UMKC SDI 2007 China DisadvantageLouie & Todd

China Disadvantage

China 1nc...........................................................................................................................................................................2-3

***Uniqueness***...............................................................................................................................................................4Relations Good\High.........................................................................................................................................................5-6Now Key Time.....................................................................................................................................................................7Relations Are On The Brink.................................................................................................................................................8Sphere Of Influence UQ.......................................................................................................................................................9

***Links\Internals***......................................................................................................................................................10Africa Key..........................................................................................................................................................................11China-Africa Relations High..............................................................................................................................................12China Gaining At Us Expense............................................................................................................................................13China Increases Influence In Africa...................................................................................................................................14Africa Is In China Sphere of Influence...............................................................................................................................15Zero Sum Links..................................................................................................................................................................16Perception Link...................................................................................................................................................................17African Policies Decrease Relations...................................................................................................................................18Containment Links.............................................................................................................................................................19Aid Links............................................................................................................................................................................20Decrease Relations Spillover..............................................................................................................................................21Taiwan Lashout Internal Link Magnifier...........................................................................................................................22Encirclement Internals- Taiwan Lashout............................................................................................................................23Containment Internals- Taiwan Lashout............................................................................................................................24

***Impacts***..................................................................................................................................................................25Cooperation Key Stop Taiwan War....................................................................................................................................26Taiwan War Goes Nuclear.................................................................................................................................................27North Korea Module...........................................................................................................................................................28Indo\Pak Module................................................................................................................................................................29Africa Key China Soft Power.............................................................................................................................................30Impact- Regime Collapse...................................................................................................................................................31

***Answers***..................................................................................................................................................................32Relations Bad......................................................................................................................................................................33No Link- No Competition...................................................................................................................................................34Increase China-Africa Relations Causes US-China Conflict.............................................................................................35

***More Answers to come- I swear…. DO NOT BUG ME ABOUT IT--- I WILL HAVE A 30 PAGE Addendum By Sunday night****

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UMKC SDI 2007 China DisadvantageLouie & Todd

China 1ncChina is increasing its sphere of influence throughout Africa by locking in a grand strategy of political warfare, which includes development assistance and economic aid as its centerpiece, in a move to counter US influence in Africa. Chinese political leaders believe their plan to be leading to less US influence in AfricaDonovan C. Chau (Adjunct Faculty Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) March 2007, “Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: US Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa”,

Africa today has emerged as a continent of strategic consequence. Domestic and international terrorism aside, the two great powers of our time, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), are vying for influence over African governments and

people. Not unlike the Cold War, the primary means of exerting influence in Africa is through the use of non-violent instruments of grand strategy.In this monograph, Dr. Donovan Chau considers one nonviolent instrument of grand strategy in particular, political warfare. Retracing the origins and mischaracterizations of political warfare, Dr. Chau suggests that the PRC has used political warfare as its leading grand strategic instrument in Africa. The monograph offers a concise, detailed overview of U.S. capabilities to conduct political warfare in Africa. It then examines PRC political warfare operations in four regional “anchor” states—Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.What emerges from Dr. Chau’s analyses is the Chinese use of political warfare intentionally targeting U.S. interests in Africa. Unless the U.S. Government recognizes the utility of political warfare and reorients the federal bureaucracy to employ it effectively, he intimates that future U.S. influence in Africa will wane—to

the benefit of a country that understands political warfare and uses it seriously. Today, as in the past, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) exerts influence on the African continent. Unlike the United States, which also attempts to sway African nations and people, the PRC uses an instrument of grand strategy called political warfare as its primary means of influence. What is political warfare, and how is it being employed in Africa today? How do U.S. capabilities compare to PRC operations and capabilities in Africa? The monograph answers these and other questions to inform the current national se-curity debate among U.S. policy and decisionmakers. For while the struggle against international terrorism will continue indefinitely, the U.S. Government must not overlook other grand strategic challenges currently taking place around the world. The monograph explains political warfare in its historic context and offers a current definition. Simply, political warfare is a nonviolent instrument of grand strategy, involves coordinated activities, and results in tangible effects on intended targets. In operational terms, political warfare includes economic aid and development assistance, as well as training, equipping, and arming military and security forces. Exchange visits and

public pronouncements are secondary political warfare operations, supporting and facilitating prim-ry operations. Political warfare offers distinct advantages to other instruments of grand strategy, making it a desirable means of exerting influence. Vis-à-vis other instruments—particularly military power—political warfare is economical. Though results may not appear immediately, using political

warfare has grand strate-gic benefits, from information-gathering to relationship-building. Moreover, political warfare may poten-tially garner prestige and a positive reputation around the world.

Chinese leaders have placed all confidence in a foreign policy to develop relations to counter US gains- Any perception of US gains will indicate Chinese lossesAgence France Presse, September 23, 1999

China's Communist leadership, once just a ragged band of soldiers, is struggling after 50 years in power to find its place on a world stage dominated by the United States. Regarded with suspicion in the early days of the People's Republic when many countries still recognised the

nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan, China is hoping to use its anniversary celebrations on October 1 to prove it has a rightful place in the international community. "China's biggest problem is the United States. US power faces them wherever they look: east, west, north, south," said Andrew Nathan, of Columbia University's East Asian Institute. "(But) they've committed themselves to an economic development policy that depends on good relations with the West." Since late supreme leader Deng Xiaoping threw open China's doors to

foreign investors in 1979, ending almost two decades of political turmoil and isolation, China has been gradually building up its confidence in foreign affairs. "The rest of the world views China as one of the world's most dynamic economies and a respectable and responsible power," ran an editorial in a recent edition of the China Daily newspaper, of a kind that peppers the official press. Sino-US ties, formally established in 1979 after a landmark visit by US President Richard Nixon in 1972, have formed the backbone of China's foreign policy in the post-Deng era. But the bilateral relationship has been far from smooth, with China seeing itself in the post-Cold War world as one of the few large countries willing to stand up to US "hegemonism." Since the bloody crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement earned international condemnation, Beijing has made it clear it sees pressure on human rights as an excuse used by rich Western countries to interfere in the internal affairs of poorer ones. Sino-US ties reached a high point with a 1998 visit by US President Bill Clinton during which he discussed human rights and democracy with President Jiang Zemin on live television. But the honeymoon period was soon over, marred by wrangling over human rights, allegations that China stole US nuclear secrets, and the war in Kosovo. Beijing strongly opposed NATO's bombing campaign in Yugoslavia even before its Belgrade embassy was hit by NATO missiles, saying it constituted "gunboat diplomacy." The bombing, which killed three Chinese journalists, sparked a backlash of anti-foreign sentiment in Beijing. "China has been extremely weak in the past and is very sensitive on that issue -- we have been invaded and suffered foreign interference on a number of occasions," said Jia Qingguo, professor at Beijing University's school of international relations. "But globalisation is an objective reality. China must accept this reality and go with the tide of history," he said. Some analysts say, however, that China's foreign policy thinking still has a long way to go to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era. Concepts like globalisation are still relatively new among China's veteran leaders. "They pretend a lot

of that stuff but they don't really mean it," said a Western diplomat. "They have a very realpolitik zero-sum game approach -- if someone is gaining we must be losing."

