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This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2036.cfm
Produced by the Asian Studies Center
Published by The Heritage Foundation214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 20002–4999(202) 546-4400 • heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to
aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
China’s Quest for a Superpower MilitaryJohn J. Tkacik, Jr.
The People’s Republic of China announced onMarch 4, 2007, that it would increase its militarybudget by 17.8 percent in 2007 to a total of $45 bil-lion—by far the largest acknowledged amount thatChina has ever spent on its military. However, CIAcalculations suggest that China really devotes 4.3percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to itsmilitary, including off-budget sectors such as for-eign arms purchases, subsidies to military indus-tries, China’s space program, the 660,000-manPeople’s Armed Police, provincial militias, andreserve forces. Adjusting China’s 2006 GDP of $2.5trillion for purchasing power parity yields a GDP ofabout $10 trillion, which pegs military spending at$430 billion.
In other words, the size of Beijing’s military bud-get puts China in the top stratum of global militarypowers with the United States. Despite the Beijingleadership’s espousal of China’s “peaceful rise,” thisunprecedented peacetime expansion of China’s mil-itary capabilities can no longer be viewed as thoughsome benign force animates it.
Military Buildup. The pace and scope of China’smilitary expansion are startling.
Nuclear Forces. In the past decade, China’snuclear forces have brought the reliability, surviv-ability, response times, and accuracy of their ballis-tic missiles to state-of-the-art standards. China hasabout 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)targeted at the United States. China’s missile subma-rines are already loaded with solid-fuel Julang-1s,
and each new Type-094 nuclear submarine after2010 will deploy with 12 ballistic missiles that havea range of 8,000 km.
Anti-Satellite Weapons. On January 12, 2007, theChinese successfully intercepted and destroyed atarget satellite. China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) technol-ogy is now state of the art. Unsurprisingly, Beijingrebuffs verification issues while purporting to seekan international pact to “prevent an arms race inouter space.” More than any other Chinese militaryprogram, the ASAT program reflects not just a capa-bility, but also, given the lack of feasible alternativetargets, an intention to strike U.S. space assets intime of war.
Naval Forces. China has made naval moderniza-tion its top arms priority. Since 1995, China hasbuilt a modern fleet of 29 advanced diesel-electricsubmarines, and 10 more are being built. China’ssurface fleet is also growing rapidly and is develop-ing a capability to project force throughout theAsia–Pacific. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)Navy is refitting a Ukrainian aircraft carrier andlaunched 19 new heavy transport ships and 10amphibious landing ships between 2003 and 2005.
No. 2036 May 17, 2007
Air Forces. The PLA Air Force now boasts about400 new Russian-designed fighter aircraft and 60new Jian-10 fighters with expected production of atleast another 190 Jian-10s—more than a match forTaiwan’s fighters in the Taiwan Strait.
Ground Forces. China’s army is still the world’slargest with 1.64 million men and is modernizingapace. The PLA’s Type 98 main battle tank arguablyoutclasses the weapons on the U.S. M-1A2 Abramstank, and Chinese arms makers now display animpressive array of new armored vehicles, mobileheavy artillery, all-terrain vehicles, helicopters, andnew small arms.
Cyberwarfare Forces. New PLA doctrine seescomputer network operations as a force multiplierin any confrontation with the United States or otherpotential adversaries, such as Taiwan, Japan, SouthKorea, and even the United Kingdom. PLA cyber-war units apparently are the only PLA troops thatregularly attack enemy targets, making at least fourmajor attacks on U.S. government computer sys-tems in 2006 alone.
Geostrategic Implications. China’s militaryexpansion is extravagantly in excess of anythingrequired by a responsible stakeholder in the existinginternational system and is even beyond thatneeded to “liberate” Taiwan. China shares land bor-ders with 14 nations, none of which is a threat to it,yet China still has contentious territorial claimsagainst India and Japan and in the South China Sea.China’s gathering geopolitical punch portends a21st century that may well become the Chinese cen-tury in Asia—a new century of China’s support forilliberal forces that will buttress the legitimacy ofBeijing’s regime at home.
What the Administration and CongressShould Do. Asia does not believe that Washing-ton—preoccupied with Iraq—is concerned aboutChina’s spreading influence, much less that it has astrategic vision for the Pacific Rim. Managing theemerging security challenge requires a new U.S.partnership with democratic Asia and a new atti-tude in Washington. The U.S. should:
• List China as the top U.S. foreign policy chal-lenge. The entire bureaucracy must prepare toimplement a coherent China policy to addressdefense, global, and regional issues, using coun-terintelligence and export control strategies asneeded.
• Commit resources to preserving the U.S. posi-tion as the world’s preeminent military power.America cannot bluff its way out of this challenge.America’s most urgent needs are increasing itssubmarine fleet, enhancing its anti-submarinewarfare capabilities, and ensuring the survivabil-ity of its space platforms (e.g., satellites).
• Reinforce eroding alliances, eschew inclina-tions to take China’s rhetorical side againstJapan or against Taiwan, reinvigorate ties inSoutheast Asia, build on new ties with India,and reengage the Atlantic Community in dia-logue on shared global interests and values ofhuman dignity and freedom.
Conclusion. The Asian perception that theUnited States is a declining Pacific power may ormay not prove prescient, but China is clearly emerg-ing as the preeminent power in the Asia–Pacific.Faced with this reality, an engaged America canstrengthen the current robust trans-Pacific align-ment, knitting together the democracies of theAmericas and the Western Pacific Rim, or a disen-gaged America can allow a Sino-centric continentalaxis to crystallize as the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations, Taiwan, Korea, and eventuallyJapan, Australia, and South and Central Asia band-wagon with China.
The choices made in Washington on how tomanage the emerging Chinese superpower willdetermine not only the direction of Asian democ-racy, but also the prospects for global political andeconomic freedoms in the 21st century.
—John J. Tkacik, Jr., is Senior Research Fellow inChina, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Stud-ies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2036.cfm
Produced by the Asian Studies Center
Published by The Heritage Foundation214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 20002–4999(202) 546-4400 • heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect-ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
• China is spending 4.3 percent of its GDP($430 billion per year) on its military, placingit in the top stratum of global military pow-ers. The People’s Liberation Army now fundsvast modern weapons systems in outerspace and cyberspace, as well as in the tra-ditional battle spaces of land, sea, and air.
• China is building a military capable of pro-jecting power and influence throughoutAsia and the Western Pacific, not just againstTaiwan.
• Current trends indicate that the 21st centurywill be a Chinese century in which Beijingbecomes the economic, trade, political secu-rity, and human rights rule-maker in Asia asthe United States recedes from the region.
• Washington needs to make fundamentalchanges in its Asia policy and engage alliesand friendly countries in the region to meetthe China challenge.
Talking Points
No. 2036May 17, 2007
China’s Quest for a Superpower MilitaryJohn J. Tkacik, Jr.
The National People’s Congress of the People’sRepublic of China (PRC) announced on March 4,2007, that it would increase the country’s militarybudget by 17.8 percent in 2007 to a total of $45 bil-lion—by far the largest acknowledged amount thatChina has ever spent on its military.1 The Chinesegovernment went out of its way to reassure the worldthat this spending hike was normal and need notworry anyone. “China is committed to taking a path ofpeaceful development and it pursues a defensive mil-itary posture,” a spokesman said.2
As the Chinese aphorism goes, “listen to what theysay, but observe what they do,” and what Beijing issaying is quite different from what it is doing.
The resources that Beijing devotes to its armedforces put China in the top stratum of global militarypowers. With China’s 2006 gross domestic product(GDP) in excess of $2.5 trillion (about $10 trillion inpurchasing power parity terms) and its militaryspending estimated by the Central IntelligenceAgency at 4.3 percent of GDP,3 China’s military spend-ing is more accurately pegged at about $430 billionthan at $45 billion.
While China’s declared military budget primarilyincludes personnel costs (and a 17.8 percent militarypay hike is reasonable), the declared budget is only asmall part of overall Chinese military spending. Theexact methodology that U.S. intelligence agencies useto estimate the military’s share of China’s GDP is clas-sified, but it reportedly accounts foreign arms pur-
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May 17, 2007
chases, subsidies to military industries, China’sspace program (which is under the absolute com-mand of the Central Military Commission), the660,000-man People’s Armed Police, provincialmilitias, and reserve forces—all of which areexcluded from official military budget figures.41234
Defense spending in some sectors that are notcounted in the defense budget appears to be in-creasing at a much faster rate than the officialmilitary budget. For example, China’s NationalDefense in 2006 (China’s 2006 Defense White Paper)noted that:
In 2005, the output value, added value andgross revenue of the entire spectrum of defense-related science, technology and industry in-creased by 24.3 percent, 20.7 percent and 21.6percent, respectively, over the previous year.5
The Chinese military budget does not include thebulk of the defense-related science, technology, andindustry sectors or overseas military procurement orprovincial spending on militias and reserves.
Despite the Chinese Communist Party leader-ship’s espousal of China’s “peaceful rise,” the factstell a different story. The unprecedented peacetimeexpansion of China’s military capabilities can nolonger be viewed as though some benign force ani-mates it. China’s military expansion is already suffi-ciently transparent that one can discern Beijing’sintention to challenge the United States in the West-ern Pacific and establish itself as the predominantmilitary power in the region—in the name of anti-hegemony and to promote a “multipolar interna-tional system.”
China’s Rise as a Military PowerChinese leaders are not seized by self-doubt
about the direction of their regime. The declaredstrategy of the Chinese leadership has been to turnits economic growth into military power by meansof the “four modernizations” (agricultural, indus-trial, science and technology, and military) and the“prosperous nation, strong military” (fu guo, qiangbing) model.
1. Edward Cody, “China Boosts Military Spending: Senior U.S. Official Presses Beijing to Clarify ‘Plans and Intentions,’” The Washington Post, March 5, 2007, p. A12, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/04/AR2007030400401.html (April 23, 2007). This was certainly the biggest increase in yuan terms. China has announced the following annual percent-age increases: 1.5 percent in 1987; 2.6 percent in 1988; 12.6 percent in 1989; 15.4 percent in 1990; 12.0 percent in 1991; 12.0 percent in 1992; 12.5 percent in 1993; 20.3 percent in 1994 (the yuan was devalued from Y6.10 to the dollar down to Y8.28 to the dollar); 14.6 percent in 1995; 11.3 percent in 1996; 12.7 percent in 1997; 12.8 percent in 1998; 12.7 per-cent in 1999; 12.7 percent in 2000; 18 percent in 2001; 17.7 percent in 2002; 9.6 percent in 2003; 11.6 percent in 2004; 12.6 in 2005; 14.7 percent in 2006; and 17.8 percent in 2007. China also increased military spending by 20 percent in 1979 to pay for its February incursion into Vietnam. Data compiled by June Teufel Dreyer, Ph.D., University of Miami.
2. Jim Yardley and David Lague, “Beijing Accelerates Its Military Spending,” The New York Times,March 5, 2007, p. A8, at www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/world/asia/05military.html (April 23, 2007).
3. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2007 (Washington, D.C., 2007), s.v. “China,” at www.cia.gov/cia/publica-tions/factbook/geos/ch.html (April 23, 2007). The latest World Bank figures for China’s GDP indicate a purchasing power parity (PPP) of $7.634 trillion in 2004, while using a nominal exchange rate yields a GDP of $1.938 trillion, producing a PPP ratio of 3.94. However, according to the Penn World Table, China’s PPP ratio was 2.14 in 2004. World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, 2006), Table 1.1, at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Table1_1.htm (May 15, 2007), and University of Penn-sylvania, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices, Penn World Table, s.v. “China,” at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php (May 15, 2007).
4. Mark Magnier, “China Announces Military Budget Hike,” The Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2007, p. A1, at www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-china5mar05,1,5200670.story (April 23, 2007). Other studies indicate that provincial reserves and militias absorbed the bulk of the 200,000 troops, which the 2006 Defense White Paper says were demobilized between 2003 and 2005. In addition, the military seems to have generated large amounts of income from land rentals and sales in major cities. Dennis Blasko, “PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway in All Military Regions, Preparing for a Variety of Missions,” presented at the 2006 PLA Conference at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., October 6–8, 2006, pp. 11–12.
5. Chinese State Council, Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2006, December 2006, in China Daily, December 29, 2006, at www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-12/29/content_771191.htm (May 3, 2007). See especially chap. VIII.
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Ironically, after the 1991 collapse of the SovietUnion—China’s only existential threat—China in-creased military spending, while the United Statesand virtually all of its allies immediately set aboutreaping a “peace dividend,” with U.S. defense ex-penditures dropping over 10 percent from $298billion in fiscal year (FY) 1992 to $268 billion in FY1997.6 During the same period, Chinese defensespending sustained annual double-digit increases.This pace of Chinese military spending increaseshas continued to this day. The Pentagon estimatestotal Chinese defense-related expenditures in 2005at between $70 billion and $105 billion, whichplaces China third in nominal dollar defense spend-ing after the United States and Russia.7
American intelligence analysts in both Republi-can and Democratic Administrations have been sur-prised in recent years at the breathtaking pace andscope of China’s military development.8 A 2006Department of Defense report on China’s militarypower notes that the transformation of the People’sLiberation Army (PLA) has included new doctrines,reform of military institutions and systems,improved exercise and training standards, and the
acquisition of new foreign and domestic weaponssystems. China’s military expansion has alreadyaltered regional military balances. The long-termtrends in China’s military have the potential to posecredible threats to modern militaries.9
Nuclear Forces. The most ominous of China’smilitary advances has been in the PLA’s strategicrocket forces, the 2nd Artillery, which includesnuclear and conventional ballistic missile com-mands and anti-satellite units. In the mid-1990s,the 2nd Artillery embarked on a modernizationprogram designed to improve the reliability, surviv-ability, response times, and accuracy of its ballisticmissiles to state-of-the-art standards. Since 1996, ithas more than doubled—and in some years has tri-pled—the annual production of solid-fuel short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).10
China has also deployed at least 40 interconti-nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted at theUnited States. The road-mobile DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) has been operationalsince 1996, and the 2nd Artillery is now introduc-ing road-mobile ICBMs, including the DF-31.11
6. Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), pp. 49–51, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/hist.pdf (March 27, 2007). The U.S. State Department lists China’s annual military expenditures as second only to those of the United States. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification and Compliance, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1999–2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 38, at www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rpt/wmeat/1999_2000 (April 23, 2007).
7. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006,” May 23, 2006, at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf (April 23, 2007).
8. Kurt Campbell, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, noted: “You look back on those studies, and it’s only been a decade, China has exceeded in every area military modernization that even the far-off estimates of the mid-1990s predicted.” Mike Shuster, “Growing Chinese Military Strength Stirs Debate,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio, October 17, 2005, at www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4961290 (April 23, 2007). Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman noted that “we are caught by surprise by the appearance of new systems that suddenly appear fully developed.” Peter Rodman, in hearing, China’s Military Modernization and U.S. Export Controls, U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S. Congress, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 16–17, 2006, p. 32, at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/march16_17/March_16-17_FINAL.pdf (April 23, 2007).
9. The Pentagon already assesses that the “pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk.” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 29, at www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf (April 23, 2007).
10. SRBMs were deployed against Taiwan at a pace of 50 per year between 1996 and 2002. Bill Gertz, “Missiles Bolstered Oppo-site Taiwan,” The Washington Times, April 29, 2002, p. A12. By the end of 2006, new SRBM deployments had reached a rate of at least 100 per year. The Pentagon estimates that deployments of M-9 and M-11 missiles increased from 500 to 690 in the Taiwan Strait theater between 2003 and 2004. U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006,” p. 3.
11. Wendell Minnick, “China Speeds ICBM Plans to Debut Missiles with Longer Reach in 2007,” DefenseNews, July 10, 2006, p. 1, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1934631 (April 23, 2007; subscription required).
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The DF-31A, which has a range of 10,000 kilome-ters, is expected to become operational by 2008.Given the known rapid growth in SRBM produc-tion, production of MRBMs, intermediate-rangeballistic missiles (IRBMs), and ICBMs has likelyincreased at the same rate. Thus, by 2006, DF-31output could easily have reached 10–20 new mis-siles per year.
China’s current Xia-class ballistic missile subma-rine is already loaded with Julang-1 (JL-1) solid-fuel missiles, and a longer-range JL variant subma-rine-launched ballistic missile with a range of8,000 km will be deployed on China’s new Jin-class(Type-094) nuclear ballistic missile submarine inthree years.12
In addition, the PLA will have “several new con-ventional and nuclear variants of MRBMs andIRBMs for regional contingencies and to augment itslong-range missile forces.”13
Logically, the strategic aim of this rapid expan-sion of China’s nuclear force, particularly the
deployment of DF-31s and DF-31As and a durablesubmarine-based nuclear capability, is to reduceChina’s nuclear vulnerability substantially anddevelop a robust nuclear deterrent focused on theUnited States.
While Beijing purports to have a nuclear “no firstuse” (NFU) policy, some U.S. experts believe thatthe Chinese leadership reserves the right to usenuclear weapons in a first strike against Taiwan orTaiwan’s defenders. The unmistakable implication isthat U.S. forces defending Taiwan would be tar-gets.14 This position was explicated on the recordby a senior Chinese strategist in 2005.15 There areindications that the PLA is contemplating the use ofa high-altitude nuclear detonation to generate apowerful electromagnetic pulse that would frymicrocircuitry in U.S. weapons systems during aconflict.16 Rather than trying to reduce instability insuch a strategic environment, internal PLA militarywritings treat NFU as a constraint on nuclear oper-ations and reflect considerable resistance to NFU inthe PLA.17
12. For a comprehensive look at China’s missile industry, see Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon, A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry, RAND Corporation, 2005, pp. 51–108, at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG334.pdf (April 11, 2006).
13. U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006,” p. 27.
14. “The Chinese delegate to the U.N. disarmament talks has asserted that since Taiwan is Chinese territory the Chinese no-first-use pledge does not apply.” Michael Nacht and Tom Woodrow, “Nuclear Issues,” Session 6, in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto, eds., Strategic Trends in China (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1998), at www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201998/Strategic%20Trends%20in%20China%20-%20June%2098/chinasess6.html (April 23, 2007).
15. On July 14, 2005, at a briefing of foreign journalists, Major General Zhu Chenghu, dean of foreign students at the PLA National Defense University, said that “if the Americans are determined to interfere [then] we will be determined to respond” and that “we Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all of the cities east of Xi’an. Of course the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds…of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese.” Danny Gittings, “General Zhu Goes Ballistic,” The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2005, p. A13.
16. See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005,” July 2005, p. 40, at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf (April 26, 2007). The PLA’s eagerness to under-stand the vulnerabilities of U.S. military radiation-hardened microcircuits is evident from the case of a Chinese scholar who illegally shipped a number of such microchips to a Chinese military research institute in 2001. Spencer S. Hsu, “Scholar Says U.S. Unharmed: Gao Defends Human Rights Efforts, Appeals for Sympathy,” The Washington Post, November 28, 2003, p. A6.
17. For example, see U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006,” p. 28. Larry Wortzel notes a significant but subtle difference in terminology in the 2006 Defense White Paper: “The ‘White Paper’ declares ‘China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any cir-cumstances.’ However, the next sentence of the ‘White Paper’ tells the reader ‘it unconditionally undertakes a pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.’” Dr. Wortzel notes that “a ‘firm commitment to policy’ is not as strong a position as an ‘unconditional’ pledge.” Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007).
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Hence, China’s NFU declaration appears to beintended primarily for propaganda advantage andpossibly to encourage complaisance in Americandecision-making. At least one study shows that Chi-nese nuclear doctrine seems to make little distinc-tion between conventional ballistic missiles andnuclear-armed ballistic missiles with respect to howthey are deployed and used.18
Another serious facet of China’s nuclear doctrineis that the Central Military Commission deploysnuclear and conventional warheads on the sameclasses of ballistic missiles and co-locates them neareach other in 2nd Artillery units. This doctrine isapparently designed to shorten the escalation fusein an effort to further complicate U.S. and Japaneseresponses during a crisis.19
Moreover, this modernized and sophisticatednuclear force is clearly well in excess of any mereTaiwan contingency. It involves new power projec-tion capabilities that give Beijing two advantages:“area denial” strength, which is achieved by placingforward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, andGuam at risk, and coercive diplomacy instrumentsto resolve other territorial disputes, such as in theEast China Sea with Japan and the South China Seawith other Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) countries. Indeed, China’s new nuclearweapons systems present grave implications forU.S. power projection in the Western Pacific, thesecurity of U.S. allies and friends in democraticAsia, and regional military balances in general.
Nuclear Proliferation. The United States alsoneeds to pay far more attention to China’s tacitdirect and indirect support for nuclear weaponsprograms in Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Stra-tegic planners in Washington need to considerwhether or not China calculates that a nuclear strikelaunched by Iran on the United States or by North
Korea on the United States or Japan might actuallybe in China’s ultimate interests. The September 11,2001, attacks on the United States weakened theUnited States, distracted U.S. policymakers fromAsia, and diverted foreign investment flows fromthe U.S. to China for several years thereafter. A sce-nario in which Iran or North Korea inflicts majordamage on the United States or its allies with anuclear device could be an underlying motivationfor China to give rogue states diplomatic supportagainst U.S. and European pressures to abandontheir nuclear programs.
As China refines its missile guidance capabilities,forward-deployed U.S. forces in the Western Pacificwill become vulnerable to Chinese missiles. Forexample, U.S. carrier battle groups could face the-ater ballistic missiles with maneuverable reentryvehicles (MaRVs) capable of hitting moving ships atsea.20 The hyperspeeds of these MaRVs make themvirtually impossible to defeat with current missiledefense technology.
