Chilean Councilmen and Export Policies, XVII

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Chilean Councilmen and Export Policies, 1600-1699Author(s): Della M. FluscheSource: The Americas, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Apr., 1980), pp. 479-498Published by: Academy of American Franciscan History

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CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT

POLICIES, 1600-1699

S trade between Spain and her American olonies declined n the

seventeenth century, interprovincial commerce increased. This

change within the Spanish Empire and some of its multiple

implications have only recently been recognized and given scholarlyattention. Consequently, little information is available on the partcolonial municipal governments played in the imperial economic

realignment. A case in point is the role of the Santiagocabildon regardto

the export trade which tied Chile's Central Valley, the region adminis-tered by that city council, to the Peruvian marketeconomy.' Although

various studies provide supportive data on this subject, a close scrutinyof the council minutes, focused on policies that regulated outboundcommerce and the production from which it flowed, can more clearlydelineate the extent of creole initiative andcabildo participationin policyformulationand enforcement. A correlativetheme pursued through this

appraisal of the records concerns the socio-economic attitudes of the

upper levels of society in the last century of Hapsburg rule.2Before wheat became a majorexport at the end of the century, tallow

andcordovan leather were the two main articlesproduced in the Central

'John Lynch, Spainunder heHabsburgs2 vols.; New York:Oxford University Press, 1965-1969),

II, 160-228, presents the new thesis; Demetrio Ramos P6rez, Mineriay comerciointerprovincialn

hispanoamericasiglosXVI, XVII, XVIII) (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1970), 111-313,

has an older view of the century; both mention the Chilean-Peruviantie, as do Stanley J. Stein and

ShaneJ. Hunt, PrincipalCurrentsin the Economic Historiographyof Latin America, The ournal

ofEconomicHistory, XXXI (March, 1971), 222-230.

2The council minutes areActasdel cabildo eSantiago,28 Vols. of ColeccibnehistoriadoreseChile

documentoselativos la historianacional,ed. Jose Toribio Medina et al (51 vols.; Santiago:Elzevirianaet al, 1861-1953). Julio Alemparte, El Cabildoen Chilecolonial:origenesmunicipales e las repuiblicas

hispanoamericanas2nd ed.; Santiago:EditorialAndres Bello, 1966), is a helpful study firstpublishedin 1940.

479







480 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORT POLICIES, 1600-1699

Valley for shipment to Lima.AThat the Santiagocouncil's interest in the

Pacific trade centered on these pastoraland, later, agrariancommodities

is understandable because, in accordance with royal law, only land-owners with a legal residence in the city were eligible for cabildo

membership. The propertied individuals (termed cosecheros,roducers)who controlled the council not only profited from export sales but could

also function as buyers without loss of social status. Thus the local

oligarchy, like aristocratic Peruvians, engaged in mercantile activity.The comerciantesmerchants)who were directly dependent on the Lima

trade for their livelihood had few social advantages and little politicalinfluence; however, individual merchants were occasionally invited to

cabildos biertos(literally, open council meetings) on a consultative basis.In this way, the councilmen (alcaldes ndregidores)ook some notice of the

views of the business community as they worked with the royal governorandaudiencia(high court) in determining policy.4

THE PRICE PROBLEM:QUANTITY AND QUALITYCONTROL

As they discussed livestock commodities, the councilmen defined

Santiago's basic economic problem as a financial one and repetitiously

3lnformationon pastoral-agrarian roduction and tradeis in Alonso de Ovalle, Hist6ricarelacibn el

reynodeChile Rome, 1646), 10-11; Diego de Rosales, Historiageneraldel reinodeChile,ed. Benjamin

Vicufia Mackenna (3 vols.; Valparaiso: Mercurio, 1877-1878), I, 192-193; Vicufia Mackenna,

Historiade Valparaisoand Historia de Santiago, Vols. III-IV, X-XI, of ObrasCompletas15 vols.;

Santiago:Universidad de Chile, 1936-1940), III, 145-166, 379-409; X,passim; Diego BarrosArana,

HistoriajeneraldeChile(16 vols.; Santiago:RafaelJover, 1884-1902),IV, 223-224, 262ff; V, 294-309;

and Francisco Antonio Encina, Historia de Chilede la prehistoriahasta 1891 (20 vols.; Santiago:

Nascimento, 1940-1953), IV, 29-35, 151-269.

4Actas, XXXI, 331-333 (1638); XXXII, 119-120 (1641); XXXVI, 368-369, 404-410 (1664);

XXXVIII, 445-446, 448-451 (1675); XLI, 200-201, 332-336 (1678-1679) XLI, 285-287 (1684);

Alemparte,passim.Royal legislation on cabildos is in Recopilaci6ne leyesde losreynosde las Indias(4

vols., Madrid, 1681), books IV, V, VIII. Frederick B. Pike, Aspects of Cabildo Economic

Regulations in Spanish America under the Hapsburgs, Inter-AmericanEconomicAffairs, XIII

(Spring, 1960), 67-86, concentrates on local market regulations; he proposes that urban interests

suffered because landed aristocrats dominated cabildos but states that Lima aristocrats often

engaged in commerce; see also Lynch, II, 212-224;Joseph B. Fichandler and Thomas F. O'Brien,

Jr., Santiago,Chile, 1541-1581:A Case Study of Urban Stagnation, T Am, XXXIII (Oct., 1976),

205-225;and

JacquesA. Barbier, Elite and Cadres in Bourbon Chile, HAHR, LII

(Aug.,1972),

416-435. Some merchants married into the Chilean aristocracy, see Nestor Meza Villalobos, La

concienciapoliticachilenadurantea monarquiaSantiago: Universidad de Chile, 1958), 103. The best

recent analysis of the Chilean elite and its enterprises is Mario G6ngora, Encomenderosestancieros:

estudios cercade la constitucibnocialaristocraiticae Chiledespues e la conquista,1580-1660 (Santiago:

Universidadde Chile, 1970), see 216-218, for dataon tallow exports for 1641, 1654-1656, 1659-1660

based on tax records. Many Santiagocouncilmen were encomenderosn the seventeenth century.







