China, Pakistan, and the "Taliban Syndrome"Author(s): M. Ehsan AhrariSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2000), pp. 658-671Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021187 .Accessed: 17/03/2011 01:41

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CHINA, PAKISTAN, AND THE "TALIBAN SYNDROME"

M. Ehsan Ahrari

The "Taliban syndrome"-the movement to create an Islamic order in Afghanistan-is likely to threaten Pakistan's strategic inter- ests and domestic stability. Ideologically, this syndrome is a blend of strict observance of Islam based on Saudi Arabia's salafiyya (puritanical) tradition. Social practices observed by highly conservative elements of the Afghan tribes and lower middle classes of the Subcontinent allow virtually no room for interpretation or deviation.

Islamic forces of Pakistan have created and nurtured this syndrome in the madrasahs (religious schools) of Pakistan, where the Taliban ("students" in Farsi) from Afghanistan received their education. Since the chief thrust of this education is on Islam and the need for jihad (holy war) to establish an Islamic government, the Taliban members become firm believers and fervent practitioners of this training. During the formative years of their exposure to power politics of Afghanistan, the Taliban had to fight a number of military battles to reunify that country. This fact validated the emphasis on militancy in these madrasahs. The "Taliban syndrome" also refers to the ever-escalat- ing role of radical Islamists in the domestic and foreign policy of Pakistan and other contiguous states. Since this syndrome recognizes no borders, it zealously seeks to establish an Islamic form of government anywhere in the region. For instance, if the Taliban remains in power in Afghanistan and their allies in the sporadic civil war in Tajikistan gain an upper hand, then Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would have ample reasons to worry about politi- cal instability within their own borders. Uzbekistan, despite all its fervor against Islamist forces of change, also remains vulnerable. It is worth noting

M. Ehsan Ahrari is Professor of National Security and Strategy at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.

Asian Survey, 40:4, pp. 658-671. ISSN: 0004-4687 ? 2000 by The Regents of the University of California/Society. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.

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that in April 2000, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to conduct "joint operations to com- bat terrorism, political and religious extremism, multinational organized crime, and other security threats."1

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has special reasons for concern over the potential effects of the Taliban syndrome on the political stability of its Xinjiang Province, where the Uighur Muslims are seeking to win indepen- dence. One report about continuing political unrest in Xinjiang observes, "Separatist sentiment, never fully quelled, has been reignited in recent years by Iran's Islamic revolution and by the newly independent Central Asian na- tions created in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse."2 Another recent report on the escalating political turbulence in this province notes, "China pins the unrest in Xinjiang on a small number of 'separatists,' 'terrorists,' and 'religious extremists' who it accuses of having links with 'foreign hostile forces' seeking to split the motherland." It goes on to state, "Most observers believe that the security situation in Xinjiang is far more serious than in Ti- bet. Local Chinese leaders have talked of 'a life and death struggle' with the enemy'.

Historical Background Precise figures on the total Muslim population in China are not available. Information released for the years 1912-49 listed it to be around 50 million, but data issued in 1990 placed the total number of Muslims at around 17 million, a result of migration to neighboring Central Asian republics in part spurred by the influx of Han Chinese promoted by the government. Accord- ing to Richard De Angelis, the Muslim population in China may be divided into two large groups: Hui-who are descendents from Central Asian, Arab, and Persian Muslim immigrants who intermarried with Han Chinese-and Turkic Muslims of China's Western province. These include Uighur, Khazak, Tajik, and Kyrgyz groups.4

Muslims of Turkic origin primarily live in Xinjiang ("the new frontier," in Chinese). The area is in the middle of Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The landmass of Xinjiang is one-sixth

1. "Russia: Security Council 'Assertive' on Doctrine, Caspian" (in Russian), Kominersant (Moscow), in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report/Central Eurasia, April 22, 2000.

2. "Police Battle Terrorists in China's Restive Northwest," Associated Press, August 29, 1998.

