CHAUCER'S C R I S I S OF FAITH

IN

"THE MILLERr S TALE, " "THE CLERKr S TALE, "

AND "THE PARDONERr S TALE"

SHARON DAWN SELBY

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate S t u d i e s

i n Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of English U n i v e r s i t y of Manitoba

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Chaucer's Crisis Of Faith In "The Miller's Tale," "The Clerk's Taie," And "The Pardoner's Talen

SHARON DAWN SELBY

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Gradusze Studies of The University

of Manitoba in partial falfillment of the requirements of the degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS

Sharon Dawn Selby01999

Permission has been granted to the Library of The University of Manitoba to lend or seIi copies of this thesis/practicum, to the National Library of Canada to micro6lm this thesis and to lend or seii copies of the film, and to Dissertations Abstracts International to publish an abstract of this thesis/practicnm.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither this thesidpracticum nor extensive extracts fmm it may be printed or otherwise reproduced withogt the author's written permission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CKAPTER ONE Medieval and Modern Literary Theory

1. Introduction

2 . St. Augustine

3. St. Thomas Aquinas

4. William of Ockham

5. John Wyclif

6. Twentieth Century Theorists

CHAPTER TWO "The Miller's Tale" & "The Clerkfs Tale"

CHAPTER THREE "The Pardonerf s Tale"

CKAPTER FOUR Conclusion

WORKS CITED

In The Canterbury Tales, Chaucerr s satiric

reappropriation of Norninalist word-play reveals the

inability of any mortal authority to impart ultimate truth.

Through his satire, Chaucer also demonstrates the

instability of the meaning of the Word (as it is interpreted

by the Church) and thus the word; the resulting uncertainty

leads to a crisis which is analogous to that recognized by

twentieth-century existentialists. In Chapter One, I examine

how the works of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, William

of Ockham, and John Wyclif inform Chaucerf s poetry. 1 also

incorporate the works of twentieth century theorists whose

ideas seern to be similar to those with which Chaucer was

working. In Chapter Two, 1 discuss how "The Miller's Tale"

and "The Clerkts Tale" illustrate the ways in which language

can be employed to create an illusion of orthodoxy to attain

unorthodox ends. As Chapter Three demonstrates, the dangers

involved in reconfiguring reality, as do the Miller and the

Clerk with their misuse of science and philosophy, are also

irnplicit in the Pardoner's failed attempt to recreate

hirnself through h i s words and his relics. Chapter Four

proposes that Chaucer's satire in T h e Canterbury Tales

denonstrates that any authority can be undermined, and that

the struggle to maintain a relationship with God is

ultimately a natter that cannot be resolved by reason or

pious ignorance alone.

CHAPTER ONE

MEDIEVAL AND MODERN LITERARY THEORY

1. I n t r o d u c t i o n

Chaucer ' s p i l g r i m a g e i n The Canterbury T a l e s r e p r e s e n t s

humanityf s q u e s t f o r knowledge and u l t i m a t e t r u t h . I n "The

M i l l e r ' s Tale," "The C l e r k ' s T a l e , " and "The P a r d o n e r r s

T a l e , " Chaucer s a t i r i z e s t h e i n a b i l i t y o f f i n i t e m o r t a l

reason--in s u c h a u t h o r i t a t i v e forms as o r g a n i z e d r e l i g i o n ,

s c i e n c e , phi losophy-- to p r o v i d e t h i s t r u t h and t o e x p l a i n t o

humankind t h e n a t u r e o f God a n d Godrs r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h H i s

c r e a t i o n . Chaucer a l s o u s e s sa t i re t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e n a t u r e

o f l anguage a n d t h e ways i n which l anguage u s e r s , i n order

t o p r e s e r v e one p a r t i c u l a r v e r s i o n of t r u t h , can

( re 1 i n t e r p r e t and man ipu la t e words t o p r i v i l e g e one

i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n w h i l e d e v a l u i n g o t h e r s . Through h i s

s a t r i ca l r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of Nomina l i s t ideas, Chaucer

d e m y s t i f i e s t h e l anguage and r i t u a l s o f t h e C a t h o l i c Church;

however, he a l s o shows t h a t t h e ability o f Nominalism i t s e l f

t o reveal t r u t h is c o n t i n g e n t on f a i t h r a t h e r t h a n on r e a s o n

and is , t h e r e f o r e , i nadequa te . Chaucer t a k e s t h e Nomina l i s t

c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e u n c e r t a i n t y of r e a l i t y t o a n extreme: t h e

r e s u l t is s k e p t i c i s m , which S h e i l a Delany d e f i n e s as " t h a t

s e n s e o f the u n r e l i a b i l i t y of t r a d i t i o n a l i n fo rma t ion" ( 2 ) . S k e p t i c s q u e s t i o n e v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e y are t o ld by supposed

a u t h o r i t i e s because t h e y believe t h a t truth c a n n o t b e proven

by l o g i c , experience, o r tradition and is, therefore,

unknowable. This skeptical tradition is "rooted in the

awareness of coexistent contradictory truths and result[s]

in the suspension of final rational judgment8' (1) In The

Tales, Chaucer presents many possible truths, none of which

can be proven absolutely by r e a s o n alone. The inability to

find a single, unquestionable truth results in a crisis

similar to t h a t faced by twentieth-century Existentialists,

in which the insignificance ar?d meaninglessness of

humankindfs existence in an uncaring world created by an

unknowable God :eads to despair.

