Chinas Air Ambitions Feb 2014

8/10/2019 Chinas Air Ambitions Feb 2014

1/10

While gaps still remain in key areas, Chinas overall

development and production of military aircraft is

advancing rapidly. IHS examines the developments,

ambitions and outlook.

Introduction

Over the last 15 years Chinas domestic aerospace

industry has made rapid progress in developing its

capabilities to such an extent that it can now increasingly

meet the requirements of the Peoples Liberation Army

(PLA) in aircraft design and development.

While there are still some key areas of deficiency, both in

terms of military and industrial capabilities, it is clear that

efforts are being made to address these remaining gaps

in order to create a domestic military aerospace sector

that is truly self-reliant.

A number of high-profile events have made it difficult to

ignore the development of Chinese aerospace capabilities

over the last five years. Since 2011 seven new aircraft

have made their maiden flights, including two fifth-

generation combat aircraft designs.

Chinas aircraft production (Source: IHS Janes DS Forecast)

November 2013

IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security

Analysis:Chinas Air

Ambitions

2013 IHS 1 ihs.com/jdsf|ihs.com/jmsa|ihs.com/jdp
http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01


2/10

IHSAnalysis: Chinas Air Ambitions

The PLAs aviation arms have also achieved a rapid pace

of inventory modernisation and enhancement, due in no

small part to the existence of nine known military aircraft

production programmes in China that produce aircraft for

the Chinese armed forces. In 2012 up to 148 aircraft arethought to have been produced for the army, navy, and

air force.

Fifth-generation ambitions

The two highest-profile projects to come to light since

2011 are the Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corporation

(CAC) J-20 and Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) J-

31 fifth-generation combat aircraft. While the emergence

of the J-20 in 2011 had been widely anticipated following

tacit acknowledgement of the programme by PLA

officials, the emergence of a second design just 21

months later was a clear demonstration of the breadth of

developmental work under way in China. At present there

have been no indications of intent to acquire the J-31.

However, the J-20 now looks set to become a future

mainstay of the PLA Air Forces (PLAAFs) twin-engine

fighter fleet.

Both designs incorporate features that are clearly aimed

at radar cross-section (RCS) minimisation. However,

judging the two aircrafts capabilities remains extremely

challenging as systems and sensors are now more crucial

to military aircraft performance than at any time in the

past. Until more is known about the technology within the

J-20 and J-31 it is impossible to accurately compare the

two to other fifth-generation combat aircraft. In addition,

the eventual production-standard aircraft may well differ

in some respects from the prototypes now in flight test as

new technologies are refined and developed.

Given the relatively limited maturity of Chinese technology

in a number of areas, the kind of integrated capabilities

possessed by these aircraft is unlikely to be of a similar

standard to Russian and Western systems. For example,

the first generation of Chinese-developed electronically

scanned array radars has yet to enter service.

Perhaps the best indication of the nascent capabilities in

these areas is the reported reluctance of Russia to supply

Beijing with Sukhois 4++-generation Su-35 for fear that

the aircrafts systems will be reverse-engineered by

China.

Even if access to technology is not behind Beijings

interest in the Su-35, its purchase at a time when so

many indigenous fighter development and production

programmes are ongoing would suggest the Russian

aircraft is superior in some respects.

Strategic lift

Arguably a more important milestone for both industry

and the PLA, however, was the first f light of the Xian

Aircraft Industries Group Y-20 strategic transport aircraft

that took place in January 2013. The Y-20 represents the

first example of a truly indigenous large aircraft, albeit

with Russian-made Aviadvigatel D-30KP2 engines and



3/10


apparent design input from Ukraines Antonov, and

demonstrates a further expansion of Chinese industrial

capabilities. The emergence of the type also provides a

potential opportunity to develop a genuine air-to-air

refuelling platform in the future, thereby addressing two ofthe key weaknesses of the PLAs current aviation

inventory.

Meanwhile, the Shaanxi Aircraft Industries Company Y-9

programme a comprehensive modernisation of the

companys Y-8 tactical transport aircraft featuring a

redesigned wing, fully pressurised fuselage, and new six-

bladed propellers provides further evidence of the

increased focus on airlift. Despite initial delays as a resultof design changes, the first production aircraft in PLAAF

colours was seen in the latter part of 2012 and the type is

now expected to begin re-equipping the air forces

transport regiments.

