CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD

George T. Yu

THE PASSING OF Mao Tse-tung in 1976 brought to an end an important era in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC). More than any other single individual among the post-1949 Chinese elite, Mao was responsible for defining the issues and determin- ing the course of Chinese domestic and foreign policies. One area where Mao predominated was in Chinese foreign policy toward the Third World. The twin foundations of this policy of uniting the Third World against the United States and the Soviet Union and organizing the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America to form a new international order was largely Mao's creation, based upon his world view and other factors. Indeed, Mao's role in the formulation of China's Third World policy was accorded special mention at the 1977 Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party;' the impact of China's Third World policy in the context of Mao's thesis of the "three worlds" has also been the subject of Chinese attention.2 Mao's influence upon China's foreign policy was clearly evident during his life-time; his legacy was certain to have a continuing impact in the future.

The Third World "The Third World is the main force in combating colonialism,

imperialism, and hegemonism. China is a developing socialist country belonging to the Third World."3 Since the 1960s, declarations similar in content have become familiar hallmarks of Chinese foreign policy

1 See "Political Report by Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, to the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, August 12, 1977." Hsinhua News Agency, August 22, 1977.

2 "The Force and Impact of the Three World Theory," Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao (New York), September 5 and 7, 1977. The article was written by a Hsinhua News Agency correspondent.

3This comment was made by Chou En-lai before a meeting of the 1975 Na- tional People's Congress of China.

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statements. This attention to and interest in the Third World has not been confined solely to verbal utterances; the preoccupation has been grounded equally in substantive activities. For example, China has sought to formally interact with most Third World states, irrespective of their social system and ideology, ranging from Brazil and Iran to the Central African Republic and Zaire. China had also extended to the Third World countries through 1974 more than $3.5 billion in economic and technical assistance.4 Indeed, the Third World consti- tuted a major arena of Chinese foreign policy.

China's attention to Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the for- mulation of China's Third World policy developed over a considerable time period. The immediate origins of China's interest in the Third World can be traced to the 1950s. This period, it should be recalled, was the high tide of Sino-Soviet cooperative interaction, symbolized by the conclusion of the treaty of friendship in 1950; it was also the period of the Korean war during which China confronted the United States, which after the conflict sought to contain China. In the 1950s, China's main interest in the Third World was primarily in devising a strategy to forestall American military and political encirclement-i.e., protection from U.S. pressure. The area of operation was South and Southeast Asia. One manifestation of China's emerging Third World policy was China's participation in the 1955 Afro-Asian conference of heads of governments, the Bandung Conference. There Chinese presented a policy of peaceful coexistence and wooed its Asian neighbors. The initial attempt to win friends and seek allies in the Third World proved short-lived; in most instances China failed to get the South and Southeast Asian states to take a firmer posture against the United States. The American presence in Asia continued unabated and China's Third World policy had yet to be formulated.

The next important development in China's emerging policy to- ward the Third World occurred in the 1960s. A series of environmen- tal-situational factors combined to alter China's international and security status, leading to a total reassessment of China's foreign policy. Two major events that influenced China's foreign policy ori- entation were the Sino-Soviet conflict and the heightened decolonializa- tion movement in Africa. The former had the effect of confronting China with a second major adversary; Soviet social-imperialism began to rival U.S. imperialism as China's principle enemy. China considered the latter event in an equally important light; it symbolized the fur- ther disintegration of the Western dominated world order and the new assertiveness of the peoples of the Third World. A consequence of these and other developments led to China's renewed search for the formulation of a Third World policy.