Much of fourteenth-century society revolved around the

rituals and teachings of the Catholic Church. The prominence

of religious themes and allusions in medieval literature

suggests the importance of the Church in daily life. Through

the Church, Christ's "Mystical Body," people had access to

redernption and grace: "Christ had chosen to manifest Himself

under the ecclesiastical dispensations . . . for the express purpose of enabling man to know and love God and other men

through an integral union with Him in the life of the

Church" (Colish 2). However, the apparent materialism of the

Church left it open to charges of corruption and nepotism.

Delaney also notes that this notion of skepticism is not simply an imposition of modern ideas on Chaucer's work; "the skeptical tradition is amply stated in the poetrs own time: it is found in cosmology, metaphysics, encyclopedic compilations, poetry, and popular treatises. . [Tl hat tradition was the product of historical and cultural events that had impaired certain established modes of authority and trust" (1).

A s t h e c u l t u r a l c r i t i c Barbara Tuchman e x p l a i n s , " [ t l h e

c l a i m o f t h e Church t o s p i r i t u a l l e a d e r s h i p c o u l d n e v e r be

made w h o l l y credible t o al1 i t s communicants when it w a s

founded i n m a t e r i a l wea l th . The more r i c h e s t h e Church

amassed, t h e more v is ible and d i s t u r b i n g became t h e f l a w "

( 6 ) - The Church's p e r c e i v e d c o r r u p t i o n , coup led w i t h its

g r e a t i n f l u e n c e on d a i l y l i f e , i n s p i r e d a t r a d i t i o n of

r e l i g i o u s sat ire and c r i t i c i s m i n t h e w o r k s of medieval

a u t h o r s . Anne Hudson s u g g e s t s t h a t w r i t e r s such as Chaucer

a t tack t h e p r a c t i c e s o f t h e Church b u t n o t " [ t h e Church's]

ideals, however much t h e y a r g u e t h a t contemporary reality

b e t r a y s [ t h o s e i d e a l s ] " (Prema t u x e 22) . However, Hudson

f a i l s t o c o n s i d e r t h a t rnany of Chaucer ' s works r e v e a l n o t

o n l y t h e d i s c r e p a n c y between t h e ideals t h e Church p r o f e s s e d

t o r e p r e s e n t and i ts p e r c e i v e d c o r r u p t i o n , b u t a l s o t h e

d a n g e r s t o t h e l a i t y a n d t h e c l e r g y i n h e r e n t i n t h e r i t u a l s

and the h i e r a r c h y o f t h e Church. Chaucer u s e s s a t i r e t o

undermine t h e i d e a l s which were t h e r e l i g i o u s f o u n d a t i o n o f

medieval s o c i e t y , and by s o d o i n g r e v e a l s t h e i n s t a b i l i t y o f

t h a t f o u n d a t i o n , f o r c i n g h i s a u d i e n c e t o r e e v a l u a t e t h e role

of t h e C a t h o l i c Church i n t h e i r p o l i t y .

Robe r t P. M i l l e r n o t e s t h a t " [ t ] h e f u n c t i o n o f the

a u t h o r i t i e s w a s t o make possible t h e p e n e t r a t i o n of

' s e d u c t i v e cove r ings ' which would o t h e r w i s e d i s t r a c t t h e

una ided mind o f Adam's progeny. . . . Truth c o u l d n o t be

a l t e r e d " (Chaucer 7 ) ; but, af ter b e i n g misled by his

garrulous guide and discovering the subjective nature of

authority itself, the narrator of The Kouse of Fame declares

"1 wot myself best how y stonde" (1878) . "Geffrey" refuses to follow indiscriminately the advice of any person or

institution: ultimately, he chooses to remain independent.

f act , when Chaucer f inally introduces "man

auctorite" (21581, the poem ends before "Geffrey" can record

any of his words. The reader is left, paradoxically, with

only the authority of Geffrey's experience: in the houses of

Fame and Rumour, certainty and justice are reduced to

unreliable words and insubstantial illusions. Similarly, in

The Canterbury Tales, Chaucer often criticizes and questions

the hegemony of the Church and its clergy: the portraits in

the "The General Prologue" reveal various forms of sin and

corruption, such as the Monkf s worldliness, the Friarf s

wantonness, and the Pardonerrs despair. The questionable

morality of these characters raises doubts about the

clergy's fitness to represent Christ,

As "Christ's mystical body," the role of the Church was

to perform Godrs will. Colish explains that medieval

thinkers believed "the Being of God Himself was the

guarantee, the criterion, and the condi t io sine qua non of

John Burrow discusses how fragmentary endings are enticing to contemporary readers, who must be conscious of "the accident and the contingent" (36); the poem may not have an ending due to accident, loss, etc. He suggests that the concern with "undiscriminating over-interpretation" ( 3 7 ) is a consequence of a postmodern taste for "anti-closure" ( 3 5 ) .