3. John Gittings, "Chinese 'Brutality' Used to Crush Ethnic Dissent," Guardian (London), April 21, 1999.

4. Richard De Angelis, "Muslims and Chinese Political Culture," Muslim World 87:2 (April 1997), pp. 151-68.

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of all of China. The population of Xinjiang includes the non-Muslim Han and various groups of Turkic Muslims (the Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tartars). The Uighurs are reported to be largest group. Xinjiang has plenty of natural resources, including precious minerals, coal, and petroleum. Confirmed oil reserves are "expected to reach 6.5 billion tons, along with billions of cubic meters of natural gas."5

The record of the Uighur independence is intermittent. It was marred by conquest by the Mongol and then by the Manchus. After conquering China, the Manchus invaded Eastern Turkistan in 1759 and ruled it until 1862. The Eastern Turkistanis (Uighurs) with the help of the Ottomans expelled the Manchus in 1863. The Uighurs briefly established the independent state of Eastern Turkistan. China, with the help of Britain, regained control of East- ern Turkistan in 1877. The area was formally annexed to China in 1884 and given its present name, Xinjiang. The Uighurs have not only maintained their religious identity throughout the long occupation by China, but also kept alive their aspiration to become independent once again.

Traditionally, Muslim groups in China have maintained their distinction from the mainstream Han population, largely as a result of their affiliation with Islam. Although the Hui became more assimilated into the Han culture than their Turkic counterparts, they still maintained their separate religious identity. The cultural differences between the Han and Chinese Muslims (es- pecially Uighurs) are acute and may not be reconciled, since the Chinese political regime inhibits cultural and political pluralism. Thus, ethnic and religious minorities who wish to maintain a separate identity undergo repres- sion and hardship to sustain their very existence. The regime strives to as- similate them into the mainstream Han culture.

According to De Angelis, the Han social order gives primacy to a Chinese society "founded on the political, social, and religious premises of filial piety and the Confucian ancestor cult." Chinese Muslims did "not accept the Con- fucian formulation of state and society." De Angelis argues that Muslims "remained alien to the larger culture while their shared faith led them to iden- tify deeply with the larger world community of Islam, the universal Ummah." Because of their unique religious perspective, Muslims were "scorned by Confucian society," and they, in turn, "turned more to their faith as a basis of their identity." The northwestern and southwestern parts of China exper- ienced Muslim unrest in the latter half of the 19th century. Until the com- munist takeover of 1949, the general attitude of the various Chinese governments toward Muslims of China oscillated "between a policy of assim-

5. "Eastern Turkistan: Natural Resources," Eastern Turkistan National Freedom Center [June 9, 1999], on the World Wide Web at <http://http://www.uyghur.org/text2.htm#A3> [accessed June 30, 2000].

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ilation and one of autonomy [that] resulted in hardship for the Muslims and their continued mistrust of the Han administrations."6

In the early years after the communist takeover, during the relaxation phase of the Hundred Flowers era in the PRC, a number of secessionist Mus- lim rebellions erupted. China's Muslims suffered atrocities during the Cul- tural Revolution in the 1960s. As a result, many fled to the Turkic regions in Soviet Central Asia. The Shadian Incident that unfolded in 1967 led to the closing down of several mosques and burning of Muslim religious books. This incident formed part of a larger attempt to wipe out what the govern- ment termed the Four Olds-old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old hab- its. Muslims in China, like Marrano Jews under the Spanish Inquisition, "prayed in secret at home. Their children pursued their study of the Quran with their imams (Akhonds) in the evenings." Despite the repression, even the fasting in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan was observed. Conflicts between the Han and Muslims escalated when the latter were compelled to eat pork. According to some reports, "abominable acts of anti-religious coer- cion were perpetrated when pork bones were thrown into wells in order to pollute irretrievably the drinking water." Official reports say 1,600 Hui Mus- lims were massacred and 4,400 Hui homes were destroyed in July 1975. During the rampage, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) "used not only guns and cannon, but also air bombings."7

After the fall of the Gang of Four in late 1976, the Chinese Communist Party decided to ease tensions with Muslims. A document entitled "Circular of Rehabilitation to the Shadian Incident" stated that this incident should not have been dealt with as a "counterrevolutionary rebellion." The circular ad- mitted that the use of military force was "wrong" and declared that "the many leaders and the people of Hui nationality who were involved in this incident should be rehabilitated." The Chinese government also provided economic assistance to widows and orphans of this brutal phase. In 1987, the party committee of Yunnan "rectified the previous records" and exonerated the leaders of the rebellion "from being treated as counterrevolutionaries."8