4 U.S. State Department, Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974, Washington, D.C., 1976.

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The reformulated policy contained two primary objectives: China's search for breaking out of the encirclement imposed now by both the Soviet Union and the United States and China's support for and or- ganization of a new international order. China's new policy was for- mally announced in 1965. It was summarized as follows:

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world." Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in North America and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the con- temporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American people who make up the overwhelming majority of the world population.5

In short, the Third World-"the rural areas of the world"-now con- stituted the center of the world revolutionary movement, struggling against the domination of the traditional powers of North America and Western Europe, "the cities of the world." Earlier, in late 1963 and 1964, Chou En-lai and Chen Yi had carried China's message to Asia and Africa.6 Meanwhile, China also sought to link the Soviet Union with the U.S. and sought to identify the Soviet Union as a European state. However, neither the formulation nor the operation- alization of China's new Third World policy succeeded. Many Third World states were indifferent or hostile to Peking's policy, seeing it as serving China's national self-interests. This was especially true of China's drive to exclude the Soviet Union from the abortive 1965 Afro-Asian conference, a Chinese attempt to mobilize the Afro-Asian states against the Soviet Union. But China's budding Third World policy soon fell into dormancy, as China in the latter half of the 1960s was subsequently preoccupied with internal matters.

The final definition and full implementation of the Third World policy awaited China's "re-entry" into the international arena in the 1970s, following the end of the Cultural Revolution. Teng Hsiao-ping formally presented China's new Third World policy before the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1974.7 The policy was set out

5 See Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking), September 3, 1965.

6 For a record of China's message and Chou En-lai's and Chen Yi's activities, see People's Publishing House, Ya-Fei jen-min fan-ti ta-t'uan-chieh wan-sui (Long Live the Great Solidarity of the Asian-African People Against Imperialism), Peking, 1964.

7 Mission to the United Nations, People's Republic of China, "Speech by Teng Hsiao-ping, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly," Press Release, April 10, 1974.

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in the context of China's new world view which divided the world into three primary units: the First World of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union; the Second World, the other industrialized powers, including the countries of Western Europe and Japan; and the Third World, the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin Amer- ica. China was defined as a part of the Third World, which constituted "a revolutionary motive force propelling the wheel of world history and are the main force combating colonialism, imperialism, and par- ticularly the superpowers."s The primary world struggle was between the Third World and the First; the Second World would support the Third World on some issues. China's Third World policy, therefore, identified China with the Third World, assigned to the Third World the role of the primary revolutionary force, formed a broad united front of Third World nations, and directed the Third World against the superpowers. The objectives underlying the Third World policy and China's world view were carefully stated by Hua Kuo-feng before the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party:

Chairman Mao's thesis differentiating the three worlds gives a correct orientation to the present international struggle and clearly defines the main revolutionary forces, the chief enemies, and the middle forces that can be won over and united, enabling the international proletariat to unite with all the forces that can be united to form the broadest united front in the class struggle against the chief enemies of the world arena.9

In the 1970s, after two false starts in the 1950s and the 1960s plus the temporary interruption due to the Cultural Revolution, China's Third World policy was finally launched. The twin goal of opposing the United States and the Soviet Union, the superpowers, and of creating a united international structure, consisting chiefly of the Third World, was now operational.

The Superpowers A key component of China's Third World policy has stressed the

"struggle against the superpowers," the U.S. and the Soviet Union. China's policy, therefore, must be understood within the context of China's interaction with and changing perception of the superpowers.

The U.S. has been a primary factor in China's Third World policy. Chinese foreign policy was born in the midst of the Cold War, and this was the primary factor in the initial course of China's foreign policy and behavior. The 1950 alliance with the Soviet Union placed China in the Socialist Camp, while the Korean War put China in di- rect conflict with the United States. China identified the U.S. as the

8 Ibid. 9 "Political Report by Hua Kuo-feng."

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foremost imperialistic power and its principle adversary. During the formative years, a chief function of China's Third World policy was to attempt to build an anti-American united front to seek protection from U.S. political and military pressures. China's international role during the Bandung era of the 1950s must be seen in this light. China also sought to rally the Third World against the United States for its support of United Nations intervention during Zaire's (then the Congo) independence in 1960, which China alleged was nothing more than a cover up for U.S. imperialism. While in these and other in- stances an attempt was made to unite elements of the Third World against the United States, the Third World refused China's challenge. But this did not diminish China's interest in the Third World; nor did it lessen the United States as an object of China's Third World policy.

