CHINA’S ONGOING MILITARIZATION of the SOUTH CHINA SEA

TLP GREEN

© 2019 Wapack Labs Corporation. All rights reserved.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

SERIAL: IR-19-122-001

COUNTRY: CN

REPORT DATE: 20190501

CHINA’S ONGOING MILITARIZATION of the SOUTH CHINA SEA

SUMMARY The People’s Republic of China has claimed the whole of the South

China Sea as its sovereign territory ever since coming to power in

1949. However, several other countries have historical claims over some of the islands, and the

Law of the Sea Treaty gives several of these countries rights to

economic zones that overlap with Chinese claims. This has led to conflict between China and the

United States, which supports the claims of its allies to parts of the

South China Sea under international law.

Since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has embarked on a major

campaign to solidify China’s claims by building a network of military bases on what had been minor rock outcroppings and submerged reefs. Dredging operations have added an estimated 3,200 acres of land area to a total of 27

locations that China is developing as military bases. Four of these locations—Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef in the Spratlys (see Figure 1.)

plus Woody Island in the Paracels—now have 10,000-foot runways, hangars for combat aircraft, radar installations, plus military barracks and military administrative complexes. The Chinese have deployed jet fighters and

surface-to-air missile systems to these bases, and deployments of anti-ship missiles have also been reported.

The US has pushed back on Chinese claims by carrying out Freedom of

Navigations Operations, sailing US Navy combat ships within 12 miles of these island bases to demonstrate that Chinese claims of sovereignty are not recognized. China has strongly reemphasized their claims and occasionally

conducted hazardous naval maneuvers within yards of US Navy ships in this area. This situation has now made the South China Sea perhaps the most

likely flashpoint for armed conflict between China and the US.

Figure 1. Overlapping claims to regions of

the South China Sea (UNCLOS)

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BACKGROUND

The Chinese have good reasons to want to have control over the South China Sea. First and foremost, about 80 percent of Chinese oil imports pass though this region. About one third of all global maritime shipping goes through the

South China Sea. It is the maritime region that leads to the Malacca Straits and then the Indian Ocean, and so is a critical node in China’s connection to

Europe and the Middle East. The South China Sea is believed to

hold significant oil reserves. Although very little oil drilling has

been done so far, China’s Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining has estimated that the region’s reserves

could be more than 17 billion tons, which would make it a larger reserve

than Kuwait holds.1 Other estimates place proven oil

reserves in the South China Sea at only about 1.1 billion tons, with

analysts suggesting that oil exploration plans are intended more on marking territory ownership

rather than actually extracting oil.2 US estimates for natural gas

reserves also vary widely, with some analysis ranging as high as 500

trillion cubic feet, but it is mostly near the Reed Bank, not a location where the Chinese have attempted

to exert control.3

The South China Sea accounts for about 12 percent of worldwide fishing catches, with an estimated worth of about $20 billion.4 This makes it an

important resource not only for China but for the other countries that border this body of water: Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

The fact that several countries border this region means there have been overlapping historical claims to the islands and the water resources here.

Several islands are claimed by multiple states, and issues of sovereignty in the

1 sites.imsa.edu/acronym/2012/09/12/south-china-sea-island-dispute-what-it-means-for-the- us. 2 www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-oil.htm. 3 www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.php?RegionTopicID=SCS. 4 theconversation.com/fishing-not-oil-is-at-the-heart-of-the-south-china-sea-dispute-63580.

Figure 2. Nine-Dash Line map published

on Chinese government website

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modern age are complex. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea signed in 1982 was created to resolve sovereignty issues. It established the concept of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), which grant sovereign rights to a coastal state over the natural resources out to a distance of 200 miles

from the coastline (see Figure 1.).

China however, claims the whole of the South China Sea, and they point to “historical precedent” for their claim. In short, Japan controlled all of these islands and the surrounding seas during World War II. After the war, the

Chinese Nationalist government issued a claim using a map with an eleven-dashed line that covered the whole of this maritime region. The Japanese

ultimately renounced its claims in the South China Sea, but no beneficiary was designated. After the communist takeover in 1949, the PRC cited the Nationalist claim as their “precedent” for “indisputable sovereignty” over all of

the South China Sea.5 They now use a slightly simplified nine-dash line, such as the one in the map in Figure 2. that accompanied an official statement of

the claim posted in 2016.6 The Philippines took China to the international Court of Arbitration in The

Hague regarding China’s claim of historical precedent for their sovereignty over the entire South China Sea. In 2016, the Court found that, “there was no legal

basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line.’”7 China has rejected this decision and claimed that the Court of Arbitration had no jurisdiction over this dispute.

