntas.The changes of government took place by means ofseven coups and six elections. Only two of the electionswere even vaguely contested: in the other four, acolonel was the sole candidate once, another colonelclaimed victory with 95 per cent of the vote and theother two elections were fraudulent and started theconflict. The war proved that militarism was the causeof this confrontation; democracy and civil power thus began as part of a military doctrine of counter-insurgency, but the magnitude of the war gave themreal value. In the 1982 elections, Álvaro Magaña (in

whom the military had confidence despite his civilstatus) was elected President by a constituent assembly.But thereafter political parties started to gain realpower and elections became more transparent. Thearmy became relatively weaker in the political arenawhile still unable to defeat the insurgency militarily. By around 1990, half the insurgency’s members wereworking in politics and the other half waging war.

The democratic changes that took place before thePeace Agreement were partial and imperfect but felttangibly by the insurgency. This gave credibility to theidea that working politically in a context of peace wasmore beneficial than continuing war. The PeaceAgreement made the judiciary independent, created acivil police force with the participation of both formerguerrillas and former members of the military, purgedthe military and constitutionally separated political andmilitary power, strengthening the democratic transition.

Learning from the Salvadorean experience It must be noted that this article is only a partialexplanation of the end of the war: it did not seek toexplain how and why the authoritarian right opted for democracy. Accounting for the transformation ofestablished power is as important as the understandingthe transformation of the insurgency.

The starting point for our conclusion is to understandthat peace is only possible if it is understood thatviolence is a real act. Comprehending the nature of theconflict and its actors allows us to differentiate betweenappearance and reality. What many people have failedto understand is that the FMLN’s origins gave it itspotential for democratic change. The internal andexternal actors who intervened to transform the FMLNdid not credit the ideological discourse with too muchimportance and knew where to apply their influence,strengthening the pragmatic visions that the insurgencyhad always had the potential to develop. Thesystematic pressure to respect human rights madeviolence, as a language between the actors, productive.They moved from an unregulated violence to aregulated violence to a negation of the violence. Finally, the tangible changes that took place madepeople think that peace was a risk worth taking.

39The Salvadorean insurgency

Choosing toengage strategic considerations forthe Karen National Union

Saw David Taw

Probably the largest of the non-Burman ethnicgroups of Burma, the Karen took up arms against the central government after Burmese

independence in 1948. The Karen National Union (KNU)had been formed in 1947 from Karen organizations thatboycotted elections for a constituent assembly and sowere not a part of Burma’s constitution-making process.By the late 1950s all the main ethnic minority groupshad taken up arms against the government.

The Burmese military has held power directly orindirectly since 1962. In 1988, the State Law and OrderRestoration Council (SLORC) military junta seized powerto crush a popular uprising. Multiparty elections werepromised, but the apparent winner, the National Leaguefor Democracy (NLD) of Aung San Suu Kyi, was deniedpower. The crackdown on pro-democracy forces drove anew generation of anti-government activists to flee tothe border area, especially the area held by the KNU.This led to the establishment of the Democratic Allianceof Burma (DAB), a ‘post-88’ alliance of pro-democracyexile organizations and ethnic insurgent organizations.The DAB comprised most of the members of an earlieralliance of armed ethnic organizations, the NationalDemocratic Front (NDF), together with several pro-democracy groups that supported the armed struggleor had taken up arms (chiefly the All Burma StudentDemocratic Front). Until a military offensive by theSLORC in January 1995, these alliances centred onManerplaw, the headquarters for the KNU and thecapital of the self-proclaimed Karen state of Kawthoolei.The KNU’s Chairman, General Bo Mya, headed the DABas well as the National Council of the Union of Burma(NCUB), the umbrella organization comprising the DAB,NDF, Members of Parliament Union and National Leaguefor Democracy–Liberated Area.

40 Accord 16

Saw David Taw heads the foreign affairs

departments of both the Karen National

Union and National Democratic Front.

He is also a member of the National

Council of the Union of Burma Foreign

Affairs Committee.

A KNLA fighter at a jungle base near theborder with Thailand, February 1998.

Source: Reuters

Armed groups’ choices

Early ceasefiresEarly peace talks between Karen insurgents and thegovernment failed in 1949, 1960 and 1963, in the lastcase resulting in a ceasefire by one Karen groupdenounced by the KNU as ‘a surrender’.

From the mid-1980s the Burmese army began to pushtowards the Thai border, challenging ethnic insurgents’ability to control the border area and the cross-bordertrade that largely financed their war. In 1989 the SLORCpioneered a strategy of negotiating bilateral ceasefireagreements without political dialogue, agreeing truces with the various ethnic armies that had beencommanded by the crumbling Communist Party ofBurma. The SLORC’s new leaders developed a secondphase of the ceasefire strategy after 1992 to split theethnic organizations away from the post-1988 alliance.For example, a ceasefire agreement was reached in1993 between the SLORC and the Kachin IndependenceOrganisation (KIO), a leading member of the DAB, indefiance of DAB policy that demanded that the SLORCnegotiate a national ceasefire and political settlementwith the DAB collectively. The KIO ceasefire was stronglycondemned by the DAB leadership as a betrayal.

With the SLORC continuing to gain the upper handmilitarily, displacing much of the Karen civilianpopulation, the semi-ceasefire that emerged in late1992 gave the KNU opportunity to review the situation.

Internal debate on KNU strategyThe KNU’s decision-making structure is that of a one-party state, topped by a periodic party congress.Between congresses the party is led by a CentralCommittee and an Executive Committee. The congress

is ‘selected’ to represent the seven administrativedistricts making up the state of Kawthoolei, eachheaded by a District Chairman. Until the military defeatof 1994-95, the KNU also formed a Kawthooleigovernment, with the post of Prime Minister held bythe KNU General Secretary. The KNU’s army, the KarenNational Liberation Army (KNLA), is a parallel commandstructure of seven military brigades each headed by aBrigade Commander and subject, in theory at least, tothe KNU’s Defence Minister (a post long held by KNUChairman General Bo Mya). These parallel structures,overlapping but not entirely coinciding, afforded theopportunity for distinct factions to develop within theKNU-Kawthoolei-KNLA leadership with somewhatdistinct outlooks and constituencies.

For the younger, middle-level section of the KNUleadership it became clear that the burden of theconflict had become unbearable for the Karenpopulation in the conflict area. This group viewed theKIO decision sympathetically, feared the consequencesfor the Karen of further erosion of the KNU’s militaryposition and regretted the DAB’s lack of understandingconcerning the need for the ethnic armies to try to endthe fighting in their areas. Meanwhile, reports of SLORChuman rights abuses in Karen areas were being used bythe NCUB to further undermine and discredit theSLORC and mobilize stronger international responses.However, there were foreign visitors to the KNU whourged the KNU to consider a strategy of minimizing theimpact of SLORC military superiority by entering aceasefire and relying on a more political strategy. Therewere also Karen leaders from inside Burma who visitedthe KNU as self-appointed ‘mediators’, urging the KNUto try to find a way to end the war. These non-KNUKaren ‘mediators’ were treated as SLORC stooges and

41Strategic considerations for the Karen National Union

given a very cool reception officially by the KNUleadership although receiving quiet encouragementfrom the pro-ceasefire faction.

In 1994 an officially sanctioned KNU working group –initiated by those responsible for the KNU’s foreignrelations – won support within the KNU to explore anegotiation initiative on the basis of the politicaladvantage in being seen to be willing to ‘talk abouttalks’. Plans were laid for a delegation to go to Rangoonin the hope that such an initiative could wininternational support. The intention was to mobilizeinternational pressure for a new approach to theSLORC, recognizing the need to open up some of thepolitical issues (i.e. equal rights, the right to self-determination and a move leading towards federalism)for discussion, rather than simply demanding theremoval of the SLORC (as the NLD’s National CoalitionGovernment of the Union of Burma was doing) orlimiting discussion to a military ceasefire (as the KIOhad done). This move collapsed late in the year whenNCGUB leaders in New York pleaded with the KNUleadership not to make such a move, which they saw as undermining their own efforts at the UN to windecisive international action against the SLORC.

Responding to military offensivesLong-standing grievances of Buddhist elements in the Karen population (which in the conflict area issubstantially non-Christian) against the mainly ChristianKNU leadership erupted at almost exactly the sametime and the SLORC quickly moved to fuel the split. The formation of the Democratic Buddhist Karen Army(DKBA) led to a major SLORC-DKBA military offensiveagainst the KNU and in early 1995 the KNU headquartersat Manerplaw fell. Afterwards, DKBA and SLORC forcescontinued to attack the KNU alleging its use of refugeecamps inside Thailand as sanctuaries. The conflict’sspillover into Thailand caused great concern to the Thaiauthorities and those providing care for the refugees.Thai pressure on the ethnic armies in the border area(the Karen, the Karenni and the Mon) to negotiateincreased. Pressure on the Mon led to another key DAB member, the New Mon State Party, agreeing to a ceasefire in 1995.

In 1996, the militarily hard-pressed KNU moved towardsceasefire talks. The moves followed a congress in whichpro-talks middle-level leaders were seen by General BoMya to be challenging his predominance, and cameagainst the backdrop of urgings from a SLORC-backedgroup of ‘mediators’ and in the face of strong alliancepressure . This time several rounds of talks were held butbroke down. The collapse of the talks can be attributed tohard-line KNU leaders’ representation of the SLORC’sposition as amounting to a demand to surrender, which

mobilized grassroots Karen opposition to a ceasefire(something that had not happened in the case of the KIOand the Mon).

A new SLORC military offensive followed in 1997 inwhich the KNU lost virtually all the rest of its territory.The long-standing hard-line President of the KNU,General Bo Mya, was displaced to the position of VicePresident, but retained his position as Defence Ministerand also remained Chairman of the DAB and the NCUB.Ostensibly his displacement by long-time GeneralSecretary Saw Bathin opened the way to a new KNUstance, but it could not hide the fact that the militarily-weakened KNU was now in an even weaker negotiatingposition. With Bo Mya still casting a wide shadow over the KNU, and with the discrediting of ‘talks’ in1996, it was difficult in KNU circles to advocate moreceasefire talks.

In the wake of the military offensive in 1997 and thehardening of Thai attitudes towards providing refuge,the situation inside Karen areas deteriorated withincreasingly large numbers of internally displacedpersons (IDPs). Those KNU leaders who in 1993-94 hadadvocated a ceasefire strategy were now preoccupiedwith trying to find humanitarian assistance for civilians. Reporting on the IDP situation led in somecases to renewed advocacy on the need for an end to the fighting.

New opportunities for dialogueA new process of dialogue between the renamedSLORC – the State Peace and Development Council(SPDC) – and Aung San Suu Kyi began to develop from late 2000. Hopes for real dialogue remained high during 2001 and 2002, and the KNU (and alliancecircles) emphasized the need for ‘tripartite dialogue’between the regime, the NLD and ‘ethnic forces’,though the ethnic struggle undoubtedly continued to be overshadowed by the democracy issue.

Intermittent contacts between the KNU and the SPDCcontinued during this period while Thai pressure, in the form of the restriction of Burmese oppositiongroups’ movement in Thailand, continued to intensify.During 2003, efforts to persuade the KNU to again trynegotiation were renewed by the SPDC-backedmediator group and independently by other Karencommunity leaders.

Under intensifying international criticism, in August2003 the SPDC announced a ‘roadmap’ for transition to democracy, the first step of which would be re-convening the National Convention, a constitution-drafting process initiated in 1992 but stalled since 1996. While international efforts were concentrated

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43Strategic considerations for the Karen National Union

(unsuccessfully) on securing the involvement of theNLD, the SPDC sought participation of key ethniccommunities, especially ethnic ceasefire groups. This,and perhaps parallel Thai persuasion, seems to accountfor a surprise visit by Bo Mya to Rangoon at theinvitation of the SPDC, where he made a ‘gentleman’sagreement’ ceasefire in December 2003. Perhaps it wasthought that a quick ceasefire would lead to KNUparticipation in the Convention. The sudden change ofposition by Bo Mya has given weight to those in theKNU who have long advocated a negotiations policy,but it has not yet neutralized those more in line with‘alliance policy’ that opposes a KNU ceasefire.

A KNU negotiating team subsequently met with theSPDC negotiators on two occasions, but remainedessentially at the confidence-building stage and madeonly nominal progress against the backdrop of theuneasy ‘gentleman’s agreement’, which elements onboth sides were inclined to want to disregard. With little progress occurring, talks were suspended whilethe Convention was in session and efforts to reconvenethe talks met a series of delays from both sides. When a KNU delegation arrived in Rangoon in October 2004,a new round of talks was engulfed by the political crisiscaused by the removal of Burmese Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and the purge of the Military Intelligenceapparatus that was his power base and had made upthe SLORC/SPDC ceasefire negotiators.

Staying engaged In the case of the KNU conflict with the militarygovernment of Burma, there are groups on both sideswho are willing to attempt to find a negotiatedsettlement. However, the credibility of such elements inthe SPDC has been severely eroded by the predominanthard-liners who appear unwilling to make anyconcessions to anyone or to hold serious dialogue. Atrecent talks with the KNU, the SPDC’s hard line quicklyeroded early potential for problem-solving talks. Thishad the effect of undermining the position of those inthe KNU who were willing to work seriously to achieve aceasefire and reinforced the position of KNU hard-linerswho do not consider a ceasefire necessary or attainable.

Despite this there is no change in the KNU mindsetregarding ceasefire talks. At the KNU Congress in late2004 it was unanimously agreed that the ceasefireprocess should continue. With the consent of the KNUCentral Committee, the KNU Chairman wrote a letter toSenior General Than Shwe on 15 November, inquiringabout the SPDC’s attitude regarding the resumption ofa process of ceasefire talks. In response, SPDC Lt. Col.Kyaw Soe of Army Security Command acknowledgedreceipt of the KNU letter in a letter dated 11 January2005. It also stated that discussions were being held on

the continuation of a peace process with the KNU, thatthe prospects were bright, and that arrangements had been made for an informal meeting for peace inMoulmein, the Headquarters of the SoutheastCommand. It stated that, if willing, a KNU delegationcould proceed to Moulmein. The KNU General Secretaryresponded by conveying a letter to the Commander ofthe SPDC Army Security Command (with copies to boththe commander of the Southeast Command and KyawSoe) expressing the KNU’s satisfaction with the SPDC’sresponses and willingness to have an informal discussion.

ConclusionThe KNU’s current stance in favour of agreeing aceasefire and engaging the SPDC in talks is the product of a long process of internal debate andpolitical manoeuvring on the costs and benefits of such a strategy. A number of inter-related factors canbe identified that have tilted the scales in eitherdirection at different times:

• Individual leaders’ changing analyses of the situationplay a decisive role: it should be noted that theviewpoints and membership of pro- or anti-ceasefirefactions are not static.

• Concern about the effects of the conflict on thecivilian population has shaped attitudes toengagement. Also, different KNU factions’ abilities to present the case for or against engagement tograssroots supporters have been importantdeterminants of strategy.

• Interpretations of the KNU’s worsening militarysituation have differed: variously suggesting aceasefire (in order to neutralize the government’smilitary advantage) or continued fighting (becausethe unfavourable negotiating position underminesthe value of negotiating).

• International influences have been an importantfactor, with Thailand’s increasing discomfort with theconflict and concurrent willingness to hinder theKNU’s military strategy being an important pushtowards a ceasefire approach.

• Perceptions of the trustworthiness of counterpartsand intermediaries and the credibility of pastengagements were other important factors.

• Membership of broader opposition groupings andalliances has played a role in the KNU’s decision-making, reinforcing certain factions’ power (especiallybecause of overlapping leadership arrangements),and usually inveigling against engagement with theruling regime. The existence of a high-profile pro-democracy movement that has overshadowed theKaren cause internationally has also played a role inKNU thinking.

Vive ladifférence?Humanitarian and politicalapproaches to engagingarmed groups

David Petrasek

Humanitarians working to mitigate theconsequences of war and to prevent needlesssuffering must engage with armed groups just

as mediators seeking a political settlement mustengage with armed groups. What is the relationshipbetween humanitarian and political engagement?

By ‘humanitarian engagement’ is meant efforts topersuade armed groups to respect humanitarian andhuman rights principles, including in particular:

• to respect civilian life and property, and to refrain from attacking civilians;

• to treat captured combatants and others hors decombat humanely, without discrimination and withrespect for their rights;

• to ensure civilians and victims of war have adequatemedical care, food and shelter, and to allowhumanitarian agencies access for this purpose; and

• to ensure insofar as possible the material and socialwell-being of civilians within areas they control.

By ‘political engagement’ is meant efforts to persuadearmed groups to negotiate a peaceful resolution of thearmed conflict, including facilitating their participationin processes to this end. Presented in this way, thereappears a tidy distinction between these types ofactivities, whereby humanitarian initiatives focus onpreventing and mitigating the consequences of war, andpolitical initiatives focus on ending the conflict

In practice, the distinctions between the two are not soclear. Humanitarian issues will often include prominentpolitical aspects. For example, if the purpose of a conflictappears precisely to terrorize civilians of one ethnicgroup, then humanitarian negotiations to protect thosecivilians necessarily challenge the underlying rationalefor the conflict. At the same time, negotiations aimed atending conflict may begin by discussing the delivery ofrelief supplies. It is also the case that multi-tasked

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David Petrasek is Policy Director of the

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in

Geneva. He previously worked for the Office

of the UN High Commissioner on Human

Rights, the International Council on Human

Rights Policy and Amnesty International.

Humanitarian and political engagement

organizations, like the UN, often engage simultaneouslyin humanitarian and conflict-resolution efforts, and some(though by no means all) humanitarian organizationsbelieve that ending war is a legitimate humanitarianendeavour. In short, distinctions are not so clear-cut andthis is one of the reasons for exploring the relationshipbetween humanitarian and political engagement.

This article will look at three issues: Lessons from humanitarian engagement. Humanitarianworkers regularly engage in the field with all parties toarmed conflict. They have, therefore, a good deal ofexperience in dealing and negotiating with non-statearmed groups. What lessons drawn from this experienceare relevant for peacemaking efforts?

Humanitarian issues as door-openers. Humanitarianissues are often easier to discuss than issues related to aresolution of the conflict. In what ways can humanitarianengagement with armed groups open the door fordiscussion of political issues?

Differences and risks. While there are similarities in thetwo approaches, key differences remain and in somesituations there might well be good reasons for keeping

approaches distinct. What are the risks involved inblurring humanitarian and political approaches toarmed groups? How can these be avoided in practice?

Lessons from humanitarian engagement There are differences and tensions, but also similaritiesand synergies between humanitarian and peacemakingapproaches to armed groups. Studies of humanitarianand human rights approaches to armed groups havemade a number of suggestions that might also beconsidered by those engaged in peacemaking:

Understand the armed group. Before engaging anarmed group on humanitarian issues, it is vital tounderstand the group’s political, social and economicmotivations. Key issues include the group’s leadership,its ideological motivation, its state and non-statesponsors, and the group’s constituency.

Know thyself! A wide variety of actors engage armedgroups on humanitarian issues – local NGOs, internationalrelief NGOs, UN agencies, diplomats, religious leaders, etc.Many of them have learned that effective engagementrequires a proper understanding of their own strengths

45Humanitarian and political approaches to engaging armed groups

Humanitarian action has never been precisely defined,and ‘humanitarianism’ is notoriously ambiguous.Perhaps it is best summed up as a concern to respondwithout bias to those in need. There are, nevertheless,some clear currents amid the muddy waters. One suchcurrent, drawn along by the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC), holds that humanitarian actionshould focus solely on the consequences of war, and notaim to resolve conflict. To enter the realm of conflictresolution is, in this view, to stray into fundamentallypolitical questions, which will inevitably compromisethe ability to mitigate suffering.

This distinction is not merely abstract philosophy. Itfinds concrete expression in the international legalregime concerning armed conflict. Legal rules fall intotwo distinct baskets: ius in bello (the law regulating theconduct of war) and ius ad bellum (the law determiningwhether a resort to armed force is justified). The ICRC,and the many humanitarian agencies that look to it forinspiration and guidance, have long maintained thatthey are only concerned with the former. The fourGeneva Conventions and their protocols – thefoundation for much humanitarian work – are silent

on questions of whether or not any war is justified,dealing only with rules for its conduct.

On the other hand, the ambiguity of humanitarianism,and the real-life demands of modern warfare, havepermitted (some would say demanded) the emergenceof humanitarian action that is committed not only torelieving suffering but also to addressing its underlyingcauses. Many humanitarians today embrace humanrights norms as a basis for their work, inevitably forcingthem to examine systemic causes and the unequalpower relations underlying conflict. Further, manyaccept that their work may have political impacts, andendeavour to ‘do no harm’ through their interventions.

There is no easy answer to these problems. Agencieswhich choose to retain a pure humanitarianism, andsteadfastly refuse to be drawn into efforts to end warare certainly entitled to do so. At the same time, onecannot deny that a modern understanding ofhumanitarian action could include the notion of endingwar. There is no universal agreement on this point, andthe result is a continuing tension concerninghumanitarian efforts to end war.

Is ending war a humanitarian objective?

and weaknesses as an interlocutor, on a particular issueand vis-à-vis a particular group. International actors oftencarry more leverage; local actors often know better whereto find points of leverage.

Factor in state behaviour. Though it seems obvious,those engaging armed groups need constantly to bear in mind the degree to which an armed group’sdecisions are influenced by its state (or other non-state)adversaries. For example, the group’s willingness torespect humanitarian and human rights norms will beinfluenced by the state’s own record in this respect. Less obvious is the fact that state’s attitude towardsengagement will play a big role. In many cases, in fact,state hostility to outside actors engaging armed groupson humanitarian issues means such engagement nevergets off the ground.

In their engagement with armed groups, humanitarianactors also encounter many of the same dilemmas faced by those mediating armed conflicts. Questions of conferring undue legitimacy, of unwittinglyempowering the wrong group, and problems ofidentifying the correct interlocutors abound.

One lesson humanitarian actors have learned, thoughnot always acted on, is that it is crucial that there be co-ordination between different actors working withsimilar groups or on similar issues. When a variety ofrelief agencies enter into uncoordinated discussionswith an armed group they may not only confuse thegroup but jeopardize each other’s efforts to get thegroup to agree on particular issues.

The humanitarian entréeBeyond efforts to reduce immediate suffering,humanitarian engagement can act as a door-opener or ‘entrée’ that allows the parties to meet and buildconfidence and trust. This may eventually create anenvironment conducive to discussion of security andpolitical issues. This case is grounded in the notions that:

• there is likely to be greater common ground onhumanitarian issues – all should be able to agree,irrespective of their view on the war, that waging itshould be done in ways that are minimally destructive;

• humanitarian norms are universal, based ininternationally accepted treaties or customary law andnot open to serious dispute; and

• in many cases, there need be no loss of militaryadvantage in accepting humanitarian constraints,provided both parties agree and respect the samehumanitarian commitments.

While each of these points might be challenged, inpractice there are numerous examples wheregovernments and armed groups have initially reachedagreement on humanitarian provisions, and only latermoved on to discuss ceasefires, security and politicalissues. In El Salvador in 1991, initial agreement onhuman rights was widely credited with creating thenecessary confidence for political talks. In Aceh,Indonesia, agreement on a ‘humanitarian pause’ (2001-2002) was a useful prelude that created the basis foreventual ceasefire (though this did not hold). In Darfur,Sudan in 2003 belligerents signed two agreements onhumanitarian issues before being able to open talks onsecurity and political issues.

There are also situations, described below, where armedgroups used agreements on humanitarian issues to winlegitimacy while they stalled on political talks. That said,humanitarian issues are usually easier to discuss, and ifonly for this fact necessarily play a role in building (orundermining) confidence.

As noted above, humanitarianism is a broad concept,and covers a vast range of issues. Some of these will berelatively easier to discuss, and this will vary dependingon the nature of the armed conflict. It is, therefore, alsoimportant to carefully consider which ‘humanitarian’issue might best serve as a door-opener or confidencebuilder. A discussion on securing medicine for childrenwill usually be easier to broach than one on prisonerexchanges, for example, though the particular contextwill be crucial.

One step forward or two steps backwards?While humanitarian engagement may create space forpeacemaking, this is by no means assured. There aretensions between a humanitarian approach andpolitical engagement, and experience shows thatbelligerents might well use humanitarian engagementas a means of putting off discussion on political issues.Armed groups might, for example, agree to discussaccess for aid workers and relief supplies to show theyare responding to international demands, but do so only to postpone serious negotiations aimed at endingthe conflict. Such behaviour can be encouraged byunwary outside governments and intergovernmentalorganizations under pressure to show they are doingsomething to address the conflict. This was the criticismlevelled by humanitarian agencies in the Bosnia war,when the European Union, UN and others entered intonumerous humanitarian agreements with the variouswarring factions, requiring these agencies to carry outvarious functions but postponing any serious pressureto end the conflict.

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A key tension between the different approaches is theworry that a blurring of approaches will compromise the ability of humanitarian agencies to carry out theiractivities. Where actors with explicitly political or conflict resolution approaches are seen to manipulatehumanitarian concerns for the sake of a negotiationstrategy, relief workers fear that this will reboundnegatively on their work. They will insist on a humanitarian‘space’, free from the parties’ short-term political interestswhere the sole concern is to tend to the needs of thewar’s victims in an impartial way. Though at timesarguments defending this space may have anexcessively ‘purist’ or unrealistic quality (given thathumanitarian issues themselves are so often deeplypoliticized), it is important for those working to end theconflict to be attentive to the general point.