The United States constituted one factor in China's Third World policy; another has been the Soviet Union. Since the 1960s, the Sino- Soviet conflict has been a major consideration in China's Third World policy. Furthermore, the importance of the Soviet factor has steadily increased as the Sino-Soviet conflict progressed from an ideological/ political dispute to a semi-military conflict. The Soviet Union replaced the U.S. as China's principle enemy. Indeed, according to China, while the world learned of the imperialistic nature of the U.S. in the 1960s, during the 1970s the world "began to know Soviet social-imperialism."

A Chinese response to the growing "Soviet social-imperialism" has been to identify the Soviet Union as an expansionist and aggressive power, especially in the Third World. Let us look at one instance of Soviet expansionism, as perceived by Peking. Events in Africa in the 1970s were seen as proving China's charges.10 First, Soviet interest in Africa was part of Soviet plans for world domination. Specifically, the Soviet Union's interest in southern Africa stemmed from its design to control Europe. By controlling the South Atlantic sea route through which oil and other supplies to Europe were transported, the Soviet Union would then "encircle Europe in a roundabout way." Second, the Soviet Union had dispatched mercenary troops to Angola and started "a barbarous armed intervention." Under the appearance of "coopera- tion," the Soviet Union had forced others to act on its behalf, "to serve as its cannon-fodder and colonialist tool." Third, Soviet appeals to Africa on the basis of a common stand against racial discrimination "is pure humbug." Such appeals constituted a method to infiltrate the African countries; they also were intended as a smokescreen to cover up the Soviet Union's expansionist designs and to bring Africa into the Soviet orbit. Finally, Soviet behavior had necessitated an "adjustment" in U.S. policy toward Africa, thereby increasing the level of competi-

10 For one account of China's charges, see "Intensified Soviet-U.S. Rivalry over Southern Africa," Hsinhua News Agency, September 23, 1976.

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD 1041

tion between the two superpowers on that continent. Clearly, the So- viet Union was the principle threat to world peace; it was on the march in the Third World.

Similar to China's attention to the United States, the focus upon Soviet behavior in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World was in- tended to verify further the hegemonic nature and objectives of the Soviet Union. A goal of China's Third World policy was to seek to mobilize the Third World against Soviet expansionism; if the Third World could be organized, such a force could provide China with a degree of protection from Soviet pressures. In the 1970s, the organiza- tion of an anti-Soviet united front in the Third World became a pri- mary Chinese foreign policy objective.

The identification of the Soviet Union as the foremost dominating world power did not exempt the U.S. from China's attention; the United States continued to be accused of seeking world domination. Consider, for example, the case of Africa. According to China, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the root cause of Africa's plight. While the Soviet Union had dispatched mercenary troops to Angola, the U.S. was trying hard to hold on to vested interests in southern Africa. Nevertheless, a major difference separated the behavior of the two superpowers; while the actions of the Soviet Union were offensive in nature, those of the United States had been motivated by self- defense. China put it thusly: Faced with the Soviet Union's African offensive, the U.S. had been compelled to take measures to defend its interests."

The tacit recognition that the U.S. constituted a counterbalance to Soviet expansionism in the Third World was not limited to Africa. One of the most overt instances of China's support of the U.S. against the Soviet Union in the Third World took place in the context of the Indian Ocean. Beginning in the 1970s, China began to take increased notice of superpower naval competition in the Indian Ocean, especially toward the increased Soviet presence.'2 Several factors accounted for China's concern, including the importance of the Indian Ocean sea lanes, the vulnerability of the Third World Indian Ocean littoral states, and the potential threat of Soviet missile attacks from submar- ines against western China. To check the Soviet Union, China looked to the United States, though the U.S. escaped neither the charges of expansionism nor the label of a hegemonic power.'3 Indeed, the United States too sought a presence in the Indian Ocean; it also was seen as seeking to control the Third World Indian Ocean littoral states. Similar to the Soviet Union, the U.S. both stationed a naval fleet and acquired installations in the Indian Ocean. However, again it was the

11 Ibid. 12 See "Expansion and Aggression of the Soviet Revisionists in the Indian

Ocean," Jen-min Jih-pao, Alay 12, 1974. 13 Hsinhua News Agency, December 19, 1974.