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UMKC SDI 2007 China DisadvantageLouie & Todd

China 1ncUS encroachment upon Chinese spheres of influence will cause direct military confrontation through miscalculations, this is empirically true with rising powers Susan Shirk (served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U.S. State Department from 1997 to 2000) 2007 CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER p. 261

We cannot control whether China's leaders heed our advice to them. But we can control how we ourselves think about and behave toward China, which is all the more important because we can't count on China always to act responsibly or in its own best interest. Everything Americans say and do regarding China reverberates through Chinese domestic politics. Just as Americans are wondering if a rising China will threaten us, the Chinese are wondering about America's intentions toward China. Can America learn to live with rising China? Or as the number one power in the world, is America bound to try to keep China weak to maintain its own position? China's people, and its leaders, are listening to what we say and watching what we do. Historically, rising powers cause war not necessarily because they are innately belligerent, but because the reigning powers mishandle those who challenge the status quo in one way or another. Based on history, the prognosis for relations between rising powers like China and reigning powers like the United States is poor. It could produce direct conflict between two nuclear powers. The costs of such a conflict would be devastating not just for the two societies but for the rest of Asia and the entire world.

US-China war will go nuclear, causing global conflagration ending human existenceStraits Times 6-25-2000

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.

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UMKC SDI 2007 China DisadvantageLouie & Todd

***Uniqueness***

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UMKC SDI 2007 China DisadvantageLouie & Todd

Relations Good\HighDialogue and cooperation now between the u.s. & chinaCarla Hills (former trade negotiator) April 2007 “u.s.-china relations: an affirmative agenda, a responsible course”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.html

For nearly two decades, U.S. policy toward China (and Taiwan) remained rooted in the strategic interests that led Nixon to Beijing during the Cold War. This policy has commonly been known as ‘‘engagement.’’ Through engagement, China’s relationship with the United States has been transformed from one characterized by near-constant antagonism to one in which dialogue and cooperation have become common.

Us / China Relations Being Built Back UpJing Li (candidate at the USC Rossier School of Education and a Holmes Scholar) 02/25/2007, http://china.usc.edu/(A(j3RHJI7wxwEkAAAAMWJjZmZkZWEtMmU4My00ZGFmLTljZTItMDA1OTkyMDVjMmM0BxsK9Huc2L-WyFS3GrJSRCq2mxw1)S(ezzw2h45gv2tyh45vhxjxh55))/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=23&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1, 7/25/07

There are many suspicions, misunderstandings, and misassumptions in the area of U.S. – China relations. Relations between these two countries have never been easy. With China’s rise in the 21st century, many fear another extended period of tension between the U.S. and China. Some Americans talk about China’s threat to U.S. security and interests and believe U.S. policy should try to restrain China. Chinese leaders are also concerned the U.S. will do everything to prevent China from gaining equal status with the U.S. However, Professor Zhao believes the conflict is navigable, because the world now is much more pluralized than in the past. It is necessary to build institutions to facilitate the U.S. - China relationship by creating and encouraging dialogue and conversation. Leaders in both China and the U.S. have made efforts to foster a candid, cooperative and constructive relationship.

Us / China Relations Good Yang Wenchang [president of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs] 07/16/2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-07/16/content_5435550.htm, 7/25/07

The Chinese and US governments signed the Shanghai Communique on February 28, 1972, expressing the shared desire to normalize bilateral relations and stating that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony"; and "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." The Shanghai Communique clearly defined the common security interests of China and the United States in opposing Soviet hegemonism and also expressed the disputes existing between the two sides in such a way that each side separately stated their positions on certain issues. This was the biggest benefit of the communique. After 23 years, Chinese-US relations began to thaw.

us-china relations high nowChina View 2007 6/7/7. China, U.S. agree to deepen parliamentary exchanges. Online.

Sheng told Cheney that the Chinese side attaches great importance to the Sino-U.S. ties and has always been treating bilateral relationship from strategic and long-term perspectives. Sheng, who led an NPC delegation to attend the fourth meeting with the U.S. Senate under a parliamentary exchange mechanism on Tuesday and Wednesday, said China is willing to continue to work with the U.S. to implement consensus reached between Chinese President Hu Jintao and U.S. President George W. Bush, and to make joint efforts to ensure a sound and steady development of constructive bilateral cooperation. Cheney, who is also president of the U.S. Senate, spoke highly of the outcome of the fourth meeting between the NPC and the U.S. Senate, saying that he will continue to support this important parliamentary exchange mechanism. The top Chinese lawmaker reaffirmed China's principled position on the Taiwan issue, noting that the current situation across the Taiwan Strait is very complicated and sensitive. He hoped that the U.S. would stick to its commitments to China on the issue and firmly oppose and contain "Taiwan independence" to safeguard the overall bilateral relationship and maintain peace and stability across the strait. Sheng also briefed Cheney on the positive outcome of the meeting between the lawmakers, saying that it is of great importance for the bilateral relationship to further consolidate and deepen substantial dialogues between lawmakers. Noting that the U.S.-China relations is one of the most important bilateral relations in the world, Cheney stressed that the continuous development of the relationship is not only significant to the prosperity and stability of the two countries, but also conducive to maintaining peace and stability in the world. He said that the U.S. side understands the importance and sensitivity of the Taiwan issue and will continue to handle it in accordance with the principles laid out in the three joint communiques between the U.S. and China.

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Relations Good\Highrelations are optimistic—gates is toning down us rhetoricReuters 2007 US and China make concessions. 3/6/7. http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/06/03/10129640.html.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates played down concerns about China's military build-up yesterday, signalling a shift in the Pentagon's tone intended to ease tensions and draw Beijing toward more transparency. China gave way too, agreeing to a defence hotline Washington has sought for more than five years. "I think it's an important start," Gates said on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the pre-eminent security conference in the region. "There has clearly been greater transparency on the part of the Chinese," he told reporters in Singapore. Tensions have risen in recent years over China's military expansion and pursuit of capabilities that Washington believes could threaten not only Taiwan, but US interests in Asia as well. Beijing has said it would boost defence spending by 17.8 per cent to about $45 billion (Dh165.2 billion) in 2007. But Pentagon and US intelligence officials say China's total real military-related spending for 2007 could be between $85 billion (Dh312.1 billion) and $125 billion (Dh458.9 billion). US officials regularly call for Beijing to be more open about its intentions, and former US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld used the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Shangri-La forum to criticise China for a lack of transparency. But this year, Gates eased the tone, saying there was reason for optimism about the US-China relationship.

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UMKC SDI 2007 China DisadvantageLouie & Todd

Now Key Timenow is key—the us and china have just started talking about africaYan Li 2007 Washington Observer. China and the United States Turn Swords into Plowshares in Africa. 1/31/7. Online.

