Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1986 183

China’s Case Against the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: rationality and morality

GEOFFREY HUNT

~BSTRACT China, India, Brazil and other major Third World nations haae long refused to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. This position might at first sight appear to be without any question morally unjustijied and even irrational. Yet their claim that the treaty is ‘discriminatoy’ merits the serious attention which it has not received. Only if certain aspects of this claim are accepted by the nuclear weapons

. signatories does a moral and rational onus to sign become unquestionable.

Many political problems look at first sight like direct clashes between prudence and principle. We ought, I think, always to suspect them of being more complicated, to assume that elements of both will be found on both sides. (Mary Midgley)

There is a good case for regarding nuclear deterrence as irrational and possession of nuclear weapons as immoral. As nuclear weapons proliferation is largely based on the deterrence doctrine proliferation is ultimately irrational and immoral and support for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is obligatory [l]. However, the argu- ments put forward by certain Third World states, notably China, against ratification of the NPT do have, I will argue, a rational and moral dimension. Here, then, there appears to be a conflict between a pro-NPT and an anti-NPT position. The task I set myself is to assess, balance and reconcile these two positions, rather than present a unilateral defence of one position which would fail to advance our understanding on this momentous issue.

I shall argue that the pro-NPT position is generally presented without sufficient qualification and self-criticism and thus does not make the concessions due to the anti- NPT position, while the anti-NPT position does not take sufficient account of certain universal demands and thus does not make proper concessions to the strengths of the NPT position.

Despite my attempt at balance the emphasis of the present article is rather lop-sided in one respect. As I am addressing myself primarily to the unqualified pro-NPT advocates who are not uncommon in the Western peace movement an important aim of mine is to show (what these advocates would either deny or not have considered) that there are indeed good grounds for accepting a rational and moral dimension in a particular Third World anti-NPT position. I shall focus on the official Chinese case, with a few references to other important Third World nations such as Brazil and India.

This article may also be considered to be a reaction to a rather curious fact, one indicative of the shortcomings of the peace movement, and that is that the Third World enters very infrequently into the debate about the global nuclear threat. A l m is sometimes rather unthinkingly expressed about the spread of nuclear weapons to ‘unstable developing countries’, and it is occasionally remarked that the ‘nuclear

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winter’ of a large-scale nuclear war in the North would also annihilate the deprived two-thirds of the world’s population in the South. But these remarks almost suggest that they are innocent bystanders in a US-USSR quarrel instead of crucial and integral elements of the global politics within which the nuclear threat takes on its meaning.

(1) The NPT and China’s Case

The need for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons had been discussed and recognised by the USA, USSR and UK in the 1950s and early 60s. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to give it its proper name, was signed by the super-powers and others in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.

The first two articles embody the super-powers’ original and principal concerns. Under Article I nuclear weapons states undertake,

.

not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non- nuclear-weapon-State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article I1 enjoins the non-nuclear weapons states not to receive, manufacture, etc. nuclear weapons [2].

Third World representatives at the negotiations leading up to the NPT complained that guarantees of non-transferral and non-receipt, and their practical safeguards (in Article 111), were insufficient and unfair because they could only serve to maintain a status quo which was based on an ‘imbalance’ between the super-powers and the rest of the world. Thus the ideas eventually embodied in Articles I11 (section 3), IVY V and VI were introduced in an attempt to meet this complaint. Most importantly, a demand was made that an end to ‘horizontal proliferation’ must be matched by an end to ‘vertical proliferation’ (i.e. a freeze on further development of existing nuclear weapons) and this as a first step to disarmament. This, one might say, is the basic bargain or contract embodied in the NPT. Its preamble declares the intention “to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament”; and Art. VI declares:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

It was also considered vital by the non-nuclear weapons states, especially the Third World ones, that they receive assurances that the NPT would not obstruct their acquisition of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and that the nuclear states be prepared to share the ‘benefits’ of the developments in nuclear technology. Articles IV and V attempt to meet those demands. Finally, some non-nuclear weapons states wanted assurances that the nuclear states would not use or threaten to use their nuclear weapons against them. The super-powers would not meet this demand, and to this day the Treaty contains no such general assurance.

Besides the well-known case of France, the most important Third World states refused to sign the Treaty and these include China, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina,

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Chile, Cuba, Algeria, Tanzania and Saudi Arabia, as well as South Africa and Israel. Fifteen years later they have still not signed. The first five alone comprise over two billion people, or nearly half of the world’s population. Yet, as far as I know, no one has sympathetically analysed the justifications given for this disheartening rejection of a tremendously important international agreement [3].

Non-signatories gave reasons for the rejection of the NPT which were in some respects quite diverse. But there is a basic argument running through many of these different statements and I think that of China captures it most adequately. Although the Chinese case has itself shifted in some ways since the ’60s and ’70s the succinct 1985 statement by Wu Xiu Quan, chairperson of the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, is in fundamentals no different from the official position of 15 years earlier. Wu declares,

The main defect of the NPT lies in the fact that it prohibits the non-nuclear weapon states parties from possessing nuclear weapons, but does scarcely anything to limit the quantity of nuclear weapons the nuclear weapon states parties possess, nor does it restrict the further expansion of their nuclear arsenals. The obligations imposed on the non-nuclear weapon states parties are specific and strict, whereas the obligation on the nuclear weapon sta- tes-to “pursue negotiations in good faith” to reach an agreement on cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament-is devoid of any binding force and therefore of little meaning. Moreover, since the non- nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT have given up the nuclear option, it is only reasonable for the nuclear weapon states parties to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. However, the Treaty avoids this issue.

For these reasons, the Chinese government’s view is that the NPT is so discriminatory in character that it could easily be exploited by the major nuclear powers< to serve their vested interests and to maintain and strengthen their position of nuclear monopoly and blackmail. Hence the Treaty is not conducive to averting the danger of nuclear war and fulfilling its avowed purpose of “safeguarding the security of peoples” [4]

Wu adds that despite the provisions of Arts. IV and V the endeavour of non-nuclear states “to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has been greatly hampered by the increasingly strict measures taken unilaterally by the major powers under the pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation”. It seems, then, that China has three main grounds for rejecting the NPT.