whatever men might know a b o u t Him, o r a b o u t ü n y t h i n g else"

(1) . But, i n "The M i l l e r r s Tale" and "The C l e r k ' s Tale,"

Chaucer i n v e r t s and p a r o d i e s t h e ideal o f a Church created

i n t h e image o f God t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e p r o b l e m a t i c n a t u r e o f

e a r t h l y a u t h o r i t y . T h i s parody s u g g e s t s t h a t i f t h e Church,

i n a l l its c o r r u p t i o n , t r u l y r e p r e s e n t s God's w i l l , t h e n God

must be e q u a l l y corrupt. By e x p l o d i n g and i n v e r t i n g t h e

c o n v e n t i o n a l v i e w of God, Chaucer a l s o e x p l o e e s e v e r y t h i n g

g u a r a n t e e d b y t h a t v i e w and f o r c e s his readers t o q u e s t i o n

what t h e y know and c a n know a b o u t a n y t h i n g .

The s t a b i l i t y o f t h e Word (and hence the word) i tself

is a l s o t h r e a t e n e d by t h i s i n v e r t e d image o f God which

undermines h u m a n i t y p s a b i l i t y t o know and u n d e r s t a n d t h i n g s ,

and c r e a t e s t h e u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f

Nominalism: i t is n o t merely p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r p r e t a word o r

a p h r a s e i n more t h a n one way b u t , r a t h e r , i n e v i t a b l e .

Accord ing t o Nomina l i s t t h e o r y , t h e r e are as many p o s s i b l e

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f a s i n g l e word as t h e r e are i n d i v i d u a l s .

A s a r e s u l t , it is e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o know a n y t h i n g w i t h

c e r t a i n t y , i n c l u d i n g God: u n i v e r s a l s and t r a n s c e n d e n t

knowledge d o n o t e x i s t o u t s i d e t h e mind. R u s s e l l A, Peck

says t h a t Nominalism

r e f u t e s real is t prernises t h a t u n i v e r s a l s are

t h i n g s o f c r e a t i o n , p r o v i n g t o t h e c o n t r a r y t h a t

o n l y i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s exist and are e x p e r i e n c e d ,

a n d t h a t c o n c e p t s beyond t h e i n d i v i d u a l are names

only (concepts which exist exclusively in our

heads) . (745)

One of the dangers of these intellectual

generalizations is that the remembrances cr retellings of an

experience may not accurately reflect the actual thing or

event. This danger parallels the difficulty of conveying

meaning through language; speakers can use words to

obfuscate and to deceive their listeners through the

recreation and reinterpretation of reality according to

their imrnediate needso3 As Peck observes, the "Nominalistic

idea that the mind and its knowledge are an ongoing

imagistic-linguistic process is appealing to Chaucer"

because the "boundaries of man's interior reality are open

to almost limitless variation" (747). Indeed, May's

deception of January in "The Merchant's Tale8' is an example

of the potential disjunction between interna1 and external

reality.

Peck also suggests that Chaucer is interested in the

moral implications of this philosophical stance; if these

concepts can exist only w i t h i n the mind of the individual,

even morality becomes a matter of will, human or divine,

rather than a universal quality inherent in a subject or an

act. William of Ockham, a fourteenth century philosopher and

theologian, recognizes the importance of the individual and

Miscomrnunications may also be inadvertent, on either the speaker8 s or the hearerr s side,

i n s i s t s t h a t t h e morali ty o f any act depends upon t h e

i n t e n t i o n w i t h which t he w i l l h a s committed itself (Peck

7 4 6 ) . A s a r e s u l t , the Pardoner s i n s even when he c a u s e s

peop le t o "twynne/ From a v a r i c e and s o o r e t o r epen te"

(430-31) b e c a u s e he p r e a c h e s "nothyng b u t f o r coveitise"

(433) . F u r t h e r , as E l i z a b e t h D. K i r k p o i n t s o u t , Norninalist

m o r a l i t y l a c k s the " o r g a n i c q u a l i t y " o f Aquinasf m o r a l i t y i n

t h a t , f o r Norn ina l i s t s , "God does n o t w i l L someth ing because

it is good; it is 'good' because he w i l l s it - h e might have

wi l led it o t h e r w i s e . . . elsewhere" (115). Thus, all t h i n g s

are p o s s i b l e f o r God a c c o r d i n g t o H i s p o t e n t i a a b s o l u t a

d e s p i t e t h e self-imposed boundar i e s of H i s p o t e n t i a

~ r d i n a t a ; ~ H e is o b l i g a t e d t o keep H i s covenan t o n l y as H e

w i l l s .