Nonetheless, after the emergence of five independent states in Central Asia in the early 1990s, many Muslims in Xinjiang Province harbor their own aspirations of independence. Moreover, the success of the Afghan muja- hideen against the former Soviet Union has palpably encouraged the Islamist groups of Xinjiang.9 The increased politicization of Uighurs in Xinjiang has

6. De Angelis, "Muslims and Chinese Political Culture," pp. 156-160, passim. 7. The preceding discussion is extracted from Raphael Israeli, "A New Wave of Muslim Re-

vivalism in China," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 17:2 (October 1997), pp. 269-82. 8. Ibid. 9. John Pomfret, "Separatists Defy Chinese Crackdown: Persistent Islamic Movement May

Have Help from Abroad," Washington Post, January 26, 2000.

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caused a great deal of concern in China. The PRC has sought reassurances from the Khazak and Kyrgyz governments and signed several agreements ensuring border security. Despite these agreements, the leaders of the PRC leaders remain wary of the potential escalation of Islamic resurgence in the Muslim regions of their own country due to the continuing civil war in Af- ghanistan and the political instability in Tajikistan. There have been frequent reports of clashes between Uighur separatists and Chinese government forces. The most notable clash was the so-called Pinavuanjie Assault in 1992. The Chinese authorities, like their Soviet counterparts in previous de- cades, described this incident as a battle with gangster groups. However, since the clashing forces were identified as Hui Muslims, one cannot rule out that this event was related to the separatist activities. A year later, skirmishes and turmoil broke out in 12 counties of Xinjiang. There was also a report of increased clashes between Chinese security forces and Uighur Islamist sepa- ratists in Xinjiang in January 2000.

In light of these recurring incidents, a classified circular from government sources in December 1999 discusses infiltration of "Islamist militants from Saudi Arabia, Iran, other Persian Gulf states, Turkey, and India." Hence, Chinese officials stated that "they have strong reason to suspect that the Uighur separatists receive help from abroad." They also suspect that explo- sives used in terrorist incidents in Xinjiang were Chinese made but originally "exported to Pakistan and then re-exported to Afghanistan.'"1

A View from Pakistan The promotion of Islamic government within one society or its export to neighboring countries may be studied by using David Lake's and Donald Rothchild's concepts of "escalation" and "diffusion." According to these au- thors, escalation occurs "when a conflict in one country brings in new foreign belligerents-whether neighbors or great powers." Diffusion occurs "when ethnic violence in one state increases the probability of conflict in a second state."11 In the context of this study, reasons for the intensification of the conflict (i.e., escalation) in China are a blend of ethnic differences and the desire of powerful militant groups to establish an Islamic government. For Pakistan and Afghanistan, the reasons for escalation of conflict include ethnic and sectarian differences and the urge to create an Islamic government. Is- lamic orthodoxy-especially the predilections of a number of Sunni groups to eradicate the Shias (Pakistan and Afghanistan) and followers of the

10. Ibid.

11. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict," in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, eds. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 23-24.

M. EHSAN AHRARI 663

Ahmadya sect in Pakistan-has also resulted in a high degree of turbulence and bloodshed in both countries. Reasons underlying diffusion are the in- tense desire on the part of indigenous Islamic groups to establish Islamic governments in a number of Central Asian countries. The Taliban as a force of diffusion are actively involved in supporting the Islamist groups in Central Asia and in Xinjiang.

Members of the Taliban are Sunni Muslim, predominantly of Pushtoon origin. The Taliban practice of Islamic puritanism is nurtured in the madrasahs of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) in the northwestern province of Pakistan where they received their religious education. The JUI-run madrasahs follow a theological line that is very similar to the Saudi salafiyya tradition. Therefore, that party's religious and social thinking has heavily influenced the socio-politico-religious character of the Taliban. Since the 1970s, the JUI has been known for its pursuit of Islamic orthodoxy, blended with strict social and moral codes. As a religious nurturer and a political supporter of the Taliban, the JUI has emerged as an important organization in Pakistan. On many occasions, the government of Pakistan found itself com- peting with the JUI as well as another major Islamist party, the Jamaat-e- Islami (JEI) for influence.