(1) It prohibits non-nuclear weapons states from acquiring nuclear weapons, but does not prohibit nuclear weapons states from acquiring more, let alone require them to reduce or disarm within a specific period.

(2) It prohibits non-nuclear weapons states from acquiring nuclear weapons, but does not, in view of this prohibition, require nuclear weapons s ta te not to use (or threaten to use) their nuclear weapons against the states which cannot acquire them.

(3) The safeguard terms of the NPT are such that it can be used by the nuclear states to hinder peaceful nuclear development in the non-nuclear states while the nuclear states control and employ those developments.

“In view of all this,” Wu concludes, “the Chinese government remains critical of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has no intention of acceding to it”. I may add that India

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and Brazil have also complained of ‘nuclear colonialism’, ‘atomic apartheid’ and have denounced the NPT as ‘discriminatory’.

In assessing these three reasons it seems to me that three different kinds of issue arise. First, do these reasons accurately reflect the terms and characteristics of the NPT? Secondly, how valid is the interpretation which China puts on the form and implications of the NPT? Thirdly, are these prima facie good reasons for not signing the NPT? By answering these three questions for each of the three reasons proposed I shall assess China’s position, and this will highlight its strengths against certain weaknesses of the NPT. This will be followed by a discussion of its weaknesses in the light of the strengths of the pro-NPT position. It is not until that latter discussion that I take account of distinctions between a justified critique of NPT, a justification for not signing NPT and a justification for nuclear deterrence as opposed to any other kind of deterrence or defence.

(2) Chinese Strength, NPT Weakness

(a) No Disarmament

As a characterisation of the terms of the NPT I think that the first reason is quite accurate, and as Wu says, the facts of the continuing nuclear arms race have borne out the charge that the ‘good faith’ clause is weak and ineffective. However, no non- nuclear weapons signatory has broken NPT terms by acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons. This disparity is easily accounted for by the fact that there are definite practical safeguards and procedures to enforce the non-nuclear states’ side of the contract while there are none to enforce the nuclear weapons states’ side.

For China this feature of the NPT is no accident or oversight which could be easily remedied. It requires an explanation, and a merit of the Chinese interpretation is that it provides one. (Alternative explanations are notable by their absence.) What this imbalance means for China is not only that the NPT “could easily be exploited by the major nuclear powers to serve their vested interests. . . nuclear monopoly and black- mail” (which compared with its earlier statements is a polite understatement) but it is a situation of global economic and political inequality which defined the very form of the NPT in the first place, bringing it into being.

Is this a valid interpretation? In seeking an answer the best one can hope for is a demonstration that this interpretation makes good sense of the facts and historical circumstances surrounding the emergence of the NPT [5]. That China was exploited and dominated by the West is denied by very few nowadays, and its colonial history surely provides justification for China’s suspicions and fears of the West immediately following the 1949 revolution. It did not appear unlikely at the time that the USA would invade China and it is said that the use of nuclear weapons was suggested by General MacArthur, the American head of UN forces in the Korean conflict [6].

The historical circumstances in which the NPT was negotiated reveal that con- siderations of world peace and justice could well be regarded as having less to do with its raison d’itre than the concrete national motivations of its creators. The discussions for a non-proliferation regime, culminating in the NPT, were going on at precisely the time that China was frantically developing its own nuclear arms in response to perceived nuclear threats and possible threats. By 1963 the USA, USSR and UK had all thorougly tested nuclear weapons and it was a convenient time for them to call for a test ban. China refused to sign the Partial Test Ban which came along in August 1963 as Chinese scientists were on the verge of a nuclear breakthrough. In October 1964,

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following more than a decade of Soviet assistance, China exploded its first nuclear device. In June 1967 China conducted its first full-scale thermonuclear test explosion, only one year before the NPT was signed by the super-powers [7]. It has been said that the super-powers allowed themselves another two years for the NPT to come into force so that they could conclude testing of nuclear weapons already scheduled. Conveniently for the nuclear states, just before the NPT came into effect the USA’s nuclear stockpile had reached the all-time peak of 32,000 nuclear warheads and the USSR’s stockpile may have been about 20% of this.

It seems that the NATO powers hoped to prevent another revolutionary state (China), which directly threatened their economic interests, following Russia’s example by acquiring atomic bombs. The USSR, on the other hand, was in greater fear of Germany acquiring them, and it is generally believed that this fear was the principal Soviet motive for negotiating and signing the NPT [8].

Does this imbalance in the terms of the NPT, especially in the light of the Chinese interpretation, provide a good reason for refusing to accede? Goldblat is critical of the accusation of ‘discrimination’ and says,

Although the term ‘discrimination’, used in the context of freely contracted international commitments, is a misnomer, it is true that the NPT is unbalanced as regards the rights and obligations of the parties. But this ‘discriminatory’ distinction was not created by the NPT, it predates the Treaty, which was meant not to correct it, but to prevent a bad situation from getting worse [9].

Of course, all contracts are by definition freely entered into; a contract into which a party is coerced is a contradiction in terms. But there are two important ways in which a treaty could properly be described as discriminatory.

(1) It is discriminatory if in its formal terms it is biassed against certain parties in enshrining an unequal exchange in some important (but not necessarily all) respects. If it is wondered why any party should enter a contract in which it would suffer such bias the answer is likely to be that because of its weakness in external circumstances it has more to lose in not signing than in signing. Such a formal inequality is one thing the Chinese, especially Wu, have in mind.

(2) It is discriminatory if the substantive (extra-contractual) constraints limiting the range of actions (economic, political, military) are unequal such that a formally egalitarian contract relevant to these actions would conserve rather than challenge the inequality. It is the substantive inequality that is crucial here. It may be stretching the usual meaning of ‘discriminatory’ in the context, but what is important is to see what the Chinese are getting at. It is something that they certainly had in mind, although it was more evident in their pronouncements of the ’60s and ’70s.

