Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegratingpeople.umass.edu/educ870/PostConflict/resources/ChildSoldiers-BVerthey.pdfA child soldier is any person under eighteen years

Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating November 2001 Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 23 Abstract Among the most egregious child rights violations, an estimated 300,000 child soldiers are involved in armed conflicts. Although a number of countries have undertaken demobilization and reintegration programs for child soldiers, there remains a dearth of documentation and dissemination of program experience and best practice to guide the countries. This working paper draws from in-depth case studies on Angola and El Salvador, as well as other country program experiences. The study follows the themes of prevention, demobilization, and reintegration, detailing concrete examples and offering checklists on each of the main themes for use in future programs. Although demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers is often seen as hopeless, this study shows that children and youths involved in armed conflict can re-engage positive social relations and productive civilian lives. It is not easy, however, and depends crucially on the political will and resources to include child soldiers in peace agreements and demobilization programs and to support their reintegration into family and community. Authors’ Affiliation and Sponsorship Beth Verhey Child Protection Consultant Email: [email protected]

THE WORKING PAPER SERIES The Africa Region Working Paper Series expedites dissemination of applied research and policy studies

with potential for improving economic performance and social conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Series publishes papers at preliminary stages to stimulate timely discussion within the Region and among client countries, donors, and the policy research community. The editorial board for the Series consists of representatives from professional Families appointed by the Region’s Sector Directors.

Editor in charge of the series: Antoine Waldburger, AFTM3, Email: [email protected], who

may be contacted for hard copies.

For additional information visit the Web site http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/index.htm, where copies are available in pdf format. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s). They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or the countries that they represent and should not be attributed to them.

Child Soldiers Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating Beth Verhey Child Protection Consultant Email: [email protected] November 2001

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s). They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or the countries that they represent and should not be attributed to them.

Preface

T his working paper shares lessons learned aboutdemobilization and reintegration programs forchild soldiers. The paper originated with field

studies, begun in 1998 in collaboration with UNICEF,documenting the experience of two countries—Angolaand El Salvador—where child soldiers were used ex-tensively during conflict.

Angola’s demobilization exercise, which lasted from1995 to 1997, was one of the most extensive in the his-tory of the United Nations. It was perhaps the firsttime that children were specifically included in a peaceprocess. While not explicit in the 1994 Lusaka Proto-col, their demobilization and reintegration was de-clared a priority in the first resolution adopted by thecommission set up to implement the peace agreement.Partnerships among local civil society networks madeit possible for many children to return to their homes.

El Salvador’s case is one of the United Nations’ mostsuccessful peacemaking missions. This experience of-fers a long-term perspective on the transition to civil-ian life for child soldiers, which began after the 1992peace accord. El Salvador is also significant becausemany of the child soldiers were girls. Important, if dis-turbing, lessons were learned from the fact that childsoldiers were excluded from the peace accord and thedemobilization and reintegration programs.

The full case studies on Angola and El Salvador,published separately,* provide a number of practicalreferences as well as a candid discussion of lessons andchallenges faced by the programs. This working pa-per highlights lessons learned from Angola and ElSalvador—and integrates lessons from other coun-tries—in order to broaden best practices in future pro-grams for child soldiers.

* The full case studies are published separately as: Verhey, Beth,“Prevention, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Sol-diers: Lessons Learned from Angola” and “Prevention, Demo-bilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: LessonsLearned from El Salvador,” 2001. These are accessible on theWorld Bank Post-Conflict website. To access, go to http://worldbank.org, click on Topics then Social Development,and, finally, Post-Conflict.

This working paper was initiated and brought to fruition by the World Bank Post-Conflict Unit.Betty Bigombe and Markus Kostner served as focal points, providing important analysis and guid-ance. Nat Coletta and Colin Scott provided valuable comments and support.

The field work and preparation of the case studies were done in collaboration with UNICEF,under the direction and guidance of Jean Claude Legrand of the Child Protection Section.

Beth Verhey prepared the field work, case studies, and this working paper. The author wishes tothank the many former child soldiers, their families, and program practitioners who contributedtheir experience, reflections, and views to this study.

Lawrence Mastri edited and formatted the final document.

Contents

Introduction 1Background and methodology 1Organization of the working paper 2

1. Prevention 3Advocacy and supporting civil society 3Preventing re-recruitment 4

2. Demobilization 6Including all child soldiers in peace accords and demobilization processes 6

Advocacy—the need for specific and persistent actions on child soldiers 7Reaching and recognizing all child soldiers 7Appropriate demobilization benefits packages for child soldiers 8

Planning, resources, and coordination 8Mobilizing resources and partnerships—appropriate staffing and procedures 9Coordination and institutional issues 9

Policy coherence and program strategies 10Protection during demobilization—the question of “centers” 10The question of centers as part of reintegration 12

3. Reintegration 15Family reunification and community-based networks 15Psychosocial approach and traditional healing 17Education and economic opportunity 18

Formal and alternative education 18Vocational training and income generating opportunities 19The link to economic policy 20Neglected needs of girls and the disabled 21

Conclusion 22Lessons learned 22Other issues 23

Annex I Selected Readings 24

Annex II Legal Framework 25

Annex III Definition of Terms 27

Annex IVSummary Table of Lessons Learned 29

IntroductionA child soldier is any person under eighteen years of agewho is part of any regular or irregular armed force or group.This includes those who are forcibly recruited as well asthose who join voluntarily. All child or adolescent partici-pants regardless of function—cooks, porters, messengers,girls used as “wives,” and other support functions—are in-cluded as well as those considered combatants.

mong the most egregious child rights viola-tions, an estimated 300,000 child soldiers areinvolved in armed conflicts. Because of thelength of many conflicts, the blurring of civil-

ian and military targets, and the proliferation of smallarms, the involvement of children in conflict has in-creased in recent decades.

When the Ugandan National Resistance Army ar-rived in Kampala in 1986 with children as young asfour among their ranks, they caught the attention ofthe media and child advocates. Coverage of conflictsin Cambodia, Liberia, Mozambique, and other coun-tries has also highlighted the use of child soldiers.

Child soldiers have often been called “future bar-barians” and “killing machines.” Many child soldiersvirtually grow up within an armed movement. Theymay have joined for protection, or face an environ-ment where joining an armed group seemed the onlychoice in life.

Demobilization and reintegration of child soldiersis often portrayed as hopeless—especially where childsoldiers have been forcibly recruited and made to par-ticipate in atrocities. Yet, this study demonstrates thatchildren and youths involved in armed conflict canre-engage positive social relations and productive ci-vilian lives. It is not easy, however, and depends cru-cially on the political will and resources to include childsoldiers in peace agreements and demobilization pro-grams and to support their reintegration into familyand community.

The years of development a child loses to soldier-ing, no matter how they join or are recruited, pro-

foundly affects their future identity. Because child sol-diers are deprived of the normal cultural, moral, andvalues socialization gained from families and commu-nities, they experience a process of asocialization.

A number of countries have undertaken demobili-zation and reintegration programs for child soldiers.But, because of a dearth of documentation and dis-semination of program experience and best practice,these countries have had little guidance or access tothe experience of others.

The 1996 United Nations Study on the Impact ofArmed Conflict on Children,1 backed by extensive re-search from non-governmental organizations, playeda crucial role in demonstrating the global problem ofchild soldiers. Most welcome is the May 2000 OptionalProtocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of theChild (CRC), which raises the minimum age for par-ticipation in armed conflict from fifteen to eighteenyears.2

Determining best practice with child soldiers is anongoing effort. And for program practitioners, it is of-ten difficult to translate a list of best practice principlesinto local application.Concerted efforts and fundingare needed to evaluate, document, and disseminatelessons. In addition to disseminating program experi-ence, that of national program practitioners should alsobe supported in staff and program exchanges.

Background and methodology

Drawing from in-depth case studies on Angola and ElSalvador, as well as other country program experi-ences, this working paper provides concrete examples

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1Prevention

While this working paper focuses on program actions forchildren already involved in armed conflict, prevention re-mains an urgent concern.

lthough advocacy efforts aiming to enforce in-ternational law, in particular the new OptionalProtocol to the CRC on the Involvement ofChildren in Armed Conflict, will contribute to

preventing future involvement of children in armedconflict, prevention must be considered more broadly.Practical measures to prevent the involvement of chil-dren in armed conflict require much greater attentionand development. For example, education and otheryouth activities, food security and the security of refu-gee camps have a direct relationship in preventingchild recruitment. Supporting civil society in protest-ing recruitment locally and preventing re-recruitmentare important protection actions aimed at prevention.

Advocacy and supporting civil society

Advocacy is essential to prevention. Advocacy requirespersistence and a full range of actions including,• Raising awareness of child rights through a variety

of media—including education and training for mili-tary and other armed forces as well as efforts to reachchildren and their families

• Monitoring and documenting child rights abuses• Using local and international human rights report-

ing mechanisms—local reporting mechanismsshould engage political and military officials andcommunity leaders in redressing cases of child re-cruitment

• Situation analysis of which children and youths aremost vulnerable to recruitment

• Promoting compliance with international law, withemphasis on the Convention on the Rights of the

Child, and developing legislation with different na-tional and local policy-makers

• Partnering with and building capacity of local asso-ciations addressing related concerns, such as unac-companied children and street or working children.

At the grassroots level, prevention may include ap-prising children and their families of their rights toresist recruitment, or encourage the intervention ofcommunity and religious leaders to stop child recruit-ment or gain the release of children. For example, inEl Salvador, national human rights and civil societyorganizations protested, often at great risk, many casesof forcibly recruited youth. The organizations mostinvolved were the non-governmental Human RightsCommission of El Salvador, the Catholic Church, andwomen’s associations representing the missing. Theaction these groups most often took was to approachthe military officials of a barracks and demand, oftensuccessfully, the release of children. In addition, thewomen’s associations organized demonstrations in thecapital and made an appeal to parliament. Bishops andother Church officials spoke publicly to promote hu-man rights principles and condemn the involvementof children in the conflict.

Redressing child recruitment abuses must be a pri-ority prevention action. Measuring whether advocacyefforts prevent recruitment is difficult, especially in theshort term; but child protection work must be a fun-damental and pro-active part of humanitarian pro-grams. Children growing up within the context of con-flict—and their families—feel they have no choice

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4 AFRICA REGION WORKING PAPER SERIES

about participating. Preventing recruitment requiresthat awareness of child rights be expanded and thatthe social and cultural values of child protection bemobilized.

Notably, the local groups in El Salvador receivedoutside support only when the UN human rights teamwas deployed during the last year of the conflict. In-ternational agencies offering humanitarian assistancefeared that protesting the recruitment of childrenwould be seen as political involvement in the conflict.

Best practice now recognizes the importance of in-corporating child rights into humanitarian advocacy.For example, the humanitarian principles project ofOperation Lifeline Sudan Southern Sector (OLS)1 suc-ceeded in gaining the parties’ commitment to the prin-ciples of the Geneva Conventions and the UN Con-vention of the Rights of the Child (CRC). Significantly,while advocacy in El Salvador was primarily directedat the government, OLS Southern Sector works spe-cifically with non-state parties—the Southern Sudanrebel movements.