DELLAM. FLUSCHE 481

complained that low prices deprived Chileans of a just return. Althoughthey retained the memory of medieval just price concepts, they also

spoke in more modern terms and remarked that neither the poor butworthy cosecheros nor the comerciantes received adequate profits fromthe export trade. The cabildo believed that economic regulations couldincreaseprofit marginsfor both groups and thereby further the common

good of the kingdom of Chile, the ostensible objective of all council

activity. To approachthis goal, the causes of depressed prices had to beidentified. The cabildo records do not contain the phrase supply and

demand; however, the councilmen did recognize superfluous abun-dance as one of the reasons for their

price problem. Accordingly, theyhelped to implement policies designed to restrict this overproduction.5The first sustained effort to improve prices through production con-

trols began during the administration of Governor Francisco Lazo de la

Vega (1629-1639). In 1635 the governor established a ceiling on the

quantity of tallow to be produced for export, but he left to the cabildothe task of assigning quotas to the ranchers. The councilmen acceptedthe policy and appointed two members, Gines de Toro Mazote, the

proprietarydepositarioeneral(public trustee), and Andres de Serrain, an

elected regidor, to divide a total of 9,000 quintales(hundredweights,quintals)among the producers. The cabildo then sought confirmation ofthe quotas and penalties for violations from the royal audiencia.6

Another method used to limit the livestock commodities available for

export to Lima became operative in 1636. This was the alternativa

which, as the name implies, was nothing more than a system of

slaughtering different types of animals in alternateyears. To ensure its

effectiveness, Lazo de la Vega appointed the depositario Toro Mazote

5Actas,XXX, 288 (1631); XXXI, 189-190, 226-227, 279, 301-302 (1636-1638); XXXII, 114-115

(1641); XXXIV, 118-120 (1651); XXXVII,307 (1669); XXXVIII, 445-446 (1675); XL, 308-309,332-336 (1679); XLII, 349 (1690); Encina, IV, 32-35; Alemparte, 84-85, 117-120, 137-145; Meza

Villalobos, 101-108;John Preston Moore, The Cabildo n Peru undertheHapsburgs:A Studyin the

Origins ndPowersoftheTown Council n theViceroyaltyfPeru,1530-1700 (Durham: Duke UniversityPress, 1954), 172-173. Comparewith Pike, 67-86.

6Actas,XXXI, 42, 110, 114-115, 127, 149-151, 158(1634-1635);Alemparte, 141-142;Encina, IV,33. The sessions also mention a cattle contract for the army on the southern frontierand payment toranchers from the situado(royal military subsidy). Eugene H. Korth, SpanishPolicy n ColonialChile:

TheStruggleor SocialJustice,1535-1700 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), a penetratinganalysisof the Araucanianquestion, discusses situado peculation, 212-215. The Toro Mazotes heldthe trusteeship with its ex officio cabildo seat during much of the century; data on the family is inLuis de Roay Ursuia,El ReynodeChile,1535-1810: estudio ist6rico,enealbgicoy iogrificoValladolid:Talleres Tipogrificas, 1945), 401-402; and Domingo Amunitegui Solar, La SociedadhilenadelsigloXVIII: mayorazgostitulosdel Castilla 3 vols.; Santiago: ImprentaBarcelona, 1901-1904), I, 183-230.See Table 1 at the end of this article for production levels and prices.








and two regidores, Agustin de Arevalo Brisefio and Gabriel Diaz

Hidalgo, as extraordinaryjudges to hear alternativacases throughout the

kingdom, even those involving corregidoresjudiciary, administrativeofficials). Whether their jurisdiction extended to violations perpetratedon estancias ranches) owned by religious orders is a moot questionbecause such enterprises usually enjoyed ecclesiastical immunity from

civil authority; however, the cabildo itself entreated religious superiorsto comply voluntarily with the slaughter regulations.7

Although the council formally recognized the gubernatorial appoin-tees drawn from its membership, it soon exerted its own influence over

the enforcement process. The first step, in 1637, took the form of

substantiating charges against persons who violated the alternativa.8

During the following year, the cabildo lobbied for permission to appointalternativajudges and on December 2 approveda formal petition to that

effect, composed by its procuratorBernardode Amasa. Under the same

date, the escribanocabildo clerk) noted that Lazo de la Vega granted the

petition and allowed any future appointees to receive salaries derived

from fines levied on those found guilty. With this faculty, the council on

December 29 commissioned a judge to hear slaughter cases.9 Thus the

governor had surrendered one of his sources of patronage. Despite hisloss of prestige, Governor Lazo retained his authority intact. He had

exercised his prerogativesin 1638by grantingcertain individuals licenses

to slaughter prohibited animals. The council could not prevent this, but

it voiced disapprovalof his relaxationof the ordinance.10Since produc-ers obtained licenses and enforcement mechanisms were necessary to

curb violations, it is obvious that some Chileans refused to abide by the

alternativa. The cabildo's interest in enforcing the policy, nevertheless,

demonstrated its faith in the principle of economic controls as well asits

determinationto share in the regulatory power.The first alternativa shortly became part of a more comprehensive

export policy (discussed below) and lasted with indifferent success until

7Actas, XXXI, 204-205, 207-208, 210-211 (1636). The Santiago corregidor presided in the

cabildo.

Actas,XXXI, 210-211, 240-241, 263-264 (1636-1637).

9Actas,XXXI, 278, 280-281, 330, 336-337, 351 (1638). The procuratorwas an annually elected

non-voting member. Information on the Amasas is in Roa y Ursuta,608; Jose Toribio Medina,Diccionariobiograficoolonialde Chile(Santiago: Elzeviriana, 1906), 427-428; Meza Villalobos, 103;

AmunaiteguiSolar, III, 135-272.

10Actas,XXXI, 318, 330(1638)

Alemparte praises the colonial respect for economic regulationand correctly stresses counciliar

power over variousaspects of colonial life, but he tends to minimize the role of the higherauthorities

re export policies.







DELLA M. FLUSCHE 483

the Governor, the Marques de Baides (1639-1646) abolished it.12 After

grappling with the price question with several other expedients, the

cabildo again launched a major offensive on the troublesome problemduring the administration of Governor Juan Henriquez (1670-1681).Much of the initiative came from Pedro Pradode la Canal, the alferez eal

(royal standardbearer),who, in 1675, urged the cabildo to reactivatetherotational slaughtering program. As a spokesman for the livestock in-

dustry, Prado insisted that overproduction was the reason for the

existing low prices and for the financialhardshipthat Chileans had been

enduring for many years while awaiting the benefaction of time andnatural accidents to reverse the production-price pattern. This hopehad not been fulfilled and ranchers only became poorer as pricescontinued to fall. Since some arbitrary measure to effect a justevaluation and congruent price, was clearly needed, Prado recom-mended an alternativa as the most feasible solution. A cabildo abierto

composed of cosecheros and merchants accepted the proposal and com-

plimented Prado on his zeal for the universalwelfare of this kingdom.The council then draftedan ordinance and asserted that it would remainin effect until prices increased. After Governor Henriquez had approved

the ordinance, the councilmen published it and appointed inspectors andjudges to enforce it, a practice that continued until 1678 when thecabildo requested the governor to revoke the alternativa.13