I do not think anyone can deny that on scrutiny the NPT is a rather curious contract. Not only is it formally unbalanced but a substantive inequality is carried into its basic terms: it ‘freezes’ an inequality between nuclear weapons states and non- nuclear weapons states.

Wu’s formal complaint is that there are two kinds of constraints on strong and weak parties in the NPT, and thus there is a formal inequality. However, even an effective prohibition of vertical proliferation, to match the effective prohibition of horizontal proliferation, would leave untouched the substantive military inequality of nuclear haves and have-nots. But the Chinese insist on the centrality of disarmament in the context of NPT and thus carry the substantive military issue into the formal

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considerations. A substantively non-discriminatory Treaty in military regards would be one which not only balanced effective vertical non-proliferation against effective horizontal non-proliferation but which enforced a process of disarmament, for only then would all states be equal with regard to nuclear arms-none would possess them. Unilateral and uncritical defence of the NPT is indeed discriminatory and the Chinese, it seems, are justified in rejecting it. And their position may be seen as a moral one insofar as it is based on a rejection of a general substantive injustice: the economic, political and social inequality of the world we live in, together with the arms which maintain that inequality.

To return to Goldblat, it appears that he recognizes the formal imbalance in the NPT, although he does not clearly spell out what he means by “unbalanced rights and obligations’’ and does not tell us how a contract which is admittedly unbalanced in such respects could not fairly be described as discriminatory. What he means by speaking of this imbalance ‘predating’ the NPT is unclear. If the imbalance refers to the ‘rights and obligations’ then these formal terms were created by the NPT, so could not be said to predate it. But Goldblat has, it transpires, unwittingly shifted to the substantive military inequality, in which case it is true that the imbalance of nuclear haves and have-nots predates the NPT, but far from being a mitigating circumstance this is perhaps, as some Third World spokespersons suggest, the very raison d’etre and basic flaw of the treaty. Then, whether the NPT is seen as preventing a ‘bad situation from getting worse’ presumably depends (unless Goldblat can explain otherwise) on whether one is a have or a have-not. From the point of view of a have-not ex-colonial nation suspicious of the super-powers it is understandable that acquiring a nuclear deterrent may be regarded as making a bad situation better. Thus the Chinese said in 1963:

Whether or not nuclear weapons help peace depends on who possesses them. It is detrimental to peace if they are in the hands of imperialist countries; it helps peace if they are in the hands of socialist countries. It must not be said indiscriminately that the danger of nuclear war increases along with the increase in the number of nuclear powers.. . A fierce class struggle is now going on in the world. In this struggle, the greater the strength on our side the better. [lo]

Goldblat does see that the charge of discrimination would have been groundless if the treaty had provided ‘for the elimination of all existing nuclear weapons within a specific period of time,’ but adds that as this was ‘infeasible’ the NPT was concluded to ‘pave the way’ for limitations on vertical proliferation. Goldblat certainly has a point here, which I will take up in section 3, but I will remark here that the have-nots are likely to regard the ‘infeasible’ verdict as a mere excuse for a treaty which is really an attempt to maintain the military, political and economic status quo, unless linked to suggestions for overcoming this ‘infeasibility’. If, I may add, the way had in fact been ‘paved’ in the last 15 years this accusation could no longer be made. Unfortunately the nuclear weapons signatories have greatly strengthened their nuclear strike capability, quantitatively and qualitatively, while doing plenty of ‘negotiating in good faith‘ for disarmament (which is all the NPT requires them to do).

The voice of the weaker Third World countries was at last heard in the final declaration of the Third Review Conference of the NPT, held in September 1985, which “notes with regret that the development and deployment of nuclear weapon systems had continued during the period of review” and that “the last five years had

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thus not given any results concerning negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament” [l 11. A Declaration by the Group of Non-aligned and Neutral States at the conference, uninhibited by the participation of the nuclear arms states, was more strongly worded, calling upon the USA, UK and USSR “to institute, as a provisional measure, an immediate moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests,” to “agree on a complete freeze” on the development of nuclear weapon systems and to “begin negotiations for substantial reductions of their existing stockpiles” [ 121.

A strength of the Chinese position is, then, precisely that it puts the emphasis where it belongs, not on non-proliferation but on abolition. Says Wu,

With regard to the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons, China holds that the emphasis should be placed on the super-powers’ renunciation of nuclear weapon development and their arms race. It is the huge amount of nuclear weapons they have stockpiled that poses the greatest threat to world peace and security. By comparison, the prospect that more nuclear weapon states might emerge is only a possibility, and this, to a great extent, is engendered by the nuclear arms race itself.

(b) No Negative Assurances

As presumably the principal reason any state might offer for acquiring nuclear arms is that it may be threatened by a state which already has them, it is surely an enormous weakness of the NPT that it embodies no general undertaking on the part of the nuclear states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapons signatories. Again, the Chinese are certainly not misrepresenting the NPT in this regard. It was discussed at tortuous lengths in the original NPT negotiations, but the super-powers rejected such an undertaking. The demand of the non-nuclear weapons states for ‘negative assurances’ (as such an undertaking has been called) continued for years after the NPT came into force and in 1978, at the UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, some concessions were made. The USSR did make a satisfactory assurance, and in 1982 went a step further in making a unilateral and general ‘no first strike’ pledge. The USA gave a form of negative assurance but with the qualification that this would not apply in the case of an attack on the USA by a non-nuclear weapons state ‘allied to’ or ‘associated with’ a nuclear weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack [13]. The UK gave a similar qualified assurance. Still, it now seems that the qualification is so strong as to make the assurance very weak. What the NPT needs is a general negative assurance to the non- nuclear weapons states, but this it still does not have.

Again, a deeper and more substantive point, which obviously the Chinese could not make without undermining their own formal position, is that even if such formal assurances were adequately made, under existing military, political and economic inequalities the security of the non-nuclear weapons states would still not be absolutely guaranteed. Undoubtedly, however, such assurances would legally, diplomatically and politically make nuclear threats and actions much more difficult. Abolition is the only real guarantee. Consistently, one should note, China early on pledged not to be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state under any circum- stances [14].