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD 1041

tion between the two superpowers on that continent. Clearly, the So- viet Union was the principle threat to world peace; it was on the march in the Third World.

Similar to China's attention to the United States, the focus upon Soviet behavior in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World was in- tended to verify further the hegemonic nature and objectives of the Soviet Union. A goal of China's Third World policy was to seek to mobilize the Third World against Soviet expansionism; if the Third World could be organized, such a force could provide China with a degree of protection from Soviet pressures. In the 1970s, the organiza- tion of an anti-Soviet united front in the Third World became a pri- mary Chinese foreign policy objective.

The identification of the Soviet Union as the foremost dominating world power did not exempt the U.S. from China's attention; the United States continued to be accused of seeking world domination. Consider, for example, the case of Africa. According to China, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the root cause of Africa's plight. While the Soviet Union had dispatched mercenary troops to Angola, the U.S. was trying hard to hold on to vested interests in southern Africa. Nevertheless, a major difference separated the behavior of the two superpowers; while the actions of the Soviet Union were offensive in nature, those of the United States had been motivated by self- defense. China put it thusly: Faced with the Soviet Union's African offensive, the U.S. had been compelled to take measures to defend its interests."

The tacit recognition that the U.S. constituted a counterbalance to Soviet expansionism in the Third World was not limited to Africa. One of the most overt instances of China's support of the U.S. against the Soviet Union in the Third World took place in the context of the Indian Ocean. Beginning in the 1970s, China began to take increased notice of superpower naval competition in the Indian Ocean, especially toward the increased Soviet presence.12 Several factors accounted for China's concern, including the importance of the Indian Ocean sea lanes, the vulnerability of the Third World Indian Ocean littoral states, and the potential threat of Soviet missile attacks from submar- ines against western China. To check the Soviet Union, China looked to the United States, though the U.S. escaped neither the charges of expansionism nor the label of a hegemonic power.'3 Indeed, the United States too sought a presence in the Indian Ocean; it also was seen as seeking to control the Third World Indian Ocean littoral states. Similar to the Soviet Union, the U.S. both stationed a naval fleet and acquired installations in the Indian Ocean. However, again it was the

11 Ibid. 12 See "Expansion and Aggression of the Soviet Revisionists in the Indian

Ocean," Jen-min Jih-pao, May 12, 1974. 13 Hsinhua News Agency, December 19, 1974.

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD 1043

had been singled out as the "primary revolutionary force" and which was playing an increasingly important role in international affairs. Both China and Tanzania belonged to the Third World. Thus rela- tions with Tanzania symbolized China's membership in and support of the Third World. Second, there was China's support of national liberation, both in the narrow sense of Africa's total liberation and in the broader definition of opposition to imperialism, colonialism, and superpowerism. In the former instance, Tanzania was a leading advo- cate of Africa's total liberation; relations with Tanzania gave credence to China's role in Africa's liberation. In the latter case, China claimed that the forces of imperialism, colonialism, and superpowerism, led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, were the successors to the old coloniali- ists. The new colonialists sought to control and dominate the Third World. Tanzania's friendship with China, therefore, constituted not only support and recognition of China's stand but also a Third World united front against the superpowers. Third, China's developmental experience was also a factor in relations with Tanzania, whose inter- action with China was seen in terms of the viability of China as a developmental model. China had long been aware of its social and economic achievements and the international implications should its developmental model (or specific features of it) be adopted by those in the Third World. Tanzania was attracted to certain features of the Chinese developmental model, thus giving credence to China and its developmental approach.