Even though the JEI is not directly involved in the religious education of the Taliban, it has niche issues that serve as sources of its political power. For instance, its position on the instrument of jihad is well established. The JEI, though, has shown willingness to enter into occasional political agree- ments with other political parties. The JEI's single-minded commitment to the creation of an Islamic government in Pakistan became questionable when it joined a coalition to establish democracy in the 1970s. The JEI's commit- ment to democracy was short-lived. For instance, the JEI became a vanguard in a highly contentious movement that declared the Ahmadya sect in Pakistan a non-Muslim entity. Moreover, during the dictatorship of General Zia ul- Haq, the JEI gained unprecedented political clout. Its constant endeavors to Islamize Pakistan were in harmony with Zia's political objective of using Islam to legitimize his own rule. Currently, the JEI still remains a leading advocate for Islamization. As such, there are hardly any theological differ- ences between the JEI and JUL. In fact, the JEI is very supportive of the Taliban, both within and outside Pakistan.

The Taliban version of Islam may be depicted as a mixture of the Islamic puritanism that is observed in Saudi Arabia and Afghan tribal practices. However, it is important to make two related points. First, these tribal prac- tices are not uniformly followed by the entire Afghan society, which is more nuanced in its approach to religion and societal affairs, especially as they involve gender relations. Second, these characteristics transcend the formal borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan and also prevail in the lower middle-

664 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XL, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2000

class Muslim families of the entire Subcontinent. In this environment, all aspects of enlightenment and secular education are perceived as antithetical to Islam. For instance, the Taliban's insistence on the creation of an Islamic state is an integral aspect of many Islamist parties in the Subcontinent. How- ever, Taliban practices of banning female education, mandating the use of the burqa (complete covering of a woman) as opposed to hijab (covering of the face), or requirement that men not even trim their beard are quintessential to the JUL. Taliban's strict requirements are not observed even in Saudi Arabia.

All religious parties of Pakistan, since the days of President Zia ul-Haq, have been radicalized. The foremost responsibility for this radicalization rests with Zia's decision to Islamize the Pakistani polity. Pakistan's role in the Afghan war against the Soviet occupation intensified the element of Is- lamic militancy. Since this war was portrayed in Pakistan as Islam's war on the atheistic Soviet communists, the militant aspect of the jihad became pop- ular within Pakistani society. The prominent roles played by the JUI and the JEI in Afghanistan's war against the Soviet Union enabled them to continue political and jihadi activities to Islamize Pakistan after the cessation of the Afghan war.

There also emerged in Pakistan other Sunni extremist parties, such as Sipah-e-Sahabe-e-Pakistan (SSP, the Society for the soldiers of the compan- ions of the Prophet), Markaz-e-Dawa-wal-Irshad (Center for Islamic invita- tion and guidance), the Lashkar-e-Tayba (Army of the faithful), and the Harakat-ul Ansar (HUA). The HUA was renamed the Harakat-ul-Muja- hideen (Movement of religious fighters) after the U.S. labeled the HUA a "terrorist" group. The last two groups were in the forefront of the Kargil military action in Kashmir. A sad aspect of the Islamization of the Pakistani society also emerged in the form of sectarian hatred between the predominant Sunni population and the Shiites, who constitute about 10%-15% of that country. The Sunni puritan parties have been instrumental in promoting such hatred. For instance, the JUI has a well-established record of producing trea- tises that "apostatize the Shiite Islam."12 The JUI influence on the Taliban explains the staunch anti-Shiite stance of the latter. This theological position of the Taliban has affected their treatment of the Afghan Shiites. In turn, the Taliban's anti-Shiite policies have poisoned their ties with Iran.