The issue is still the cause of bitterness in the Third World. The Third Review

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Conference, under Third World pressure, noted the qualified assurances of the nuclear super-powers but “regrets that the search for a common approach which could be included in an international legally binding instrument, has been unsuccessful” [ 151.

In view of historical events this bitterness is understandable. Thus, in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Russians (and subsequently the Chinese) believed that the USA planned a pre-emptive nuclear strike on Soviet cities, and the belief that there existed such a plan was recently reiterated by Soviet academician Georgiy Arbatov [16]. In the post-war period nuclear threats have been made a number of times [17]. And I may observe that the behaviour of South Africa and Israel, which almost certainly have nuclear weapons, is hardly reassuring to peoples who regard themselves as oppressed. In these two cases the USA and the West are generally perceived by the Third World as their economic, political and military supporters [lS].

Does the foregoing provide prima facie good reason for not signing the NPT? Surely it is reasonable to suppose, in the light of history, that signing a treaty which prohibits one from acquiring nuclear arms, in the absence of at least a formal guarantee from the nuclear weapons states that such weapons are unnecessary as a deterrent, would be playing into the hands of proven aggressors. Given its perception of the need to develop a nuclear deterrent to protect hundreds of millions of people who have been exploited and oppressed for a century, the rejection by China was, it seems, not only rational but morally commendable. As Nigel Dower eloquently put it,

Thus prudence, seen through the standard perception of national self- interest, demands the logic of defence, and moral reasoning, understood in terms of the obligation of governments to promote that national interest, supports the demands of prudence [19].

Of course, Dower feels uneasy about that logic and morality, as should we all, but more of that later.

Goldblat’s pro-NPT view is that the claimed nuclear threats invoked to justify the acquisition of nuclear arms do not actually exist. He does not attempt to answer the question why, if this is the case, the USA, UK and France have not satisifed Third World demands and given satisfactory negative assurances in over 15 years of NPT. Furthermore, he completely fails to appreciate the general feeling of insecurity, especially in the Third World, in a highly unstable and super-power dominated world. He says that in India’s case there is no need for nuclear arms because “it is unlikely that any Chinese government would feel compelled to revoke its commitment not to use nuclear weapons against a country not possessing these weapons” [20]. India has, in fact, refrained from further developing its nuclear military potential, and perhaps the Chinese commitment has something to do with that. Surely this might indicate that there is a good case for assuming that Third World nations would feel (and before acquiring nuclear weapons China would have felt) reassured by such commitments from the USA, UK and France.

(c) Economic Obstruction

It is undeniable that the safeguard requirements of the non-proliferation regime can and have come into conflict with the international supply and demand of peaceful nuclear facilities. Ironically it clashes not only with the Third World demands but with the economic aims of western nuclear producers and suppliers. It is typical of the tension between protectionism and free market policies which has run through the

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history of capitalism that on the one hand the NPT can serve to protect the Western nuclear oligopoly from potential Third World competitors (notably Brazil) but cannot do so without, on the other hand, hindering the large profits to be made by selling nuclear facilities to the Third World. The clash between public policies, including the NPT and proliferation regulations, and private initiative in the nuclear industry is well recognised [21].

The Chinese have been steadfast in their insistence on the economic obstructiveness of the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards associ- ated with it. The Chinese delegate at the IAEA meeting in October 1983 averred, “We cannot go along with any attempt at arbitrary and unilateral widening of the scope of restrictions and controls in the name of strengthening the non-proliferation regime” [22]. On the formal level the complaint appears to be aimed at a potential conflict in the NPT between the restrictions of Art. I and the safeguard provisions of Art. 111, sections 1 and 2, on the one hand, and the co-operation provisions of Art. 111, section 3 and Art. IV, on the other. The implication of the Chinese criticisms, I think, is that the nuclear super-powers had to concede the rather undefined co-operation assurances, for otherwise they would have had no Treaty at all; but the safeguards and restrictions in the Treaty and associated with the IAEA regulations actually work against the spirit of those assurances in serving super-power interests.

In Art. IV we find it stated that all NPT parties have the ‘inalienable right’ to develop peaceful nuclear facilities, that all parties ‘have the right’ to facilitate, and participate in, the exchange of such developments, that there should be nuclear co- operation “with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world”

. [23]. This might appear to be entirely satisfactory. But a close reading of Art. I (see my section 1) will show that it is so broad and vague (especially the phrases ‘indirectly’, ‘otherwise acquire’, and ‘in any way’) that almost any peaceful exchange could be ruled out by it, depending on interpretation.

Art. 111, sections 1 and 2, and the IAEA’s safeguard system which the Article supports, are sufficiently strict and precise that the rejection of almost any request for nuclear information or materials might be justified by appealing to them. The second section of Art. I11 in particular states:

Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide (a) source or special fissionable material, and (b) equipment or material especially de- signed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

But it has been said by Third World spokespersons that this excludes the very material and equipment necessary for the independent development of a peaceful nuclear industry. It is on this claim that, for example, the Brazilian charge of ‘nuclear colonialism’ mainly rests. Goldblat’s assertion that “The claim made by certain non- parties to the NPT that acquisition of a full nuclear fuel cycle could reduce the technological gap between the developing and industrialized states has no basis in economic reality, especially that of countries such as India, Brazil or Argentina” [24] appears, from a Third World perspective to beg the question. It is the ‘economic reality’ of poverty and economic dependence which they wish to change, and they hope to achieve this partly through nuclear energy. If they are wrong in this it is for the same reasons that evely other nation is wrong (see next section).

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The problem arises because there is no absolute distinction between military and peaceful applications of nuclear technology. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) study reported that, in Goldblat’s words, “although certain measures could make misuse of the nuclear fuel cycle more difficult, there is no technical way to produce nuclear energy without at the same time producing fissile material usable for weapons’’ [25]. And another study asserts that “Attempts to deal separately” with the military and peaceful aspects “will be increasingly difficult” [26].