"China and the United States have had some dialogues on African issues, but the progress is very slow. The two sides are cooperating in many fields in Africa and there are still great space for talks about education, peacekeeping, sanitation, health care and efficient management," Morrison concluded. "Everything has just started."

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Relations Are On The BrinkUS-China relations are on the brink now because of each countries trade relations with many nations in the sub-saharan region of Africa. Peter Brookes (Deputy assistant defense secretary) February 22 2006. "Chinas influence in Africa: Impacts for the United States". The Heritage Foundation. July 25 2007. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm. mp)

China's burgeoning relationship with Africa is alarming not only because it has facilitated Chinese energy and weapons dealings, but also because it is competing with U.S.–African trade. The China– Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF) was founded in 2000 to promote stronger trade and investment relations between China and African countries in both the government and private sectors. The CACF has produced two ministerial meetings and four meetings of senior officials, contributing to the rapid growth of trade and investment over the past five years. In 1999, the annual volume of trade between China and Africa was $5.6 billion.After the establishment of the CACF, Sino–African trade more than quintupled to $29.5 billion in 2004. [27] By the end of October 2005, annual Sino–African trade for the year totaled $32.2 billion , surpassing the 2004 total.[28] The volume of trade between the United States and Africa also increased remarkably, more than doubling from $26.9 billion in 1999 to $58.9 billion in 2004. However, African trade with China is growing at a much faster rate: an average of more than 50 percent annually since 2002.

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Sphere Of Influence UQChina and US have avoided confrontation in Africa until nowBates Gill (Freeman Chair in China Studies CSIS) December 1, 2006 “China’s Expanding Role in Africa Implications for the United States” http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf, 7/26/07 MS

Up to now, the United States and China have been largely absorbed in their separate, respective spheres, enlarging their presence and investment in Africa, with little systematic or substantive reference to the other. Some initial think tank research, as well as multiple media reports in the United States, has raised concerns about China-Africa relations, often framed in apprehensive or censorious terms. The United States and China did endorse in principle in 2005 a U.S.-China subregional Africa dialogue, as part of the larger U.S.-China strategic dialogue, but since that point there has been very little progress in building real content into that commitment.

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***Links\Internals***

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Africa KeyChina uses Africa ties to preserve its global positioning and to fight US influenceCarla Hills (former trade negotiator) April 2007 “u.s.-china relations: an affirmative agenda, a responsible course”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12985/uschina_relations.html

At the same time, China’s leaders increasingly chafe at what they perceive to be American hegemony, and they work to counterbalance U.S. influence in Asia and elsewhere through their own efforts to build global economic, political, and security links . China’s advocacy of ‘‘Asian-only’’ groupings, diplomatic outreach to Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, growing military ties to Russia, and its opposition to an enhanced role for the U.S.-Japan Alliance in East Asian security affairs (especially Taiwan), all reflect Beijing’s efforts to maintain a zone of peace, to assert political leadership commensurate with China’s growing economic clout, and to hedge against the possible emergence of any U.S.-led anti-China coalition. China believes this dual approach— cooperating and balancing—is most likely to create the conditions necessary for China’s continued economic growth and security.

China is challenging the US influence in Africa Lyman Princeton (Director of Africa Policy Studies) July 21, 2005 Council on Foreign Relations], Presentation to the US-China Commission, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8436/, 7/26/07 MS

China poses a particular challenge, nevertheless, to the ways in which the United States has sought to maintain and utilize its leverage.  China utilizes a variety of instruments to advance its interest in ways that western nations can only envy. Most of China’s investments are through state-owned companies, whose individual investments do not have to be profitable if they serve overall Chinese objectives.  Thus the representative of China’s state owned construction company in Ethiopia could reveal that he was instructed by Beijing to bid low on various tenders, without regard for profit.  China’s long term objective in Ethiopia is in access to future natural resource investments, not in construction business profits.  In other cases, China can use aid, investment and technical inputs to win long term gains and access, with a willingness to “lose” much in the short run to gain in the long run.  In Kenya, China’s largest telecoms manufacturer, ZTE Communications, made a “gift” of equipment worth 144 million Kenyan shillings to Telkom Kenya, saying it hoped to play a positive role in Kenya’s telecommunications industry.[xvi]  China’s interest in taking over Nigeria’s Kaduna refinery, an installation steeped in corruption, waste and decay, can only be seen in this light. Not only is this a challenge to American and other foreign businesses seeking contracts on the continent, China challenges areas where US political leverage was once greatest.  This is particularly true in the oil and gas sectors.  Once the United States could threaten rogue states with barring American, and with pressure, other western countries’ oil companies from exploration and production in those countries.

China believes this to be their window of opportunity to forge relations with countries at the US expanseSusan Shirk (served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U.S. State Department from 1997 to 2000) 2007 CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER

President Jiang Zemin, in his last major statement before retiring, framed the restrained approach to foreign policy in language most likely to gain widespread Communist Party support—as a smart strategy for China to strengthen its national power. "Taking an overall view, for us the first twenty years of the twenty-first century are a period of important strategic opportunity Which we must tightly seize and in which we can get a lot done," Jiang said in his report to the Sixteenth CCP National Congress in November 2002.% In an ironic twist, the Chinese appropriated the term "period of strategic opportunity" from the U.S. National Security Strategy of 1999, which said (as the Chinese rendered it), that because no large country would catch up with it before 2015 or 2020, America had the opportunity to mold a new order and realize U.S. global leadership." But after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America, Jiang Zemin realized that China had been handed its own period of strategic opportu nity that it could exploit to improve relations with the United States and accelerate its domestic economic development. "After the 9/11 incident, the U.S. strategic focus has been somewhat readjusted . . . with the result that China may win a correspondingly longer lasting environment of peace and development and concentrate more of its strength on developing the country.'''' (Military strategists take a more cynical view of 9/n and argue that "the fundamental aim of U.S. national security strategy is to use the war - against terrorism as the means to make full use of the current 'period of strategic opportunity' . . . to seek . . . superiority in the new century and ensure and maintain the unipolar world under U.S. hegemony).

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China-Africa Relations HighAfrican-Chinese relations are high- A historical connection provides a gateway for friendship.Ethan Zuckerman 2006 (founder of Tripod and a graduate of Williams College, Africa in China: No to Taiwan, Yes to Infrastructure, November 6, 2006, http://ethanzuckerman.com/blog/?p=1096) 

China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship.   The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchange of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Our bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many occasions.   Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development-these are the principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations. 

China’s relations with Africa are high. Pragmatic economic and political solutions keep African support of China’s influence.Drew Thompson 2005 (Assistant Director at the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, China's Soft Power in Africa, October 13, 2005, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=32003)

China’s relations with Africa have steadily deepened and strengthened since the founding of "new China" in 1949. Evolving from ideologically-driven interactions during the Cold War, today’s China-Africa relations combine pragmatic economic and political means to achieve China’s objective of establishing a world order that is peaceful and conducive to continued economic growth and stability at home. In the 1960s and 1970s, China supported liberation movements in several African countries, gave aid to socialist nations to build stadiums, hospitals, railroads and other infrastructure, and cemented relations through a steady stream of expert engineers, teachers, and doctors. Today, Chinese officials travel to Africa accompanied by bankers and businesspeople, promoting political and economic commerce that expands China-Africa ties in a sustainable fashion. While trade and diplomacy are driven by China’s newfound economic strength and subsequent demand for raw materials, China continues to support longstanding programs that deliver aid to underserved African citizens, such as sending teams of doctors and providing medicines. Following the framework set out by the first China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000, China-Africa relations are set to advance through a combination of traditional financial aid and technical support programs, along with rapidly growing bilateral trade and investment.