A related issue is that armed groups are alert to the factthat beginning a discussion on humanitarian issues maydraw them towards political negotiation: where they arereluctant to proceed so far, this wariness may in factcreate a block to solving humanitarian matters.

Ending conflicts is a difficult, long-term task. It would be unwise for its practitioners to gamble too carelessly with the short-term humanitarian goals of mitigatingsuffering. Using humanitarian issues as an entrée,therefore, must be done carefully and due recognitiongiven to the fact that humanitarian principles areimportant in their own right. They cannot be simplysubsumed, in a purely instrumental way, to the goal of resolving the conflict.

Key risks that arise, therefore, include:

• armed groups may use negotiations on humanitarianissues as an easy means of gaining legitimacy anddelaying progress on substantive political issues;

• humanitarian principles may get subordinated topolitical ends, and if means to achieve those ends failthe conflict may continue with even less respect forthose principles;

• armed groups win the legitimacy conferred byinternational engagement, without being forced togive anything in return.

A further set of issues concerns the universality ofhumanitarian principles. Governments and their militaryforces must show at least rhetorical commitment tointernational humanitarian law (IHL), because virtually all governments have ratified the core IHL treaties.Armed groups no doubt gain international legitimacywhen they make a similar commitment, but only fromthe particular perspective of a state-centred world

governed by a set of international norms of behaviour,regulated by state-dominated institutions. If an armedgroup’s constituency and/or ideology expressly rejectsor pays little heed to such a world then it may show little inclination to abide by its rules of behaviour.

In other words, when dealing with armed groups onecannot assume there is agreement on key humanitarianprinciples, even at a purely rhetorical level. Anarchists,fundamentalists of all stripes, new religious movementsand others may indeed refuse to stand on the sharedplatform that allows for a discussion on means toenhance civilian protection or ensure access tomedical supplies.

Summary Opening the door to considering how humanitarian and political engagement can relate to each other in a positive way may entail some risks to the stricthumanitarian ethic. On the other hand, whether we likeit or not, the door relating humanitarian and politicalengagement may already be open. It is not always easyin practice to separate humanitarian and politicalapproaches to armed groups. Such groups are morelikely than states to view all international agencies asrelated, and will not easily appreciate the differencebetween, for example, the UN’s relief arm and itsmediators. Humanitarian issues are often easier issueson which to open dialogue. Reaching agreement on thedelivery of relief supplies, respect for civilian property, orthe fair treatment of prisoners may build trust betweencombatants and open the door to discussions leading to a resolution of the conflict.

Humanitarian agencies and political actors need to bewary of the potential downsides of relating humanitarianand political engagement. Armed groups, no less thanstate belligerents, may use humanitarian discussions as a means of gaining legitimacy while stalling onaddressing security and political issues. Humanitarianagreements can be a fig leaf hiding naked politicaldisagreement. Armed groups, unlike recognized states,are not bound to show commitment to humanitarianprinciples. Though they often do so (not least to gainlegitimacy), their tactics will be driven by theirideologies and constituencies, either or both of whichmay reject such principles. Finally, political actors mustbe careful in manipulating humanitarian issues.Ensuring respect for humanitarian principles is an end in itself; agreements towards this end cannot simply beinstrumentalized and used willy-nilly as tools orinducements in a peace process.

47Humanitarian and political approaches to engaging armed groups

48 Accord 16

The struggleagainstlandmines an opening for peace talksin Colombia

Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey

In December 1997, the Ottawa Convention or MineBan Treaty (MBT) was signed by 144 states. As withother international treaties and conventions, the MBT

can only be acceded to by states. It does not containany provisions dealing with armed non-state actors, nordoes it provide them with the opportunity to expresstheir commitment to the ban. Seeking to complementthe state-centric process, Geneva Call launched a newtool to engage armed groups in a landmine ban: theDeed of Commitment.

Geneva Call seeks to establish humanitarian dialoguewith these groups and obtain from them a sustainablecommitment to the mine ban, as well as respect for thenorms of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) morebroadly. The Deed of Commitment by which the armedgroups can commit to the ban is a unique processbased on an inclusive rather than exclusive orrepressive approach towards these actors.

The work of Geneva Call in ColombiaColombia is the only country in South America wherelandmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) arestill being laid. The civil war that has been raging forforty years is vastly complex due to the variety of actorsinvolved: two large guerrilla organizations, a range ofparamilitary groups and the government armed forces.Colombia is a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty and, atpresent, no longer uses anti-personnel (AP) mines. Thearmed forces affirmed the destruction of their stock ofAP mines in October 2004.

The other actors in the conflict are regular landmineusers because mines are cheap and easy to acquire andassemble. The population is therefore severely affectedby landmines. Current statistics suggest that AP minesare responsible for a conservative average of twovictims a day, of which around 40 per cent are civilians.A significant proportion of the indigenous population isalso victimized by these weapons, with displacement,the prevention of land cultivation, and disruptedtransportation among the effects. Furthermore,landmines placed by armed groups cause 50 per centof the armed forces’ casualties. Considering the gravityof the situation, in 2003 Geneva Call decided to commititself to approaching the Colombian groups usingmines or IEDs.

The Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), a member of the International Campaign to BanLandmines, works in Colombia supporting theimplementation of the MBT and immediately expressed interest in assisting Geneva Call’s projectwith its knowledge of the conflict and its contacts with local communities. Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey is Executive

President of Geneva Call.

An ELN map of the area of Micoahumadoshowing mined and de-mined areas.

Source: ELN

Humanitarian and political engagement

49An opening for peace talks in Colombia

Since 2003 Geneva Call has approached two armedgroups: the National Liberation Army (ELN) and theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Whileonly indirect contact has been established with theFARC, considerable progress has been made with theELN with whom Geneva Call is in direct communication.

One of the guiding principles of Geneva Call’s work istransparency. This means that in most of the caseswhere the organization initiates contact with an armedgroup it informs the state authorities and publicizes itsaction in the local communities concerned. When theColombia project started the government supportedGeneva Call’s inclusive approach to the landmine banand took steps to facilitate contacts between theorganization and the armed groups active on itsterritory. For example, a Geneva Call delegation wasallowed to meet directly with two ELN spokespersonsdetained in the high security Itagui prison in Medellín.Since this first meeting, regular exchanges have takenplace and a dialogue with the group’s leadership hasbeen made possible. Discussions are continuing withFrancisco Galan, the ELN spokesperson imprisoned inItagui, and with contacts in the field. Geneva Call hasalso met a member of the Central Command in Cuba.

It is important to remember that at the time of its firstmeeting with Geneva Call, the ELN had publicly ruledout attempting to seek a negotiated settlement with

President Uribe’s administration after the breakdown ofa peace process with the previous government in May2002. In a Forum organized by Geneva Call in June 2004(see below) the ELN opened the door again and thegovernment replied positively, proposing Mexico as a facilitator. But the talks between the two parties aredifficult, and tensions and disagreements have made theColombian government more cautious in its support –initially very positive – for Geneva Call’s activities.

Geneva Call is not alone in its efforts to engage armedgroups in dialogue. Many other actors such as theCatholic Church and the ‘group of friendly countries’ arealso active in trying to find ways to re-open negotiationsand to maintain contact with the armed groups.

From rejection to first steps Early on, it became apparent to Geneva Call that theELN was not willing to discuss the possibility ofrenouncing the use of landmines and IEDs at that time. Landmines were deemed essential in the armedstruggle against the government. For Geneva Call thiswas a first: previous negotiations with armed groups inother parts of the world had been long and arduousbut never had a group categorically refused the notionof a total ban on AP mines. The ELN showed no signs ofbending on the issue.

At this juncture, Geneva Call faced a dilemma: shouldthe dialogue be halted until the ELN assumed a morereasonable position? It was decided that to do so wouldbe to abandon the humanitarian cause of the people in the region. If even a slight possibility existed thatcontinued dialogue might build confidence and yield a positive outcome for potential victims, then this hadto be pursued.

Thus the dialogue continued and the idea of creating a mine-free pilot zone was conceived. This idea, whichhas been accepted in principle and is currently beingdeveloped, concerns a zone in which the ELN will carryout an initiative on three fronts: (1) progressivelyallowing the implementation of mine-risk educationprograms; (2) mapping and marking mined land; and (3) enabling the eventual de-mining of designated zones.

Linking the landmine ban to the peace processOn 4-5 June 2004 Geneva Call and the CCCM organizedthe ‘First International Forum on Landmines, Non-StateActors and Humanitarian Agreements’ in the Senateroom in Bogotá. Government officials, NGOs,international organizations, indigenous peoples,representatives of the Colombian military and otherswere to attend.

Upon learning of this event, the ELN voiced its concernthat the forum would provide an opportunity for all butitself to be heard. Geneva Call asked the government toauthorize the recording of a video interview with theELN to be shown during the Forum. The governmentrefused but later made a proposal that signalled itswillingness to endorse the renewal of peace talks.Francisco Galan would be released from prison for a fewhours to make a declaration in front of the participants.

In a live broadcast from the Senate room on 4 June,Galan read a statement on behalf of the ELN thatproposed peace negotiations be re-opened aroundthree themes:

1. a humanitarian agreement that includes acommitment to limiting the use of AP mines;

2. a general amnesty for ELN political detainees andprisoners of war;

3. a temporary bilateral ceasefire agreement.

Galan expressed the wish that “Geneva Call and theColombian Campaign Against Mines […] accompany[the ELN] in the process of building this humanitarianagreement.” This attested to the successful confidence-building process of the preceding year.

The Colombian authorities immediately respondedpositively, voicing willingness to re-open negotiationswith the ELN through the Mexican government andemphasizing the need to prioritize the fight againstlandmines. Moreover, Colombian Vice-PresidentFrancisco Santos publicly authorized Geneva Call to holddiscussions with the illegal armed groups on this issue.

Through the organization of a forum on landmines, andafter a long process of confidence-building betweenthe ELN and Geneva Call, a possible small path to peacewas opening.

Positive spin-offsSince June 2004 work has continued, and Geneva Call and the CCCM have organized several regionalmeetings. New actors have become interested in thequestion of armed groups and landmine usage. Mostnotably, the Governor of Antioquia has created aHumanitarian Commission, launched during a GenevaCall workshop, with a view to finding regional solutionsto the humanitarian crisis. Antioquia is one of theregions that suffers most from landmines, which haveleft a number of villages completely deserted. GenevaCall was the only international organization invited tobecome a member of this Commission. The Governor’sobjective is to negotiate various humanitarianagreements through the Commission, with the AP mineissue as one of the priorities. Geneva Call has beenendorsed as the Commission’s intermediary with theguerrilla groups, the main responsibility being toformalize agreements for demining affected zones andenabling the safe return of internally displaced persons.To date, Geneva Call has visited communities fromthree of the most affected towns in the Antioquiaregion – San Carlos, San Fransisco and Argelia – wherethe proposed negotiation of humanitarian agreementson landmines with armed groups has been verypositively received. However, until now the progress of the Commission has been slight because thegovernment has resisted the development of regionalhumanitarian agreements. President Uribe’s strategydemands a global and total agreement on a suspensionof hostilities before any talks with the ELN are opened.

At the end of November 2004, the ELN proposeddiscussing another humanitarian agreement outside of this Commission. The group proposed allowingdemining in an area of Micoahumado, north ofSantander, and asked Geneva Call to follow up. Severalcriteria were taken into account in selecting this zone: it is a zone under the ELN’s influence whose miningseriously affects civilians, and the local population iswell organized, thus facilitating the monitoring processand information exchange.

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Rejecting the ELN’s proposal, the government refusedto authorize a specialized NGO to de-mine the area. Inresponse, in January 2005 the ELN announced it hadtaken the initiative itself and de-mined the zone. TheELN requested that Geneva Call ensure that a process of verification was conducted before civilians use thiszone again.

The government has so far refused to allow thisverification to take place, despite the readiness of aspecialized international organization to do it. Thegovernment is under enormous pressure to allowverification to occur, with appeals from such actors asthe regional Laboratory of Peace, the United NationsDevelopment Programme, the United NationsChildren’s Fund, the Geneva International Centre forHumanitarian Demining and the local population. The deaths of three children in a landmine incident in February 2005 have further increased this pressure.

Geneva Call has proposed that this zone be declareddemilitarized to prevent the land from being re-minedin the future. The authorities have also rejected this, butGeneva Call intends to seek a compromise that wouldguarantee that the zone will not be mined again.

In this difficult and suspicious climate Geneva Call triesto reaffirm that the landmine initiative must be isolatedfrom political debates and considered only in relationto meeting humanitarian needs. This is a greatchallenge since up till now the Colombian authoritieshave always refused to support regional or localagreements. But Geneva Call hopes that discussions onmines can open doors for broader negotiations or evenre-launch abandoned peace talks.

Lessons learned, dilemmas andopportunitiesEven if the ultimate objective of a total ban on APmines seems out of reach for the moment, there isspace to improve the lives of populations that face thethreat of landmines on a daily basis. The followinglessons, dilemmas and opportunities from Geneva Call’sinvolvement in Colombia can be identified:

• Discussing a concrete and tangible topic such aslandmines could open up new possibilities fordialogue and bring actors who would otherwiserefuse to speak to each other together, because theacute need for solutions to the humanitarian issueposed by mines seems to be accepted by bothparties and many other actors. By raising awarenessof the question of landmines, it is possible to findcommon ground for negotiating regional humanitarianagreements. This approach of beginning locally and

expanding regionally was the key to achieving peacein El Salvador.

• The involvement of the national government isindispensable. Conversely, an NGO such as GenevaCall can assume a role that governments can rarelyafford to play, especially in a complex political realitysuch as Colombia’s. Engaging armed groups is asensitive issue, and other foreign governments fearcreating diplomatic incidents with the countriesconcerned or giving legitimacy to these groups. AnNGO can play a complementary role by engagingwith armed groups without taking risks on diplomaticor political matters.

• The fight against landmines, approached inclusivelythrough the parallel engagement of state and non-state actors, has provided opportunities for direct and indirect dialogue between the Colombiangovernment and the ELN that could potentially helpbuild the trust and mutual understanding requiredfor future peace talks.

Geneva Call is working in a specific niche, guided by theprinciple of neutrality and independence. Geneva Callwill never take part in the conflict and is involved onlyin humanitarian action. The organization is fully awarethat it does not control all the decisions taken by oneside or the other. It remains aware of all these politicalmanoeuvres and is motivated by only one objective: tosave human lives.

Geneva Call’s engagement with the ELN and Colombiangovernment on landmines has experienced bothprogress and setbacks. The project of de-mining areasof Colombia has an impact on the prospective peaceprocess, and the relationship between the parties issubject to both opportunities and risks; for example,there may be negative ramifications for this relationshipwhen the ELN pushes forward on a de-mining initiativeand the government is reticent. But while results maybe small, they are real. Since Geneva Call initiated itsproject in Colombia, debate on the landmine issue andthe condemnation of mine use has become very visiblethroughout the country. Thanks to several regionalworkshops, the Afro-Colombian and indigenouscommunities, usually excluded from these debates,have become very active on this question. TheGovernor of Antioquia has created a HumanitarianCommission and other mayors have expressed theirwillingness to negotiate humanitarian agreements onmines. A small zone has been de-mined. Colombia’sattention is increasingly focused on this question. Theprocess has grown yet is fragile and complicated, but itis important to push forward with this work as even alittle progress is of benefit to the population.

51An opening for peace talks in Colombia

OperationLifeline Sudan war, peace and relief insouthern Sudan

Lam Akol

In 1988, the United Nations Secretary-General, JavierPerez de Cuellar, appointed James P. Grant, ExecutiveDirector of the United Nations Children’s Fund

(UNICEF) to organize a special relief operation in Sudan.This decision was taken against the backdrop ofrepeated media reports of a high death toll resultingfrom war-induced famine. For southern Sudan, somesources put the figure as high as 500,000 persons, mostof them children and the aged. The conference was totake place in Khartoum and to be attended byrepresentatives from the United Nations, donorcountries, relief NGOs and the Government of Sudan(GoS). The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army(SPLM/A) was not invited, despite a string of recentmilitary victories that left it in full control of theinternational borders between Sudan and its neighbours:Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, east of the Bahr el Jebeland south of the Sobat river. The InternationalConference on Sudan Emergency Relief opened on 8 March 1989. Grant declared his wish that the partiesto the conflict agree a six-month ceasefire in order tostock food on site for the needy population.

Genesis of the operationSPLM/A Chairman Dr. John Garang sent an urgent letter to the Khartoum Conference commending theinternational community’s concern and expressing the SPLM/A’s readiness to co-operate with theorganizations and agencies meeting in Khartoum inassisting the needy populations.

Grant took the letter seriously and once the conferenceclosed, he flew to Addis Ababa to discuss the issue. Asthe Director of the SPLM/A Office of Co-ordination andExternal Relations, I met Grant on 10 March 1989 in thecompany of two of my assistants. He briefed us on thedeliberations that took place in the conference andexcitedly added that Dr. Garang’s letter was wellreceived by the participants. Finally, he outlined theissues he wanted SPLA agreement on. The six-monthceasefire was to facilitate the implementation of a

52 Accord 16

Dr. Lam Akol is currently a member of the

National Liberation Council of the Sudan

People’s Liberation Movement / Army

(SPLM/A). He has held various posts

within the Movement (1986-1991),

SPLM-Nasir (1991-1993) and SPLM-

United (1993-2003), and also served as

Minister of Transport (1998-2002).

SPLA soldiers carrying relief food.

Source: PANOS/Sven TorfinnHumanitarian and political engagement

massive relief operation to deliver food into southernSudan by land, river and air from across the borders ofEthiopia, Kenya and Uganda. I gave my initial responsebut promised him that I would convey our discussion tothe Chairman so that a firm decision could be made.We agreed to meet again.

The Chairman ruled out a ceasefire for any length oftime but instructed me to continue dialogue on thesuggested relief operation. He pointed out that the UNneeded to secure the agreement of the neigbouringcountries for any cross-border operation to be possible.

I met Grant again, as well as the US Embassy Chargéd’Affaires in Addis Ababa and his Deputy Chief ofMission (DCM). I communicated to them that theSPLM/A was not prepared for a ceasefire but more than ready to explore other modalities for the reliefoperation. We then got locked into a series of meetingsto explore these modalities with the US embassy staffled by Bob Frasure, the DCM. It was not an easy task. At the final stage Julia Taft, a senior official of the USOffice of Foreign Disaster Assistance in Washington,joined the talks.

The problem was how to carry out the operationwithout a ceasefire. Ultimately, I suggested that it may

be easier for the SPLA to consider a ceasefire along therelief routes rather than all over the south. This wouldtake care of the land and river routes. Air routes neededmore discussion. All agreed there and then to aceasefire along the routes followed by UN reliefconvoys. Bob Frasure termed those ceasefire axes“Corridors of Tranquillity”, a phrase later adopted by therelief operation. The Chairman gave his final approval. It proved to be a turning point for the SPLM/A in termsof international exposure and its dealings with the UN system.

OLS I (April – December 1989)The Chairman instructed me to represent theMovement for the negotiation and implementation of the relief operation. I left Addis Ababa for Nairobi on 17 March, and met Grant again to conclude theagreement. It aimed to get sufficient food aid intosouthern Sudan to feed approximately two millioncivilians, bringing in 100,000 tons of food over a six-week period before the rainy season made the roadsimpassable. The cost of the operation was estimated atUS$132 million. It was code-named Operation LifelineSudan (OLS), and officially launched on 1 April 1989 inNairobi when Grant flagged off the first convoy of truckstaking food to Kapoeta and Torit through Lokichoggio.

53Operation Lifeline Sudan

The following terms formed the basis of OperationLifeline Sudan:

1. The UN has to deal with all the parties to the conflictthat control territory through which relief items passor to which they are delivered

2. The parties to the conflict commit themselves to thesafe and unhindered passage and delivery of reliefitems to the needy population

3. The UN, as a neutral body, was to co-ordinate theoperations with the parties to the conflict

There was no written agreement between the partiesto the conflict (the SPLA and the GoS) and the UN whenOLS came into being on 1 April 1989. It was only theexpress commitment of the parties to the above termsthat kept the operation going. Although the UN doesnot confer formal recognition of any kind to the SPLA, it had to deal with it in order to reach the needypopulation. Indeed, Grant made it clear that the choiceof UNICEF as the UN lead agency in OLS was in part tostress non-recognition of the SPLA while dealing with it on this humanitarian undertaking.

Kenya and Uganda readily agreed to allow cross-borderrelief operations through their territories. Since theEthiopian government did not give its consent, theplans for river and land cross-border operationsenvisaged through Gambela were shelved. Lokichoggiowas chosen as the main relief centre to serve the SPLA-administered areas of southern Sudan, especially by air.During this period, relief items were delivered into theareas of southern Sudan controlled by both the SPLM/Aand the GoS by river, rail and air. Improved healthconditions among the population became noticeable.

The advent of OLS provided an opportunity for theSPLA High Command to have a presence outside Addis Ababa, facilitating sustained direct access to theSPLM/A leadership for the international community andthe press. In fact, for the first time in the SPLA’s history,journalists were milling around in previously out ofbounds SPLM/A-administered areas.

There was a profound connection between OLS andopportunities for peacemaking, even if peace was not its stated aim. The operation was mounted toameliorate the suffering caused by war-induced famine,hence, the final solution to the problem lay in achievingpeace. OLS also provided the donors, especially the US,with leverage or influence on the SPLM/A. In a meetingbetween the SPLM/A leader and Grant at Panyagor inApril 1989, the latter raised the issue of how he and the donors could assist in bringing about a peacefulresolution to the conflict. This was followed by an

announcement from the Chairman of a unilateral one-month ceasefire to commence on 1 May 1989. It will be recalled that this was one of Grant’s initial requests.The ceasefire was renewed several times. The SPLM/A’sinitiative had the effect of exerting tremendouspressure on the government of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, andled to the first peace talks between the parties in AddisAbaba in June 1989. This was a very significant shift forthe Movement, which had previously held meetingsonly with political parties and not with the sittinggovernment. The talks made considerable progress and the two sides agreed to reconvene on 4 July. Theprocess was, however, interrupted by the coup d’etaton 30 June 1989.

OLS II (April - December 1990)The new regime’s seizure of power, supposedly indefence of Islamic laws (sharia), was widely seen as anattempt to derail the peace process. Clearly, the juntawanted the peace process on its terms.

The ceasefire collapsed in October 1989 with renewedfighting on a number of fronts. In November, themilitary junta suspended all OLS relief flights tosouthern Sudan. It saw the relief operation as feedingits enemies. Thus, the breakdown of the ceasefire led tothe breakdown of the humanitarian partnership withthe GoS. The renewed fighting brought about a newpeace initiative mediated by former US President Carterand talks took place in Nairobi in November-December1989. These efforts were undertaken in close co-ordination with the US government.

Negotiations for the second phase, or what becameknown as OLS II, did not lead to an agreement betweenthe three parties similar to that of OLS I. The reliefoperations took on an ad hoc nature, and the GoSslowly became the dominant partner, dictating termsto both the SPLA and the UN. This dominance wasparticularly evident in the GoS approval of destinationsin southern Sudan to be reached by air. To the SPLA, theGoS was motivated by purely military considerations,using food as a weapon of war. To make things worse,these approvals always came late and sometimeswhole months passed without any flights at all. Thekeenness of the UN system not to push the regime tothe point of withdrawing from the OLS prevented themfrom reacting strongly to the junta’s machinations, asituation further exploited by the regime. There werealso allegations that the SPLA was itself diverting foodaid to feed its army. These allegations remainedunsubstantiated; however, the truth is that, as civilians,soldiers’ spouses receive food aid which they share with their partners and children.

54 Accord 16

OLS III (post December 1991)Negotiations for OLS III in October 1991 came after the Movement had split into two: the Torit and Nasirfactions. The then UN Under-Secretary General co-ordinating relief for the Horn of Africa, James Jonah,was to blame for the failure to reach agreement on thethird phase of OLS. Contrary to the principles adoptedby the UN to deal with those parties in control on theground, the very principles that brought about OLS inthe first place, Jonah insisted that the Nasir faction ofthe SPLM/A should not take part in the October 1991meeting to discuss the corridors of tranquillity for OLSIII. Eventually, the meeting ended in disarray. Soon afterthis incident the OLS agreed to deal with the SPLM-Nasir and its relief wing, the Relief Association forSouthern Sudan. However, the SPLM-United (the nameSPLM-Nasir adopted in 1993) split in February 1994.With the backing of the US Embassy in Nairobi, PhilipO’Brien, the OLS Coordinator for the Southern Sector,refused to co-operate with the SPLM-United under mycommand and its relief wing, the Fashoda Relief andRehabilitation Association, citing the flimsy argumentthat this would encourage SPLM/A factionalization. Therefusal to deal with the SPLM-United, which controlledterritory in Southern Sudan, meant denying reliefassistance to the population in that territory. It was only O’Brien’s successor, Pierce Gerety, who signed theGround Rules agreement on relief with the SPLM-United on 29 May 1996.