For Chaucer, Nomina l i s t ideas do n o t provide a n y

u l t i m a t e answers; r a t h e r , Nominalism c o m p l i c a t e s t h e problern

of knowledge a n d t r u t h even f u r t h e r . Chaucer a p p r o p r i a t e s

Norninalist p h i l o s o p h y t o u p s e t and i n v e r t t r a d i t i o n a l ways

of t h i n k i n g , b u t even Nominalism itself is n o t exempt from

h i s s c r u t i n y . H e dernons t ra tes t h a t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f

language makes t h e t a s k s o f a c c u r a t e l y p o r t r a y i n g and

According t o Oberman, "God can--and, i n fact, has chosen to--do c e r t a i n t h i n g s a c c o r d i n g t o the l a w s which h e f r e e l y e s t a b l i s h e d , t h a t is , de potentia ord ina ta . On t h e o t h e r hand, God can do e v e r y t h i n g tha t does n o t imply c o n t r a d i c t i o n , whe the r God h a s decided t o do t h e s e t h i n g s [de p o t e n t i a o rd ina ta ] or n o t , as t h e r e are many t h i n g s God c a n d o b u t which he does n o t want t o do. T h e latter is called God' s power de p o t e n t i a absoluta" (Narvest 37) .

unde r s t and i . ng r ea l i t y so h o p l e s s t h a t : the Manciple ends his

tale with the declaration, "be noon a u c t o u r newe/ of

t h e po ten t i a .1 to lead ta skepticism, to empty al1 t h i n g s of

meanino, and t o a l - i c rna te people f i i r ther from. God and each

other; f o r t h e Manciple, t h e only r e c o u r s e is s i l e n c e .

Ultirnately, C h a u c e r demonstrates t h a t r e a s o n alone cannot

provide adeqiiat:e a n s w e r s about God and t h e n a t u r e of reality

and, i n t h e a b s e n c e of c o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e , humanity must make

a leap of f a i t h "to avoid agnosticism" (Delany 2 4 ) and

d e ~ p a i r . ~ In the end, Nominalism can prove n o t h i n g because

it, too, depends on fai t h t o explain s u c h problems as t h e

n a t u r e of Goci.

When no p h i l o s n p h y o r system of bel ief can crovide

absol rite proof of the existence and nature of God, hi~rnans

exnerience a crisis i n f a i t h , As Chaucer seems t o h a v e

recogn i .zed, many were di .s i 7 lusioned by t h e Churchf s obvious

~eoccupation wj th m a t e r i a 3 things, a n d t h a i r discontent was

compoimded by t h e C h i i r c h ' s inability t o provj.de a

satisfactory e x p l m a t i o n of o r meaninq for s u c h apparently

inexplicable events as the B l a c k Plagiin. Tiichrnan explains:

If a disaster of s u c h magnitr lde , . . w a s a mere

wanton ac t of God or perhaps not Godrs .work at

T h i s f a i t h may be r e l i g i o u s o r s e c u l a r in n a t u r e : i n the former case, indivuals place their trust i n God and the afterl i fe , whereas, in the latter, individuals p l a c e their t r u s t i n other humam o r human i n s t i t u t i o n s ar,d i n the present earthly life.

all, then the absolutes of a fixed order were

loosed from their moorings- Minds that opened to

admit these questions could never again be shut.

Once people envisioned the possibility of change

in a fixed order, the end of an age of submission

came in sight; the turn to individual conscience

lay ahead- (123)

When personal doubt and fear isolate the individual from

others and £rom God, that individual faces a void created by

the loss of fixity: the future becomes uncertain. Thus, in

the face of such a crisis, William Barrettrs description of

the plight of modern humanity becomes applicable to the

fourteenth century:

The loss of the Church was the loss of a whole

system of symbols, images, dogmas, and rites which

had the psychological validity of immediate

experience. . . . In losing religion, man lost the concrete connection with a transcendent realm of

being; he was set free to deal with this world in

al1 its brute objectivity. (21)

Barrett demonstrates that without the "psychological

validity of immediate experience," people must ultirnately

move toward a form of persona1 faith: even disbelief

requires a f o m of faith. Many of Chaucer's tales

systematically reveal the instability of philosophies that

attempt to establish themselves as "right" beyond doubt, and

that claim to provide a definitive solution to uncertainty,

b y s t r i p p i n g t h o s e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f their c e r t a i n t y a n d t h e i r

a b i l i t y t o provide meaning. Chauce r shows t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s

mus t move beyond t h i s s p i r i t u a l a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l v o i d a n d

e s t a b l i s h for t h e m s e l v e s a set of beliefs t o which t h e y c a n

a d h e r e , b a s e d o n l y on t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e i r p e r s o n a 1

e x p e r i e n c e ra ther t h a n o n a n u n a t t a i n a b l e , a b s o l u t e p r o o f .

As Chaucer ' s P a r d o n e r d e m o n s t r a t e s , anyone u n a b l e t o move

beyond t h i s v o i d becomes "cast ad r i f t , . . . a wande re r upon

t h e face o f t h e e a r t h " ( B a r r e t t 21-2).