Chinese advances in land attack cruise missilesand theater ballistic missiles will also place U.S. forcesin Japan, Korea, and Guam within their range.21
Anti-Satellite Weapons. Given the Americanmilitary’s highly advertised reliance on space sys-tems, an equally unsettling development is the 2ndArtillery’s experimentation with various anti-satel-lite (ASAT) systems—capabilities that are targetedexclusively at U.S. space assets. On January 12,2007 (Beijing time), a Chinese DF-21 missile lifteda kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) into an intercept trackfor a Chinese weather satellite in polar orbit.22 Themissile warhead then fired the KKV at the satellite(perhaps guided by ground-based targeting laser)and successfully destroyed it. U.S. space trackershave monitored but did not publicize at least twoprevious ASAT tests in July 2005 and February
18. Wortzel describes a conventional missile target set that is identical to a nuclear target set. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 11, 2007, p. 10, at http://intelligence.senate.gov/070111/negroponte.pdf (April 26, 2007).
21. Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Con-gress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated February 7, 2007, pp. 5–6, at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf (April 26, 2007).
22. Craig Covault, “Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 22, 2007.
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2006. In the February test, the KKV was maneu-vered into close range of the target satellite but sud-denly veered away.23
Given the grievous risks to low-orbit satellitespresented by a debris cloud from the January test,why the U.S. did not confront the Chinese followingthe earlier tests is a mystery.24 No doubt someAdministration officials did not want to antagonizeChina’s space efforts.
In April 2006, shortly before Chinese PresidentHu Jintao’s official visit to Washington, China’s Dep-uty Space Agency Administrator Luo Ge evidentlyfound a receptive audience in the White House forhis proposals for joint U.S.–China space coopera-tion. Mr. Luo requested that the U.S. agree to Chi-nese participation in the International Space Station(ISS), including making modifications on the orbit-ing station that would allow Chinese spacecraft todock, and President Hu and President George W.Bush did discuss Chinese participation in the ISSand cooperation on a future lunar landing effort—an initiative that might explain some of the U.S. hes-itation.25 Some observers speculate that U.S. offi-cials were holding out the prospect of spacecooperation to persuade China to accept spacelaunch rules of the road. In fact, China’s People’s
Daily touted U.S. interest in manned lunar missioncooperation with China, an obvious propagandaploy, but the PLA rejected Washington’s rules-of-the-road initiatives.26
Some enthusiastic support for U.S.–China spacecooperation persisted in the White House untilAugust 2006, when the PLA attempted to blind (orilluminate) a U.S. reconnaissance satellite, but thatsupport was resisted by the Pentagon and NASAand by Undersecretary of State Robert Joseph.27 Bythe end of September, NASA Administrator MichaelD. Griffin was expressing deep frustration that thePLA had blocked any reciprocal access to Chinesespace launch facilities or engineering centers. With-out transparency in China’s programs, especiallygiven China’s refusal to coordinate launch informa-tion and space debris data, cooperation remainedimpossible.28 While senior U.S. military command-ers debated on China’s ASAT intentions even intoOctober 2006, all but the most ardent apologistsadmitted that China simply was not prepared forserious international cooperation in space.29
The Propaganda Department of the ChineseCommunist Party approved a September 28, 2006,commentary in Beijing’s Huanqiu Shibao thatdeclared: “The United States’ exaggeration of China’s
23. Private conversations with U.S. analysts.
24. The New York Times reports that the Bush Administration pondered how to respond, but that the suggestion that Washington ask Beijing “to forgo the test had been broached by some Pentagon officials” but “was rejected for several reasons,” including that “China was unlikely to cancel the test and that there were few good options to punish China if they ignored an American warning.” Additionally, “American intelligence agencies were loath to let the Chinese know they were aware of the state of their preparations.” Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Knew of China’s Missile Test, But Kept Silent,” The New York Times, April 23, 2007, p. 1.
25. See John J. Tkacik, Jr., “To the Moon,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2006, p. 18, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114712364365647008.html (April 26, 2007; subscription required).
26. These conclusions are based on private correspondence with U.S. experts on China’s space programs. On May 1, 2006, the Chinese press reported that “US space experts believe that China will launch spacecraft to the Moon in 2017” and that “the United States will send astronauts to the Moon in 2018” so “the two countries have a ‘coincident’ landing time.” “China, US to Join Hands in Lunar Probing?” People’s Daily Online, May 1, 2006, at http://english.people.com.cn/200605/01/eng20060501_262542.html (April 26, 2007). China wants the world to believe the next manned lunar mission will be a joint China–U.S. program.
27. Andy Pasztor, “U.S. Asserts a Military Option Is Needed to Guard Space Assets,” The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2006, p. A6, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116607013949049936.html (April 26, 2007; subscription required), and Marc Kaufman, “Talk of Satellite Defense Raises Fears of Space War; U.S. Says Attacks on Crucial Systems Are Possible, Warns It Would Respond Forcefully,” The Washington Post, December 17, 2006, p. A12, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/16/AR2006121600791.html (April 26, 2007).
28. Warren E. Leary, “NASA Chief, on First China Trip, Says Joint Spaceflight Is Unlikely,” The New York Times, September 28, 2006, p. A7, at www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/science/space/28nasa.html (April 27, 2007).
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counter-satellite technology is only an attempt toseek an excuse to justify its development of spaceweapons.”30 In retrospect, however, whatever theUnited States was doing regarding China’s counter-satellite technology, it was not exaggerating it. TheJanuary 12, 2007, ASAT test irrefutably confirmedthat China was interested solely in scoring propa-ganda points and not in space cooperation, as Chinadid not seem to feel any obligation to give interna-tional notification that it intended to fill a polar orbit530 miles up with thousands of particles of spacedebris, each with the potential to damage or destroyspace craft orbiting at or below that altitude.31
The following week, the State Department filed adémarche with the Chinese government protestingthe ASAT test but received no response. A weeklater, the Pentagon briefed journalists on the test. Itwas the first time the Department of Defense hadreported on China’s KKV–ASAT program, althoughthe Defense Department had described other Chi-nese ASAT efforts in its annual China military powerreports.32 Subsequently, the Chinese foreign minis-try, while not publicly admitting that an ASATweapon test had taken place, dryly observed thatBeijing has shown a “responsible attitude” by offer-ing “explanations” to the U.S. and Japan andinsisted that Beijing has all along “upheld the peace-ful use of outer space.”33 “China opposes the weap-
onization of space and any arms race,” the foreignministry added, pledging reassuringly that “The testis not targeted at any country and will not threatenany country.”34 Judging from the clueless reactionof China’s foreign ministry to the angry démarchesand complaints from several nations with space pro-grams, few outside the PLA chain of command orthe Communist Party Politburo were informed ofthe tests ahead of time or were briefed afterward.35
This does not mean that Beijing’s foreign minis-try does not have a vital role in China’s ASAT pro-gram. Chinese diplomats have the importantmission of getting the United States to adhere to aChinese draft statement, “Preventing an Arms Racein Outer Space” (PAROS), that Beijing has circulatedin the United Nations. Although U.S. negotiatorshave tried to engage Chinese counterparts onBeijing’s thoughts on verification of a PAROSregime, the Chinese have uniformly insisted thatthey will consider verification issues only after theU.S. has first signed a PAROS agreement.36 How-ever, this point seems lost on most of America’sallies. China and Russia managed to isolate theUnited States 160–1 on the PAROS statement in thelast meeting of the U.N. First Committee. Israelabstained, while Japan, Britain, and Australia votedfor it. The United States needs to be wary of thedisastrous potential for Beijing’s public relations
29. See Vago Muradian, “China Tried to Blind U.S. Sats with Laser,” DefenseNews, September 26, 2006, p. 1, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2125489Americas (April 27, 2007), and Elaine M. Grossman, “Top Commander: Chinese Interference with U.S. Satellites Uncertain,” Inside the Pentagon, October 12, 2006, p. 1.
30. Zhang Mingqi, “Duifu Weixing Youjizhao (xiangxi baodao)” (A few ways to counter satellites (detailed report)), Huanqiu Ribao, September 28, 2006, p. 8, at http://paper.people.com.cn/hqsb/html/2006-09/28/content_11461231.htm (April 27, 2007).
31. William J. Broad, “Orbiting Junk, Once a Nuisance, Is Now a Threat,” The New York Times, February 6, 2007, p. D1.
32. For example, see U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006,” p. 35.
33. Whatever “explanations” the Chinese may have given to American interlocutors were apparently lost in translation. Marine General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that during his March 2007 visit to Beijing, he received no explanation: “I don’t know what their policy is…. So I am still, as are others, confused about what their intent is.” Peter Spiegel, “Review Ordered into Vulnerability of U.S. Satellites,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2007, at www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/washingtondc/la-na-satellite22apr22,1,3289845.story (May 7, 2007).
34. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press conference, January 23, 2007, at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t291388.htm (April 27, 2007).
35. James Mulvenon, “Rogue Warriors? A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test,” Hoover Institution China Leadership Monitor No. 20, Winter 2007, at http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm20jm.pdf (April 27, 2007).
36. For a comprehensive review of the problems inherent in PAROS negotiations with China, see The Honorable Jon Kyl, “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons and American National Security,” Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 990, February 1, 2007, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/upload/hl_990.pdf.
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campaign on the PAROS statement to drive a wedgebetween the U.S. and its allies.37
In this, the Chinese have learned much fromSoviet arms control negotiators, who realized by the1980s that they did not have to rely on verificationwhen dealing with the United States. Once the U.S.signed an arms control agreement, it was self-enforced by America’s democratic processes. More-over, as evidenced by the Soviets’ construction of theKrasnoyarsk anti-ballistic missile (ABM) battle-man-agement radar in direct contravention of the ABMTreaty, the Soviets could openly cheat, deny inspec-tions, and confound verification without fear thatthe U.S. would abrogate the treaty. China appearssimilarly intent on violating any PAROS agreementby forming covert ASAT units in the 2nd Artillery.38
Since the January 12 test, U.S. media reports fromthe Pentagon have reflected alarm among U.S. spacestrategists over several other Chinese space weaponinitiatives including ground-based lasers and radiofrequency weapons.39 They are particularly con-cerned about the launching of small Chinese satel-lites into orbits very close to key U.S. intelligence,reconnaissance, and communications spacecraft.
Such parasitic microsatellites are presumed to betime bombs that could blind and cripple Americanmilitary operations and financial communications.“These things aren’t being sent up there to be spacerocks,” one military source said.40 All these pro-grams bespeak an anti-satellite development pro-gram that is very broad and sophisticated.41
While official U.S. government speculation thatChina’s political leaders may not have known of theASAT tests42 is not credible, it is certainly PLA prac-tice to withhold information from civilian depart-ments. The PLA’s refusal to inform health authoritiesabout the 2003 SARS epidemic in military hospitalsacross China is a clear example of this. It is possiblethat the PLA believed that the January 12 ASAT testwould go unnoticed, although for 18 months beforethe test the Pentagon had extended a standing invi-tation to China’s 2nd Artillery commanders to visitU.S. Strategic Command to discuss the dangers ofspace debris and how the U.S. tracks it.43 Fewdoubt that the PLA is fully aware of U.S. StrategicCommand’s and Air Force Space Command’s spacetracking capabilities and fully appreciates that theU.S. would detect the debris cloud immediately
37. Press release, “Disarmament Committee Approves Text Reaffirming Urgency of Preventing Outer Space Arms Race, Need for Reinforcing Existing Legal Regime,” GA/DIS/3334, U.N. General Assembly, October 25, 2006, at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gadis3334.doc.htm (April 27, 2007).