Overproduction was not the only obstacle confronting the cabildo inits efforts to maintain a high profit level for livestock producers andmerchants engaged in the export trade. Quality control was another.This the council fully realized and, as early as 1619, moved resolutely tooutlaw the unethical practice of mixing tallow with sand or grease to

increase weight. To detect offenders, it ordered ranchers to pack theirtallow in containers made of hides stamped with their livestock brands,thus authorizingthe use of a type of trademark.That the ruling failed toachieve enduring results and fell into disuse is apparent from its repeti-tion and the introduction of more stringent quality controls in later

years. While Lazo de la Vega governed, the council again prohibitedadulterationand instructed the procurator,Juan Rodolfo Lisperguer, to

'2Actas,XXXII, 143-144(1641)

3Actas,XXXVIII, 445-446, 448-451, 455-456, 469 (1675); XL, 43, 56-58, 69-70,81-83,126,205-206, 264-265 (1676-1678); Alemparte, 143-144. Data on the Prado family is in Medina,Diccionario,702-704; Roa y Ursuta,542-544; AmunaiteguiSolar, II, 309-371. For a discussion of the

Henriquez era including his official and private economic interests see Barros Arana, V, 121-213,218-222; Encina, III, 336.








inspect tallow being stored in Santiago's port, Valparaiso, prior to

shipment.14In the drive to increase

exportvalues that Pedro Prado

helpedto

conduct in the 1670's, the precedents from earlier decades served as

models. Prado, who was the cabildo procuratorin 1672, recommended

the use of branded containers to store and ship tallow that had been

melted and strained to remove impurities. Although four cabildo mem-

bers favored his plan, a majority of seven claimed that the cosecheros

could not possibly adopt the new process. His proposal, nevertheless,became the basis for a bando(proclamation)that Governor Henriquez

promulgated in 1672 and for measures considered in 1679. The bando

reiterated an advisory opinion that the audiencia had submitted to the

governor. Taking cognizance of the cabildo majority opinion, Henriquezand the oidoresaudienciajudges) did not require producers to implementthe melting-straining process but did enjoin them to use brands duly

registered by the cabildo escribano. The bodegueroswarehousers) in

Valparaiso, charged with keeping accurate records, had to incorporatethe brands in their account books and in promissory notes issued to

producers. This procedure, Henriquez predicted, would prevent tallow

adulterationbecause guilty ranchers, identifiable by their brands, couldbe forced to make restitution. He also praised the audiencia for suggest-

ing that heavy penalties be levied againstbodegueros who tampered with

tallow allotments. The royal authorities thus amplified and carried into

law a measure which had originated in the cabildo. In December, 1676,word reached Santiago that the tallow price on the Lima market had

shown a temporary rise,15 an indication that the quality regulations,with the previously mentioned alternativa,had had the desired effect.

The endemic financial problem, nevertheless, soon directedrenewed

attention to both quality and quantity controls. The cabildo in 1679 not

only reenacted the branding practice but also appointed a committee

composed of councilmen, producers, and merchants to study other

means to improve prices. As his representative in policy discussions,Governor Henriquez named the auditor general of the army, the licen-

tiate Juan de la Cerda y Contreras. The Chilean-born attorney, who

Actas, XX, 324, (1619);XXXI, 148, 163(1635-1636);Alemparte, 141-145, 232,; Encina, IV, 33.

On the powerful Lisperguer family see Medina, Diccionario,464-466; Meza Villalobos, 104,

143-146.

5Actas,XXXVIII, 245-246, 251-254 (1672); XL, 81-83 (1676);the penalty for a bodeguero'sfirst

offense was 200 pesos; for the second it was a 500 peso fine plus two years suspension from

warehousing.







DELLA . FLUSCHE 485

early in the eighteenthcenturyestablishedone of the kingdom's irst

mayorazgosentailed states),had been the cabildo'segaladvisorn 1665.

He became thefiscal(crownattorney)of the audienciaof Santiago n1668andin 1676was electedan alcalde.WhenCerdaandthecommittee

reportedin 1679, the council acceptedtheir recommendation f the

preparationechniquethat Prado,now a cabildodelegateto the com-

mittee, had suggestedseven yearsearlier.However, there is no clearevidencethat it was ever fully implemented; ather,the cabildocon-tented itself with a temporary mbargoon shipments o Valparaiso.16This apparentlyerveda dualpurpose:t restricted he supplyof tallowavailable for

export,and it

gaveindividualswho had allotments

warehousedn the portmarketing riorityoverothers.

PRICE FIXING AND MONOPOLY EXPORT CONTRACTS

One of the routineactivities he cabildoperformedwas the fixingof

prices on articlesconsumed domestically.17 This local practicewas

appliedto the exporttradein 1647in an effortto protectthe valueoftallow reserves

spared bythe calamitous

earthquakehat occurred n

May. The council set a minimumprice of 5 pesos the peso was the

Spanishpieceof 8)per quintalontallowto defendproducers gainstanyunscrupulousdealerwho might takeadvantageof their straitenedcir-cumstances. The ordinanceprohibited violations under penalty ofconfiscation f the tallowand a 500peso fine.18

In 1648GovernorMartinde Mujica 1646-1649) pheldthe principleof exportpricecontrolsand grantedpermission or a tasa(mandatoryprice list) on both tallow and cordovanleather. For several years

thereafter he cabildoarrangedor a committeeof producersand mer-chants to draft an annualminimumprice list; however, the councilrecordssuggestthat the practicewas responsible or retaliatory ctionfromPeru. The corregidor uan RodolfoLisperguer eported hat theChileans eceived ow returnson the Limamarket n 1649becauseatasa

1Actas,XL, 308-309, 330-336, 399-400 (1679-1680); XLI, 107, 190-191 (1682); Alemparte,144-145; Vicufiia Mackenna, Valparaiso, II, 387-389. Data on the Cerdas is in Actas, XXXVII, 37

(1665);Medina, Diccionario,197-203;AmunaiteguiSolar, I,

129-181.

17Examples are Actas, XXIV, 150-151 (1609); XXVIII, 203 (1624); XLI, 140, 175-176 (1682);

comparewith Pike, 67-86; Moore, 168-184;Alemparte, 117-141, 145-166;Encina, IV, 19-22, 24-26;and Constantino Bayle, LosCabildosecularesnAmerica spafiolaMadrid:Sapientia, 1952), 453-518.