The parallel development of a maritime patrol and anti-

submarine warfare version of the aircraft featuring a

large chin-mounted surface-search radar, electro-optical

turret, ordnance bay, and magnetic anomaly detectorboom also appears to have made rapid progress over

the last three years, with the aircraft pictured in flight in

late 2012.

This was followed in November 2013 by images

suggesting a new airborne early warning (AEW) variant of

the Y-8/9 was also under development. This featured a

top-mounted rotating dome radar, possibly representing

a further development of the ZDK-03 AEW aircraft

supplied to the Pakistan Air Force in 2011. With the

Ilyushin Il-76-based KJ-2000 and Y-8-based KJ-200

already in service with the PLAAF and the PLA Navy

(PLAN), China appears to be intent on enhancing anairborne surveillance fleet that is already second in size

only to the United States.

Brand new trainers

The modernisation of the PLAAF and PLANs advanced

jet trainer fleets has now also begun in earnest with the

Guizhou Aviation Industry Company JL-9 and Hongdu

Aviation Industry Group JL-10 (formerly known by its

manufacturers designation of L-15) having both entered

series production. On 1 July the initial JL-10 production

aircraft for the PLAAF conducted its maiden flight. With

250 of the aircrafts Ukrainian Motor Sich AL222-24F

afterburning turbofan engines placed under contract in

2011, it seems highly likely that at least 100 aircraft will

enter service as replacements for the ageing CAC JJ-7

inventory. At present the PLAN appears to be focused on

the less technologically advanced JL-9 design, with statemedia revealing the existence of a carrier-training variant

in 2011.

The rotary-wing sector has seen more mixed progress.

Local industry has yet to develop a suitable medium- or

heavy-lift helicopter design despite pressing requirements

for both from the PLA. The development of the Hafei

Aviation Industry Company Z-9 (based on the Eurocopter



4/10


AS 365 Dauphin) to fill a range of roles such as troop

transport (Z-9B), anti-submarine warfare (Z-9C), anti-

surface warfare (Z-9D), and close air support (Z-9WZ) has

been in part due to the lack of a viable, indigenously

produced alternative to meet these requirements.

The most notable recent successes from a PLA

perspective have come in the form of the Changhe

Aircraft Industries Group Z-10 and Hafei Aviation Industry

Company Z-19: two indigenously produced attack

helicopters. The Z-10, which is now known to have been

designed in its initial form by Russias Kamov, has been

identified operating with at least five army aviation

regiments and provided the PLA with its first true attackhelicopter. Meanwhile, recent photographs suggest the Z-

19, a further extensive re-development of the Z-9 with a

tandom cockpit, may now also have entered service.

Nevertheless, the scale of imports of Russian Mil Mi-

17/171 helicopters over the last 10 years provides an

indication of the comparative lack of progress that has

been made by the Chinese aerospace industry in the

rotary-wing sector. Since the Sichuan earthquake in 2008,where PLA units sent to assist in rescue operations were

delayed by a lack of tactical airlift, import orders have

accelerated in an apparently pragmatic recognition that

local industry would not be in a position to address this

capability shortfall soon enough.

In the future a militarised development of the civil Hafei

Aviation Industry Company Z-15 (EC175) co-developed

with Eurocopter and an unnamed design resembling the

Sikorsky S-70 (UH-60) Black Hawk often referred to as

the Z-20 offer the most likely short-term prospects for

success.

Combat aircraft developments

While the spectrum of activity in aircraft design and

manufacturing has broadened over the last three years,

combat aircraft remain the short-term focus of the

aerospace industry. Of the nine production programmes

known to be active in China in 2013, four Xian Aircraft

Industries Groups H-6K and JH-7A, the J-10A, and the

J-11B are producing aircraft for PLA fighter and bomber

divisions. Similarly, five of the identified developmental

efforts that are under way the J-10B, J-15, SAC J-16, J-

20, and J-31 are multirole fighter designs.