I n t h e f irst c h a p t e r of t h i s t h e s i s , 1 w i l l examine t h e

works o f S t . Augus t i ne , S t . Thomas Aquinas , W i l l i a m o f

Ockham, and John Wyc l i f t o show how some of Chaucer ' s poems

are in fo rmed by t h e s e t h i n k e r s . 1 w i l l t h e n i n c o r p o r a t e t h e

ideas o f t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y c r i t i c s , i n c l u d i n g S a u s s u r e ,

Barrett , and S a r t r e , t o d e m o n s t r a t e how the ideas with which

Chaucer w a s work ing a r e , i n some r e s p e c t s , a n a l o g o u s t o the

ideas of modern t h e o r i s t s . I n C h a p t e r s Two a n d Three, 1 will

examine C h a u c e r c s u s e o f r e l i g i o u s sa t i re i n "The M i l l e r ' s

T a l e , " "The C l e r k f s T a l e , " a n d "The P a r d o n e r r s T a l e . ''

T o g e t h e r , "The M i l l e r ' s Ta l e " and "The C l e r k r s T a l e "

d e m o n s t r a t e t h e ways i n which l a n g u a g e c a n b e employed t o

create a n i l l u s i o n of o r t h o d o x y t o a t t a i n uno r thodox ends .

T h e d a n g e r s i n v o l v e d i n r e c o n f i g u r i n g r e a l i t y , as do t h e

M i l l e r a n d t h e C l e r k w i t h t h e i r N o m i n a l i s t wordp l ay a n d

t h e i r rnisuse o f s c i e n c e and p h i l o s o p h y , are a lso i m p l i c i t i n

t h e P a r d o n e r r s fa i led a t t e m p t t o recreate h i m s e l f t h r o u g h

his words and his relics: the Pardoner dernonstrates the

impossibility of controlling and limiting the potential

meanings of longuage. Like "The Millerf s Tale, " and "The

Clerk's Tale," "The Pardonerf s Prologue" and "Tale" are

examples of Nominalist wordplay because words, deeds, and

intentions are at odds. Thus, the Nominalist position is

undermined through the revelation that the Pardonerfs

arrogance and extravagance are subterfuges, intended to

disguise his absolute despair. In al1 three tales, Chaucer

uses satire to show the ease with which an authority can

manipulate language and create illusions that ironically

reveal its own failings; in "The Pardonerf s Tale,'' he shows

the crisis of faith that results when these illusions are

revealed and stripped away. Chapter Four demonstrates that

any authoritative position can be subverted and undermined,

and suggests that the struggle to understand the nature of

God and the universe is ultimately a matter which cannot be

resolved by science, philosophy, or pious ignorance.

2. St. Augustine (354-430)

As J. A- Robson says:

The genius of Plato and Paul, transmitted from

antiquity in the monumental work of Augustine of

Hippo, cast upon the medieval mind a spell which

none could avoid. . Indeed it is hard to think of any century . . more soaked in Augustine than the fourteenth. (25)

Because his writing played such a significant role in

fourteenth-century thought, any discussion of that period

requires an acknowledgment of Augustine's philosophy and

theology. Augustine believed it was necessary for people to

question their faith and to understand what Church doctrine

demanded of thern. He argued that only through rational

questioning and contemplation does the individual attain

knowledge which, when illurninated by faith, can lead to a

better, more persona1 comprehension of God by transcending

"pious ignorance," the blind acceptance of theological

doctrine without knowledge or understanding. Meyrick H.

Carré explains:

The searching and comprehensive inquiries of

Augustine led the meditations of subsequent

generations of churchmen to pass beyond this rule

of pious ignorance. His writings invited men to

examine the rational basis of their faith. He did

not deny that it is necessary to believe in order

to know; understanding is the reward of faith.

But he also declared that Christian doctrine

contains many things that we cannot believe unless

we understand them. A man who thinks it is

sufficient to hold fast to the Faith without

aspiring to an understanding of it ignores the

true end of Eaith. (5)

Thus, it is not enough for Christians simply to accept and

believe what they are told: they must contemplate and test

both their faith and their understanding.

A clear understanding of Church doctrine depended on a

correct and rational perception of reality, and Augustine's

view of that perception was based on Platonic principles of

Ideas and their essences, Barrett explains that for Plato,

as well as for Augustine, "[tlhese Ideas . . . were . . . keally real,' more real than the particular things t h a t

derived their own individual being from participation in t h e

Ideas" (91) . Augustine believed in the existe~ce of objective, transcendent truths that were independent of the

changeable, transient world of things:

The region of reality is the world of Ideas,

necessary, imrnutable, intelligible. Augustine's

main concern is this realm of Ideas, and he

constantly seeks to show that they are integral to

thought, even at the lowest levels, (Carré 12)