38. Michael P. Pillsbury, “An Assessment of China’s Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines,” U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 19, 2007, pp. 21–47, at www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2007/FINAL_REPORT_1-19-2007_REVISED_BY_MPP.pdf (April 27, 2007).
39. For example, see Reuters, “Satellite Surprise Highlights U.S.–China Gap—Official,” DefenseNews, February 1, 2007, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2525587 (April 27, 2007), and Bill Gertz, “Officials Fear War in Space by China,” The Washington Times, January 24, 2007, at http://washingtontimes.com/national/20070124-121536-8225r_page2.htm (April 27, 2007). For descriptions of Chinese ASAT programs, see U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006,” pp. 34–35.
40. Vago Muradian, “China’s Mystery Satellites; U.S. Gauges Beijing’s ASAT Strategy,” DefenseNews, February 5, 2007, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2528099 (April 27, 2007).
41. General James E. Cartwright told a Senate panel on March 28, 2007, that “they [the Chinese] have—they have undertaken a what we would call a very disciplined and comprehensive continuum of capability against space—our space capabilities, okay—all the way from temporary and reversible effects that could be—examples would be GPS jamming, things like that, COM jamming, all the way through direct ascent ASAT. And eventually, they’ll probably be looking at co-orbital. And then, the one that you really worry about is introducing weapons of mass destruction into space on a missile.” General James E. Cartwright, testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 28, 2007.
42. David E. Sanger and Joseph Kahn, “U.S. Officials Try to Interpret China’s Silence over Satellite,” The New York Times, January 22, 2007, p. A3.
43. See Richard Lawless, testimony before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 1, 2007, at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/written_testimonies/07_02_01_02wrts/07_02_1_2_lawless_richard_statement.pdf (April 27, 2007).
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after a successful ASAT test. While low-level officialsin China’s foreign ministry have admitted that theyknew nothing of the ASAT tests, most observersagree that the civilian party and government lead-ers, at least at the Politburo level, are extensivelybriefed on important military advances.44
Naval Forces. China is now the world’s largestcommercial shipbuilder, and its naval ship produc-tion has slipstreamed behind the civilian sector.45
President Hu’s speech to the PLA Navy on Decem-ber 27, 2006, indicated clearly—if not explicitly—that China is preparing to confront the UnitedStates at sea and under the sea.46 China’s navy isalso upgrading its naval aviation and power projec-tion capacities. China’s naval modernization, Hureported, “has made great strides, comprehensivecombat capabilities have strengthened visibly, andwe have achieved new heights and made new con-tributions to the various missions which the Partyand the people have bestowed.”
A few days later, China’s Defense White Paperdeclared: “The Navy aims at gradual extension ofthe strategic depth for offshore defensive operationsand enhancing its capabilities in integrated mari-time operations and nuclear counterattacks.”47
China has already assembled a modern submarinefleet of 29 advanced diesel-electric submarines,including 12 super-quiet Russian-made Kilo-classsubs48 and 14 Chinese-made Song-class and Yuan-
class boats. At least 10 more conventional andnuclear submarines are under construction in Chi-nese shipyards, with another five new nuclear bal-listic missile and attack subs on the drawing boards.
China’s surface fleet is undergoing a similar mod-ernization, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) is refitting theformer Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag for sea duty—atthe very least as a training platform for naval pilots.
Submarine Force. Chinese submarines slip outinto open seas from underwater tunnels and are vir-tually undetectable. In 2004, U.S. intelligence offi-cials admitted that development of the Yuan-classsubmarines was concealed from American satellitesbecause they were constructed in an undergrounddry dock in south-central China.49 The PLAN’s Songsubmarines are stealthy diesel-electrics equippedwith long-range wake-homing torpedoes designedto sink aircraft carriers.
In September 2006, Rear Admiral Ding Yiping,China’s top submarine officer and PLAN Vice Chiefof Staff, sent a Song submarine on a mission to huntan American carrier. On October 27 (October 26,Washington time), the submarine surfaced inwaters off Okinawa within torpedo range of theU.S.S. Kitty Hawk, where it was seen in the KittyHawk’s wake by an F-18 pilot on landing approach.It then submerged and disappeared, defeating allU.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts to detectit.50 The carrier battle group’s ASW systems did not
44. Mulvenon speculates that the ASAT program was approved by the civilian leadership, but “the civilians should be faulted for not maintaining closer oversight of the program and not calculating the possible negative international diplomatic reper-cussions of a successful test.” Mulvenon, “Rogue Warriors?” pp. 2–3.
45. See “China Tops Korea Again for New Ship Orders,” Chosun Ilbo, March 20, 2007, at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200703/200703200009.html (April 27, 2007). During the first two months of 2007, Chinese shipyards accounted for almost half of the total tonnage of all new ship orders worldwide, up 48 percent from 2006 levels and outpacing South Korea as the world’s top vendor.
46. Cao Zhi and Chen Wanjun, “Hu Jintao zai huijian Haijun di shice dangdaihui daibiao shi qiangdiao; anzhao geminghua, xiandaihua, zhengguihua xiangtongyide yuanze; duanzao shiying wojun lishi shi ming yaoqiude qiangda renmin haijun; Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, Xu Caihou canjia huijian” (Meeting Navy representatives at the 10th party congress, Hu Jin-tao stresses that integrating principles of revolutionization, modernization, and regularization to forge a strong People’s Navy fulfills the requirements of our historic mission. Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan and Xu Caihou present), Renmin Ribao, December 28, 2006, p. 1, at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2006-12/28/content_12168965.htm (April 27, 2007).
47. Chinese State Council, China’s National Defense in 2006, chap. II.
48. China seems to have at least 10 Kilo-class submarines now: four Kilo 877s, six Kilo 636s, and two additional Kilo 636s that are no longer in Russian shipyards but are not yet necessarily deployed by the PLAN.
49. Bill Gertz, “Commercial Photos Show Chinese Nuke Buildup,” The Washington Times, February 16, 2006, at www.washingtontimes.com/national/20060216-020211-7960r.htm (April 27, 2007).
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detect the sub because it had apparently waited—submerged, stationary, and silent—for at least oneday as the task force approached the area. Beijing’sstate-controlled media reported that Admiral Dinghad personally commanded the entire operation,perhaps even skippering the submarine himself,and predicted that the success of his mission wouldlead to a promotion.51
In March 2007, a Chinese newspaper describedthe jubilant homecoming ceremony for a submarineat “a certain naval port in southern China”:
[O]n this day marked by a soft breeze and daz-zling sun, amid deep gentle currents, a newtype of Chinese Naval vessel courses steadilyinto harbor’s bay after the flawless completionof its special test. On the pier are two columnsof naval officers and soldiers lined up in fulldress uniform to salute the victorious return ofthe ship. The dockside is filled with fresh flow-ers and the sound of applause.52
This article describes an extravagant welcom-ing home for a vessel returning from sea trials, butit never identifies the type of ship or the nature ofthe experimental propulsion system that it was
testing. However, myriad hints suggest that theship was a submarine steaming with “air indepen-dent propulsion,” a conclusion evidently sharedby other analysts.53 And although unverifiable, itmay also be, given the circumstances, the verysame submarine encountered by the Kitty Hawk.
The official Chinese press noted the PLA highcommand’s confidence in Admiral Ding—ampleevidence of their pleasure at the success the missionagainst the Kitty Hawk. The Chinese foreign minis-try’s protest that the vessel had not stalked the KittyHawk is likely the literal truth, indicating that thesubmarine simply waited submerged until the U.S.battle group sailed over it.54 The ease with whichthe submarine maneuvered undetected into Japa-nese waters and evaded U.S. and Japan Self DefenseForce submarine sensors suggests that China’s largesubmarine fleet engages in far more sea patrols thanthe U.S. has any hope of tracking.55 Like the Janu-ary ASAT test, this incident was a clear message tothe United States that China is the rising power inthe Pacific.
China’s submarine fleet is now considered thePLAN’s most “potent strength.”56 Since 1995, the
50. Audra Ang, “Admiral Downplays China Sub Incident,” The Washington Post, November 17, 2006, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/17/AR2006111701469.html (April 27, 2007). Private conversations with U.S. analysts indicate that the submarine was spotted accidentally by an F-18.
51. “Gencong Xiaoying, Ding Yiping zuozhen zhihui; Haijun zhongda xingdong zhihuiguan zhiyi 2003 nian yin qianting shigu bei jiangzhi; jinnian 8 yue beige jinsheng fusilingyuan; yuji sannian hou geng shang cenglou” (Shadowing the Kitty Hawk, Ding Yiping in personal command; one of commanders of the major naval operation was demoted because of a 2003 sub-marine accident; promoted to deputy commander of the navy this August; predicted for another step up within three years), Shijie Ribao, November 16, 2006, p. A1 at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq_id=1445428 (April 27, 2007).
52. The article describes the work of Dr. Jin Donghan, a Chinese naval propulsion engineer, and his team at the 722 Institute in perfecting a new marine engine and overcoming problems of “high pressure combustion” in “small spaces,” “gas recircu-lation,” and other technical challenges that sound suspiciously like an air independent propulsion (AIP) system. The author goes out of his way to insist that the technology is “entirely Chinese intellectual property” to “overcome the blockade of for-eign technology.” Qi Yao, “Wei Woguo Xinxing Jianchuan tigong Qiangjingde ‘Zhongguo Xin’” (Providing our country’s new warships with a powerful ‘Chinese heart’), Keji Ribao (Science and Technology Daily), March 14, 2007, at www.stdaily.com/gb/stdaily/2007-03/14/content_643783.htm (May 8, 2007).
53. See Jonathon Weng and Richard Scott, “China Develops Stirling AIP Technology for Submarines,” Jane’s Navy International, April 1, 2007.
54. “Waijiaobu: Zhongguo Qianting we isui Mei ‘Xiaoying’ hao hangmu baodao bu shi” (Foreign Ministry: Report of Chinese submarine tailing ‘Kitty Hawk’ carrier not fact), Xinhua, November 16, 2006, at http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1029/5052209.html (April 27, 2007).
55. A Federation of American Scientists blog says that the U.S. detected only two PLAN submarine patrols in 2006 and none in 2005. Hans Kristensen, “Chinese Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol Rate,” Federation of American Scientists Strategic Security Blog, February 6, 2007, at www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/post_2.php (April 27, 2007).
56. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006 Report to Congress, November 2006, p. 135.