This phase of the OLS saw divisions within theliberation Movement and raised concerns within theinternational community as to whether the reliefoperation caused or contributed to fuelling thisdivision. It cannot be overemphasized that factionalismis a political development driven by the politicaldynamics of the situation concerned. It does not needany prompting or recognition by UN bodies and aidorganizations. They just have to deal with the reality. Inorder for it to reach all the needy population, the UNneeds to deal with all the parties to the conflict thatcontrol territory. The refusal to deal with any of theparties results in denying relief assistance to thepopulation in the territory controlled by that party. TheUN would have put itself in the unenviable position ofnot only using food as a weapon of war but also takingsides in an internal conflict.

The period also saw a lull in the peace process. Apartfrom the 1992 Abuja mediation which was plannedbefore the split, no serious peace talks took place. Thegovernment sought to exploit the SPLM/A split byplaying one faction off against the other. For example, on 23 February 1993 the GoS agreed with Garang inEntebbe that the SPLM-Nasir be excluded from the

‘Abuja 2’ talks. Thus, there were two parallel talks inMay-June 1993 between the GoS and the two factionsof the SPLM/A: one in Abuja with the SPLM-Torit andthe other in Nairobi with the SPLM-United. Thegovernment’s intransigence and its attempt to dictateterms on the OLS must be seen in this light.

The expansion of the OLS system, the increasednumber of parties to the humanitarian engagement,and some violations of the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ bythe parties necessitated a change in approach towardswritten ground rules. These were first developedbetween OLS and the liberation Movements in 1992 toprovide greater security to relief workers. Strengthenedground rules were further developed as an improvedframework for OLS engagement with armed oppositionmovements. As a signed document, it was one of thefew international agreements made with non-stateentities. Garang signed the Ground Rules for theSPLM/A in July 1995, Riek Machar for the South SudanIndependence Movement/Army in August 1995, and I signed for the SPLM-United in May 1996.

ConclusionOLS was innovative in that it was one of the first post-Cold War UN-led humanitarian programmes. It came at a critical historical moment of changing notions ofsovereignty, intervention, and engagement with non-state actors. It was the first time that the UN had to deal with a non-state armed group without conferringrecognition upon it. With regard to peace, a number ofdevelopments took place in this period. Influenced bythe stakeholders in OLS, the SPLM/A declared a blanketceasefire on 1 May 1989 paving the way for the firstmeeting between the two sides to the conflict in June.The installation of the military regime on 30 June led tothe breakdown of the ceasefire, which in turn had anegative impact on OLS. Splits within the liberationmovement in the first half of the 1990s also had anegative impact on both OLS and the peace process.

OLS saved lives in southern Sudan. That was itsdeclared mandate. However, it is evident that theinitiative created an atmosphere conducive to peace asdemonstrated by the accelerated peace efforts duringits early period. Although other developments inKhartoum and within the SPLM/A slowed down thisprocess, it is significant that the Inter-GovernmentalAgency for Development (IGAD)-mediated talks startedwith an agreement on relief issues in 1994. As with OLS,this agreement helped the parties to start talking aboutthe political issues.

55Operation Lifeline Sudan

The relationshipbetween trackone and tracktwo diplomacy

Julian Thomas Hottinger

Track one actors (governmental officials,representatives of inter-governmentalorganizations, and third-party governments)

are common and established interlocutors with armedgroups in the context of peace processes. The lasttwenty years have seen track two actors (non-governmental and unofficial groups and individuals)play a wide variety of roles vis-à-vis armed groups and peacemaking.

Joseph Montville, who coined the term ‘track two’ in1982, defined track two diplomacy as:

“ an unofficial, informal interaction betweenmembers of adversary groups or nations thataims to develop strategies, influence publicopinion, and organize human and materialresources in ways that might help to resolvetheir conflict. …[It] is a process designed toassist official leaders to resolve or, in the firstinstance, to manage conflicts by exploringpossible solutions out of public view andwithout the requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage”

Broader theoretical systems have been developed sincethen to differentiate further between different actors,and different segments of society can play a role. TheInstitute of Multi-Track Diplomacy’s model of Multi-Track Diplomacy defines ‘track two’ as peacemaking by conflict resolution professionals and NGOs, with anumber of other tracks from ‘track three’ (peacemakingthrough commerce or business) through to ‘track nine’(peacemaking through the media and information)having a role. Within a multi-track system it is importantto see negotiations as taking place at multiple levels,while the different tracks can be either engaged insequence or parallel, or even get mixed up to theextent of having various tracks knitted together andstrongly interrelated.

56 Accord 16

Julian Thomas Hottinger is an expert in

mediation and facilitation attached to

the Expert Pool of the Swiss Federal

Department of Foreign Affairs. The

views expressed below are those of the

author alone, and do not necessarily

reflect the views of the Swiss Federal

Department of Foreign Affairs.

Negotiators for the Free Aceh Movement and theGovernment of Indonesia sign a peace accord, 9 December

2002 watched by mediator Martin Griffiths (centre) of theHenri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Source: REUTERS/Denis Balibouse

Track one - track two interaction

The growing appreciation of models of peacemakingdriven by non-state actors is partly explained by theway non-state armed groups have become morecomplex, heterogeneous and harder to deal with. Forexample, many armed groups have evolved to diversifytheir economic resource base. This phenomenon wasclearly seen during the civil war in Lebanon, where no militia could survive without an economic base inthe ‘taxes’ gathered from the communities or diasporas,extorting money from business circles, or creating legal or illegal businesses. Because of the complexnature of armed groups, negotiations with them need to cover much more than military aspects, andinclude broad societal issues and the reintegration offormer combatants.

This development demands the diverse kinds ofpeacemaking that increasingly flexible and pragmaticmulti-track diplomacy offers.

Comparative advantages While distinctions between tracks are not always asclear in practice as they are in theory, it is useful torecognize how each track can have its own advantagesand disadvantages for engaging armed groups indialogue. Track one actors are more likely to haveresources and status. They may have powerful ‘carrots’and ‘sticks’ in terms of their ability to intervene militarily,support peace processes/agreements with monitorsand peacekeepers, and give or withhold legitimacy, aid,trade or loans, etc. They may also be constrained fromacting effectively as they may be wary of conveyingstatus and legitimacy on ‘rebels’, may be compromisedby national interest or seen as too partial toward one of the combatants or have too great a stake in theoutcome of the process. There may also be legalconstraints and difficulties in acting without drawinglots of media attention.

57The relationship between track one and track two diplomacy

Track two parties are less threatening to armed groups,and find it easier to work flexibly, unofficially, and off-the-record, and have less to be concerned about interms of conveying official/legal recognition. Lackinggeopolitical interests and stakes in the conflict, theymay be more impartial, forming relationships with awider variety of actors in the conflict, and hearingthings official actors do not. On the other hand, theylack the capacity to compel or coerce parties, can havea harder time ‘gaining entry’ to a conflict (especiallywith state actors), and cannot provide the sameincentives and guarantees as a track one actor.Importantly, they often lack resources and funding,especially for their more longer-term work that is ‘out of the spotlight’.

Ways that track one and track two canwork together well In many peace processes now it would be unrealistic to think that one track could work without the others,or that you can totally separate the track roles to theextent that each level can work autonomously, ignoringthe others. There are several ways in which track oneand track two contributions complement each other:

Track two can assist the process of understandingarmed groupsLike most organizations, armed groups do not appearspontaneously and remain stable until the end of theirexistence. Because armed groups are highly volatileorganizations, building up an understanding of themcan take many years. Track two actors can help buildthis gradual understanding. One of the essential tasksof any mediator interested in an armed group is towatch and measure the phases within an armedgroup’s life, so as to understand its intentions,reasoning, strategy and evolution in such as way as to be in a position to help prevent the situation fromdeteriorating, or occasionally to help set the venue and agenda within pre-negotiations. This has been thecase in Burundi, for example, where a number of NGOssustained contact with the Forces for the Defence ofDemocracy–National Council for the Defence ofDemocracy (FDD-CNDD), while discussing issues withthem, organizing seminars and trying to help thembuild a political agenda solid enough to deal with theBurundian government. The FDD-CNDD eventuallydecided to negotiate in 2000.

Track two can help build the willingness and ability of armed groups to participate successfully in a peace processThere is a sort of myth that in negotiations – especiallybetween armed groups – militarily-trained leaders areapt to be pragmatic, and can simply start talking toeach other if seated at a table. Rather, parties are likelyto sit down and continue fighting across the table, as ifthe battlefield had simply been replaced by a meetingroom. To avoid this, a lot of background preparatorywork needs to be done over months or years at differenttrack levels. ‘Shadow diplomats’ or professionalintermediaries regularly engage in informal meetingswhere delegates or friends of an armed group willparticipate, often anonymously, to learn aboutexperiences elsewhere, or sound out ideas. Where sides participate together, the process of drawing onexperiences from elsewhere and studying alternativepractice is a way of sounding out what the other isthinking, or gauging reactions. These meetings canbecome a sort of testing ground for what the leadersmight discuss at a latter date in track one negotiations.In this way a track two process helps prepare for a trackone process, and different projects at different levelscan inter-connect.

Keeping lines of communication open Track two actors might be employed by formalmediators to make informal contact with armed groupswith the aim of following events within the movement,grasping its logic, and letting them know that whenthey want to sit down and talk there are organizationswilling to assist. Messages may be carried across lineswith the hope of sharing and cross-fertilizing each side’sperception of events, or to negotiate an exchange ofprisoners or the liberation of hostages. In this process of‘putting one’s foot in the door,’ track two mediators donot try to impose themselves, but just follow events and,if required, try to find some alternative paths towardspeace. Another reason for the need to constantly keepchannels open is to prevent armed groups from fallinginto total isolation, to the extent that they burythemselves in their own logic, making any form ofcontact more difficult. It is slow but essential work: anarmed group’s confidence in a political dialogue cannotbe built overnight. It demands a significant investmentof time and energy and constant follow-up. It is alsocomplicated, especially as changes in leadership can berelatively common due to internal struggles or militarydefeats. The best known example of this kind of activityremains discussions with Sinn Féin in Northern Irelandbefore the Belfast Agreement, but it is also commonlypractised in Europe, the former Soviet Union, SouthAmerica and elsewhere.

58 Accord 16

Support from aboveAn effective track two actor may have a high level of technical and process expertise, and acquiredknowledge of the armed group, but without track one political pressure, help and backing, professionalmediators or facilitators would be lost. Armed groupsare in need of reassurance that the internationalcommunity and its official representatives will back thepeace process and help implement and guarantee theresults. This was clearly the case in Sudan’s Machakosnegotiations, where the close and steady watch of theinternational community and its reassurances onassistance with implementation made the agreementreached in January 2005 feasible.

Blurred boundariesAs the number, roles, and importance of track twoactors have proliferated, the management of the track one – track two relationship has come to have asignificant effect – positive or negative – on the processof getting armed groups successfully engaged inpolitical dialogue.

A number of problems can arise in complex, multi-level peacemaking. Track two actors do not alwaysconduct themselves responsibly or act with sufficientaccountability. When there are a number of track twoactors involved in a single conflict, it can be confusingfor all concerned, increasing the risk of misunderstandingsand disagreements. It can be especially confusing forarmed groups when track two actors appear to speakfor a country or state they do not necessarily represent,and NGOs sometimes underestimate armed groups’confusion between the NGO and the state representativesof the country where the NGO has its headquarters.Quite often warring parties do not necessarily grasp the difference between state and non-governmentalintermediaries, confounding informal track two positionson certain issues with state positions.

Track two actors should make an effort to understandtheir position in a complex peace process. They mustalso try to understand that track one actors are undervarious pressures: i.e. they must “get results” and “show success” while making sure they serve their own government or agency’s strategic interests. It isimportant that track two actors recognize the politicaland diplomatic constraints that they are not themselves subject to.

The most important response to these problems isbetter communication and networking. We need tohear more about complementary roles that differenttracks have played in peace processes. We need more

proposals on rules of conduct for interaction betweentracks, addressing such issues of confidentiality,transparency and respect for boundaries. Perhaps thehardest issue to deal with is when and how to convincean NGO working within track two that its task has beenfulfilled and it is time to step down. Many NGOs havehad their fingers burnt on this issue by wanting to stayon to fulfil a task that they are not needed for any longer.

To conclude it must be noted that practical experiencecasts doubt on the applicability of neat distinctionsbetween track roles and identities: in reality they areoften hazy. Complex peace processes are by definitionuntidy affairs: track two actors do not always feel theyare doing track two work – and the same is true withtrack one actors and their work. While distinctionsbetween tracks continue to have theoretical usefulness,as negotiations themselves become increasinglycomplex the nuances and distinctions between tracksbecome less clear-cut.

59The relationship between track one and track two diplomacy

Ceasefirenegotiations in easternDemocraticRepublic ofCongo

Steven A. Smith

Since 2001 a team of Returned Peace CorpsVolunteers (RPCVs) and conflict resolutionpractitioners have engaged in track two

discussions with the three main belligerents in theCongolese war. This article explores efforts to achieve a cessation of hostilities between the Mayi-mayi(sometimes Mai-mai) local militia fighters and theCongolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) inthe context of the implementation of the Lusaka Accord.It also explores the impact of tensions between trackone and track two players have had on that effort.

BackgroundThe Lusaka Accord of 1999 laid out the modalities forthe withdrawal of foreign forces from the DemocraticRepublic of Congo (DRC), established ceasefire linesand created a process known as the Inter-Congolesedialogue. It was signed by several foreign governmentsas well as the DRC government (hereafter ‘Kinshasa’),the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) andthe RCD. The RCD was formed after the initial Rwandanand Ugandan invasion of the DRC in August 1998, andlater split into several factions, the largest and mostinfluential being the RCD-Goma. The ongoing RPCVinitiative included facilitating dialogues betweenKinshasa, the MLC and the RCD in support of theirparticipation in the official Inter-Congolese dialogue.

Through the work of mediators from South Africa and the UN, a further agreement was reached in July2002 between Kinshasa and the Rwandan governmenton the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC. InDecember that year a power-sharing deal was signedby the Congolese parties.

During this time, fighting between Mayi-mayi forcesand the RCD in eastern DRC escalated. Mayi-mayi arelocal militia with numerous tribal and politicalallegiances and no collective leadership, opposed toRwandan intervention in Congo. The Rwandans’

60 Accord 16

Steven A. Smith is a consultant

specializing in conflict resolution and

links between conflict and natural

resources. He has been an NGO

coordinator in Rwandan refugee camps

in the Democratic Republic of Congo,

country director for USAID’s Office of

Transition Initiatives in Rwanda, and

senior advocate for Refugees

International covering humanitarian

crises in sub-Saharan Africa.

A group of Congolese Mayi-mayi child soldiers sit in theirposition in the north Kivu town of Walikale after the RCD

Goma soldiers pulled out, December 2004.

Souce: Reuters/David Lewis

Track one - track two interaction

withdrawal from eastern DRC in November 2002permitted the Mayi-mayi to expand into Rwanda’sformer positions in South Kivu province, pressuring theRCD politically and militarily. The RCD believed this tobe a violation of the Lusaka Accord and planned toretake the territory. The population was certain to bearthe brunt of the fighting.

Discussions with the Mayi-mayi and RCDIn early 2002, I had been contacted by a representativeof one of the Mayi-mayi groups. They had becomeaware of our track two team through our work with themain actors in Congo. They requested that we facilitatea dialogue between themselves and the Rwandans –not the RCD, whom they considered Rwandan proxies.We initially declined, but as it became clear that thefighting in eastern DRC might undermine the formationof a transitional government, we decided to proceed.

Hans Romkema, country representative for the Life and Peace Institute in Bukavu in South Kivu, wasengaged in dialogue with some Mayi-mayi groups,including one led by General Padiri. I accompaniedRomkema to a meeting with General Padiri inNovember 2002. Members of the RPCV team workedwith the RCD leadership to determine the basis for acessation of hostilities that might lead to a ceasefireand cooperation on humanitarian access.

The Mayi-mayi wanted a formal ceasefire, freedom ofmovement between sides, humanitarian aid, and localautonomy while retaining political authority andsecurity in their areas. The RCD wanted the Mayi-mayito accept their authority, but could live with some localautonomy provided the Mayi-mayi did not work withthe ex-Rwandan armed forces or the Interhamwemilitias. Our goal was a cessation of hostilities as aninitial step, after which the UN could push the sidestowards a formal resolution.

The first meeting with Padiri was positive, but while we were there RCD military hardliners attacked Padiri’spositions, violating the temporary ceasefire both sideshad accepted to allow for the meeting. Despite this,Padiri offered a permanent formal ceasefire, proposedfreedom of movement for the population andinternational organizations, and discussed therepatriation of ex-Rwandan armed forces andInterhamwe militias operating in South Kivu.

The RCD leadership was split over pursuingnegotiations for complex reasons of trust and personalinterest linked to the national peace process. Somebelieved that the Mayi-mayi were just Kinshasa’s proxies– the government’s support being a grave violation ofthe Lusaka Accord. Did the Mayi-mayi have the capacityto resist Kinshasa’s entreaties to keep fighting? Further,discussions with the Mayi-mayi legitimized them, letting

61Ceasefire negotiations in eastern DRC

Kinshasa off the hook. Some questioned whether theMayi-mayi could separate themselves from theInterhamwe and ex-Rwandan armed forces.

There was also a deep lack of trust within the RCDleadership over the Lusaka process. They believed thattoo much was being given up for a problematic dealwith a government they felt had demonstrated badfaith by supporting the Mayi-mayi, and worse, thegenocidal forces represented by the Interhamwe andex-Rwandan military. Finally, some elements in the RCD pushed to keep the status quo. The status quo was desirable for security and for economic andpolitical reasons:

• they would continue to control the ancestral lands of the Congolese Tutsis, the ethnic group of much of the senior RCD leadership;

• they felt secure with their Rwandan allies on theborder and the vast, trackless Congolese rain forestsand mountains lying between them and Kinshasa;

• they controlled significant wealth in naturalresources, including coltan, diamonds, gold, timberand agricultural land.

Delay and resumption of the processFive months elapsed between the initial meetings andthe second effort in May 2003. There were two reasons:(1) a lack of funding; and (2) our attempts to persuadethe US embassy in Kinshasa to support local peacetalks. The US State Department funded the secondmission, but discussions with the embassy revealedtheir concern that local peace talks before thetransitional government was formed could result inCongo’s partition.

The embassy also did not want our team involved withthe national peace process, at least while travelling on US government funding. There had been somedifferences and misunderstandings over our track twoefforts. They felt that we were only going to work onlocal peace processes and thus should stay away fromthe RCD leadership while in Goma. However, we feltmeeting the RCD was advisable both for the success of the mission and for our own security: it would beimpossible to achieve our objectives without the RCD’scomprehension and active support. In addition, weknew the RCD leadership from our track two efforts,and for us to travel to Goma and not meet them wouldhave been both insulting and unwise politically. From asecurity standpoint, we could not expect to meet withMayi-mayi representatives without the RCD securityservices knowing. Attempting the mission whileavoiding the RCD would have endangered others’ lives

as well as our own, and in any event we would havebeen ‘invited’ to meet the RCD in a way that we couldnot refuse. We were unable to resolve the difference ofopinion with the embassy and would later be hauntedby that failure.

The May 2003 mission began in Kinshasa with meetingswith the US Ambassador and political staff. We thenproceeded to Goma. By this point, the RCD had begunits long-anticipated offensive to retake areas occupiedby the Mayi-mayi. We met with RCD PresidentOnasumba, Vice President Ruberwa and military chief ofstaff Sylvain Buki. We urged them to consider a ceasefirewith General Padiri and to continue their support for theoverall peace process. We also met representatives ofthe Mayi mayi, although due to the fighting we wereunable to meet with Padiri directly. Both sides reiterateda guarded willingness to stop fighting.

Tensions with track one: a critical decisionWe returned to the US and presented our findings tothe State Department, strongly recommending thaturgent follow-up discussions between the Mayi-mayiand RCD be undertaken. We waited for feedback fromthe embassy on our report, but a week later wereceived a clear message: the embassy intervened withthe State Department to block any future funding ofour efforts. They had complained that we had exceededour terms of reference during the mission.

We never fully understood the basis for this decision.Not everyone viewed a halt to the fighting in the eastas positive: credible reports indicated that elementswithin the Kinshasa government were using the Mayi-mayi and ex-Rwandan armed forces and militias to fighta proxy war in the east in order to weaken the RCD andforce them into a transitional government on Kinshasa’sterms. Successful local peace negotiations would haveundercut that strategy and brought the RCD into thegovernment in a stronger position. Kinshasa was evenmore alarmed about the possibility that some Mayi-mayi elements might join with the RCD and threatenthe capital with military action.

It is doubtful that that local peace accords would haveled to Rwanda and the RCD advancing upon Kinshasa.All sides were exhausted and wanted an end to thefighting, albeit on their terms. We felt reducing theviolence would strengthen moderates on all sides andfacilitate the RCD’s entry into a transitional government.Key RCD leaders repeatedly emphasized how attacksupon their positions had eroded confidence and madeit more difficult to continue the peace process. Further,serious differences existed within the RCD on whetherto pursue negotiations or warfare, and it was clear that

62 Accord 16

Kinshasa’s continued support to the Mayi-mayi and ex-Rwandan forces strengthened the pro-war faction inthe RCD.

We were presented with a dilemma: the RCD and Mayi-mayi were committed to entering into dialogue on aceasefire, but it was clear that we could expect no helpand probably active opposition from the US embassy.We decided that we could not allow the conflict tocontinue to burn when the parties were willing todiscuss stopping it.

Lacking US government or private support, I returnedto Congo in July 2003 using personal funds. I informedthe State Department and embassy of my decision, andmet with the RCD leaders in Goma where they agreedto cease hostilities to permit discussions with GeneralPadiri. Romkema organized a trip to see Padiri at hisheadquarters in South Kivu. We spent two days withPadiri and his senior staff, including all of his seniorofficers and political leadership from the front lines. I ran a training seminar in negotiations and conflictresolution for most of the staff. Most of the participants’questions were on a possible integrated army andwhether the RCD would keep their word. HansRomkema worked with General Padiri on the details ofthe Mayi-mayi ceasefire offer. The evenings were spentin long conversations with the senior officer corps. Aftertwo days, we had a ceasefire offer in hand and returnedto Bukavu to deliver it to the RCD and MONUC (UnitedNations Observer Mission to Congo). Our meeting withMONUC was brief: both the US embassy and UNheadquarters instructed MONUC’s Bukavu office tohave nothing to do with it.

The next day we watched the Congolese national flagraised in Bukavu for the first time in five years, markingthe fact that the country was now in theory united. Wethen went back to Goma and delivered the ceasefireproposal to the RCD. They accepted it and the fightingbetween Padiri and the RCD subsided.

Eventually, MONUC became involved in formal ceasefire negotiations between Padiri and the RCD.These ended with General Padiri taking a position inthe new Congolese army. The violence was reduced,although fighting continued and still does with otherMayi-mayi groups yet to be formally inducted into the peace process.

Reflections on the track one - track tworelationshipThe track two team’s relations with the UN in New Yorkand the US State Department in Washington were openand professional, based on constant dialogue and trustestablished over a long period. We provided ongoinganalysis and recommendations to both organizations aswell as to the facilitator of the Inter-Congolese dialoguePresident Masire. Members of the track two team werepresent for the dialogue in Sun City, South Africa.However, our relationships with both the US embassyand MONUC were more problematic. Early on the State Department had requested that they handlecommunications on our track two efforts with theembassy, and we respected that request. In retrospect,much misunderstanding may have been avoided andthe overall peacebuilding effort strengthened if a directchannel of communications between our team and theembassy existed. We may have had more success inpersuading the embassy of our position on the need forlocal peace accords and, more importantly, built up agreater degree of trust between us.

It appeared that MONUC headquarters was taking asimilar line to the embassy. Our team had direct contactwith the Goma and Bukavu offices of MONUC, but littlewith the Kinshasa office. This again hampered ourefforts. The Life and Peace Institute’s relations with theBukavu office of MONUC were especially difficult,although I made several interventions with the head of the office and his staff, which met with some successand ultimately a key MONUC officer decided to becomeactively involved.

Relations with the US embassy in Kinshasa never got ontrack and this conflict caused the embassy to opposeour mission in eastern DRC. The case illustrates thedifficulties that can occur when track two actors try to work closely with track one actors when there is afundamental disagreement. But it would be wrong toconclude that this case means that track two shoulddistance itself from track one. Rather, our relationshipswith track one actors were, in sum, helpful for us. Ourinterlocutors at the State Department and the UN withwhom we had most contact also said they found ourrelationship helpful to them. If anything, the case showsthe need for stronger engagement between track oneand track two actors, as long as both sides respect eachother’s right to disagree in good faith.