BUILDING FOR CONTROL

China has sought for years to strengthen its claims to locations in

the Paracel and Spratly Island Groups through naval patrols and the deployment of troops to occupy

marginal island locations, often little more than barren rocks.

While the Chinese have been claiming control over the entire Paracel Islands

group, the PRC really only had control over five rocks that were still above

the surface at high tide.8 The early days of Chinese claims over these

5 www.eurasiareview.com/22082012-uncertainty-and-insecurity-generated-by-claimants-in- south-china-sea-oped. 6 www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-07/12/content_5090628.htm.jpg. 7 pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-

English.pdf. 8 www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN - 20160712 - Award.pdf.

Figure 3. Early PLA image of troops

guarding a rock outcropping in the

South China Sea

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islands were accompanied by images of the PLA defending “their” territory,

such as that in Figure 3. However, since Xi Jinping became China’s president in 2013, China has

embarked on a major construction program to reclaim land and build out their positions on several of its claimed holdings in the South China Sea. The result

has been that by 2017 they were no longer clinging to isolated rock outcroppings but have built permanent and significant new islands where, in many cases, they have established military bases.

China has at least 20 outposts in the Paracels and another 7 in the Spratlys.9

Including Woody Island in the Paracels, China now has four islands with full-size runways and air base facilities. In most cases these facilities include radomes, communication facilities, lighthouses, and multi-story admin

buildings and barracks. These bases have been visited by a variety of Chinese naval vessels including Jiangdao class and Jiangwei II class missile frigates,

transportation ships, and an amphibious transport dock.10 The deployment of fighter aircraft to some of these was noted in 2016-17.11 12

Images showing the current state of the principal Chinese-occupied locations are given below. In many cases, these images are from the comprehensive

website of The Center for Strategic & International Studies devoted to, among other things, documenting the Chinese build-up in the South China Sea. The CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI, amti.csis.org) has posted

images and analyzed of all the locations that China has been building out since 2013, tracking them at least up to 2017. Other images shown below are more

recent coverage from Google Earth/Digital Globe.

FIERY CROSS REEF Figure 4. below shows AMTI images of Fiery Cross Reef posted on Chinese social media, contrasting the

original appearance of the largely submerged reef with its

appearance after Chinese construction. This development is the result of extensive

dredging and deposit of sand into the built-up area. The Chinese

took possession of this reef in 1988, but dredging operations did

not

9 www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea. 10 www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea. 11 www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/2186449/explained-south-china-sea-dispute. 12 www.inquirer.net/specials/exclusive-china-militarization-south-china-sea.

Figure 4. Images of Fiery Cross Reef posted on Chinese social media, showing

original reef appearance (2013) and after dredging and construction (2016)

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start until 2014. The runway was completed in 2015.13

This work has not been done in secret. Chinese government media has often highlighted the construction, and Chinese social media has expanded on island

descriptions. Coverage in Hong Kong media stated that satellite imagery showed Fiery Cross Reef built up with, “domes for radar equipment,

communication facilities, hangars, missile positions, underground tunnels and high-frequency radar antennas, and other military facilities.” It also has fresh water supplies, solar panels, and greenhouses, and appeared capable of

accommodating more than 1,000 troops. 14 Figure 5. shows the headquarters/administrative area as it appeared in December 2018. Generally

speaking, this complex of buildings appears very much like the structures on Chinese land-based military facilities. The communications or sensor array near the mouth of the harbor is shown in Figure 6.

13 amti.csis.org/fiery-cross-reef. 14 www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2184351/china-builds-rescue-centre- artificial-spratly-island-south.

Figure 5. Extensive administrative complex on Fiery Cross

Reef (Google Earth, 19 Dec 2018)

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The ostensible mission for this facility was declared in Jan 2019, when China's Ministry of Transport announced that it had opened a, “maritime rescue center”

on Fiery Cross Reef to “better protect navigation and transport safety in the South China Sea.”15

MISCHIEF REEF The Chinese took possession of Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in 1995. A small

platform was present in at least 2012, but dredging did not start until 2015. The 10,000-foot runway was completed in 2016, with hangar space for perhaps 20 aircraft completed by 2017.

15 www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/29/WS5c501d94a3106c65c34e7249.html.

Figure 6. Probable radar/communications complex

Fiery Cross Reef (Google Earth, 19 Dec 2018)

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Figure 8. below shows the

headquarters complex as it appeared in Dec 2018.