The J-10 programme remains arguably the most

important Chinese fighter project of the past two

decades, representing a breakthrough moment for the

domestic aerospace industry when it entered service in

2003. While deliveries of the J-10A have proceeded at

pace over the intervening 10 years, production is now

expected to draw to a close following completion of the

development of the enhanced J-10B.

There has been no official confirmation of PLAAF units

being equipped with this new variant, although imagery

from China suggests series production is now well under

way, with the aircraft expected to enter service in the next

few months after a lengthy flight programme. Ultimately,



5/10


more than 600 J-10s are expected to enter service with

the PLAAF as the remaining CAC J-7-equipped regiments

are recapitalised.

Chinas fighter fleet has undergone a generational shift (Source: IHS Janes

DS Forecast)

The J-10B variant provides an excellent example of the

incremental approach to the development of combat

aircraft that has been a standard approach for Chinese

manufacturers since the 1970s. Production of the initial

variant has continued at pace alongside the development

of the J-10B. The aircraft appears to feature a scanned

array radar the first fitted to a Chinese fighter a

modified diverterless engine intake, and an enhanced

range of sensors and electronic warfare capabilities.

Chinese officials have confirmed an increased use of

composite materials and the creation of a pulsation

production line, demonstrating that manufacturing

techniques are maturing alongside system and aircraft

design capabilities.

While in the past the approach of incremental

developments to existing aircraft designs was necessary

due to the lack of capability in platform design, this may

no longer be the key motivation. With production shifting

from foreign to indigenously designed aircraft, this

technique is in many ways well suited to the pace of

progress being made in parallel areas such as engine and

system development. The breadth and tempo of projects

currently under way in China necessitates such a flexible

approach and has also provided a key advantage in

rapidly building the competency of domestic designbureaus and production facilities.

Simultaneously, SACs previously troubled J-11B project

now appears to be making steady progress. Following

several years of setbacks largely a result of

development issues with the intended indigenous Liming

Aero-Engine Manufacturing Corporation (LMAC) WS-10A

Taihang powerplant at least four regiments are now

equipped with the type. While the aircraft is essentially anindigenised development of the license-built Sukhoi Su-

27SK, the design incorporates substantial improvements,

including a reduced RCS, a strengthened airframe with

the use of composite materials, an improved fire-control

radar, a new flight-control system, and a glass cockpit.

The PLAN also began taking deliveries of the J-11B in

mid-2010.



6/10


One significant consequence of the proliferation of

indigenous combat aircraft projects is that the PLAs

fighter fleet has experienced a rapid pace of

modernisation over the past decade. While a large

number of regiments continue to be equipped withobsolete J-7 and SAC J-8 designs, the increasingly

reliable flow of aircraft from the J-10 and J-11 production

lines has allowed for significant qualitative advances. In

2007 around one in four of the PLAAFs combat aircraft

fleet could be considered to possess modern, fourth-

generation capabilities, whereas by late 2013 just six

years later close to half of the fighter fleet is thought to

have reached this standard.

Nevertheless, modernisation to date has been largely

limited to combat aircraft fleets, with the development

and production of combat aircraft prioritised over support

aircraft such as airlifters and aerial refuelling platforms. As

a result the PLAAFs inventory remains largely focused on

the provision of capabilities suited to localised operations

and possesses only limited power projection capabilities.

Strategic transformation

A comparative analysis of army and air force aviation in

the United States and China shows that mobility remains

a key capability weakness for the PLA. China operates

one transport helicopter for every seven US platforms;

one C-130-sized tactical transport for every 13 in US

service; and one strategic transport for every 14 operated

by the US Air Force (USAF).

The USAF, meanwhile, operates around 570 aerial

refuelling aircraft compared with just 10 possessed by the

PLAAF. If training aircraft are excluded, then 42% of the

USAFs inventory is dedicated to support tasks such as

airlift, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),and aerial refuelling. The PLAAFs own support aircraft

constitute 26% of its inventory.