8Acontemporary account of the earthquake is in BibliotecaHispano-Chilena, d. Jose ToribioMedina (3 vols.; Santiago, 1897-1899), II, 5-20; see also reports on damage in Actas, XXXIII,188-190ff(1647); 202 is the price ordinance;Alemparte, 143, 145; BarrosArana, V, 436.








issued there set price ceilings on imports. The cabildo listened to his

jeremiad on Santiago's post-earthquake condition and voted its proc-

urator, Pedro Prado, a power of attorney to argue against the tasa beforethe Lima audiencia. Another advocate, Antonio Barambio, left for Peru

in 1651 armed with 4,000 pesos collected from the supposedly im-

poverished city residents to continue the legal action.19

Santiagoclaimed to receive royal support for its subsequent resistance

to Lima tasas when dispatches arrived in 1654 from a lobbyist the city

employed at the Spanish court. Included were copies of six royalcedulas

(decrees), one of which purportedly forbade the Lima authorities to set

priceson Chilean

products.20

Sinceappeals

to

Spain

as well as to Lima

were part of the cabildo's normal correspondence, the councilmen

sought additional aid from the crown as they protested a tasa in 1666. In

an address that mirrored the pace of life in Santiago, the corregidorMelchor de Carvajaly Saravia lamented that many buildings damaged

by an earthquake some nine years earlier were not yet rebuilt. Lack of

funds had delayed repairs and now a tasa promulgated in Lima had

totally destroyed export prices. This easily persuaded the cabildo to

entreat Governor Francisco de Meneses (1664-1668) and the audiencia

judges to report conditions to Spain and Peru. The council itself senttwo emissaries to court as special procuratorsto plead municipal cases,

including the enforcement of a decree, presumably the one received in

1654, prohibiting price ceilings; they were assigned 1000 pesos for

expenses.21News came from Peru in 1676 that although the cabildo's twofold

programof production and quality controls had effected a price increase

in Lima the Viceroy of Peru, the Conde de Castellar (1673-1678), had

countered these ploys by imposing a tasa of his own. In one of its fewreferences to the Consulado of Lima, the council asserted that the

merchant association had been unable to dissuade Castellarfrom settingthe price of tallow at 6V2pesos. Obviously, the council declared, the

viceroy had been misinformed on the reason for the Peruvian shortageand wrongly supposed that Chileans had withheld exports. This the

councilmen denied, claiming that of the 27,500 quintales shipped during1676 only 13,700 were produced that year, in contrast to a normal

19Actas,XXXIII, 257-258, 268, 283-284, 402, 407-411 (1648-1649);XXXIV, 6, 18, 117-120, 139,

142-143, 148-150 (1650-1651);Alemparte, 145, mentions missions to Peru.

20Actas,XXXIV, 482-483 (1654); Encina, IV, 301-302; the contents were not copied into the

Actas;perhapsthe decree was merely of a general nature.

21Actas,XXXVII, 100-101, 124-128, 136(1666).







DELLAM.FLUSCHE 487

annualyield of 30,000.Further, he viceroylackedknowledgeof royallegislationwhich protectedChilean productsfrom price ceilings in

Lima.To clarifymatters, he cabildomentioned specialdecreegrantedin the 1650's and cited a generalcedula dating from 1536 that

prohibited asason goodssent fromSpainto any portsunder Peruvian

jurisdiction.The Lima audienciaon January20, 1553,hadinterpretedthe earlylaw broadly o waivepricecontrolson goodstransportedromLima to Chile. From this precedent, the cabildo deduced that the

exemption houldcoverChile'scurrent hipmentso Peru.To reenforcetheseargumentsubmitted o theviceroy nwriting,thecouncilempow-eredthe Chilean

lawyerDiegoMonterodel

Aguilar,who livedin Peru

and practicedbeforethe Limaaudiencia, o present ts remonstrances.

Objectingto the tasa on the groundsthat naturalscarcityhad legiti-matelyincreased allowvalues,the councilchoseto ignorethe artificialcharacter f the shortage reatedby the alternativa, nd,whiledecryingthe viceregalorderon prices, itself consideredimposinga minimum

priceof 8 pesoson tallowexports.22Cabildo attitudes on price fixing continued to vary with cir-

cumstances.In 1678, for example, the corregidorPedro de Amasa

advocated he pricingof exports prior to shipment, yet he opposedPeruviancontrols six years later. On the latteroccasion, Amasa in-formed he producers ndmerchantsn acabildoabierto hat one Diegode Manterola,who enjoyeda virtualmonopolyas a Limapurchasingagent orChileanproducts,hadpriced allowat42 pesos.This, plushis

arbitrary riceson cordovaneather,notonly violated he royalexemp-tionsgranted o Chilebut alsocontravened commonaw. Thecouncil,in a privatesession, then resolved to enter a protest, supported by

GovernorJose de Garro(1682-1692)before the viceroyand the Con-suladoof Lima.23

The cabildofirmlydefended its right to establishminimumpriceswhen it felt conditionsmerited hem. It opposedpriceceilings mposedfromoutside. The only consistencyherewas the desireto protect ocal

profits. Appeals to secure a privilegedcommercialposition throughpoliticalinterventioncoincided with the severalpolicies which were

designed o exerteconomicpressure.Limapricecontrolswere a factor

22Actas,XL, 81-83, 87, 93-95 (1676-1677);the texts of the decrees are not included; Montero was

to receive 100 pesos for expenses.23Actas,XL, 206-207 (1678); XLI, 285-287 (1684);the prices for tanned goatskins rangedfrom 12

to 15 pesos per dozen.








limitingprofits n Chile,butif theywereoccasionally eemednecessary,Chileans and others who supplied Peru with livestockcommodities

probablymanipulatedhe market o a considerabledegree.The councilmenwho objectedto Lima tasashad mixedfeelingson

monopolyexportcontracts.Although he cabildoresentedanycontrac-tual arrangements elievedto be unfavorableo Santiago'snterests, tdid not condemn the principleof monopolyas such and in 1690madeovertures o Limafor a tallowasientomonopolycontract)between thetwo cities. Earlier, n 1631,the possibilityof entrusting xports o onehand had beenexplored n an effortto avoid he financialdisadvantagesthatproducers ncounteredwhenthey sold their tallowindividually.24

Between 1638 and 1642, the council minutes refer to a pair ofcontracts,one of which was a monopolythe Viceroy, the Conde deChinch6n 1628-1638),and the Limacabildohadarrangedo supplythe

viceregalcapitalwith tallowcandles.The asentistacontractor)n Peruwas SanJuande Hermuia, Basquewell known n Chile becausehe hadheldbothproprietary ndappointiveofficesthere,conducted he royalmilitary subsidy from Peru, and was related to the local Cerda yContrerasamilythroughmarriage.Whenthe Santiago ouncilheardof

his importationprivilegein 1638, it registereda protest againsthiscontractbeforethe authoritiesn Peru.Nevertheless, hecabildosignedan asiento, sometimein 1639, with individualswho were either his

agents or had presumablyreachedsome agreementwith him. The

recordsof this localcontract,which mayhave beena subsidiaryof the

one in Lima,arefar fromcompleteand less thancoherent,but salientfeatures an be ascertained.To underwrite he localventure, hebuyersconvinceda numberof Santiagoaristocratso postbondtotalling80,000

pesos.The cabildothenapprovedhe financialguarantee.According othe finaltermsof the asiento,the contractorswouldpurchase he tallow

producedorexportduringa tenyear periodat thepriceof 62 pesosper

quintal, payablepartially n ropa(cloth). The tallow buyers were to

enforce healternativadoptedn 1636which wasto continueasa means

of limitingproduction.25

24Actas,XXX, 288, 332, (1631-1632);XLII, 349 (1690);Alemparte, 143.