63Ceasefire negotiations in eastern DRC

Building linksand sustainingmomentum reflections on track two rolesin Sierra Leone

Rashid Sandi and Frances Fortune

Civil society groups and citizen intermediarieswere instrumental in bringing the RevolutionaryUnited Front (RUF) to the table and negotiating

the 1999 Lomé Agreement that formed the basis forpeace in Sierra Leone. These efforts complementedtrack one negotiations between the RUF and theGovernment of Sierra Leone (GoSL), which wereorganized by the Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS) and the United Nations and hosted bythe Togolese government. Both the track one process –the formal political negotiations concentrating onpower-sharing and full amnesty – and the track twoefforts, which encouraged both parties to stay engagedduring the difficult times, were important in reachingthe final agreement. Just as the women’s movementhad stimulated action for the Abidjan Accord betweenthe RUF and the new government of President Kabbahin 1996, the Civil Society Movement (CSM) and theInter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) galvanizeda groundswell of public opinion in favour of a peacefulsettlement. During the Lomé talks, the IRCSL and theCSM facilitated interaction and discussion by drawingon informal relationships, leveraging extended networksand creating an atmosphere conducive to engagingthe armed parties. Their efforts remain integral to thesustainability of the peace process in Sierra Leone.

Civil society actors during conflict Civil society responses to the war that began in 1991developed slowly, beginning with local communityefforts to protect themselves and promote humansecurity. The formal civil society organizations did notbegin mobilizing to promote peace until the RUFapproached and threatened the main urban centres. By the time of the first peace process that led to theAbidjan Accord, civil society actors were very active,wresting the initiative for settlement away from thewarring parties and placing it squarely in the publicforum and forcing the warring parties to the table.However, the Abidjan Accord soon broke down and

64 Accord 16

Rashid Sandi was a member of the

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from

1991 to 2000. He was the RUF’s

representative as Co-Chair of the Socio-

Humanitarian committee at the Lomé

peace talks.

In three years with Conciliation Resources

and in her current post as Regional Director

for Search for Common Ground in West

Africa, Frances Fortune has worked in track

two processes with several military factions.

Sierra Leonean women stand next to an AFRCsoldier while attending a rally in Freetown

calling for a peaceful end to the conflict.

Source: Reuters

Track one - track two interaction

RUF leader Foday Sankoh was arrested and detained in Nigeria. On 25 May 1997 some parts of the militarytook advantage of the situation in a coup d’état underthe auspices of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council(AFRC). The AFRC invited the RUF to Freetown to sharepower and a volatile coalition junta was formed, fullyaware that it lacked the support of the internationalcommunity and of the majority of the populace. Inresponse to the occupation of Freetown, the CSMorganized consultative meetings around the countryand urged a virtual labour boycott, rendering the thenAFRC-RUF government quite toothless.

In the coming months, civil society actors kept up theiraction, despite a dismal series of failed peace initiatives,broken ceasefires and coups. Nigerian-led ECOWASMonitoring and Observation Group (ECOMOG) troopsforced the AFRC-RUF out of Freetown in April 1998. The joint dissident forces again attacked Freetown in January 1999 and were eventually driven back byECOMOG troops. Galvanized by the sheer scale of thehuman tragedy of these events, the CSM initiated andconvened meetings in Freetown with the reinstatedKabbah government to try to find a coordinatedapproach to engaging the AFRC-RUF and pursuing a

peaceful settlement. The IRCSL, which was formed in1997 to encourage dialogue for peace, initiated similaractivities shortly afterwards.

The RUF’s retreat into the bush made communicationwith them very difficult. Further, in a highly polarizedsociety suspicious of anyone making overtures to theRUF, both organizations walked a fine line betweenpursuing peace while trying not to be maligned as‘collaborators’. Meanwhile, the gulf between the GoSLand the RUF widened with Sankoh’s extradition fromNigeria and trial for treason. Through the ongoing civilsociety consultations, CSM and IRCSL indirectly ensuredSankoh’s release from prison in Sierra Leone to theIvorian authorities to allow his participation in talks. The two civil society groups acquired huge legitimacywith the RUF as they had moved the government todialogue and ultimately the Lomé peace talks. PresidentKabbah later said of the IRCSL, “They did a great job …they went into the bush and sat on the ground withrebel forces,” while Kadi Sesay of the Human RightsCommission said, “The IRCSL made it possible for rebelsto talk with the government”.

65Reflections on track two roles in Sierra Leone

While the RUF was aware that CSM and IRCSL wereworking with both sides, advising the government onthe RUF position as well as encouraging the RUF to findmutually acceptable solutions, they appreciated thegroups’ legitimacy derived from the public consultativeprocesses they had conducted over the years. The RUFhad confidence that, although the CSM was not neutralor even non-partisan as they lived in ‘governmentterritory’ and worked with government, they werebasically representing the interests of all SierraLeoneans – unlike the GoSL that they felt representednarrow, elitist political interests.

The Lomé talksIn preparation for the Lomé peace talks scheduled forJuly 1999, the AFRC-RUF War Council developed theirworking document outlining their positions. The RUFconsulted with Sankoh (under house arrest in Abidjan)to finalize their working draft and make amendments.They then submitted their paper to the officialmediator. Omrie Golley, a civilian intermediary who had long been involved with the RUF, was chosen torepresent their interests at the talks. Fourteen peopletook part in the Lomé peace process on behalf of theAFRC-RUF, with RUF Adjutant General Rashid Sandi asone of the younger members.

Track one rolesPresident Gnassingbe Eyadema and the Togolesegovernment hosted and facilitated the Lomé talks, withForeign Affairs Minister Joseph Kokou Koffigoh as chiefmediator. They invited the RUF to the meeting andcoordinated with the UN to transfer them from Vahunin Liberia via Monrovia to Lomé, where their securitywas assured. The RUF felt comfortable with theneutrality of the Togolese government who had shown no signs of favouring one group. There was no discrimination between the sides right down to the details of food and lodging.

On the first day of the talks to launch the peace process, the ECOWAS Committee of Seven (comprisingsenior ministers from West African countries) officiallydeclared the process open. The extent of theirinvolvement was to speak to all the parties politely andencourage everyone to reach an agreement. After thelaunch, only Ivorian Minister of Foreign Affairs AmaraEssay, the UN Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral Francis Okelo and US, UK and CommonwealthRepresentatives were involved in the talks process.

President Eyadema helped facilitate the negotiationprocess by engaging both parties in substantivediscussions about their demands and proposals before

the peace talks officially opened. He helped themdevelop platforms that were appropriate and wouldgenerate productive dialogue, finding access pointsthat would eventually lead to agreement. He alsoregularly invited both the RUF and GoSL delegations to his house (separately) during the peace talks tofurther encourage the process.

In an additional move to support the talks and facilitateengagement, the Togolese government provided fivestar hotel accommodation, transportation, food andeven ‘pocket money’ to the RUF. While the RUFdelegates were very excited about these benefits, andmany had never experienced similar conditions, thebenefits were not the primary incentive to stayinvolved. The delegates were committed to the process in its own right, and the benefits providedadded recognition of their participation.

Track two roles The IRCSL and the CSM were encouraged to come to Lomé by the GoSL and their international partners.The civil society groups did not receive governmentalfunding to attend, although some benefited fromfinancial support from foreign NGOs. Theirrepresentatives sat as observers on each of thecommittees and took part in the plenary sessions, butwere not included in the caucuses or smaller groupwork. The official talks drove the bargaining processand the eventual agreement; the track two playerscomplemented the track one diplomacy by helpingmaintain the momentum, mediating the issues andeasing competition and negativity between the actorsas discussions became tense. Okelo admitted that he,“needed to use the IRCSL members constantly indealing with the RUF and the government”, while USAmbassador to Sierra Leone Joseph Melrose reportedthat, “when things looked bad in negotiations, theykept the dialogue going”.

During the talks, the civil society actors pressured bothsides to make concessions and reach agreement. Whilethe RUF were aware that CSM and IRCSL were mainly‘for’ the government, they had respect for their point of view and listened to the interlocutors they sent. Forexample, the RUF’s proposal included a provision forquality education, an idea scoffed at by the GoSLrepresentative given the government’s financialresources. The civil society delegate Alpha Timbopressured the government to include the provision inthe agreement, saying that it was an appropriate goalfor a country and a positive, productive contribution by the RUF. The RUF were pleased with this process and it raised their confidence in engaging with civilsociety actors.

66 Accord 16

According to the RUF, the IRCSL and CSM were mosteffective outside the general meetings. The CSMdelegates were staying with their colleagues (teachers)and had to travel some distance to the talks every day.The RUF admired their commitment despite the factthat they were not receiving any substantial materialsupport to play this role. The civil actors used theirinformal networks and connections to engage RUFdelegates and appeal to them to commit to the processand pursue a meaningful peace. They started withRashid Sandi, who was the youngest delegate at thetalks, approaching him through schoolmates and otherCSM interlocutors of a similar age group to the RUFwho had connections with them through schools andfamily ties. As they made inroads in discussion withhim, they were able to expand their conversations andrelationships with other members of the AFRC-RUFdelegation. The delegates were initially suspicious, butthrough connections with extended family membersand other relationships they gradually warmed to thecivil society representatives and were inspired by theircommitment to finding a peaceful resolution to theconflict. CSM interlocutors joined the RUF socially afterthe talks each day, eating with them and discussing andanalysing the progress and outcomes from the day. Asthis was their first personal contact together, the RUFgroup also had the opportunity to show themselves asstraightforward people who could be talked to, andboth found they could listen to each other and thisgenerated a sense of hope. The civil society actorsbasically showed confidence in the RUF negotiatinggroup. This role may have been especially importantbecause of the disparity between the negotiatingteams evident in the obvious age differential on eitherside of the table: the government represented bypolitically seasoned senior ministers and the RUFrepresented by young, battle-hardened RUF memberswith a few elder political types.

The practical hospitality shown by the Togolese to thenegotiating parties did not extend to the civil societyparticipants who had to rely on their own resources foraccommodation, transport, etc. Their effectiveness wassomewhat constrained: had they lodged in the samelocation as the delegates it is possible that they couldhave continued their individual meetings and lobbyingefforts after hours and exerted further influence overthe process.

Lessons learned It is not the purpose of this paper to put a gloss on theLomé Agreement, which had many design andimplementation problems, but the role of track twoactors suggests several general lessons that could be learned from the perspective of the RUF in the Lomé process.

Track two efforts should start early – long before formalpeace talks are organized – to create the environmentand linkages that can be used to foster dialoguebetween the groups. The CSM and IRCSL initiateddialogue about the war and how it should be handledin the public forum without an overt political orpartisan agenda – wresting the initiative from an overlysensitive government and depoliticizing the issue. Thisinitiative created an opportunity for the RUF that hadnot previously existed.

The involvement of track two players is essential inmoving processes forward, but it is important thatindividuals and groups chosen be completely differentfrom the track one actors. They should not be co-optedby government; rather they should be acknowledgedas legitimate actors who are non-partisan and have acommitted social agenda, as they were in Sierra Leoneat this time. Their presence serves to broaden theagenda and supports addressing some of the rootcause issues of the war.

Related to this, diverse track two actors should beutilized and should be identified with the interests andconcerns of the armed groups in mind. In this case, theRUF were young people who were engaged effectivelythrough their age group and schoolmates.

Finally, like track one, track two diplomacy needssupport. This support should be channelled separatelyfrom that of track one so that it appears and can beperceived as independent. This recognition lends statusto their role and bolsters the track two actors’ authorityto speak with the armed groups. Civil societycontributions are central to the sustainability of a peace process, which is directly linked to how well apolitical agreement can be translated into a socialagreement that is embraced by the nation.

67Reflections on track two roles in Sierra Leone

Engaging armedgroups the challenge of asymmetries

Liz Philipson

Power asymmetry and analysisAsymmetric conflicts are notoriously intractable andpose analytical and practical problems for the conflictparties and mediators. ‘Asymmetry’ in conflict literatureis often reduced to ‘imbalance’, rather than beingunderstood in its more normal, and more useful, senseof ‘not symmetrical – different’. Conflict asymmetry is a more complex conception than a simple matter ofpower imbalance based on conventional conceptionsof power, which are heavily reliant on military andeconomic criteria.

A broader conception of power resources wouldinclude: ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ political power; thecommitment of constituencies, combatants andpoliticians; communication and bilateral relationships;and the political will to apply resources to war andpeace. The relative symmetries of overt structuralpower are more easily determined than the power of hidden informal relationships. Yet the failure toaccount for the latter will weaken an analysis of theopportunities for effective engagement in peaceprocesses. For example, in Sri Lanka, the military andeconomic stalemate helped to deliver a ceasefire buthas so far proved insufficient to deliver an agreedsettlement between the parties. To comprehend thislack of progress and move forward the more complexunderlying asymmetries must be understood.

Asymmetry will manifest itself differently anddynamically in each conflict, and determining factorswill include historical and geographical issues and theimpact of third parties. Analysis and understanding ofthe shifting relations and conflict issues are critical forany peacemaker, and the failure of analysis at theground level can seriously undermine attempts toencourage pacific engagement. Poor analyses includethose that lack historical perspective – such as in Israel-Palestine where the use of the latest failed settlementrather than original conflict issues as a starting point fornegotiations has continually undermined progress.

68 Accord 16

Liz Philipson is Visiting Research Fellow

at the London School of Economics and

Political Science and a Conciliation

Resources Programme Associate. She

also works freelance on conflict and

political economy analysis in South Asia.

Israeli (left) and Palestinian (right) negotiators attendpeace talks in Taba, Egypt 21 January 2001.

Source: Reuters/Natalie Behring

The impact of asymmetries

In asymmetrical conditions a failure to develop astrategy tailored from a strong analysis of theasymmetry risks institutionalizing inequalities andprolonging the conflict through a continuation ofactual and perceived injustice.

Asymmetry and peacemaking in a state-centric systemGlobalization has resulted in more intervention ininternal conflicts from the international level wheresystemic state bias can prove an obstacle to theproductive engagement of non-state actors in conflictresolution efforts. For example:

• legitimacy is more readily accorded to state actorsby other state actors,

• state actors tend to be more familiar with diplomaticnorms and the rules of the system, and

• in the current anti-terrorist age, internationalproscription, or threats of international proscription,may be used against armed groups by state actors

Granting legitimacyAn armed non-state actor wishing to enter negotiationson the basis of parity with a state faces huge obstaclesto achieving the legitimacy of a place at the table. Max Weber defined the state by its monopoly over thelegitimate use of force. Thus states by their nature willassume that a non-state actor using force is doing soillegitimately. Almost all negotiations in recent yearshave involved foreign governments in a variety of rolesand a state actor will likely have established relationshipswith other governments, even governments of ‘weak’and ‘fragile’ states, whereas this is less likely for a non-state actor. However, if an armed group succeeds inbecoming a government, all the relationships and

benefits of statehood are conferred upon it, as recentlyobserved in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Another form of legitimacy comes with the assumedcompliance with the rule of law and human rights ofstate actors as opposed to armed groups. Ideally, theobjective of negotiations should be to move the partiesfrom violence to pacific politics and bring the armednon-state actor into the political mainstream and underthe rule of law. There tends to be an assumption thatgovernments are already compliant with the rule of law and human rights – at least compared with rebelgroups. This assumption can distort dynamics if thereverse is true in the experience of the population, butthe negotiations proceed on the basis of assumedgovernment compliance with assumed regular rebelabuse as a norm. While there may be advantages inbeing a state actor in a peace process that takes place in the state system, third-party governments do notnecessarily side with the state party if there is someoverriding national interest at stake, such as the case of US support for the Contras in Nicaragua.

Diplomatic norms and international rulesOnce armed groups enter negotiations they areentering an arena in which diplomacy and internationalnorms largely dictate both the formal and the informalrules of behaviour – rules with which they may initiallyhave little or no familiarity. By contrast most states,which are operating daily in this sphere and with these rules, are more familiar and comfortable with the diplomatic setting and international norms.Furthermore, states are often more experienced at howthe international system works and how to navigate it.For example, the competition between the internationalactors in response to the 2004 Darfur crisis was difficultfor both mediators and armed groups to work with and,for a time, the conflicts between foreign governmentswere detrimental to both relief and peacemaking.

69The challenge of asymmetries

Peacemaking in the shadow of the ‘war on terror’When foreign governments decide to focus on bringingpeace, they can have a powerful, positive influence.However, the current international climate is reducingthe political space for peaceful engagement andplacing obstacles in the way of peacemakers seeking to engage with armed non-state groups.

Anti-terrorist measures began to receive more attentionat the international level during the late 1990s and thediscussions were given great impetus by the attack onthe United States in 2001. Both the InternationalConvention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings(1997) and the International Convention for theSuppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) requiresignatories to enact domestic legislation to exercisecontrol relating to these aspects of terrorism withintheir jurisdiction. This has resulted in many governments,such as the UK, and intergovernmental organizations,such as the EU and UN, developing lists of organizationsdesignated as terrorist.

The atmosphere of fear and exclusion giving rise tomuch of the anti-terrorist rhetoric deepens asymmetries.The former Mayor of New York Rudolf Giuliani’sdeclaration on terrorism shows this tendency towardspolarization: “Those who practise terrorism lose anyright to have their cause understood. We’re right,they’re wrong. It’s as simple as that” (reported on theBBC). This blanket attitude is reflected in much anti-terrorist legislation, despite the fact that it covers a widespectrum of groups with widely differing objectivesand methodology.

Listing an organization as ‘terrorist’ potentiallylengthens the path to non-violent politics for thatgroup as negative perceptions of the group areencouraged, and the group’s own perceptions aboutwhether they can or should have a place in non-violentpolitics may also be negatively affected. In Nepal, theUS has listed the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)and there has been pressure for other countries to doso to freeze their assets. In the absence of any externalassets this has little practical purpose and serves only asa political label. In Nepal the effect of this threat leantweight to those in both the Royal Nepal Army and theMaoists who were in favour of continuing war, ratherthan entering negotiation. It was taken as a signal thatthe international community would support a policy of isolating and defeating the Maoists.

In Sri Lanka during 2003, two international conferencesadded to the negative dynamics which led to thedeadlock of the peace process. A conference held in Washington to discuss development aid andreconstruction, which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE) could not attend because of domesticterrorist legislation, emphasized the asymmetricaldisadvantages for the LTTE at the international level.This was followed by a conference in Tokyo alsodiscussing development money. The LTTE refused toattend the later conference as the process had almostreached stagnation and began to talk about ‘over-internationalization’ of the conflict. Both of theseconferences were as much to do with the internationalaspirations of the host nations as the peace process in Sri Lanka.

The discourse of terrorism has allowed a number ofgovernments to cast their opponents as terroristswhose cause is disconnected from any legitimatepolitical grievance – the intention and effect of which is to decrease any international understanding anddeepen isolation of the group both domestically andpolitically – hence entrenching asymmetries. In Acehduring May 2003, the Indonesian government launcheda brutal military offensive against the Free AcehMovement (GAM) “terrorists” which replicated many ofthe tactics of the war against Iraq and was responsiblefor the death and injury of many Achenese civilians.

Terrorist listings are often problematical forpeacemakers as well as the groups they are designed to regulate. Peacemakers working directly with listedgroups risk being labelled terrorist sympathizers.Peacemakers are also in danger of operating outsidethe law if they meet representatives of a listed group in certain circumstances, even if it is to advocate peaceor mediate. This is not the intention of the legislationbut legal advice has confirmed that is its effect in somecases. Furthermore, funding of undertakings that arefocused on training, or other pacific activities solelydirected at a listed group, may also be illegal. This is not to deny the problem of ‘asymmetrical warfare’ forthe international community, nor the need to bringperpetrators to justice. But the current legislation is notsmart or nuanced and listing and de-listing can sendunintended and non-constructive messages. Thelegislation generally inhibits measures designed tobring ‘terrorists’ back into the mainstream and fails to recognize the nature of asymmetry.

Taking a group off a terrorist list can also poseproblems. For example, many people in the peacemovement who opposed the listing of the LTTE bynumerous countries – especially the USA (1997) and UK (2000) – are currently reluctant about giving themthe very positive signal of de-listing despite the three-year ceasefire. This is due to the LTTE’s ongoingassassinations of many Tamil political opponents.

70 Accord 16

Asymmetries that arise between theparties in conflict The following section explores some of the differentdimensions of asymmetry between armed groups andstate actors engaged in peace processes. Most aredynamic, changing over time, and contain within them opportunities as well as risks for the resolution of violent conflict. The stereotype of armed non-stateactors arriving at negotiations ill-prepared with corditeon their fingers to face a government side honed intheir diplomatic skills is misleading because asymmetryis more complex than that.

Adaptability, learning and accountability As the parties to the conflict move through differentconflict stages, they learn more about handling conflictand become more knowledgeable. However, armedgroups are generally less constrained than states byrule-bound bureaucracies or the need to gain supportfor their actions through national democraticmachinery. These characteristics can inhibit states’adaptability and their learning processes, and changethe nature of imbalance between the parties. There areseveral examples of governments, at the first rounds ofnegotiation, assuming that there would be a return tothe status quo ante (Sri Lanka 1985, Nepal 2001) andfailing to demonstrate any flexibility in negotiations.Equally, in 1985 when the LTTE joined the negotiationswith the Sri Lankan government, they were uninterestedand possibly incapable of delivering a settlement.Twenty years of war and four sets of negotiations havematured the organization in some respects and, despitethe difficulties of the current Sri Lankan peace process,they have proved to be a capable negotiating partner.

Often free from internal democratic accountability,leaders of armed groups may be able to demonstratemore flexibility in their decision-making, and with fewerchances for leadership changes, more long-termconsistency as well. In Sri Lanka, there have been twochanges of government since the Norwegian mediationbegan and there was also a very short lull in mediationduring a Norwegian election campaign. By contrast, theLTTE leadership has remained unchanged at the toplevel, though there has been some strain and changesamong second level leaders.

The differing nature of agendasModerating between differing issues on the agendas of conflict parties is in itself problematic. A governmentwill have a programme which covers all aspects ofgoverning a state at the national, local andinternational levels, whereas an armed group is likely tobe more able to focus directly on the conflict issues

without the distractions of wider issues. So the differingand perhaps more spasmodic attention to the details of negotiation can cause frustration between theparties. Differing timeframes can also pose significantchallenges for the mediator. Governments’ timeframesmay be the next election, or perhaps the next donorconference, and armed groups may be committed tolong-term societal change or simply the next meal.

Security and self-confidenceGovernments can be confident that they will continueto have the right to ‘legitimate force’ and are usuallysecure in their legality. Armed groups have won theirplace at the negotiations table through armed struggleand violence. They need to find a new basis for theirself-confidence and legitimacy – other than intimidationof their constituents or mobilization against the enemy– however confident they are of their constituency andposition. The search for formal domestic politicallegitimization whilst maintaining military prowess is acontradiction that all armed groups find difficult andthat is fraught with dangers of misinterpretation byother actors.

Premature calls for the decommissioning of weaponscan exacerbate this dilemma. No organization whichhas won its place at the negotiation table through armscan afford to put arms out of use until they have asecure agreement being implemented and the safetyof their members is guaranteed. This vulnerability isoften exploited politically by conflict opponents.

Reflections on the challenges formediationThe nature of the different experiences of state andnon-state actors means that they need different sorts of mediation support and assistance. Providing thatdiffering assistance lays a mediator open to the chargeof partiality. Furthermore, the ethical code embraced by most independent negotiators requires strictimpartiality, though states may be more interest-based.Recommended methods of dealing with strongasymmetry do require the mediator to give unbalancedassistance directly or persuade other experts to workdirectly with the weaker party – government or non-government. In the current international climate,intermediaries need to maintain this space to addressasymmetries constructively. Governments andinternational organizations need to ensure that theirefforts to promote security do not compound theasymmetries that make internal armed conflicts difficult to resolve.

71The challenge of asymmetries

Facilitatingdialogue with armedinsurgents in the Philippines

Rene V. Sarmiento

Peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) andcommunist insurgents would be even more

difficult than they are if not for a facilitating mechanismcalled the Joint Agreement on Safety and ImmunityGuarantees (JASIG). The JASIG was adopted by the two parties to promote peace negotiations, create an atmosphere conducive to free discussion and freemovement during negotiations, and avert any incidentthat may jeopardize them.

Historical backgroundThe longest running communist insurgency in Asia isthe one being waged by the National Democratic Frontof the Philippines (NDFP), which was founded in 1973.The NDFP is an alliance of seventeen organizations ledby the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and itsarmed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA). The NDFPhas been fighting what it calls a “people’s democraticwar” against the GRP for more than three decades.

Peace talks between the GRP and the NDFP started in1986 during the administration of President Corazon C. Aquino. A discreet meeting in May between the GRPand the CPP/NPA/NDF and the appointment of panelmembers from both sides set the peace process inmotion. In November, after four months of contentiousdiscussions, the panels signed a Memorandum ofAgreement for a Preliminary Ceasefire (60 days), whichstarted on 10 December. Thereafter, a NationalCeasefire Committee was formed to overseeimplementation. However, progress was slow as thetwo sides differed on the framework and agenda forpeace talks, and negotiations ended abruptly on 22 January 1987 when peasant demonstrators werekilled – allegedly by presidential security forces – in arally held in Mendiola Bridge near Malacanang Palace.No substantive issue had been discussed and therewere no commitments on future talks. Armed hostilitiesresumed shortly afterwards. The breakdown of the

72 Accord 16

Rene V. Sarmiento has been a member

of the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines Peace Panel for talks

with the CPP/NPA/NDF since February

1996. He teaches human rights law and

constitutional law.

The signing of the JASIG, 24 February 1995, the Netherlands.

Source: Rene V. Sarmiento

The impact of asymmetries

peace talks and the experience of putting a ceasefireahead of formal talks had taught the CPP/NPA/NDF thatthe proper place for a nationwide ceasefire agreementis toward the end of the talks after the signing of thesubstantive agreements.