US and Chinese transport aircraft inventories (Source: IHS Janes Military &

Security Assessments Intelligence Centre)

It is therefore perhaps no surprise that one of the Chinese

Ministry of National Defenses (MNDs) stated priorities for

the PLAAF is to accelerate its transition from territorial air

defence to both offensive and defensive operations, and

increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance

and early warning ... and strategic projection, in an effort

to build itself into a modernised strategic air force. As a

result, while the PLAAF is expected to continue to



7/10


modernise its combat aircraft fleet over the coming

decade, it is likely to be the support elements of the

inventory that see a quantitative expansion as Beijing

looks to create a more balanced air force capability better

suited to supporting the expanding ambitions of the PLAand the Chinese government.

The entry into service of the Y-9 which is expected to

maintain a steady rate of production over the next 10

years and the Y-20 in the longer term will provide

Chinese airlift capabilities with a considerable boost and

allow the PLAAF to modernise and expand its air

transport fleet.

Although progress is likely to be relatively slow compared

with the transformation seen in the combat aircraft fleet,

particularly with regard to strategic lift, the domestic

aerospace sector now appears to be much closer to

being in a position to fill these increasingly important PLA

requirements. Furthermore, the Y-9 and Y-20 are likely to

form the basis of a number of ISR and aerial refuelling

platforms in the future.

Air-to-air refuelling is perhaps the most significant gap in

capabilities at present; the air force currently has just 10

H-6U modified bombers offering very little in the way of

capacity and minimal hope that this capability can be

expanded significantly in the short term. Until this

situation is rectified the PLAs ability to conduct and

sustain operations at even modest distances beyond its

national territory will remain severely constrained.

Importing capability

The governments growing emphasis on indigenous

sources for its defence equipment has certainly placed

pressure on the domestic industry to develop the

technologies and platforms now required to fill the more

expansive strategic goals of the PLA. Nevertheless, the

Chinese aerospace sector remains unable to meet all PLA

requirements, with the clearest indications of the more

persistent gaps in industrial capability being provided by

the contracts signed over recent years for foreign-

manufactured aircraft and systems.

While imports of Russian Sukhoi combat aircraft

concluded in 2005 and local production of the licence-

produced J-11A (Su-27SK) was curtailed in 2004, a

number of contracts have been finalised since that time in

areas where local capacity is less robust.

In total, contracts for 138 aircraft and 1,423 engines have

been finalised with foreign suppliers over the past decade

and there have been few signs of a discernible downturn

in the pace or size of orders.

Of more than 1,400 engines, 707 ordered have been

placed under contract since the start of 2011. With

production rates suggesting that around 100 engines will

be required annually to support fighter production alone

over the next 10 years, reports stating that follow-on

orders are already under negotiation seem plausible.



8/10


Furthermore, a number of key aviation programmes

remain reliant on the continued supply of foreign-made

powerplants. The L-15 advanced jet trainer is currently

powered by the Ukrainian-made AL-222-24F, the J-10

and J-10B by the Russian AL-31FN, the H-6K and Y-20by the D-30KP2, and the CAC JF-17 a key Chinese

export programme by the RD-93.

Investing in engines

While Beijing has been pragmatic in its decision to

continue importing large numbers of engines from

abroad, government and industry continue to invest in

closing this key capability gap. In April 2011 AVIC

announced plans to commit more than CNY10 billion

(USD1.53 billion) to aero-engine R&D over the following

five years: a commitment that represented AVICs

greatest independent investment during the period. The

company also announced in 2012 that it would task

LMAC one of its major aero-engine subsidiaries with

the creation and implementation of a technology roadmap

aimed at accelerating progress in this area.

There have, however, been indications of progress. The

acceleration of J-11B deliveries is largely a result of the

WS-10A turbofan being delivered in meaningful numbers.

Furthermore, in early 2013 Chinese state media, citing

officials at the PLAAF Command Institute, revealed that

the Y-20 would also soon fly with an indigenous engine

thought to be the so-called WS-20 high-bypass turbofan

which would offer improved performance compared

with the D-30KP2. While previous attempts at engine

development suggest any such maiden flight would

significantly pre-date series production of the powerplant,

this would nevertheless represent progress in an area

short on success.

At present the WS-10A remains the only indigenously

developed engine in series production, with a number of

other projects, notably the WS-13 the intended

replacement for the RD-93 delayed. There have been

numerous indications that the domestic aero-engine

industry has begun work on a number of powerplants for

the next generation of Chinese combat aircraft. However,

it seems likely that progress will remain slow relative towider aerospace manufacturing capabilities. The entry

into series production of the J-20 may well be dictated

more by the ability of AVIC to develop and manufacture a

suitable and reliable powerplant than by the development

of the airframe and systems of the aircraft.