25Actas,XXXI, 301-302, 331-336, 338, 340-341, 365-366, 374, 380-381, 399, 415 (1638-1639);XXXII, 34-35, 95, 162-164 (1640-1642); data on Hermua is in XXVIII, 435-440 (1627); XXX,

211-215, 217-219 (1630); XXXI, 61-64 (1634); Roa y Ursdia,628, 630-631; AmunaiteguiSolar, I,

129-181;he was both uncle and father-in-law to the attorneyJuan de la Cerda. Viceroy Mancera

mentioned the Lima contract in Relaci6ndel . . . Marquesde Mancera, Colecci6nelas memorias

relacionesqueescribieronosvirreyes elPeri, ed. RicardoBeltrin R6zpide and Angel de Altolaguirre(2

vols.; Madrid:Imprenta del Asilo de Huerfanos, 1921-1930), II, 168-169;see also Moore, 275.







DELLA M. FLUSCHE 489

A number of intrinsic and extrinsic complications that led to thecontract's premature cancellation soon arose. Among the first obstacles

impeding its smooth functioning were disputes over the value of mer-chandise imported for payments during 1640. The audiencia created an

arbitration board, composed of asentistas and councilmen, to evaluate

the payments in kind; however, the exporters promptly asked for a

downward adjustment in the purchase price of tallow. A cabildo abierto

favored this price reduction, but the council itself deferred a final

decision despite a reminderfrom the corregidor, Valeriano de Ahumada,that the contract benefited both Santiagoand Lima. Unable to meet their

obligations, the buyersbegan

to default on payments to

producerswho,

in turn, had accumulated debts for goods received from the contractors,and on July 13, the council attempted to halt the credit buying.26

Problems relating to the contract and to the more fundamental issuesof production and prices multiplied in 1641. When the cosecheros

produced excessive amounts of tallow in violation of the alternativa,the

buyers abnegatedtheir right to enforce it, and the councilmen undertook

the task. Meanwhile, the Lima tallow price declined from 3V2 pesos in

May to only 2V2 in July, less than half the sum stipulated in the Chilean

contract. Governor Baides intervened in October with an executiveorder that prohibited all slaughtering until April, 1642, and imposed a

ceiling of 18,000 quintales on future tallow production. The cabildo had

already considered such an expedient and later approved quotas for

producers that the depositario Gines de Toro Mazote helped to prepare.To enforce the regulation, Baides, not the council, appointed a judge tohearcases.27

In order to collect the debts outstanding to producers, the cabildo had

brought suit against the asentistas on behalf of the ranchers. Theaudiencia ruled in October, 1641, that an appeal was necessary tocontinue the litigation. Although a cabildo majorityfavoredprosecuting,the alcaldeTomaisCalder6nwon a postponement with the argumentthatthe tallow buyers were bankrupt and hasty action might lead them to

pay their Peruvian creditors with Santiago's assets. In a speech to

producers gathered in a cabildo abierto at the beginning of 1642, thealcaldeJuan Rodolfo Lisperguerannounced that the local residents who

26Actas, XXXII, 12-13, 33-37, 45 (1640). Data on the Ahumadas is in Roa y Ursua, 360-361;

Medina,Diccionario,33-35.

27Actas,XXXII, 95, 99-100, 105, 114-115, 117, 119, 121-123, 134-138, 143-144, 147, 152-153

(1641); Encina, IV, 33. For subsequent mention of the maximum-quota regulations see Actas,

XXXII, 214-215, 254, 271, 287-289(1642-1643).








hadunderwritten he contractwere in a precariousposition.Not onlywere the asentistasbankruptbut Viceroy Mancera(1638-1648)and

GovernorBaides had withdrawnauthorizationromthe contract.Theassemblyrespondedto this informationby naming delegatesto meetwith the councilon the matter,28a timeless bureaucratic roceduren

problem olving.At the end of his term as viceroy, the Marquesde Mancera ecalled

that Chileanremonstrancesagainst he Limacontracthad influencedhisdecisionto revokeit. Notwithstanding, ocal opinionon the Chileancontracthad been divided.Those individualswho had postedbondtounderwrite t had investedin its success. Othershad

pressedfor

legalactionagainst he contractorswhich mighthaveled to the forfeitureofthebond.In viewof theviceregalandgubernatorialulingsbanning he

local asiento, the councilmen and representativesrom the cabildo

abiertovotedto abolish he Chileancontract.Afterthis, they declared,in a meetingwith one of the exporters, hat it was null and void and

withdrewthe lawsuit. A finalcompromisebetweenthe partiesstipu-lated:(1) a scale of paymentsdue the ranchers or tallow previouslydeliveredto the buyers, and (2) interestpaymentson the debts that

producers wedthecontractors.29Although he firstcontracthadmerelycompoundedhe Chileanprice

problem, ts unpleasantmemoryhadfadedwhen two prominent ristoc-

ratscompetedfor anotherasientoin 1664. FranciscoBravode Saravia

Sotomayor,whom Charles I ennobledas the firstMarquesde la Pica,and Pedro Prado, active in formulatingseveraltallow policies, bid

against achotherfor theprivilegeof exportingChilean allow,withthe

latterbeingawarded he contract.The termsof the asiento,underwrit-

ten for 40,000 pesos, providedthat Prado would purchase20,000quintalesannually or afouryearperiodbeginningn 1666at thepriceof

6 pesosperquintal, payable n cashimmediatelyupondelivery.Gover-

nor Meneses,son-in-law o the futureMarques,authorized he Prado

monopolythroughout he kingdomonly to revoke t beforeit became

operative.Meneses,who earnedthe nicknameBarabbasn Chile, in-

formedthe cabildothat a higherprice could be securedwithout the

contract,pronouncedt void, and declared he ranchersreeto dealwith

28Actas,XXXII, 137-138, 159-160(1641-1642). The alfirez, Francisco Eraso, seconded Calder6n

in the call for a cabildo abierto;the texts of the viceregal and gubernatorialrulings are not included

in the Actas.

29Actas,XXXII, 160-164, 188-191 (1642); Mancera, Memorias,II, 168-169; Moore, 275. The

tallow prices ranged downward from 6 V2 pesos depending on delivery date. Meza Villalobos,

143-161, discusses cabildo factionalism.







DELLAM. FLUSCHE 491

tallow buyers of their own choosing. Given the corruption of the

Meneses administration, his personal dislike for Prado, his intervention

in council membership, and the partisan factions in the cabildo, it isprobable that ulterior motives entered into the contract cancellation.