When President Fidel V. Ramos succeeded PresidentAquino in 1992, he stressed that the advancement ofpeace would be among his priorities because, “withoutpolitical stability, social reform and economic progresscould not move forward”. Within his first two months ofoffice, he issued Amnesty Proclamations 10 and 10-A,endorsed the de-criminalization of the CPP through therepeal of Republic Act No. 1700 (the Anti-SubversionLaw), created a committee to review alleged politicaloffenders’ cases and dispatched a special mission led byCongressman Jose V. Yap to the Netherlands, where theCPP/NPA/NDF leadership is based, to explore theiropenness to peace talks.

Difficult exploratory talksThe participation of CPP/NPA/NDF in formal peace talkswith the GRP from June 1995 onwards did not comeabout instantaneously, nor did it come in neat stages.Their participation was the fruit of difficult and tortuouspreliminary and exploratory talks covering a period ofmore than two years. Both parties agreed on theNetherlands as the venue, with the CPP/NPA/NDFexpressing its preference for talks held in a neutral

venue on the grounds of its safety. Moreover, theCPP/NPA/NDF claimed that third-party facilitation by a foreign government raised the level of seriousness of the GRP-NDFP negotiations. The Dutch governmentfacilitated the peace talks from 1992 to 2001.

Out of four rounds of exploratory talks came the HagueJoint Declaration of 1 September 1992 (an agreement to hold formal peace negotiations to resolve armedconflict) and a number of procedural agreementsincluding the JASIG that paved the way for formalpeace talks. Chairman of the NDFP Panel Luis Jalandonicalls the JASIG, “the most important document after the Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 … because asidefrom providing safety and immunity guarantees for allparticipants in the GRP-NDF negotiations, it vividlyexpresses the equal terms under which the GRP andthe NDF enter into peace negotiations”. NDFP PoliticalConsultant Jose Ma. Sison considers the JASIG as,“formulated in accordance with the framework ofmutually acceptable principles and no capitulation”provided in the Hague Declaration.

JASIG – the toughest to negotiate Of the three agreements signed by the two panelsduring the exploratory talks, the JASIG was thetoughest to negotiate because of the contentiousissues of political authority and belligerency. The NDFP, claiming equal status with the GRP in the peace

73Facilitating dialogue with armed insurgents in the Philippines

negotiations, asserted that it was a nationwide allianceof patriotic and progressive forces in control ofconsiderable portions of the Philippine population andterritory, carrying out a national democratic revolutionwith political organs and a well-disciplined People’sArmy. It argued that the armed conflict between the GRPand the NDFP was a civil war between the belligerentforces and not a mere insurgency. The GRP, on the otherhand, referred to the NDFP as an insurgent forcecriminally liable for rebellion under the Revised PenalCode. The GRP upheld its sovereignty over the wholecountry, denying NDFP control or influence over anyportion of the Philippine territory.

Thus, the negotiations on JASIG were shot through withdifficulties. The initial peace talks at De Bilt, scheduledfor 10-14 October 1994, were a big letdown. Theycollapsed on the first day because the NDFP assertedfull equality with the GRP. Through its proposal to grantsafety and immunity guarantees to the members andpersonnel of the GRP Peace Panel, the NDFP had askedthe GRP to accept the premise of two sovereignties,two constitutions, two systems of law and two armiesexisting in Philippine territory. The NDFP demandednothing less than the authority to issue GRP negotiatorsand personnel safe conduct passes which wouldrequire the GRP to accept the NDFP’s sovereignty overPhilippine territory. The GRP Panel did not accept thisuntenable position and contended that the constitutionrecognizes only one sovereign, the Filipino people,united under the banner of the Republic. It furtherpointed out that the NDFP sought to obtain throughthe negotiating table what it could not achieve throughforce of arms, seeking only an agreement confirming itsstatus of belligerency, poisoning the peace talks by notapproaching them as a forum for compromise. In hisfinal statement, however, Chairman of the GRP PeacePanel Ambassador Howard Dee vowed, “to keep allchannels open for the resumption of talks in the future”and invited the NDFP, “to join the people … in thepursuit of social reform which should usher in an era ofsocial justice, of equality, human dignity, plurality andrule of law”.

Amid all the difficulties in the negotiation of the JASIG,the GRP persisted in pursuing the peace talks because it was morally right to do so and because PresidentRamos wisely wanted a peaceful climate that would be attractive to investors, one of the main tracks of hisadministration’s centrepiece programme, ‘Philippines 2000’.

Indeed, the two panels kept open all the channels ofcommunication and negotiated JASIG by phone andfax to and from the Netherlands and by internalconsultations over the next three and a half months.After the exchange of seventeen drafts and counter-

drafts with corresponding corrections and revisions –and much creative language engineering to protect GRPsovereignty and territorial integrity while respectingNDF’s organizational dignity – agreement on the finalJASIG draft was reached on 24 February 1995 atNieuwegein. The mutual acceptability of the JASIG wasmade possible by employing neutral language thatmade no explicit reference either to the GRP as theguarantor of safety and immunity or to the NDFP as thebeneficiary of guarantees, and no specific reference asto which party would avail of the safety and immunityguarantees or which party would recognize thedocuments of identification as safe conduct passes.Some of these features are demonstrated in thefollowing excerpts:

1. Each party has the inherent right to issue documentsof identification to its negotiators, consultants,staffers, security and other personnel and suchdocuments shall be duly recognized as safe conductpasses as provided in this Joint Agreement (I, para. 2);

2. The GRP and the NDFP shall agree through theirrespective panel chairmen on the number ofdocuments of identification each party will issuebased on the different categories of functions whichthe parties will designate from time to time (I, para. 3);

3. In addition to or in lieu of the aforesaid documentsof identification, the party concerned may requestthe other to issue safe conduct passes to the holdersof such documents of identification or to otherpersons involved in the peace negotiation asprovided in this Joint Agreement (I, para. 3).

Such avoidance of the problem of competing claims ofsovereignty has certainly contributed to the protractionof the peace negotiations. It has not, however, scuttledthe process. The process has continued and has evenresulted in one substantive agreement, theComprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rightsand International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in1998. The use of neutral language can continue untilthe discussion on the third substantive agendum,Political and Constitutional Reforms, when the period of ‘dribbling the ball’ or ‘suspension of disbelief’ has tostop and the issue of political authority be resolvedonce and for all.

The meaning of safety and immunityguaranteesUnder the JASIG, duly accredited persons in possessionof documents of identification or safe conduct passesare guaranteed free and unhindered passage in allareas in the Philippines, and in travelling to and from

74 Accord 16

the Philippines in connection with the performance oftheir duties in the peace negotiations. All accreditedpersons are provided with immunity from surveillance,harassment, search, arrest, detention, prosecution and interrogations or any other similar punitive actionsdue to any involvement or participation in the peacenegotiations. The immunity guarantees cover all actsand utterances made in the course of the peacenegotiations and likewise cover all materials,information and data submitted to or producedpursuant to these peace negotiations.

Such mechanisms to facilitate the peace negotiationsbetween the GRP and the NDFP are acceptable to the GRP because they help create and sustain anenvironment conducive to peace talks. With peace talks made possible through the JASIG, political stability in the Philippines is enhanced and the GRP’s peacefulapproach towards local insurgency is made known to the global community. The peace talks have evendrawn the Royal Norwegian Government, known for itspeacemaking efforts in many parts of the world, into afacilitation role, thereby increasing the legitimacy of theGRP’s efforts in peace talks. The JASIG has also allowedthe GRP a window of opportunity to better understandthe logic and dynamics of the NDFP and to better knowits leaders and supporters.

To express their mutual satisfaction in successfullycompleting the JASIG, the two panels issued a JointStatement describing the JASIG as highly significantbecause it paved the way for the resumption of theexploratory talks and provided for the opening offormal talks on 1 June 1995 in Brussels, Belgium.

Chairman Luis Jalandoni stated that by working for andsigning the JASIG, the NDFP showed its seriousness indialoguing with the GRP. After the signing of the JASIGon 24 February 1995 the two panels engaged in formaland informal peace negotiations resulting in thecompletion of five more agreements. These include the CARHRIHL, though it remains only partiallyimplemented because the sides have yet to agree onthe contentious and nagging issue of political authorityvis-à-vis arrest, prosecution, trial and punishment ofhuman rights violators and offenders.

Assessment of the JASIGAlthough the JASIG has helped paved the way for theholding of informal and formal peace negotiations andthe entry of the Royal Norwegian Government as third-party facilitator, its has not contributed immensely topushing the peace negotiations forwards. Of the foursubstantive agreements to be completed and signedunder the Hague Joint Declaration, the CARHRIHL is the

only substantive agreement signed so far. Despite theJASIG, peace negotiations remain tumultuous – a tumultspanning twelve long years and three presidencies.

Like the peace negotiations, the JASIG has not beenspared from issues and controversies, and it has beenterminated and reinstated several times. On 1 August1995 the GRP called for a suspension of the talks andthe termination of JASIG due to the NDFP’sunreasonable demand to bring their imprisonedPolitical Consultant Sotero Llamas to Brussels beforethey would attend the first substantive session (he wassubsequently released pursuant to the agreementcalled Joint Efforts to Seek Release of Sotero Llamas inAccordance with Judicial Processes). In February 1999 the GRP called for an indefinite suspension of the talks and the JASIG due to the abduction of policeand armed forces officials. In June the same year the GRPissued notice of the termination of the JASIG in responseto the NDFP’s termination of peace talks in May.

While there are those who claim that the JASIG hasallowed the NDFP greater movement for propagandaand recruitment and to intensify its other activities, thisclaim has not affected the GRP’s commitment to theJASIG and its belief that peace through talks isimperative to economic growth and investment. Whileundertaking legitimate military action, the GRP iscommitted to the just completion of the peace process,which is item 9 of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’sTen-Point Legacy Agenda. The GRP continues tovigorously pursue the Six Paths To Peace espousedunder Executive Order No. 3, Defining Policy andAdministrative Structure for Government’sComprehensive Peace Efforts (2001).

ConclusionThe resolve and intensity demonstrated by the twoPanels in reaching agreement on the JASIG are worthtelling and retelling. Indeed, a revival of the same spiritin the negotiation of the three remaining substantiveagreements (on social and political reforms, politicaland constitutional reforms and the end of hostilitiesand disposition of forces) is vital for a politicalsettlement in the Philippines. Enough of brotherfighting against brother, sister against sister!

75Facilitating dialogue with armed insurgents in the Philippines

In search ofrespect at thetable Hamas ceasefires 2001-03

Alastair Crooke

“Negotiating without resistance leads to surrender. But negotiatingwith resistance leads to real peace…the world understood that theVietnamese resistance had to continue whilst the Vietnamese werenegotiating with the American Administration in Paris”.Khaled Meshaal, Head of the Political Committee of Hamas,interview on BBC Newsnight, 13 December 2004.

Islam and Arab custom have a long history of conflictresolution through ceasefire and truce as a step towardpeace. All of the traditional Islamic and tribal methodsbegin alike – with talking. Unless one of the parties issimply suing for peace in the wake of overwhelmingdefeat, all Islamist factions subscribe to the wisdom thata ‘just’ outcome – that is, one that has legitimacy andtherefore may endure – can only be achieved whenboth parties to a conflict arrive at the table treating theother as an adversary worthy of respect.

This search for ‘justness’ within conflict resolution in the Palestinian context is not confined to the Islamistgroups such as Hamas and Jihad; but the more secularmovements such as Fateh or the Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine (PFLP), although alive to suchtraditions, tend to an approach that leans more towardsengaging a third party and international public opinionas the counterweight to a lack of symmetry. For Islamistmovements, third parties can play some compensatingrole, but this can never fully act as a corrective to asituation in which one of the parties to a negotiationperceives itself treated with disdain or a without therespect owing to a worthy adversary.

In some respects this view reflects Senator GeorgeMitchell’s ‘first rule’ of conflict resolution: unless eachparty to a dispute acknowledges and accepts that the‘Other’ has an argument for their side to advance, there can be no resolution. Armed Islamist groups inthe Palestinian arena have been engaged in not onlyasserting that there is a valid Palestinian ‘case’, but alsoin attempting to achieve Israeli ‘respect’ throughresistance. Islamist groups’ effort to find this grudgingesteem and some parity has been adversely affectedboth by the dehumanization and de-legitimization ofthe cause of both parties by the other as a result of

76 Accord 16

Alastair Crooke served as adviser on

security issues to European Union (EU)

High Representative Javier Solana and

was instrumental in facilitating various

ceasefires between 2002 and 2003 in the

Israeli-Palestinian context. He was an

intermediary on behalf of the EU in

facilitating the Hudna (truce) of June 2003.

Senior Hamas leaders talk during arally in Gaza, 24 March 2004.

Source: Reuters/Mohammed Salem

The impact of asymmetries

violence, and by proscription in the international arena. Of course Hamas and the other Islamist factionsunderstand that there will never be parity in terms of military power, but at the same time they have theexample of Hizbollah, which is perceived in Lebanonand Syria as having achieved a ‘parity of deterrence or fear’ with Israel. The perception is that Israel hasabsolute air superiority and greater firepower, butunderstands Hizbollah possesses the rockets andweaponry in south Lebanon to drive the north of Israelinto the air raid shelters were it to choose to retaliate. In short, parity is not conceived as absolute. Palestiniangroups such as Hamas understand that Hizbollah’ssuccessful resistance in south Lebanon has causedIsrael’s military to treat Hizbollah with caution, as arespected foe. Israeli armed forces do not take actionagainst Hizbollah lightly. Hamas has sought to emulatethe respect in which Hizbollah is held by Israel. TheIslamist movements understand that there cannot notbe parity in each compartment such as weaponry, airpower and so on; but, provided that there is someperceived ‘parity’ of esteem between parties to theconflict, then and only then is there the prospect ofachieving a ‘just’ and durable outcome.

Ceasefires 2001-03The principal object of the various ceasefires mountedby the various Palestinian factions from 2001 until 2003was essentially to test Israeli readiness to engage in aserious political process that would lead to a Palestinianstate on the basis of the 1967 borders. Unilateralattempts at military de-escalation had not beenattempted earlier as the outset of Oslo period had been characterized by Fateh attempting to capitalizeon its monopoly of power and control of security. Osloeffectively licensed the transformation of the militia of a single faction (Fateh) into the official organs of the Palestinian National Authority police and nationalsecurity in order to control and ultimately destroy itspolitical rivals. Well before the time of the last Intifada,this mandate for Fateh to suppress its rivals had erodedas a result of a shift of public support in the PalestinianTerritories towards the Islamists.

There were other considerations that prompted theceasefire efforts of 2001-03. The civilian population ofboth communities was periodically experiencing Intifadafatigue and morale dips in response to what has been

77Hamas ceasefires 2001-03

called ‘Fourth Generation’ warfare. Fourth Generationwarfare really is no more than the modern evolution of insurgency, but has been well summarized as:

…widely dispersed and largely undefined; thedistinction between war and peace [becoming]blurred to the vanishing point…nonlinear,possibly to the point of having no definablebattlefields or fronts…[and] distinctions between“civilian” and “military” disappearing; actions[occurring] concurrently throughout allparticipants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, [and] not just a physical, entity. (William S. Lind et al. ‘The changing face of war:into the fourth generation’ Marine Corps Gazette,October 1989).

Fluid asymmetrical insurgency of this type, which was incorporated into some aspects of the secondPalestinian Intifada, is aimed at undermining thepsychological steadfastness of the opponent. Itsdeliberately uneven tempo also affords the irregularforces more flexibility to test the political waterswithout experiencing adverse political consequencesfrom their supporters. A change in an already uneventempo does not imply concession or defeat.

For the EU and for some within the US Administration,de-escalation of violence was one of Senator Mitchell’sthree key linked components towards a resolution ofthe conflict, which he summarized as “reduce violence,build confidence and begin talking”. In this aspect theMitchell Report ran concurrently with Islamic norms ofconflict resolution. For the Islamists a Hudna (a periodduring which military activities are suspended in orderto allow a peace process to proceed) held a particularattraction because there was no implied return to thestatus quo ante: that is, in their perception it carried noimplied return to the Oslo approach by which Hamasand other groups were to be dismantled or destroyed.It also opened political space vis-à-vis Fateh. Here were Islamists taking their own independent political initiative.

Israel throughout the period of attempted ceasefiresremained ambivalent on whether or not to encouragethe Hudna until after August 2003, when the Hudnadeclared on 29 June ended with a bus bomb inJerusalem and the subsequent targeted killing ofHamas leader abu-Shanab in Gaza. Israel then pressedfor Hamas to be internationally proscribed and isolated.Although proscription by the European Union, a movethat divided Europeans, carried little practical import forHamas in terms of finance or activities, it furtherisolated and marginalized them from the politicalprocess. More seriously from Hamas’ perspective it

gave the ‘green light’ to Israel to try to assassinate their leadership.

Before the EU proscription, some Israeli officials andmilitary officers (e.g. Efraim Halevy, a security adviser to the Israeli Prime Minister) had argued the benefit ofco-opting Hamas and the Islamists into the politicalframework, because they had seen the consequencesof the Islamists’ exclusion on the efforts of Colin Powell,George Tenet and Anthony Zinni to try to resurrect theearlier security commitments by Fateh at the outset ofthe Oslo era. They also understood that inclusion ofHamas was necessary to bring an end to conflict.

Other Israeli officials however argued that Hamas wasnot capable of transformation into a political party byvirtue of its nature as an Islamist movement. Thishostility to the religious aspect, in contrast to the more secular Fateh, also coloured the attitude of the US and some Europeans. Some secular Europeans toohad misgivings about the wisdom of accommodatingreligious movements. These misgivings persisteddespite the evidence of polls which showed thatIslamism was no longer optional to the equation, no marginal phenomenon; Hamas was mainstream.Perhaps of greater weight for some Israelis howeverwas the value of harnessing the ‘war on terror’ toportray Israel as engaging in a wider conflict withIslamic extremism rather than a political struggle overdisputed territory.

Similar disquiets also affected the Egyptian mediationefforts. For Egypt, the baggage of their own repressionof the Muslim Brotherhood weighed heavily. They wereconcerned that tacit endorsement and any legitimizingof Palestinian Islamists might be seized on by their ownIslamists and exploited. Consequently, their approachwas circumscribed by the framework of the domesticpolitical objective of containment of Egyptian Islamism aswell as their approach towards Israel and the Palestinians.

The result of this accumulated ambivalence was thatthe unilateral efforts of four de-escalation initiatives (2 June–9 Aug 2001, 16 December–17 January 2002, 19 September–21 October 2002 and 29 June–19August 2003) in which Hamas participated provoked no efforts at establishing a framework of reciprocitythat was detailed and understood by both parties.Israeli security forces continued to kill Palestiniancivilians, make incursions into Palestinian areas anddemolish houses during the periods of significant de-escalation by the Palestinians. In the last Hudna inJune 2003, the number of civilian Palestinian deathscaused by Israeli military forces did reduce significantly.However arrests of Palestinians rose fourfold, and therewere continued targeted killings.

78 Accord 16

Missed opportunitiesIsrael’s failure to define or to practice reciprocity wasprobably the principal trigger of the Islamists’ decisionto return to armed operations. Both Egypt and the EUmade some efforts to obtain reciprocity, but neithersucceeded. Israel for policy reasons remainedadamantly opposed to entering any Grapes of Wrathtype of reciprocal agreement (an agreement betweenIsrael and the groups in Lebanon that defined themilitary operational activities of both parties) with thefactions. Israel was concerned that such a step couldlead to limitations on its freedom of military action andopen the door to internationalization of the conflict (in the form of non-US third-party involvement inmonitoring or negotiating any elements of anyagreement affecting Israel’s relationship with thePalestinians). There were two other principal causes ofthe truce breakdowns however: the failure to provideany ‘feel-good’ factor to the Palestinian public that couldsustain the momentum towards complete ceasefire andthe failure of the international community to use thesede-escalations to develop any political dynamic.

The failure to develop political dynamic stemmedprincipally from the refusal of European nations and of the US to acknowledge or accept the breakdown of legitimacy and credibility of the Oslo process. TheMitchell Report had already signalled in 2002 that for both publics involved there was a crisis ofconfidence in the incremental Oslo approach. Thisacknowledgement would have required theinternational community to consider how to recoupthat lost credibility of both the Oslo process as well as that of Palestinian institutions themselves.

The external actors were not alone in their difficulties.The second Intifada had so weakened and dividedFateh that it too found it difficult to accommodateHamas and the other groups politically without calling into question the monopoly of authority and the position of interlocutor granted to them by Oslo.Consistently throughout this period, Fateh failed todiscuss the key issues of defining national objectives,the appropriate tools by which to achieve them and theleadership required to pursue them with Hamas andthe other factions for fear that it could unravel theirspecial status as the ‘legitimate’ authority. The inabilityof any Fateh leader to do this was also of course boundup with the evolution of the movement itself. Fateh was having great difficulty in accommodating its own ‘younger’ generations, let alone other factions.Paradoxically, it was Hamas that proved better placedthan Fateh to manage negotiations. Throughout thetalks in Cairo it was plain that Hamas had a leadershipthat was sophisticated and operated to a clear mandate.

One obvious way to respond to these challenges was to encourage accommodation within the Palestinianconstituency and to emphasize elections as the tool to revalidate and find some Palestinian consensus onmeans and objectives. Western prejudices against non-secular politics and groups that used violence forpolitical ends however led to hesitations. It requiredalso that external actors be plain in arguing thatPalestinian unity was a positive objective not only forPalestinians, but for Israel too. The mindset of Oslo wastoo ingrained for many to feel comfortable making this case. The West felt more at ease with secularinterlocutors and a ‘crack-down’ on ‘rejectionists’. Thisessentially was the Tenet (Work Plan of 2001) and Zinni(ceasefire proposal of March 2002) response: let usrevert to the status quo ante commitments of a process,the breakdown of which was a principal cause of theviolence, and only then – once recommitted to thatwhich had failed – can talks begin. It did not work.

There would always be some rejectionists in both campsto any outcome, but if that outcome was validated bythe bulk of Palestinians and gained a critical mass ofpopular support from the public, then there would besome prospect of consolidating progress.

The hostility of the West however, with its ‘war on terror’rhetoric of demonization and isolation of Islamist groupshas left Islamists cynical and radicalized. The proscriptionand isolation of the Islamists has heightened the sense ofasymmetry of the process and the ‘unjustness’ of theWest’s perceived bias toward the stronger party – Israel.Europeans and Americans remain vacillating between thepragmatic understanding of the need for inclusivenessand effective reduction in violence; and a fear that toengage fully along this path might muddle the black andwhite principles of the ‘war on terror’, leaving the Westwith unravelling policies. But for anyone looking for adurable end to conflict, inclusiveness and legitimacy aretwo elements for which any amount of top-downWestern pressure are unlikely to substitute.

79Hamas ceasefires 2001-03

Asymmetries in the peaceprocess the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran

As Clausewitz observed, war is politics by othermeans. Negotiations are a form of politics, butwithout some real or perceived symmetry of

power they will be an exercise in one side imposing its will on the other. Power – i.e. the ability of one partyto move the other in an intended direction – isconstituted by military resources, economic leverage,international legitimacy, the moral basis of one’sposition, mass support, leadership, etc. It includes ‘hardpower’ such as military coercion, as well as ‘soft power’,which is defined by Joseph Nye as the ability to achieveone’s intended results through cultural or ideological‘attraction’. Symmetry can be created between statesand non-state entities by military parity, the drain onthe state’s economy, persuasion or coercion by largepowers, etc. The power to persuade, in large part a softpower, is perhaps the most important power at thenegotiating table and can help the negotiating table be a ‘leveller’ in terms of power symmetry.

However, when the parties are competitive to the point of being unable to meet and have discussions,symmetry of power will not yield a negotiatedsettlement unless the international system in which the negotiation takes place forces the parties to adoptcooperative attitudes towards each other.

It is often argued that a government and non-electednon-state actor cannot be treated equally because theformer is ‘democratically elected’. This argument mayhave merit in some cases, but it is not applicable withrespect to national liberation movements fighting forself-determination. In national conflicts, liberationmovements represent a ‘people’ who share attributessuch as language, culture, a sense of oneness and aterritorial relationship. The aggrieved people oftenneither voted for the ‘democratically elected’government in power nor owe any allegiance towardsit. While liberation movements are not elected throughballots, Judge Amoun of the International Court ofJustice observed that, “the struggle undertaken incommon, with the risks and even sacrifices it entails…is more decisive than a referendum, being absolutelysincere and authentic”.

80 Accord 16

Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran is a legal

advisor to the LTTE and an Attorney-at-

Law in the USA.

Female LTTE cadres march through the town ofKilinochchi to celebrate Tamil Women's day,

10 October 2002.

Source: Reuters

The impact of asymmetries

Unfortunately, as many scholars have rightly observed,the international climate in which most negotiationstake place inherently fosters asymmetrical relations infavour of states, which have presumptive and elitelegitimacy, allies (whether genuine or interest-based),membership in international organizations and theresources of a government. The Sri Lankan government’sprevention of the UN Secretary General’s visit to theareas most severely affected by the December 2004tsunami because they were governed by the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is one illustration of theasymmetry between states and non-state entities intheir relations with international institutions. This articlewill elaborate on the ways in which the asymmetricaltreatment of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan governmentby the international system has hurt the Sri Lankanpeace process.