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China Gaining At Us ExpenseChina has more influence in africa than the u.s.Paul McLeary (staff writer for the Columbia Journalism Review) The Guardian and The San Francisco Chronicle, FOREIGN POLICY, March 2007, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3744&print=1

For years, China has been offering loans, building critical infrastructure, and providing engineering and military advice and hardware to African regimes without extracting any promises that the regimes clean up their human rights records—something Western countries insist upon before aid is shipped. This uncritical support of its African partners has allowed China to make diplomatic inroads on the continent, since it provides aid without strings attached, as opposed to the Western approach of basing aid on human rights and good governance benchmarks that many African regimes are unwilling, or slow, to make. Put simply, an African farmer would rather have a Chinese road built from his village to the market today, rather than wait for an American or World Bank road to be built only after the government makes the required reforms.

China gaining influence in AfricaThe New Republic 2005 (6/21/2005, Joshua Kurlantzick, “How China is changing global diplomacy”, http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20050627&s=kurlantzick062705

In Africa and Latin America, where postindependence economic models imposed by Western international financial organizations have failed to raise living standards, China's ideas, its companies, and its emphasis on a multipolar international system are also increasingly welcome. Beijing has signed trade deals with 40 African states. In many resource-rich African countries--including pariah nations like Sudan, where Beijing covets Sudanese oil--China has dramatically bolstered its diplomatic and economic presence, as Stephanie Giry has reported in these pages ("Out of Beijing," November 15, 2004). In Zimbabwe, Beijing has become a major provider of military hardware, including fighter jets. "Suffering under the effects of international isolation, Zimbabwe has looked to new partners, including China, who won't attach conditions [to aid]," one Western diplomat told The Christian Science Monitor. Hu's 2004 trip to Latin America highlighted China's growing power there as well, even as the Bush administration neglects the region. As Ramo notes, China's enormous consumption of natural resources, such as steel, oil, and copper, makes it an essential ally and trading partner of nearly any nation in Latin America and Africa. Indeed, not only did Hu sign $30 billion in new investment deals during his Latin trip, but China has become Brazil's second-biggest trading partner. By comparison, during his 2004 Latin America swing, Bush spent little time anywhere other than Colombia and Chile (and almost got in a fistfight in the latter). Furthermore, the American president has failed to persuade Latin nations to back his proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas pact, one of the White House's main goals for the Western Hemisphere.

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China Increases Influence In AfricaChina increasing influence in AfricaBates Gill (Freeman Chair in China Studies CSIS) December 1, 2006 “China’s Expanding Role in Africa Implications for the United States” http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf, 7/26/07 MS

Drawing momentum and confidence from the six key factors above, China’s expansive presence in Africa has been erected on an array of political, economic, and cultural exchanges that have proliferated in recent years. These activities visibly confirm China’s growing interest in Africa; they also visibly signal the continent’s emergent importance to China’s burgeoning economy and rising political stature.

Chinese Engagement With Africa Is IncreasingLinda Thomas-Greenfield, U.S. Department of State, STATES NEWS SERVICE, February 15, 2007, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/80210.htm

The other major investor in Africa right now is China. We do not see Chinese engagement on the continent as a threat; we believe that we can work with China to support shared goals including poverty reduction and sustainable development. That said, there is concern about China's rapidly increasing lending to poor nations in Africa.

Chinese Ties And Aid To Africa Are IncreasingChina Economic Review, December 2006, http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/subscriber/articledetail/1485.html

If nothing else, the long line of African leaders at the Great Hall of the People in early November showed China's approach to the continent is generating interest where it was meant to. One by one, the heads of state of 48 African nations, and senior officials from 13 more, shook hands with Chinese President Hu Jintao to launch the Beijing summit of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum. It wasn't long before China pledged US$5 billion in aid, mostly loans and credit, and a more open market for African products.

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Africa Is In China Sphere of InfluenceChinese have become Africa's largest lenders. Also, Africa-China trade has nearly quadrupled. Aid and trade are expected to continue to rise, making China within Africa's sphere of influence.World Watch November 22, 2006 (China's New Scramble for Africa; accessed July 25, 2007; http://www.american.com/archive/2006/november/chinas-new-scramble-for-africa )

"Chinese believe high risk can bring high benefit," the hotel's manager, Yang Zhao, would say in later interviews. And Chernor Jalloh, Sierra Leone's Tourism Minister, would say, "The early bird catches the worm." The Chinese have been exercising these philosophies with a vengeance. Earlier this month, Beijing played host to a two-day summit that brought together the heads of state of virtually every country in Africa. Its outcome – $1.9 billion in new business deals, a pledge by President Hu Jintao for $5 billion in aid and loans, and a promise to double aid to Africa by 2009 – leaves no doubt of the pivotal role the Chinese believe Africa will play in their future. Chinese industrialization, unfolding at an unprecedented speed, is driving a ravenous demand for raw materials and new markets. In this sense, China is pursuing the same trajectory taken by many post-industrial countries at critical moments in their economic history: Europe's colonization of Africa; US imperialism in Latin America; Japan's occupations of China and Korea. China hopes it can help sustain its economic expansion by turning Africa into a sphere of influence. The scale of that influence and the speed at which it has grown have taken many by surprise. Total trade between China and Africa nearly quadrupled over the last six years, from $10.8 billion in 2000 to nearly $40 billion in 2006, making Beijing the continent's third largest trading partner. The Chinese government intends to reach $100 billion by 2010, and Chinese trade and investment are a major factor driving Sub-Saharan Africa's record 5.8% growth rate, the highest since 1974. In 2004, China accounted for $900 million of $15 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the continent. China is signing deals left and right to secure state-owned companies' access to natural resources like oil, wood, aluminum, bauxite, and copper, and negotiating bilateral trade agreements to open African markets to Chinese textiles. China will soon surpass the World Bank as Africa's largest lender.