The OLS project featured awareness raising andtraining workshops to promote humanitarian prin-ciples and children’s rights. Leaflets were disseminatedthrough churches, schools, health centers, and mili-tary barracks. Workshops, attended by over 7,000people, are credited with making families aware of theprohibition against recruiting children under fifteenyears of age, and with decreasing abductions fromschools.

Partnering with civil society requires a situationanalysis of each country. While the church in El Salva-dor and women’s associations were the primary civilsociety actors engaged in protection actions for chil-dren, the “relief wings” of the rebel movements—teachers, families and church leaders—all play signifi-cant roles in Southern Sudan. In another context, muysafid, traditional elders, in Afghanistan have, in somecases, reached agreements with local commanders toregulate the conscription of youth.

In some cases, armed groups take their protectiverole with children seriously. The Frente FarabundoMartí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) rebel coali-tion in El Salvador responded to public criticism andresentment about recruiting children. During the con-flict, the FMLN leadership adopted a policy to stopforcibly recruiting children and to give all children al-ready recruited the option of leaving the rebel force.

Preventing re-recruitment

The 1995–1998 Angola demobilization and reintegra-tion program included measures to prevent the re-re-cruitment of children. The Angola legal framework onchild soldiers included a provision that child soldierswould not be subject to Angola’s compulsory militaryservice regime. In addition, the legal framework in-cluded a provision that child soldiers could receivedemobilization documentation and benefits outside ofthe formal demobilization assembly areas.2

The Angola experience shows that some preventionof re-recruitment was effected through the accompa-niment and family reunification strategy. The Angolaprogram featured an extensive community-based net-work whose members accompanied child soldiersfrom demobilization through family reunification.3

Some officials of the National Union for the Total In-dependence of Angola (UNITA) rebel force acknowl-edged that family reunification obstructed their re-cruitment strategies. But despite these positive lessons,child soldiers were unprotected in the quartering anddemobilization process. (Chapter 2 outlines howUNITA used the demobilization process for new re-cruitment and re-recruitment of child soldiers.)

The resumption of the Angolan conflict presents thechallenge of preventing re-recruitment in stark real-ity. In the case of government recruitment, the legalframework provisions regarding compulsory militaryservice should be upheld. Because of awareness raised

Angola Legal Framework on UnderageSoldiers

� Recognized the principles of the Convention onthe Rights of the Child and Angolan Law (Law1/93) providing for eighteen years as the mini-mum age for military service.

� 1996 was determined the “calendar year” of de-mobilization. All soldiers born after 1 January1978 were to be considered underage.

� As a measure to prevent re-recruitment, all un-derage soldiers were granted “disponibilidade”status, guaranteeing full exemption from futuremilitary service.

� Gave “open status” to all underage soldiers’ files,preventing consideration as deserters and guar-anteeing the right to demobilization, and ben-efits if not present on day of demobilization.

5CHILD SOLDIERS—PREVENTING, DEMOBILIZING AND REINTEGRATING

during the demobilization program, there have beena number of cases where children, their families, andcommunity leaders have protested and reported re-cruitment abuses to program officers. Still, both par-ties continue to violate national and international lawin recruiting child soldiers.

While advocacy, family reunification, and policiesthat prevent re-recruitment help curb the use of chil-dren as soldiers, greater attention and expanded strat-egies are critical in future programs.

Prevention lessons checklist

• What is the national law on the age of recruitment?• Is there advocation for ratification and implementation of the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the

Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict?• Is there a mechanism to redress cases of underage recruitment?• Is child recruitment being documented and reported through national and international human rights

groups?• Is a variety of media being engaged to advocate against the use of child soldiers?• Who are the community leaders, religious leaders, women’s associations or other national networks

that can advocate against child recruitment? Are there traditional practices and values upon which tobase child protection measures?

• Which networks and contacts can reach non-state parties to promote their commitment to the prin-ciples of the CRC and prevent recruitment (e.g., religious leaders, diaspora, or other social struc-tures)?

• Is there a situation analysis being done to ascertain which children are the most vulnerable to recruit-ment (e.g., members of particular ethnic groups, those internally displaced or in refugee camps, chil-dren in institutions, working children, or unaccompanied children)?

• Which programs and activities can reach these groups and contribute to prevention (e.g., formal andnon-formal education, food security measures, cultural and psychosocial support activities)?

1 For the humanitarian principles generally, not specifically con-cerning child soldiers, see, Iain Levine, “Promoting Hu-manitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience,”1997, London. A Network Paper from the Overseas Devel-opment Institute (ODI). (www.odi.org.uk)

2 Demobilization exercises often have a “one man, one gun”policy such that combatants are expected to turn in aweapon for admission to an assembly area for demobiliza-tion. Demobilization of child soldiers should not be tied tosuch weapons collection criteria, but should be a priority inits own right.

3 See Angola case study.

2Demobilization

emobilization may refer to a formal exerciseor a variety of informal occasions. Formal de-mobilization, including for child soldiers, usu-

ally follows a peace agreement but may also occur aspart of a military restructuring. Informal occasions in-clude instances where child soldiers escape from orare released by their armed group, whether sponta-neously or because of advocacy or other circumstances.For example, child soldiers found as prisoners of warhave been demobilized. Informal occasions also in-clude gaining the agreement of a particular armedgroup to release child soldiers during an ongoing con-flict. Such opportunities can be developed but requireadvance program planning.

Demobilization may be involuntary for child sol-diers, and they may fear the transition from militaryto civilian life and an unknown future. During thiskind of transition, it is important to gain the supportand encouragement of military and civilian officials,as well as families and communities. Former child sol-diers themselves can play a valuable role in counsel-ing their peers.

In this chapter, lessons learned on demobilizationare organized under: a) advocacy and the importanceof including children in peace agreements and demobi-lization plans,2 b) planning, resources and coordination,and c) policy development and program strategies.

Including all child soldiers in peace accords anddemobilization processes

Early advocacy is essential to generate political atten-tion and commitment to child soldiers. Silence on theissue and a lack of political will may obliterate the is-

D sue of child soldiers and their exclusion from peaceprocesses. In addition, political and military authori-ties often limit programs to “official, adult combatants.”In El Salvador the government insisted that supportto ex-combatants was intended for “citizens,” mean-ing those eighteen years or older. A late negotiationresulted in some of those sixteen years and older be-ing included in a land credit program, and proposalswere advanced for education or training for some ofthose fifteen or sixteen years old. No provisions weremade for those under fifteen. Likewise, the UN peace-keeping mission in Angola, following the example ofMozambique, tried to limit its mandate and budget tothe demobilization of soldiers fifteen years and older.3

This criterion ultimately was not enforced, but otherdebates followed.

Determining a child soldier as under eighteen yearswas finally accepted as national law; but there wasintense debate concerning from which date to countsomeone as being under eighteen years. Most demo-bilization programs take the date of a peace accord asa practical point from which to determine an under-age soldier. But arguments by military officials inAngola resulted in a compromise: “the calendar yearof demobilization,” more than a year after the peaceagreement, was adopted as the baseline for determin-ing who was underage. This resulted in thousands ofchild soldiers “ageing out” of support programs.

Child soldiers have also been excluded from peaceaccords and demobilization programs because theirstatus often hides them. If the term soldier is only un-derstood to mean combatant, or if a peace agreementonly refers to the demobilization of combatants, many

The term demobilization may refer broadly to the processof leaving an armed group and integrating into civil soci-ety.1 In this paper, demobilization refers to the release ordischarge of child soldiers, their reception, and the initialassistance provided them to return to their home commu-nity or other place of settlement. Reintegration, in the fol-lowing chapter, refers to the transition process to civilianroles through training and assistance programs.


children and youths, especially girls, serving in so-called support functions will be excluded.

While international law now establishes eighteenyears as the minimum age for involvement in conflict,4

age criteria are artificial to the actual experience ofchildren as soldiers. For socio-cultural reasons, manychild soldiers may not know their age, and physicaljudgments are often inaccurate. Child soldier pro-grams must be sensitive to local social and culturalconceptions of children and youths, their role in soci-ety, and stages of development and responsibility. Forexample, program practitioners in Angola and El Sal-vador usefully adopted the terms “underage soldier”and “youth combatant” to avoid emotional debatesover the term “child” and to clarify understandingsabout child soldiers.

In view of the duration of many conflicts, those whomay be a few years more than eighteen at the time ofa peace accord or demobilization exercise will havespent their developing years as a soldier. Like theiryounger peers, they will have been deprived of thenormal skill development and moral socializationgained from families and communities

On the other hand, many child soldiers see theirparticipation as equal to that of the adults and wantsimilar recognition in a demobilization exercise. Whileattention to the special needs of child soldiers in de-mobilization programs is vital, questions of age un-derline the need to see reintegration holistically for arange of war-affected youth.

Advocacy—the need for specific and persistent actions onchild soldiersThe exclusion of some child soldiers from demobiliza-tion programs because of age, gender, or function canin part be addressed by assuring inclusive, commu-nity-based reintegration strategies. But the risk of childsoldiers being excluded by demobilization plans raisesagain the importance of advocacy. In El Salvador, re-ports and recommendations by consultant teams inthe demobilization planning phase were ignored5 —even though one report, prepared a year in advanceof the peace accord, recommended that strategies fo-cus on child soldiers.

Angola offers a positive example of how advocacycan bring the issue of child soldiers into demobiliza-tion plans. Even though child soldiers in Angola wereomitted from the peace agreement, the demobilization

commission’s first resolution gave child soldiers pri-ority and adopted procedures for their demobilizationand reintegration. This advocacy achievement subse-quently faced eighteen months of delay but remainedan important reference point in the push to make childdemobilization a reality.

In the effort to bring attention to the rights and needsof child soldiers, program partners in Angola engageda range of influential policy actors. A UN consultantteam’s recommendations were prepared in time forthe first funding appeals. The Special Representativeof the Secretary General to Angola promoted the is-sue of demobilizing child soldiers. Reports on obstruc-tions and delays to child demobilization were includedin the Secretary General’s reports to the Security Coun-cil. The embassies of influential donor governmentsdrew attention to child soldiers through their roles inthe peace process. The lesson learned was that childprotection concerns require the active participation ofall political and humanitarian offices. Concern for childsoldiers required high-level political attention; other-wise, the matter risked being lost in the peace process.

Such high level political attention can be difficult tomaintain. Again, in Angola, UNITA manipulated thequartering process for child recruitment for monthsdespite monitoring and appeals by child advocates (seebelow). Both parties in Angola were violating elementsof the peace accord, but the UN and international com-munity were committed to make the peace process,and especially demobilization, a success. Rather thanadvocating child protection concerns, the strategy wasto use positive encouragement in meetings with theparties. After almost a year, when UNITA’s abuses werepainfully evident, the UN finally suspended the childsoldier demobilization and insisted on a series of policyand procedural changes.

Reaching and recognizing all child soldiersWhile some child soldiers will participate in formaldemobilization exercises with adults, many will beexcluded because of age, gender, or function. Contin-gency planning is especially important to reach girlsand disabled child soldiers.

In Angola, the separation of the “military war dis-abled” program meant that the child soldiers programaccessed only “able-bodied” child soldiers. It is be-lieved that most disabled child soldiers independentlyreturned to their communities.