Nevertheless, the councilmen who had perhaps devised some exportscheme with him approved his action.30 Expediency dictated the Chil-

eans' evaluation of monopolies; enticed by the promise of greaterprofitsor threatened by the governor, they abandoned the contract.

COMMERCIALAXES AND PORTREGULATIONS

The overlapping urisdictionshat came into play in arrangingand

cancellingexportcontractswere alsoa featureof the administrationf

Valparaiso. nitiallythe Santiagocouncil's nterest n its portcenteredon the municipalrevenueobtainedfromthe commercialactivitythere.In 1619thecouncilmen nstalledabalanzascales)andbegancharginga

dutyongoods shipped hroughValparaiso;heyusually eased hescalesto an individualwhose accountsweresubject o theirreview.In 1648 hecabildo rescinded he tax becauseof the

earthquakehe

previousyear,but the audiencia estored t in 1651,designatingt as a sourceof royalrevenue.After 1666theoidores,withroyal permission ecuredthroughcabildopetitions,allowed he councilto farmout the tariffand useit for

specifiedpublicworksprojects.The highcourtoccasionally udited hebalanza ccountsandperformed thersupervisoryunctions.31

Santiagonot only acquiredbalanza ncomethatwouldnormallyhaveaccrued o the crownbutalsoenjoyedperiodicrelieffromroyaltaxeson

30Actas,XXXVI, 368-369, 384-386, 403-411, 420 (1664);XXXVII, 40-43, 59(1665); Encina, III,299-302; IV, 33-35; Barros Arana, V, 48-73, 88, 92, 102-112, 166ff; Korth, 190-192, 214, 218-

219; Mcza Villalobos, 146-154; AmunaiteguiSolar, I, 231-270; II, 318-320; Roa y Ursuia,248-250;

Medina, Diccionario, 139-143; Barbier, 421-422; Eduardo Pino Zapata, Estampas de la vidachilena durante el gobierno de Don Francisco Meneses, Boletin de la academiachilenade historia,

Yr. 25, no. 58 (1958), 69-88. See also the council sessions on membership in Actas, XXXVI-XXXVII (1664-1667).

31Actas,XXV, 344-345 (1619); XXXII, 166, 172, 174 (1642); XXXIII, 302-303 (1648); XXXIV,

83,, 330, 482-483 (1651, 1653-1654);XXXVII, 162-163, 325-327, 335-339, 380 (1667,1669); XLI,

passim 1682);XLIII,passim(1696); XLIV, 224, 236-237, 249, 261-262, 265, 281-282 (1699);Encina,IV, 38-39; Vicufia Mackenna, Valparaiso, II, 371-372; Bayle, 319-320; Manuel Cruchaga,Estudiosobre a organizaci6ncondmicala hacienda

ptiblicade Chile(2 vols.; Santiago: 1878-1880), I, 237-238;

Manuel Josef de Ayala, Diccionario egobierno legislacion e Indias, Vols. IV, VIII of Coleccion e

documentosniditospara la historiade Ibero-Am?rica, d. Rafael Altamira et al (14 vols.; Madrid:

CompaniaIbero-Americana; 1927-1932), VIII, 151-152;Juan de Sol6rzano Pereyra,Politica ndiana

(5 vols.; Madrid:Compania Ibero-Americana, 1930), V, 58-60.








trade and commerce. In the sixteenth century, the crown had dispensedthe kingdom of Chile from two imposts, the alcabala sales tax) and the

almojarifazgo customs duty). This exemption lasted until they werecombined in the derecho e la uni6n de las armas intended for imperialdefense spending. At its inception, Santiago's share of the tax packagewas 12,500 pesos. Pleading the poverty of the city, earthquake damages,and the financial drain of the continuing Araucanian war, the council

successfully postponed its collection in the Central Valley until 1640and

for some twenty years thereafter won temporary exemptions from the

levy.32In addition to defending its region against imperial taxes, the cabildo

acted to prevent the loss of private profits to the warehousers who were

middlemen in the Pacific trade. The requirement that bodegueros postbond for the goods they handled was a device to insure honest transac-

tions, but repeated injunctions merely testify to the problem of enforce-

ment.33

Promissory notes issued for goods received were another persistentsource of cabildo grievance that sometimes evoked audiencia and guber-natorial intervention. The most forthright criticism of the warehouse

operators appeared in the session of March 6, 1691. The alguacilmayor(chief constable) Agustin de Vargas, seconded by the alf6rez DomingoEraso and the regidor Antonio Fernfandez Romo, indicted the

bodegueros on the charge that their promissory notes and the bonding

practice had a history of bankruptcy that led to burdensome investiga-tions. Therefore, he argued, producers should arrangefree pacts directlywith merchants without becoming embroiled with the middlemen in

Valparaiso. In sum, each rancher should remain at liberty to sell his

tallow as he pleased because it was his private property ( cosasuyapropia ).34

These remarksabout private property have a Lockean tone suggestingthe emergence of an individualistic, absolute approach to property

32Actas, XXXI, 396-397, 416-418 (1639);XXXII,passim (1640-1643);XXXIII, 193, 243-244, 281,

287-288, 429, 431 (1647-1649); XXXIV, 481-484, 487-490, 506 (1654); XXXV, 15-17, 181-183

(1655-1656); XXXVIII, 287, 290-292 (1674); XLIV, 68-69 (1697); Meza Villalobos, 76, 85-99;

Encina, III, 529-533; IV, 200; Medina,Biblioteca, I, 323-326;Lynch, II, 94-101, 164;BarrosArana,

IV., 437-442; V, 307-309; Cruchaga, I, 234-235, 239-240, 247-253; Vicufia Mackenna, Valparaiso,III, 343-347, 372-373.

33ExamplesareActas, XXXIV, 29 (1650);XLII, 52, 66 (1685);XLIV, 56, 187, 189, 192, 196-197

(1697-1698).

34Actas,XLII, 388 (1691); see also XXXVII, 127 (1666);XXXVIII, 121, 123 (1671);XLI, 65-66

(1681);XLII, 249-250, 262, 374, 384-385, 398-399 (1687-1688, 1691);Vicufia Mackenna,Valpariso,

III, 155-159, 162.







DELLAM. FLUSCHE 493

rights. The reference to free agreements, also seems to herald a breakwith the concept of a regulatedeconomy. If Chileans had acquiredsome

of the vocabulary later employed during the Enlightenment, it would,nevertheless, be unwise to attach too much significance to the terminol-

ogy because the argument in which it was used probably flowed morefrom exasperationthan economic theory. Vargas'contempt for dishonest

middlemen was as old as it was new.