China wants America out of Areas it sees as its sphere of influence, it has lots of soft power at its disposal to use against America Joshua Kurlantzick, March 9, 2007 (National Post, “Chinese Cash vs. Western interests: In its quest for oil and other natural resources, Beijing is pressuring our allies and propping up our enemies”, July 25, 2007, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/universe/document?_m=a8dd3834a4e94442d868684bf7dab936&_docnum=27&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=a4868fc402ef8c347abbe45ac5cdd3de, CB) 

By 2005, China was ready to use its influence to support the region in taking a clearer stand against America, which had established bases in and around Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in July, 2005, countries warned against any nation -- clearly, they meant only one nation: America -- "monopolizing or dominating international affairs," and demanded that Washington provide a timeline for withdrawing American forces from SCO member countries. Soon Uzbekistan rescinded America's basing rights. Suddenly, Washington began paying attention to the SCO. The pattern of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is being repeated elsewhere. In a short period of time, China has amassed significant soft power. Beijing now has the tools to build allegiances with nations not only in Asia, but around the world. And the world seems quite happy about it: A 2005 BBC poll of 22 nations found 48% of people thought China's role in global affairs was mainly positive. Only 30% saw China's role as negative. In interviews with opinion leaders across Asia, Latin America, and Africa, I have found far less concern about China's growing influence than I heard during the late 1990s; nations from Egypt to Thailand are declaring they want to build "special relationships" with China that could eclipse their relationships with the United States.

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Zero Sum LinksIts A Zero-Sum Game To China; US policy wins Directly Trades Off With Chinese influenceNancy Chen (Special to The Herald) 1999 The Herald (Rock Hill, S.C.) May 22

The Chinese are also raised to believe that their country is moral and good. They believe they represent the rights of developing countries, and the same moral fervor and idealism of communism that existed during the Cold War still is very much alive in China. From their perspective, the conflict between capitalism and communism is at the forefront of all international actions. They still call U.S. actions in Kosovo "hegemonic" because we want to force Yugoslavia's government to act in a certain way. We say we are protecting the rights of the Albanian minority. In this zero-sum game, a U.S. gain is a Chinese loss. It is a struggle between who has the moral high ground, capitalist America or communist China. When the U.S. bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the Chinese felt they had gined the upper hand in this moral struggle.

China views international relations as zero-sumA.D. McLennan, [Australian intelligence and diplomatic official, was deputy director-general at the Office of National Assessments, Canberra, during 1981-90.] 26 Jul. 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_n49?pnum=13&opg=20319598, 7/26/07 MS

It is hard to deny, too, the good sense of recognizing the essential tension between China's rush toward economic development and its ossified political system, a tension that Henry S. Rowen and others maintain will be resolved in the end in a relatively benign way, in favor of democracy. And it also makes sense, as Bruce Cumings has suggested, for Americans to understand the historical - and, in some cases, the very subjective - origins of their own images of China before setting off to propound U.S. interests in Beijing. Less persuasive, however, are some of the means advanced to achieve these goals. Zoellick's argument, for example, that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could effectively engage China on regional security issues takes insufficient account of China's zero-sum view of international relations - a view generic to East Asia. It also underestimates the damaging collateral effects that might attend such an "engagement" policy line, especially on the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and especially bearing in mind the skill that China has demonstrated in

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Perception LinkChina fears the u.s. Will crowd it out of africaBates Gill, China expert, CSIS, CHINA’S EXPANDING ROLE IN AFRICA, January 2007, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf

China, however, remains wary of and highly sensitive to U.S. discussion of its approach in Africa, including proposed collaboration. That reflects Beijing’s continuing concern with perceived U.S. hegemony and the related fear that Washington’s long-term intention is to thwart or contain China’s ambitions to become a fully global power. It is rooted in a proud Chinese nationalism that bridles at overreaching American power, influence, and sermonizing in Africa (and elsewhere around the world).

Invading China’s sphere of influence hurts US/Chinese relationsPatrick Goodenough, CNSNews.com May 28, 2003 Russia and China Unite Against Americahttp://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/5/28/105817.shtml

Yang said this has been particularly clearly seen in Russia's readiness to have the U.S. expand its military influence in Central Asia in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks. China considers that region to be a part of its sphere of influence and was deeply troubled by the U.S. penetration.

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African Policies Decrease RelationsCompetition in africa will hurt relationsPaul McLeary 2007 A Different Kind of Great Game. March 2007. Foreign Policy. Online.

But these motivations—a pursuit of energy resources and desire to quell the most dangerous forms of instability—will probably not lead to any direct conflicts between the United States and China any time soon, if ever. Rather, if these two powers are going to come to blows in the near term, it will most likely be in the diplomatic and development arena. Although a geostrategic competition over oil supplies in Africa remains unlikely, a greater concern, according to Alex de Waal, a fellow at the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University, is the way in which “the peace and security and democracy agenda … has been jeopardized by the Chinese weighing in with large scale uncritical support of Sudan, of Zimbabwe, and Angola.” For years, China has been offering loans, building critical infrastructure, and providing engineering and military advice and hardware to African regimes without extracting any promises that the regimes clean up their human rights records—something Western countries insist upon before aid is shipped. This uncritical support of its African partners has allowed China to make diplomatic inroads on the continent, since it provides aid without strings attached, as opposed to the Western approach of basing aid on human rights and good governance benchmarks that many African regimes are unwilling, or slow, to make. Put simply, an African farmer would rather have a Chinese road built from his village to the market today, rather than wait for an American or World Bank road to be built only after the government makes the required reforms. Thus, it’s on human rights and governance, not oil or strict security matters, that the interests of the United States and China will likely collide. In such a fight, China’s unfettered aid would seem to have the upper hand. But that may not necessarily be so. “In places like South Africa and Nigeria, the flood of textiles has displaced a lot of people in the textile industry,” says Jennifer Cooke, co-director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Africa Program. “And as they get more engaged, they’re going to be pushed to take up issues like worker conditions and employment quotas and corporate social responsibility issues that U.S. companies were pushed to do over the 1970s and 1980s.” Already, there is evidence of demands for more responsibility. Hu’s planned visit to Zambia was marred by the threat of protests. Unsafe working conditions at Chinese-run copper mines and the low wages paid to local workers at Chinese businesses emerged as campaign issues in last fall’s Zambian presidential election. And in late 2006, Gabon forced a Chinese energy company to stop drilling for oil due to environmentally unsafe practices, and South African textile trade unions are loudly pressing their government to curb Chinese apparel and textiles imports. Given their competing approaches to the continent—the humanitarian and military approach favored by the United States, and the purely economic policy favored by China—it’s clear that Africa will be the scene of some major disagreements between the two powers. The United States’ uneven track record in the war on terror doesn’t inspire much confidence, but the fact that Africa will no longer be split among several military commands is cause for some hope. It remains to be seen, however, if African regimes prefer the quick investment that China is willing to provide, or the less tangible, longer-term health and stability that the United States is promising.

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Containment LinksPlan would be perceived as an attempt to contain China, their alliances are an attempt to counter US “hegemonism” Robert A. Scalapino (Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus at the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley) 1999 The People’s Republic of China at Fifty THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH

Second, China sees a threat in “unipolarism,” which it defines as U.S. “hegemonism.” Thus, it now urges “multipolarism,” and seeks to counter what many Chinese leaders regard as a U.S. attempt to contain China despite Washington’s denials. Hence, China seeks to build up “partnerships” with as many neighbors as possible. While these partnerships are proclaimed non-alliances, from a Chinese perspective a number have strategic as well as economic and political implications. To be sure, such a partnership was created on paper with the United States. But the basic thrust of current PRC policy aims at the creation of a vast buffer-zone around the nation, making American strategic penetration more difficult.