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PLAN has commissioned about 31 new submarines,including two nuclear-powered submarines basedon advanced Russian technology.57 Eight subma-rines were commissioned in 2005, and seven werecommissioned in 2006, including new Song-classboats and a Yuan-class boat heavily inspired by Rus-sia’s Amur-class sub with its anechoic tile coatingsand quiet seven-bladed skewed propeller.58 Thereported incorporation of “air-independent propul-sion” systems that permit submarines to operateunderwater for up to 30 days would make the Songand Yuan submarines virtually undetectable toexisting U.S. surveillance networks.59
In addition, China has three new nuclear-pow-ered submarine design and construction programs.The Type-093 Shang-class nuclear attack boat andthe Type-094 Jin-class nuclear ballistic missile sub-marine programs are underway. Two Shang subma-rines are deployed, and three are underconstruction, and five Jin-class ballistic missile sub-marines are reportedly under construction. FiveType-095 submarines, a larger version of the Shang/Jin hull, are also under development.60 Togetherwith its procurement program for improved Rus-
sian-made Kilo-class submarines, China has at leastsix new submarine programs under way simulta-neously—a submarine development campaign thatis unprecedented in peacetime. China will have atleast 34 advanced submarines deployed in thePacific by 2010—some analysts expect as many as50 to 60—assuming that those under constructionwill be completed within three years. China will cer-tainly have over 60 advanced submarines by 2020.61
Meanwhile, the United States has three sub-marines under construction today, is downsizingsubmarine shipyards, and is laying off expert techni-cians needed for submarine construction. Undercurrent construction and decommissioning sched-ules, the U.S. Navy’s total submarine force will dropto 48 boats in 2020, 17 percent below the Pentagon’sown stated requirement of 58—a level that cannotprovide more than 60 percent of the U.S. Navy’sexisting submarine mission requirements. By 2027,the U.S. Navy will have less than 40 submarines.62
Surface Combatants. The PLAN is also lavishingfinancial resources on its surface fleet. It receivedthe second of its two Russian-made Sovremennyy IIguided missile destroyers in September 2006, fitted
57. O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization,” pp. 7–11.
58. Some observers consider the Yuan-class submarines under construction in Wuhan to be an improved version of the Song class. See “Songji Gailiang Qianjian, Haijun Weilai Zhuli, Waigou Eluosi K ji Qianjian, Tianbu Changgui Zhanli Kongxi, Bing Jiji Yanshi Xinjian” (Improved Song-class submarine is main force of future Chinese navy, with Russian Kilo-class, to buttress conventional force posture in region, actively research and develop new vessels), Shijie Ribao, June 1, 2005, p. A8.
59. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/written_testimonies/04_02_06wrts/goldsteinmurray_us_china_commission.htm (April 27, 2007), and Weng and Scott, “China Develops Stirling AIP Technology for Submarines.”
60. Bill Gertz, “China Expands Sub Fleet,” The Washington Times, March 2, 2007, p. A1, at www.washingtontimes.com/national/20070302-012440-4462r.htm (April 27, 2007). Little is reported about the Type-095 except that design work is apparently completed. Some reports describe it as an improved attack submarine, while others indicate that it will be a ballistic missile boat. See U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006,” pp. 26 and 27. For a graphic of China’s current submarine fleet, see Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Leased Akulas Advance India’s Blue-Water Plans,” DefenseNews, March 5, 2007, p. 12.
61. Including at least five Type-94 Jins, five Type-093 Shangs, five Type-095s, one Yuan, 13 Songs, and 13 Kilo 877s and 636s. For the higher estimates, see hearing, China’s Military Power, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., July 27, 2005.
62. The United States will soon experience a depletion of its submarine fleet, which will drop below 48 by 2020 (probably sooner, given the heightened operational tempo) and below 40 by 2027, despite an optimal fleet size of 68 and an absolute minimum of 58. The U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet can now fulfill only 62 percent of its mission requests—a percentage that drops every year. See testimony of Vice Admiral John J. Donnelly, Commander U.S. Submarine Forces, et al., in hearing, Sub-marine Force Structure and Acquisition Policy, Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., March 8, 2007.
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with advanced anti-ship cruise missiles and sophis-ticated wide-area air defense systems, a qualitativeimprovement over even China’s two advanced-tech-nology Sovremennyy ships acquired in 2000.63
In 2005, the PLAN launched its newest ships:Luzhou-class (Type 051C) guided missile destroyersequipped with Russian SA-N-20 air defense systemsand a Tombstone phased-array radar that doublesthe range of current PLA Navy air defense weapons.The Luzhou destroyer complements ongoing devel-opments of the Luyang I (Type 052B) guided missiledestroyers (similar to the Sovremennyy) and LuyangII (Type 052C) guided missile destroyer. The LuyangI is equipped with the Russian SA-N-7B Grizzly airdefense missiles and YJ-83 anti-ship cruise missiles.The Luyang II is also fitted with Chinese-producedHHQ-9 air defense missiles.64 The PLAN’s deploy-ment of eight new classes of Chinese-built destroy-ers and frigates since 1994 and the launching of 13new frigates since 1998 are, as one congressionalanalyst notes, “an undertaking with few parallels byany country in recent decades.”65
China’s naval buildup has two other intriguingaspects: aircraft carriers and amphibious assaultships, both designed for region-wide projection ofsoft and hard power. These would not be particu-larly useful in a Taiwan Strait scenario, given thefairly short distances between Taiwan and the Chi-nese coast. Rather, they appear intended to projectChina’s military force out into the East Asian and
Pacific region in crises or confrontations in whichthey would not be challenged by hostile submarines.
The Varyag. For over a year, the PLAN has beenmore or less open about China’s eventual deploy-ment of an aircraft carrier battle group. Except forthe carrier, China has all the elements of a carrierbattle group in place, according to Lieutenant Gen-eral Wang Zhiyuan of the PLA General ArmamentsDepartment.66 China will finish constructing itsfirst aircraft carrier by 2010, according to anunnamed lieutenant general (probably GeneralWang again),67 but its first operational carrier willlikely be the Varyag, the former Soviet carrierbought from Ukraine.
China’s once-secret naval aviation programappears to be underway at full steam. At its center isthe massive 67,000-ton former Ukrainian aircraftcarrier, which the Chinese government extractedfrom the Black Sea in 2001 after considerable costsin both treasure and political capital with Turkey.68
In March 2002, the Varyag finally completed its15,200-mile journey to its new home port ofDalian, where it was immediately placed underheavy security at the PLAN dry docks.69
China has reportedly negotiated a contract for 48Sukhoi-33 jet fighters, the carrier-based version ofthe Su-27, and is now preparing the Varyag’s flightdeck for flight operations.70 Reports in the PRCmedia indicate that China will also configure itsnew Jian-10 fighter for carrier operations.71
63. Nabi Abdullaev, “Russia Sends 4th Destroyer to China,” DefenseNews, October 9, 2006, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2152422 (April 27, 2007).
64. U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006,” pp. 4, 5, 26, and 48.
65. O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization,” p. 12.
66. “Junfang: Yao fazhan hangmu jiandui, zhuan jian zaiji, fushu jianting kuai wancheng, keneng xian zhuangbei Nanhai” (Military: China will develop aircraft carrier group, sources say carrier-based planes and escort ships almost complete, will probably first deploy in South China Sea), Shijie Ribao, March 10, 2006, at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq_id=1323694 (April 27, 2007).
67. “Zhongguo Hangmu 2010 nian qian zhicheng; Renda Jiefangjun daibiaotuan zhongjiang: Zhongguo you quanli, you shili, taguo wu quan guowen” (China will complete construction of aircraft carrier by 2010; lieutenant general in People’s Con-gress PLA delegation: China has the right, and the power, and other nations have no right to question it), Shijie Ribao, March 7, 2007, p. A4, at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq_id=1497958 (April 27, 2007).
68. John Ward Anderson, “Turks Keep Ship Going Round in Circles; It’s No Longer a Carrier, Not Yet a Casino,” The Washington Post, July 22, 2001, p. A18.
69. Ruan Leyi, “Wayagehao mujian hu yanmi” (Varyag carrier under heavy security), Zhongguo Shibao, May 13, 2002, and Ruan Leyi, “Zhonggong gouru wei wangong Ezhi hangmu rinei tongguo Taiwan dongbu” (Unfinished Russian-built aircraft car-rier purchased will transit east of Taiwan in next few days), Zhongguo Shibao, February 19, 2002.
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The PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) schedule appar-ently envisions developing a carrier air wing by thetime China launches its own aircraft carrier,72
despite official Beijing’s continuing protestationsthat while “China already is capable of building anaircraft carrier, a final decision on construction hasnot yet been made.”73
Amphibious Landing Vessels. A carrier force isonly half of the naval power projection formula.The ability to land a significant ground force on adistant shore is the other half. In 2003–2005,China built three new classes of landing craft,including 19 amphibious ships and 10 amphibiouslanding craft.74 On December 20, 2006, Chinalaunched the PLAN’s largest combat amphibiousassault ship, an indigenously designed amphibiouslanding dock (LPD) identified as the Type 071,which is similar to but a little bigger than the U.S.Whidbey Island-class LPD.75 Designed in the 10thfive-year plan (2001–2005), the ship was built inabout six months in the second half of 2006 andappears to be the first of four LPDs. The Type 071appears to be designed to land 500–800 troops and25–50 armored vehicles and supplies using 15landing craft or several large hovercraft. It will carryat least two Changhe Z-8 helicopters, each capableof transporting 30 soldiers inland beyond thebeachhead.
The prospect of being able to assemble a signifi-cant show of military and naval force during somefuture instances of anti-Chinese upheavals inSoutheast Asia or the Pacific islands rather thanchartering evacuation flights is no doubt attractivein the Politburo. One or two instances of Chinesemilitary intervention in regional Asia–Pacific unrest,with an aircraft carrier and a few LPDs carrying abrigade or more of PLA special forces troops, wouldestablish China as the preeminent Asian power anddemonstrate its readiness to defend Chinese émi-grés in any country in Asia. As President Huexhorted the PLAN in December 2006, “China is agreat maritime nation; in the defense of nationalsovereignty and security, and protecting our nation’smaritime rights, the navy’s role is important and itsmission is glorious.”76
Air Forces. Although the modernization of thePLA Air Force has taken a backseat to nuclear,space, and naval development, the PLAAF is amuch more modern fighting force in 2007 than itwas in 1997. It now boasts about 450 advancedfighter aircraft, including about 300 Russian-designed fourth-generation Su-27 Flankers andChinese Jian-11s and 76 Su-30MKK fighter-bomb-ers, which display substantial ground attack capa-bilities and are armed with Russia’s most advancedair-to-air missiles.77
70. “China to Buy Su-33 Carrier-Based Fighters from Russia?” Defense Industry Daily, November 17, 2006, at www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2006/11/china-to-buy-su33-carrierbased-fighters-from-russia/index.php (April 27, 2007).