Since the Pacific was the major commercial highway to Peru, thecabildo tried to regulate the vessels plying that route. For example, itmade some occasional efforts to restrict sailings for Callao, the Lima

port,

to three month intervals. An

appeal

to the audienciafor ratificationof such a policy in 1638 emphasized that periodic departures would

increaseproducer and merchantprofits and further the common good of

both Chile and Peru. If tallow were shipped at designated times, itwould neither be too plentiful nor would the limenos Lima residents)suffer a shortage.35Whether or not the petition was granted, it reflects

balance as an ideal. Too much tallow in Lima could lower the price tothe Chileans' detriment; too little might work a hardship on the Peru-vians.

In 1698the cabildo turned its attention to excessive freight costs whichaffected both tallow and wheat. An ordinance giving it supervision of

freight charges on chartered vessels also prohibited persons who hiredthose ships from embarking before at least one-third of the potentialcargo was aboard. The cabildo, striving to keep freight costs down andto prevent exporters from racing to the Lima market, continued to

exercise these port authority functions as the tallow century gave wayto the wheat century.' 36

WHEAT REGULATIONS

Although Central Chile had produced cereals for domestic consump-tion since the sixteenth century, its grain had no significant external

5Actas,XXXI, 226-227, 274, 279 (1637-1638); Encina, IV, 33; Alemparte, 142, 145.

36Actas,XLIV, 199-201, 297-298 (1698-1699); compare with XXXVII, 103 (1666). Vicufia

Mackenna,Valparaiso,II, 408,coined the

phrases. Encina, IV, 242-248,discusses

freightcosts and

the volume of trade. More data on shipping is available in Demetrio Ramos Perez, Trigochileno:navierosdel Callaoy hacendadosimefios ntre a crisisagricoladelsigloXVIIy la primeramitaddelXVIII(Madrid:Instituto Fernaindezde Oviedo, 1967), and Sergio Sepulveda, El Trigochileno nel mercadomundial:ensayode geografiabist6rica Santiago: Editoral Universitaria, 1959), 10-21; both utilizematerialfrom Robert S. Smith, Datos estadisticos sobre el comercio de importacionen el Peru enlos afiosde 1698 y 1699, Revista hiknadehistoria geografia,CXIII (Jan./June, 1949), 162-177.







494 CHILEAN COUNCILMENAND EXPORTPOLICIES, 1600-1699

outletuntil after the Peruvianearthquake f 1687and the subsequentcrop failures there. The price of wheat rose sharplyin Lima, but a

disease hatinfectedChileangraincomplicatedheattempts o capitalizeon the new market,and, at the sametime, guaranteeSantiago'sbread

supply.In the crisisperiodbetween1693and1697,thecabildoresortedto the timehonoredpractice f requisitioning asiccommoditiesnorderto furnishbakerswith flour. To controlprofiteeringhat threatened o

intensify he localscarcity,whichmay perhapshavebeenexaggeratedowithholdexportsuntilacuteshortagesdrovethe Limaprice higher,thecabildo also cooperated,at least outwardly, with the audiencia andGovernorTomaisMarinde Poveda 1692-1700)n issuingandenforcingfullorpartial mbargos n thegrain rade.37

The scarcity n bothkingdoms,while it confirmed he council'slongstanding conviction that prices fluctuatedaccordingto supply and

demand,not only offeredenticingprofits o wheatgrowersandspecu-lators but also presentedopportunities or peculation o the governor,the audiencia,and thecabildo. It was commonknowledge,accordingotwo councilmen, hat cabildocrop inspectionsdesignedto estimate hetotal harvestand measurehisagainstmunicipalneeds were riddledwith

fraud. Thus various measuresadoptedwith the ostensible end of ob-tainingbreadfor the city covered some dishonestadministrative rac-tices.38

If individualofficeholdersmisused authorityfor privategain, thecouncil as an institution was the instrumentof an aristocracy hat

traditionally bstructed ocialjustice.Forexample, hecouncilmen, hevoice of the elite on the labor question since the city's founding,continued o speak o this issue. Withoutspecifically ommenting n the

demands thatwheat cultivation made on the rural labor

force, theyinformed he crown in 1695 that the kingdomneededblack slaves to

supplementthe small numbersof Indian workers.39The expanded

37Actas,XLIII, 78-79, 141-142, 151-152, 155, 177, 231-233, 238-239, 242-243, 246, 254-260, 268,

271-272, 276, 278, 291-292, 298, 301-302, 307, 310-312, 322-323, 339-341, 346-350, 366-367,

369-370, 375-377, 398 (1693-1696); XLIV, 24, 52-53, 58-60 (1697); Ramos Perez, Mineria, 242-

249, and Trigo, especially 5-31, 37-53, 131-134; Sepulveda, 13-21; Barros Arana V, 295-298;

Vicufia Mackenna, Valparaiso,II, 397-409, andSantiago,X, 359-367. Encina, IV, 18-26, 218-223,

andAlemparte, 117-141,

155-166, have data on thissubject

and traditional means to provision

cities; on the latter point see also Pike, 67-86; Moore, 170-172; Bayle, 453-500.

38Seethe sessions in n. 37, especially Actas, XLIII, 246-247, 256, 334 (1695); Barros Arana, V,

296-298; Sepuilveda,20-21; compare with Ramos Perez, Trigo,passim,and Alemparte, 139-141.

39Actas,XLIII, 288-289, 307-308 (1695). On agrarian labor see Ramos Perez, Trigo, 13-14,

131-132. Authorities on colonial Chilean labor, given minimal notice here to retain the focus on

exports, include Rolando Mellafe, Gonzalo Vial Correa, Mario G6ngora, and Alvaro Jara. Korth







DELLAM. FLUSCHE 495

marketfor an agrarian ommodityneitherofferedrespiteto Chileanlaborersnorwidenedthe aristocracy'self-serving nterpretationf the

commongood.The latter is furtherillustrated n a cabildo abiertoconvokedon

January 5, 1696.The featuredspeaker,helicentiateAlonsoRomerodeSaavedra, egal advisor to the council, presentedan analysisof theeconomicregulatory unctionsproper o a municipalgovernment.The

speechmade three mainpoints: 1)it stressed hat a city council'sbasic

duty was to supply residents with provisionsof good quality;(2) it

justified,or rationalized,he powerof a cabildo o set local breadpricesat levelsthatincludedan

adequateprofitmarginor

producersbut

onlymoderate eimbursementorbakers; 3)it defended he rightof produc-ers to market heircropsfreely aftercomplyingwith counciliar nact-ments to meet domesticneeds. Fromthesepremises,Romerodeducedthat the unusualscarcityin Santiagowarrantedan embargoon newwheat until 12,000fanegasSpanishbushels)were harvested or local

consumption.Once a cosecherohad suppliedhis quotafor the city hecould sell the remainder f his cropfor exportwithoutfurtherrestric-tion;however,wheatbuyershad to awaitpermissionbeforeexportingthe new grain.On the otherhand,all the wheat fromthe pastharvest,which had been embargoedand was spoiling, should be exported norder to enhance the common good of the kingdom, because bad

provisions,nsteadof nourishingife, harmed t. The council,whichhad

alreadygoneon record n favorof dumping he old wheat on the Limamarket,endorsedRomero'sopinion.4oChileanshad formerlysoughtgreaterprofits from livestockcommodities at Peruvianexpense yetoccasionallyextended their viewpoint to encompasstheir neighbors'

well-being.Now there was no pretenseof protecting imefiosfrom arecognizedhealthhazard.