China believes US foreign policy actions are attempts to contain China’s riseYing Ma (Feb-March 2007) NRI Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute China's stubborn anti-democracy Policy Review 141

THOUGH THE CHINESE people may be pressing for their rights and better lives in their own ways, they have simultaneously exhibited unmistakable signs of anti-Americanism and nationalism that make them less receptive to the virtues of democratization. In an era when the Chinese communist ideology has become defunct through the pursuit of market capitalism, China has aggressively maligned Western-style democracy as chaos-inducing and unsuitable for the country's current economic conditions. Chinese citizens, argues Beijing, have the duty to pursue Chinese greatness that would result in a strong China, a powerful China, deserving of influence and glory. Economic modernization is key, with social stability as a mandatory accessory. Through its media, textbooks, and propaganda machinery, Beijing emphasizes that democratization, political liberalization, a free press, and anti-government protests will only bring about the collapse of the current regime and hence are dangerous and destabilizing for Chinese society. When the United States criticizes China's human rights abuses or advocates democratization, it is therefore acting as an overbearing and domineering hegemon and is only seeking to undermine China's rise. Ideological indoctrination has its consequences. Numerous Chinese citizens, particularly those in the emerging middle class, agree with their government that China is not ready for democratization. They see post-Soviet Russia's social instability, weakened economic growth, declining national power and overall chaos as most unappealing for China. In addition, they are deeply skeptical of U.S. motives. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Chinese newspaper Global Times (Huan Qiu Shi Bao) in 2006, some 59 percent of the Chinese people who live in urban metropolises believe that the United States is seeking to contain China, with 56.3 percent seeing the United States as China's competitor. (15) In addition, Chinese citizens recoil at U.S. criticisms of their government's human rights abuses. A similar Global Times survey in 2005 reports that almost 79 percent of the respondents have negative views toward U.S. criticism of China's human rights abuses: 49.3 percent believe that the United States is attempting to destroy stability in China; 10.4 percent believe that the United States is trying to make China look bad, and 19.1 percent believe that America simply does not understand China's internal situation. (16)

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Aid LinksChina is using humanitarian assistance to Africa as a means to gain influence and favor versus the WestLombard April 2006 “AFRICAS CHINA CARD” consultant to the Small Arms Survey and Seattle-based writer. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3419

Earlier this year, Chinese oil giant CNOOC purchased a 45 percent stake in an offshore Nigerian oil rig in a deal worth $2.3 billion. Hundreds of Chinese workers descended upon the Takazee River in 2002, just two months after the Ethiopian government had turned to a low-cost Chinese firm to finance a $300 million dam project. In neighboring Uganda, bureaucrats work inside the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, a gift from Beijing. All the signs, including directions for how to operate the fire extinguishers, are in Chinese. China’s reach now extends deep into the continent. When the CAR’s François Bozizé took power after a violent coup in 2003 and declared himself president, the African Union booted the country from its membership rolls. A few weeks later, Beijing extended a $2.5 million interest-free loan and welcomed Bozizé with open arms for an official visit a year later. New buildings, more interest-free loans and grants, millions of dollars of office and telecommunications

equipment and other gifts have followed, as well as a promise to explore the CAR’s potential oil reserves and harvest its vast timber resources.The Chinese government builds its influence in Africa by using its state-owned companies to underbid competitors—including Western companies—for government projects. It’s a practice the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s member states have agreed to avoid, due to the unfair competition that results when government aid mixes with private investment. That’s not a concern for Beijing. Because China’s objective is to make allies rather than quick profits, it is willing to bid low. Chinese-owned companies keep costs low by relying on cheap labor, including prisoners who reportedly receive a reduced sentence for their toil. While Western donors talk about “sustainable development,” the Chinese concentrate on building sustainable relationships by providing something concrete, literally. Rwanda’s potholed roads, for example, are currently being rebuilt by a Chinese firm. Behind the frenzied construction, China’s relationships with African nations are grounded in agreements to not meddle in each other’s domestic affairs. African governments on the outs with the West can still find aid and investment, and China gets access to resources and diplomatic support. For example, when Robert Mugabe’s slum clearance program in Zimbabwe left hundreds of thousands homeless in the summer of 2005, the Chinese ambassador left the room when the United States and the European Union presented the matter before the UN Security Council. China, for its part, feted Mugabe for his “remarkable contribution” to diplomacy while naming him an honorary professor at Beijing’s Foreign Affairs University and continued to supply him with arms. In exchange, Mugabe signed lucrative mining concessions over to BeijingIn essence, China and its African partners have figured out a way to circumvent the patchwork system of accountability for foreign aid. It’s a maneuver that is causing unease in Western capitals, and particularly in the United States. If there is an upside to China’s scruples free investment, it may be that the competition for allies and resources will force the West to reconsider its own neglect of the continent.

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Decrease Relations SpilloverDecreased relations in one area spillover to othersRon Montaperto (PhD @ the National Defense University) 1995 Managing U.S. Relations with China. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF_42/forum42.html.

United States relations with the People's Republic of China are fragile. Problems in one area, most dramatically Taiwan, affect our ability to manage other issues, such as proliferation. Negativism is greater than ever before. Despite continuing efforts to set the record straight, Beijing believes the United States regards China as its future enemy. In Beijing's view, the new goal of the United States is to contain China. This is not a ploy. Although the leadership is clearly attempting to extract concessions, their statements fully reflect Chinese perceptions at all levels. In early 1992, the idea that the United States viewed China as a future, hostile peer competitor resided mainly within the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Now, the PLA appears to have carried the day. Where the United States sees Comprehensive Engagement, the Chinese see Containment.

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Taiwan Lashout Internal Link MagnifierChina is attempting to isolate Taiwan through it African policy- Loses will be magnified in Taiwan policyPeter Brookes (Deputy assistant defense secretary) February 22 2006. "Chinas influence in Africa: Impacts for the United States". The Heritage Foundation. July 25 2007. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm. mp)

 Moreover, China rewards its African friends with diplomatic attention and financial and military assistance, exacerbating existing forced dislocations of populations and abetting massive human rights abuses in troubled countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. As a consequence, Chinese support for political and economic repression in Africa counters the liberalizing influences of Africa's traditional European and American partners. China's vigorous campaign to develop close ties with individual African nations also reflects Beijing's global quest to isolate Taiwan diplomatically (seven of the 26 countries that have full diplomatic relations with Taiwan are African).