Finally, Tanzania has been a major recipient of Chinese economic assistance, which had included no-interest loans, joint projects in in- dustry and agricultural, and the Tanzania-Zambia railway, completed in 1975. China argued that Sino-Tanzania economic interaction repre- sented a "new type" of cooperation and that the Third World could only make true economic and social progress by fully supporting and closely cooperating with one another. Only in this way could the Third World shake "off dependence on the imperialists and hegomonists"; such cooperation would eventually replace "the evil old international economic order" with a new one. Chinese-Tanzania economic interac- tion was a model for the future new order in the Third World.

Another important instance of China-Third World interaction is China's relationship with the South Asian state of Pakistan.16 Begin- ning with diplomatic relations in 1950, China's friendship with Pakis- tan developed slowly. It was not until the Bandung Conference of 1955 that the first important contact occurred. Thereafter, relations grew rapidly, symbolized by Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy's visit to China and Premier Chou En-lai's return visit to Pakistan in 1956.

16 For two accounts of Sino-Pakistani relations, see Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: A Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale, Amherst, 1974 and G. W. Choud- hury, "Reflections on Sino-Pakistan Relations," Pacific Community, 7:2 (January 1976), pp. 248-270.

1044 GEORGE T. YU

These visits were followed with China's acceptance of Pakistan's offer to begin border settlement negotiations in 1961, which were concluded with an agreement in 1963. Other areas of cooperation ensued, includ- ing joint construction of a highway between Pakistan and China and the start of air services between the two countries. Meanwhile, another series of exchange visits took place between Chinese and Pakistani leaders; in 1965, President Ayub Khan visited China, while both Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Chen Yi went to Pakistan. Following the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir and the Soviet- sponsored Tashkent meeting in 1966, Chinese-Pakistani interaction entered an even higher level. China, for example, after a slow begin- ning commenced a major economic and military assistance program to Pakistan; by 1974 Chinese aid (excluding military) totaled $391 million. Similar to China's relations with Tanzania, the Great Proletarian Cul- tural Revolution had no overt adverse effect upon Sino-Pakistani in- teraction. Through the mid-1970s, relations continued at a high level. In the words of the Joint Communique issued upon the conclusion of Prime Minister Bhutto's official visit to China in 1974, "The two sides noted with satisfaction that the visit of Prime Minister Bhutto to China had made a significant contribution to the future consolidation of the close-relations between the two governments."

What were China's interests in close relations with Pakistan? And of what importance has Pakistan been to China's Third World policy? We will consider three possibilities. First, there was the factor of China's common cause with the Third World, and especially one of China's neighbors. China has long stressed the goal of Third World unity, including the importance of mutual support and Third World countries settling their own differences. China had not only settled Aria peaceful negotiations its border and other differences with Pakistan, but had also extended a hand of friendship through economic assis- tance and other forms of support. Sino-Pakistani relations, therefore, symbolized China's operationalization of its Third World policy, especially as that policy applied to a fellow Third World Asian neigh- bor.

Second, clearly a factor in China's interaction with Pakistan was a felt need to counter the superpowers, especially the Soviet Union. There were two interrelated aspects of this problem. On the one hand, there had been a concern by China over the increasing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, as we have noted. On the other, China was also concerned over the developing Soviet-Indian relationship, in- cluding Soviet military assistance to India. China viewed this as part of a Soviet attempt to dominate the area and encircle China. Pakistan shared a similar aversion to these developments. Pakistan was seen as a partner against the Soviet Union in South Asia.

Finally, there was the Indian factor in Chinese-Pakistani relations. This was related to the deteriorating relationship since the mid-1950s

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD 1045

between China and India and the increasing friendship between the Soviet Union and India; also to be considered were the strained rela- tions between Pakistan and India. Beginning with the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1959 followed by the border war of 1962, the Soviet Union became a major supporter of India, both in the diplomatic arena and in the areas of economic and military aid. India, with sup- port from the Soviet Union, soon came to be seen as part of the Soviet containment system directed against China. India had become a "junior hegemonic power." Meanwhile, Indian-Pakistani interaction continued on a strained path, reaching a height with the conflict over Bangladesh (East Pakistan) in 1971. Both China and Pakistan regarded the Soviet Union through its alliance with India as contributing to India's activism. For China, therefore, relations with Pakistan repre- sented a united stand against common foes, the superpower (the Soviet Union) and the "junior hegemonic power" (India).