Negative effects of the state-based systemThe impact that international institutions can have onthe peaceful resolution of conflicts between states andnon-state actors such as armed liberation groups issubstantially diminished by this dominant pro-statebias. The state-based composition of international

institutions has negative implications for their ability to engage successfully with all the parties in a nationalconflict. Thus, these international institutions areincreasingly becoming less relevant to peacemaking in the contemporary world in which conflict betweenstates and armed entities ‘predominate and proliferate’to a greater degree than conflicts between states. Boththe Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel onThreats, Challenges and Change and the UN SecretaryGeneral’s proposal entitled In Larger Freedom: TowardsDevelopment, Security and Human Rights for All failed to address this asymmetry between states and nonstate actors.

Since the current international system is an inter-stateone, states playing the role of the mediator or facilitatortend to treat the state and non-state entities in anasymmetrical manner. This third-party state is itself amember of the existing inter-state system and thus hasa vested interest in preserving it. While there may beexceptions to this general statement, the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord is a clear example. Besides her geopoliticalinterest, India treated the Sri Lankan state as an equaland entered into an agreement with her. The LTTE,though a protagonist in the conflict, was not a party to

81Asymmetries in the peace process: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

the Indo-Lanka Accord. Its exclusion resulted in failure toaddress the Tamil issue satisfactorily and ultimately thefailure of India’s peacemaking effort.

Proscription and anti-terrorist legislationBefore the commencement of talks in the current peace process, the LTTE insisted that the Sri Lankangovernment remove its legal ban against them.Although the proscription of the LTTE did not have anytangible impact on the organization, the LTTE wantedthe ban removed because both parties should perceivethemselves, and be perceived by others, as equals. TheLTTE viewed the de-proscription as a visible sign ofpower symmetry between the two. The governmenthas historically fought any recognition of equal statusvigorously, but taking into consideration the militaryreality on the ground, its economic capacity and thearguments of the international community, the SriLankan government removed the ban before thecommencement of talks.

Despite the fact that ban had been removed, the peaceprocess was ongoing and the ceasefire in effect, the USgovernment invited only the Sri Lankan government toattend the Washington donor conference of April 2003that was meant to address post-conflict resettlement,rehabilitation and development. The LTTE, which wasgoverning 70 per cent of the north east, the area mostlyaffected by the war, was not invited. The Sri Lankangovernment characterized this conference as apreparatory seminar for the main Tokyo donorconference in June that year. The LTTE was upset and pointed out that the Sri Lankan government’sattendance in Washington was a breach of the parties’commitment to seek developmental aid as jointpartners. The US government’s rationale for not invitingthe LTTE was not that the conference was limited tostate representatives, but that the US anti-terrorismstatute did not permit LTTE members to enter the US,because of their designation as a foreign terroristorganization. Yet if that were the case, the conferencecould have been held in a country without such a list.

The whole exercise was viewed by the LTTE as anattempt to destroy the power symmetry between theprotagonists and added to growing mistrust betweenthe Sri Lankan state and the LTTE. The LTTE’s exclusioncontributed to their dismay at the lack of progress innegotiations and the Sri Lankan government’s failure toimplement its obligations under the Memorandum ofUnderstanding signed almost a year before. On 21 April2003 the LTTE suspended its participation in the talksand decided to boycott the Tokyo conference. TheLTTE’s chief negotiator and political strategist Dr. AntonBalasingham observed, “As a non-state actor caught

up in the intrigue-ridden network of the internationalstate system, the LTTE was compelled to act to freeitself from the overpowering forces of containment”. By failing to engage with non-state entities, third-partystates were also lessening their ability to persuade orbecome fair arbitrators of the conflict.

Anti-terrorism legislation is another example of howartificial and unhelpful asymmetry is created betweenstates and non-state actors pursuing legitimate armedstruggles. Anti-terrorism statutes address terrorist actsby foreign non-state actors, but not by state actors. Yetthere is no moral or legal reason for state terrorism tobe immune from any anti-terrorism statute. Theprovisions of the Additional Protocol I and II of theGeneva Conventions refer to the “party” to the conflict,not the state in conflict, and thus cover conduct of both state and non-state actors. Thus the rationale forlimiting anti-terrorist legislation to non-state actors onlyis flawed. The unreasonableness of the anti-terrorismstatute is demonstrated by the case of Sri Lankangovernment whose armed actions against the Tamilsresulted in the mass murder of Tamils and their burial in mass graves. According to the UN Human RightsCommission, in the period from 1980 to 2000 Sri Lankawas second only to Saddam Hussein’s regime in thenumber of outstanding cases of disappearances. Yetthe officers of the Sri Lankan military establishmentwere able to come to Hawaii where the US PacificCommand is situated, whereas the LTTE’s political andeconomic advisors were unable to enter the US as‘members’ of a ‘foreign terrorist organization’.

As an attorney who was involved in the legal challengesto the designation and/or characterization of the LTTEas a terrorist organization in the USA and in Canada Iwas privy to the unclassified information in those legalproceedings. I was appalled to see that the designationor characterization was primarily based on intelligencereports from the country in which these groups operateand from reports by academics of one of the protagonistnations claiming to be objective experts. Since theintelligence agencies are part of the conflict with thenon-state entities in those countries, it cannot beexpected that those agencies will provide unbiasedinformation. However, other states uncritically acceptthe host government’s demonization of an armedgroup when it suits their own geopolitical interests, and often possibly for the sake of courtesy. The aboveillustrates the asymmetry inherent in the internationalcommunity that influences its legal systems.

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Human rights violations andinternational instrumentsIt is notable that prosecutors from the newlyestablished International Criminal Court, another multi-lateral initiative, have chosen to begin investigations ofabuses by the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army buthave not yet given indications that they will investigatealleged abuses committed by the Ugandan state in the north. In the Sri Lankan peace process persistentaccusations about LTTE’s recruitment of underagechildren are made, whereas the adverse impact onTamil children of actions taken by the government inthe name of security (such as depriving Tamil fishermanof their livelihood, which contributes to the starvationof Tamil children) is not brought up in internationaldiscussions. Another example is the Sri Lankangovernment’s refusal to withdraw from high securityzones in violation of the Memorandum of Understanding.This is a clear violation of humanitarian laws which onlyrecognize the right to a military occupation of civilianproperties for an “imperative need”. Humanitarian lawsdo not accept forced occupation of civilian lands andhomes for the sake of maintaining the balance ofmilitary power. Given the three-year ceasefire and thepeace process, the occupation of civilian land by themilitary in the northeast is contrary to humanitarianlaws and clearly unlawful, yet the internationalcommunity does not condemn this.

With respect to the resumption of talks, the LTTEpresented its proposal and expressed its willingness to resume talks in October 2003. However, the presentSri Lankan government failed to resume talks from the point left off by the previous administration inNovember 2003, as is customary in any negotiatingprocess. Even though the government has changed thestate has not. Even in cases of the succession of states,international law mandates that the new state honoursthe commitment made by the previous states. It isacknowledged that in some instances whengovernments change, their approach to negotiationsalso change, but it is clear that in Sri Lanka the failure to resume talks is due to the government’s insistenceon a completely new approach to the talks. Yet thegovernment uses its access to the international mediato spin the story that it was the LTTE who suspendedthe talks in April 2003.

The international instruments used to monitor thebehaviour of states and non-state actors are alsoasymmetric. First of all, it must be recognized that almostall international agreements are negotiated and preparedby states. Thus, it should not be a surprise that theseinternational agreements give primacy to state interests.Some say that the LTTE is in violation of the Optional

Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.The Optional Protocol allows states to recruit individualsunder 18 for their armed forces, while prohibiting armedgroups from recruiting individuals under 18 for theirnational forces or even for political and administrativework. There is no provision in the Optional Protocol for a national liberation movement and/or a de factogovernment like the LTTE. Application of the OptionalProtocol, which has not yet become customaryinternational law, will favour the Sri Lankan state againstthe LTTE. However, there is criticism that the LTTE isviolating the Optional Protocol provisions that it is not a party to, has never signed and thus is not legallybound by.

Negotiating peaceAsymmetry also characterizes the facilities for preparingnegotiations between state and non-state actors.States’ resources to train their diplomatic corpsprofessionally and academically exceed those of non-state actors. The LTTE recognizes this asymmetry andcompensates for it with the resourceful Tamil diaspora’stalents and with assistance from some internationalNGOs and academics, a strategy manifested in theInterim Self-Governing Authority, a proposal putforwarded by the LTTE to address the urgenthumanitarian needs of the people of the northeast.

The Sri Lankan government comprises variousconstituencies and ideologies and has to expend its resources to address various interests. For thegovernment, the peace process is just one of manythings on its agenda. The LTTE’s commitment to thepeace process has helped to reduce the asymmetrybetween its resources and those of the government.

ConclusionThis article has tried to identify some of the asymmetriesbetween state and non-state actors pervasive in thecurrent international state system in light of the SriLankan peace process, as well as the lack of factors inthat system to compel state actors to adopt a cooperativeorientation towards non-state actors. The third partieswho are involved in such processes must address theseasymmetries for the process to work. If the internationalenvironment is not rectified to enable the non-stateactor to exercise its soft power effectively, the non-stateactor will be forced to conclude that only through hardpower can they level the playing field and compel thestate actor to reach a negotiated settlement.

83Asymmetries in the peace process: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Engaging armedgroups in peaceprocesses lessons for effective third-party practice

Nicholas (Fink) Haysom

The fundamental question that third-partyfacilitators or mediators (hereafter, the mediator)should ask themselves at the outset is whether

their intervention is indicated at all. However, perhapsbecause there is currently a distinct competitiveness orterritoriality in regard to facilitating or brokering peaceprocesses, this question is seldom asked. Best practicesuggests that peace processes are more likely tosucceed where the parties engage directly with oneanother and take ownership of the peace process andits products. But where belligerent parties are unwillingto engage with each other, collaborate in joint structuresor even meet in the same room, third parties or mediatorsare often required. For this reason, this article attemptsto identify key lessons learned about effective third-party practice during the early phases of engagementwith armed groups and state parties in the context of a peace process. This article may also provide someuseful insights to armed groups and state parties interms of how to negotiate effective third-party roles orat least to appreciate the considerations of third parties.

The third party’s choice: whether to engage Mediators should be cautious where it seems one orboth of the parties to a conflict wish to engage in talkswithout any intention of reaching agreement. Thisphenomenon is common in a world where there isincreasing international or regional pressure on partiesin armed conflict to engage in negotiations. Motivationsfor engaging may derive only from the economic rewardsof being seen to do so or the punitive conditions orconsequences of failing to do so. Engagement may alsobe a military stratagem serving to bolster the parties’image or to secure a period of respite prior to anothermilitary manoeuvre. In these circumstances, a mediatormust think carefully before engaging parties in anunworkable or potentially damaging peace process.While negotiations can build a party’s commitment to political dialogue, it is also clear that the fallout of failed negotiations can prevent or delay a more seriouspeace process.

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Long-time legal adviser to former

South African President Nelson Mandela,

Fink Haysom has extensive direct

experience of mediation and facilitation

in a number of peace processes. He was

recently appointed to lead the UN team

helping Iraq to write its new Constitution.

Colombian peace negotiators Camilo Gomez (right) andJuan Uribe (centre) with the commander of the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Simon Trinidad,January 2002. Trinidad has since been arrested.

Source: Reuters

Mediators should also be able to walk away from a process that has become dishonest or counter-productive. States whose international profile is closely associated with their successful participation in particular peace processes tend to make frequent third-party interventions in those processes, and it isoften difficult for officials to walk away for fear ofdamaging their careers or their country’s reputation.

An important corollary to this is that mediators have atleast some independence in exercising a measure ofcontrol over the process and doing so may mean thatthe mediator acts more independently than the partieswould initially wish. Failure to do so could lead to achaotic process in which parties exercise unbearablepressure on the mediator. While it is crucial for amediator to have the trust of the parties and theirconsent to act as a mediator, this should not beconstrued as an imperative towards appeasement. The parties will generally come to respect a measure of control over the process, provided it is exercisedimpartially and professionally. This needs to be assertedat the outset – even at the risk of ‘losing’ the mediation.

Building credibility In the first engagements the mediator needs toestablish and build confidence in his or her role, andaccordingly the skills of listening, empathetic

understanding and impartiality are important. It will beimportant for the mediator to respect the rules ofconfidentiality and insist that the parties do so too.

The mediator must possess knowledge of creativeprocess options and the capacity to move from oneform of negotiations to another: formal to informal,committee to sub-committee, bilateral to multilateral,one-on-one or side talks. In order to do this themediator should, with the parties’ consent, establishsome responsibility for the orchestration of thenegotiations including facilitating the preparation of an agenda. General Sumbeiywo managed this at theoutset of the Machakos round of Sudanese peace talks.The failures to do so in the Burundi peace talks becamea significant complication.

A good mediator is acquainted with the substance of the issues at the heart of the conflict as well as thenature of the possible solutions, and they have accessto the necessary national, regional or internationalauthority to secure the parties’ compliance with theirprocess requests. Preferably the mediator should also be able to guarantee (or know that others willguarantee) the resources necessary to facilitate thenegotiations. Mediators may often need to rectify the imbalance in access to resources and knowledgepossessed by non-state parties. In this regard, state or multilateral organizations may be more clearly

85Lessons for effective third-party practice

indicated as mediators in certain conflicts thanindividuals or eminent persons.

Changing the mindset of the parties infavour of negotiation External pressure on both state and non-state actors(i.e. threats to their resources, status, or pressure fromregional powers) is critical but not decisive in inducinga state of mind conducive to participation innegotiations. What is more important than externalpressures is the armed group’s subjective appreciationof a negotiated settlement as the first prize – assomething that can actually deliver on their bottomline demands.

Three important barriers to achieving such willingnessto enter a peace process are: the legacy of previous bad faith negotiations; the belief that the adversary isunable to meet its bottom line demands; or the currentimbalance in power between the two parties. Thus, the first task of a third party is to engage the armedgroups (and the other parties) on the grounds that anegotiated solution is both possible and capable ofgenerating a lasting and enduring settlement of theconflict. These negotiations are usually separate,unsolicited, preliminary, informal confidence-buildingexercises. The mediator, as in subsequentengagements, is required to share best and worstalternatives to a negotiated agreement, to separatepositions from interests and explore possibilities.

A mediator should build the parties’ understanding that their enemy is also their negotiating partner. Thebarriers, problems and constraints that affect one’snegotiating partner are also likely to affect the successof the peace process. In this sense, recognizing thatboth parties have some mutual obligation to assisteach other in dealing with their respective constraintsmay encourage collaborative and constructiveapproaches and an understanding of each side’s needto frame a solution in a form its supporters can digest.

It is critical that both parties appreciate the need fordemonstrable gains so that they both can claim benefitsarising out of the engagement and negotiations fortheir respective constituencies. Thus in South Africa thenegotiations initially followed a tit-for-tat series ofconcessions that both sides were able to hold out totheir supporters. It is important to recognize that peaceis itself a ‘bread and butter’ benefit for both sides.

Armed groups need to turn around the slogans andbattle cries which served them well during periods ofmobilization. ‘No compromise’ or ‘victory or death’ are

not appropriate rallying cries for parties in a peaceprocess. The African National Congress (ANC) neededseveral months to bring their cadres round to thepossibility of a negotiated settlement.

There is a tendency for parties to personalize the causesof the conflict and to believe that the removal ordestruction of the opposing leader will secure theconditions for peace (the so-called Savimbi option). The practice of undermining a rival leader’s authoritymay well mean that an agreement will either not beconcluded, because of accusations of bad faith (as inthe so-called Karuna issue in Sri Lanka) or worse, theleader will sign a peace agreement without the supportof their constituency or military commanders. It is thusimportant that parties respect each other’s leaders andtheir legitimacy.

Negotiating the processInitial engagements are not only about securing thearmed group’s entry, but involve the very nature anddetails of the peace process itself. Such negotiationsinvolve establishing the role of the third party. Buildingtrust in the process involves building trust in themediator. Due to the intrigue and manoeuveringinvolved in establishing the Burundi talks, theTanzanian facilitation team was on the back footthroughout the process.

Pre-negotiations: rules and arrangements The range of process issues that can be pre-negotiatedis extensive and the more that is agreed the smaller thelist of potential flash points that might threaten theprocess later. Such issues include: decision-makingformulae at the talks; the extent and nature ofrepresentation of the parties at the talks; importantlogistical questions such as the venue and transport;the powers and role of the third party; the removal of pre-conditions to the talks; time frames; rules ofprocedure, etc. A comprehensive negotiation of theseprocess issues with an armed group is also a form ofpreparation for the substantive talks to come.

Negotiating a peace process ‘road map’ can provideboth clarity and confidence in the direction andtrajectory of the peace process. In South Africa it wasonly after the conclusion of an agreement on such aroad map (in a memorandum of understandingbetween the South African government and the ANC)that negotiations proper were able to commence. Thefailure to negotiate a road map at the outset in Sri Lankahas seen that process stranded in a state of uncertainty.

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Logistical arrangements An issue that may have disproportionate importance inthe discussion of negotiation arrangements with armedgroups is the equality of treatment and status of theparties. Whilst state parties are sometimes loathe toaccord full and equal status to non-state parties andarmed groups, the very process of engaging across anegotiating table is itself an equalizing mechanism.However, sensitivities over equality may mean symbolicissues such as the number of bodyguards participantsmay bring, the motor vehicles they use, their hotelrooms and other issues of formal status may have moreimportance than might seem warranted to an outsider.There are also key issues of asymmetry between stateparties and armed groups that need to be addressed,such as access to resources, finances and expertise,securing visas for travel, and any perception of inferiortreatment in the process.

Pre-agreementsOne reason why an armed group may be loath to enterinto a peace process is the fear that it may not succeedin some critical issues in the negotiations. Certainassurances can provide confidence in the process andsecurity to an armed group: for example, pre-agreeingsome outcomes that affect neither party’s bottom lines.Typically, ‘binding fundamental principles’ might governthe conduct of the parties during the transition, theoutcome of any constitution-making process down the line, or simply guarantee the rights of minorities in a post-conflict society. Such binding principles werecritical in South Africa and Namibia.

Agreeing on confidentiality, transparency and inclusivity The mediator should ensure mutual clarity on rules of confidentiality so that the parties do not leakinformation about the process to secure certain off-the-table advantages. Breaches of confidentiality havefrequently scuppered peace processes before they havestarted (for example the talks between the NationalCouncil for the Defence of Democracy and theBurundian government in Rome, 1998). Party-to-partyengagement is generally best conducted in anatmosphere of candour and confidentiality. Yet failureto provide a measure of transparency on the substanceof the talks can lead to disinformation and suspicionabout the nature of the deals being struck betweenpolitical elites. It is thus necessary for the mediator tobalance the need for confidentiality within the processand transparency about it.

The conduct of the media, and the parties’ use of it, canhave an important effect on the overall negotiatingenvironment: belligerent war talk, continuedpropaganda and disinformation can sour theatmosphere. The mediator can offer to regulateinformation about the peace process itself, and mayraise the need to agree on rules regarding each party’sapproach to the media. It is also critical for the partiesto be aware that there are multiple audiences on whompublic statements may have quite different effects.Triumphalist reporting of negotiations to supportersmay affect the constituency of the negotiating partnerand undermine the capacity to keep to agreedcompromises. While the participants at the table mayallow some space to either side to ‘talk up’ the fruits of their participation, this may not be understood sostrategically by the other’s rank and file (as in NorthernIreland). In this regard media releases should addressthe sensitivities or insecurities of persons who are not at the table but who may have a critical role indestabilizing the peace process.

In the interest of a durable and sustainable peaceagreement the mediator should endeavour to point out the need for inclusivity especially in regard to anylong-term political or constitutional implications of the agreement which affect people and groups notrepresented at the talks. It is not the mediator’s duty torepresent unrepresented parties, but for the durabilityand workability of the outcome of the peace process, a third party may raise the need for inclusivity in theprocesses and/or institutions created by the peaceprocess. It is unclear whether the Norwegian facilitatorsdid enough to persuade the government to adopt abipartisan approach to the Sri Lankan talks. In anyevent, the absence of such an inclusive approach is the principal problem the process now faces.

Generating momentum from the outsetAn enduring pressure on the mediator from the outsetis to ensure that the peace process builds and sustainsa momentum. Momentum in this context meansconcrete achievements and deliverable benefits fromthe process, or an ever-broadening area of commonagreement. In the initial phase, this may mean interimhumanitarian access, or provisional ceasefires or eventhe agenda of the talks. In some situations the use of‘sunrise’ and ‘sunset’ conditions can be used whereissues of principle are agreed but implementation isdelayed, or there is a phased removal of the disputedcondition or circumstance. In both cases the armedgroup may be precluded from entering a peace processif it cannot at least demonstrate that a central

87Lessons for effective third-party practice

underlying principle has been or will be addressed (e.g.withdrawal of troops, representation in state structures).

The most important test of a mediator’s judgment iswhen and how to facilitate agreement by introducingcompromises in these initial stages. In circumstanceswhere it may be difficult or overly risky for a party toaccept another party’s proposal on issues of processand/or substance, or make one of their own, it is therole of the mediator to provide parties with ‘neutral’compromise proposals or single texts from which bothcan negotiate. In this way, parties may be empoweredto move past initial positions and onto discussingsubstantive issues. This is a high-risk strategy, especiallyif one party insists on using the mediator’s agenda forthe negotiations and the other party insists that it berejected (Sudan). Moreover, the mediator stands to beaccused of bias by one or both sides, as was the case inboth Burundi and Sudan. However the compromisepackages in both cases introduced the likely middleground, which the parties, although unable to acceptthen, were later able to implement or refine.

Tackling substantive issuesThere are several substantive issues that may arise in the initial stages of a peace process that requireattention by the mediator, including ceasefires,amnesty and other important issues of internationallaw, and implementation of agreements.

Cessation of armed hostilities It is not uncommon for the parties to a peace processto insist on the continuation of armed conflict duringthe talks on the grounds that it is such armed conflictthat has created the conditions and established theweight of the armed group at the table. This was thesituation in Sudan until the Sudan People’s LiberationMovement / Army overran the garrison town of Toritwith disastrous consequences for the negotiations. Ingeneral the continued conduct of armed hostilitiesdoes not create an environment favourable to asuccessful peace initiative, as the capacity to negotiatecan become hostage to battlefield fortunes.

The issue of whether and how to negotiate a ceasefirein the preliminary stages of engagement is a context-specific choice and difficult to discuss fully in thisarticle. However, one critical consideration for amediator dealing with the issue of a ceasefire at theoutset of a process is that ceasefires can be notoriouslydifficult obligations to fulfill. Even though an armedgroup or state party may believe or wish to give theimpression that it is capable of fulfilling the obligation,it would be most damaging for the process if one orother of the parties subsequently fails to live up to itscommitments. In Sri Lanka the large and disproportionatenumber of ceasefire violations by the Liberation Tigersof Tamil Eelam is steadily eroding confidence in theceasefire agreement. In this regard the third-partymediator may have some role in counselling the partieson undertaking unrealistic obligations.

Difficult issues and international law Questions of amnesty, human rights, treatment ofprisoners, torture, maintenance of ‘no-go’ zones, laying ofmines, etc. will arise at an early stage in most negotiatedsettlements to armed conflict. The mediator’sresponsibility is to draw the parties’ attention to theappropriate international law provisions, while concedingthat the terms of the agreement will ultimately be theresponsibility of the parties themselves. With issues ofamnesty in particular, the mediator may simply point outthat such provisions will have limited applicability outsidetheir territories and may serve to undermine their statusand international support.

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Commonwealth mediator and former Fiji Prime MinisterSitiveni Rabuka (left) at peace talks with George Grey,secretary of the Isiantabu Freedom Fighters in the SolomonIslands, June 1999.

Source: AFP/Getty Images

Anticipating implementation issues A mediator should anticipate putting implementationmodalities on the agenda for negotiations from thestart so that the parties are thinking about this issuethroughout the process instead of scrambling toaddress it after agreement has been reached. Armedgroups do not want to be held hostage to theiradversary’s cumbersome legal procedures and seldomrespect the imperatives of legal continuity. Nonethelesseffective practice requires that new rights andstructures should be protected from challenges to theirlegality and this was the option taken in South Africa,Burundi and Sudan. In Sri Lanka and Nepal this optionposes serious impediments to a settlement.

Building a party’s capacity to negotiateTraining and resources Parties who are experienced or trained in negotiationare more likely to engage constructively in anegotiation process. They are more likely to have theconfidence to be risk-takers – and negotiations is a risk-taking business – and be bound by the discipline of negotiations. Government parties are not necessarilyskillful in negotiating or understanding tacticalcompromises and how they can be used to effectconcessions. Accordingly they are in equal need ofexposure to negotiating skills. In South Africa theevident and unexpected initial disparity of negotiatingskills between the ANC and the National Party wasinitially a source of some satisfaction to the ANC. Thischanged however when the ANC recognized thatadversaries who are poor negotiators make for a poornegotiating process.

What is true for negotiating skills is equally true forquestions of substance. It is in the mediator’s owninterest to arrange for or to provide training for theparties. In some instances joint training can be aneffective first exercise in a collaborative engagementbetween the parties, as was successfully employed inselected technical areas in Sudan and Burundi. Thishowever is unusual, and there are also good reasons for conducting training separately, not least the needfor candid exchanges.