China Courts African Countries In Order To Isolate TaiwanBates Gill, China expert, CSIS, CHINA’S EXPANDING ROLE IN AFRICA, January 2007, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/chinainafrica.pdf

Chinese leaders also recognize that its relationship with Africa has earned China momentous diplomatic dividends. Beijing has not forgotten that Africa’s support in the early-1970s was vital to Beijing gaining its seat in the United Nations. Today, Beijing assiduously courts those remaining African countries that continue formally to recognize Taiwan in an effort to further isolate Taiwan on the international stage

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Encirclement Internals- Taiwan LashoutUS encirclement will drive hard-liner fears forcing a Taiwan lashout Erich Marquardt September 8, 2003 ''China's Distant Threat to U.S. Dominance in Asia'', Power and Interest News report, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=87&language_id=1

Besides, America desperately needs China. We are dependent on China’s continuing willingness to lend us billions of dollars a year. Without this cash flow, the U.S. economy would implode. The U.S. government could not keep running huge budget deficits. Americans could not keep spending without saving. We also need China to help us police North Korea. China is the only nation with real economic leverage over that rogue nation. If we encircle China with that resembles a new NATO, we feed China’s fear that America sees it as our enemy. That way we strengthen the hands of hard-liners in the Chinese government who want to further crack down on dissent, to take over Taiwan, and to build up China’s military even more.

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Containment Internals- Taiwan LashoutUS containment will drive hard-liner fears forcing a Taiwan lashoutBryce Harland (former senior New Zealand diplomat) 1996 International Herald Tribune

Rapid growth stimulates nationalism, so the argument goes. Now that their economy is one of the largest and other countries are so eager to exploit it, the Chinese will want a greater say in world affairs and a recognized place among world leaders. If others do not accept China's claim to be a world power, some think it will resort to force, as Germany did in 1914. What is the essential difference between China today and the Germany of 100 years ago? The answer in one word is militarism. After Bismarck, the German empire was dominated by Prussian generals for whom war was the main function of the state. But China has no Junkers (land-owners with a strong military tradition) and no tradition of militarism. The Communists led by Mao Zedong had to fight to achieve power, and then stood up to the Americans in Korea. Success raised the status of the People's Liberation Army and gave it a key role in Chinese politics. Mao used it to launch his Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and later on to stop it. But the PLA inherited no Junker-like tradition of military domination and expansionism. It deferred to the Communist Party and normally intervened in politics only when ordered to by the party leadership. The main exception was the action in 1976 to prevent Mao's wife from seizing power after his death. Deng Xiaoping rewarded the PLA by putting it last in his Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry and technology came before defense) and cutting its manpower and resources. During his decline, his successors have courted PLA support and it has become more assertive. Although it played a prominent part in Beijing's attempt in March to influence elections in Taiwan, it has no tradition of militarism or of aggression against other countries. If the soldier is no longer at the bottom of the Chinese order of esteem, he is still far from the top. President Jiang Zemin needs PLA support if he is to maintain his position after Mr. Deng's death. The Chinese armed forces see themselves as guardians of the state, and evidently feel that they should play a part in the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Will they be allowed to dictate the tactics and the timetable? The possibility cannot be entirely excluded, especially if other countries are seen to be encouraging those in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Tibet who are opposed to reunification and Chinese rule. The more talk there is of ''containing'' China, the greater the danger of the Chinese becoming as paranoid as the Germans were before 1914 when they feared '' encirclement.'' If China is frustrated and baited, it could become aggressive.

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***Impacts***

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Cooperation Key Stop Taiwan WarCooperation key to prevent china-taiwan warTom Christensen (Professor of politics and international affairs @ Princeton University) 2003 “ China's Transition at a Turning Point: Session 4: "Does China Have a more Confident Foreign Policy," Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. (September 24, 2003) pg. http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/FinalPanel24Sept.pdf

The second is that trust can be squandered by a change in the international environment. What if things start going well for the United States? Will China really trust that assurance about Taiwan over time? That’s an open question because it’s not so much fragile in the sense that it can break like a piece of glass, but it is contingent on an international situation that the United States would rather see go away. And that’s in the context of what is a real buildup – and this is the down side – that the PRC is building up its coercive capacity against Taiwan in a fast manner. It’s difficult to maintain deterrence under that situation, and deterring against coercion rather than deterring against domination requires a higher degree of American and Taiwanese superiority in combination. So that means that the United States is going to react with U.S. readiness, with arms sales, and with coordination with the Taiwan military. Under those circumstances, that’s going to appear provocative on the mainland, and the mainland’s buildup is already provocative. So you have the potential for a spiral of tensions in the cross-straits relations in the absence of this political agreement between Beijing and Washington, which is there now. With that political agreement, I don’t think arms races lead to conflict. Without that political agreement, you could have real potential problems.

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Taiwan War Goes NuclearTaiwan war goes nuclearTaylor 2002 Former Dir of State Dept Analysis Los Angeles Times April 28, 2002 Sunday Home Edition SECTION: OPINION; Part M; Pg. 3 LENGTH: 1249 words HEADLINE: TAIWAN; Bush Scraps China Policy of Six Presidents BYLINE: JAY TAYLOR, Jay Taylor was State Department director of analysis, for East Asia and the Pacific and deputy assistant secretary for, intelligence and research in the Reagan administration.

They could be wrong, however. At some point, the Chinese people could feel so strongly about what they would see as the final violation of the unity of China that they would be willing to go to war. The revisionists, and those in the upper echelon of the Bush administration who apparently support them, notably Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, no doubt have thought this war scenario through. They realize that with only 2% of the mainland's population, no matter how many F-16s, submarines, or anti-missile missiles we sell Taiwan, the island would not likely prevail in a prolonged conflict with China. A Chinese blockade, which few nations would challenge, could quickly devastate the Taiwan economy. Furthermore, the hawks understand that if the United States intervened in such a conflict, regardless of how many thousands of smart bombs it rained down on the mainland, China might outlast the patience of the American people. That brings up the administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which, for the first time, declared that the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons should take into account the possibility of a nuclear war with China "over Taiwan. " In other words, to maintain a potential strategic offshore base for use in a hypothetical conflict with China, we may have to fight a nuclear war with China. This would be "a self-fulfilling prophecy" of biblical proportions.

And, more evidenceChalmers Johnson (President of the Japan Policy Research Institute) 2001 “ Time to Bring the Troops Home,” The Nation, (May 14, 2001 issue, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010514&c=1&s=johnson

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust.

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North Korea Moduleus-china cooperation is key to north korea denuclearization Thomas Christensen (Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) 2007 U.S.-China Relations. 3/27/7. http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/82276.htm.

The United States encourages China to work with us to build and strengthen the global system and advance global peace and security. We appreciate China’s positive contributions, and we urge China to do more. China has played a critical role as host of the Six-Party Talks aimed at achieving a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. China was instrumental in brokering the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement, which, when implemented, will get North Korea out of the nuclear business. In February of this year in Beijing, China again played a key role in helping get North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks and reaching agreement on the Initial Actions plan. China has supported strong measures, including sanctions, in the United Nations to press North Korea to end its nuclear program and has been key to getting Pyongyang to negotiate on a multilateral basis. The Administration is committed to continuing to work closely with China to achieve North Korea’s complete, irreversible, and verifiable denuclearization; adopt more responsible behavior; and, implement the September 2005 Joint Statement.

the impact is extinctionPat Fungamwango, October 25, 1999, Times of Zambia (Lusaka), in Africa News, “Third world war: Watch the Koreas”

If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with North Korea.

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Indo\Pak Modulerelations solve a nuclear war between india and pakistanWilliam Perry (Former Secretary of Defense) 1995 Remarks to the Japan Society, September 12, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/1995/b091395_bt498-95.html

There is a lot to gain from engaging with China. Through engagement we can address a broad range of global and regional security concerns. Our military-to-military contacts put us in touch with the highest levels of the PLA, who have great influence in China. And by working to improve relations with China, we are also working to reduce tensions between the three great powers on the Asian continent -- China, India and Pakistan. The relationship between these three powers has long been one of fear and mistrust. While India worries about the threat from Pakistan, it also keeps a strong force because it feels threatened by China. And Pakistan keeps a strong force as a deterrent against India's forces. What makes this tension truly worrisome is the potential for nuclear weapons use in the event of a conflict. Our relations with China are crucial in reducing tensions between these three regional powers.

war results in extinctionWashington Times 2001 The Most Dangerous Place. 7/8/1.

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary.

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Africa Key China Soft PowerAfrican-Chinese relations are necessary to China’s international influence.Drew Thompson 2005 (Drew Thompson is Assistant Director at the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, China's Soft Power in Africa, October 13, 2005, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=32003)

The strength of China’s African relations and the source of much of its soft power stems from more than just the relatively recent growth in trade and investment. Throughout its history of cooperation with African nations, China has emphasized that it has "given what it could" in terms of financial aid and technical support and it continues to do so even as its ability to promote relations through economic incentives -- primarily trade, tourism, and investment -- has grown. Technical support, without political "strings attached" (other than affirmation of a "one China policy") has remained a significant aspect of China’s support for African states. Under the auspices of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, China has committed to contributing to the development of human resources in Africa by establishing a fund that is jointly administered and used by various Chinese ministries

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UMKC SDI 2007 China DisadvantageLouie & Todd

Impact- Regime CollapseRegime collapse causes lashout and nuclear warThe Epoch Times 2005 http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

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***Answers***

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UMKC SDI 2007 China DisadvantageLouie & Todd

Relations BadUs / China Relations BadGlaser, Bonnie [senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS and CSIS in Washington DC. She also writes the chapter on US-China relations for Comparative Connections] 25/07/07, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17907, 7/25/07

Although the referendum will have no practical impact on Taiwan's status, the United States has made clear that it opposes the initiative because it "appears designed to change Taiwan's status quo unilaterally" and could undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. From the US perspective, Chen's initiative violates the spirit if not the letter of his "four no's" pledge, enunciated in 2000 when Chen was inaugurated as Taiwan's first DPP president. He said that he would not declare independence, change the national title, incorporate the concept of state-to-state relations between the island and the mainland in the Constitution of the Republic of China, or promote any referendum on independence or reunification. President Bush sees the "four-no's" as a commitment not just to the Taiwan people, but also to the international community and to himself.

relations down—new pentagon reportSimom Tisdall June 13 2007 Pentagon report chills US-China relations. The Guardian. 6/13/7. Online.

Even as the US struggles to stop relations with Russia plunging into deep freeze, a distinct chill has descended over its dealings with Beijing following a new Pentagon report on China's military build-up. Richard Nixon knew better than to antagonise both superpower rivals at once. No such wisdom troubles George Bush. Noting China's "rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations", the Pentagon complained of uncertainty surrounding its expanding military might and how it may be used. Beijing's short-term focus was "military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait", it said. But it was also planning to project military power further afield in the Asia-Pacific region, in preparation for possible conflicts over resources or territory.

no cooperation now—multiple issuesMichael Schiffer May 30 2007 China Relations Won't Work on Autopilot. 5/30/7. Online.

Yet there remains serious gaps between the US and China on a range of trade and economic issues – starting with currency, IPR protections, and labor standards, for example – that if they continue to fester could lead to a breach in US-China trade and economic ties, and perhaps even trigger a larger crisis in US-China relations. All this, of course, takes place against a backdrop in which almost all the domestic political pressures in both the US and China are stacked against cooperation.

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UMKC SDI 2007 China DisadvantageLouie & Todd

No Link- No CompetitionChina does not compete with US in Africa.David H. Shinn June 20, 2006, Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “Africa and China’s Global Activism”,

Fared Zakaria wrote in Newsweek earlier this year that “Chinese foreign policy is still mostly motivated by parochial concerns.” He cited its focus on countering Taiwan and retaining access to energy sources wherever they might exist. Zakaria argued that this narrow policy begs the question whether Beijing wants to be a stakeholder in the international system. It also leaves unanswered if China is willing to pay the price that comes with great global power. These questions are in play in Africa and the outcome is not yet clear. In its dialogue with China on Africa, the U.S. has for the time being opted for the view that China should be seen as a “responsible stakeholder.” A senior official in the State Department’s Africa bureau testified before the House Africa Subcommittee in 2005 that China can help to advance U.S. goals if it increases prosperity and stability on the continent. He listed the following as areas of mutual cooperation: Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping operations, financial support for the African Union and its development efforts, and the expansion of business and investment opportunities for African partners. He concluded that “China should have many of the same interests in Africa as the United States, based, among other elements, on our shared reliance on a global oil market, shared desire to diversify sources from the Middle East and shared concern over volatile oil prices.” Following talks in Beijing at the end of 2005, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, commented that she did not believe the U.S. is in direct competition with China in Africa. She added that it would be a mistake to “consider China an adversary in Africa.”

China cannot increase health assistance.Drew Thompson, October 13, 2005, Assistant Director at the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “China's Soft Power in Africa: From the "Beijing Consensus" to Health Diplomacy”, Jamestown Foundation's China Brief http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=32003

Yet China’s capacity to send large numbers of medical doctors to Africa is limited, and the program faces an uncertain future over the long term. Many provincial budgets are increasingly stretched by a shrinking tax base since rural tax reforms have been implemented. The health needs of many Chinese are also not being met and government doctors are increasingly called upon to deal with public health issues at home. Additionally, given that the Chinese medical system is increasingly privatized, more doctors are less inclined to accept a two-year posting in Africa, particularly because they currently subsidize their meager government stipend with income generated through patient fees and medicine sales. Medical bureaus in some wealthy provinces have reportedly been forced to recruit doctors from inland provinces in order to fulfill their yilaodui obligations.

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Increase China-Africa Relations Causes US-China ConflictChinas increase in diplomatic relations with Africa, have lead to China being more willing to challenge the USPeter Brookes (Deputy assistant defense secretary) February 22 2006. "Chinas influence in Africa: Impacts for the United States". The Heritage Foundation. July 25 2007. http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1916.cfm. mp)

As China's power and influence grows, Beijing is becoming more willing to challenge the United States, EU nations, and others in international arenas to protect its interests in Africa. Over time, differences between China and democracies over human rights and basic political and civil rights will sharpen. For example, in September 2004, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1564, which condemned the mass killing of civilians in the Darfur region, but stopped short of imposing oil sanctions if Khartoum did not act to stop the killing. China abstained from the vote and threatened to veto any further move to impose sanctions.

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