Building robust capabilities in this area will also be crucial

in expanding Chinese exports in the military aerospace

market, with the lack of control over this key element ofthe supply chain acting as an impediment to

independence. While Beijing has been keen to promote

the JF-17 to potential foreign customers in recent years,

the aircrafts Russian-made RD-93 engine ostensibly

provides Moscow with a veto over potential sales of the

aircraft, which in many markets is a competitor for

Russian offerings. This awkward dynamic has arguably

been a key reason behind the continued sales of the



9/10


increasingly technologically obsolete F-7, with final

deliveries of the most recent F-7BGI variant completed

during 2013.

While engine imports continue at a rapid pace, orders for

foreign-made aircraft have slowed noticeably since 2007

and are now limited to filling specific PLA requirements

that cannot, as yet, be met effectively by local industry.

Of the 138 aircraft ordered from foreign manufacturers in

the last 10 years, 80% have been Russian-made Mil Mi-

17 Hip transport helicopter variants purchased to

address the lack of an indigenous medium helicopter

design. An assembly line for the type opened in China in

2008 to provide a further 20 helicopters a year.

However, fixed-wing imports have slowed significantly

following the collapse of Chinas order for 30 Il-76TD

Candid strategic transport and eight Il-78M Midas

tanker aircraft due to complications relating to the

aircrafts production facilities. A contract for 10

refurbished Il-76MD airlifters announced in late 2012

suggests that, had a viable production line been available,

significant orders for the type would likely have beenplaced throughout the past decade. However, China now

seems likely to assess progress in the development of its

own Y-20 strategic transport before considering the

purchase of additional Russian-made aircraft.

Conclusion

While China has made great strides in aircraft

development, aircraft systems, production techniques,

composites, and to a lesser extent engine

development and manufacture, these capabilities remain

far from a fully mature state at this stage.

Furthermore, in a number of these areas, in terms of the

capabilities of both industry and the PLA, gaps remain.

The challenge for China in the next decade will not be

developing new indigenous combat aircraft, but in closing

the gaps that still exist.

Nevertheless, given the political will and vast investments

being made in the aerospace sector, it certainly appears

to be a matter of when, rather than if, this state of full

maturity will be achieved.

This analysis is abridged. The full report was developed

using programme data and forecasts fromIHS Janes DS

ForecastandIHS Janes Defence Procurementand

military inventories information fromIHS Janes Military &

Security Assessments Intelligence Centre.

http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01


10/10


About IHS

IHS (NYSE: IHS) is a leading source of information andinsight in pivotal areas that shape todays businesslandscape: energy, economics, geopolitical risk,

sustainability and supply chain management.

Businesses and governments around the globe rely onthe comprehensive content, expert independent analysisand flexible delivery methods of IHS to make high-impactdecisions and develop strategies with speed andconfidence.

IHS has been in business since 1959 and became apublicly traded company on the New York Stock

Exchange in 2005. Headquartered in Englewood,Colorado, USA, IHS employs more than 8,000 people inmore than 30 countries around the world.

ihs.com

About IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security

With a legacy of over 100 years as Janes, IHS is the mosttrusted and respected public source of defence andsecurity information in the world.

With a reputation built on products such as IHS JanesFighting Ships, IHS Janes All the Worlds Aircraft and IHSJanes Defence Weekly, IHS delivers comprehensive,credible and reliable news, insight and analysis across allkey defence and security subject areas, and in support ofcritical military and security processes.

IHS defence and security products and servicesrepresent invaluable open-source news, information and

intelligence assets for businesses, defence organisationsand armed forces.

www.ihs.com/jmsa

http://www.ihs.com/http://www.ihs.com/http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/procurement-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jdp:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/security/military-assessments-intelligence-centre.aspx?ocid=jmsa:email:01http://www.ihs.com/products/janes/defence-business/market-forecasting/index.aspx?ocid=jdsf:email:01

Documents

Chinas Air Ambitions Feb 2014