Like at Mischief Reef, this complex has the appearance of a

Chinese military base. Figure 9. shows a 2017 aerial shot of the

Mischief Reef communications/sensor facility.

Figure 7. Chinese-posted image of Mischief Reef in 2016

Figure 8. Headquarters/admin complex at Mischief Reef

(Google Earth, 13 Dec 2018)

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SUBI REEF When the Chinese first came to Subi Reef in 1988, it was a “low-tide elevation,”

an atoll that was entirely submerged except at low tide. Like the facilities described above, dredging started here in 2015. The runway and hangars

were completed by 2017. Figure 10. shows troops on the island with a radome in the background.

Figure 9. Airborne image of Mischief Reef radar

complex (Inquirer.net)

Figure 11. Subi Reef (Digital Globe)

Figure 10. Chinese image of PLA Navy

troops on Subi Reef

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WOODY ISLAND

One of the few Chinese locations in the South China Sea that was an actual island before their occupation is Woody Island in the Paracels, closer to the Chinese mainland. Chinese presence here can be dated to a 1909 naval visit,

and it was later occupied by France, Japan, and Chinese Nationalist forces. The PRC established a permanent presence on this one-square-mile island in

1956. South Vietnam, attempting to claim sovereignty over the Paracels, tried to expel the Chinese presence in 1974 with a landing of troops and a naval engagement, but they failed to dislodge the Chinese forces.

There was a significant permanent Chinese presence on Woody Island prior to the Xi Jinping expansion campaign in the South China Sea. Imagery from 2012

shows a small town, an airfield, a military installation, and two developed harbors with some small Chinese Navy ships present.16

Imagery since 2016 shows extensive enlargement of the island through dredging operations, reconstruction of the runway, addition of 16 hangars for

combat aircraft, and four larger hangars,

16 amti.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Woody-Island-Old-12.14.12.jpg.

Figure 12. Chinese-posted AMTI image of Woody Island in 2016

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In May 2018 US media, citing sources with access to U.S. intelligence, reported that China had deployed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles to their bases in the South China Sea. At least some equipment deployments

went to each of the major bases: Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef in the Spratlys and Woody Island in the Paracels. The anti-ship cruise

missiles reported were the YJ-12B, a vehicle-mounted variant of an anti-ship missile with an estimated range of 295 nautical miles. The surface-to-air missiles reported were the HQ-9B, a mobile system with a range of 160

nautical miles.17

HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles have been deployed off and on since at least 2016 on Woody Island. They were seen in satellite imagery, and ground-level images also appeared on Chinese television with details of their missile-launch

exercises. Figure 13. is a screen shot from television coverage that was later posted on Chinese social media.

Several deployments of Chinese fighter aircraft to Woody Island

were also noted in 2016 and 2017. Figure 14. is a screen shot from Chinese Central Television

coverage of a Woody Island deployment of J-11 fighters, the

Chinese-manufactured version of the Sukhoi-35.

17 www.cnbc.com/2018/05/02/china-added-missile-systems-on-spratly-islands-in-south-china- sea.html.

Figure 13. Chinese television image of HQ-9 missile launchers

exercising on Woody Island, Jul 2016

Figure 14. Chinese television news image of J-11 fighters during Nov

2017 deployment to Woody Island

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Development on Woody Island has continued up to the present, with China

designating the facility there as “Sansha City” and including it in Hainan Province, even though Woody Island is 200 miles from Hainan Island. The local government in Sansha City announced in Mar 2019 that it planned to

build out to a full island city, eventually becoming a “national key strategic service and logistics base.”18

OTHER CHINESE BASES

A smaller category of Chinese island base has been constructed at several other reefs in the Spratlys and the Paracels. Many of these are configured with

a main multi-story building with short towers around it that appear to be mounts for anti-aircraft weapons. These bases are usually equipped with a dock and a heliport plus radar or communications facilities. Hughes Reef,

shown in an aerial shot from 2016 in Figure 16., is representative of this base style.

18 www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3002229/beijing-plans-strategic-service-and- logistics-base-woody.

Figure 15. Image of the core of “Sansha City, Hainan Province”

(Google Earth, 12 Nov 2018)

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Johnson Reef, shown in Figure 17. as it appeared in Dec 2018, is another example that shows the main building, tower-mounted radar domes, probable solar panels, and agriculture zones.