These Ideas, perceived by the mind, exist beyond the

material world; they "constitute the stable reality of

things" (Carré 26) . To deal with the limitations of human speech to express

Ideas, such as the nature of God, Augustine developed a

linguistic sign system based on his conception of the Word

and t h e problem of its expression. Colish says that

Augustine's definition of a sign is a "thing which causes us

to think of something beyond the impression that the thing

i tsel f makes upon t h e senses" ( 5 9 ) . Beyond every p h y s i c a l

t h i n g l i e s t h e Idea o r e s s e n c e of the t h i n g : s i g n s r e p r e s e n t

u n i v e r s a l Ideas b u t t h e y can a l s o be a p p l i e d t o i n d i v i d u a l

t h i n g s , Also , it is p o s s i b l e f o r words t o r e p r e s e n t God and

t r u t h a c c u r a t e l y when t h e y are i n t e r p r e t e d wi th t h e gu idance

of d i v i n e i l l u m i n a t i o n : l anguage c a n be t r ans fo rmed and

recast as a P a u l i n e m i r r o r , f a i t h f u l l y rnedia t ing

God t o man i n t h e p r e s e n t l i fe; and t h e a g e n c i e s

a p p o i n t e d f o r t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f man's p a r t i a l

knowledge by f a i t h i n t o h i s complete knowledge o f

God by direct v i s i o n w e r e t o be r e d e f i n e d as modes

of verbal e x p r e s s i o n . ( C o l i s h 19-20)

Thus, when i n t e r p r e t e d p r o p e r l y , l anguage becornes a n

i n s t r u m e n t of t r u t h . T h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o c c u r s b e c a u s e

t r u t h is g u a r a n t e e d by t h e I n c a r n a t i o n which, Augus t ine

clairns, b r i d g e s t h e gap between t h e human and t h e divine:

God creates t h e wor ld and man th rough H i s Word,

and He takes on hurnanity i n t h e Word made f l e s h so

t h a t human words may t a k e on D i v i n i t y . . . and

man's f a c u l t y o f speech is empowered t o c a r r y on

the work of I n c a r n a t i o n i n e x p r e s s i n g t h e Word t o

the world. ( C o l i s h 35)

Augus t ine a l s o w r i t e s t h a t i t is p o s s i b l e t o i n t e r p r e t

a t e x t e i t h e r l i t e r a l l y o r f i g u r a t i v e l y , and t h a t more t han

one meaning c a n be t r u e . Signs are "called l i t e r a l when t h e y

a r e used t o d e s i g n a t e t h i n g s on a c c o u n t o f which t h e y were

i n s t i t u t e d . . . F i g u r a t i v e s i g n s occur when that t h i n g

which we designate by a literal sign is used to signify

something else . . ." (OCD 2.10.15). In other words, it is

possible for a text to have meaning on multiple levels.

ALso, the use of figurative language allows for the

possibility that not every sign will be understood

perfectly: figurative signs must be interpreted, which

allows for more than one way of reading and understanding

them but also increases the opportunities for human error.

As a result of the possibilities of signification,

authors can reveal profound truths both consciously and

unconsciously. Augustine States in On Christian Doctrine

that, when deciphering the Holy Scriptures, meanings not

intended by the author are still valid as long as they do

not contradict those set down in other sections of the

Scripturez because

the Spirit of God, who worked through that author,

undoubtedly foresaw that this meaning would occur

to the reader. . . . For what could God have more generously and abundantly provided in the divine

writings than that the same words might be

understood in various ways . . . ? (3.27.38)

Augustine also acknowledges that, if the Scriptures cannot

provide evidence to support a statementfs meaning, the

interpreter must use reason:

when a meaning is elicited whose uncertainty

cannot be resolved by the evidence of places in

the Scriptures whose meaning is certain, it

remains t o make it more clear by r e c o u r s e t o

r ea son , even i f h e whose words w e s e e k t o

u n d e r s t a n d did n o t pe rhaps i n t e n d t h a t meaning.

(3.28.39)

H e warns, however, t h a t such a d e p a r t u r e from t h e S c r i p t u r e s

is dangerous because i t may lead t o wrong t h i n k i n g a n d s i n ,

Users o f l anguage can p e m e r t the t r u t h by t e l l i n g l ies, and

i t is for t h i s r e a s o n t h a t Augus t ine condemns and rejects

the pagan a u t h o r s because of

t h e i r a b u s e o f l anguage and t h e d e l e t e r i o u s

m o r a l i t y which h e feels t h a t t h i s abuse

encourages . T h e p o e t s , h e s a y s , u s e words

e r r o n e o u s l y , s i n c e t h e y u s e them t o refer t o

t h i n g s and ideas which are n o n e x i s t e n t o r u n t r u e ,

F u r t h e m o r e , h e adds, t h e p o e t s d e p i c t i g n o r a n t

and i r r e s p o n s i b l e a c t i o n s i n t h e i r f i c t i t i o u s

c h a r a c t e r s , who o p e r a t e i n accordance w i t h t h e

u n r e a l u n i v e r s e o f t h e a u t h o r s f c r e a t i o n , . . and

. . . make t h e f a n t a s t i c m o r a l i t y o f t h a t world

a t t r a c t i v e a n d convinc ing . ( C o l i s h 25)

T h i s p e r v e r s i o n o f l anguage i s s i g n i f i c a n t because it

a d u l t e r a t e s t h e " t r u e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f words" ( C o l i s h 55),

b u t more i m p o r t a n t l y because it is a c o r r u p t i o n o f Godrs

w i l l t h a t b l u r s t h e l i n e s of m o r a l i t y and makes t h i s

c o r r u p t i o n attractive. Y e t , d e s p i t e h i s warning, Augus t ine

a l l o w s f o r a s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e Word g u i d e d by

b o t h r e a s o n a n d f a i t h i n S c r i p t u r a l knowledge.