71. Ruan Leyi, “Zhonggong yi neng dazao hangmu, xiang wei dingan poban” (PRC now capable of building carrier; decision not final), Zhongguo Shibao, January 10, 2007. For a comprehensive look at China’s aircraft carrier program as of 2002, see Rich-ard D. Fisher, Jr., “China’s Carrier of Chance,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 2, Issue 6 (March 14, 2002), at www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=18&issue_id=646&article_id=4621 (April 27, 2007).
72. The official media in China appear to be encouraging Chinese readers to believe that China is, in fact, moving toward deployment of a carrier fleet. For a series of images in a blog on a People’s Daily Web site, see “Haiwai kan Zhongguo: Zhong-guo goumaide Su-33 ji jiang zai hangmushang shifei” (How China is seen abroad—China buys Russian Su-33 fighters for carrier test), Qiangguo Shequ (powerful nation community), December 29, 2006, at military.people.com.cn/GB/42969/58519/5228125.html (April 27, 2007).
73. Ruan Leyi, “Yao bu yao hangmu, qu jueyu zhanlue xuyao” (An aircraft carrier or not—depends on strategic demand), Zhong-guo Shibao, January 10, 2007.
74. O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization,” p. 15.
75. Richard Fisher, Jr., “China’s New Large Amphibious Assault Ship,” International Strategy and Assessment Center, January 8, 2007, at www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.136/pub_detail.asp (April 27, 2007).
76. Cao Zhi and Chen Wanjun, “Hu Jintao zai huijian Haijun di shice dangdaihui daibiao shi qiangdiao.”
77. Kevin Lanzit, “PLAAF Transformation—a Midpoint Review,” paper presented at conference, “Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organizations,” Carlisle Barracks, Pa., October 6–8, 2006, p. 4.
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In January 2007, the PLAAF unveiled its newJian-10 multirole fighter jet, which is based on theIsraeli Lavi airframe, itself an evolutionary offshootof the F-16. As of March 2007, the PLAAF hadreportedly deployed 60 Jian-10s, with the total pro-duction run estimated at around 250.78 Althoughits forward-wing canards are a novelty among Chi-nese-designed fighters, the Jian-10’s most remark-able characteristic is its midair refueling module.79
The PLAAF has been practicing in-flight refuelingsince at least 2005 with both Su-27 and older Jian-8 fighters.80 Following Peace Mission 2005, a jointChinese–Russian military exercise on China’s Shan-dong peninsula, China contracted for six to 10 Illy-ushin-78s configured as aerial refueling platformsand 30 Illyushin-76 cargo aircraft configured forparatroop drops.81
The increasing size of China’s fourth-generationfighter fleet,82 which is heavily armed with the lat-est Russian and Chinese air-to-air missiles andequipped with fire control systems and refuelingmodules, gives the PLAAF a technological andnumerical edge in the Taiwan Strait. The Pentagonestimates that China has deployed more than 700fighters in the Taiwan Strait theater.83
On the other side of the strait, Taiwan hasroughly 320 fourth-generation fighters: 56 Mirage-2000-5s, 146 F-16s, and 128 Taiwanese-designedChing-kuo fighters. Furthermore, Taiwan has only120 AIM-120 missiles for its 146 F-16s—less thanone per F-16. One U.S. official privately com-mented, “if they want to bring down a second Chi-nese Su-27, they have to crash into it.”84 Of course,this assumes that the PLA’s Su-27 fighters or itsSA-10, SA-20, or Russian S-300PMU2 missiles donot shoot them down first.85
The goal of the PLAAF’s buildup is quite transpar-ent. According to the 2006 Defense White Paper, thePLAAF “aims at speeding up its transition from ter-ritorial air defense to both offensive and defensiveoperations, and increasing its capabilities in the areasof air strike, air and missile defense, early warningand reconnaissance, and strategic projection.”86
Ground Forces. China’s standing army of 1.64million men is the largest in the world and is nowundergoing a comprehensive modernization. Hop-ing to persuade the outside world that downsizingthe PLA’s ground forces is a key component ofChina’s military modernization, Beijing’s 2006Defense White Paper makes much of the demobili-
78. See Phillip C. Saunders and Erik Quam, “Future Force Structure of the Chinese Air Force,” paper presented at conference, “Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military,” p. 8. Some estimates of the production run are as high as 300. Taiwan’s defense ministry apparently believes it will be capped at 120. Agence France-Presse, “China Looks to New Fighters, Spark-ing Regional Arms Race: Report,” DefenseNews, January 31, 2007, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2521412 (April 27, 2007); Rich Chang, “China Deploys Advanced Fighters,” Taipei Times, January 22, 2007, p. 1, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/01/22/2003345791 (April 27, 2007); and Chua Chin Hon, “China Unveils New Fighter Jet Amid Fanfare,” Straits Times, January 5, 2007, at www.taiwansecurity.org/ST/2007/ST-050107.htm (April 27, 2007).
79. Wendell Minnick, “China Fields Indigenous J-10 Fighter Aircraft,” DefenseNews, January 6, 2007, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2460838 (April 27, 2007).
80. “Kongzhong jiayou, Jiefangjun zuodao; yanchang zhandouji daikong shijian; zengqiang yuancheng gongji nengli” (PLA achieves midair fueling, prolongs fighter loiter time, strengthens long-distance attack capabilities), Shijie Ribao, April 24, 2005.
81. “Junyan jieshu, jungou kaishi, Zhonggong xiading, caigou yunshuji jiayouji” (After China–Russia military exercise, arms buys begin, PRC contracts purchase of cargo and refueling aircraft), Zhongguo Shibao, August 29, 2005.
82. Chinese journals refer to the Su-27 and Jian-10 as “third generation” fighters.
83. U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006,” p. 4.
84. Private conversation with U.S. official. A Taiwan request for over 400 new AIM-120 air-to-air missiles and Maverick air-to-ground missiles was approved by the Pentagon on March 1, 2007. News release, “Taipei Economic and Cultural Represen-tative Office in the United States—AMRAAM and Maverick Missiles,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, February 28, 2007, at www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Taiwan_07-10.pdf (April 27, 2007).
85. For a depiction of the “notional coverage provided by China’s SA-10, SA-20 SAM systems, as well as the soon-to-be acquired S-300PMU2,” see U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005,” p. 32, Figure 8.
86. See Chinese State Council, China’s National Defense in 2006, chap. IV.
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zation of over 200,000 PLA troops between 2003and 2005, reducing the regular army from 1.84 mil-lion men to 1.64 million.87 However, the demobili-zation’s main effect appears to have been to movethe downsized troops out of PLA roles and to reas-sign them to provincial militias and reserve units orto change their status to non–active-duty contractpersonnel (feixianyi renyuan and wenzhi renyuan),whose salaries are not part of the published nationalmilitary budget.88
However, China is not neglecting its groundforces in favor of nuclear, naval, and air services.The sole thrust of ground troop reductions is toconstruct a more effective fighting force.89
While PLA ground force modernization includesimportant organizational, training, doctrinal, andlogistical reforms, it would be of little use withoutsignificant equipment upgrades. For example, thePLA’s workhorse Type 96 main battle tank is gradu-ally being replaced by the Type 98, which arguablyoutclasses its U.S. counterpart, the M-1A2Abrams.90 The PLA is also being outfitted with theType-63A, a new amphibious light tank describedas “the most heavily armed amphibious tank in theworld.” PLA Amphibious Army and PLAN Marineunits have received 400 to 600 Type-63As.91
The equipment modernization also includes newRussian and Chinese helicopters, unmanned aerialvehicles, self-propelled guns, mobile surface-to-air
missiles and launchers, multiple rocker launchers,small all-terrain vehicles for special operationsforces, and a panoply of new small arms. In addition,the PLA is developing a new class of amphibiousassault hovercraft, which appears designed to carry60 to 75 tons of cargo or one main battle tank.92
Cyberwarfare Forces. Perhaps the most promi-nent buzzword in China’s 2006 Defense WhitePaper is “informationization” (xinxihua). The PLAground forces organized their first cyberwarfareunits (zixunhua budui) in early 2003.93 They havesince become a highly active element in China’sground force organization, no doubt building onthe expertise developed in the late 1990s by China’spolice and state security services, which are wellequipped and well trained in using the Internet andcell phone networks to monitor, identify, locate, andcensor cyberdissidents. New PLA doctrine indicatesthat computer network operations (CNO) are nowseen as a force multiplier in any confrontation94
with the United States and other potential adversar-ies, including Taiwan, Japan, South Korea,95 andeven the United Kingdom.
Since then, PLA cyber units seem to have beenactive and to have become highly sophisticated.They apparently are the only PLA units that regularlyattack enemy targets in the course of their duties.
On November 1, 2004, according to Time mag-azine, PLA cyberwarfare troops “sat down at com-
87. The 2006 Defense White Paper says that the PLA numbers 2.3 million, but this apparently includes the 660,000 in the Peo-ple’s Armed Police (wuzhuang jingcha). U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006 Report to Congress, November 2006, p. 134, at www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2006/annual_report_full_06.pdf (April 29, 2007).
88. Blasko, “PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway.”
89. See Chinese State Council, China’s National Defense in 2006, chap. IV.
90. The Type-98 is protected by reactive armor and armed with a fully stabilized 125-mm 50-calibre smoothbore gun with auto-loader and is controlled by a laser rangefinder, wind sensor, ballistic computer, and thermal barrel sleeve. Dual-axis stabili-zation ensures precise targeting and firing on the move. The Type 98’s 125-mm cannon can fire a Russian A-11 laser-guided anti-tank missile (ATGM). Both the commander and gunner have roof-mounted stabilized sights with daylight and infrared channels. The gun system reportedly outclasses the Abrams. See Jane’s Armour and Artillery Yearbook.
91. See Fisher, “China’s New Large Amphibious Assault Ship.” Blasko suggests that only 400 have been deployed. Blasko, “PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway.”
92. Fisher, “China’s New Large Amphibious Assault Ship.”
93. Zhou Ye, “Jiefangjun Zixunhua budui jinnian chengjun” (PLA cyberwarfare units deployed this year), Zhongguo Shibao, March 15, 2003.
94. For an overview of China’s cyberwar strategies, see James C. Mulvenon, Ph.D., “Chinese Information Operations Strategies in a Taiwan Contingency,” testimony before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Commission, September 15, 2005, at www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_09_15wrts/mulvenon_james.php (April 29, 2007).