Child soldiers want to be recognized and includedin formal demobilization programs. When child sol-diers are excluded, resentment and a sense of aban-donment lead some to return to violence as a way ofimproving their lives. Former child soldiers in El Sal-vador, for example, feel betrayed by the demobiliza-tion program and by their former commanders. As oneformer child soldier in El Salvador said, “We youngpeople were not recognized in any way… This wasthe worst that could have happened to me and mycomrades…”

For others, recognition plays an important protec-tion role. In Uganda, the security clearance and docu-ment that former child soldiers receive gives them theconfidence to return to their communities withoutsuspicion. In an informal demobilization in EasternDemocratic Republic of Congo, former child soldiersasked for demobilization documentation in order toprotect themselves from re-recruitment or from beingcharged as deserters.

Appropriate demobilization benefits packages forchild soldiersLooking to the Mozambique experience, where childsoldiers expressed resentment about being excludedfrom demobilization exercises, program partners inAngola insisted that all child soldiers access demobili-zation benefits. Planning thus included that benefitscould be claimed and processed at the local level aswell as through the formal demobilization process.6

While ensuring benefits equity between child andadult demobilizing soldiers, there should be a recog-nition too of the special needs of child soldiers andsupports appropriate to their community situation. Insome cases, benefits packages for child soldiers havebeen seen as way of honoring their participation, whileignoring justice for the victims. In another turn, ben-efits (such as food supplements and indemnity pay-ments) may not play the reintegration role that hu-manitarian programs hoped for: In a number of cases,families and foster caregivers rejected child soldiersonce their benefits package ran out.

Although most child soldiers want to be treated inthe same way as adult soldiers, they often lack civilianlife experience in gaining the social, cultural, and live-lihood skills necessary to their future. In most demo-bilization exercises, child soldiers should receive a ben-efits package equitable to that of demobilizingadults7—but program planning must harmonize ben-efits packages with reintegration strategies.

Planning, resources, and coordination

Advance planning is vital to demobilization and rein-tegration. In many instances, peace negotiations anddemobilization planning proceed outside the humani-tarian programming framework vital to child soldiers.In Liberia, humanitarian programs had to rush to meetdemobilization plans and agreements. In both Angolaand El Salvador, a consultant team engaged in advanceof the peace accord brought early attention to childsoldiers. Although their recommendations were ig-nored in El Salvador, Angola took up a special pro-gram framework for child soldiers and made it a pri-ority in the demobilization. Planning must be in viewof the full process of demobilization and reintegration.Planning for demobilization must not only take intoaccount supplies for reception centers, but also mobi-lize policy coherence, staffing, partnerships. and re-sources.

The demobilization of child soldiers must corre-spond with adult demobilization processes and em-phasize community rebuilding. Program planningshould reflect analysis of the local circumstances ofchild recruitment and the experiences and roles ofchild soldiers in a country experience. For example, aspart of growing up, have children participated withinan armed movement? were they forcibly recruited?are they known to have committed atrocities?

The numbers game

The logistics of preparing for demobilization andmedia pressure often fuel considerable discussionabout the number of child soldiers. While data onchild soldiers may help explain the extent of the prob-lem, their actual numbers may never be known. Manywill be excluded from “counts,” and in lengthy con-flicts a large proportion of children may be involvedin some way.

While acknowledging that estimates are importantfor budget preparations, more essential to demobili-zation is the early mobilization of a community- basedsupport network to ensure family reunification andpsychosocial support. The establishment of such anetwork could diminish debates about the numberof child soldiers, since it can accommodate any in-crease or decrease in their actual number through-out the demobilization and reintegration process.


Mobilizing resources and partnerships—appropriatestaffing and proceduresAdvance preparations for staffing, training, and otherresources are essential in demobilization planning. Ina number of instances in Liberia, agencies scrambledto deploy staff and programs to demobilization sitesat only several days notice.

In Angola, delays in staff training and deploymentcaused a delay of almost two years—one year after thepeace accord—before quartering commenced, and afurther ten months while child soldiers languished inthe quartering areas. Despite having commissioned anadvance consultant team to plan the demobilization,an ill-prepared three-person team had to circulateamong fifteen quartering areas to register thousandsof child soldiers. Because the team had inadequate lan-guage skills, military commanders served as interpret-ers, manipulating the children’s registration data toserve re-recruitment purposes.

INTERVIEWING CHILD SOLDIERS. The question of lan-guage skills and military control in the Angola quar-tering areas raises issues of confidentiality, freedomof expression, and the veracity of interviews with childsoldiers. Raising sensitive issues during initial inter-views may expose child soldiers to threats or retalia-tion. A child’s war experiences should neither be ex-ploited during this time by media or public interviews.

Following a series of aborted demobilizations inLiberia, program practitioners concluded that askingchild soldiers about their traumatic experiences dur-ing the demobilization phase was inappropriate andfruitless because of the child’s high level of fear andmistrust. In a positive point from Angola, interviewsduring the demobilization phase focused on familyreunification data and immediate needs. Psychosocialsymptoms and questions about the child’s experiencewere left to the reintegration phase when family andsocial workers provided consistent follow-up supportto the child.

Other resource mobilization difficulties in Angolaconcerned data management. The system for gather-ing family tracing data through the registration pro-cess and managing the analysis necessary for trans-portation and other logistics was cumbersome andinefficient. The resources of the UN database teamwere simply over-stretched.8

MOBILIZING AN APPROPRIATE NETWORK OF PROGRAMS.A significant degree of reintegration program planningmust be part of demobilization planning. Planningshould be based on an analysis of how child soldierscan be integrated into a comprehensive framework offamily tracing, psychosocial support, and community-based skill-building opportunities.

In Angola, program partners anticipated that childsoldiers could be incorporated into the existing familytracing and psychosocial programs without additionalstaff or resources. But this was inadequate, and, belat-edly, a community-based network of social promoterswas mobilized, which proved invaluable to familytracing and psychosocial support needs.

Demobilization planning must include the develop-ment of extensive program partnerships. Such part-nerships will ensure that the demobilization and re-integration of child soldiers reaches the communitylevel. In Angola, a network of social promoters, whichconsisted of partnerships formed with the Church andother local associations, was a singular success. Thepartnerships were developed following an analysis ofwhich social structures were neutral and had the ca-pacity to provide support to child soldiers at the com-munity level. (See Chapter 3 for more on the Angolanetwork.)

Coordination and institutional issuesUnfortunately, leadership and coordination roles inchild demobilization often suffer because of confusionand disagreement among agencies. Given the com-plexity of military, humanitarian, and child-specificaspects to demobilization, it is usual that a variety ofagencies with some degree of overlapping mandatesbe present. Despite this, the locus of coordination andpolicy leadership has been well served by UN agen-cies, especially in regard to the persistent advocacynecessary at multiple political levels. Thus, effectivecoordination between UN offices with overall politi-cal, military, and humanitarian roles and those withchild-specific roles and expertise is essential.

In Angola, program partners created a technical co-ordination committee to focus on issues for the childsoldiers program distinct from, but related to, the morepoliticized full demobilization exercise and peace pro-cess. An important characteristic of the coordinationcommittee was its inclusiveness. Under joint coordi-nation by UNICEF and the overall UN coordinationoffice, membership included the government social


affairs ministry, representatives of both parties to theconflict, international non-governmental organiza-tions, and local associations.

Coordination is also essential for the extensive lo-gistical aspects of family tracing, reunification, andfollow-up support to child soldiers. Representativesof each partner in the Angola technical coordinationcommittee met weekly as a provincial-level commit-tee. These weekly meetings helped coordinate familyreunification details, developing solutions for childsoldiers whose families could not be traced, and creat-ing individually appropriate education or income-gen-erating opportunities for the child soldiers.

Policy coherence and program strategies

Agencies and partners spend a good deal of time de-bating policy development and program strategy. De-bates include the basis of determining age, how toseparate child soldiers from military authority, theprocess needed for family reunification and commu-nity acceptance, the role of trauma interventions, andwhether special centers are needed for child soldiers.

Policy debates on the age for determining a childsoldier have already been mentioned. For example, inAngola, the legal framework emphasized the nationallegal recruiting age of eighteen years as the age fordetermining child soldiers but compromised in tak-ing the “calendar year of demobilization” rather thanthe year of the peace agreement as the basis fromwhich to determine who is considered under eighteen.

Policy debates clearly overlap with program strat-egy debates. In Angola, there was considerable debateabout whether child soldiers should be included withadults in the demobilization quartering areas and bar-racks, or if special reception centers should be created.Advocates for trauma programs questioned the pro-posed strategy of rapid family reunification and com-munity-based supports for reintegration. A foreigngovernment proposed creating special military acad-emies for child soldiers, instead of family reunification.

The issue of special centers is a challenge to programpractitioners. The debates center on how to separatechild soldiers from military authority, assure their ef-fective protection, and allow for a process of familyreunification and community acceptance, and the roleof trauma or special training programs.

The question of establishing special centers arisesin both the demobilization and reintegration phase.During demobilization, there is the question of how

to receive child soldiers and ensure their interim carepending family tracing. Especially within the contextof ongoing tensions, child soldiers need to be protectedfrom re-recruitment, retribution, abuse, and stigmati-zation. In the reintegration phase, center-based caremay be proposed —in the event that family reunifica-tion proves unsuccessful—for trauma counseling oras an efficient locale for training.

Protection during demobilization—the question of“centers”Establishing special reception centers for child soldiersduring demobilization is an important protection mea-sure. In most cases, special reception centers will be away of separating child soldiers from military author-ity and protecting them from re-recruitment or fur-ther abuse.

In Angola, mixing UNITA child soldiers with adultsin the quartering areas for demobilization was analarming experience. UNITA commanders manipu-lated the demobilization process in order to move childsoldiers back into UNITA training camps, and newchild soldiers were recruited to meet quartering tar-gets. Of 8,613 child soldiers registered in the UNITAquartering areas, only 57 percent could be tracked fordemobilization and family reunification.

This is a clear example of inadequate child protec-tion in the demobilization process and of where sepa-rate reception centers should have been established.In Liberia, 89 percent of child soldiers in the 1996–1997demobilization “wandered away” from demobilizationsites. Many returned to their commanders, some “vol-untarily” and some by force. In another example fromLiberia, some former child soldiers were prematurelyreturned to home areas controlled by opposing fac-tions, resulting in a number of children being arrestedand flogged.

While there may be situations where child soldierscan be protected within adult demobilization pro-cesses, careful monitoring is required to ensure effec-tive transition from military to civilian control. InAngola, a small group of child soldiers associated withgovernment forces were grouped in special barracksfor demobilization. Program partners had free accessto the children for counseling, family tracing, healthcare, and other immediate steps towards reintegration.While this demobilization experience was relativelypositive, hundreds of child soldiers were held backfrom the demobilization in other barracks. In El Sal-


vador, child soldiers associated with the government9

were held in barracks pending demobilization, butwere excluded from support programs while the mili-tary denied their existence.

Some child soldiers join armed groups for protec-tion and form strong emotional attachments to theirmilitary commanders.10 In El Salvador, many youthsjoined the FMLN following attacks on their commu-nities by government-affiliated forces. Many childrenvirtually “grow up” within an armed movement. Insuch contexts, it is especially important to engage thesupport of military authorities in counseling child sol-diers on demobilization and establishing a civilian life.While these child soldiers may be less vulnerable tore-recruitment or other abuse by their military com-manders, separate demobilization procedures shouldstill be established to facilitate their rupture with mili-tary identity.