Figure 16. Airborne image of Hughes Reef in Jun 2016

Figure 17. Johnson Reef (Google Earth, 19 Dec 2018)

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OTHER DEPLOYMENTS

Chinese military activity in the South China Sea has greatly increased in the Xi Jinping era. China conducted a major naval exercise on the South China Sea in March 2018 that included about 40 ships and submarines and China’s one

operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning.19 In May 2018, the Chinese Air Force announced that it had deployed H-6K long-range bombers to islands in the

South China Sea for the first time, without specifying which islands.20 Chinese Coast Guard ships have also been used to chase off or sink Vietnamese fishing vessels found near Chinese-claimed islands in the Paracels, including one

fishing boat sunk in March 2019.21

THE US STANCE: FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION China has been successful in complicating the sovereignty issue by enlarging their presence in the South China Sea and militarizing locations that have no

use other than to make claims of sovereignty. This has not caused capitulation to the Chinese or acceptance of their claims, but the military presence at these

locations could give them leverage in sovereignty resolution negotiations. The consistent position of the United States on the South China Sea has been

to deny China’s claims and to support fair access, freedom of navigation, and that respect for international law, including The United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is a matter of national interest to the US.22 In 2012, the US Senate passed a resolution reaffirming the US commitment to assisting Southeast Asian nations remaining strong and independent through

continued operations by US forces in the Western Pacific region, including the South China Sea.23

As part of that commitment, the United States has made its opposition to

Chinese claims of sovereignty plain through the deployment of US Navy vessels into South China Sea waters that the Chinese claim as their own. The US initiated these Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in 2015 as a direct

confrontation to Chinese claims, creating a major point of friction between China and the US. They typically involve a US destroyer or other Navy ship

passing within the 12-mile limit that the Chinese would like to claim as sovereign space not open to ships of other navies. As of March 2019, the US Navy had conducted 15 FONOPS missions in the South China Sea.24

19 www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence/exclusive-satellite-images-reveal-show-of-force-

by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-sea-idUSKBN1H3135. 20 www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china/china-air-force-lands-bombers-on-south- china-sea-island-idUSKCN1IK047. 21 www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3002794/vietnam-protests-over-chinas- sinking-vessel-contested. 22 www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html. 23 www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/sres524/text. 24 www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3003895/time-tougher-deterrence-china-us- steps-patrols-south-china-sea.

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Freedom of Navigation operations are always denounced by China at the

political level. For example, China reacted to the Mar 2018 FONOP by guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin near Mischief Reef with typical language: “By repeatedly sending military ships into these areas without authorization, the

US has seriously harmed Chinese sovereignty and security, violated basic rules of international relations, and harmed regional peace and stability.” The

Chinese also claimed that two of its Navy frigates had warded off the US destroyer.25

FONOPs have occasionally been directly challenged by Chinese

forces. In Sep 2018 the USS Decatur, a destroyer on a FONOP was confronted by a Chinese

Navy destroyer. A US Navy spokesman claimed that “a

Luyang destroyer approached USS Decatur in an unsafe and unprofessional maneuver in the

vicinity of Gaven Reef in the South China Sea.” The Chinese

ship passed with about 120 feet of the US Navy vessel, and "conducted a series of

increasingly aggressive maneuvers accompanied by warnings for the Decatur to depart the area.” Figure 18. is a reportedly leaked US Navy image that

captured the close pass by the Chinese vessel.26 27

FONOPs have continued into 2019. In Jan 2019, US Pacific Fleet Headquarters announced that the USS McCampbell had carried out a FONOP within 12 nautical miles of the Paracels, "to challenge excessive maritime claims."28 In

February, guided missile destroyers USS Spruance and USS Preble conducted a FONOP within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef.29

The Chinese Ministry of Defense in Feb 2019 pushed back on these FONOPs, stating that the US presence reflected, “disregard for international laws and

rules.” The Ministry’s spokesman said that, “the Chinese military will take

25 news.usni.org/2018/03/23/u-s-warship-sails-past-disputed-south-china-sea-artificial-island- freedom-navigation-mission. 26 www.stripes.com/news/photos-show-how-close-chinese-warship-came-to-colliding-with-us- navy-destroyer-1.550153. 27 www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-03/south-china-sea-encounter-between-us-warship-and- chinese-vessel/10333096. 28 www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-07/us-navy-ship-sails-in-disputed-south-china-sea-amid-

trade-talks/10696148. 29 news.usni.org/2019/02/12/41070.

Figure 18. Reported US Navy image of close

pass near USS Decatur by a Chinese

destroyer, 30 Sep 2018

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resolute measures to safeguard national sovereignty and security, and to

safeguard peace and stability in the region.”30 The US is not alone in contesting China’s claims in the South China Sea. In

2018, Australia increased the frequency of its patrols in the region. A French task group also joined British ships to sail through the South China Sea.