In response, the Shiites have formed extremist parties of their own. These include Tahrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafariyya (Movement for the defense of Jafari [Shia] law) and Sipah-e-Mohammad (Mohammad's soldiers). The lat- ter group was specifically established to eradicate the SSP and succeeded in assassinating the founder of the SSP, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. The spiral of vio-

12. Eijaz Haider, "Pakistan's Afghan Policy and Its Fallout," Central Asia Monitor, no. 5 (1998), pp. 1-6.

M. EHSAN AHRARI 665

lence further ratcheted upward when an equally fanatic anti-Shia group, the Lashar-e-Jhangi (Army of Jhangvi), came into existence in the aftermath of Jhangvi's assassination. The cumulative effect of this sectarian-based vio- lence is that Pakistan is edging closer to chaos.

While the Pakistani government remains a strong supporter of the Taliban groups in Afghanistan, it has not been able to influence their political or religious agenda. The Taliban have become almost an indispensable group for Pakistan because Pakistan needs their manpower in the Kashmir conflict. According to one report, the Taliban's growing significance, along with its strong JUI connection, has enabled the former to achieve "a level of social integration with the Pakistani society that is scary."13 The overall outcome of this type of alliance might be creating a powerful momentum toward an attainment of Islamic puritanism that might tear apart the very social fabric of that society.

Pakistan's heavy involvement in the ongoing Afghan civil war appears to be influenced by a number of factors. First, as a country that lacks strategic depth vis-a-vis India, Pakistan seeks various avenues of building spheres of influence and alliances in its northern neighborhood. Moreover, Pakistan is also driven by the fact that if it reduced its efforts at strategic influence in Central Asia-given the zero-sum nature that both South Asian countries as- sign to strategic affairs affecting each other-then India would emerge as a main beneficiary of this ineptitude. Second, given the complexity of the eth- nic politics of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and its linkages with Pakistan, no Pakistani government can afford to remain a neutral observer of the unpredictable power play in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central Asia.

Third, the great Sunni-Shia divide of the Islamic world holds a special meaning in Southwest and Central Asia. Shiite Iran constantly watches the strategic quicksand in which various Sunni groups are maneuvering to remain dominant. Whichever Sunni groups become powerful, they are likely to af- fect the fortunes of the Shia minorities in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Mus- lim Central Asia. The Shiite groups in Afghanistan are suffering a great deal since the Taliban has branded them as infidels. Therefore, Iran cannot afford to watch passively while Shia groups are either annihilated by the Taliban or exiled into Iran. By the same token, Pakistan cannot lower its own support of the Taliban. If the anti-Taliban forces were to gain an upper hand in the Afghan civil war, Iran's strategic influence would be enhanced. Thus, the Taliban has strained the ties between Pakistan and Iran. These ties promise to remain under stress until the Taliban and the Iranian government reach some form of accommodation. In this context, Pakistan has little choice other than remaining heavily involved in the Afghan civil war.

13. Ibid., p. 5.

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An essential side effect of Pakistan's military support of the Taliban has also emerged in relation to its growing appeasement of indigenous Islamist puritan groups. The influence of the overall Taliban syndrome on the strate- gic affairs of Pakistan is palpably on the rise in the aftermath of the leading role played by the Taliban and their Islamist supporters of Pakistan in the Kargil conflict of May-July 1999. This reality was not at all affected even by the military coup of that October in Pakistan. As Pakistan tries to come to grips with the Taliban syndrome, its next door neighbor, China, watches closely how its own Muslim population in the Xinjiang will be affected by this seemingly growing radicalization of Islamic parties in the region.

The Taliban, Islamic Internationalism, and Its Regional Implications

Notwithstanding the growing instability of Pakistan, Islamic internationalism seems to be popularizing the Taliban syndrome in Pakistan and the contigu- ous areas of Central Asia and Xinjiang. This phenomenon is based on the notion of a Muslim Ummah. It de-emphasizes such exclusivistic characteris- tics of a modern-day nation-state as nationality, ethnicity, and tribal identity. The Taliban presumes that all Muslim men and women are brothers and sis- ters in faith and that all must work together to improve the welfare of the Ummah. This theological position is common to all Islamist parties sympa- thetic to the Taliban.