Centers may also be necessary because the militaryprovides little information, and children may notknow their family’s location, or if they are alive. Chil-dren may be apprehensive about leaving the militaryand about how they will be received by their familyand community. As in good practice for family tracinggenerally, it is vital to prepare the family and child forreunification.

In Uganda, former child soldiers abducted by therebel force pass through a military barracks and thenNGO reception center before returning to relatives andthe community. They receive a “security clearance”letter from the military and the center attesting to theirpassage and civilian status. As expressed by one formerchild soldier: “the letter given to us by the militarymakes us feel secure […] means we are now a normalmember of the community.”

The temporary need for special reception centersmust be reconciled with the inherent risk of centers tostigmatize or marginalize child soldiers. Reflectingtheir strong desire for normalcy, former child soldiersin Liberia resented being labeled “war affected.” Andcenters are contrary to the need to emphasize familyand community links in the process of transition tocivilian life.

Lessons learned in other countries demonstrate thatreception centers can be organized in ways that modelfamily and community life. Transit centers for the1996–1997 demobilization in Liberia provided only thebasic necessities in line with the means of the sur-

rounding community. Earlier transit centers providedfull-service care, and created resentment of the spe-cial treatment given to child soldiers. In a 1993 demo-bilization in Sierra Leone, homes for demobilized chil-dren modeled family care, including chores and con-tact with the surrounding community.

In other cases, child soldiers have been demobilizedinto foster settings rather than transit centers or groupcare. The Angola network members provided interimcare in their homes pending family tracing or arrange-ments for fostering or independent living.

There should be measures to ensure that temporarycenter arrangements do not become long-term solu-tions. For example, in a local demobilization in east-ern Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997, officialsrequested a full-board vocational school. Program of-ficers argued for an emphasis on family reunificationand community-based support. The result was a re-ception center, supported with a time limit of twomonths. By the end of the two months, only thirteenchild soldiers, whose families could not be traced, re-mained in the center and foster arrangements weremade for their ongoing care.

Work in Uganda11 has identified the following keyelements for center-based interim care of former childsoldiers:• All staff must be provided training12 on child develop-

ment, child rights, and the effects of war on children.• All staff, from managers to guards to cooks, must be

aware of the role-model they represent for the chil-dren—especially in demonstrating accountability,trustworthiness, and honesty.

• The center must assure adequate protection, includ-ing security arrangements against re-recruitment,retribution, or abduction as well as measures to pre-vent further distress. such as stigmatization, isola-tion, or further abuse.

• Priority should be given to building relationshipsbetween the child and his family with the goal of asshort a stay as possible in the center.

• Integration into the community should be proactivethrough family tracing or placement, communitysensitization and developing the child’s social skills.

• The center should contribute to an appropriate fol-low-up system, following family reunification orother living arrangements.

• The center should be culturally appropriate, includ-ing traditional healing and spiritual measures.


• Child soldiers should be part of the care system,forming relationships and engaging in roles andtasks appropriate to daily family life,

• Psychosocial support activities should providehealth care as well as basic needs.

• The center should help develop a new identity forthe children through cultural activities, spiritual ini-tiatives, sports, individual guidance, and peer-groupactivities.

• The center should have an open style and seek awide range of community links and resources.

• Staff should be supported with ongoing capacitybuilding and stress management support.

Working with child soldiers can be extremely diffi-cult. They often have highly inflated expectations, ex-aggerated pride in their military identity, and havelearned to rely on aggression to meet needs and solveproblems. In some cases, child soldiers have stolenmaterial goods from centers or returned to the mili-

tary to obtain drugs or seek sexual partners. As shownin Uganda, program staff are often unprepared to ad-dress issues such as drug abuse or sexually transmit-ted diseases in child soldiers and, therefore, need con-sistent support.

Adequate investments must be made in staff train-ing and establishing partnerships with relevant health,psychosocial, and educational programs. These part-nerships should form the network of supports andopportunities to regain education and livelihood skillsfor the former child soldier ’s ongoing reintegrationupon leaving the center.

The question of centers as part of reintegrationThere has been considerable debate about the role ofspecial centers as part of reintegration strategies forchild soldiers. Angola addressed a proposal to createa special military school instead of demobilizing childsoldiers to their families and home communities. Suchproposals are not uncommon—both Uganda and

Demobilization lessons checklist

• Are child soldiers specifically included in the peace agreement?• Are there specific provisions for child soldiers in demobilization plans?• Are political leaders, UN officials, peacekeeping forces, and national NGOs included in advocacy on

behalf of child soldiers?• Has a legal framework been developed that includes the child’s right to be demobilized, not considered

a deserter, and exempt from future service?• Do terminology and program approaches incorporate local social and cultural values on children and

youth?• Are the particular needs of girls and the disabled taken into account?• Which benefit packages are appropriate for child soldiers? Are they equitable to benefits for adults

demobilized? Are supports oriented to re-gaining civilian life rather than “rewards”?• If child soldiers participate in the assembly process with regular troops for demobilization, how can their

departure be as rapid as possible so as to separate them from military authority?• How will demobilized child soldiers be received? Since temporary centers are often necessary, how can

they model on family-based care and how can family tracing be maximized? Alternatively, are fostersystems available instead?

• Are effective measures adopted to ensure the protection of child soldiers during demobilization (e.g.,protection from re-recruitment, revenge or retributive attacks, or discrimination or harassment)?

• Do interviews and registration during demobilization focus on family tracing and other immediate needs?Are the child’s experiences during the conflict and psychosocial impacts being addressed in a support-ive reintegration context?

• Are tracing and psychosocial programs adequately mobilized and funded?• Are program partnerships established for psychosocial support, education, and livelihood opportuni-

ties?• Are appropriate staff (considering language skills, community rapport, and experience working with

youth) recruited and trained?• Is there a community-based strategy to support child soldiers that may escape or be released outside of

formal demobilization?• Are links made between supports for child soldiers and programs for those disabled by war?


Rwanda have experience with such approaches. TheUganda experience in the 1980s was not evaluated, butreports indicate that the majority of the “demobilized”child soldiers ran away, resorted to delinquent behav-ior, or returned to military life. The Rwanda experi-ence underscores the risk of short-term centers becom-ing long-term solutions.

In Angola, program partners argued against creat-ing special centers for child soldiers for both demobi-lization and reintegration, emphasizing the followingarguments:• Family reunification or a family-based setting is an

essential first step in the social reintegration processfor child soldiers.

• The socio-economic life of a community serves asan anchor in the transition from military identity andviolence to civilian life.

• Special centers create artificial ghettos disconnectedfrom the dynamics of civilian life.

• Child soldiers in such centers would be stigmatizedas “trauma cases.”

Some argue that child soldiers need special traumaprograms before making the transition to family andcommunity life. Experience advises to the contrary—that is, psychosocial support through the family andcommunity environment is the most effective. (Les-sons learned on the need for a psychosocial approachare developed further in the next chapter.) In lessonslearned from Liberia, it was thought that less than 5percent of the former child soldiers needed specialpsychological support.

Other arguments presented in favor of center-basedreintegration strategies include: claims that the chil-dren are orphans, that they will not be accepted in theircommunities because of atrocities committed, or thattheir surviving family members are too poor to takethem back. Others argue that special health or train-ing programs are best provided in centers.

In Angola, the Ministry of Social Affairs had alreadyadopted a non-institutional policy for unaccompaniedchildren and had foster and independent livingprojects. International child welfare practice consis-tently concludes that institutional settings are inap-propriate to the emotional, social, and cultural devel-opment needs of children. The CRC provides an im-portant reference on the many development needs ofchildren not met by even the best-funded facilities:emotional development, stable adult relationships,integration with community, cultural traditions andvalues, and preparation for roles and responsibilitiesupon leaving for independent adult lives.

While centers are often necessary in the demobili-zation phase, lessons learned in reintegration re-em-phasize the need to ensure as short a stay as possible.Child soldiers themselves express a preoccupationwith being accepted by their family and community.For example, in Uganda, former child soldiers reportedthat one of their greatest fears was that their familieswould not visit them. One reporting, “this gives usmuch pain; we fear they hate us.”

Because of the role children have played in manyconflicts, a careful process of community acceptanceand family reintegration is vital. This underscores theimportance of harmonizing child soldier programswith community rebuilding. Experience shows thateffective reintegration depends most on family reuni-fication, an emphasis on psychosocial supports andcommunity rebuilding, and access to skill-buildingactivities.


1 Annex III provides a discussion of the terms demobilizationand reintegration.

2 As has been called for by the Secretary General of the UnitedNations in his Report to the Security Council, S/2000/101, 11February 2000.

3 This followed Article 38 of the CRC previous to the adoptionof the May 2000 Optional Protocol. See Annex II for furtherdiscussion.

4 See Annex II for further discussion of the legal framework forchild soldiers.

5 See El Salvador case study.6 Demobilization benefits in Angola were otherwise distributed

on a specific “demobilization day” at the specific quarteringsite. Because many child soldiers would be afraid to presentthemselves on this day or would not have been sent for de-mobilization by their commanders, program officers ar-ranged to receive child soldiers and give them their benefitspackages at provincial locales.

7 In Angola, child soldiers received the same cash and materialsbenefits package as adults plus an additional $50 stipend.

8 The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has initiated a newdatabase for work with unaccompanied children that pre-sents a potential resource to future work with child soldiers.Experimentation with software and new technologies havecreated the ability to incorporate digital photos within datarecords, keep designated fields secure for protection andconfidentiality concerns, and allow multiple partners to har-monize data. IRC and Save the Children (UK) are currentlypiloting the database.

9 A question largely uninvestigated in El Salvador concerns “or-phaned” children taken into military barracks for “care” fol-lowing bombing raids and other operations. A number ofcases have been traced to profit-making, “black market” for-eign adoptions involving military officials. (Cfr. TinaRosenberg, “What did you do in the war, mama?”, The NewYork Times Magazine, 7 February 1999.)

10 While some point to cases where sexual relationships withcommanders become long-term relationships, most rela-tions are a further abuse and exploitation of the child sol-dier. The emotional attachment referenced here should notbe confused with such relations; it encompasses the emo-tional attachment some child soldiers develop with theircommanders in the absence of parental and other normalsocialization roles by other relatives and community members.

11 Elizabeth Jareg and Lenhart Falk, “Steps in the developmentof a monitoring and evaluation system for center and com-munity-based psychosocial work with war-affected childrenin Uganda.” Report of a consultation between Save theChildren Norway and Denmark with the Gulu Support theChildren Organization, May 1999 (unpublished document).

12 The Angola case study provides example training outlines.

3Reintegration

he child soldier’s development will have beenaffected in many ways by his or her experiencein armed conflict. The context of their family

and community life will likely have changed becauseof increased poverty, the death of family members andfriends, displacement, and perhaps resettlement. Thisraises the question of what is meant by the terms rein-tegration, reinsertion, recovery, and rehabilitation.Reintegration to what? The reality is a matter of ad-justing to new circumstances. The process is complexand should include a multitude of inter-related issues:health and basic needs, psychosocial support, a fam-ily context, establishing positive relationships, andopportunities for education and income generation.The combination of these elements—balancing socialand economic factors—is essential. Experience showsthree things fundamental to successful reintegration:

1)Family reunification and an inclusive communityenvironment2)Psychosocial support3)Opportunities for education and livelihood.