Getting good negotiating mandates The mediator should, as far as possible, ensure that therepresentatives of the parties, particularly the armedgroups, have a mandate to negotiate. Dealing withmessengers from a leadership not present at the talks – and thus not subject to the discipline of the processand the logic of its compromises – is to be avoided.

Moreover, the negotiating teams should not necessarilyinclude the highest level of leadership of the respectiveparties. The leaders of the parties can be left out of thetough and undignified bargaining that may take placein acrimonious exchanges at the negotiating table.Apart from questions of dignity and personal securitythere is the important objective of having recourse to a higher level of decision-makers once deadlock isreached. This process was effectively used in SouthAfrica to create layers of deadlock-breakingmechanisms, while in Sudan it was the eventualpresence of the highest level of leadership at the talksthat secured real movement in the negotiations oncethe negotiating teams (with their very limited mandates)had reached a seemingly intractable impasse.

Managing internal divisions Understanding the relationship between partyleadership and their rank and file is critical. The SouthAfrican negotiations took their rhythm from the need to allow party leaders to consult with their regularmembers. This was critical in order to engage popularsupport for a new social contract. This in turnguarantees that the leaders are able to deliver theirmembers and supporters in any resulting compact. Thisis particularly true of armed groups whose negotiatorsneed to keep close to their commanders, rank and file,and the various hard-line factions in the movement.

Conclusion: the need to build ownership The mediator should always be alive to the need for theparties to have ownership and even management ofthe process. As the peace process unfolds it may bepossible to achieve ever greater levels of collaborationand joint decision-making in regard to the managementof the process. The failure to achieve this sense ofownership may result in a situation where one party is able to walk away from the table claiming that theprocess is a “UN” or “Norwegian” or “foreign” project.Establishing collegial management committees toarrange daily agendas or investigate problem areas is one way to increase ownership of both the processand the text. In this regard the mediator is increasinglyrequired to adopt a background role. This is whathappened in the Naivasha talks in Sudan. ‘Ownership’ is not a soft ‘feel good’ consideration. It is about thehard realities of implementation and sustainability.Throughout the engagement process mediators mustremember that the process must belong to the partiesand that they are assisting the parties with theirprocess, not the other way around.

89Lessons for effective third-party practice

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Key texts and agreementsAdditional materials are available at www.c-r.org/accord/ansa/index.shtml

! Joint Agreement On Safety AndImmunity Guarantees, between the Government of theRepublic of the Philippines and theNational Democratic Front of thePhilippines, 24 February 1995.

! Agreement on Ground Rules,between Operation Lifeline Sudanand SPLM-United, May 1996.

! Deed of Commitment under GenevaCall for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and forCooperation in Mine Action. Genericversion.

Joint Agreement OnSafety And ImmunityGuarantees 24 February 1995

Signed between the Government of theRepublic of the Philippines (GRP) andthe National Democratic Front of thePhilippines (NDFP)

This JOINT AGREEMENT on Safety andImmunity Guarantees, hereinafterreferred to as the Joint Agreement ISENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN:

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES, including itsexecutive departments and agencies,hereinafter referred to as the GRP,through its negotiating panel headedby its Chairman, HOWARD Q. DEE;

AND

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONTOF THE PHILIPPINES, including theCOMMUNIST PARTY OF THEPHILIPPINES and the NEW PEOPLE’SARMY, hereinafter referred to as theNDFP, through its negotiating panelheaded by its Chairman, LUISJALANDONI;

WITNESSETH:

In firm adherence to the HAGUE JOINTDECLARATION and pursuant to thepertinent provisions of the JOINTSTATEMENT signed in Breukelen, theNetherlands on June 14, 1994, theGOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES (GRP) and theNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT OFTHE PHILIPPINES (NDFP) hereby adoptsafety and immunity guarantees toprotect the rights of negotiators,consultants, staffers, security and otherpersonnel who participate in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations.

The primary purposes of the safety andimmunity guarantees hereby adoptedare to facilitate the peace negotiations,create a favorable atmosphereconducive to free discussions and freemovement during the negotiations, andavert any incident that may jeopardizethe negotiations.

I. Safety Guarantees 1. As used and understood in this JointAgreement, safety guarantees shallmean that all duly accredited persons asdefined herein in possession ofdocuments of identification or safeconduct passes are guaranteed free andunhindered passage in all areas in thePhilippines, and in travelling to andfrom the Philippines in connection with the performance of their duties inthe negotiations.

2. Each party has the inherent right toissue documents of identification to itsnegotiators, consultants, staffers,security and other personnel and suchdocuments shall be duly recognized assafe conduct passes as provided in thisJoint Agreement.

The GRP and the NDFP shall agreethrough their respective panel chairmenon the number of documents ofidentification each party will issuebased on the different categories offunctions which the parties willdesignate from time to time.

The documents of identification shallcontain the official seal of the issuingparty, the bearer’s photograph, name,sex, date and place of birth, height,color of hair and eyes, distinguishingphysical features, the assigned number,designation or duty in the peacenegotiations, and the period of validity.Each party shall provide the other withthe name, designation and assignednumber on each document ofidentification issued in accordancewith this Joint Agreement.

The holder of the document ofidentification so considered as a safeconduct pass in accordance with thisJoint Agreement or of the safe conductpass referred to in the precedingparagraph is hereinafter referred to as the duly accredited person.

Any person under detention who maybe designated to participate in thepeace negotiations pursuant to thisJoint Agreement shall be the subject of separate agreement between the two parties on a case to case basis.

Upon presentation by the dulyaccredited person to any entity,authority or agent of the partyconcerned, the document ofidentification or safe conduct passshall be honored and respected and

the duly accredited person shall beaccorded due recognition and courtesyand allowed free and unhinderedpassage as stipulated in this JointAgreement. The duly accredited personshall have in his or her possession thedocument of identification or safeconduct pass for the duration of thepeace negotiations.

3. The document of identification orsafe conduct pass shall not betransferable, provided that safetyguarantees granted to the dulyaccredited person shall extend to anyperson or persons consulted by theduly accredited person during and intransit to and from such consultations,and provided that these consultationsshall be in connection with and infurtherance of the purposes of thepeace negotiations. The appropriateinformation on these consultationsshall be given by the party concernedto the other with due consideration tothe safety of the persons involved insuch consultations.

4. All duly accredited persons who arealready publicly known to be involvedin the GRP-NDFP peace negotiationsshall be free from surveillance andshall be allowed freely to consult with the leaders and entities of theparty concerned in the Philippines and abroad.

5. The GRP shall promptly issue uponrequest regular passports to NDFPpersonnel who are duly accreditedpersons, without obligation to take an oath of allegiance to the GRP.

6. The GRP hereby recognizes andrespects the right of NDFP personnelwho are duly accredited persons tohold and use passports or traveldocuments issued by other countries or other recognized entities. Said NDFPpersonnel who are duly accreditedpersons may use such passports ortravel documents in entering, stayingin and departing from the Philippines,and shall not be subjected to any form of punitive action, harassment,obstruction or similar acts by the GRP in the course of travel, entry, stay or departure.

7. Each party shall upon requestprovide to the other any appropriateassistance to achieve the primarypurposes of this Joint Agreement.

II. Immunity Guarantees 1. As used and understood in this JointAgreement, immunity guarantees shallmean that all duly accredited personsare guaranteed immunity fromsurveillance, harassment, search, arrest, detention, prosecution andinterrogation or any other similarpunitive actions due to anyinvolvement or participation in the peace negotiations.

The immunity guarantees shall coverall acts and utterances made in thecourse of and pursuant to the purposesof the peace negotiations.

All materials, information and datasubmitted to or produced in the courseof and pursuant to the purposes of thepeace negotiations shall likewise becovered by the immunities provided forin this Joint Agreement and shall notbe used in any investigation or judicialproceeding.

Any evidence obtained in violation of this Joint Agreement shall not beused in any investigation or judicialproceeding.

All immunities acquired by virtue ofthis Joint Agreement shall remain infull force and effect even after thetermination of this Joint Agreement,provided said immunities shall notcover acts which are contrary to thepurposes of the peace negotiations andoutside and beyond involvement orparticipation in the peace negotiations.

2. In all cases involving duly accreditedpersons, the prosecutors shall move forthe suspension, during the peacenegotiations, of criminal proceedingsor processes including arrest andsearch, for acts allegedly committedprior to the effectivity of this JointAgreement.

3. All persons who shall assist thepersonnel of either side in theperformance of their work in the peacenegotiations, including the conduct of public consultations and peacefulassemblies, shall not be held liable forrendering such assistance.

4. In the course of requesting apassport from the GRP in accordancewith No. 5 of I above, the dulyaccredited person shall be immunefrom surveillance, arrest, prosecution,trial, punitive action, harassment,

discrimination or any liabilities due toexposure of identity and role in thepeace negotiations.

5. Any NDFP personnel, holding a GRP passport, who is a duly accreditedperson and who goes abroad to consultwith the NDFP negotiating panel or to attend any meeting in peacenegotiations or perform work related tothe GRP-NDFP peace negotiations shallbe exempt from passport cancellationand shall continue to be entitled to thesafety and immunity guarantees,including immunity from arrest, searchor any punitive action, within a periodof 30 days upon his return to thePhilippines, or 30 days from the formaltermination of this Joint Agreement,whichever comes later.

6. Any NDFP personnel based abroadwho is a duly accredited person andwho goes to the Philippines forconsultations or to perform any otherwork related to the peace negotiationsshall enjoy safety and immunityguarantees as provided for in this JointAgreement and shall be free to returnabroad at any time before and within a period of 30 days after the formaltermination of this Joint Agreement.

III. General Provisions 1. This Joint Agreement on Safety andImmunity Guarantees shall be signedby the GRP and the NDFP negotiatingpanels and shall be subject to approvalin writing by the respective principalsof both parties, which approval shall be made and communicated to theother party within 90 days from thesigning hereof.

2. Any violation of this JointAgreement may be presented by theaggrieved party to the other and shallpromptly be the subject ofconsultations between the two panelsof the negotiating parties in order toremove impediments to the peacenegotiations. Such violation shall beinvestigated and dealt with accordinglyby the party to which the personnelcharged with the violation belongs.

3. Any disagreement or ambiguity inthe interpretation and application ofthe provisions of this Joint Agreementshall be subject of consultationsbetween the two panels and resolved in accordance with the letter and spiritof the HAGUE JOINT DECLARATION

91Key texts and agreements

and the pertinent provisions of theBREUKELEN JOINT STATEMENT.

4. The two parties may mutuallyamend, modify or supplement thisJoint Agreement if the progress of thepeace negotiations so demands.

5. After its approval as provided in No. 1 of III above, this Joint Agreementshall be effective and binding upon theparties 30 days prior to the formalopening of the peace negotiations onJune 1, 1995 and for the duration ofthe peace negotiations, unless thisJoint Agreement is sooner terminatedby written notice given by one party to the other. In the latter event, thisJoint Agreement shall be deemedterminated 30 days after receipt of the notice of termination.

6. The venue of the formal talks shallbe Brussels, Belgium, unless bothparties mutually agree on anotherneutral venue. For this purpose, both parties shall separately makearrangements with the host countryconcerned.

Done In The Town Of Nieuwegein, The Netherlands, On The 24th Day Of February 1995.

APPROVED BY:

(Sgd.) FIDEL RAMOS

President

Government of the Republic

of the Philippines

April 25, 1995

(Sgd.) MARIANO OROSA

Chairperson

National Democratic

Front of the Philippines

April 10, 1995

SPLM-United /Operation LifelineSudan Agreement on Ground RulesMay 1996

This agreement is intended to lay out the basic principles upon whichOperation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) worksand to lay out the rules and regulationsresulting from such principles. It seeksto define the minimum acceptablestandards of conduct for the activitiesof OLS agencies and the Fashoda Relief and Rehabilitation Association(FRRA), as the official counterpart in areas controlled by the SudanPeople’s Liberation Movement-United(SPLM-United).

We, the undersigned, enter into thisagreement in a spirit of good faith and mutual cooperation in order toimprove the delivery of humanitarianassistance to and protection of civilians in need.

In signing this agreement, we expressour support for the followinginternational humanitarian conventionsand their principles, namely:

i. Convention on the Rights of theChild 1989

ii. Geneva Conventions of 1949 andthe 1977 Protocols additional to theGeneva Conventions

A. Statement of humanitarianprinciples 1. The fundamental objective of OLS and FRRA is the provision ofhumanitarian assistance to populationsin need wherever they may be. Suchhumanitarian assistance seeks to savelife, to ease suffering, to promote self-reliance, self-sufficiency and themaintenance of livelihoods. The rightto receive humanitarian assistance and to offer it is a fundamentalhumanitarian principle.

2. The guiding principle of OLS andFRRA is that of humanitarianneutrality – an independent status forhumanitarian work beyond political ormilitary considerations. In other words:

i. Humanitarian aid must be givenaccording to considerations of humanneed alone. Its granting, or its

acceptance must not be madedependent on political factors or uponrace, religion, ethnicity or nationality.It must not seek to advance anypolitical agenda. Where humanitarianassistance is inadequate to meet theneeds of all, priority must be given to the most vulnerable.

ii. The passage of humanitarianassistance to populations in needshould not be denied even if thisrequires that aid passes through anarea controlled by one party in order to reach the needy in another area,provided that such passage is not used for military advantage.

iii. Relief assistance is provided solelyon the basis of need; those providingassistance do not affiliate themselvesto any side in the ongoing conflict.

iv. The only constraints on respondingto humanitarian need should be thoseof resources and practicality.

3. All humanitarian assistanceprovided is for the use of identifiedcivilian beneficiaries. Priority must at all time be given to women andchildren and other vulnerable groupssuch as the elderly, disabled anddisplaced people.

4. Those carrying out relief activitiesunder the auspices of OLS must beaccountable to the beneficiaries andtheir representative structures in firstplace, and to those who fund theactivities. This places the followingobligations on the various parties:

i. those rendering humanitarian aidhave a duty to ensure its appropriateend use. This includes a right tomonitor and participate in thedistribution of humanitarian aid on the ground in partnership with FRRA.

ii. local authorities, through the FRRA,must ensure that aid is distributedfairly to civilian beneficiaries.Diversion of aid from intendedbeneficiaries is regarded as a breach of humanitarian principles.

iii. decision-making on the selection ofbeneficiaries and the monitoring of theuse of inputs and resources must be,and be seen to be, transparent andresponsive to broad based decision-making at the level of affectedcommunities. Local authorities andrelief agencies should involve local

92 Accord 16

representatives of communities in theprocesses of targeting and monitoringof aid. Where possible, this should bedone through the Joint Relief andRehabilitation Committees whichinclude elected communityrepresentatives.

5. OLS is based on the completetransparency of all its activities. Thismeans that local authorities have theright to expect that OLS agenciesprovide full information regarding theresources to be provided. In return, it isexpected that local authorities willreport honestly and fairly in all theirdealings with OLS with respect toneeds identified, populations in need,use of resources, etc.

6. All humanitarian actions should betailored to local circumstances and aim to enhance, not supplant, locallyavailable resources and mechanisms.Strengthening local capacity to preventfuture crises and emergencies and topromote greater involvement ofSudanese institutions and individualsin all humanitarian actions is anintegral part of OLS’s humanitarianmandate.

7. The fundamental human right of allpersons to live in safety and dignitymust be affirmed and supportedthrough appropriate measures ofprotection as well as relief. All thoseinvolved in OLS must respect anduphold international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights.

8. Bona fide staff members of OLSagencies and others living, working ortravelling in Sudan under the auspicesof OLS have the right to go about theirbusiness freely and without restraintprovided that they adhere to theseground rules and to local laws andcustoms. In all their dealings, reliefworkers and local authorities mustdemonstrate mutual respect.

B. Mutual obligations 1. All externally supportedprogrammes and projects in SPLM-United administered areas, must beapproved by FRRA (both locally and at FRRA head office) prior to theirimplementation. NGOs or UN agenciesare responsible for ensuring that suchapproval is obtained in writing. Projectimplementation should be based upon

a letter of understanding between theagency, FRRA and OLS which definesroles, responsibilities and commitmentsof all sides plus procedures forresolving differences and grievances.

2. All UN/NGO workers are expected to act in accordance with thehumanitarian principles previouslydefined: provision of aid according to need; neutrality, impartiality,accountability and transparency. This includes non-involvement inpolitical/military activity. NGOs andUN agencies must not act or divulgeinformation in a manner that willjeopardise the security of the area.

3. All UN/NGO workers must showrespect for cultural sensitivities and forlocal laws and customs. Relief agenciesmust ensure that their staff are familiarwith these laws and customs.

4. UN agencies and NGOs shall strive to offer the highest possible standardsof service to their beneficiaries. Thismeans that all agencies committhemselves to recruiting only thosestaff judged to have adequate technicaland personal skills and experiencerequired for their work.

5. UN agencies and NGOs must ensurethat all their staff living, working orvisiting Sudan are bearers of validentry passes from SPLM-United.

6. FRRA must commit itself to thehumanitarian principles defined aboveand not allow itself to be motivated bypolitical, military or strategic interests.It should seek to provide an efficientand effective coordinated informationand planning service for relief andrehabilitation activities.

7. The SPLM-United recognizes andrespects the humanitarian andimpartial nature of UN agencies andthose NGOs who have signed a letter of understanding with UNICEF/OLSand FRRA.

8. The FRRA should facilitate the flow of relief goods and services and provide accurate and timelyinformation regarding the needs andthe situation of civilians in their areas.

9. Local authorities assume fullresponsibility, through the FRRA forthe safety and Protection of reliefworkers in areas under their control.

This responsibility includes:

i. Providing an immediate alert to reliefworkers in potentially insecure areas;

ii. facilitation of safe relocation whennecessary;

iii. protection from any form of threatharassment or hostility from any source;

Relief staff or agencies are not expectedto pay for such protection either ofthemselves or of their property.

10. UN/NGO compounds should berespected as property of theseinstitutions. Those living in thesecompounds have the right to privacyand compounds should only be enteredwith the permission of their residents.No military or political activity shouldtake place in these compounds and nopersonnel bearing arms may enterthem except when the safety of theirresidents is threatened.

C. Use of relief property andsupplies 1. i. All UN/NGO property, includingvehicles and property hired byUN/NGOs, is to be controlled andmoved at the discretion of UN/NGOs ortheir agencies, unless such property isformally donated to another party.

Project agreements between NGOs,FRRA and UN/OLS should clearlydefine which assets will remain theproperty of the agency concerned andwhich are project assets which mustremain in Sudan even when the agencyconcerned leaves temporarily orpermanently.

ii. Those assets defined as agencyassets remain the effective property of the agency at all times and may be removed whenever a projectterminates or an agency withdrawsfrom a location for whatever reason.

iii. Project assets are those which arefor direct use by project beneficiariesor are integral to the running andsustainability of the project. Thesegoods remain the property of UN/NGOuntil formally handed over to theFRRA or local communities and theirleaders. Decisions regarding thedistribution and use of such itemsshould be made, whenever possible,jointly between NGOs and localauthorities, under the auspices of theJoint Relief and Rehabilitation

93Key texts and agreements

Committee following the humanitarianprinciples stated above.

2. UN and NGO flags are for exclusiveuse by these agencies.

3. UN and NGO staff will be allowedunrestricted access to theircommunication equipment and toexercise normal property rights. Exceptfor emergencies, all messages shouldbe written and recorded. Use ofUN/NGO radios or other communicationequipment will be limited toinformation on relief activities only.All messages will be in the Englishlanguage. Operation shall be by alocally designated radio operatorseconded and selected jointly by thelocal authorities and relief agencies.Whenever necessary, UN/NGOpersonnel will be allowed to transmittheir own messages.

4. No armed or uniformed personnel isallowed to travel on UN/NGO vehicles:planes, boats or cars. This includesthose vehicles contracted by UN/NGOs.

D. Employment of staff 1. All UN agencies and NGO have theright to hire their own staff as directemployees. These agencies should beencouraged to employ appropriatelyqualified and experienced Sudanese aspart of a capacity building strategy.

2. In the cases of Sudanese staffseconded to an NGO supported project(e.g. health staff), appointments anddismissals are made by the localauthority in consultation with theagency which is expected to supportpayment of that workers incentives. The number of workers to be supportedmust be agreed jointly. An NGO or a UNagency may ask the local authorities towithdraw seconded staff consideredincompetent, dishonest or otherwiseunsuitable for their jobs.

3. Local authorities should ensure thatthe Sudanese staff of UN/NGOs and,especially, those staff who receivespecial training programmes toupgrade and improve their skills areexempted, whenever possible, frommilitary or other service so that theycan contribute to the welfare of thecivilian population.

E. Rents, taxes, licences,protection money 1. No UN/NGO should be expected topay rent for buildings or areas which arepart of their work, for example, officesor stores when they have built thesebuildings themselves or where they aredonated by the local authority.

2. In the case of public buildings whichare being rented by an NGO as livingaccommodation, a reasonable rent maybe paid by the NGO/UN agency to thecivil administration. Genuine effortsshould be made to make movestowards standardization of these rents.

3. All OLS agencies shall be exemptfrom customs duties for supplies(including personal supplies) andequipment brought into Sudan. Anytaxes to be paid will be agreed betweenthe agency concerned and the localauthority as part of the projectagreement.

F. Implementation of thisagreement 1. All signatories to this agreementmust accept responsibility for ensuringthat it is disseminated to all theirofficials and staff working in Sudan. It should also be publicised in publicplaces in Sudan to ensure that localcommunities and beneficiariesunderstand its principles and rules.

2. UNICEF/OLS, together with theFRRA will be responsible for ensuringthe holding of workshops and meetingsin all key locations in which theprinciples and rules of this agreementare explained and discussed with allrelevant personnel.

3. The FRRA is fully responsible forensuring compliance with thisagreement by the local authorities and communities.

4. Joint Relief and RehabilitationCommittees established in all reliefcentres and involving all relevantactors should meet together on aregular basis to plan, implement andmonitor the delivery of humanitarianassistance. These committees will beregarded as the custodians of theprinciples of this agreement at locallevel and responsible for ensuring thatthe rules are upheld and respected byall sides.

G. Mechanisms for resolvingalleged violations of groundrules 1. In cases where allegations of non-compliance with this agreement aremade, all parties commit themselves toresolving differences as speedily aspossible in an attitude of good faith.

2. Where alleged violations of groundrules have occurred, the allegationshould be documented in writing bythe complainant.

3. The issue should then be taken to thelocal Joint Relief and RehabilitationCommittee where this exists.

4. If unresolved, it should then bediscussed at local level with meetingsbetween the area secretary of theFRRA, the civil administrator and thelocal head of the UN/NGO, togetherwith the UNICEF/OLS Resident ProjectOfficer, where appropriate.

5. If the issue remains unresolved atlocal level, it should be referred tocentral authorities in writing to bedealt with by the senior officials of the agencies concerned, i.e. the FRRAhead office, the head of the NGO and, if appropriate, the UNICEF/OLScoordinator.

Signed:

Dr. Lam Akol, Chairman andCommander in Chief SPLM-United,and Pierce Gerety, OLS Coordinator and UNICEF Chief of Operations

94 Accord 16

Deed of commitmentunder Geneva Call foradherence to a total banon anti-personnel minesand for cooperation inmine actionWe [the undersigned rebel movementor armed group] through our dulyauthorized representative(s),

Recognizing the global scourge of anti-personnel mines whichindiscriminately and inhumanely killand maim combatants and civilians,mostly innocent and defencelesspeople, especially women and children,even after the armed conflict is over;

Realizing that the limited militaryutility of anti-personnel mines is faroutweighed by their appallinghumanitarian, socio-economic andenvironmental consequences,including on post-conflictreconciliation and reconstruction;

Rejecting the notion that revolutionaryends or just causes justify inhumanemeans and methods of warfare of anature to cause unnecessary suffering;

Reaffirming our determination toprotect the civilian population from theeffects or dangers of military actions,and to respect their rights to life, tohuman dignity, and to development;

Resolved to play our role not only as actors in armed conflicts but also as participants in the practice anddevelopment of legal and normativestandards for such conflicts, startingwith a contribution to the overallhumanitarian effort to solve the global landmine problem for the sake of its victims;

Accepting that internationalhumanitarian law and human rightsapply to and oblige all parties to armed conflicts;

Acknowledging the norm of a total banon anti-personnel mines established by the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, which is an important step toward the totaleradication of landmines;

NOW, THEREFORE, hereby solemnlycommit ourselves to the followingterms:

1. TO ADHERE to a total ban on anti-personnel mines. By anti-personnelmines, we refer to those devices whicheffectively explode by the presence,proximity or contact of a person,including other victim-activatedexplosive devices and anti-vehiclemines with the same effect whetherwith or without anti-handling devices.By total ban, we refer to a completeprohibition on all use, development,production, acquisition, stockpiling,retention, and transfer of such mines,under any circumstances. This includesan undertaking on the destruction ofall such mines.

2. TO COOPERATE IN ANDUNDERTAKE stockpile destruction,mine clearance, victim assistance, mineawareness, and various other forms of mine action, especially where theseprograms are being implemented byindependent international and national organizations.