In describing this theological emphasis, it should be pointed out that na- tionalism and ethnic or tribal identities have not dissipated from the Muslim world at large. Muslim unity was a scarce commodity in Central Asia during the so-called basmachi14 rebellion. Since then, ethnic differences and ethnonationalism are still very much alive in Central Asia. In the creation of Bangladesh, ethnic and linguistic differences outweighed the commonality of the Islamic faith shared by the people of East and West Pakistan.

Despite this reality, Islamic internationalism continues to be emphasized by the most radical Islamist parties in Muslim countries. This philosophical outlook was effectively practiced during the Afghan war against the Soviet occupation. It was not portrayed as a struggle of people of a Third World country (Afghanistan) against a militarily powerful neighbor (the USSR). Rather, it was depicted as a jihad of Muslims of Afghanistan against the communist infidels. In the lexicon of Lake and Rothchild, Islamic interna- tionalism was used to escalate the struggle between Islam and communism. The involvement of Pakistan and the U.S. was also an example of the same

14. Basmachi means "bandit," a highly pejorative and contemptuous phrase given by the So- viet occupiers to the Muslim rebellion that erupted between the Russian revolution and the early 1930s.

M. EHSAN AHRARI 667

phenomenon. During the initial phase of the war, the Soviet Union also tried to use the Soviet Muslims-albeit unsuccessfully-in its propaganda to gain support for the puppet regime of Afghanistan. This escalatory aspect of Is- lam did not work for the Soviet Union largely because it was used to justify the communist invasion of a Muslim country. The Afghan use of the concept of jihad during their freedom struggle against the Soviet occupiers later "be- came part of the mass consciousness of the local peoples in Central Asia and greatly stimulated Islamic revival."15 This was a good example of the diffu- sion of the conflict.

Another aspect of Islamic internationalism in Central Asia-diffusion of conflict-is the role of the Islamic Resurgence Party (IRP) that was formed in the Soviet Union in 1990. Its primary agenda was the promotion of the common bond of Islam among all the Islamist parties of Central Asia. As one author notes, the IRP "stood for the ideal of revival of Islam, restoration of Islamic culture and the maintenance of Islamic traditions." According to this report, IRP leaders described affairs among nations as "the age-old strug- gle between the Christian West and the Muslim East."16 They considered Islam as the only power that could withstand the Western and Russian impe- rialistic suppression of Muslims. However, in order to be victorious, the IRP promoted the idea that Muslim people of the former Soviet empire must edu- cate themselves about becoming "real Muslims." Hence, Islam must be re- vived or should spread to regions where it is unknown. Aside from rejecting nationalism and differences based on language and ethnicity, the IRP also rejects pan-Turkism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Iranianism as threats to Islam. It advocates that Muslim unity should be based solely on the greater community of believers, the Ummah.

The IRP established close ties with the Afghan mujahideen, and these ties only grew stronger in 1992 with the onset of the Tajik civil war. Even though the ostensible end of the Tajik civil war in 1997 resulted in a setback for the Islamist forces in Tajikistan, the cross-border bonds between Islamist groups remained firm. The current governments of Tajikistan and Uzbeki- stan are fearful of the growing power of the Islamist groups as the Central Asian populace becomes more fervently-Islamic. The authoritarian character of these two regimes might turn out to be catalytic for the popularity of other reform groups. An idiosyncrasy of authoritarian rule is that it equates politi- cal dissent with treason, thereby disallowing legitimate protest activities. As the Muslim character of the Central Asian societies becomes more pro- nounced, this author predicts that Islamist groups will enhance their promi-

15. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modem Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 277.

16. Pinar Akcali, "Islam as a 'Common Bond' in Central Asia: Islamic Renaissance Party and the Afghan Mujahideen," Central Asian Survey 17:2 (June 1998), pp. 276-84.

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nence. In turn, the governments of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will suppress these groups as they resist authoritarian challenges to their activities. Their demands for political change include assigning primacy to Islam in the politi- cal arena.