Family reunification and community-based networks

The demobilization chapter has shown that family re-unification or alternative family-based living arrange-ments, rather than centers, are the most effective re-integration strategy. Experience consistently demon-strates that family and community relationships arethe most important factors in the reintegration of childsoldiers.

In a follow-up survey of former child soldiers in ElSalvador, 84 percent reported that their family playedthe most important role in their transition to civil life.

While demobilization represents the point at which a childleaves military life, reintegration represents the process ofestablishing a civilian life. Reintegration programs need tosupport the child in constructing a new, positive course ofdevelopment.

T Considering that 41.6 percent of the child soldiers hadlost one or both parents during the conflict, this find-ing was contrary to expectations. This is especially sig-nificant in view of the absence of a family tracing pro-gram for child soldiers.

Other child soldiers, 9.6 percent, in the El Salvadorfollow-up survey, said that friends were the most im-portant factor in their transition. Former child soldiersin Uganda also stressed the importance of friends.Many reported in focus groups that they would seekadvice from friends first but also reported their moth-ers as their choice for discussing “deep problems.”

Skepticism about the prospects for family reunifica-tion is often high in the aftermath of conflict. But, asnoted in El Salvador, experience demonstrates thatfamily tracing can have surprising success. In Angola,despite the resumption of conflict, only 6 percent ofthe thousands of former child soldiers whose casescould be followed up were living alone or with non-related foster families.

The prospect of former child soldiers living indepen-dently or having children, with or without a partner,must be addressed proactively in reintegration pro-grams. Of the Angolan former child soldiers living“alone,” many have new families because they mar-ried and/or had children during the conflict. Amongchild soldiers in the El Salvador follow-up survey, 56percent reported that their family situation changedafter the war because of new ties. Almost half of theformer child soldiers, 47.9 percent, were married orwith a partner, and 58.7 percent had children.

One of the most important support projects inAngola was a “self-building project,” in which former


child soldiers and their new families were supportedin home construction. An essential project componentof community integration was that either family orcommunity leaders gave the land for the new homes.

This is not to say that family reunifications alwaysgo smoothly. Staff working with child soldiers need todevelop family mediation and community mobiliza-tion skills. A demobilized child soldier is no longer thechild he or she was before recruitment, and both thechild and family have to adjust to new roles, expecta-tions, and hardships. In Angola, 16 percent of the casesfollowed up had left their care situation after reunifi-cation. Some moved to an urban area as a means ofself-protection from re-recruitment or to access voca-tional training, but others moved due to family rela-tionship problems.

There may also be concerns about whether a familyor community will accept a former child soldier, espe-cially if child soldiers have been involved in killingsor rape. In Northern Uganda, families feared that re-united child soldiers would attract the attention ofrebels in future attacks. Children themselves inUganda note the importance of cleansing ceremoniesso that their communities do not view them as cen or“contaminated.” Supporting these socio-cultural pro-cesses is especially important for girls who have beenforced to serve as “wives” to rebels. These girls andtheir children may face the long-term concern of be-ing considered a poor marriage prospect.

On the other hand, the concern that former childsoldiers will be refused by their families or communi-ties can be overstated. In Angola, practitioners quicklylearned that families recognized that acts committedby child soldiers were the responsibility of the adults

who recruited them. Among former child soldiers fol-lowed up in El Salvador, 98.5 percent reported thattheir family relations were good or very good, and only6.6 percent reported that they had difficulties beingaccepted by the community upon demobilization.

Indeed, the reintegration of child soldiers faces achallenging process of reconciliation and mediation.Family and community reintegration takes time andmust allow for an appropriate process of acceptanceand new roles. The role of traditional ceremonies andspecial attention for girls is discussed further below.

Community mobilization is as important as the moretechnical tracing and logistics of family reunification.Lessons learned emphasize that post-conflict recov-ery must emphasize psychosocial support activities aswell as physical needs. In Liberia, program practitio-ners had to invest in community coping mechanismsand welfare structures rather than the traditional em-phasis on physically rehabilitating schools and clinics.

Angola provides a successful example of a commu-nity-based network to support the reintegration ofchild soldiers: a partnership with some 200 churchsocial promoters called “catechists.” The catechist net-work achieved family reunification, follow-up support,and monitoring despite immense challenges causedby the country’s size, difficult terrain, and problemswith landmines and security. In sum, the catechists:• were perceived to be neutral by all parties• provided a sense of authority and a structure inde-

pendent from political-military leaders• adhered to humanitarian and child rights principles

within social welfare services• had the capacity for outreach and communication

to difficult areas

The Kadogo School in Rwanda

In October 1994, following UNICEF advocacy, the Rwandan Ministry of Defense announced a plan tocreate a special military school for the demobilization of child soldiers. Child soldiers were referred to as“kadogos,” meaning “little ones” in Swahili. It was argued that these children could not return home becausemany had lost their families and that their attitudes would cause problems for reintegration.

With support from UNICEF and other NGOs, the Kadogo School, a full-board facility, opened in June 1995.The intake quickly rose to 2,922—more than twice the number expected. Only 41 teachers and 15 socialworkers had been engaged to work at the school. The program became overwhelmed with providing school-ing and basic needs. By November 1996, only 400 had been reunited with their families.

Following an evaluation in 1997, agencies and the government have worked to emphasize family reunifica-tion, community-based follow-up, and changing the school/center over to alternative uses.

The school was closed in 1998, with many of the children transferred to secondary schools. No follow-upsurveys were undertaken to trace the kadogos’ transition to civilian life.


• were respected by the community, in part becausecatechists were often the only literate person in thevillage

• were a permanent support for demobilizing childsoldiers and their families because the catechistswere from local villages, spoke local languages, andknew the local culture.

Such a network does not necessarily require exten-sive outside funding. The Angola program gave thecatechists training, nominal monthly payments, andlogistical and technical support. The churches andother network partners received no compensation andcontributed their own resources in the form of train-ing venues and short-term accommodation duringfamily reunification processes. Those who providedinterim foster care for child soldiers were not compen-sated.

Working with churches may not always be the bestchoice for programs seeking to identify appropriatesocial structures and partnerships. However, the fea-tures of the Angola catechist network—neutrality, out-reach capacity, commitment, local knowledge, andsustainability—give practitioners a transferable model.And, although programs often neglect the child’s rightto participation, the Angola network allowed the childsoldiers and their families to participate in determin-ing reintegration needs and supports.

Psychosocial approach and traditional healing

Child soldiers experience a process of asocializationin armed conflict. As a national NGO in El Salvadorexplains, child soldiers have been “socialized into apolarized existence of hostility.”1 They are deprivedof the normal cultural, moral, and values socializationusually gained from family and community. These el-ements have to be restored during the reintegrationprocess.

The reintegration of child soldiers raises difficultpsychosocial questions. Adolescence is a time of es-tablishing identity, and the child soldier may resistchanging this identity from soldier to civilian. Demo-bilized child soldiers model their behavior on the vio-lence and assertiveness learned in armed conflict.Overcoming the mistrust they learn can be difficult.This is why reintegration programs must emphasizethe opportunity to form positive, trusting, consistentrelationships with adults, with an emphasis on a fam-ily-based environment. (This again points to impor-

tant lessons from the Angola catechist network: theyprovided an immediate, respected, and trusted con-tact point for child soldiers from reception throughreintegration.)

Experience shows that psychosocial approaches aremore beneficial than Western-derived trauma assis-tance. The very definition of psychosocial2 emphasizesthat psychological process takes place in a social con-text, with family and community. In many cultures,child development is more socio-centric than egocen-tric. In El Salvador, for example, mental health is con-sidered the harmonization of physical, emotional, andcommunity well-being. One community developed anannual ceremony to honor the deceased and renewawareness of the impact of the conflict in communityterms. Community solidarity provides recognition,acceptance, and historical place for individual experi-ences of grief and trauma.

Community-based measures have been successfulin addressing cases of psychosocial distress in othercountry experiences. Reflecting on lessons learned,counselors in Liberia estimated that less than 5 per-cent required special psychological care. NGOs in ElSalvador put such estimates at less than 2 percent.Group counseling, incorporating collective conflictresolution approaches, was the most effective. Smallgroup sessions emphasizing expression and reflectionwere also found to be effective in El Salvador. Discus-sion themes included: militarism, self-identity, family,

What is psychosocial?

The diverse and often violent experiences of armedconflict have profound effects on child developmentand well-being. The word “psychosocial” simply un-derlines the dynamic relationship between psycho-logical and social effects, each continually influenc-ing the other. “Psychological effects” are those whichaffect emotion, behavior, thoughts, memory, learningability, perceptions, and understanding. “Social ef-fects” refer to altered relationships caused by death,separation, estrangement and other losses, family andcommunity breakdown, damage to social values andcustomary practices, and the destruction of socialfacilities and services. Social effects also extend tothe economic dimension as many individuals andfamilies become destitute through the material andeconomic devastation of armed conflict, thus losingstatus and place in their social network.


community, religion, and the future. Techniques usedin the sessions included drawing, making collages andmasks, photos, story-telling, and dramatization

Program practitioners in Liberia found the mostimportant reintegration factors to be: a “normal” en-vironment, a sense of forgiveness through religiousand cultural ceremonies, and family reunification. Theprogram in Angola placed culture at the center of ad-dressing the psychosocial impacts of conflict, includ-ing traditional healing rituals for child soldiers. Therituals provide acceptance of the child, assuage the illspirits associated with the child soldier’s actions dur-ing conflict, and reconcile the child with ancestral spir-its. Similarly in Northern Uganda, former child sol-diers report that traditional cleansing ceremonies areimportant so that the whole community understandsthey are “decontaminated.”

While guarding against any harmful effects of therituals, reintegration programs should support appro-priate measures identified by the community. Somequestion the degree to which a ceremony “cleanses” aformer child soldier, but the value of these processesto family and community is important to healing andpost-conflict recovery.3

In Angola, a pre-established psychosocial programpromoted community sensitization and providedtraining and support to the catechist network.4 Thespecific roles of the catechists were:• Facilitate, through program finances if needed, cer-

emonies with traditional healers• Provide follow up visits and family mediation to the

youths and their families• Facilitate contacts with sobas (traditional community

leaders) and other community members to holdwelcome ceremonies and raise awareness of theneeds and rights of child soldiers

• Help children access education, work, or trainingopportunities through locally available or interna-tionally funded projects.

A psychosocial approach underscores the synergygained by supporting physical health and activity, cog-nitive, emotional, and moral development. Indeed,while family support was vital to the reintegration ofchild soldiers in El Salvador, the absence of comple-mentary psychosocial supports, education or economicopportunities hindered reintegration. Many formercombatants contribute to the marked growth of urban

gangs and organized crime in El Salvador, showingthe link between unsuccessful reintegration and so-cial violence. Such examples pose significant concernfor post-conflict societies.

Education and economic opportunity

The third essential component to reintegration is ac-cess to education and economic opportunity. This islinked to the psychosocial component because estab-lishing a new identity for the child soldier will dependon productive activities and new learning. Identity andpositive meaning in their civilian life is gained throughappropriate, contributive roles in their families andcommunities.