This blurred boundary means that what is considered ‘military’ can always be extended or relaxed to suit Western (and Soviet) economic or politicaVmilitary interests in specific cases. This arbitrariness continues to attract Third World protests from time to time, especially ois -his the nuclear capabilities of South Africa and Israel. These two states gained nuclear weapons after the NPT came into effect, and could only have done so, it is claimed, with Western assistance. Obviously such cases hardly help to convince the Third World nations of the effective universality and seriousness of intent of the NPT and its safeguard provisions [27].

Once again it would not be surprising if the Chinese saw here a symptom of something deeper. Just as the concession to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith’ on disarmament has a weak form compared with the form of the non-proliferation undertakings, so the concession to co-operation on peaceful nuclear development has a weak form compared with the non-proliferation safeguards. Whereas the what, when, where and how of the safeguards are detailed and practically enforced (as is often the case with what should not be done) the what, when, where and how of the co-operation is left general and vague. Economic inequality between developed and developing nations is thought to lie at the bottom of this disparity. In any case, it is evidently discriminatory that non-nuclear weapons states should be required to subject them- selves to IAEA inspections while the nuclear weapons states need not.

Once more we have to question the idea that the NPT embodies a fair and equal exchange. For the Chinese the exchange of ‘co-operation’ for ‘safeguards’ maintains the oligopoly of the nuclear weapons states and their allies, ensuring that any peaceful development of nuclear power will be on their terms and at their pace. The NPT is seen as a flexible protectionist device (albeit one which sometimes works against the private nuclear industry of the West). This interpretation is certainly not unreasonable and on its basis we could see why the Chinese rejection of NPT should, on the common-sense premise of an injustice against ‘exploited peoples’, be regarded as quite rational and moral. I cannot, without fundamental qualifications, share Goldblat’s view that this Chinese complaint is ‘unfounded’ [28].

(3) Chinese Weakness, NPT Strength

So far I hope to have shown that from both a formal viewpoint and a substantive historical perspective (which the Chinese take to be intimately related) China’s rejection of the NPT on the grounds of its unbalanced and discriminatory character would appear to have a rational and morally commendable dimension. But it is now time to look more closely at three assumptions which the Chinese have always made, and which I have so far been making with them: (1) justified criticism of the NPT entails a justified refusal to sign the NPT, (2) justified refusal to sign (on the basis of justified criticism) entails justified acquisition of nuclear weapons; (3) peaceful nuclear developments are a good thing.

It may help to restate the main Chinese criticisms. The NPT states, in a nutshell,

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“We agree that there shall be no more nuclear weapons (horizontally)”. China objects, (1) this ‘no more’ is discriminatory if it is not seen to be merely apreZiminu?y to ‘none at all’, i.e. to the abolition of all nuclear arms already in existence; (2) the authenticity of the preliminary status of the ‘no more’ is called into question if those who already have nuclear arms refuse to promise the have-nots that they will not use these arms against them; (3) the authenticity of the preliminary status of the ‘no more’ is also called into question if its practical enforcement is prejudicially extended from the military into the peaceful economic sphere.

To take the third assumption first: it is assumed that the benefits of the uses of nuclear processes for the large-scale generation of energy (putting aside other small- scale uses such as the medical) outweigh the costs of accidents and exceedingly dangerous wastes [29]. Of course, the NPT also makes this assumption in its formal concessions to co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear know-how. No nuclear weapons signatory to the NPT challenges the soundness of its nuclear energy policy. Now, while in the case of nuclear weapons China can argue (wrongly I think, as we shall see) that she needs such weapons because potential aggressors already have them, in the case of peaceful nuclear facilities there is no convincing place for such an argument. Indeed one could have hoped that China might have taken the lead in developing alternative energy sources, but far from this has even recently signed agreements accepting the toxic nuclear waste of other countries. If it is true that China has been the victim of global economic inequality this does not entail the desirability for China (or any other nation) of every commodity involved in that inequality.

It seems to me that an international scheme of co-operation on the development of non-nuclear sources of energy is one of the principal needs of our time.

(a) On Signing NPT

Concerning China’s arguments about the lack of proper abolition measures and negative assurances in the NPT: we should ask, if a non-nuclear weapons state accepts these arguments as perfectly valid criticisms of the NPT does it follow that it should refuse to sign the NPT? That is, is it inconsistent to accept the criticisms and sign? I argue that it does not follow, and is not inconsistent, and there remain good reasons for signing. Putting aside super-power political pressure to sign, and assuming the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, I would maintain that a good reason for a Third World state to accede to the NPT is in fact provided by the very grounds of the validity of the criticisms. The criticisms imply that the super-powers and their allies wish to be able to fall back on nuclear weapons in maintaining their economic and political domination; they are potential aggressors who would threaten the mass killing of civilians in pursuit of this aim; and they are using the NPT as a means of preventing the emergence of constraints on their ability to maintain and improve on this domination.

But there is nothing static about the NPT or the uses to which it can be put. Article VIII does provide for amendments (although approval of the nuclear weapons states is required), and collective pressures can be applied at the quinquennial review confer- ences. The NPT already provides, one important international forum for organising and publicising pressures to disarm, although this need not exclude the application of other economic and political pressures. After all, disarmament terms are already there in the NPT, in a weak form as we have seen, so the task could be envisaged as one of enforcement and progressive amendment, of open international debate and build-up of

194 G. Hunt

pressure in the legal and diplomatic arena. If the NPT has not been entirely successful so far, will it continue to contribute so little if China, India, Brazil, Argentina, and others join it and lead a Third World pressure group for reform from within its confines? Remaining outside the NPT to make one’s criticisms leaves one open to the charge that these criticisms are mere propaganda serving to rationalise ‘Great Power’ aspirations, etc.