3. TO ALLOW AND COOPERATE in the monitoring and verification of ourcommitment to a total ban on anti-personnel mines by Geneva Call andother independent international andnational organizations associated forthis purpose with Geneva Call. Suchmonitoring and verification includevisits and inspections in all areaswhere anti-personnel mines may be present, and the provision of thenecessary information and reports, as may be required for such purposesin the spirit of transparency andaccountability.

4. TO ISSUE the necessary orders anddirectives to our commanders andfighters for the implementation andenforcement of our commitment under the foregoing paragraphs,including measures for informationdissemination and training, as well as disciplinary sanctions in case ofnon-compliance.

5. TO TREAT this commitment as onestep or part of a broader commitmentin principle to the ideal of humanitariannorms, particularly of internationalhumanitarian law and human rights,and to contribute to their respect infield practice as well as to the furtherdevelopment of humanitarian normsfor armed conflicts.

6. This Deed of Commitment shall notaffect our legal status, pursuant to therelevant clause in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of August12, 1949.

7. We understand that Geneva Callmay publicize our compliance or non-compliance with this Deed ofCommitment.

8. We see the desirability of attractingthe adherence of other armed groups to this Deed of Commitment and willdo our part to promote it.

9. This Deed of Commitmentcomplements or supercedes, as the case may be, any existing unilateraldeclaration of ours on anti-personnelmines.

10. This Deed of Commitment shalltake effect immediately upon itssigning and receipt by the Governmentof the Republic and Canton of Genevawhich receives it as the custodian ofsuch deeds and similar unilateraldeclarations.

Done this [date] in [place]

[Signatories]

95Key texts and agreements

96 Accord 16

Further readingThe further reading list is organized toprovide general reading on each of thefive main themes of the publication plus additional material on conflictscovered in the case studies. Web linksand a more extensive bibliography and are available at:www.c-r.org/accord/ansa/index.shtml

Understanding armed groups / armedgroups’ choices

! Baker, Bruce. ‘Separating the sheepfrom the goats among Africa’sseparatist movements’ Terrorismand political violence, vol. 13, no. 1(2001): 66-86

! International Crisis Group.‘Myanmar backgrounder: ethnicminority politics’ (Bangkok/Brussels:Asia Report No. 52, May 2003)

! McCartney, Clem. ‘Revolutionaryand agreed change: managing the contradictions’ . Seehttp://www.c-r.org/accord

! Mowlam, Mo. Momentum (London:Hodder & Stoughton, 2002)

! Policzer, Pablo. ‘Neither terroristsnor freedom fighters’ Paperpresented at the InternationalStudies Association Conference,Honolulu, Hawaii, 3-5 March 2005.See http://www.armedgroups.org/

! Rees, Phil. Dining with terrorists:meetings with the world’s mostwanted militants (London:Macmillan, 2005)

! Russell, John. ‘Terrorists, bandits,spooks and thieves: Russiandemonisation of the Chechensbefore and since 9/11’ Third WorldQuarterly Vol. 26, No. 1 (March2005): 101-116

! Shultz, Richard H., Douglas Farah& Itamara Lochard. 'Armed groups:a tier-one security priority'(Colorado: USAF Institute forNational Security Studies,Occasional Paper 57, September2004)

! Waite, Terry. Taken on Trust(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993)

Humanitarian & political engagement

! Bradbury, Mark, Nicholas Leader& Kate Mackintosh. ‘The‘Agreement on Ground Rules’ inSouth Sudan’ (London: OverseasDevelopment Institute, HumanitarianPolicy Group Report 4, 2000)

! Bruderlein, Claude. ‘The role ofnon-state actors in building humansecurity: the case of armed groupsin intra-state wars’ (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,May 2000)

! Geneva Call. Seeking RebelAccountability. Report of the GenevaCall mission to the Moro IslamicLiberation Front (MILF) in centralMindanao, Philippines. 3-8 April 2002.Monograph No.1, (Geneva: GenevaCall, August 2002)

! De Waal, Alex. Food and power inSudan (London: African Rights,1997)

! Hofmann, Claudia. ‘Engaging non-state armed groups in humanitarianaction: state actor and non-governmental approaches’ (GermanDevelopment Institute backgroundpaper, July-August 2004)

! International Council on HumanRights Policy. Ends and means:human rights approaches to armedgroups (International Council onHuman Rights Policy, 2000)

! Kay, Kira. ‘The “newhumanitarianism”: the HenryDunant Center and the Aceh peacenegotiations’ (Woodrow WilsonSchool of International Affairs, CaseStudies in International Diplomacy:case study 02/03)

! Levine, Iain. ‘Promotinghumanitarian principles: thesouthern Sudan approach’ (London:Overseas Development Institute,Relief and Rehabilitation Networkpaper 21, 1997)

! Mazurana, Dyan. Women in ArmedOpposition Groups Speak on War,Protection and Obligations underInternational Humanitarian andHuman Rights Law. Report of aworkshop organized in Geneva by Geneva Call and the Program for the Study of InternationalOrganization(s) August 26 – 29, 2004

! Harmer, Adele & Joanna Macrae.‘Humanitarian action and the‘global war on terror’: a review oftrends and issues’ (London:Overseas Development Institute,Humanitarian Policy Group BriefingNo. 9, July 2003)

! Harpviken, Kristain Berg & BerntA. Skara. ‘Humanitarian mineaction and peace building:exploring the relationship’ ThirdWorld Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 5 (2003):809-822

! Policzer, Pablo. ‘Human rights andarmed groups: toward a new policyarchitecture’. Mimeo, July 2002

! Santos, Soliman M. ‘A criticalreflection on the Geneva Callinstrument and approach inengaging armed groups onhumanitarian norms: a southernperspective’ (Paper for the ArmedGroups Conference, Vancouver, 13-15 November 2003)

! Toole, Daniel. ‘Humanitariannegotiation: observations fromrecent experience’. HarvardProgram on Humanitarian Policyand Conflict Research.

! Vanvoorhis, B. ‘Food as a weaponfor peace - Operation LifelineSudan’ Africa Today, Vol. 36, no. 3-4(1989): 29-42

Track one – track two interaction

! Diamond, Louise & JohnMcDonald. Multi-track diplomacy: a systems approach to peace (WestHartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press,1996)

! International Crisis Group. ‘TheKivus: the forgotten crucible of theCongo conflict’ (Nairobi/Brussels:Africa Report No. 56, January 2003)

! Montville, Joseph V. ‘The arrowand the olive branch: a case for tracktwo diplomacy’ in John McDonald &Diane Bendahmane (eds.), Conflictresolution: track two diplomacy(Washington, DC: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 1995)

! Ricigliano, Robert. ‘Networks ofeffective action: implementing an integrated approach topeacebuilding’ Security dialogueVol. 34 No. 4 (2003): 445-462

! Saunders, Hal. ‘The multilevelprocess in Tajikistan’ in Herding cats:multiparty mediation in a complexworld (Washington, DC: USIP, 1999)

! Strimling, Andrea & Susan AllenNan. ‘Track I - Track II cooperation’,an essay for Beyond Intractability,2003:http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/track_1_2_cooperation.jsp

The impact of asymmetries

! Balasingham, Anton. War andPeace: Armed Struggle and PeaceEfforts of Liberation Tigers (London:Fairmax Publishing, 2004)

! Bhatia Michael V. ‘Fighting words:naming terrorists, bandits, rebelsand other violent actors’ Third World Quarterly Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 2005): 5-22

! International Crisis Group.‘Dealing with Hamas’(Amman/Brussels: ICG Middle EastBriefing no. 21, January 2004)

! Milton-Edwards, Beverley &Alastair Crooke. ‘Waving, NotDrowning: Strategic Dimensions ofCeasefires and Islamic Movements’Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3(2004): 295-310

General: armed groups and peaceprocesses

! Andreopoulos, George J. ‘TheInternational Legal Framework andArmed Groups’ (Draft paperpresented at the Conference onCurbing Human Rights Violations byNon-State Armed Groups, Universityof British Columbia, November 13-15, 2003)

! Capie, David & Pablo Policzer.‘Keeping the promise of protection:holding armed groups to the samestandard as states’ Paper for UnitedNations and Global Security, UnitedNations Foundation

! Fisher, Ronald J. ‘Methods of third-party intervention’ Berghofhandbook for conflict transformation(Berlin: Berghof Research Center forConstructive Conflict Management,2001)

! Franco, Andrés. ‘Armed non-stateactors’ in David Malone (ed.) The UNSecurity Council (Boulder, CO: LynneRienner, 2004)

! Haysom, Nicholas & JulianHottinger. ‘Do’s and Don’ts ofsustainable ceasefire agreements’.Presentation to IGAD Sudan PeaceProcess Workshop on DetailedSecurity Arrangements in SudanDuring the Transition

! Kaldor, Mary. New and old wars:organized violence in a global era(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999)

! Lederach, John Paul. ‘Quo Vadis?Reframing terror from theperspective of conflict resolution’paper presented at University ofCalifornia, Irvine, Townhall meeting,convened by Global Peace andConflict Studies, 24 October, 2001.

! Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham& Tom Woodhouse. ContemporaryConflict Resolution (Cambridge:Polity Press, 1999)

! Peake, Gordon, Cathy Gormley-Heenan & Mari Fitzduff. Fromwarlords to peacelords: localleadership capacity in peaceprocesses (Londonderry: Universityof Ulster, INCORE Report, December2004)

! Stepanova, Ekaterina. ‘Anti-terrorism and peacebuilding duringand after conflict’ (Stockholm: SIPRIPolicy Paper no. 2, June 2003)

! Williams, Sue & Steve Williams.Being in the middle by being at the edge (York: William Sessions Ltd, 1994)

! Zartman, William. ‘Dynamics and constraints in negotiations in internal conflicts’ in WilliamZartman (ed.) Elusive peace:negotiating an end to civil wars(Washington, DC: The BrookingsInstitution, 1995)

! Zartman, William. ‘Negotiatingwith Terrorists’ InternationalNegotiation: A Journal of Theory andPractice, Vol. 8, no. 3 (2003)

97Further reading

Glossary Armed groups: The focus in this volume is on armedgroups operating primarily within state borders andengaged in violent attempts to challenge or reform the balance and structures of political and economicpower, to avenge perceived past injustices and/or todefend or control resources, territory or institutions forthe benefit of a particular ethnic or social group. Assuch they would share the following characteristicsoutlined by Pablo Policzer:

• They are challengers to the state’s monopoly oncoercive force;

• They are not under effective state control; and

• They are capable of preventing, blocking orendangering humanitarian action or a peace process.

Criminal organizations and international terroristnetworks such as al-Qaeda are outside the primaryfocus of this publication.

Conflict resolution: has come to be understood as anumbrella term that refers to several distinctinterventions which all aim to help people find peacefulor non-violent responses to conflict and potentiallyresolving disputes and addressing underlying drivers ofviolence. These include:

• Conflict Prevention: stopping or averting theoccurrence of violence or other destructive responsesto conflict through activities intended to addressconflictual issues or relations in a society.

• Conflict Management: building the ability of people to work together cooperatively to deal with theirconflicts. Conflict management and mitigation is aterm that refers to attempts to contain or lessen theimpact of violent conflict.

• Conflict Transformation: changing the underlyingsystems/institutions, attitudes and relationships thatunderlie violence and building new systems/institutions, attitudes and relationships that promoteconstructive methods for dealing with conflict.

98 Accord 16

Conflict resolution processes: can be used to addressconflicts and disputes:

• Negotiation: discussion between two or more peoplewith the purpose of solving a common problem,resolving a dispute and/or planning joint action.

• Dialogue: a process in which participants share andlearn about each others beliefs, needs, perceptionsand feelings.

• Facilitation: a third party assists the parties in adialogue process.

• Mediation: a third party (outside the control of anyone participant in the negotiation) is givenresponsibility to manage the process through whichthe parties to come to an agreement.

Engagement: refers to efforts or activities initiated byeither the parties to the conflict or intermediaries toexplore, enable, instigate or sustain opportunities forcontact (and possibly other conflict resolutionprocesses) with or between the parties.

Intermediary: a person who is engaged in workingwith or between parties in conflict to help themcommunicate, discuss and possibly reach agreementrelevant to their dispute or conflict. Intermediaries canplay a number of roles such as conveying messagesback and forth, hosting or convening meetings,facilitating dialogue, providing advice and othersupport for negotiations, and mediating.

Legitimacy: the degree to which an action, process,actor or institution is perceived as having legal, moral or ethical authority and consequently whether it shouldbe recognized or dealt with. In situations of civil warand insurgency, contested legitimacy may be at theheart of the conflict. Legitimization refers to an actionor process that is perceived as granting legal or moralstatus to another actor or institution.

Peace process: refers to a long-term series ofnegotiations, dialogue and/or other conflict resolutionprocesses involving the parties to the conflict (e.g. stateparties and armed groups) as well as elements of civilsociety and the international community to define andimplement a transition from a state of violent conflict toa state of sustainable peace.

Political dialogue: used in this volume to refer todiscussions between parties to a conflict (e.g. a stateparty and armed group) on the substantive issues inwhich they have an interest, such as security,governance or democracy, and ways to manage orresolve their conflict or stop the use of military force.

State party: used in this volume to refer to a sovereigngovernment that is a participant in a conflict andpossibly a conflict resolution process with an armedgroup within their borders.

Third party: refers to the status of a person who is notdirectly affiliated with any of the participants in aconflict and who gets involved to try to help them workout a solution. Most third parties do not have a stake (or at most a minimal stake) in the problems or issuesunder discussion by the parties. Third parties can befrom the international community, non-governmentalorganizations and from the local country or affectedpopulation. While third parties from the affectedpopulation certainly have a stake in the outcome of a conflict or the cessation of violence, they qualify asthird parties so long as they are not directly involved in the structures of any of the parties to the conflict

Track one and track two processes: track one conflict resolution processes are official mediations ornegotiations with the intended outcome of reaching an agreement among the leadership of the combatantparties to end military operations and/or reach a peaceaccord. Track one actors (governments and inter-governmental bodies like the UN) can impose legalsanctions and provide military and financial assistance.Track two conflict resolution processes tend to involvenon-governmental actors or mid-level officials and arenot intended to produce official binding commitments,but instead focus more on facilitating contact,relationship building, dialogue, brainstorming andaction planning with the parties to a conflict or withnon-governmental leaders (such as from business,media, religion, etc.). Often, track one and track twoactors are in contact with each other or cooperate tosome degree within the context of a peace process.

99Glossary

100 Accord 16

AcronymsAFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

ANC African National Congress

AP Anti-personnel [landmines]

CNDD National Council for the Defence of Democracy

CPP Communist Party of the Philippines

CSM Civil Society Movement

DAB Democratic Alliance of Burma

DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring and Observation Group

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ELN National Liberation Army

ERP People’s Revolutionary Army

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FDR Revolutionary Democratic Front

FMLN Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front

FSB Federal Security Service

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IHL International Humanitarian Law

IRA Irish Republican Army

IRCSL Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone

JASIG Joint Agreement on Safety and ImmunityGuarantees

KIO Kachin Independence Organization

KNLA Karen National Liberation Army

KNU Karen National Union

LRA Lord’s Resistance Army

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MBT Mine Ban Treaty

MONUC United Nations Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo

NCUB National Council of the Union of Burma

NDF National Democratic Front [Burma]

NDFP National Democratic Front of the Philippines

NLD National League for Democracy

NPA New People’s Army

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope

PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

RCD Congolese Rally for Democracy

RPCV Returned Peace Corps Volunteers

RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary

RUF Revolutionary United Front

SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council

SPDC State Peace and Development Council

SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army

SPLM-U Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–United

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

Facilitators Col. Barnwell and the Life andPeace Institute's Hans Romkema meet twoex-Congolese Rally for Democracy officersin the DRC in a track two initiative

Source: Rob Ricigliano

conciliation resources

101About CR

Conciliation Resources (CR) supports people working toprevent violence, promote justice and transform conflictinto opportunities for development.

CR’s organizational goals are to:

• Support people working at local, national andinternational levels in developing innovative solutionsto social, economic and political problems related toviolent conflicts

• Provide opportunities for inclusive dialogue andimproved relationships within communities and acrossconflict divides at all social and political levels

• Influence governments and other decision makers toemploy conflict transformation policies that promotealternatives to violence

• Improve peacemaking practice and policies bypromoting learning from peace processes around theworld

• Strengthen the media’s capacities in divided societies tochallenge stereotypes and increases public awarenessof human rights, conflict and peace issues

In addition to the Accord programme, CR has recentlyworked with:

• Civic groups in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia

• Kacoke Madit and its partners in northern Uganda

• Non-governmental organizations and officials in the Caucasus

• The Citizens’ Constitutional Forum in Fiji

For more information or to make a donation contact:

Conciliation Resources173 Upper StreetLondon N1 1RGUnited Kingdom

Telephone +44 (0)20-7359 7728Fax +44 (0)20-7359 4081E-mail cr@c-r.orgWebsite www.c-r.org

Charity Registration No 1055436

Participants working during CR's joint analysis workshopon 'engaging armed groups in peace processes', July 2004.

102 Accord 16

The Liberian Peace Process 1990–1996

Issue 1 | 1996

The Liberia issue documents the lengthy and

fractious Liberian peace process and provides

insight into why thirteen individual peace

accords collapsed in half as many years.

Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process

Issue 2 | 1997

The signing of the peace agreement in 1996

brought an end to 36 years of civil war in

Guatemala. The publication analyses issues

of impunity, indigenous rights, political

participation and land reform.

The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective

Issue 3 | 1998

The Mozambique issue documents the diverse

initiatives which drove the parties to a negotiated

settlement of the conflict as well as illustrating

the impact of changing regional and

international dynamics on Mozambique.

Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka

Issue 4 | 1998

The Sri Lanka issue documents the cycles of

ethnic/national conflict which have blighted the

country since 1983. It analyses negotiations and

other peace initiatives that have taken place since

1993 and outlines fundamental issues

that need to be confronted in future

peacemaking efforts.

Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia’s Constitutional Challenge

Issue 5 | 1998

This publication documents issues around

the signing of the 1991 Paris agreements

which officially "brought to an end"

Cambodia's long war and the violent

collapse of the country's governing

coalition in July 1997.

Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in Transition

Issue 6 | 1999

The GRP-MNLF 1996 Peace Agreement was

a milestone in many ways. The publication

analyses features of peacemaking in

Mindanao and examines the challenges

of implementation.

2003: Supplement issue

A question of sovereignty:the Georgia–Abkhazia peace process

Issue 7 | 1999

The publication explores the background

and issues at the heart of the Georgia-

Abkhazia conflict, provides a unique insight

into a political stalemate and points towards

possible avenues out of deadlock.

Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peace process

Issue 8 | 1999

Accord 8 explores the factors that led to

the negotiations resulting in the Belfast

Agreement, describing the complex

underlying forces and the development

of an environment for peace.

2003: Supplement issue

The Accord seriesAccord: an international review of peace initiatives is published by Conciliation Resources (CR). It provides detailed narrativeand analysis on specific war and peace processes in an accessible format. The series is intended to provide a practical resourcefor reflection for all those engaged in peacemaking activities.

103The Accord series

Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process

Issue 9 | 2000

The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999 sought

to bring an end to one of the most brutal civil

wars of recent times. Accord 9 explores earlier

attempts to bring the conflict to an end and in

doing so seeks to draw valuable lessons for

Sierra Leone’s transition.

Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace process

Issue 10 | 2001

Accord 10 describes the aspirations of the

parties to the conflict in Tajikistan and

documents the negotiation process leading to

the General Agreement of June 1997. It looks

at the role of the international community,

led by the UN, as well as local civil society, in

reaching a negotiated settlement.

Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda

Issue 11 | 2002

While a meaningful peace process in Northern

Uganda remains elusive, this issue documents

significant peacemaking initiatives undertaken

by internal and external actors and analyses

their impact on the dynamics of the conflict

and attempts to find peace.

Owning the process: public participation in peacemaking

Issue 13 | 2002

The first thematic publication documents

mechanisms for public participation in

peacemaking. It features extended studies

looking at how people were enabled to

participate in political processes in

Guatemala, Mali and South Africa. It also

contains shorter pieces from Colombia,

Northern Ireland and the Philippines.

Alternatives to war: Colombia’s peace processes

Issue 14 | 2004

This issue provides an overview of more

than 25 years of peace initiatives with

Colombia's guerrilla and paramilitary

groups. It includes analysis of civil society

efforts at local, regional and national levels

and identifies the necessary elements of a

new model of conflict resolution.

From military peace to social justice?The Angola peace process

Issue 15 | 2004

The Luena Memorandum of 2002 brought

an end to Angola’s 27-year civil war. This

issue reviews Angola’s history of

peacemaking efforts, and analyses the

challenges remaining if the absence of

violence is to develop into a sustainable

and just peace.

Future issues The Nagorny Karabakh conflict has languished in a state of ‘nopeace, no war’ for over a decade following the ceasefire of1994. The conflict remains the central obstacle to the politicaldevelopment of the newly independent states of Azerbaijanand Armenia, and a key impediment to the development of the South Caucasus region as a whole. This Accord issue willdocument official and unofficial peace initiatives in the region,exploring the positions of key stakeholders and the centralissues and dynamics to be addressed in future conflictresolution initiatives.

Weaving consensus: The Papua NewGuinea – Bougainville peace process

Issue 12 | 2002

Accord 12 documents efforts leading to the

Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2001. The

issue describes an indigenous process that

drew on the strengths of Melanesian

traditions, as well as innovative roles played

by international third-parties.

104 Order form

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I would like to pre-order Accord !!In lieu of a subscription system, future Accord issues can be pre-ordered by signing up to receive new issues immediately uponpublication. New issues will be sent with an invoice when published. Pre-order customers who sign up to receive future issues of Accord on a standing order basis will receive all additional published materials free of charge. If you would like to sign up for pre-order of future Accord issues, please fill in your details above and return it to Accord Marketing.

Issue 1 The Liberian peace process 1990–1996 !!Issue 2 Negotiating rights: the Guatemalan peace process !!Issue 3 The Mozambican peace process in perspective !!Issue 4 Demanding sacrifice: war and negotiation in Sri Lanka !!Issue 5 Safeguarding peace: Cambodia’s constitutional challenge !!Issue 6 Compromising on autonomy: Mindanao in transition

(including 2003 supplement) !! Supplement only £5.00 !!Issue 7 A question of sovereignty: the Georgia–Abkhazia peace process !!Issue 8 Striking a balance: the Northern Ireland peace process

(including 2003 supplement) !! Supplement only £5.00 !!Issue 9 Paying the price: the Sierra Leone peace process !!

Issue 10 Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace process !!

Issue 11 Protracted conflict, elusive peace: initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda !!

Issue 12 Weaving consensus: the Papua New Guinea – Bougainville peace process !!

Issue 13 Owning the process: public participation in peacemaking !!

Issue 14 Alternatives to war: Colombia’s peace processes !!

Issue 15 From military peace to social justice?The Angolan peace process !!

Issue 16 Choosing to engage:

armed groups and peace processes !!

a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v i e w o f p e a c e i n i t i a t i ve s

Issue Editor Robert Ricigliano

Armed groups and peace processes

Choosing to engage

Choosing to engage: armed groups and peace processes

Non-state armed groups are central figures in many of theworld’s internal armed conflicts.Their objectives and use ofviolence spark deep controversy about appropriate responses totheir actions,particularly in the context of the global ‘war onterror’.Yet in the last two decades armed groups have participatedin peace processes on every continent, resulting in a wealth ofexperiences of dialogue and peace negotiation involving stateactors,civil society groups, foreign governments and multilateralorganizations.

This Accord issue draws on these experiences to explore the casefor engagement with armed groups and lessons learned frompeacemaking practice.Highlighting both the opportunities andchallenges of this approach, it suggests that the diversity ofengagement options and potential interveners makes a strongargument for greater commitment to engagement by allstakeholders.The publication combines the voices of armedgroups,governments and intermediaries for a rich and varied setof perspectives on five key issues: the challenge ofunderstanding armed groups; armed groups’choices aboutpeacemaking; political and humanitarian engagement options;the roles of governmental and non-governmental actors; andthe impact of asymmetries in a state-based international system.With case studies from twelve countries complementinganalytical overviews of these issues, Choosing to engage: armedgroups and peace processes highlights important lessons andgood practice for future peacemaking efforts involving armedgroups.

Conciliation Resources and the Accord programmeConciliation Resources (CR) is an international non-governmental organization,which supports people working toprevent violence,promote justice and transform armed conflict.CR’s Accord programme aims to inform and strengthen peaceprocesses,providing a unique resource on conflict andpeacemaking.Working collaboratively with locally basedorganizations,we document peace processes, increaseunderstanding and promote learning from past and comparablepeacemaking experiences.

“Accord is an incredible source of valuable insight andinformation, indispensable for any peace or conflict worker.”

Johan Galtung,Professor of Peace Studies and Director of TRANSCEND.

“Accord offers very interesting and informative reporting. It willgreatly contribute to our own knowledge and wisdom as wework in this complex field of peacebuilding and conflictresolution in Africa.”

Joseph W.Butiku,Executive Director,The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation,Tanzania

The full text of all issues in the Accord series can be found on theConciliation Resources website at http://www c-r org

Issue 16 2005

ISSN 1365-0742£17.00

Accord 16

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