When i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e Word and t h e word, August ine

emphasizes t h e importance of t h e i n d i v i d u a l and t h e

i n d i v i d u a l ' s consc ience as i t is gu ided by d i v i n e

i l l u m i n a t i o n . Augustine says t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l "Go n o t

o u t s i d e t h y s e l f , b u t r e t u r n w i t h i n t h y s e l f ; f o r t r u t h

resides i n t h e inrnost part o f man" ( C a r r é 11). Barrett

r e i n f o r c e s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f August ine ' s focus on t h e

i n d i v i d u a l :

Where P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e had asked t h e ques t ion ,

What i s man?, S t . August ine ( i n t h e Confessions)

asks, Who am 12-and t h i s s h i f t is d e c i s i v e . . . . August ine 's q u e s t i o n . . . s t e m s from an

a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t , more obscure and v i t a l

c e n t e r w i t h i n t h e q u e s t i o n e r h imsel f : from a n

a c u t e l y p e r s o n a l s e n s e o f d e r e l i c t i o n and l o s s ,

r a t h e r t h a n from t h e detachment w i t h which reason

susveys t h e world o f o b j e c t s i n order t o l o c a t e

i t s bearer, man, z o o l o g i c a l l y w i t h i n it. ( 8 4 )

Thus reason a l o n e is n o t enough: w i t h o u t f a i t h , t h e

"pe r sona l s e n s e o f d e r e l i c t i o n and l o s s " leads t o d e s p a i r .

True unders t and ing of u n i v e r s a l Ideas and o f God, who is t h e

s o u r c e cf t h o s e Ideas , depends upon t h e i l l u m i n a t i o n of

reason by f a i t h ; i n t h i s way, t h e i n d i v i d u a l ach ieves

wisdom.

August ine saw " f a i t h and reason-the v i t a l and t h e

r a t i o n a l - a s coming t o g e t h e r i n e v e n t u a l hamony" ( B a r r e t t

85) as a mode1 f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as f o r t h e whole

of C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t . H e r a i s e d q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e human

mind and s o u l , a n d a b o u t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l

t r u t h s which would be t a k e n up almost n i n e hundred y e a r s

la ter by S t . Thomas Aquinas .

3 . St. Thomas Aqu inas (c.1225-1274)

Like St, A u g u s t i n e , St- Thomas A q u i n a s was p r i m a r i l y

conce rned w i t h "how t h e o u t s i d e world gets i n t o t h e mind"

(Colish 166). H e q u e s t i o n e d t h e way t h a t t h e mind

internalizes and u n d e r s t a n d s s e n s a t i o n , which he u n d e r s t o o d

as t h e p r o c e s s t h r o u g h which p e o p l e p e r c e i v e a n d know

r e a l i t y . The p e r c e p t i o n of r e a l i t y i n c l u d e s t h e p e r c e p t i o n

of t h e Word; C o l i s h e x p l a i n s t h a t Aquinas expanded upon t h e

t h e o r y of s i g n s d e v e l o p e d by Augus t i ne :

T r a n s l a t e d i n t o t he mode o f o logic o r i g i n a l l y

f o r m u l a t e d t o analyze and t o o r g a n i z e c o n c e p t u a l l y

t h e s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n o f t h e s e n s i b l e

u n i v e r s e , t h i s t h e o r y i s i n t e r p r e t e d b y Thomas so

as t o stress ideas, and t o some e x t e n t t h e created

u n i v e r s e , as t h e p r i n c i p l e signa Dei. Like

A u g u s t i n e . . . Thomas is p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e

t a s k of f i n d i n g the most s u i t a b l e t e r m s i n which

t o e x p r e s s man's knowledge of God, a n d h e is

i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e r e a s o n s why these terms make

d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t i v e impressions on d i f f e r e n t

a u d i e n c e s . (1 62 )

Aquinas is indebted to Augustine not only for his theories

of linguistic signs and subjective interpretations, but also

for his theory of the interaction between faith and

knowledge, and the dependence of understanding on

illumination by God's grace. However, Aquinas takes the

Realist premises of Ideas and their divine Source and

develops his own theories about knowledge and faith that

move towards the subjectivity of the individual mind which

the Nominalists would later take to extremes.

Aquinas' works dispute the premise that al1 minds are

one Mind. He declares that "the intellect is united to the

human body as its [the bodyr s ] form. But one form cannot

possibly exist in more than one matter" (SCG 2 : 7 3 : 2 ) . Carré

elaborates:

The active intellect [which causes particulas

impressions to be abstracted and generalized in

the mind as universals] is not a power outside the

mind, an Intelligence in which the mind can share.