The New International Order

A different course to high level interaction with select Third World countries was China's identification with the Third World on issues of common interest. In general, this identification was related to China's attempt to break what it saw as the domination by the superpowers, on the one hand, and China's support of the Third World's demand for a restructuring of the international political and economic system, on the other. Two examples of China's drive for a new world order can be seen on the questions of maritime rights and disarmament. China's position on U.S. and Soviet policies on disarma- ment has been stated clearly: Peking has called the policies "a calcu- lated fraud"; instead of disarmament there was "fierce and all-sided" competition between the superpowers; and the policies were designed to "bind the hands of the numerous small and medium countries."17 This latter applied especially to the Third World. China's stand on the objectives and conditions for disarmament have been put forth with equal clarity. The goal of disarmament was the complete prohibi- tion and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. China rejected the idea of a disarmament conference, especially one without "clear aims and the necessary pre-conditions." The preconditions included a U.S. and Soviet declaration that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons and that they would withdraw their armed forces completely from abroad, including the dismantling of all foreign military bases.

China's stand on disarmament struck a sensitive chord, especially in the Third World where the issue was often most pressing because

17 Mission to the United Nations, People's Republic of China, "Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the 30th Session of the U.N. General Assembly," Press Release, September 26, 1975.

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of the sense of helplessness on the part of some Third World countries in their relationship with the superpowers. A view of the Third World can be discerned from Tanzania's position on the question of super- power rivalry in the Indian Ocean.18 First, there was dismay that through the presence of the U.S. and Soviet naval task forces in the Indian Ocean the "cold war confrontation has been brought to our door." Furthermore, this presence had resulted "for no fault of the countries surrounding the Indian Ocean." Second, the behavior of the superpowers was in direct violation of the wishes of the Third World African-Asian states, manifested in the 1970 Lusaka Declaration which declared the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace and which was subsequently adopted by the United Nations in 1971. Third, the presence of super- power fleets and bases in the Indian Ocean not only demonstrated dis- respect for the security of the Indian Ocean littoral states, but their presence also endangered the struggle for liberation in those areas yet to gain independence. Finally, disarmament seemed only to serve the interests of the superpowers. Increased U.S.-Soviet naval competition in the Indian Ocean was taking place at a time when the two superpowers were speaking of detente and holding discussions on mutual force reductions in Europe and elsewhere. "Hence, peace to these Powers is peace in Europe and America." The interests of the Third World which did not wish to become involved in superpower military rivalry were totally disregarded.

China has been equally vocal on maritime rights, an issue of great interest to many Third World countries. There were two primary com- ponents to China's position, both linked to the struggle "against the ocean hegemony of the superpowers.''19 First, China supported the claim of the Third World's littoral states for a new delimitation of territorial waters. China, for example, defended the proposal to extend a state's territorial waters to 200 nautical miles, first put forth by sev- eral Latin American states, on both economic and security grounds. Economically, the new limits constituted a protective measure against resource plundering by one or both of the superpowers; U.S. and Soviet fishery and other activities demonstrated a clear need for the new limits. A new delimitation was also required to enable the Third World littoral states to better defend their national sovereignty against armed aggression and intervention; U.S. and Soviet "gunboat diplomacy" throughout the world were reasons enough for the establishment of the new territorial waters proposal.

Second, China also supported a change in international law gov- erning navigation through straits. China's position was that "a strait that lies within the limits of the territorial sea forms a part of the territorial sea of a strait state."20 Therefore, the strait state or states

18 Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (The United Republic of Tanzania), Press Release, October 30, 1973.

19 Hsinhua News Agency, June 17, 1974. 20 Hsinhua News Agency, July 25, 1974.

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD 1047

exercised sovereignty or jurisdiction over that strait, including "the right to make all necessary laws and regulations." And while China fully upheld the concept of "innocent passage" by merchant vessels of all states, use of a strait by foreign military vessels was a different matter. The latter was a question of "the fundamental right of a sovereign state." China favored prior notification of or authorization by the strait state for the passage of foreign military vessels.