Education and economic activity should be linkedto broader rehabilitation efforts, and program frame-works must include family livelihood needs. Projectexamples in Angola included supporting bakeries forformer child soldiers and their families, and support-ing apprenticeships through material assistance to ar-tisans or businesses.

Experience teaches that a balance must be achievedbetween the child soldier’s need to earn income andthe need to resume education. Access to education isone of the most often requested supports by child sol-diers but often forgone for economic reasons. The keyaspects to education and economic opportunity in re-integration programs are:• Accelerated formal education as well as alternative

education modalities• Supporting livelihood needs with income generat-

ing opportunities and market-appropriate voca-tional training

• Including child soldier reintegration in post-conflicteconomic policy.

Formal and alternative educationAccess to formal education5 presents special challengesfor the reintegration of child soldiers; yet former childsoldiers and their families overwhelming see this asthe best path to a new future. In Liberia, 77 percent offormer child soldiers said they wanted to return toacademic schooling. Program practitioners found thatformal schooling was preferred even in areas wherefree vocational and literacy training were offered.

Economic considerations pose the most significantobstacle to education. In El Salvador, livelihood needsin relation to formal education were neglected. Fol-


lowing a difficult negotiation to provide child soldiersfifteen years and older with some supports, more thana year after demobilization, 152 were selected forschool enrollment. However, in a survey preceding thisselection, only five had sought formal education op-portunities. In follow-up research for this workingpaper, many former child soldiers explained that theywould like to study but lacked financial resources andneeded to prioritize income generation. As two formerchild soldiers in El Salvador commented:

“I think that housing and education are what I need,but…. for education, I would like to have a night jobso that I could study in the day….”

“Now they do give classes, but I won’t go with thoselittle boys…”

Former child soldiers cite many obstacles to reinser-tion in formal schooling, including:• They cannot attend school during formal school

hours because they must earn their own income orcontribute to the family livelihood.

• They or their families cannot afford the school feesor expenses of uniforms and supplies.

• Education facilities were destroyed during the con-flict, or there is a lack of teachers in their commu-nity.

• They have difficulty getting documentation for en-rollment, or school authorities would not allow olderformer child soldiers to join the same level asyounger children.

• They feel shame or resentment about going to schoolwith much younger children.

A few pilot projects in Angola offer models for fu-ture child soldier reintegration programs. ChristianChildren’s Fund, the international NGO partneringwith the catechist network, organized an “ID Regis-tration Project” to arrange the civilian documentationessential for school enrollment. The Ministry of Edu-cation initiated a network of “animator teachers.” Theanimator teachers work at the community level toidentify disabled children out of school, plan their in-take with parents, teachers and headmasters, and pro-vide training and support to teachers who assist dis-abled children with learning difficulties. The catechistnetwork in Angola played a role similar to the anima-tor teachers with child soldiers, and investments intraining and awareness raising hold great potential ifpeace can be regained.

Former child soldiers need education opportunitieswith flexible hours and an emphasis on literacy andnumeracy skills. Training in life skills—including nu-trition, sexual and reproductive health, and manag-ing finances—should also be incorporated. These edu-cation modalities are gravely lacking in reintegrationprograms.

Vocational training and income generating opportunitiesSoldier reintegration programs to date have offeredfew meaningful training and livelihood opportunities.In El Salvador, only 23 out of 293 former child soldiersin a follow-up survey reported that they had access toa vocational training project. A few more, forty-four,accessed a land credit project. In Liberia, child soldierswere given “coupons” for future training projects,which rarely materialized.

Reintegration programs have to address the imme-diate need of most child soldiers for income. Vocationaltraining and small business schemes must also be cre-ated for quality and market absorption factors. In ElSalvador, evaluations of the program for demobilizedadults found only 25 percent working in the area forwhich they were trained. Problems identified with thetraining courses in El Salvador included:• There were no job opportunities upon course

completion• Courses were assigned by political and military lead-

ers rather than selected by the participants them-selves, leading to low motivation levels and incon-sistent attendance

• The academic level was too high because many par-ticipants were illiterate

• There was little orientation or referral at communitylevel to possible opportunities.

Former child soldiers followed-up in El Salvadorwere pessimistic about their future because of chronicpoverty and the lack of socio-economic change in theircountry. Only 49.5 percent earn their own income; ofthis, 85 percent earn less than the minimum wage.Some seven years after the peace accord, a few evenreported dissatisfaction about being demobilized. Thisnegative experience of economic reintegration is instark contrast to their motivation for participating inthe conflict: to improve the future of their country.

The resumption of conflict in Angola effectivelyended reintegration projects; but their experience pro-


vides insights to effective reintegration strategies. Withthe support of “Quick Impact Project” funds, knownas ‘QIPs,’6 a number of families with demobilized childsoldiers were able to rehabilitate bakeries and othersmall businesses. These projects provide an importantexample of combining the families’ income needs withthe needs of the child. Lessons learned in Liberia alsonote that family poverty alleviation programs are asimportant as family reunification follow-up visits.

The Angola demobilization and reintegration pro-gram also initiated a referral service in each province.These offices arranged a number of apprenticeshipsfor demobilized child soldiers. For example, tailorswere given favorable rental terms on sewing machinesin exchange for taking apprentices, and training wageswere supported in community restaurants.

The Angola apprenticeships and QIP-supportedmicro-enterprises were more effective than vocationaltraining schemes because they provided a quicker wayof acquiring skills and income. Similarly, programs inLiberia had to progress from a core of vocational andliteracy training to an emphasis on programs thatcould run in combination with regular schools.

The experience of the Angola QIP projects and pro-vincial referral structure underscores the need for flex-ible program funding mechanisms. The ability to de-velop projects and organize funding at the provinciallevel was crucial to reaching individual child soldiersand their families.

In addition, the QIPs in Angola had some impact inbringing economic activity to more rural and isolatedlocations. Locating vocational training projects in ur-ban areas raises the issue of the distribution of eco-nomic activity in post-conflict societies, where manycommunities have significant numbers of demobilizedsoldiers, repatriating refugees, and other especiallywar-affected groups.

The link to economic policyEconomic recovery is likely to be precarious in acountry’s transition from war to peace. This is accen-tuated by the large number of young adults, includ-ing former child soldiers, in need of a means of liveli-hood. The experience of El Salvador shows how eco-nomic policies can run against the needs of ex-com-batants and the most war-affected communities.

In El Salvador, industrial policy emphasized export-processing zones—but they were not established inthe predominantly rural or semi-urban areas wheremany combatants re-settled. The strategy for the agri-cultural sector was to promote the export of special-ized crops. Former combatants in the agricultural re-integration program were assigned marginally pro-ductive land and did not have the skills, capacity, time,or resources to engage in advanced marketing andcredit schemes. Evaluations of the program found thatthe debt level of former combatants reached 400 per-cent of an annual rural salary. Clearly, having spentsome ten years as a soldier, left the child soldiers espe-cially disadvantaged.

Reintegration lessons checklist

• Is a family tracing system adequately mobilized, staffed, and funded?• Is adequate time planned for the preparation of child soldiers and their family for reunification?• Are fostering arrangements available for cases where tracing is not successful?• Are arrangements for independent living possible, and is funding available?• How can a community-based psychosocial program be established?• Are traditional healing practices being identified and supported?• What social structures can contribute to sustainable monitoring and follow-up?• Are teachers, health workers, churches, local NGOs, and others being reached by an awareness rais-

ing initiative on the rights and needs of child soldiers?• Are recreational, cultural, religious, and life-skill building activities available and accessible?• How will access to formal education be facilitated? Are there programs with flexible hours? What policy

will be undertaken to support school fees and materials?• How can family and community small businesses be supported? Are there artisans and trade profes-

sionals that could be supported to provide apprenticeships?• Is the country’s economic policy conducive to meeting the livelihood needs of youth and war-affected

communities?


While some economic policy measures may notreach former child soldiers because of their age andlevel of skill and education, economic policies clearlyaffect their reintegration prospects. These problems arecompounded because former child soldiers often be-long to families that meet multiple vulnerability crite-ria, such as a war-disabled father, widowed mother, ordisplacement.

Neglected needs of girls and the disabledAs outlined in Chapter 2, child soldier programs mustemploy community-based strategies that reach girls,the disabled, and other groups that demobilizationprograms routinely omit. In El Salvador, 33 percent offormer child soldiers were girls. While they have notreported stigmatization by family or community incases where they had sexual relations and childrenoutside of marriage, support programs did not accom-modate the needs of female-headed households. Thesame was true for girls in Liberia.

Like girls, the needs of former child soldiers withdisabilities are also often ignored. In El Salvador, agroup of disabled former soldiers occupied the legis-lative assembly in order to make the government ful-fill pensions promised under the reinsertion program.In Angola, those working with child soldiers workedin isolation from the military war disabled program.In Liberia, disabled former child soldiers were espe-cially vulnerable to neglect and isolation.

The omission of girls and the disabled by many childsoldiers programs underscores the need for commu-nity-based approaches supporting the recovery andintegration needs of all war-affected children.

1 Fundacion 16 de Enero, “Los Ninos y Jóvenes Ex-Combatientes en su Proceso de Reinserción a la Vida Civil,”1995. See full case study on El Salvador.

2 The definition provided in the text box was agreed upon at aMay 1997 UNICEF workshop including UN and NGO part-ners. A report of the workshop is available from UNICEFOffice of Emergency Programs. A recommended resourceon psychosocial programs is Save the Children Alliance,“Promoting Psychosocial Well-Being Among Children Af-fected by Armed Conflict,” London, 1996.

3 For further discussion, see Alicinda Honwana, (1997) “Healingfor peace: Traditional healers and post-war reconstructionin Southern Mozambique.” Peace and conflict: Journal of PeacePsychology, Vol. 3, 293-305.

4 See the full case study on Angola for training outlines.5 Reflecting on such questions in Angola, a demobilization offi-

cial noted that reintegration programs should help formercombatants with school fees for their children. The WorldBank noted the same of a demobilization exercise inUganda. (See Coletta et al. in recommended readings.)

6 QIPS were first developed in Nicaragua by UNHCR for com-munities with large populations of returning refugees.

his paper has tried to provide lessons and guid-ance for future programs of prevention, demo-bilization, and reintegration of child soldiers.

While prevention is the best solution, the efforts ofthose working to demobilize and reintegrate child sol-diers require our full support. Program practitioners,child soldiers, and their families face difficult processesof post-conflict transition. And this transition shouldnot be undermined by a lack of political will or unful-filled programs of family reunification, or by a lack ofpsychosocial support and economic and educationalopportunity. Former child soldiers striving to achievea better future—despite ongoing conflict, social vio-lence, and few reintegration supports—demonstratethe possibilities of regaining a productive civilian life.

Lessons learned

Civil society actors, who have a vital role in prevent-ing child recruitment, require external support. Thedemobilization and reintegration of child soldiers re-quires persistent advocacy from both civil society andinternational actors. In addition, child soldiers mustbe specifically included in peace agreements and pro-cesses. The exclusion of child soldiers in the Salvadoranpeace process hindered their reintegration, engen-dered resentment, and left them socially and economi-cally marginalized. In Angola, a formal resolution pri-oritizing child soldiers proved essential to achievingtheir demobilization. Other lessons include:• Child soldiers must be separated from military au-

thority and protected during demobilization. In anumber of country experiences, a lack of protectionfor child soldiers allowed military authorities to

Conclusion

T manipulate the demobilization process for recruit-ment. This lesson underscores the wisdom of estab-lishing special reception centers for child soldiersduring demobilization.