Taking the correct starting point, that the NPT is discriminatory, the anti-NPT advocates go too far when they suggest that everything said in support of the NPT is the political ploy and propaganda of the nuclear weapons states. Once the interpreta- tion of its discriminatory character is extended in this uncompromising fashion then of course no commitment can be made by the critic to signing. This is an extreme position: and indeed the Chinese have argued themselves into a corner. They need to recognise that despite (or because of) its discriminatory nature, and despite ploys and ideology, it remains true that horizontal proliferation is bad for everyone. Even if China’s view of the nuclear arms race in terms of the rationality of ‘imperialism’ is quite right it still has like everyone else, in the words of E. P. Thompson, to face the “irrational outcome of colliding formations and wills” [30]. The belief contained in the preamble of the NPT “that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war” [31] is surely absolutely correct. ‘No more’ may not be as good as ‘none at all’, but it is better than ‘more and more’ from a global perspective, and it can provide a foothold on a ladder to ‘none at all’, a ladder which can only be created by positive attitudes to the disarmament institutions and proce- dures already gained, allowing the possibility of pressing further the complaints and demands made by the Third World nations at the Third Review Conference [32].

It may be insisted by some Western observers of somewhat cynical bent that it is indeed the case that China simply wanted and wants nuclear arms to assert Great Power status, so that its interpretation and critique of the NPT is really a hypocritical rationalisation. However, it should not be overlooked that China turns the tables on this argument by claiming that the pro-NPT arguments (threat to human race, etc.) are really a hypocritical rationalisation of a super-power effort to maintain domination. Our historical position, I believe, demands the rejection of both these extreme interpretations for such mutual accusations do not advance anyone’s grasp of the global military situation and its dangers and ultimately are not to anyone’s advantage. They rather present a block to understanding and present ‘advantage’ in narrow and increasingly outdated nationalistic terms which run counter to collective human interest. What we have here is a situation in which there is a one-sided truth in each position, pro-NPT and anti-NPT, and the important task is to bring these two aspects together to break the stalemate.

China now claims to be firmly against proliferation. But curiously, some of the arguments presented against the NPT still make China appear to be “at least indirectly in favour of proliferation,” as Goldblat puts it [33], and this is one price of not signing. This uncomfortable inconsistency is not an inscrutable Chinese puzzle but springs from the logic of the position adopted in the face of the facts and global consequences of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons states generally justify possession on the grounds of deterrence, overlooking the fact that this implicitly condones proliferation. As McMahan says,

There is an element of hypocrisy in the view, common among apologists for the British force, that, while it would be bad if other countries-even

China’s Case Against the NPT 195

Britain’s allies-were to acquire nuclear weapons, nevertheless Britain must have them in order (among other things) to deter nuclear blackmail. [34]

This inconsistency is a tacit recognition on China’s part of the truth (the rationality and morality) in the pro-NPT position, a truth which it wrongly believes it cannot fully acknowledge without undermining its critique of the NPT.

Wu does say, This critical attitude [of China towards NPT], however, does not mean that China stands for or encourages the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, he adds that China opposes “South Africa’s and Israel’s attempts to acquire or develop nuclear weapons” [35]. One may well ask whether Chinese pressure from within the NPT would not help in this opposition.

(b) On Forgoing Nuclear Weapons

I further maintain that even if China did have a good case for not signing it still would not follow from that that it is justified in acquiring nuclear arms. There need be no inconsistency in refusing to sign while at the same time also refusing to develop or acquire nuclear weapons (in spite of the freedom and capacity to do so). Indeed, if China had adopted this course its moral standing would surely have gained interna- tional recognition, its critique of the NPT would have been more readily received as sincere and cogent, and the cause of disarmament admirably served. However, now that China also has nuclear missiles there is arguably no more onus on the USA or USSR to disarm than on China; why should not China take the lead? By acquiring nuclear arms China has got itself enmeshed in nuclear strategies and war games and, apparently, now finds American military bases and nuclear facilities on foreign territory ‘useful’ to China.

But it is safe to assume that China dismissed the non-nuclear weapons option because it believed in the necessity of a nuclear deterrent, and in this belief it is joined by present-day Brazil and India who have declared a need to keep the nuclear deterrent option open. If this belief is correct then certainly my argument about signing the NPT would not appear to be very persuasive. It may be thought that there is no real alternative to acquiring a nuclear deterrent if one can, especially if one is as important a country in terms of resources and demography as China or India or Brazil.

This belief could relate to the NPT in one of two ways. Either it is claimed that given the present form of the NPT there is no choice but to acquire nuclear arms, or it is claimed that whatever its form there is no choice. The latter, strong form implies a rejection even of a Treaty amended to take full account of the Chinese critique. In this outlandish position there would be no point in making the critique, and China’s motives would have to be equated with the highly dubious ones of South Africa or Israel. All things considered, it must be the weaker form which China intends. That is, only if the NPT were radically amended to stand as a genuine preliminary to nuclear disarmament could China have been expected (and non-nuclear weapons states still be expected) to forgo the acquisition of nuclear arms. But such an amendment, I would suggest, cannot come all at once and may only come about by the participation of China and the other major Third World countries in the NPT. China should consider whether it is not putting the cart before the horse.

Still, one may say that if it were true that a nuclear deterrent is necessary for China in existing political and military conditions then it would be unwise for China to forgo

196 G. Hunt

such a deterrent while it lays all its hopes on reform of the NPT. Now here, one could adopt one of two tacks: (1) to deny that there is no acceptable alternative to the nuclear deterrent; (2) to show how even if there is no comparable alternative deterrent, obtaining a nuclear deterrent is still not the answer. Let us first try the former tack.

Although this is not the place to review all the arguments brought forward against the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and anyway I do not pretend to be able to say anything new in this regard, I will just mention some particularly compelling points against the doctrine and in favour of an alternative. Firstly, acquiring nuclear weapons, however justified the criticism of the NPT may be, increases global insecurity and gives greater cause for the development of further nuclear arms both among those who already have them and those who do not. Furthermore, a state which acquires nuclear arms, especially perhaps when it cannot possibly develop a large and invulnerable second-strike capability, is more, not less, likely to bring nuclear violence upon itself. Forgoing (or dismantling) nuclear weapons, especially on the grounds of their omnicidal implications, would give the nuclear super-powers and their allies less cause to increase their arsenals and would put moral, legal, diplomatic and political pressure on them to take the NPT more seriously.