Many Third World littoral states stood on common grounds with China. Consider, for example, Indonesia's position.21 Through the "Archipelago Principle," Indonesia had claimed sovereignty over waters more than sixty miles from its larger islands; it had also an- nounced, together with Singapore, that the Straits of Malacca were no longer to be regarded as international waterways, a position which had been tentatively endorsed by China. The claims were necessitated by the felt need to control the economic, political, and security activi- ties of the country. Indonesia's position was expressed in the context of its concern with superpower naval competition in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere.

China's position on the use of straits, especially by foreign naval vessels, was directed against the superpowers, especially the Soviet Union, who China accused of seeking to gain control of straits through- out the world as part of the Soviet domination of the world.22 The objective of Soviet policy was "prompted by its ambitions for world hegemony." Similar to Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean and else- where, this had prompted a U.S. reaction, resulting in both super- powers contending for the control of the world's straits.

Like the interaction with select Third World states, China's iden- tification with and support of issues of common interest has been di- rected at establishing a united front with the Third World. China has consistently supported the Third World's demand for a restructuing of the international order, one not dominated by the superpowers. China's Third World policy has sought a new international order.

Conclusion What conclusions can we reach on the basis of this survey of

China and the Third World? I should like to make three suggestions. First, there has been a clear relationship between China's Third World policy and China's interaction with the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the 1950 origins of China's Third World policy can be traced in part to the early efforts of China to "win friends and influence people" in Asia against the United States. While organiz- ing an anti-American united front in the Third World constituted a

21 Robert L. Rau, "Considerations in Indonesian Foreign Policy: National Resilience and the Archipelago Principle," a paper given at the Mid-West Conference on Asian Affairs, Ohio University, October 1975.

22 Jen-min Jih-pao, May 26, 1977.

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key Chinese policy, in the 1960s and 1970s this policy was replaced by the organization of an anti-Soviet united front. Indeed, the Soviet factor assumed greater importance in China's Third World policy and was of course a function of the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations, though to be sure the U.S. remained an object of China's attention. In short, one vital element of China's Third World policy has been its direct linkage to China's opposition to the superpowers.

Second, China's Third World policy must also be understood in the positive context of the search for allies in support of a new inter- national structure free from superpower domination. We have discussed the early stages of China's interaction with the Third World. We can- not assume that China foresaw the full international significance of these lands, nor that China anticipated the increased assertiveness of the Third World. However, China did seize upon new developments, identified with new causes, recognized their significance, and incorpo- rated the trends as part of its international strategy. One cannot ignore the importance of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as factors in China's Third World policy. But China's own input into the formulation of a policy toward the Third World must be recognized-that is, China's recognition of the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America as a potential and actual international bloc which could be mobilized and united to served both China's and the Third World's interests.

Finally, there is the question of the future of China and the Third World. We began our discussion with a comment on Mao's influence on China's foreign policy, including China's pattern of interaction with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Third World. For the immediate future, China's policies of increased international ac- tivism and opposition to the superpowers, policies formulated by Mao, are unlikely to undergo great changes. As one recent Chinese publica- tion stated it: The revolutionary foreign policy of the struggle of the international proletariat (e.g., Third World) against imperialism (the United States) and reactionism (the Soviet Union) is Mao's greatest contribution.23 And if we accept our earlier comment that there exists a direct linkage between China's Third World policy and China's rela- tions with the U.S. and the Soviet Union, we can also expect a con- tinued Chinese high interest in Africa, Asia and Latin America. But this should not be misunderstood so that China's interest in the Third World is seen only from a negative viewpoint. The uniting of the Third World to form a distinct international order must be also recognized as a dominant element in China's Third World policy.

23 Mao chu-hsi ke-ming wai-chiao yu-lu (Chairman Mao's Revolutionary For- eign Policy Sayings), Peking, 1977.

GEORGE T. YU is Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana.