ChessBase 12 Printout, Douglas Griffin, 21/08/2016 1 C99 ... · appear in 'Chess in the USSR' (No. 12, 1947). - Griffin.) 1.e4 e5 2. f3 c6 3. b5 a6 4. a4 ... In the later game Suetin-Mikenas

ChessBase 12 Printout, Douglas Griffin, 21/08/2016 1

C99Aronin,LevLisitsyn,Georgy

16th USSR-ch Semi-final (7) 1947[Aronin]

(RR - The annotations to this gameappear in 'Chess in the USSR' (No. 12,1947). - Griffin.)

1.e4 e5 2.f3 c6 3.b5 a6 4.a4 f6 5.0-0 e7 6.e1 b5 7.b3 d6 8.c3 0-0 9.h3 a5 10.c2 c5 11.d4 c7 12.bd2

[ One of the most well-known positionin the Spanish Game. In thetournaments of previous yearsnormally played here was ( 12.bd2) c6 , but, as Rauzer showed, after

13.de5 de5 14.a4! White obtains theadvantage.In recent times the continuationemployed by Black in the presentgame has gained popularity.However, its developmentconvincingly shows, in our opinion,that this path too does not bring Blackhappiness. ]

12...cd4 13.cd4 c6 14.b3 a5 15.e3 a4 16.bd2 a3

[ The continuation 16...b4 17.b1 a3 18.b3! leads to White'sadvantage. (RR - Earlier that year,this had occurred in the gameBoleslavsky-Ragozin (15th USSR-ch,Leningrad 1947). ]

[ Later, it became established thatBlack should prefer the developingmove 16...d7 . - Griffin.) ]

17.ba3 a3 The only thing that themarch of the a- has brought Black isthe opening of the file for the , whichin the given position does not haveparticular significance. The darkersides of this manoeuvre are moreperceptible: White succeeds in

completing development, the b5- isweak, and moreover, the poor positionof the at a3 permits White to carryout the following manoeuvre: 18.c1

[ The strategic idea of this manoeuvreconsists in the transfer of the ontothe a1-h8 diagonal, to bring under firethe e5-, in order thereby to forceBlack to give up the centre (...e5xd4);moreover, this manoeuvre creates aseries of tactical threats, which areillustrated by the following variations:( 18.c1 )

A) 18...c3 19.b1 c4 20.a3 b4 21.b3 and White wins theexchange.;

B) 18...b4 19.a3 c2 20.ac1, also with an extra exchange forWhite.;

C) 18...b4 19.b3 (threatening 20.d5) b7 20.b2 ( premature is

20.de5 de5 21.c4 a8 22.fe5 e5 23.e5 on account of e4 ), and Black is forced to play

20...ed4 ( since on 20...d7there follows 21.de5 de5 22.c4winning the e5-. );

D) 18...a5 , which occurred in thegame. ]

18...a5 [ (RR - In the later game Suetin-Mikenas (23rd USSR-ch Semi-final,Moscow 1955) Black tried a 4thalternative to the text move - 18...a8; however, after 19.d3 b7 20.b2

d7 21.ab1 ed4 22.d4 d4 23.d4 fc8 24.c4! Black similarlyfailed to solve his opening difficulties.- Griffin.) ]

19.b3 b7 20.b2 [ A gross error would have been, ofcourse, 20.b1? on account of b3. Now, however White, as well as thecapture at e5, threatens this move.Therefore the immediate ceding of


the centre is forced. ] 20...ed4 21.d4 d4

[ This is forced, in view of the threatsof 21...-- 22.b5 ( or 22.c2 . )]

22.d4 This position is clearly the bestthat can be achieved by Black after themove 18.c1. Nonetheless it isundoubtedly favourable for White,whose pieces are operating veryharmoniously. Black, on the otherhand, has weak s at b5 and d6, thea3 finds itself out of play and thethreat of e4-e5 is hanging over him.

a8 23.e5 [ The strength of this move is aboveall in the fact that ( 23.e5 ) de5is impossible, since after 24.e5the e7 and the b5- prove to beunder attack. For example: e8

25.b5 g2 26.g5 , and Whitewins a piece. ]

23...h5 24.e6 f5 [ The is, as previously, inviolable.On 24...fe6 there follows 25.e6, winning a piece. ]

25.f3 a6 26.ad1 d8 27.f1 d5Diagram

(Diagram)

A natural attempt to obtain counter-play,attacking the e6-. However, this move'kills' the b7 and permits White tobegin a decisive attack on the 's flank,not fearing the slight weakening of hisown castled position. 28.g4! fg4

29.hg4 f6 30.g3 g6 31.e2 [ Not only attacking the b5-, but alsothreatening to win immediately bymeans of 31.e2 -- 32.g5followed by 33.e5. ]

31...c8 There is no other defence. 32.b5 e6 33.g5 a6 34.a4 e1 35.e1 d6 36.e5 c5 37.d4

[ 37.d4 led after a5!

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to unecessary complications. ] 37...d6 38.g2 h5 39.h5 gh5 40.e5

[ (RR - An immediate win waspossible with 40.a6! a6 41.d5

f7 42.e7 , etc. However, the textmove is sufficient for victory. - Griffin.) ]

40...e6 The only move, since it isessential to simultaneously defend e6and d5. 41.f6!

[ White succesfully avoids thetemptation to play here 41.a5, which at first sight wins immediately,since on any defence of the d5-there follows 42.f6 with a win.However, this would have been agross error, which Black would haverefuted in the following way: f1!

42.f1 ( 42.f2 f3; or 42.g1 c4 43.c4 dc4 44.f6 c5! 45.g2 c6 with level chances ) 42...e5 43.d5 d5 44.d5 g7 45.f4 h4!with chances of a draw. ]

[ After the move in the text Black isdefenceless. On ( 41.f6 ) e2

( 41...e1 42.d5 and mate in 3moves ) White wins with 42.e4!

( but not 42.e7? since after f5it is White who would have to think of


saving the game ) 42...e4 43.fe4 f6 44.d5 h8 45.gf6 and Whitewins. ]

41...f1 42.f1 f6 43.gf6 f6 44.d4 f5 45.f2 g5 46.g1Black resigned.1-0

B51Boleslavsky,IsaacAronin,Lev

18th USSR-ch Final (4) 16.11.1950[Aronin]

(RR - The annotations to this gameappear in 'XVIII Chempionat SSSR poShakhmatam' (Fizkultura i Sport,Moscow 1952). - Griffin.)

1.e4 c5 2.f3 d6 3.b5This continuation, introduced intotournament practice and elaborated bySoviet chessplayers, has beenencountered more and more commonlyin recent events. Thus, for example,one may refer to the games Sokolsky-Botvinnik (Chigorin MemorialTournament, Moscow 1947), Aronin-Kotov (16th USSR-ch, Moscow 1948),Sokolsky-Kotov (17th USSR-ch,Moscow 1949), and what is more, ineach case the opening stage of thegame concluded favourably for White.

c6 [ Also possible is 3...d7 . However,after 4.d7 d7 5.c4 Black hasfewer possibilities. ]

4.0-0 g4 This active development ofthe , which was first encountered inMoscow tournaments, is a principledcontinuation, since it involves a fight forthe important central square d4. True,Black delays the development of his -side, but this is not easily exploited byWhite.

[ In each of the above-mentionedgames Black continued 4...a6 . ]

5.c3 f6 6.e1 a6 7.c6 bc6 8.d3 [ Since Black has the -pair, Whiterefrains from opening the game bymeans of 8.d4 . ]

8...e6 [ In the case of 8...e5 Black's dark-squared would have a lesspromising future, since it would bedifficult for Black to carry out theadvance ...d6-d5. ]

9.bd2 d7 It is essential toundertake prophylaxis against thepossible threat of breaking up Black'ss with e4-e5.

[ Thus, for example: 9...e7 10.a4 b6 11.e5 . ]

10.a4 b6 11.h3 [ Deserving attention is 11.e5, attacking the . The most probablecontinuation in this case would havebeen f3 12.f3 d5 13.c4!, and White's position is, perhaps,slightly preferable. ]

11...h5 12.h2 In order to free thed2, and also with the idea of 'hunting'the h5 after g2-g4 and f2-f4. Blackwith his s is ready to meet the comingcomplications head-on. e7 13.c4

b5 14.c2 d5 15.e3 Diagram

(Diagram)

c4! A responsible decision. Blackrealises that the c4- will be sacrificed.However, for now this remains on theboard, and it will be very unpleasant forthe opponent. 16.dc4 dc4 17.g4It is impossible to delay, since themanoeuvre ...c5-d3 is immediatelythreatened. In playing the text move,White consistently and boldly goes infor all the complications, which,however, finally prove to be in Black's


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favour. [ Perhaps it was more discrete toabandon ideas of obtaining theadvantage, playing 17.b3. For example: cb3 18.ab3 c5

19.b4 d3 20.f1 c1 21.fc1 g6 22.f3 . ]

17...g6 18.f3 [ Leading to unclear complicationswas 18.f4 . For example: f6 19.f3

e5 .After the move in the text Blackcannot defend the c4- in connectionwith the threat of 19.d4. But thishas been achieved at the cost ofweakening White's -side, which theopponent immediately exploits. ]

18...h5 19.d4 b7 [ At c5 the was more vulnerable: 19...c5 20.f4 e5 21.b4! ]

20.c4 hg4 21.hg4 c5 22.b3There is no other retreat for the ,

[ since on 22.f3 there follows f6 ] [ and after 22.f5 ef5 the reply 23.ef5 is impossible in view of mateat h1 ( h1# ). ]

22...c7! Exactly so. [ In the case of the immediate 22...h4 White by means of 23.f3fortifies his -position. ]

23.f4 [ Now 23.f3 is impossible on accountof g3 24.g2 e1 . ]

23...h4 24.g2 f6 A criticalmoment in the struggle. Correctlyassessing the situation as veryfavourable for himself, Black showshaste, which permits the opponent toorganise a defence.

[ Stronger was immediate castling,uniting the s. After 24...0-0-0 25.e5

dh8 it would be very difficult forWhite to defend himself, while at thesame time no effective way tocounterattack is evident. ]

[ If however White on 24...0-0-0does not play 25.e5, then it is difficultto defend against the threat of 25.--

f6 26.e5 d6 .Now, however, White apparently hasthe possibility to lead the game to adraw. ]

25.e5 0-0-0 [ Here 25...d6 is parried by meansof 26.g3 . ]

26.g5! Forced in view of the threat of26...d6, but Black all the same playsthis continuation, although it involvesthe sacrifice of a piece. d6

[ It is difficult to say how the strugglewould have concluded in the case ofthe retreat of the . After 26...d7

27.g6 fg6 28.e3 no decisivecontinuation is apparent, and Blacktherefore decided on the -sacrifice. ]

27.gf6 e5 28.fe5 e5 Diagram

(Diagram)

29.d2 [ White ought to have played 29.f2!In this case the game would haveended in a draw after dh8 30.c5

c5 31.c5 h1 with perpetual


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check. As grandmaster Boleslavskysaid after the game, he rejected thiscontinuation since he considered thatin this position White is not obliged toplay for a draw. ]

29...h5! Clearly, Whiteunderestimated the strength of thismove. It is difficult to parry the threat of30...g4. 30.c4

[ On 30.f3 there follows simply f3 31.f3 gf6 . ]

30...c7 31.fg7 White tries to obtaincounter-chances with the sacrifice ofhis , but this does not save him. g4

32.g4 g4 33.e5 f5! 34.g5 [ Better was 34.h6 but in this casetoo after g8 Black, sacrificing theexchange, obtains a strong attack. ]

34...g7 35.b6 c7 36.d8 d8 37.f2 g5 38.a8 f4White resigned.0-1

B11Aronin,LevFlohr,Salomon



1.e4 c6 2.c3 d5 3.f3 g4 4.h3 f3 5.f3 e6 6.d3 f6 7.g3

[ Normally 7.g3 is played here. ] [ The idea of the move g3 came tome during the game. Its point is theaspiration of holding up thedevelopment of Black's -side, whichin the present game was completelysuccesfull. However, one should notover-estimate the strength of themove 7.g3 . Immediately after thegame grandmaster Boleslavsky drewattention to the fact that after h5the best of all returns to f3 ( 8.f3). Playing f6 , Black returns to theinitial position. ]

[ As well as 7...h5, deservingattention is 7.g3 g6 , as happenedin the game Gurgenidze-Lipnitsky(tournament at Tbilisi, September1951). ]

7...a6 This is weaker than the repliesreviewed in the previous note. With thefollowing move White nullifies the threatto the square c2 and the possibility ofthe thrust ...h5. 8.e2 d4 9.b1

b4 10.a3 c5 This and thefollowing moves, slowing down thedevelopment of the black pieces, are infact forced. 10...c5 is necessary inorder in the case of c2-c3 to have theretreat square c6 for the .

[ After 10...e7 White would win theg7-, playing the preliminary 11.e5 . ]

11.0-0 a6 It is essential to consider the


threat of b5. 12.f4 Now there arisesthe threat of the manoeuvre c4-d6,and Black makes a 3rd consecutivemove with a -side .This permits White to go over todecisive operations in the centre. b5

13.c4! Diagram

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This move forces Black to take at c3,since no suitable defence of the b5- isapparent. dc3

[ On 13...d7 there follows 14.e5!, and it is difficult to offer Black goodadvice. ]

14.bc3 c6 15.c2White's intentions are clear. Seeking toexploit his superiority in development,he prepares to open the game with d3-d4. h5 16.d4 Proposing the sacrificeof one of the central s, the acceptanceof which would be clearlydisadvantageous for Black.

[ For example: ( 16.d4 ) A) 16...e4 17.f3 f5 18.d3 d5 19.fe1 ( or 19.e3 ); B) 16...cd4 17.cd4 d4 ( 17...e4 18.f3 d5 19.e3 d4 20.d5 f3 21.gf3, winning ) 18.d4 d4 19.fd1, and then 20.ac1 with greatadvantage to White. ]

16...h4 17.d3 cd4 18.cd4 e7 [ Better chances of creatingcounterplay were given here by theimmediate 18...e5 . In this case,clearly, White gets nothing fromtaking the , since after 19.e5 e5

20.de5 d3 21.d3 d7 22.f4 g5in general there is nothing left of hisadvantage. ]

[ However, in the case of ( 18...e5 ) 19.e3! d6 ( unsatisfactory is 19...ed4 20.d4 e5 21.b3 e4, if only on account of 22.b5 ab5

23.b5 d7 24.ad1 ef6 25.fe1 e7 26.c5 , and White wins ) 20.ad1 Black's position remainsdifficult. ]

19.ad1 e5 [ Black is all the same prepared forcastling, but if this now follows (

19...0-0 ), then after 20.d5 ed5 21.ed5 b4 22.b4 b4 23.d6White has an advantage sufficient forvictory. In order to defend againstthis threat, Black is forced toreconcile himself to the opening ofthe game. ]

20.e3 [ Clearly, here too taking the wouldbe disadvantageous for White. Forexample, 20.de5 d3 21.d3 d7

22.d5 b6 etc. ] 20...0-0 Diagram

(Diagram)

21.f4! [ Continuing 21.d5 b4 22.b4 b4 23.g5 , White could win a .However, the character of theposition is such that a direct attack inthe is the shortest path to the win. ]

21...ed4 22.d4 d4 23.d4 a5There now follows a precipitousstorming of Black's castled position.


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24.e5 d7 25.f5 c5 26.c5 c5 27.e3 b6 28.h1 The exchange ofs must be prevented. Now there isthreatened 29.d6 followed by 30.f6.

ae8 29.f6 gf6 30.h6 e4 31.f4There is no defence against the threatsof 32.g4 or 32.h4. e5 32.h4Black resigned.1-0

D36Petrosian,TigranAronin,Lev



1.d4 d5 2.c4 e6 3.f3 c6 4.c3 f6 5.cd5 ed5 6.c2 g4Black selects the most natural meansof developing this (normally) inactive ,later tranferring it to g6. 7.g5 e7

8.e3 bd7 [ Also possible is immediately 8...h5and then ...g6. ]

9.d3 h5 10.h4 With this

manoeuvre White achieves theexchange of Black's light-squared forthe , and not for the d3. But in suchpositions the 'performs' no worsethan a and Black retains a fully equalgame. 0-0 11.f5 g6 12.h3 f5

13.f5 e8 14.f4 White's inoffensiveplan (to retain the 2 s) does notcreate difficulties for the opponent. f8

15.0-0-0 a5 Not for an attack on the, but with the aim of preparing (after ...b4xc3) to seize the e4-square with the. 16.b1 Diagram

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b4! 17.hf1 g6 18.g3 [ If White were to retreat the to h2 ( 18.h2 ), and to continue after c3 19.c3 c3 20.bc3 e4(as in the game) with 21.c2, then Black could reply h4attacking the f5 and the g2- andforcing the exchange at e4 ( 22.e4

e4 ). ] 18...c3 19.c3 c3 20.bc3 e4 21.e4 e4 22.c2 f5 23.fe1 ae8 24.d2 f7 25.b1 b6 26.f3 4e6 27.h2 h5 Preventing g2-g4 with theexchange of the f5- and a later d3and e3-e4. 28.e2 f4 Black wronglyhurries to simplify the position, forcingthe exchange of s at e3.


[ After 28...f6 ] [ or 28...h4 he would have beenthreatened with nothing. On 29.be1it was possible to reply c5 . ]

29.be1 e3 30.e3 e3 31.e3 fe3 32.e3 h4 Black must prevent theadvance g2-g4, but now the will betied to the defence of the h4-, whileWhite's is fairly active.Thus, over Black's position there soonlooms the ominous threat of zugzwang.

33.b8 a6 34.c7 b5 35.d8 e6 36.g5 a5

[ Matters are not changed by 36...f5 37.f4 . It is better to advance the a-further. ]

37.d8 a4 38.g5 d6 39.d3 e6 40.f4 d6 41.e2 This move wassealed by master Petrosian, when thegame was adjourned. After the breakhe not only failed to exploit hisadvantage, but also even to achieve adraw... e6 42.f3

[ Simpler was 42.a3 , decreasing thepossibility of a breakthrough of theblack s on the 's flank. ]

42...a3 For Black this is the only savingchance. At a suitable moment he canplay ...c6-c5 and, if d4xc5, then ...d5-d4,realising the advance ...b5-b4-b3.

43.d8 [ White ought to have played 43.g4, picking up the h4-. ]

43...f5 44.c7 [ It was still possible to correct themistake with the move 44.g5 , etc. ]

44...f8! Diagram

(Diagram)

45.d8? [ The has freed itself, and Whiteought to have reconciled himself to adraw after 45.d6 e6 46.a3 f4etc. ]

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45...b4! Clever and unexpected! Nowthe will be much stronger than the .

46.cb4 [ Losing is 46.e7 b3 47.a3 ba2 48.b2 e6 . ]

46...e6 47.b6 f4 48.b5Against the threat of ...d3 there wasno sufficient defence. cb5 49.a5

[ On 49.c5? there follows d3 50.a3 b4 . ]

49...d3 50.d2 g5 51.e3 f4 52.f3 e6 53.c3 d8The transfer of the to c6 followed by...b5-b4-b3 decides the game. 54.e3

c6 55.d3 b4 56.d2 b3 57.ab3 a2 58.c3 f4 59.c2 g3 60.b2 g2 61.d2 h3 62.g5 g4White resigned.0-1

C99Aronin,LevTolush,Aleksandr


(RR - The annotations to this gameappear in 'XVIII Chempionat SSSR poShakhmatam' (Fizkultura i Sport, 1952).


It was a critical game from the point ofview of the tournament standings; with3 rounds remaining these were asfollows:1-2 Keres, Tolush 9½/143-4 Lipnitsky, Smyslov 9/145 - Aronin 8½/14, etc.- Griffin.)

1.e4 e5 2.f3 c6 3.b5 a6 4.a4 f6 5.0-0 e7 6.e1 b5 7.b3 0-0 8.c3 d6 9.h3 a5 10.c2 c5 11.d4 c7 12.bd2 cd4 13.cd4 b7This branch of the Chigorin Defencewas introduced into practice by themaster V. Panov.

[ Its idea consists in, after ( 13...b7 ) 14.f1 , the preparation of acounterblow in the centre with d5with the possible continuations:

15.de5 ( or 15.ed5 e4! 16.e4 e4 17.e4 d5 ) 15...e4 16.g3 f5 17.ef6 f6 . ]

14.d5 White played this move with theaim of avoiding the above variation. Itdoes involve some loss of time,although, and this is much moreimportant, it siezes space and restrictsthe activity of the black s. fc8

15.d3 d7 16.f1 c5 17.e3White permits the exchange of the d3.The later course of the game showsthat White's prove to be very active.

[ (RR - The text move is criticised byBoleslavsky and Konstantinopolsky inthe article 'Developments in theTheory of Opening', published in thetournament book of the 18th USSR-ch:"Here White, in our opinion,committed a strategic error, agreeingto the exchange of his light-squared, since this exchange gives theblack the possibility of invadingalong the c-file. The ought to havebeen retreated to b1 - 17.b1

, threatening the move 18.b4. IfBlack plays b4 , then after 18.b3the b4- is weak, and the blackpieces are bogged down on the -side while his -side is insufficientlydefended." - Griffin.) ]

17...d3 18.d3 c4 19.f5 f8 20.b3 b6 21.d2 With the threat of22.a5 White forces Black's move inreply. d7

[ Possible was 21...c2 (see theopening survey).(RR - Boleslavsky andKonstantinopolsky continue theanalysis as follows: 22.e3 d5

23.g5 f6 , "and White hasnothing better than perpetual check (

24.h6 h8 25.f7 g8 26.h6, etc.)". - Griffin.)The majority of black pieces arefocused on the 's flank and,naturally, White tries to attack on the's. However, this is far from simplein the absence of weaknesses in the-cover of the black . It is in orderto provoke such a weakening that thefollowing move by White was made. ]

22.g5 h6 23.f3 h7 Diagram

(Diagram)

Intending to expel the other with themove ...g7-g6. 24.3h4!

[ Now on ( 24.3h4! ) g6there follows 25.f3 , and as can beeasily verified, in the case of thecapture of the White develops apowerful attack. ]

24...c2 25.e3 c5 Renewing thethreat of exchange (26...d3). 26.b4

[ Now ( 26.b4 ) d3 is impossibleon account of 27.c5 , ]

[ and in the case of ( 26.b4 ) d3there follows 27.e2 b4 28.c2

c2 29.b6 a1 30.b7 g8


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31.e7 e7 32.e7 with advantageto White.After the move in the game there isthe threat of 27.e2. ]

26...g6! The only move! [ On ( 26...g6 ) 27.e2 Black replies e4 . ]

27.f3! This move confronts Black withdifficult problems.

[ The acceptance of the sacrifice loses.For example: ( 27.f3 ) gf5 28.f5

g8 29.e3 g7 30.c5 c5 31.g3 h8 ( 31...f8 32.h7 f6 33.f5 ) 32.f7 c7 33.g6 h7 34.e7! ] [ If Black refrains from capturing the he must defend against a series ofthreats, first among them ( 27.f3 )

-- 28.e3 with an attack on f7. Ingeneral the weakness of the squaref7 is the principal motif for thefollowing combination. ]

[ On ( 27.f3 ) g8 there couldfollow 28.e2 d3 29.e3 c2

30.g4 followed by a sacrifice at g6. ] [ The attempt to defend f7 with ( 27.f3 ) c7 loses after 28.e2 d3 29.e3 c2 30.c3 b2 31.ac1 gf5 ( there was threatened 31...-- 32.3c2; or 31...-- 32.d6 ) 32.f5

a2 33.g4 b2 34.1c2 b1 35.h2 with the irresistible threat ofg3.In this difficult position A. Tolush findsthe only , while at the same timesufficiently effective, continuation. ]

27...e4! 28.e4 d5 29.ae1The position is very double-edged.Thanks to the sacrifice of a piece,Black has obtained counterchances.He can already re-establish materialequality, but the position here isdefined not so much by the ratio offorces, but rather by whether White'sattack can be succesfully repelled. c6

[ Black should have played 29...e4 30.e4 d5 . After this 3 of White'spieces prove to be under attack.Master Tolush after the game saidthat he considered this continuation,but wrongly considered that theadvantage in the present position ison his side, and refrained from it inview of the possibility of White forcingthe draw with the move 31.d6. Indeed, after de4 32.f7 g7

33.g6 g8 34.e6 h7White has nothing other thanperpetual check. ]

[ Is there, however, after 29...e4 30.e4 d5 a way for White to play forthe win? It seems that the solution tothis question is in the variation

31.e2 d1 32.h2 , and Blackcannot take at b4 ( b4 ) on accountof 33.e3 with an attack on the and on f7. ]

[ However, Black in this case ( 29...e4 30.e4 d5 31.e2) has the strong intermediate move

e4! (in place of 31...d1), after whichWhite has nothing better than 32.c2

ef3 33.c8 c8 34.f8 f8 . ] [ Therefore, if White decided tocontinue the struggle, there would be


nothing other than for him to decideon the following continuation: (

29...e4 30.e4 d5 ) 31.e1 gf5 ( bad is 31...b4 32.e3! c7 33.d5 and then 34.b4 ) 32.d5 ( or even 32.h5 , when at the costof an exchange White retains definitethreats. )]

[ For example: ( 29...e4 30.e4 d5 31.e1 gf5 ) 32.h5 c7 ( evidently stronger is 32...c7 ) 33.f5 g7 34.d6 .Clearly, to play for the win with 31.e1 would be associated with risks.Therefore, Black ought to have gonein for this continuation. ]

30.g3 A timely retreat for theregrouping of forces. e7 Black isattracted by the possibility of attackingthe h4 which, it appears, is difficult todefend. However, this moveencounters a convincing refutation.

[ Better was 30...g7 . ] 31.d1! e6 32.ee1! In this lies thewhole point. Thanks to the threat of 33.d2 White succeeds in convenientlyreorganising himself. cc8 33.d2

c7 34.hf5! Again proposing theaacrifice of a , which already Blackcannot refuse. gf5 35.f5 g5

[ Greater chances of salvation weregiven here by 35...g8 . ]

36.d6 f4 After this White, sacrificinganother exchange, invades with the into the position of the black , forcingvictory. 37.e6! fe6 38.e7 f8

39.e4 g7 40.g6 h8 41.e6 h7 42.g6 h8 43.d6 c3 44.e5 Black resigned.1-0

D75Mikenas,VladasAronin,Lev


(RR - The annotations to this gameappear in 'XVIII Chempionat SSSR poShakhmatam' (Fizkultura i Sport,Moscow 1952).This was a critical encounter for Aronin.Prior to this, the penultimate round, theleading standings were:1 Keres 10½/152 Lipnitsky 103-4 Aronin & Tolush 9½Both Keres and Lipnitsky lost their 16th-round games, so that by winning thisencounter Aronin joined Keres (andTolush, who also won in this round) inthe lead with 1 round remaining. -Griffin.)

1.d4 f6 2.c4 g6 3.c3 g7 4.f3 0-0 5.g3 d5 The transposition to therealms of the Gruenfeld Defence after 5.g3 appears wholly expedient. After theexchange at d5 (6.cd5) Black's task isto undermine White's very strong -centre. 6.cd5 d5 7.g2 c3 8.bc3

c5 9.0-0 c6 10.dc5 [ This move appears ratherunexpected, since the strengtheningof the centre by means of 10.e3suggests itself. However, it containsa concrete idea of obtaining activepiece play. All the same (as is shownby the present game), playing in thisway White is unlikely to be able tocount on retaining an openingadvantage. ]

10...a5 11.e3 c3 12.c1 g7There are no weaknesses in Black'sposition, if one does not count the b7-.It is precisely this weakness that Whitetries to exploit with his following move.


13.b3 Now for Black it remains onlyto defend the b7-, after which it will bepossible to play the move ...e6 withgreat force. But how should this to bedone?

[ On ( 13.b3 ) b8 there couldfollow 14.g5 . For example: a6

( 15.c6 was threatened, and on 14...f5 - 15.f7! ) 15.d5 e6 16.c4 etc. ] [ Another move which suggests itselfis ( 13.b3 ) a6 . However, Blackrejected it on account of 14.a4!For example, e2 15.fd1, and White threatens -- 16.d2 a6

17.b5 , ] [ as well as the simple ( 13.b3 a6 14.a4! e2 15.fd1 ) -- 16.d4. (RR - Aronin's idea 14.a4! wasintroduced into practice many yearslater, in the game Vakhidov-Yermolinsky (Khodzhaev MemorialTournament, Tashkent 1982), inwhich White was successful. - Griffin.)Therefore Black chooses a sharpcontinuation, the consequences ofwhich were difficult to define. ]

13...e6 14.b7 fc8 Now Blackthreatens to win the with the move15...ab8, or at least to win the a2-,obtaining in return for the white c- apassed on the a-file. However, theposition contains dangers also forBlack.

[ In playing the move 13...e6, he hadabove all to reckon with the possibilityof the sacrifice of the with (

14...fc8 ) 15.g5! , and, probably,White could have gone in for it: ab8

16.c6 b7 17.b7 c7 18.e6 fe6 , and the compensation for the ,considering the strength of thepassed at c5, is clearly fullysufficient. ]

15.f4 a2 16.fd1 [ Now Black repels 16.g5 with d5. ]

16...b3 17.a6 Clearly, theexchange of s would be veryadvantageous to Black: the a- could inthis case quickly move forward. b4

18.a5 c6 19.a6 Diagram

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h6 Black rejects the repetition ofmoves, since his position all the samedeserves slight preference. The pointis that the relatively far-advanced whitec- can in some cases become anobject of attack, whereas Black'spassed in the case of its advance willbe very dangerous. However suchreasoning, having a somewhat abstractcharacter, is testament to theinsignificant nature of Black'sadvantage, and it still took some furtherinaccuracies by White before thescales tipped decisively in favour of hisopponent. 20.e1

[ In the case of 20.d2Black intended to play a2 21.b5

d5 . In order to exclude the fromd5, White retreats the to e1. Thispermits Black to carry out a littleexchanging combination which,however, does not bring about a


significant change in the assessmentof the position. True, after thiscontinuation White loses one of hiss. ]

20...a2 21.b5 d4 22.d4 d4 23.a8 a8 24.c6 b2It is necessary to take urgent measures,as otherwise the white c- couldbecome decidedly unpleasant. 25.b7

c8 [ The tempting -sacrifice 25...e2!?did not work in view of 26.a8 h7

27.d3! ] 26.c2 b6 27.d3 g5 28.e5 e5 29.e5 c7 30.a8 This move ismistaken. White's is cut off from theplay, which soon permits Black to carryout a combination, based precisely onthe poor position of the .

[ Continuing 30.b6 ab6 31.c1White retained good drawing chances,although the endgame is morefavourable for Black

( but not immediately 31.d3on account of f5 . )]

30...g7 31.d3 d5 32.c5Now there follows a little combination:

b1 33.c1 [ Or 33.c1 e4 34.f3 e3 . ]

33...c1! 34.c1 c6 In view of thethreat of mate White must return the .

35.d3 c1 36.c1 a8 37.f4 gf4 38.gf4 a5 White resigned.0-1


Chigorin Memorial Tournament[Aronin]

(RR - The annotations to this gameappear in 'Chess in the USSR' (No. 1,1948). - Griffin.) 1.e4 e5 2.f3 c6

3.b5 d4 4.d4 ed4 5.0-0 c6 6.a4

[ Theory recommends here 6.c4 d5 7.ed5 cd5 8.b5 d7 9.e1etc. However, in the present gameWhite tries to solve the problems ofthe opening, playing 'by commonsense', aiming only for rapid andcomfortable piece development. ]

6...f6 7.d3 d5 8.g5 de4 [ On 8...e7 there could follow 9.f6 f6 10.ed5 d5 11.b3 d8 12.e1 e7 13.e2 , and it is verydifficult for Black to castle. ]

9.de4 e7 This is the position forwhich White was aiming. He considersthat his -majority on the 's flank canbe more rapidly exploited to obtain anattack on the , than Black willmanage to create counter-play on theother wing. 10.e5 d5 11.e7 e7

12.b3 0-0 13.d2 g6 This moveshould be censured. The point is that itprovokes the advance f2-f4, which wasalready included in White's plan.Black's after f2-f4 aims at e3, but thisdemans a great deal of time, whereasthe could have more easily reachede3 from e7.

[ Evidently, better is 13...e6 . ] 14.f4 h4 15.e4 f5 16.h5

[ Forcing the exchange of s, since ( 16.h5 ) e3 is impossible onaccount of 17.g5 , ]

[ while in the case of ( 16.h5 ) h6White wins with an attack by 17.g4

e3 18.f5 f1 19.f6! (with thethreat of 20.g6). (RR - Here e6should be examined. - Griffin.) ]

16...h4 17.h4 h4 Notwithstanding the exchange of s, Whitemaintains a serious initiative. Hemanages to exchange the g- for theopponent's central and to occupy theopen file. 18.fd1


[ After 18.ad1 f5 there is thethreat of 19.-- e3 . ]

18...f5 19.g4 e3 20.d4 g4 21.f2 The advance of White's tothe centre secures him the advantage.

f5 22.d3 e7 23.d6 ab8 24.g3 e6 25.ad1 Diagram

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White has seized the open file, but toexploit this advantage is not so simple,since it is difficult to penetrate to the7th rank with a , while the exchangeof s at e6 fixes the weakness of thewhite at f4. Black with his followingmoves tries to force this exchange,while at the same time White transfersthe to the centre in order toexchange in the most favourablecircumstances possible. c5 26.f3!

b5 27.e6 fe6 28.e4 a5 29.h4Haste, which could have deprivedWhite of all the fruits of his previouslabour.

[ The strongest continuation was 29.g1 , in order on g6 to play 30.g4 followed by 31.h4. ]

29...g6! 30.f5 ef5 31.f5 e5! 32.e7 f7 33.e5 Diagram be8 After this there is obtained asingle -endgame that is definitelyfavourable to White.

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[ Black ought to have played 33...fe8. For example: 34.d6 e7 35.f1

e8 36.df3 d8 37.c6! c8 38.b5 b7 39.c4 b2with counter-play. ]

34.d6 e7 35.f1 e8 36.f8 f8 37.d5

[ The other possibility (more natural,and probably, stronger) was 37.c5. For example c7 38.b5 c2

39.b3 h2 40.a5 h4 41.a4, and White's s are the first toadvance. ]

37...e4 38.c5 h4 39.b5 b4 [ Time in such positions is the mostvaluable of all. Grandmaster Kotovrecommended here the move 39...h5!as giving the best chances ofsalvation. ]

40.f5 g8 41.b3 a4 42.c3 g4 43.b4 Here the game was adjourned,and Black resigned without resumingplay.1-0


B38Aronin,LevBronstein,David


(RR - The annotations to this gameappear in 'XIX Chempionat SSSR poShakhmatam' (Fizkultura i Sport,Moscow 1953). - Griffin.)

1.e4 c5 2.f3 c6 3.d4 cd4 4.d4 g6 This move, which not somany years ago was considered to bean opening error, since it permits Whiteto obtain a grip on the position with c2-c4, is at present gaining more andmore adherents. It is employedparticularly often employed, and withsuccess, by V. Simagin. All the same,clearly White has a way to retain anopening advantage. 5.c4 g7 6.e3

f6 7.c3 0-0 [ After prolonged thought grandmasterD. Bronstein refrains from thecontinuation 7...g4 , which isencountered in tournament practice.Probably, this is also the cause of allBlack's later difficulties. ]

[ In the case of 7...g4 8.g4 d4 9.d1! c6 10.d2 White has onlya slight advantage. ]

[ True, in place of ( 7...g4 8.g4 d4 9.d1 ) 9...c6 deservingattention is Bronstein'srecommendation e5!? but, this movestill needs practical testing. (RR -Aronin later faced this move in thegame Aronin-Aronson (24th USSR-ch,Moscow 1957), where he continuedwith the unorthodox 10.e2 0-0

11.h4!? ; after the continuation f5 12.h5 f4 13.d4 ed4 14.d5 g5 15.g4 e8 16.f3 h6 17.0-0 d6 18.f5 e5 19.g4 he achieved adominating position. - Griffin.) ]

8.e2 e8 Bronstein refrained from7...g4 for the sake of this idea. Heintends to undermine the white -centreby means of ...f7-f5. The followingstruggle, however, reveals the negativesides of this plan.

[ Perhaps, better was to play 8...d6 . ] 9.d2 Precisely so! White, anticipatingthe inevitable weakening of the black -side after ...f7-f5, prepares to castlelong. f5 10.ef5 gf5 11.f4! Drasticallypreventing the development of Black'sinitiative (11...f4 was threatened) andsimultaneously beginning an offensiveby White on the flank. c7 12.0-0-0The decision to castle long isabsolutely well-founded. As well asattacking on the -side, long castlingpermits White to immediately organisepressure on the central files. Black issooner or later obliged to advance hiscentral s, which will give rise todecisive weaknesses in his position.Naturally, for Black there appeardefinite counter-chances, associatedwith a counter-attack on the white ,but to organise such an attack willprove to be a very difficult matterprecisely thanks to White's superiorityin the centre. d6 13.f3 d7 14.h3

a5 15.e2 e5 Black is all the sameforced to be active, since otherwise hecannot repel White's offensiveassociated with the threatened g2-g4.

16.b3 b3 This forced exchangegreatly consolidates the position of thewhite . 17.ab3 e4 18.h5 e8

19.e8 When attacking, it is alwaysuseful to remove those enemy piecesthat participate in defence. e8

20.d2 The idea of this manoeuvre isnot only an assault on the d6-, butalso to dominate the central squares.

[ Thus, for example, on ( 20.d2 ) a5 there follows 21.d5 d5


22.d5 with a strategically winningposition for White. ]

20...a5 Diagram

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21.d4! [ In the case of 21.d6Black, continuing h4 followed by ...a5-a4, could have complicated thestruggle. Therefore White does nothurry to obtain a material advantage,but exchanges the dark-squared , inorder to remove the cover of theenemy . ]

21...a4 22.b4 f7 [ On 22...a3 there could havefollowed 23.ba3 a3 24.b2 . ]

23.g7 g7 24.d4 g8 25.g4!While threatening to open the g,White with gain of tempo carries out g4-g5, restricting Black still further. g6

26.g5 f7 In order to prevent themanoeuvre d5-f6. 27.d5 d5

28.d5 h8 29.d4 g8 30.d5 h8 Diagram

(Diagram)

31.c5! In this way White rapidlyachieves a decisive advantage.

[ Impossible now, of course, is ( 31.c5!) dc5 on account of 32.e5 . ]

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31...e8 32.cd6 d7 33.b1Preparing an invasion on the c andpreventing the advance of the black a-. a3 34.c1 Now the threat of e5and c7 is decisive. a2 35.a1 fc8

36.e5 g8 37.c7 c7 38.dc7 e8

[ Black's position is hopeless alsoafter the move 38...c8 , on whichthere follows 39.c1 . ]

39.e8! e8 40.d1 f7 41.d8 b5 42.c8 Black resigned,

[ since after ( 42.c8 ) f1 43.a2 a6 44.b3 he has no morechecks.(RR - A crushing victory by Aroninover a player who, earlier the sameyear, had drawn a match for theWorld Championship with Botvinnik. -Griffin.) ]

1-0


B08Aronin,LevSmyslov,Vasily


(RR - The annotations to this gameappear in 'XIX Chempionat SSSR poShakhmatam' (Fizkultura i Sport,Moscow 1953).Prior to the final round the tournamentstandings were:1. Keres 11/162-4 Geller, Petrosian, Smyslov 10½5-6. Botvinnik, Taimanov 9½7-8. Averbakh, Bronshtein 99. Aronin 8½,10-11. Kotov, Flohr 8, etc.The 19th USSR-ch was simultaneouslya FIDE Zonal Tournament, withqualification for the 1952 InterzonalTournament at stake. Keres, Smyslovand Bronshtein were already exemptfrom qualification by virtue of theirresults in the previous WorldChampionship cycle, but there were 5other places available. - Griffin.)

1.e4 d6 This encounter had greatsporting significance for bothopponents, in particular for V. Smyslov,who in the case of a win had chancesof 1st place in the tournament. Clearly,he was aiming for a complicatedstruggle and this explains the choice ofan opening that is somewhat unusualfor him. Black selects a system workedout by Soviet master A. Ufimtsev. 2.d4

f6 3.c3 g6 4.f3 White does notseek to a 'refutation' of Black's chosendefence since, as tournament practicehas shown that a refutation is unlikelyto be possible. In the opening herestricts himself to the task of rapidlyand expediently developing the pieces.

g7 5.g5 h6 6.e3 A slight finesse.

White plays the move f4 only in replyto ...g4.

[ On the immediate 6.f4 there couldfollow g5 7.g3 h5 . ]

6...c6 Black proposes to display activityon the -side in connection with ...b7-b5. Often in such positions Whiteautomatically replies a2-a4, but this isnot at all obligatory. In the presentgame he permits the black -offensive,exploiting the time for theimplementation of his intended goal -the rapid mobilisation of forces. 7.d2Now for Black it is not easy to carry outcastling. He ought to have done so onthe previous move, when the h6- wasnot under double attack. b5?V. Smyslov is playing the opening veryrecklessly and with each move worsenshis position still further. 8.d3This position for the is not the best,but on the other hand in this way it ispossible to defend against the threat ofattack on the e4- without loss of timeon the move a2-a3. g4 Continuing inthe same spirit. Black initiates lengthyand almost forced complications, whichdo not promise him anything good.Until it is too late to do so, he ought tohave thought about piece development.

9.f4 e5 10.de5 de5 11.g3 h5Otherwise the e5- cannot be defended(h2-h3 is threatened).

[ Black was pinning his hopes on themove 11...h5 , intending after 12.h3to reply h4! However, the followingmove by White emphasises themistaken nature of the opponent'sopening strategy. ]

12.h4! f6 [ After 12...f6 there follow 13.f6 f6 14.h3 h6 15.b5 cb5 16.d5 c6 17.e5 etc. ]

13.h3 h6 14.e2 [ White does not even try to delve into


variations such as 14.d1 g5 15.hg4 hg4! etc. He correctlyconsiders that the position obtainedafter the further weakening of Black's's flank will be strategically won forhim. ]

14...b4? A doubtful move, since nowthere are created 'incurable'weaknesses also on the other wing.

15.a4 g5 16.g3 h4 17.h2 h2 18.h2 The exchanges have defusedthe situation, and the situation isdefined. Black's pieces stand in theirinitial positions, his cannot count ona safe shelter, and his s are weak.The presence of 2 s also cannot beconsidered a consolation, since the f8is restricted by the advance of Black'ss. Precisely this circumstance shouldalso have played a decisive role in theoutcome of the struggle.Black's position is essentially lost.White can realise his advantage eitherby an attack on the , or bytransposition into an advantageousendgame after the simplification of theposition. d7 19.c4 It is not worththe tempting check at h5. At e8 the stands no better than on nearbysquares. f8 20.g4 b6 21.d1

e7 22.b3 b8 23.0-0 a4 24.a4 b6 25.c4 e6 Forced.

[ On 25...d7 the doubling of s onthe d decides. ]

26.d3 [ Renouncing 26.e6 e6 27.f6. White correctly aims for more. ]

26...e7 27.d5 [ Counting on ( 27.d5 ) c7 28.f6 e7 29.g8! e8 30.c4 g7 31.d2 and, doubling s, White winsrapidly. However, after Black's replyhe is forced to return to the startingposition. ]

27...e6! 28.d3

[ Of course, not 28.c6? f7, and White loses a piece. ]

28...g7 29.b3 Since White'simmediate assault has been beatenback, he is forced to transpose towinning endgame. 0-0 30.e3 b3

31.b3 f7 32.f5 b3 33.ab3Decisive for the evaluation of theposition that has arisen is the absolutesuperiority of the white over theblack . f7 34.d8 h7 35.a1!

f8 36.a8 bb7 37.d1 In this wayWhite burst into the enemy rear withthe second too. bc7 38.dd8 g7

39.f1 fd7 40.d7 d7 41.c8 g6 Here the position was adjourned,and White sealed his move.

[ Had the control still not beenreached, he without thinking wouldhave taken at c6 ( 41...g6 42.c6) and, obviously, would have easilyachieved victory. ]

[ However, for him there was time tothink, and then he noticed the move (

41...g6 ) 42.g8 , promisingtransposition into an easily winning(as it seemed to him) -endgame.This move was sealed. Objectively itis the strongest in the given position,but together with White's idea is wasa fateful mistake.After the adjournment therefollowed: ]

42.g8 h7 Diagram

(Diagram)

43.g7? A mistake, all the moreinexcusable in that White had a full dayin which to analyse the interruptedgame. This analysis followed, however,altogether incorrect paths.

[ Suggesting itself is the move 43.e8!, after which further resistance ispointless. On g6 there follows


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44.e7! e7 45.e7 , and Blackloses 2 s, while other moves are notevident.The exchange of s and the transferinto a minor-piece ending was themost logical and simple path tovictory. White, however, intendingthe transposition into the -endgame,did not even pay attention to thepossibility of the move 43.e8! ]

[ In home analysis there was testedonly the following variation, which hehad in mind during the adjournment:

43.g7 g7 44.g7 g7 45.g4 f7 46.e2 e6 47.d3 d6 48.c4 a5 ( or 48...c5 49.b5 ) 49.f3 d7 50.c5 c7 51.c3 bc3 52.bc3 b7 53.d6 b6 54.c4 b7 55.c5 , and White wins.With this variation and certainty invictory White came to theadjournment, letting slip from hisattention the fact that playing blackwas grandmaster Smyslov, a genuinevirtuoso in the endgame.(RR - It should be pointed out that theremaining games from the final roundwith significance for the qualifyingplaces for the Interzonal had all beenconcluded, and that it was now clear

that victory in this game would havegiven Aronin a share of 6th-9thplaces (along with Averbakh andTaimanov) and a place in theInterzonal. - Griffin.) ]

43...g7 44.g7 g7 45.g4This move is essential, since otherwiseBlack obtains counterplay on the -side in connection with ...f6-f5 and ...g5-g4. hg3! This exchange had beenrejected by White in analysis, since itpresents White with a distant passed on the h, which, it seemed, mustguarantee him an easy victory. 46.fg3

g4! One surprise after another. Thedistant passed also becomes aprotected one. 47.h4 c5 48.e2 h7The , breaking the general rule, doesnot at all aim for the centre. 49.d3

h6 Only now did White appreciate theopponent's idea.

[ The natural ( 49...h6 ) 50.c4even loses after f5! 51.ef5 e4!, and the white can (and must) goonly forwards, after which the black promotes to a , ]

[ and if ( 49...h6 50.c4 f5! ) 51.d3 , then after f4 52.gf4 ef4 53.e2 h5 54.e5 g6 , and then55...f5 and 56...e5 Black alsowins. ]

50.c3 a5 51.cb4 ab4 Agreed drawn,since White must retain the in hiscamp. If the White s were notdoubled and the b2- stood at a2, he ofcourse woule win easily, playing 52.a4.The concluding position, created bygrandmaster Smyslov, is very beautifuland is a valuable contribution to thetheory of endgames.(RR - As a result of his failure toconvert the advantage to a win, Aroninfinished in 9th-10th place and failed toqualify for the Interzonal. Apparentlythe outcome of this game had a


profound psychological effect on Aronin.The previous year (18th USSR-ch,Moscow 1950) he had also sufferedsevere disappointment in the finalround; there in the final stages of thegame he let slip a win againstBorisenko that would have given him ashare of 1st-2nd places. - Griffin.)½-½



(RR - The annotations to this gameappear in 'XX Chempionat SSSR poShakhmatam' (Fizkultura i Sport,Moscow 1954). - Griffin.)

1.e4 e5 2.f3 c6 3.b5 a6 4.a4 f6 5.0-0 e7 6.e1 b5 7.b3 0-0 8.c3 d6 9.h3 a5 10.c2 c5 11.d4 c7 12.bd2 cd4 This exchangebegins a system of play proposed by V.Panov. A serious objection to itconsists in the plan of play for Whitebeginning at the 14th move. 13.cd4

b7 14.d5 [ The variation of V. Panov counts on 14.f1 d5! 15.de5 e4 16.g3 f5etc. The move in the gameeliminates Black's activity in thecentre and gains a spatial advantagefor White. The advantageousness ofthis continuation is supported by thegames Aronin-Tolush (18th USSR-ch,Moscow 1950) and Boleslavsky-Bondarevsky (USSR Team-ch, Tbilisi1951). ]

14...c8 The at b7 has nothing betterto do and A. Tolush returns it to the c8-h3 diagonal. It is clear that Black istrying to carry out the advance ...f7-f5,

but White easily prevents this. [ (RR - The previous Aronin-Tolushencounter referred to above hadcontinued instead 14...fc8 15.d3

d7 16.f1 c5 , etc. ] [ Later, the continuation 14...ac8 15.d3 d7 ( 16.f1 f5 ) becamepopular. - Griffin.) ]

15.f1 e8 16.g4 [ (RR - The above-mentionedBoleslavsky-Bondarevsky game hadcontinued instead 16.b3 g6 17.e3

g7 18.d2 b7 19.c1 d7 20.b4 ac8 21.g4 d8 22.e2 f5 23.ef5 gf5 24.h6 h8 25.g4!, etc. - Griffin.) ]

16...d7 17.g3 g6 18.h6 g7 19.d3 White intends a plan involving astruggle on both flanks. Keeping theblack under fire, he simultaneouslybegins play against the -side s. fc8

20.e2 c4 21.ec1 b7 22.a4 [ Threatening ( 22.a4 ) -- 23.b3 a5 24.c8 c8 25.ab5 ab5 26.b5, etc. ]

22...d8 23.b4 ab8 24.ab5 [ More attention is merited by 24.c3, intending the transfer of the other to c1 or b1. Now Black succeeds inrepelling the first assault. ]

24...ab5 25.c2 b6 26.c8 c8 27.g2 a4 28.c1 a6 29.a2 b6 30.d2 Preparing a blow on the's flank, to which Black wrongly doesnot pay attention.

[ He ought now to have defended bymeans of ( 30.d2 ) f6 . ]

30...a7 Diagram

(Diagram)

31.f5! How many times, in positionsarising from this opening, has thismove of the to f5 been made and, asa rule, succesfully for White! The skill


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of play in the middlegame consists, inparticular, of noticing such patterns.

f5 [ Taking with the ( 31...gf5) loses immediately in view of 32.g5, ]

[ as does 31...e8 on account of 32.e7 h8 33.g5 . After theforced move in the game White's light-squared is activated, which is oneof the main problems in the SpanishGame. Black's now comes undera strong attack. ]

32.ef5 d8 [ Defending against the threat 32...-- 33.g5 d8 34.d8 d8 35.h6. But all the same the move 33.g5is now decisive. ]

33.g5 f6 Black is forced to give up a.

[ After 33...g7 White winsimmediately with 34.d8 d8 35.f6. ]

34.e3 b6 35.fg6 hg6 36.g6 g7 37.e4 h8 38.g3 Preparing thetransfer of the via h4. b8 39.h4

e3 40.e3 b6 41.f3 c4 42.f5 b7 43.a1 f5 44.f5 f7 45.e6

[ More decisive was 45.g5! h5 ( if

45...fg5 , then 46.g5 h7 47.a7!,; while on 45...f8 decisive is 46.g6and 47.h5 ) 46.gf6 h6 47.e6etc. ]

45...e6 46.de6 e8 47.f5 g8 48.e7 d5 49.a7 d4 50.d7 f7 51.f3

[ After 51.h4 Black could still provokecomplications, continuing e6

52.d8 e7! 53.e7 e7 54.a8 d3 . True, also in this case Whitewins: 55.a1 ( but not 55.f3? e4!

56.e4 d2 etc. ) 55...b2 ( or 55...e4 56.f4 ) 56.f3 e4 57.e3etc. ]

51...e6 52.a7 f7 53.e4 b8 54.h4 d2 55.d3 Black resigned.1-0

C65Aronin,LevKeres,Paul



1.e4 e5 2.f3 c6 3.b5 f6 4.0-0 c5 A very rare continuation, inreply to which White has a number ofgood responses. 5.e5

[ Also possible is 5.c3 ] [ or 5.c3 . The continuation in thegame takes on a more forcingcharacter. ]

5...e5 6.d4 c6 7.de5 e4 8.d3 d5 9.ed6 f6! This unexpected replyis the best in the given situation.

[ On the natural 9...d6 there couldfollow 10.e1 and impossible is e6on account of 11.h5! with the win ofa piece (both 12.c5 and 12.e6 are


threatened). ] 10.f4 Now Black easily equalises thegame.

[ White can retain a slight advantageonly with the continuation 10.g5!(RR - Interestingly, this later occurredin the game Shamkovich-Aronin(Moscow Central Chess ClubInternational, 1962), which continued

d6 ( 10...d6!? ) 11.c3 e6 12.f6 gf6 13.e4 e5 14.c5 c5 15.f3 with the better prospectsfor White. - Griffin.) ]

10...d6 11.d6 d6 12.c3 e6 13.e2 0-0 14.e4 Whereas this isalready haste, after which theadvantage passes to Black.

[ White ought to have continued 14.ad1 , and in the case of b4 - 15.e4 . ]

14...e5 15.f6 f6 16.c3 ad8In this at first sight simple positionWhite is required to play with greataccuracy for the retention of equality.

17.ad1 g6 18.c4 de8 19.fe1 g7 20.e6 e6 21.c4 d8

[ With the strong threat of ( 21...d8 ) 22.-- d2 . It is now clear that Blackmoved the away from g8 in orderthat the move 22.d8 would not bepossible. ]

22.f1 e1 23.e1 d2 24.e2 d1 25.e1 e1 26.e1 e5 27.d2 h2 White has sacrificed a , but for ithe takes over the initiative, whichcompletely equalises the chances.

28.d4 h6 29.g3! [ Now, as well as ( 29.g3 ) -- 30.a7 ( there is threatened also 30.f6 . )]

29...h5 30.a7 d5 31.e3 c5 32.b4 In -endings it is necessary toaim at the creation of passed s which,as a rule, guarantee against defeat.Therefore White begins decisive

operations where he is strongest - onthe 's flank. e6 33.d3 d7

34.c2 f5 35.b3 b1 36.c4 f1 37.b3 d1 38.a3 c1 39.b3 b1 40.c4 f1 41.b3Diagram

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Here the game was adjourned. P.Keres renounced the perpetual check,deciding to play for the win. As isshown by the further development ofthe struggle, this decision was unlikelyto be sufficiently justified. d1 42.a3

cb4 43.cb4 f3 44.b2 f6 45.b3 b6 46.c7 With a little trap.

[ Now taking the at f2 ( 46.c7 f2) loses on account of 47.f4 f4

48.gf4 g7 49.a4 etc. ] 46...f3 47.c4 e2 48.b3 d1 49.b2 d4 50.b3 d5 51.c3 b5 52.c5! The most decisive. Whiteproposes the sacrifice of one, and thena second , leaving himself with asingle, but for that far advanced,passed . a2 53.b5 f2 54.e5

g5 55.b5 b6 56.c4 f6 57.c5 e6 58.b4 e1 59.c4 e2 60.d5 f3 61.e6 g3Thus, Black has 2 extra s, but onlyWhite can play for a win. 62.b6 g4This move puts Black in a dangerous


situation. [ Better was 62...b3 . ]

63.b7 b3 64.f6 White is seducedby the mating threat to the enemy ,but gives Black the possibility toannounce perpetual check.

[ Stronger was 64.d5! . In this casethe continuation e3 65.d7 a7

66.c8 a6 67.c7 a7 68.d6! g3 69.c8 g2 70.h2 leads toWhite's victory. ]

[ However, also after 64.d5!Black achieves the draw, continuing

b6 65.d7 g3 66.c8 g2, and now nothing is given for Whiteby the play with 4 s: 67.d2 h5

68.d1 h6 69.b8 g1 . ] 64...f3 65.f5 c3 66.e5 f3Agreed drawn.½-½

B92Lipnitsky,IsaacAronin,Lev



1.e4 c5 2.f3 d6 3.d4 cd4 4.d4 f6 5.c3 a6 6.e2 e5 7.b3 e7 8.0-0 0-0 9.e3 bd7

[ In the case of 9...b5 very strong is 10.a4! b4 11.d5 , while after themove in the game White succeeds inpreventing the advance ...b7-b5. ]

10.a4! b6 11.f3 Initiating a positionalset-up which, despite its outwardinoffensiveness, presents Black withdifficult problems.(RR - The great specialist in thissystem was grandmaster Geller. -

Griffin.) c7 12.d2 b7 13.fd1 fd8 14.e1 Now White's plan isdefined. He posts the behind the sand intends to attack the weakened son Black's 's flank.

[ Thus, for example, ( 14.e1 ) ac8 15.f1! .Passive tactics on Black's part wouldbe in principle incorrect. Blackcarries out a -sacrifice, sharpeningthe struggle to the maximum. ]

[ (RR - Geller later tried the alternativecontinuation 14.f1 ; e.g. c5

15.c5 dc5 16.f2 ac8 17.c4 d1 18.d1 d8 19.e2 d1 20.d1 c8 21.c3 and Whiteretained some positional pressure(Geller-Soloviev, 22nd USSR-chSemi-final, Gorky 1954). - Griffin.) ]

14...d5! 15.ed5 b4 16.h4!Attacking the b4, White succeeds inretaining the d-.

[ (RR - All this was later repeated inthe game Geller-Polugaevsky (22ndUSSR-ch Semi-final, Gorky 1954);there play continued 16.f2 c3

17.d6 c6 18.bc3 d5 19.c4 c3 20.a5 d1 21.d1 b5 22.c5with a sharp and complicatedstruggle. - Griffin.) ]

16...c3 17.d6 c6 18.bc3 d5 [ Simpler and better was the natural 18...c3 , in order on 19.d3to continue e8 , intending ...e5-e4. ]

19.g5 f6 20.d2 f8? Black playstoo delicately.

[ Not at all bad was the simple 20...d6 21.c4 e7 22.a5 e6 . ]

21.c4 f4 22.f4 g6 23.f2 f4 24.c5 ac8 25.f1 e8 26.d2

[ Better was 26.cb6 , for example: g6 27.h1 c2 28.d2, and White has the advantage. ]

26...g6 27.h1 bc5 28.a5 a8 29.ab1!


[ Creating the threat of winning with ( 29.ab1! ) -- 30.d7 c7 31.b8! b8 32.d8 d8 33.d8and 34.c7. ]

29...d7 30.b6 Diagram [ On 30.a6 there follows d6! ]

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30...h5! The only resource for Blackconsists in counterplay on the 'sflank. 31.a6 White wrongly ignoresthe opponent's initiative. He believesthat the creation of 2 passed s on theflank is most important of all.

[ It was necessary to play 31.f2and on h4 to reply 32.h4 c2

33.e1! ( 33.c4 d5! )] 31...h4 32.h3

[ Otherwise Black himself plays 32.-- h3 . ]

32...g3 33.e1 h3! All the same!The following attack is very interesting.

34.g3 hg3 35.c4 f8 36.e6 f2 37.g1 d1 38.d7 b8The position that has been createdseems losing for Black, since the d-and a-s are strong. However,decisive for the assessment of theposition is the poor position of the white, which permits Black to createmating threats. 39.b5 c3 40.c4

d5 The last move before the timecontrol, made in time trouble, sharplychanges the character of the position.

[ Black had at his disposal an elegantcombination, securing him a materialadvantage. It consisted in 40...a4!

41.a4 c6! , and Black regains thepiece, being left with an extra . Nowinstead Black is faced with the threatof defeat, and only many hours ofhome analysis of the adjournedposition gave him the possibility forfind the saving path. ]

41.b6 The sealed move, creating thethreat 42.d7.

[ Analysis showed that losing for Blackis now ( 41.b6 ) e6 42.a8! a8

43.a8 , and the passed s decide. ] 41...d8! 42.d7

[ The possibilities in this position arevery rich. For example, in thevariation 42.d5 d5 43.c4 f4!

44.d7 f7! 45.a7 g6! 46.c7 h8 47.c8 h2 48.d8 g2 49.f1 ( 49.h1 h2 50.g1 e2 51.f1 g2 , etc. ) 49...f2 ( RR - in fact, here Black wins byforce after 49...a2! - Griffin. )

50.e1 ( 50.g1 leads to mate in 2moves ) 50...g2 51.d1 e3

52.c1? ( 52.e1 still leads to adraw ) 52...g2 53.d3 f5!Black even wins. ]

42...f7 43.c5 f5 44.a7 f6 45.d7 e4 46.fe4 fe4 47.c7 e3 48.c8 e7 49.f1 b5 50.ab5 c4 51.d3 b5 52.e1 d7 53.c5 c8 54.c8 c8 55.c5 d6 56.e4 e5 57.g3Agreed drawn.½-½


B76Aronin,LevBoleslavsky,Isaac



1.e4 c5 2.f3 d6 3.d4 cd4 4.d4 f6 5.c3 g6 The choice of openingvariation on the part of I. Boleslavskywas for White a surprise. It is wellknown that Boleslavsky withunchanging consistency adopts withBlack the Sicilian Defence, but alwayschooses his own system in this opening(involving ...e7-e5). His adoption of the'Dragon' variation was provoked, assoon becomes clear, by a desire to testthe continuation 8...d5. 6.e3 g7

7.f3 0-0 8.d2 d5 [ This continuation differs from 8...c6in that Black immediately begins astruggle in the centre. The essentialshortcoming of the variation is thedeficit in the development of Black's-side pieces. ]

9.e5 e8 10.f4 f6 11.0-0-0 [ This move seems more appropriatethan the immediate 11.h4, as was played, for example, in thegame Ravinsky-Zagorovsky (All-Union Central Council of TradeUnions Team-ch, Odessa 1952). ]

11...fe5 12.fe5 c6 [ Important for the assessment ofWhite's 11th move is the variationwith the acceptance of the sacrificed. The play in this case develops inWhite's favour: 12...e5 13.f3!

c3 (otherwise 14.d5) 14.c3 f6 ( or 14...e6 15.h4 with a strongattack for the ) 15.h6 e8

( the move 15...f7 leads to the lossof the exchange after 16.g5 )

16.d5! etc. ] 13.f3 With the attack on the d5-White wins the tempo necessary for thedefence of the at e5. e6

[ It is unfavourable for Black toexchange the at d5 for the at e5,thus: 13...e5 14.d5 e6

( impossible is 14...f3 on accountof 15.f6 ) 15.e5 e5 16.c4with the strong threat of -- 17.g5 . ]

[ (RR - Here Black later tried 13...g4, for example: 14.d5 f3 15.gf3

f3 16.c4 h8 17.f2 d1 18.d1 c8 19.b3 ( an improvement on the gameBannik-Vasilchuk (24th USSR-chSemi-final, Kharkov 1956), whichcontinued 19.g5 e5 20.b3 d6

21.e7 g4 ½-½ ) 19...e6 20.f4 c7 21.h4 with strong pressure forWhite (Lein-Ilivitsky, 21st RSFSR-ch,Omsk 1961). - Griffin.) ]

14.h6 c7 [ The exchange sacrifice 14...e5 15.e5 e5 16.f8 f8 after 17.d3 does not promise Blacksuccess, since White rapidlydevelops an attack. ]

15.b5 f7 16.g7 g7 17.h4!White prepares the transition into afavourable endgame, for which thismove was principally played. Theopening of the h plays only anauxiliary role. f4 18.f4 f4 19.h5

d7 20.hg6 hg6 21.e2 Threateningto double s on the h-file; thereforeBlack is forced to go in forsimplification. a6 22.bd4 d4

23.d4 d4 24.d4 c7 25.d2There has arisen and endgame that isvery favourable for White. The e5-strongly restricts Black's pieces. h8

26.h8 h8 Diagram


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27.g4! [ Precisely at that moment when Blackcannot reply ( 27.g4 ) g5 in view of

28.f3 . The white arrives at g5,and this is decisive, since Black'spieces prove to be cut off in their ownrear. ]

27...g7 28.g5 f7 29.c3 e8 30.d3 d7 31.b4 b6 32.c3This and the following few moves weremade in order to win time. e8 33.a3

d7 34.b4 e8 35.f1 e7 36.e2 f7 37.f1 e7 38.e2 f7 39.d3 e7 40.a4 a5 41.a3 f7 42.c3 In this position the game wasadjourned and, without resuming play,Black resigned.

[ There could follow: ( 42.c3 ) e8(the sealed move) 43.b4 ab4

( otherwise 43...-- 44.ba5 ba5 45.b3 ) 44.cb4 , and the creation ofa passed after -- 45.b5 , --

46.b4 and -- 47.a5 secures victoryfor White. ]

1-0

B65Aronin,LevSuetin,Aleksei

VTsSPS Team-ch 1953[Aronin]

(RR - This game took place in theTeam Championship of the All-UnionCentral Council of Trade Unions, inlater years this became known as the'USSR Cup'; effectively it was thenational championship of trade unionteams. Aronin and Suetin weremeeting on the top board of theencounter, in the final group, between'Lokomotiv' and 'Trud'.The annotations to it appear in theSoviet Yearbook, 'Shakhmat za 1953 g.' (Fizkultura i Sport, 1954). - Griffin.)

1.e4 c5 2.f3 c6 3.d4 cd4 4.d4 f6 5.c3 d6 6.g5 e6 7.d2 e7 Thus Black now plays mostoften of all.

[ However, in our opinion the systembeginning with the moves 7...a6and 8...h6 is quite viable; it usuallyleads to a very substantive struggle. ]

8.0-0-0 0-0 9.f4 d4 10.d4 a5 [ Here theory recommends White tocontinue ( 10...a5 ) 11.d2followed by b1, e1, d3, intendinge4-e5 etc. This plan is evidently themost expedient in the position thathas been created. However, in thepresent game White, seemingly forthe first time in tournament practice,tested the new move 11.e5, pointedout to him by the Candidate Master I.Lyskov. ]

11.e5 de5 12.e5 Forcing theexchange of s and intending to exploita series of circumstances that arefavourable for the endgame.

[ The attempt to avoid the exchangeby means of ( 12.e5 ) b6


loses by force: 13.a4! c6 ( 13...b4 14.d4 ) 14.b5 g2 15.hg1 and 16.f6. ] [ In reply to ( 12.e5 ) c5White intended to continue 13.f6

gf6 14.e1 , and then d3 and h4with an attack. ]

[ Therefore, as well as 12...e5, asplayed by Suetin, the only other movethat merits attention is ( 12.e5 ) b6, which was later employed in theCandidates' Tournament (Switzerland,1953) by Gligoric against Boleslavsky(the encounter concluded in adraw).(RR - In fact, in that game the moves10...h6 11.h4 had been interposed. -Griffin.) ]

12...e5 13.fe5 d5 14.e7 e7 15.d3 This is the position for whichWhite was aiming. It what do itsadvantages consist? Firstly, in theposition of the at e5, which stronglyrestricts Black, and secondly, in thepossession of the d-file and the betterpiece-position. The forepost at e5 hasthe most significance in thisassessment. The whole futher struggleunfolds around it. c6 The most mostnatural move, but probably not thestrongest.

[ True, not good is 15...g6 in view of 16.g6 hg6 17.h4! with the intentionof playing then -- 18.h5 and on g5to reply 19.h6! ]

[ However, deserving attention is 15...b6! , aiming to immediatelydevelop the c8 and not toimmediately start the battle for the e5-square.(RR - Indeed, 15...b6 later becameestablished as the main line here.For example: 16.e4 b8 17.he1

b7 18.d7 e4 19.e4 c6 20.b5 fd8 , etc. (Khasin-

Boleslavsky, 28th USSR-ch, Moscow1961). - Griffin.) ]

16.he1 d8 Diagram

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17.b4! Threatening to drive the c6from its active position.

[ Black ought to reconcile himself tothis, and continue ( 17.b4! ) d7!

18.b5 a5 19.e4 ac8with counter-chances.The following move by Blackrepresents a serious , perhaps evendecisive, positional mistake, since hislater play can hardly be improved.(RR - It is interesting to note that thecontinuation suggested by Aroninwas seen, later the same year, in thegame Tal-Illivitsky (3rd USSR Team-ch, Leningrad 1953). That encountercontinued: 20.d6 c5 21.e4 f8

22.b7 , and White won. - Griffin.) ] 17...a6 Retaining the at c6, butweakening the important b6-square,which is much more significant. 18.a4

[ Again preventing the move ( 18.a4) d7 in view of 19.b6 and then 20.d7 and 21.h7. ]

18...f8 19.e4! Forcing transition toan endgame that is very favourable forWhite.

[ The s at b4 and e5 are invulnerable,


since in the case of ( 19.e4! ) d1 20.d1 e5 there follows 21.b6and 22.d8. ]

19...e7 20.c6 d1 21.d1 bc6 22.d6 a7! Relatively best.

[ He could not play 22...a5on account of 23.b6 b8 24.ba5. ]

[ Bad too is 22...d7 in view of 23.b6 ( but not the 'automatic'combination 23.d7 d7 24.b6

c7 25.a8 , since after b7the game is drawn ) 23...a7 24.d7

d7 25.c6 . ] 23.b6

[ Of course, not 23.c6? d7, and Black wins. ]

23...c7 24.c4! Preventing the freeingmove ...c6-c5, and moreover, the move...f7-f6 is already now of little help toBlack. f6

[ On 24...c5 simplest of all was 25.c8 c8 26.b5! , and the 2connected passed s on the wingguarantee White victory. ]

25.c5 The e5- has played its role,preparing the possibility of a bind onBlack's entire position. Now it mayperish. fe5 26.d2 In order to achievevictory, the final reserves must bemobilised. d7 27.e3 With the atc4 it would have been possible to forcetransposition into to a winning +ending. Now however a total exchangeat d7 will not do, since it will beimpossible for White to create a distantpassed on the 's flank. e8

28.c4 c8 29.a3! A further essentialdetail.

[ The hasty 29.e5 could havedeprived White of all the fruits of theprevious labour, since after b8!

30.a3 a5! Black saves himself. ] [ Now, however, White intends tocontinue ( 29.a3 ) -- 30.e4 f6

31.d2 g6 32.e3 , and then -- 33.f2 and 34.e5 etc. Thefollowing move by Black somewhateases his task. ]

29...a8 30.e5 c8 31.h4 f6Diagram

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32.f3! Now in view of the doublethreat of 35.g5 and 35.d4 Blackunavoidably loses a . a5 33.g5 ab4

34.ab4 h6 35.e6 b8 36.c7Transposition to a -ending with anextra represents the most simpletechnical solution to the problem. f5

37.e8 e8 38.d3 c8 39.c4 h5 40.g3 g6 41.b5 cb5 42.b5 b8 43.c4 b1 44.d3 Black resigned,since he has no defence against thethreat of the advance of the white c-.

[ For example: 44.d3 e6 45.c6 c1 46.c3 c3 47.c3 d6 48.d4 etc.This game has theoreticalsignificance. It is also instructive asan example of the exploitation of aslight positional advantage. ]

1-0


B95Aronin,LevPetrosian,Tigran

VTsSPS Team-ch (7.1) 09.1954[Aronin]

(RR - This game took place in theTeam Championship of the All-UnionCentral Council of Trade Unions, inlater years this became known as the'USSR Cup'; effectively it was thenational championship of trade unionteams. Aronin and Petrosian weremeeting on the top board of theencounter between 'Lokomotiv' and'Spartak'.The annotations to the game appear in'Chess in the USSR', No. 1, 1955. -Griffin.)

1.e4 c5 2.f3 d6 3.d4 cd4 4.d4 f6 5.c3 a6 This variation enteredtournament practice very recently, all of5 years ago. It brought Black not a littlesuccess, but now a crisis for thiscontinuation is beginning. This isexplained by the fact that for the timebeing Black has not managed to find asufficiently effective continuationagainst the system with 6.g5 and 7.f3, which was also encountered in thepresent game. 6.g5 e6 7.f3 bd7

8.0-0-0 c7 9.g3 [ In this way also developed theencounter Bronshtein-Najdorf (MatchUSSR-Argentina, Buenos Aires 1954).With the move 9.g3 White preventsthe advance ...b7-b5, with whichBlack's counterplay is usuallyassociated in this variation. Najdorfall the same dared to play b5, but after 10.b5! (RR - this hadalready been seen as long ago as thegame Rauzer-Makogonov, 9th USSR-ch, Leningrad 1934. - Griffin.) ab5

11.db5 b8 12.d6 d6 13.d6

d6 14.d6 obtained a difficultposition and ultimately lost. ]

[ Besides 9.g3, also meritingattention is 9.g1 , as was playedthe game Tal-Petrosian, (VTsSPS-chTeam Championship, Riga 1954), ]

[ or even immediately 9.g4(Bastrikov-Zurakhov, 14th RSFSR-ch,Rostov-on-Don 1954). ]

9...h6 This move does not bring Blacksuccess.

[ In my opinion, better is 9...e7 . ] 10.f6 gf6 11.b1 White waits untilthe black goes to b6, and only thenintends to play f2-f4.

[ On the immediate 11.f4 there couldfollow b5 . ]

11...b6 12.f4 d7 Black intends tocastle, and then his position will be notbad. However, White can prevent thecalm development of events. 13.h4!

e7 14.h5 h7 Diagram

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In order all the same to castle.However, events unexpectedlysharpen. 15.f5 e5 As T. Petrosianexplained after the game, in general hedid not reckon with the possibility of thereply 16.e6.

[ It is not easy, however, torecommend anything stronger for


Black. For example: 15...0-0-0 16.fe6 fe6 17.e2 b8 18.g4 c8 19.h3 and a decisiveweakening of the black s isunavoidable. ]

[ Or 15...c5 16.g4! (threatening17.g8) 0-0-0 17.fe6 fe6 18.e6

e5 19.g6 etc. ] 16.e6! c6

[ If 16...e6 17.fe6 0-0-0 , then after 18.ef7 in connection with the threat of19.f5 White also obtains a decisiveadvantage. ]

17.g4 Winning the exchange, and thisshould lead to a rapid victory. f8

18.g8 fe6 19.h7 0-0-0 20.fe6 e6 21.e2 d5 The best chance forBlack, obtaining the possibility ofenlivening his s. 22.ed5 d5

23.d5 d5 24.hf1 [ Correct is 24.g4! b8 25.f3 . ]

24...b8 25.f5 e7 26.f3 [ There was the threat of ( 26.-- ) e4. ]

26...e4 27.e2 c8 28.d5White gives up a , but provokessimplification.

[ In the case of 28.c4it was necessary to reckon with thecontinuation c4! 29.c1 e2

30.c6 d3 31.a1 c6, after which it is not easy for White torealise his advantage. ]

28...c2 29.a1 e2 30.fe1 g2 31.e4 e4 32.e4 d6 33.e2 e5 34.b1 c4 35.d3 h5 36.b3 h4 37.h3 f4 38.c2 c7 39.g2 c6 40.d1 f1 Diagram

(Diagram)

In this position the game wasadjourned, and White sealed the move

41.e2 . [ , analysing, in the main,

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continuations beginning with ( 41.e2 ) h1 . After analysis it wasestablished that the strongest forWhite in this case is 42.a4. Here are some variations:

A) 42...h4 43.g4 g3 44.c4 b6 45.d5! h3 ( if 45...a5, then 46.b5 a6 47.c8 ) 46.a5

a7 47.c8! (with the threat ofmating after 48.dd8) h2 48.f1!

( 48.d3 e1! ) 48...h1 49.g2 h2 50.g1 a2 51.b4, and there is no defence to 52.dd8. (RR - In fact, after h3Black is the first to create matingthreats; the white must return tothe 1st rank. - Griffin.);

B) 42...b5 (naturally aiming toeliminate the white s on the 'sflank) 43.g8! ba4 44.ba4 h2

45.f1 a2 ( 45...c5 46.a8and the a- is lost ) 46.c8 b6

47.c4 a5 48.d5 b6 49.b4 c6 50.a5 etc.; C) 42...c5 43.g8 b4 44.a8! ( this move is perhaps the only pathto victory, since on 44.h8there could follow b5 45.ab5 ab5

46.h5 a3! , intending 47...b4and 48...c3, and Black has good


chances of a draw ) . Now White,threatening 45.a7!, forces Black toplay 44...a5 ( or to go back with the - 44...c5 - on which therefollows 45.h8 ) , and then 45.a7

b6 46.b7 c5 47.h7 . ] 41...f4 42.g8 a5 43.h8 h4 44.a8 b6 45.a4 Affirming White'sdomination of the light squares.Important is the circumstance that theblack is cut off, and that for him thereremains only to way. The series ofmoves, here and later, which do notessentially change the position, areexplained by a desire to gain time forthought. e4 46.f3 f4 47.e2

e4 48.e3 h4 49.c8 d4 50.d3 e4 51.f3 f4 52.e2 e4 53.e3 d4 54.c2 h4 55.d3 e4 56.f3 f4 57.g2 e4 58.f3Before playing c4, White must bringthe to e2.

[ The immediate 58.c4 was worseon account of c4 59.bc4 c5

60.b3 c4 61.b7 c3, intending the manoeuvre ...b4 and...b3. ]

58...f4 59.e2 e4 60.e3 f4 61.c4 c4

[ Black cannot avoid the exchange ofs, since after 61...f5 62.h4!there is no defence against 63.f3.After the exchange at c4 there arisesa very interesting endgame. ]

62.bc4 c5 63.b3 c4 64.b7 h4The attempt to carry out the manoeuvre...e5-c3-b4 together with ...b3 isrefuted by the transfer of the to c2.

65.b5 [ In order, on ( 65.b5 ) c3to win after 66.h5 . However, T.Petrosian finds a very interestingdefensive resource. ]

65...g3! 66.a5 b4 67.a7 f5 68.f3 f4 How is White now to

achieve victory? [ The continuation ( 68...f4 ) 69.e4followed by the transfer of the tothe h-file leads to a draw; the cannot leave the a-file, since it mustdefend the , while the white mustcontrol the advance of the f-.

( For example: 69.a5 a4 70.e4 b4 71.d5 f3 72.f7 a5 73.f3 b6 , and a draw, as is easilyestablished from the variation 74.c3

f2 75.e4 g3 76.f5 b5 77.g4 b6 78.c8 b5 79.h8 c6 80.h4 h4 81.h4 d7 82.g5 e8 83.g6 f8 ).In the endgame with the at h3against and at h4, the win canonly be achieved if White manages todrive the black to the a. White'sfurther play is directed towards this. )]

69.a8 a3 70.g2 b4 71.a6 a3 72.a7 b4 73.f3 a3 74.e4 b4 75.a8 b3 76.a5White has to give up the a-, but hewishes to do so by deflecting the black to the danger zone. The whole ofthe following path to victory I found inhome analysis together with masterKopaev. b4 77.a6 b5 78.d5

b6 [ The continuation 78...f3 led after 79.a7 a6 80.f8 a7 81.c6!to a variation which was also possiblelater in the game. ]

79.a7 b7 80.g8! a7 81.c6!The only path to victory. The position isnow won in view of the very badposition of the black . f2

[ As well as the move played in thegame, Black had 2 other possibilities:

81...f3 82.f8 f2 83.f3 b8 84.f7 a8 ( or 84...h2 85.f2 g3 86.f7 h2 87.f8 a7 88.f2 g3 89.b2 and the goalhas been achieved - the black is


cut off at the edge of the board ) 85.b6 etc. ] [ Or 81...e1 82.g7 b8 ( or 82...a6 83.g1 c3 84.g4 e1 85.f4 a5 86.f1 g3 87.b1etc. ) 83.b7 a8 ( 83...c8

84.e7 etc. ) 84.c7 and so on, inanalogous fashion to that whichoccurred in the game. ]

82.g2 g3 [ Or 82...e3 83.g4! f2 84.f4 g3 85.b4 etc. ]

83.b2 a8 84.b7 f2 85.c7!The beginning of the concludingmanoeuvre: the white is transferredto c8, after which mating threats arecreated. g3 86.c8 f3

[ Nor do -moves help, for example: 86...e1 87.b1 c3 88.b3 d4 89.a3 a7 90.a1 f3 91.a2 f2 92.a1 f1 93.f1 etc. ]

87.e7! [ Mistaken would be the immediate 87.f7 in view of f2 with a draw!Now however on any move therefollows 87.f7. ]

87...f2 88.f7 e5 89.f2 a7 90.f5 g3 91.b5 The goal isachieved - the black is cut off on thea-file. There followed: a6 92.b1

a5 93.d7 a4 94.e6 a5 95.f5 a4 96.g4 a5 97.b7Black resigned.1-0

Documents

ChessBase 12 Printout, Douglas Griffin, 21/08/2016 1 C99 ... · appear in 'Chess in the USSR' (No. 12, 1947). - Griffin.) 1.e4 e5 2. f3 c6 3. b5 a6 4. a4 ... In the later game Suetin-Mikenas