However, none of these allied have been testing the 12-mile limit around Chinese-claimed islands. The US Navy also conducted exercises with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in the South China Sea in 2018, and Japan

separately conducted antisubmarine warfare training in the South China Sea with a submarine and three of its destroyers.31

The US Air Force has also been involved this year in the show of force in the South China Sea. A Pacific Air Force statement issued on 13 Mar 2019 that

“two B-52H Stratofortress bombers took off from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and conducted routine training in the vicinity of the South China Sea

on March 13 [Hawaii Standard Time], before returning to base. US aircraft regularly operate in the South China Sea in support of allies, partners, and a free and open Indo-Pacific.”32 Another B-52 mission had been conducted over

the South China Sea in Sep 2018.

At the political level, the US stance was again made plain by the Vice President in a 16 Nov 2018 statement: "The South China Sea doesn't belong to any one nation, and you can be sure: The United States will continue to sail and fly

wherever international law allows and our national interests demand.”33

THE CHINESE STANCE China’s response to any challenge to its claims in the South China Sea has

been a standard position: “China enjoys indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and its islands. China's stand is based on historical facts and international law. China's sovereign rights and positions are formed in the

course of history and this position has been held by the Chinese Government for a long time.”34 US Navy FONOPS have not changed that stance.

The current position includes warnings that confrontation could turn into military conflict, although the government frequently expresses these

warnings through unofficial spokesmen. The director of the Chinese National Institute for South China Sea Studies, looking forward to 2019, stated in March

that, “tension in the South China Sea will rise in the coming year so we must

30 www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2188107/respect-chinese-sovereignty-south- china-sea-beijing-warns. 31 www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-01-16/how-us-can-step-south-china-sea. 32 www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3001655/us-b-52-bombers-fly-over-disputed- south-china-sea-second-time. 33 www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-16/us-vp-mike-pence-says-south-china-sea-belongs-to-no-

one-country/10506016. 34 www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers48/paper4702.html.

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deploy some defensive facilities that are able to overawe American warships

entering nearby waters. The Americans would have to think twice before going too far, that we might take counteraction that could threaten their vessels.” 35

In Apr 2019, a Chinese think tank, Peking University’s South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, also struck a cautionary note: “The US

military will continue intensifying military operations in the South China Sea, constantly exploring the grey zones between peace and conflict, and probing China’s bottom line, which will inevitably push the threshold of small-scale

armed conflict and war.”36

CONCLUSIONS For whatever reason, Xi Jinping has undertaken a major facility expansion and base-building campaign at many of the marginal islands China has claimed in

the South China Sea. What had been largely limited to rock outcroppings and precarious sea platforms has become, in just the last five years, a network of

military bases capable of supporting combat aircraft, missile defenses, anti-ship weapons, interlocking radar facilities, and berths for combat ships. The extent of fully functional bases in the Spratlys and Paracels gives China a

strengthened claim to this maritime region. Many of the islands they have built out may be the focus of conflicting claims, but the Chinese are there, in

force, and so resolution of disputes in any other country’s favor would have to overcome the facts of Chinese military occupation and infrastructure development.

The United States, despite this build-up, has not recognized China’s claims in

the South China Sea. The US has emphasized its lack of recognition through Freedom of Navigation Operations, right up to the present time. It has

continued FONOPs on a regular basis despite Chinese criticism and hazardous attempts by the Chinese Navy to force the US Navy to stay out of disputed waters.

Taiwan has historically been assumed to be the most likely flashpoint for war

between China and the Unites States, should China decide to seize Taiwan by force. Conflict over Taiwan remains a possibility. However, Xi Jinping has shown his willingness to confront the US in the South China Sea, and has done

so through gaining armed possession of disputed locations. The US has likewise shown its willingness to ignore Chinese claims by maneuvering

military forces within 12 miles of China-claimed territory. The current impetus on both sides to be bold in their use of military forces in the South China Sea sovereignty dispute may now make this region a more likely location for

military conflict between China and the United States.

35 www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3003895/time-tougher-deterrence-china-us- steps-patrols-south-china-sea. 36 www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3005439/us-china-greater-risk-military-

incidents-south-china-sea-think.

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Contact the Wapack Labs for more information: 603-606-1246, or

[email protected]. Prepared: Silkworm, Wapack Labs Asia Desk

Reviewed: B. Schenkelberg

Approved: J. McKee

Documents

CHINA’S ONGOING MILITARIZATION of the SOUTH CHINA SEA