In addition, one should consider continued economic underdevelopment, high unemployment rates, high birth rates, and the pervasive ineptitude of governments in order to explain the likelihood of political extremism and attendant instability in Central Asian countries. Some authors expect that the large oil reserves of the Caspian Sea will bring prosperity to Central Asia.17 Unless political and economic institutions are built to make optimal alloca- tional and redistributive policies, oil-related prosperity would only increase the determination of powerful nations of the region (i.e., Russia, China, and Iran) to have a large say in determining the pipeline routes. These three countries may scheme to determine which groups will be in power in coun- tries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan. In other words, the oil-related Central Asia's "new great game" of the 21st century does not hold high promise for political stability for the region. In this unpredictable game, the Taliban remain only one, albeit a potent, force.

The preceding variables regarding the potential for growing political insta- bility in Central Asia may also be used to describe the potential for political instability in the Xinjiang Province of China. For instance, the leaders of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan and the JUI of Pakistan reportedly discussed the possibility of forming a "bloc of Islamic countries" opposed to the U.S. The promoters of such a movement are reported to be the leader of the Taliban, Mulla Mohamad Umar, and JUI leader, Fazl-ur-Rahman.18

Chinese Anxiety The theological aspect of the Taliban movement worries the rulers of China. Their chief concern stems from the Taliban's potential for becoming a cata- lyst for an Islamic revolution in the Xinjiang Province, whereby this province would become another independent Islamic state in the region. Contacts and military training among the Taliban groups, the IRP groups of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Muslim separatists of Xinjiang Province are widely re- ported. 19

The India-Pakistan military conflict in the Kargil region of Kashmir of May-July 1999 coincided with China's sensitivity over NATO's air war

17. For a background of this increasingly important issue, see Ariel Cohen, U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Building a New 'Silk Road' to Economic Prosperity, Heritage Foun- dation Backgrounder, no. 1132, July 24, 1997, on the World Wide Web at <http://www.heritage. org/library/categories/forpol/bgl 132.html> [accessed June 30, 2000].

18. "Taliban and JUI to Form a Block of Islamic Countries," Deccan Herald, July 15, 1999. 19. James Pringle, "Muslims in China Pay Price of Peace," Times (London), June 4, 1999.

M. EHSAN AHRARI 669

against Yugoslavia. China's chief concerns were over the war's symbolic aspects. First, ethnic cleansing was carried out under the auspices of Slobodan Milosovic's government. In my view, the rulers of the PRC must have been constantly reminded during that war of the similarity between Milosovic's brutal treatment of independence-minded Kosovars and China's own treatment of the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang and Buddhist Tibetans. There are also some differences between these conflicts. The fact that China is a nuclear power forecloses the probability of a multinational military action against it. It is conceivable that Western industrial nations could take other coercive measures, such as imposing economic sanctions, against China in order to resolve the Tibetan issue. A potential use of economic sanctions- unlikely though it may be-continues to remind leaders in Beijing of the potential vulnerability of their country to outside pressure.

Chinese reaction to NATO's war on Yugoslavia was an interesting study of paradox and contradictions. During the initial phase of that war, the offi- cial Chinese press defended Milosovic's "right" to mercilessly crack down on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. An analysis of the Chinese response to the con- flict showed that Yugoslavia was portrayed as an innocent victim. Some Chi- nese publications portrayed President Bill Clinton wearing a Hitler-type mustache. But later on the Chinese press softened its criticism of NATO. The Chinese government even allowed some press reports detailing the plight of Albanian refugees. Nonetheless, the government reportedly issued circu- lars to various universities "instructing professors to be careful when they denounce the NATO operation."20 However, the most direct impact of NATO's war on Yugoslavia in China was reported to be "the establishment within the communist party of two committees to draft recommendations for policies in Tibet and Xinjiang."21 The recommendations of these committees are likely to be scrutinized by the international community.