Secondly, developing countries have to weigh up the putative benefits of nuclear arms against the appalling economic costs which divert critical resources from areas of dire need. Thus China, understandably perhaps, but quite unnecessarily, invested 2-3% of its GNP in its two original nuclear plants at a time when the country was ravaged by disease and famine. The Lanclow plant alone, it is estimated, used 10% of the nation’s entire electric power in the 1959-65 period [36]. It will be said that China had to make a choice between defending its revolution for long-term development and satisfying the short-term economic needs of its people. My argument is not against the priority of defence in such a situation, but against the priority of nuclear defence given the cost of maintaining its effectiveness.

Thirdly, considering an alternative to the nuclear deterrent: although future nuclear threats and attacks against China, or other Third World countries, are quite possible, an effective defence may be provided by a massive ‘people’s army’ or ‘territorial’ defence system using conventional weapons. In super-power wars against unified and mobilised countries like Vietnam nuclear weapons are inappropriate insofar as the aggressor has to face the prospect of a long-term, debilitating and politically uncom- fortable war of attrition with the entire population even if the seat of government and industry is annihilated [37]. In such a situation nuclear aggression is pointless and the potential victim may succeed in persuading an aggressor of this even before hostilities begin.

This proposal for an alternative to nuclear deterrence, and the cogency of the two immediately preceding considerations, may still not be regarded as absolutely persua- sive, although surely it should enter into any national weighing up of the pros and cons of acquiring nuclear arms. In the last analysis there is only one absolutely persuasive argument, but it requires a challenge to merely national perspectives and this, admittedly, is hard for many to accept under contemporary political, social and ideological conditions. This is where we adopt the second tack.

Ultimately, any state should forgo nuclear weapons (or dismantle them) not because of the existence of alternatives, or because economic costs are too high, but because of the omnicidal implications. We can approach this through a consideration of an apparent contradiction which has emerged in the course of the discussion SO far.

China’s Case Against the NPT ‘ 197

In section 2 I had concluded that there does appear to be good reason for rejecting the NPT and obtaining nuclear arms, from China’s point of view (or that of any non- nuclear weapons state which considers itself a potential victim of nuclear attack). Now, I am saying that even though the NPT is discriminatory China ultimately has no good reason for rejecting NPT and obtaining these weapons. What can be done about this contradiction?

A simplified model may help. Consider a world of states in which two, U and R, are enemies. If U alone has nuclear weapons then a ‘no more’ treaty serves U’s military advantage. It can threaten R with nuclear attack in pursuing its economic and political ends. But an easily overlooked feature of this situation is that it is not (or is extremely unlikely to be) ornnicidal-it is potentially genocidal for R. In this scenario, looked at from R’s viewpoint, if it were also to obtain these weapons then U’s military advantage would be taken away, and this of course is the charm of the nuclear deterrent. But now it is easily overlooked that the military advantages are equalised only in the sense that the situation (mutual assured destruction) is to no one’s advantage but rather to the equal disadvantage of both. This is how a dangerous and uneasy ‘peace’ is obtained. Furthermore, once it escalates to a certain level, this mutual deterrent system is, from the point of view of the whole, not better but is worse than the monopoly situation because this situation is potentially omnicidal. Still, we might expect, and post-war history bears this out, that R will prefer a situation of equal disadvantage with omncidal implications to one of disadvantage for R alone with genocidal implications. A rational basis for this choice, at an early stage, might be that genocide can be regarded as more likely than omnicide. But, again from the point of view of the whole, this is not an overriding consideration. What is overriding for the whole is that even a remote chance of omnicide is less preferable to a high chance of genocide because omnicide is final for humanity whereas genocide is not.

As the nuclear arms race progresses the situation changes in complexion. Because of ‘nuclear winter’ effects the omnicidal threshold is soon passed (as happened years ago) and then any other state, C, which obtains nuclear weapons to thwart genocide is only increasing the now high risk of omnicide and thus indirectly of course increasing the threat to itself. In this late stage, and in most actual circumstances, it is quite likely that the omnicidal risk would be greater than the genocidal risk. C‘s acquisition of nuclear weapons might just be the last straw.

Still, potential proliferators may only be persuaded that the omnicidal cost of acquiring these weapons outweighs the anti-genocidal benefits if the NPT can be seen to be an element in a process resulting in the abolition of all nuclear arms. Only if the NPT parties can be engaged in such a process can the ‘illusory’ rationale for proliferation be taken away, and the ‘good reasons’ that a Third World country has for rejecting NPT and obtaining nuclear arms be invalidated without qualification. To abolish nuclear weapons entirely is the only way of benefiting everyone, although of course it would not thereby eradicate conflict and war.

Conclusion

To summarise. When, on one hand, Wu Xiu Quan says, “ ... the NPT is so discriminatory in character that it could easily be exploited by the major nuclear powers to serve their vested interests.. . Hence the Treaty is not conducive to averting the danger of nuclear war.. .” [38] the inference is invalid, for the NPT is both discriminatory and is, and can be made more, conducive to world peace. Hoev

198 G. Hunt

conducive depends in large part on China and the other major non-signatories. When Goldblat, on the other hand, says in support of NPT, “if the need to stop nuclear proliferation is accepted, criticism of the NPT on the grounds that it is discriminatory is besides the point” [39] the inference is again invalid, for both the need for non- proliferation and the discriminatory character of NPT can and should be accepted and acted upon.

Now, acting upon the discriminatory character of the NPT involves not only what I have already suggested, namely legal and diplomatic attention to the imbalance built into the formal terms of the NPT. It requires attention, on the part of the non- governmental peace organisations, to the substantive global inequalities of wealth and power indicated by the Chinese critique. I conclude with the suggestion that the substantive issue of the economic competition and exploitation, both on the level of contending classes and of contending nations, which is so often the basic (although certainly not the only) motive of war has to be embraced in the analysis and demands of the peace movement. No serious peace initiative can ignore the economic division of the world into haves and have-nots.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Steve Brigley and Russell Holden of the Welsh Centre for Interna- tional Affairs and Collin Stephens of the Foreign i? Commonwealth Office (Arms Control i?z Disarmament Research Unit) for their assistance with sources of informa- tion on the NPT and the 1985 Review Conference. I am grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for providing the support which made this work possible. I received useful comments from Robin Attfield, Andrew Belsey, Roger Crisp and from participants in a seminar at St David’s University College, Lampeter at which this paper was presented. Remaining errors are my own.