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puters in southern China and set off once again ontheir daily hunt for U.S. secrets.” Pentagon com-puter security sleuths had monitored their opera-tions since 2003, when the unit began their attackson U.S. government networks, part of an informa-tion operation that U.S. investigators have code-named Titan Rain. Using a simple but elegantlymodified scanner program, Titan Rain hackersidentified network vulnerabilities in scores of Pen-tagon systems, including critically important com-puters at the U.S. Army Information SystemsEngineering Command at Fort Huachuca, Arizona;the Defense Information Systems Agency in Arling-ton, Virginia; the Naval Ocean Systems Center inSan Diego, California; and the Army Space andStrategic Defense Command in Huntsville, Ala-bama.96 The attacks were traced to a network inChina’s Guangdong province, and according to oneexpert, the software and hacking techniques iden-tified it as a professional military operation. Thehackers “were in and out with no keystroke errorsand left no fingerprints, and created a backdoor inless than 30 minutes. How can this be done by any-one other than a military organization?”97
Throughout December 2005, British Parliamentoffices in London were surreptitiously penetrated,also from computers using the Guangdong ISP net-work. Britain’s National Infrastructure SecurityCoordination Center investigators told reporters,“These were not normal hackers…. The degree of
sophistication was extremely high. They were veryclever programmers.” The Chinese hackerssearched files in offices of the British governmentdealing with human rights issues—“a very odd tar-get,” noted one U.K. security official,98 unless thehackers had been tasked by the Chinese govern-ment. The attacks on British parliamentary officeswere well funded and well organized. The hackersused highly sophisticated software and had authori-zation to develop Web sites in China to which infor-mation was directed by e-mails. A British networksecurity expert observed, “it costs money to be ableto mount an operation of this complexity.”99
The U.K. attacks involved Trojan e-mails specifi-cally targeted on unique victims. “One email was tar-geted at one company in aviation. It was a MicrosoftWord document that had a Math/cad component. Ifyou did not have math/cad on your computer itwould not open,” said one expert. “The point was tofind documents that had been written in that partic-ular program and then send them back.”100 PLAcyber penetrations of Japanese organizations usedMicrosoft zero-day vulnerabilities.101
The PLA cyberwarfare units almost certainly dis-covered these software and hardware vulnerabilitiesin key global operating systems and business pro-grams when they gained full access to Microsoftsource codes via the Chinese State Planning Com-mission (SPC). The SPC signed a memorandumwith Microsoft in June 2002 in which Chinese gov-
95. See Dow Jones Newswires, “Taiwan Military—China Cyber War More Likely Than Invasion,” December 14, 2004; “Chinese Hacker May Be PLA,” Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 2004; “NK Hands Suspected in Cyberattacks,” Korea Times, July 15, 2004; and CNET News.com, “Flaw in Microsoft Word Used in Computer Attack,” The New York Times, May 20, 2006, at www.nytimes.com/2006/05/20/technology/20zero.html (April 29, 2007).
96. Nathan Thornburgh, “Inside the Chinese Hack Attack; How a Ring of Hackers, Codenamed Titan Rain by Investigators, Probed U.S. Government Computers,” Time, August 25, 2005, at www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,1098371,00.html (April 29, 2007).
97. Allan Paller, Director, SANS Institute Research, quoted in Bill Brenner, “Titan Rain Shows Need for Better Training,” SearchSecurity.com, December 13, 2005, at http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid14_gci1151715,00.html (April 29, 2007). See also Bradley Graham, “Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites; U.S. Agencies’ Networks Are Among Targets,” The Washington Post, August 25, 2005, p. A1, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/24/AR2005082402318.html (April 29, 2007).
98. Peter Warren, “Smash and Grab, the Hi-Tech Way,” The Guardian, January 19, 2006, at http://technology.guardian.co.uk/weekly/story/0,,1689093,00.html (April 29, 2007).
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. CNET News.com, “Flaw in Microsoft Word Used in Computer Attack.”
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ernment access to source codes was a condition ofMicrosoft’s future investments in China.102
One British academic has pointed out:
Hacking in China carries the death penalty….You also have to sign on with the police if youwant to use the internet. And then there is theGreat Firewall of China, which lets very littlethrough—and lets [the Chinese government]know exactly what is happening.103
Consequently, there is little doubt that thesecyberattacks were part of a deliberate Chinese gov-ernment-sanctioned campaign.
While the Pentagon managed to shore up itscyber defenses after the 2004 attacks, other U.S.government agencies remained lackadaisical.104 In2006, at least four separate U.S. government com-puter networks were covertly attacked by Chinesecyber forces. Sometime in the spring of 2006, com-puters at the U.S. Department of State were shutdown when it was discovered that Chinese hackershad installed software backdoors in the depart-ment’s unclassified networks and were siphoningsensitive data from computers in offices dealingwith China and North Korea.105 Under congres-sional pressure, the State Department discontinuedpurchases of computers from Lenovo, a Chinesefirm that acquired IBM’s personal computer divisionin 2005.106
In July 2006, overseas hackers operating fromChinese Internet servers penetrated computers inthe Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the office
in the U.S. Department of Commerce that managesexport licensing of military-use products and infor-mation. “Through established security procedures,BIS discovered a targeted effort to gain access to BISuser accounts,” according to a Commerce Depart-ment spokesman. Commerce officials admitted pri-vately that Chinese hackers had implanted covert“rootkit” programs in the computers to mask theirpresence and to obtain privileged access to the com-puter system. When the damage was assessed, theagency’s information security officers determinedthat they could not salvage the workstations andinstead spent several million dollars building anentirely new system with clean hardware and cleansoftware.107
In mid-November, computer security officialsdetermined that Chinese hackers had penetratedthe computer network at the Naval War College inRhode Island. Retired Air Force Major GeneralRichard Goetze, a professor at the Naval War Col-lege, said the Chinese took down the entire NavalWar College computer network, an operation thatprompted the U.S. Strategic Command to raise thesecurity alert level for the Pentagon’s 12,000 com-puter networks and 5 million computers. Onereport hinted that the Chinese cyberwarriors mayhave been targeting the college’s Strategic StudiesGroup, which had begun developing concepts forwaging cyberwarfare.108
At about the same time, in November–December2006, the computers at the National Defense Uni-versity in Washington, D.C., were also attacked.
102. Lian Junwei, “Weiruan chengnuo yu Zhonggong xiang yuanshima” (Microsoft commits to giving source codes to PRC), Gongshang Shibao, July 18, 2002.
103. Warren, “Smash and Grab, the Hi-Tech Way.”
104. Dawn S. Onley and Patience Wait, “Red Storm Rising; DOD’s Efforts to Stave Off Nation-State Cyberattacks Begin with China,” Government Computer News, August 21, 2006, at www.gcn.com/print/25_25/41716-1.html (April 29, 2007).
105. Ted Bridis, “State Dept. Suffers Computer Break-Ins,” Associated Press, July 11, 2006.
106. Agence France-Presse, “U.S. pulls Lenovo PCs from State Department,” The Washington Times, May 19, 2006, at www.wash-ingtontimes.com/world/20060518-104316-9737r.htm (April 29, 2007), and Associated Press, “U.S. to Restrict Use of Com-puters from Lenovo,” The New York Times, May 20, 2006, p. C9, at www.nytimes.com/2006/05/20/business/20computer.html (April 29, 2007).
107. Alan Sipress, “Computer System Under Attack; Commerce Department Targeted; Hackers Traced to China,” The Washing-ton Post, October 6, 2006, p. A21, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/05/AR2006100501781.html (April 29, 2007).
108. Bill Gertz, “Chinese Hackers Prompt Navy College Site Closure,” The Washington Times, November 30, 2006, p. A11, at www.washingtontimes.com/national/20061130-103049-5042r.htm (April 29, 2007).
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The NDU attack was not publicized, but it was well-known among academic circles that NDU’s e-mailaccounts had been shut down for weeks while thepenetrated systems were replaced.
No one should be comforted by the fact thatsome Chinese cyberattacks have been identified.While PLA cyberwarfare units devoutly wish toavoid detection, they also seek to give a false senseof security that all network penetrations can bedetected. One expert told a conference of federalinformation managers early this year that “The Chi-nese are in half of your agencies’ systems.”109 U.S.Defense Department sources say privately that thelevel of Chinese cyberattacks obliges them to avoidChinese-origin hardware and software in all classi-fied systems and as many unclassified systems as isfiscally possible. Moreover, the already seriousthreat of Chinese cyber penetration of U.S. defensenetworks will only be magnified as the Pentagonloses more and more of its domestic sources oftrusted and classified microchips.
A report published in February 2005 warns that“a significant migration of critical microelectronicsmanufacturing from the United States to other for-eign countries has [occurred] and will continue tooccur.” The strategic significance of this phenome-non cannot be overstated because this technology isthe foundation of America’s ability to maintain atechnological advantage in the military, govern-ment, commercial, and industrial sectors. Indeed,microelectronics supplies for defense, nationalinfrastructure, and intelligence applications are nowin peril.110
This is a critical national security issue becauseAmerica’s defense-critical electronics demand trustedand classified microchips. The “confidence that classi-fied or mission critical information contained in chipdesigns is not compromised, reliability is not de-graded, or unintended design elements were not in-serted in chips as a result of design or fabrication inconditions open to adversary agents” simply does notexist in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) microchipsmanufactured overseas. As the February 2005 reportexplained, that “trust cannot be added to integratedcircuits after fabrication; electrical testing and reverseengineering cannot be relied upon to detect undesiredalterations in military integrated circuits.”111
Increasingly, China is the source of COTS micro-chips, and Chinese foundries and design shops havehad direct network access to foundries in othercountries, particularly Taiwan—a fact that has be-come a source of alarm for Taiwan’s intelligenceagencies.112 Chinese government pressure is nowinducing Intel to propose construction of a $2.5 bil-lion semiconductor wafer fabrication plant in Dalian,China,113 despite the fact “that manufacturing costsin China are only ten percent lower than in theUnited States while manufacturing costs in Taiwanare seven percent lower—almost all…accounted forby labor costs.” These data, according to the Semi-conductor Industry Association, “[do] not supportthe hypothesis that…the current migration to Chinais due to lower construction and operating costs….[Chinese] Government policies are driving this.”114
The U.S. government is very reticent about thevulnerabilities of its databases to Chinese penetra-
109. Mark A Kellner, “China a ‘Latent Threat, Potential Enemy’: Expert,” DefenseNews, December 4, 2006, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2389588 (April 29, 2007).
110. Defense Science Board Task Force, High Performance Microchip Supply, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February 2005, p. 1, at www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-02-HPMS_Report_Final.pdf (January 4, 2007).
111. Ibid., p. 17.
112. Jimmy Chuang, “Ex-TSMC Employee Suspected of Selling Secrets to Shanghai,” Taipei Times, March 7, 2002, p. 1, at www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/03/07/story/0000126662 (April 29, 2007). See also Stephanie Low, “Government Drafts Law to Fight High-Tech Espionage,” Taipei Times, March 31, 2002, p. 1, at www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/03/31/story/0000129898 (April 29, 2007), and Dan Nystedt, “Top Secret Report Sets Off Alarms in the Tech Sector,” Taipei Times, July 4, 2001, p. 17, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2001/07/04/92739 (April 29, 2007).
113. Jason Dean and Don Clark, “China Clears Intel Chip Plant, Marking a Potential Milestone,” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2007, p. A4.
114. Defense Science Board Task Force, High Performance Microchip Supply, p. 30 (emphasis added).
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tion, but an example of how widespread Chinesecyberattacks have become surfaced in spring2006, when a certain foreign “coast guard agency”discovered a covert program imbedded in its net-work that systematically searched for shippingschedules and then forwarded them to an e-mailaddress in China.115 There is every likelihood thatChinese PLA cyberwarfare units have already pen-etrated the Pentagon’s unclassified NIPRNET(Unclassified but Sensitive Internet ProtocolRouter Network) and have designed software todisable it in time of conflict or confrontation.116
PLA cyberwarfare units’ access to source codes forAmerica’s ubiquitous office software means thatthey have a skeleton key to any networked gov-ernment, military, business, or private computerin America.