In the interim, China may produce discreet demands on the Pakistani gov- ernment-which relies heavily on military aid and political support from Beijing-to control the activities of the Taliban groups operating from its territory. It is likely that China was forced to see the India-Pakistan conflict in a different light. India accused Pakistan of actively supporting the border skirmishes with Taliban mercenaries. If India's accusations are true, then it is a clear-cut outcome of the Taliban syndrome. Hence, Beijing is likely to be more sympathetic to the Indian perspective, especially since it is con- cerned about the portrayal of its treatment of ethnic minorities. During the height of the Kargil dispute, China reportedly rebuffed Pakistan's former

20. John Pomfret, "Shift Shows Sensitivity to Ethnic Tensions at Home," International Her- ald Tribune, May 8, 1999.

21. Ibid.

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prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, when he visited Beijing to seek political sup- port of that country's involvement in the ongoing conflict.

China will have to consider its crucial strategic interests vis-a'-vis India. Given the increasingly intricate web of strategic interests that the PRC is developing in the Islamic Middle East and Central Asia, Beijing will continue to be trapped between the many competing interests in the domestic and in- ternational political arenas. Notwithstanding these contradictions, Sino- Pakistani strategic ties will probably remain unaffected. After all, other payoffs for China are too high to abandon a nuclear Pakistan.

Synthesis Islamist groups in Pakistan are directly responsible for creating and nurturing the Taliban syndrome. It is tempting to think that these groups quite wit- tingly created this syndrome so that they could use it for an Islamic revolu- tion in the contiguous area. However, one has to be excessively charitable to give Pakistani Islamists credit for being so farsighted. Farsightedness re- quires cool-headed calculation, a pragmatic approach to planning for future, and a ready willingness to alter plans. Extremists belonging to any religion or ideology have little use for these traits.

In all likelihood, this phenomenon was fortuitous. It happened at a time when Pakistan had a dictator, General Zia, who was also interested in Islam- izing Pakistan. After the eventual implosion of the Soviet Union, Pakistan and Afghanistan were already being governed under the banner of an Islamic republic. One should ask why the Muslims of Central Asia do not enjoy the fruits of the Taliban syndrome. One should also ask why there is no coopera- tion between the Taliban and Islamist groups of other predominantly Muslim states of Central Asia and Xinjiang. There are great similarities between the Afghan struggle against the Soviet occupiers in the 1980s and the struggle of the Uighur Muslims and their Chinese rulers.

Pakistan faces a dilemma regarding the Taliban syndrome. It wants to use it against India in Kashmir, but leaders in Islamabad are genuinely concerned about stemming its tide within their country. These hard-line, jihadi Islamic groups want to wage a military battle against India to solve the Kashmir dispute. Domestically, though, these groups want to purify their society by eliminating the Shias and followers of the Ahmadya sect. The educated and secular-minded Pakistanis are increasingly alarmed about the future of their country. They do not wish to be citizens of a nuclear state where forces of tradition and obfuscation are growing strong. The military coup of October 12, 1999, did not diminish the level of internal violence or Islamic militancy. At the moment, Pakistan does not seem to be in firm control of its strategic affairs. As the Taliban syndrome gathers momentum in Pakistan's contigu- ous areas, Beijing is bound to demand that Islamabad control the activities of

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its allies. An extreme scenario of a Taliban alliance with the Islamist groups in Xinjiang might not be farfetched. Even if the Taliban are defeated in Af- ghanistan, the attempted Islamization of Pakistan and its neighboring areas would only slow down or be postponed. Islamization is a politico-religious phenomenon that is based on Islamic internationalism. Whether a moderate or a hard-line version of Islamization materializes in Pakistan and elsewhere in Central Asia will depend on how the existing governments treat political dissent within their borders. Equally important, the state of economic devel- opment of these countries will also influence the modality of Islamization in these countries. A steady pace of economic development, along with a po- tential lessening of authoritarian rule (which means increased tolerance of political dissent), would enable the moderate Islamist groups to compete for power and influence with other groups in the coming months and years. Under such circumstances the potential emergence of religious extremism promises to be minimal.

How China deals with these developments within the Xinjiang Province will also affect the course of political stability and economic development in that province. If the past behavior of the Chinese leadership toward political dissent, that is, the brutal suppression of protesters in Tiananmen Square or the more recent suppression of the Falun Gong religious sect-were to con- tinue in the future, then Xinjiang Province would only edge toward increased political turbulence and instability.