Correspondence: Geoffrey Hunt, Leverhulme Visiting Fellow, Department of Philoso- phy, University College, P.O. Box 78, Cardiff CF1 IXL, Wales.

NOTES

[I] See B. PASKINS, Proliferation and the nature of deterrence, in: N. BLAKE & K. POLE (Eds) (1983) Dangers of Deterrence (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul). For claims about the efficacy of deterrence see R.N. LEBOW (1985) Deterrence reconsidered: the challenge of recent research, Sumiwal, 27, pp.

[2] For the full text of the NPT see J. GOLDBLAT (1983) Arms Control Agreements: a handbook (London, Taylor & Francis), pp. 157-158 or J.H. BARTON & L.D. WEILER (Eds) (1976) International Arms Control: issues and agreements, Appendix C (California, Stanford University Press).

20-28.

[3] At the time of writing 130 nations have signed the NPT and 40 or more have not. [4] Reproduced in J. GOLDBLAT (Ed.) (1985) Non-proliferation: the why and the wherefore (London,

Taylor & Francis). [5] Of course, the validity of an interpretation is not settled simply by reference to ‘the facts’, for it is also a

question of identifying the facts and understanding them. To show the validity of an interpretation requires an extensive discursive method which indicates the coherence and consistency of the ‘picture’, and to show its superiority requires an extensive comparison with alternative interpretations. For a comparison of alternative paradigms underlying theories of economic ‘underdevelopment’ see G. HUNT, Two methodological paradigms in development economics, The Philosophical Forum (forthcoming).

[6] See the contribution of R. DRIFTE in: GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., p. 45. [7] India, which also refused to sign NPT, exploded its first nuclear device in May 1974.

China’s Case Against the NPT 199

[8] See J.H. BARTON & L.D. WEILER, op. cit., p. 28. [9] GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., p. 22.

[lo] Peking Review, 16 August 1963, cited by R. DRIFTE, in his contribution to GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., p.

[ll] Final Document, NPT/CONF.III/64/IY Annex I, pp. 11-12. [12] Ibid., Annex 11, p. 2. [13] J. GOLDBLAT (1983) op. cit., p. 46. [14] See WU XIU QUAN, in: GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., p. 42. [15] Final Document, NPT/CONF.III/64/1, Annex I, p. 17. [la] See: Who wants the bomb? South, No. 59, September 1985, p. 14. [17] See B.M. BLECHMAN & D.M. HART (1982) The political utility of nuclear weapons: the 1973 Middle

East Crisis, International Security, 7, pp. 132-56. [l8] On 22 September 1979 there was an event over the Indian Ocean widely believed to be a South African

nuclear test. See UNITED NATIONS (1980) South Africa’s Plan & Capability in the Nuclear Field A summary, Disarmament Factsheet, No. 15 which concludes that “According to the experts, there is no doubt that South Africa has the technical capability to make nuclear weapons and the necessary means of delivery”.

46.

[19] N. DOWER (1983) World Powerty: challenge 6’ response (York, William Sessions). [20] GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., p. 19. [21] See J.K. JACOBSEN & C. HOFHANSEL (1984) Safeguards and profits: civilian nuclear exports, Neo-

Marxism and the Statist approach, International Studies Quarterly, 28, pp. 195-218; R.F. GOHEEN (1983) Problems of Proliferation: US policy and the Third World, World Politics, 35, pp. 194-215. The clash between non-proliferation safeguards and profits has been strikingly evident in the recent vacillations and evasions of the Sino-American nuclear co-operation agreement. On this see Economist, 291,5 May 1984 and same vol. 30 June 1984 as well as Bewng Review, 27,2 July 1984.

[22] Cited by R. D R I ~ in GOLDBLAT (1985), op. cit., p. 50. [23] GOLDBLAT (1983) op. cit., p. 157. [24] GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., p. 28. Note that the safeguards got tighter with the 1977 Guidelines for

[25] GOLDBLAT (1983) op. cit., pp. 41-43. [26] SIPRI (1980) The NPT: the main political barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation (London, Taylor &

[27] For example, see the complaints of a Cameroonian diplomat: P.B. ENGO (1985) An African perspective

[28] GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., p. 26. [29] See for example Beding Rewiew, 26, of 28 November 1983 and 27, of 2 July 1984 on benefits of nuclear

[30] E.P. THOMPSON (1982) Zero Option, pp. 41-43. (London, Merlin Press). [31] Incredibly perhaps, it has been argued at length that “the slow spread of nuclear weapons will promote

peace and reinforce international stability”, K.N. WALTZ (1981) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: more may be bener (Adelphi Papers No. 171, International Institute for Strategic Studies). A critique of this view is given by B. RUSSE-IT in D.L. BRITO, M.D. INTRILIGATOR & A.E. WICK (1983) Snategiesfm Managing Nuclear Proliferation: economic and political issues (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books).

[32] According to one report on the conference, “It is the first time that the Treaty’s 130 signatories-most of them Third World countries-have been able to agree onanything that criticizes both East and West for fuelling the arms race”, The Sunday Times (London), 23 September 1985, p. 19.

Nuclear Transfers brought into effect by 15 developed nations called ‘the London Club’.

Francis).

on security in the non-proliferation regime, Disarmament, 8, pp. 34-39.

technology.

[33] GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., p. 18. [34] J. MCMAHAN, Nuclear blackmail, in: BLAKE & POLE (1983) op. cit., p. 99. [35] Cited in GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., pp. 42-43. Wu goes on to quote a statement to the same effect

[36] BARTON & WEILER point out that “These investments drastically affected the availability of resources

[37] See MCMAHAN, op. cit., pp. 99-108 on alternatives to nuclear deterrence. 1381 Cited in GOLDBLAT (1985) op. cit., p. 41. [39] Ibid., p. 23.

recently made by Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang.

for other programmes, but were assigned the highest priority”, op. cit., p. 146.