Romero's ddressandotherrecordsconcerningwheatdiscloseharsher

feelings toward merchantsper se, whether they were ChileansorPeruvians, han do the tallow documents.But the minutesironically

demonstrates the cabildo's role in maintaining the encomienda and securing royal permission for

Indian slavery.

40Actas,XLIII, 339-341, 346-350 (1696); compare with Ramos Perez, Trigo, 13, 15-16, 39-40,43-46; Alemparte, 139-141; Encina, IV, 20.

41The accusations against the Marques and Prado are in Actas, XLIII, 76 (1693); the letter is

255-257 (1695); see also ibid., 78-79, 141-142, 151-152, 231-233, 271-272, 366-367, 375-377

(1693-1696);XLIV, 24, 52-53, 58-60 (1697);L, 1. See also Alemparte, 139-141;RamosPerez, Trigo,15-18, 38-41, 43-46, 131-132;Septilveda, 20-21; Meza Villalobos, 103, 143-161;Amunategui Solar,

I, 183-230.







496 CHILEAN COUNCILMENAND EXPORTPOLICIES, 1600-1699

revealthat class distinctions n some casesremained,as before,morenominal hanreal. Aristocrats ccusedof speculatingo a harmfuldegree

in 1693werethe Marquesde la Picaand PedroPradode Lorca,whosefatherhad earliercontendedagainstthe Marques or a tallowasiento.Thisevidence, akenwith insinuations gainst thermembers f theelite

andassertions hatwheatgrowersshouldhavepriorityover merchantsin obtainingexport licenses, demonstrates hat the aristocracystill

engaged n commerce,sometimes n an unethicalmanner.Particularly

sharpcriticismof grainspeculators,nterwovenwithfearof violenceon

the partof the populace,appearedn a letterfrom two councilmen ent

as port inspectorsto Valparaison 1695 to enforcean embargo.The

alcalde uanAntonioCaldera ndthe depositarioMartinGonzailez e laCruz declaredthat city councils held sufficientpower to avert such

dangersas breadriots andcautioned he cabildo o relievethe domestic

grainshortage.They favoredretaining he embargobecause his would

curb the avariceof profiteers hreatening o destroy the fatherland

with their covetousness.Both men, alliedto the Toro Mazotefamily

throughmarriage,were apparentlyrathernew membersof the oli-

garchy; certain ealousy f theirsocialmobilitymaypartially xplain he

outburst.It is also possiblethat envy generatedantipathywithin thearistocracy ecause hereare undercurrentsf rivalries hatseemto pitranchersagainstwheat raisers,thus addinganotherdimensionto old

familyfeuds.41As CentralChilegeared tself forthe massivegrainproduction f the

Bourbonera, the cabildofaced the attendantsocio-economic hangewitha bodyof administrativexperience.Market onditionsplaguedbyabundancehadreversedwith the new problemof supplyinadequateo

demand,but past experienceurnishedbasic

policieswhich could be

adjusted rmodified.A senseofcontinuityandchangepervadeshefinal

years of the century. In economicthoughtand practice,the cabildo

continuedto speakof the commongood achievedwithin a regulated

economybut maintainedts biasin defending he financialnterestsof a

small,thoughnotentirelyclosed,oligarchy.42An extremeconcentrationn the localsceneis a striking haracteristic

of the council minutes devoted to exports. If imperialcommercial

42Sepuilveda,0-21;RamosPNrez, 8,39-48,MezaVillalobos,103,Barbier, 21-422. nregardo

policymotivation, he evidenceexaminedgenerally upportsAlempartebut perhaps ndicatesa

strongerprofitmotive and less concernfor social justicein the seventeenthcenturythan he

discoverednhisbroadertudy.His characterizationf thecouncilmen sbothfeudalandbourgeoishassomemerit,but it alsocreates onfusionbecause f themanyconnotationshesetermscarry.







DELLAM. FLUSCHE 497

legislation eceived cantattention ither n the breachor in observance,the crown's permissiveness n regard to Chilean trade,43and the

economicties bindingChile to Peru were factorsin maintaininghepolitical tructure f theempire.Whenthecouncilmen eltaggrievedbyroyaltax levies or Limapricecontrols,they appealed o the Hapsburgmonarchs orredress hatthe crownoftengranted.Although hecabildoresentedviceregal asas,only a few viceroys mposedpriceceilings,and

they did not intervenewhen wheat scarcitygave Santiagoa financial

advantage over the limeiios.The councilmen showed little awareness of the competition in the

Lima market that Chilean livestock commodities had from other areas in

the viceroyalty. Neither do the records, even those pertaining to wheat,reveal that Lima merchants encountered any special animosity because

of their place of residence. The council minutes thus do not demonstrate

that anti-Peruvian feeling had hardened into overt nationalism. Ob-

versely, the emergent patriotism expressed in the cabildo's deep attach-

ment to city and kingdom, born of an aristocratic desire to guarantee

privilege,44 manifested itself in economic policies. Within their region,the Santiago councilmen, acting in conjunction with the governor and

the audiencia, wielded power over financial and economic conditions.This had repercussions on the wider Spanish world, especially the Lima

market.

DELLA M. FLUSCHE

EasternMichiganUniversity

Ypsilanti,Michigan

43Encina,IV, 199-201.

44MezaVillalobos, 100-142.







498 CHILEAN COUNCILMEN AND EXPORTPOLICIES, 1600-1699

TABLE 1

TALLOW EXPORT PRODUCTION LEVELS AND PRICESa

Yearb Quintalesc Pesosper quintal

1635 9,000

1640 6V2

1641 (May) 3?2

1641 (July) 2 2d

1642 18,000e 62f

1647 5

1664 20,000 6

1676 13,700 6?

1684 4V

aSource:Actas,passim.bThe cabildo set some production levels for the following year's slaughter.cA quintal would produce 350 candles. In 1654 candles weighing 1 libra (pound) each sold in

Santiago @ 6 for 1real (the eighth part of a peso).dThe price was quoted as 19 to 20 reales, approximately 2V2pesos.eTotal production for domestic consumption and export.fPrice index ranged downward from this figure.

Documents

Chilean Councilmen and Export Policies, XVII