Geostrategic Implications of China’s Military Expansion
One might accept that China is simply a greatnation that requires a great navy, but what doesBeijing’s leadership intend for such a large andincreasingly well-equipped ground force? Theobvious answer lies in the 2006 Defense WhitePaper, which declares that the PLA’s mission is“defending against violation of China’s territorialsea and air space, and borders; opposing and con-taining the separatist forces for ‘Taiwan indepen-dence’ and their activities.”117
Aside from assembling an invasion force to “lib-erate” Taiwan, China has other borders and territo-
rial seas to defend. China’s landmass is vast, and itspopulation is the world’s largest. China shares landborders with 14 nations, but none of them is in aposition to challenge China on land. Even Russia,with a population of 6 million east of the UralMountains, is no match for the 120 million Chinesewho live in Manchuria alone. Indeed, many Rus-sians believe that, economically at least, China hasalready taken over the Russian Far East.118
China’s still unrequited claims on Asian main-land irredenta include the recent assertion that “thewhole of what [India] calls the state of ArunachalPradesh is Chinese territory and Tawang (district) isonly one place in it and we are claiming all ofthat.”119 New Delhi downplayed the remarks pub-licly, but Indian officials are concerned that Beijingwill continue to press its claims on the Tawang dis-trict, where the sixth Dalai Lama was born, as a wayto tighten its hold on Tibet. Beijing has similar ter-ritorial concerns with Bhutan. Moreover, Kazakh-stan and Mongolia would surely pay more heed toChina’s desires if they were backed up by a modernPLA, China’s army already seems strong enough tointercede in the event of a North Korean collapse toprevent unification of the peninsula,120 and a sig-nificant Chinese amphibious infantry force wouldhave a similar effect on the nations of Southeast Asiaand the Pacific.
The geopolitical impact in Eurasia of an over-whelmingly massive Chinese army would be one ofintense intimidation throughout the region, andBeijing no doubt wants to keep its neighbors calm,
115. John Markoff, “Attack of the Zombie Computers Is Growing Threat, Experts Say,” The New York Times, January 7, 2007, at www.nytimes.com/2007/01/07/technology/07net.html (April 29, 2007).
116. Mulvenon, “Chinese Information Operations Strategies in a Taiwan Contingency.”
117. Chinese State Council, China’s National Defense in 2006, chap. 2.
118. For a colorful discussion of China’s impact on the Russian Far East, see Burt Herman, “Chinese Presence Grows in Russian Far East,” Associated Press, August 24, 2005. See also “Zhongguo yimin daju zhuanru, Eguo fangdu; Mosike nian sunshi 71.9 yi meiyuan; jiang tuichu xilie zhendui cuoshi, shi jushi zhengchanghua” (Russia seeks to stem flood of Chinese immi-grants, Moscow loses US$7.19 billion each year, will take measures to address this problem and normalize this trend), Shijie Ribao, March 17, 2006, at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq_id=1327123 (April 29, 2007).
119. “PRC Ambassador to India Claims ‘Whole of Arunachal Pradesh Is Chinese Territory,’” CNN–IBN News (India), November 13, 2006, at www.ibnlive.com/news/arunachal-is-chinese-territory-envoy-minces-no-words/26108-3.html (April 29, 2007).
120. For an expanded look at this issue, see John J. Tkacik, Jr., “How the PLA Sees North Korea,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., Shaping China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), pp. 139–172, at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub709.pdf (April 29, 2007).
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at least until it can develop a modernized navy andair force that would discourage U.S. intervention.
Thus, while China’s strategic, space, and navalmodernization is doubtless targeted at the UnitedStates and Japan, and as its expanding fighter fleetanticipates a Taiwan Strait contingency, China’sground force modernization looks beyond possiblyinvading and occupying Taiwan to establishingChinese military predominance on the Eurasianlandmass.
What the Administration and Congress Should Do
The perception in Asia is that the top levels ofthe Bush Administration have no strategic visionfor Asia in general and are not concerned aboutChina’s spreading influence in particular and thatwhatever concern exists at working levels of thenational security bureaucracy is eclipsed by MiddleEast concerns.121
This perception should inform the Administra-tion’s and Congress’s management of the gatheringsecurity challenge posed by China’s emergence as arival superpower in the 21st century. Any effectiveAmerican response will require a new partnershipwith democratic Asia and an attitude change inWashington.
Three strategic goals are essential elements of aneffective U.S. policy toward China:
• The United States must have a vision for theAsia–Pacific Region that is based on the follow-ing principles: (1) The U.S. definitely has a posi-tion on differences between despotism andfreedom; (2) the U.S. has a stake in the survivaland success of Asian democracy; and (3) the U.S.will ensure that Asia’s democracies are notcoerced into acceding to Chinese demands orsubservient relationships with China.
• As the preeminent global maritime power, theUnited States cannot permit the rise of a newhostile naval power on mainland Asia to com-promise America’s “Island Asia” lifelines tothe Pacific.
• As a matter of national security, the UnitedStates must maintain its military technologi-cal supremacy, not just in traditional battlespaces, but also in outer space and cyberspace.
With these goals in mind, an effective set of pol-icies that are structured to manage China’s expand-ing strategic footprint in Asia must include thefollowing elements:
• Coherence and consistency in the interagencyand intra-agency implementation of policies.Each Cabinet department and agency shouldhave an office devoted to China issues, initia-tives, and coordination. In national securityagencies, each bureau should have a Chinaofficer who is responsible for monitoring China-related issues on a full-time basis and briefing thebureau’s principals and the East Asia/PacificBureau on them.
• A heightened policy commitment to protect-ing defense-critical technologies, equipment,software, and intellectual property.
• A revitalized presence in the Asia–Pacific andSouth Asia regions. The United States must notonly be committed to maintaining stability andbalance in the region, but must also be seen ashaving such a commitment. This requires thattop American officials engage key Asian group-ings and fora, including the ASEAN heads ofstate, ASEAN ministerials, the ASEAN RegionalForum, and the Asia–Pacific Economic Coopera-tion (APEC) forum. On an ongoing basis, theU.S. should seek to preserve and strengthen U.S.security alliances in East Asia by expanding bi-
121. For an excellent summary of the problem, see Wendell Minnick, “China Rising: East Asia Braces as American Influence Fades,” DefenseNews, March 19, 2007, pp. 11–12, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2623660 (April 29, 2007). Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reportedly believes that, “distracted by problems elsewhere, the U.S. isn’t paying enough attention to Southeast Asia, losing its regional influence to a rising China and potentially weakening antiterror-ism cooperation.” Yaroslav Trofimov and Paul Beckett, “Singapore Prime Minister Urges U.S. to Bolster Its Ties in Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2007, p. A9, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117679618020172427.html (May 7, 2007; subscription required).
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lateral and multilateral strategic consultationsand joint military exercises with treaty allies andother U.S. partners.
• A renewed commitment to Asian allies andfriends. Sun Tzu advised that a most effectiveway of defeating an enemy is to “divide him fromhis allies,”122 and this is assuredly a top Chinesestrategic goal in Asia. Washington should there-fore be wary of Beijing’s stratagems to drivewedges between the U.S. and its partners. TheU.S. should resolutely support Japan againstChina’s territorial pretensions in the East ChinaSea and vigorously protest Beijing’s missile, air,and naval buildup against Taipei. China’s suc-cessful U.N. campaign for a PAROS regime isdriving a wedge between the U.S. and allies onspace policy. The U.S. needs to explain to itsfriends and allies that it views space as a matter ofthe highest national security priority.
• Reengagement with the Atlantic Commu-nity—the European Union and NATO allies—in a robust consultation and dialogue onshared strategic interests and basic values ofhuman dignity and freedom. Most NATOallies recognize that the proposed EU armssales to China would significantly harm Amer-ican and Japanese security interests in Asia, butonly the prospect of terminating or severelycurtailing defense industrial cooperation per-suaded others to maintain the EU armsembargo on China. European leaders were gen-uinely surprised at Washington’s reaction in2004–2005 to anticipated EU–China weaponssystems cooperation because the United Stateshad simply not engaged Europe in a dialogueon China and Asia.
• Encouragement of India as a participantin Eurasian geopolitical dynamics. The U.S.should encourage India’s continued involve-ment in the East Asian Summit, India’s securityconsultations with Japan and Australia, and adeepening engagement of New Delhi in a stra-tegic dialogue.
Managing the emerging Chinese military super-power will require:
• A U.S. naval and air presence sufficient tomaintain strategic supremacy in Asia. Forexample, the U.S. needs to expand its submarinefleet by building at least two boats per year, start-ing now. Given the high costs of nuclear subma-rines, the U.S. Navy may need to considerconventional submarine platforms for short mis-sions from forward bases, especially for anti-sub-marine warfare operations.
• Expansion of forward bases and facilities inthe Pacific, particularly Guam, and the allot-ment of resources needed for secure and uncom-promised military construction.
• Strengthened Japanese anti-submarine andanti-mine warfare capabilities in addition to itsballistic missile defense efforts. Japan will be themost reliable ally in the Western Pacific and musthave the confidence to stand with the UnitedStates as Chinese power grows. The geopoliticalsituation may also require making a next-gener-ation fighter, Aegis ships, ballistic missiledefense, and other equipment available to Japanand Australia as the United States finds its ownresources strained in the region.
• Expanded subsurface and ballistic missile–related sensors throughout the WesternPacific and littoral East Asia.
ConclusionThe Asian perception that the United States is a
Pacific power in decline may prove prescient, eventhough America’s leaders may not see themselvespresiding over America’s retreat. However, China isclearly emerging as the preeminent power in theAsia–Pacific region.
America could engage and strengthen the cur-rent robust trans-Pacific alignment, knitting thedemocracies of the Americas with their counter-parts along the Western Pacific Rim, or a disengagedAmerica could allow a Sino-centric axis to crystal-lize as ASEAN, Taiwan, Korea, and eventually
122. Or “disrupt his alliances” (fa jiao). Sunzi Bingfa III. 5. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 78.
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Japan, Australia, and South and Central Asia band-wagon with China. The latter would make Leninist-mercantilist China the rule-maker in Asia, not justfor transnational trade and financial structures, butalso for a new Asian security architecture and a newideology of authoritarian state-mercantilism thatdefends repressive “development models based onnational conditions.”
Over the next few years, the choices made inWashington, both in the White House and on Cap-
itol Hill, will be a bellwether to the capitals of dem-ocratic Asia for their own geopolitical decisions.How Washington manages the emerging Chinesesuperpower will determine not only the direction ofAsian democracy, but the prospects for global free-dom in the 21st century.
—John J. Tkacik, Jr., is Senior Research Fellow inChina, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Stud-ies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