• Child soldiers should remain in reception centersfor as little time as possible. While special centersare necessary in demobilization, experience showsthat family reunification and community-basedstrategies are the most effective in reintegration.

• Community-based networks are essential for sus-tainable support to demobilized child soldiers andfor reaching those excluded, most often girls and thedisabled, from formal demobilization.

• Planning for demobilization should encompass thefull demobilization and reintegration process, in-cluding preparing staff, establishing partnerships,generating resources, and clarifying policy. InAngola, belated staff recruitment and training, in-appropriate language skills and interpretation ar-rangements, and policy debates delayed child sol-dier demobilization.

• Coordination structures must include all actors—UN, government, representatives of armed groups,NGOs, local social organizations, and child soldiersand their families.

Reintegration of child soldiers should emphasizethree components: family reunification, psychosocialsupport and education, and economic opportunity.Family reunification—or, where that is not possible,foster placement or support for independent living—is crucial to successful reintegration. Psychosocial sup-port, including traditional rituals and family and com-


munity mediation, is central to addressing the asocialand aggressive behavior learned by child soldiers andto helping them recover from distressful experiences.Finally, education and economic opportunities mustbe individually determined and must include familylivelihood needs. In a number of experiences, appren-ticeships and micro-enterprise support have beenmore effective than vocational training. Resources andprograms must be able to meet the educational andlivelihood needs of child soldiers.

Reintegration requires a reasonable period, at leastthree to five years, of committed resources.

Other issues

Prevention will require greater investment in practi-cal measures, such as education and non-formal youthactivities, and community level advocacy. This paperhas identified obstacles to regaining education andprovides early indications on the effectiveness of ap-prenticeship and micro-enterprise strategies in com-parison to vocational training centers. However, theremust be improvement in programs that combine edu-cation and income-generating needs.

The needs of girls used in conflict require muchgreater program attention. For example, although 33percent of the child soldiers followed up in El Salva-dor were female, special program strategies for girlsdid not exist. While girls in El Salvador have not re-ported being stigmatized by family or community for

having sexual relations and children outside of mar-riage, support programs must address the needs offemale-headed households.

Improved links are needed between child soldier,disability, and mine awareness programs. While pro-grams for the disabled and war-injured were devel-oped in Angola and El Salvador, neither incorporatedchild soldiers nor adequate child-conscious measures.

The impact of drug use by child soldiers has not beenadequately addressed. And, staff working with childsoldiers are often ill-prepared for working with childsoldiers influenced by drugs and affected by sexuallytransmitted diseases.

Finally, reintegration efforts face challenges wherechild soldiers have committed atrocities or war crimes.The child’s reintegration faces a complex process inbalance with the need of many communities for jus-tice. A number of experiences demonstrate the impor-tant role of traditional healing rituals in addressingfamily and community concerns about a child soldier’sactions. Rwanda1 provides perspective on workingwith children accused of atrocities. Further programdocumentation and exchange, especially regardinglegal and amnesty provisions, is required in this area.

1 See “Children, Genocide and Justice: Rwandan Perspectives onCulpability and Punishment for Children Convicted ofCrimes Associated with Genocide.” Save the Children USA,1996.

Selected Readings

Brett, Rachel and Margaret McCallin, Children: TheInvisible Soldiers, 2nd edition, Rädda Barnen, 1998.

The book expands research commissioned for the 1996 UNStudy on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.Save the Children Sweden (Rädda Barnen) has a usefulweb site, www.rb.se, featuring a newsletter anddatabase on child soldiers.

Cohn, Ilene and Guy Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers:the Role of Children in Armed Conflicts, prepared onbehalf of the Henry Dunant Institute in Geneva,Oxford University Press, 1994.

Colletta, Nat J., Markus Kostner and IngoWiederhofer, The Transition from War to Peace inSub-Saharan Africa, Directions in Development,World Bank, Washington DC, 1996.

Colletta, Nat J., Markus Kostner and IngoWiederhofer, Case Studies in War to Peace Transition:The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combat-ants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda, World BankDiscussion Paper No. 331, World Bank, Washing-ton DC, 1996.

International Labor Organization, “The Reintegra-tion of Young Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life”,prepared for the Expert Meeting on the Design ofGuidelines for Training and Employment of Ex-Combatants, Harare, 11-14 July 1995.

United Nations, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children,Report of the Expert of the Secretary General,Graça Machel, UN Document A/51/306 and Add.1,New York, 1996.

UNICEF, “Cape Town Principles and Best Practiceson the prevention of recruitment of children intothe armed forces and on demobilization and socialreintegration of child soldiers in Africa,” UNICEF,New York, 1999.

This booklet is the report of the 1997 workshop held withthe NGO Working Group on the Convention on theRights of the Child. UNICEF web address:www.unicef.org.

UNICEF Liberia, The Disarmament, Demobilization andReintegration of Child Soldiers in Liberia: 1994 to1997: The Process and Lessons Learned, UNICEF andthe US Committee for UNICEF, New York, 1998.

United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations, “Disarmament, Demobilisation andReintegration of Ex-Combatants in a PeacekeepingEnvironment,“United Nations, New York, 2000.

This lessons learned paper contributed to the Report of theSecretary General to the Security Council on the Role ofUnited Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demo-bilization and Reintegration, S/2000/101, 11 February2000.

Annex I

Legal Framework

Awareness of the law, including empowering chil-dren and their families to protest underage recruit-ment, has proved vital to prevention and advocacy—and legal provisions for child soldiers are an essentialbasis for demobilization and reintegration programs.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and AdditionalProtocols thereto of 1977 and the UN Convention onthe Rights of the Child of 1989 are the pillars of thelegal framework on the involvement of children inarmed conflict.

1949 Geneva ConventionsAdditional Protocol I, Article 77

…“Children shall be the object of special respect andshall be protected against any form of indecent as-sault…”

Because of its near universal ratification, the UNConvention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) providesthe strongest basis of law and guiding principles onchild protection and well-being. The demobilizationand reintegration of child soldiers draws specificallyon Article 39 of the CRC,

“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures topromote the physical and psychological recovery andsocial integration of a child victim of [….] armedconflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall takeplace in an environment which fosters the health,self-respect and dignity of the child.”

Most significantly, in May 2000, the UN GeneralAssembly adopted the Optional Protocol on the In-volvement of Children in Armed Conflict to the CRC.

The Optional Protocol provides the strongest instru-ment to date prohibiting the use of those less than eigh-teen years as soldiers. The Optional Protocol replacesArticle 38 of the CRC, increasing the minimum age fordirect participation in hostilities to eighteen years fromfifteen years. The Optional Protocol includes non-stateparties in its prohibitions.

Key provisions of theOptional Protocol on the Involvement

of Children in Armed Conflict

Article 1State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensurethat members of their armed forces who have not at-tained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part inhostilities.Article 2State Parties shall ensure that persons who have notattained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily re-cruited into their armed forces.Article 3States Parties shall raise the minimum age in years forthe voluntary recruitment of persons into their nationalarmed forces from that set out in Article 38(3) of theConvention on the Rights of the Child, taking accountof the principles contained in that article and recog-nizing that under the Convention persons under 18 areentitled to special protection.[…]States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment intotheir national armed forces under the age of 18 shallmaintain safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, that:

a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;b) Such recruitment is done with the informed con-

sent of the person’s parents or legal guardians;c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties

involved in such military service, andd) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior

to acceptance into national military service.

Annex II


Article 41. Armed groups that are distinct from the armedforces of a State should not, under any circumstances,recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18years.2. State Parties shall take all feasible measures to pre-vent such recruitment and use, including the adoptionof legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalizesuch practices.[…]

An additional international instrument is Interna-tional Labour Convention No. 182 concerning the Pro-hibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination ofthe Worst Forms of Child Labour, adopted unani-mously in June 1999. Convention 182 prohibits, inter alia,forced or compulsory recruitment of children (personsunder the age of eighteen) for use in armed conflict.

Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999Article 3

“For the purposes of this Convention, the term “theworst forms of child labour” comprises:a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery,such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bond-age and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, in-cluding forced or compulsory recruitment of childrenfor use in armed conflict [...]”

In addition, the Statute of the International Crimi-nal Court makes it a war crime to conscript or enlistchildren under the age of fifteen or use them in hos-tilities in both international and non-internationalarmed conflicts.

Regional instruments are also important. For countrieswithin the Organization of African Unity, the AfricanCharter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, whichprovides eighteen as the minimum age for recruitment,is the strongest protection against child recruitment.

African Charter on the Rights and Welfareof the Child

Article II: For the purposes of this Charter, a childmeans every human being below the age of 18 years.Article XXII: Armed Conflicts[…]States Parties to the present Charter shall take allnecessary measures to ensure that no child shall take adirect part in hostilities and refrain in particular, fromrecruiting any child.States Parties to the present Charter shall, in accordancewith their obligations under international humanitar-ian law, protect the civilian population in armed con-flicts and shall take all feasible measure to ensure theprotection and care of children who are affected by

armed conflicts. Such rules shall also apply to childrenin situation of internal armed conflicts, tension andstrife.

The CRC and African Charter are only binding ongovernments, not on “non-state parties,” such as rebelor armed opposition groups. However, non-state par-ties may be willing to commit to these instruments.The experience of the humanitarian principles projectof Operation Lifeline Sudan (Southern Sector) is rec-ommended for program strategies in reaching non-state parties.1

In practice, forced recruitment can be blurred withconscription. While conscription policies are legal,armed forces often resort to forcible means of enforc-ing conscription, such as rounding up young men inmarkets and at sports events. Such means are illegal,and many who are underage fall victim to these mea-sures. Child rights monitoring should include mecha-nisms by which cases of underage recruitment can beredressed.

States are responsible for the recruitment practicesof other armed groups they establish, support, or con-done—such as civil defense forces, police, special po-lice forces, or local militias. Governments who supportnon-state parties or allow them to recruit or operatefrom their territory must ensure that they respect in-ternational humanitarian law.

As a policy basis for programs, it is recommendedthat a legal framework on child soldiers be adopted ateach country level. Angola clarifies age, the basis ofdetermining age, and offers a measure to prevent re-recruitment by considering that child soldiers havealready met their military service.

Angola Legal Frameworkon Underage Soldiers:

• Recognized the principles of the Convention on theRights of the Child and Angolan Law (Law 1/93) pro-viding for 18 years as minimum age for military ser-vice;

• 1996 was determined the “calendar year” of demo-bilization, all soldiers born after 1 January 1978 were tobe considered underage;

• As a measure to prevent re-recruitment, all under-age soldiers were granted “disponibilidade” status,guaranteeing full exemption from future military ser-vice;

• Gave “open status” to all underage soldiers’ files,preventing consideration as deserters and guarantee-ing right to demobilization and benefits if not presenton day of demobilization.

1 See section 1 of text.

Definition of Terms

Program practitioners working with child soldiersoften encounter a number of debates related to termi-nology and applicable law. In Angola, for example,debates over terminology and definition of age ob-structed and delayed the demobilization of child sol-diers for more than a year.

Demobilization and reintegration often take placein a political context. The multiple government bod-ies, agencies and organizations involved, frequentlywith overlapping mandates, may have different un-derstandings of terms, policies, procedures, and pro-gram strategies. Clarifying and agreeing upon termsis essential in each program context.

Child soldier

“A child soldier has been defined as any person under 18years of age who forms part of an armed force in any capac-ity, and those accompanying such groups, other than purelyas family members, as well as girls recruited for sexual pur-poses and forced marriage.”Secretary General of the United Nations, Report tothe Security Council, S/2000/101, 11 February 2000

Child soldier refers to any person under eighteen yearsof age who is part of any, regular or irregular, armedforce or group. This includes all child or adolescentparticipants regardless of function. Cooks, porters,messengers, girls recruited for sexual purposes, andother support functions are included as well as thoseconsidered combatants. This includes those forciblyrecruited as well as those who join voluntarily.

Despite assertions that child soldiers have volun-teered, they are often coerced into joining armed

groups. Reasons for “joining voluntarily” can includethe participation of relatives, threats, bribes, and falsepromises of compensation. Research has consistentlyshown that child soldiers join for protection, or forfood, clothing, or shelter. These reasons prevent thefree choice of the child.

Children are more likely to become child soldiers ifthey are poor, separated from their families, displacedfrom their homes, living in a combat zone, or have lim-ited or no access to education. Orphans and refugeesare particularly vulnerable to recruitment.

The involvement of children in armed conflict is oneof the most egregious violations of child rights. Childdevelopment is a dynamic process affected by social-ization, cultural values and traditions, gender andethnicity, emotions, and participation in communitylife. Children actively construct their own identity andthe course of their development, especially duringadolescence. The involvement of children in armedconflict has a significant effect on their development,particularly their identity construction, and can leadto social isolation, violence, and reduced education andeconomic potential.

Because the term “child” often carries the emotionalconnotation of being a very young and vulnerableperson, youth and adolescents may not be seen as childsoldiers. The CRC sets eighteen years as the divisionbetween child and adult, but many societies use otherdefinitions. Terms such as “youth,” as in El Salvador,may be helpful to common understanding in pro-grams. In Angola, the phrase “underage soldier” wasadopted to clarify that this included all those underthe legal recruitment age of eighteen years.

Annex III


While most governments have established recruit-ment laws with an eighteen-year age minimum, thereremains an international legal basis for allowing re-cruitment at younger ages. Historically, AdditionalProtocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article77(2), and Additional Protocol II, Article 4(3)(c), pro-vided for a fifteen-year age minimum. This legal normwas subsequently incorporated into Article 38 of the1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

In May 2000, following six years of advocacy andnegotiation, the UN General Assembly adopted byconsensus an Optional Protocol on the Involvementof Children in Armed Conflict. The Optional Protocolprohibits the direct participation of all those undereighteen years in armed conflict (see Annex II). How-ever, the Optional Protocol leaves room for govern-ments to set voluntary recruitment ages as young assixteen years. The varying age minimums continue toleave many children vulnerable to recruitment andhave fueled debate about including child soldiers insome demobilization exercises.

The experience of debates over terminology andapplicable law illustrates the urgency of• Advocacy to include all child soldiers under eigh-

teen years in demobilization and reintegration pro-grams

• Community-based approaches to reach child sol-diers, especially girls, excluded from formal demo-bilization exercises

• Incorporating local social and cultural values regard-ing children and youth.

Demobilization and reintegration programs are of-ten highly politicized and require persistent, coordi-nated advocacy to ensure the inclusion of the needsand rights of child soldiers.

[…] “The role of children in armed conflict should be ac-knowledged from the onset of peace negotiations andchildren’s rights should be identified as an explicit priorityin peacemaking, peace-building and conflict resolution pro-cesses, both in the peace agreement and disarmament, demo-bilization and reintegration plans.”Secretary General of the United Nations, Report tothe Security Council, S/2000/101, 11 February 2000

Demobilization and reintegrationDemobilization and reintegration programs are com-plex operations that include a number of interdepen-dent issues. The United Nations, and other bodies, use

the phrase disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration(DDR).

Disarmament is the collection, control, and disposalof weapons and development of arms managementprograms. Demining is usually included as part of dis-armament. Given the interdependent nature of theDDR process, disarmament programs will overlapwith concerns for child soldiers. Child-specific con-cerns with disarmament will include child-orientedmine awareness and weapons safety education. Whiledisarmament is an important child protection concern,this paper focuses on the demobilization and reinte-gration components as they concern child soldiers.

Demobilization is the process by which armed forceseither downsize or disband. Demobilization may takeplace as a military restructuring in a post war contextas well as following a peace accord. Demobilizationinvolves the assembly, disarmament, and discharge ofcombatants and their compensation or assistance.Quartering and cantonment are other terms used for theassembly portion of the process.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO) defines reintegration as an essential concomi-tant of successful demobilization. Reintegration refersto programs of cash or in-kind compensation, train-ing, and income generation meant to increase the po-tential for economic and social reintegration of ex-com-batants and their families. The compensation packagesor assistance programs that accompany discharge aresometimes referred to as reinsertion—such that rein-sertion would refer to a phase in between demobiliza-tion and reintegration. The World Bank for examplediscusses three phases in the war-to-peace transition:demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration.1 Rein-sertion represents the former combatant’s immediateperiod of returning to their home community or re-settlement location, while reintegration refers tolong-term social and economic support programs. Insome country experiences, such as El Salvador, rein-sertion has been used instead of reintegration. Thiscan be a matter of semantics, since in some languagesreintegration and reinsertion have the same meaning.

In this working paper, demobilization refers to thereception and discharge of child soldiers and reinte-gration encompasses measures supporting their pro-cess of establishing a new civilian course of develop-ment. An emphasis on community-based supports isessential as reintegration involves multiple physical,social, and economic needs beyond any timeframe ofcash or other supports.

1 See recommended reading list, Annex I, for World Bank bestpractice publications.

Summaryof Lessons Learned

Annex IV Angola and El Salvador

Phase Highlights of program actions Lessons learned

Angola El Salvador

PreventionAdvocacy • NGOs and Catholic Church • Support civil service in

helped protest recruitment preventing recruitment andduring conflict promoting child rights

• Include child soldiers inpeace processes

Legal framework • Towards preventing re-recruitment • Promote legislation andin the demobilization process, mechanisms to redressdeveloped legal framework with underage recruitmentagreed upon definition of an • Establish legal frame-“underage soldier” work that includes child’s

right to be demobilized

Monitoring and • Study of “vulnerable groups” • Early reporting by journalists • Support early documen-documentation conducted in demobilization and advocacy groups on child tation and reporting on

planning soldiers and recruitment abuses child soldiers• Gained parties’ agreement to • Include non-state partiesbe monitored on their com- in seeking commitmentsmitment to human rights and monitoring on human

rights

DemobilizationAdvocacy • Persistent lobbying of UN, parties • Early demobilization planning • Include soldiers in peace

to conflict resulted in child soldiers consultants highlighted the needs agreements and formalbeing made a priority in the de- of child soldiers, but their recom- demobilization plansmobilization and reintegration plans mendations were ignored • Without political will orearly on • Child soldiers were excluded specific provision for child• Prioritized “vulnerable groups,” in- from reintegration programs; a soldiers, they will be ex-cluding child soldiers, in demobili- few were incorporated in a one- cluded from demobilizationzation policy and plans year later renegotiation • When child soldiers are• Information campaign regarding not included, they aredemobilization with specific elements likely to feel marginalizedon the rights and needs of child soldiers and resentful• Developed “open file” mechanism to • Conduct information cam-include child soldiers excluded from paign to promote awarenessformal demobilization of child rights


Planning, resources, • Coordination committee inclusive of UN, • Coordination mechan-and coordination government, parties to the conflict, NGOs, isms should be inclusive

and local associations UN, NGOs, donors, gov-• Coordination committee extended to ernment agencies, rep-provincial levels of all armed groups, and• Delayed family tracing work, data and local organizationscoordination and staff deployment • Adequately mobilize staff• Lack of planning for interpretation and program partnershipsand interviews of child soldiers during for family tracing andquartering resulted in manipulation psychosocial supportof data for recruitment network

Community • Community-based network assured • Family reunification and • Community-based net-involvement a supportive relationship at the vil- community acceptance works are essential to

lage level for child soldiers from partially compensated for reach many former com-demobilization through reintegration child soldiers’ exclusion from batants, including those

formal demobilization excluded from formaldemobilization

ReintegrationFamily reunification • Community-based network of • Family’s role cited as most • Community-based net-and community- “catequistas” effective in family crucial to social reintegration works are effective becausebased networks reunification, psychosocial support by former child soldiers they are widely respected

and facilitating individual insertion and consistently presentinto education or livelihood activities for follow-up• Follow-up to family reunification, • Follow-up, including familyincluding surveys and community mediation

and incorporation into ed-ucation or livelihood projects,is essential

Alternatives to • Catequistas provided temporary • Develop foster familyfamily reunification care and facilitated support for opportunities and indepen-

independent living in home communities living arrangements in• Policy decision not to institutionalize anticipation that somechild soldiers complemented by child soldiers will not beproject supporting housing construction able to be reunified withfor independent living their families

• Need to support childsoldiers who have formednew families

Psychosocial • Integrated Western and local • Some community-based • Emphasize children’sapproach and understanding of healing; activities outside the formal psychosocial needs andtraditional healing supported traditional healing practices reintegration program helped new civilian development

• Focus on children’s psychosocial child soldiers, including a few pathneeds and development NGO psychosocial projects • Support traditional healing• Catequistas trained and supported by that supported community processes; integrate Westernpsychosocial project and local concepts of healing

• Sensitize communities tothe needs of child soldiers• Recreational and culturalactivities are important


Angola El Salvador


Education and • Quick impact projects to support • The few educational • Need flexible approacheseconomic apprenticeships and creation of scholarships offered to to support child soldiers’opportunities new businesses were administered were not used because education and income-

through flexible funding modalities child soldiers needed to generating needsat the provincial level prioritize income generation • Apprenticeships and• Micro-enterprise projects in- micro-enterprise approachescorporated family livelihood needs were more effective thanas well as the role of the former vocational trainingchild soldiers • Need to make alterna-

tive education and life-skills training available toformer child soldiers• Integrate child soldier re-integration with communityrevitalization• Need to include childsoldiers in broader econo-mic policies

Neglected needs • Catequista network and an NGO • 33 percent of ex-soldiers • Include specific attentionof girls and the psychosocial project provided some were female, but their to girls and the disabled indisabled outreach to girls and the disabled specific needs, including demobilization

the needs of female-headed • Ensure child-specifichouseholds, were not ad- measures and linkagesdressed in reintegration program between demobilization,

disability, and mine injuryprograms• Draw on communitynetworks and inclusiveprogram partnerships toreach girls and the disabled


Angola El Salvador

Documents

Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegratingpeople.umass.edu/educ870/PostConflict/resources/ChildSoldiers-BVerthey.pdfA child soldier is any person under eighteen years