For it is imperfect and attains truth, not by

direct intuition, but by . . . reasoning. The

Augustinian view t?at the active intellect is the

divine Mind must be rejected. (86)

Augustine's view of the one Mind is based on the assertion

that the body and the mind are wholly separate, and that the

mind works actively upon the body which is, in essence,

passive and thus unable to influence the mind. Aquinas

agrees with Augustine's description of the mindrs

i n c o r p o r e a l n a t u r e , b u t s u g g e s t s t h a t i t h a s a d i f f e r e n t

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e body:

The s e n s e s do n o t know e x i s t e n c e Save u n d e r

c o n d i t i o n s o f here a n d now, w h e r e a s the

u n d e r s t a n d i n g knows t h i n g s a b s o l u t e l y a n d

e t e r n a l l y . S o far, Thomas a d h e r e s c o r n p l e t e l y t o

S t . A u g u s t i n e ' s way o f t h o u g h t . B u t t h e g r e a t

d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h a t p h i l o s o p h y a n d h i s own i s

t h a t h e does n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e mind as such , pu re

u n d e r s t a n d i n g , f u n c t i o n s i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e . The

mind o f man is n o t a p u r e i n t e l l i g e n c e ( s u c h as a n

a n g e l ) n o r is i t a s p i r i t i n a c o r p s e . I t i s a n

o r g a n i c c o m p o s i t e of mind a n d body. ( C a r r é 77)

Aquinas ' c o n c e p t of t h i s " o r g a n i c composite" p l a c e s

i m p o r t a n c e on the i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e p t i o n b e c a u s e

minds are i n d i v i d u a l i z e d ; f o r t h e b o d i e s of which

they are p a r t s are, as matter, n e c e s s a r i l y

particular. . . . S i n c e , t h e n , t h e human mind i s

i n t i m a t e l y a l l i ed w i t h rnatter i t s t h i n k i n g is

t h r o u g h o u t i n f e c t e d w i t h s e n s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e . . . . Human knowledge i s d e p e n d e n t upon p e r c e p t u a l

e x p e r i e n c e . Our minds c a n n o t free thernselves of

s e n s o r y r e f e r e n c e s e v e n i n r e f l e c t i o n upon " the

e t e r n a l t r u t h s " . . . . I n c o r p o r e a l p r i n c i p l e s are

known t o us o n l y t h r o u g h s e n s i b l e b o d i e s . ( C a r r e

79-81)

While Augus t ine declares t h a t t h e mind c o u l d know

e s s e n c e s and forms but n o t p h y s i c a l b o d i e s , Aquinas

d i s a g r e e s , i n s i s t i n g t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be no knowledge i f

s e n s e and though t w e r e s e p a r a t e front one a n o t h e r . C a r r é

e x p l a i n s t h a t i f

t h e r e is n o t h i n g i n e x p e r i e n c e b u t what i s

apprehended by t h e s e n s e s , e x p e r i e n c e becornes a

p e r p e t u a l f l u x . And what is i n t h i s s tate ceases

t o be and i s r e p l a c e d by a n o t h e r b e f o r e t h e mind

can Say what i t is. If o n t h e o t h e r hand . . . genu ine knowledge were c o n f i n e d t o immaterial

entities w e s h o u l d p o s s e s s no u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f

b o d i e s i n motion. . . . [ W J e are asked t o refer t o

e n t i t i e s which have no connexion w i t h them. (85)

The r e s u l t of Aquinas ' r e a s o n i n g is t h a t t h e mind and s e n s e s

work t o g e t h e r t o u n d e r s t a n d o b j e c t s ; each mind i n t e r p r e t s

t h e s e n s e s t h a t effect i ts p a r t i c u l a r body a c c o r d i n g t o i t s

own n a t u r e . Thus, t h e r e a r e as many i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of

r e a l i t y as t h e r e are mincis. Aquinas a l s o e x t e n d s his t h e o r y

t o a l l o w f o r m u l t i p l e meanings when i n t e r p r e t i n g S c r i p t u r e s ,

'not because one w o r d h a s many meanings b u t because the

a c t u a l t h i n g s s i g n i f i e d by t h e words can b e s i g n s of o t h e r

t h i n g s " (Minnis et . a l . 242) . Aquinas r e i n t e r p r e t s Augus t ine ' s t h e o r y o f t h e

a c q u i s i t i o n o f knowledge a c c o r d i n g t o his own belief that

knowledge depends upon t h e s e n s e s . Aquinas' t h e o r y o f

internalization maintains that a sensory sign is made

intelligible by the active intellect,

The active intellect in a sense distills the

significative content out of the phantasm6 by

abstracting it frorn its intelligible species, that

is, the aspect of the phantasm which is capable of

being conceptualized. The intelligible species is

then impressed on the possible intellect, or the

mind insofar as it can know all things, and the

possible intellect responds by forrning a verbum

mentis, or conceptual sign of the original object.

(Colish 172)

Once the verbum mentis has been formed, the mind must

evaluate the object as a conceptual sign before it can make

use of that object.

The validity of the sign must be judged and its

truly representative character accepted before the

mind can willingly employ the sign in composing

negative or affirmative propositions concerning

the object. . . . As in [Augustine0 s] theory of signification . . . the beings signified, for Thomas, are the criteria of the correspondence,

and hence the truth, of the ideas that men have

about them. (Colish 173-74)

A phantasm is " [ a l n accurate sensible sign . . . forrned out of sensory impressions" (Colish 172).

According to Aquinas, it is necessary for the mind to judge

the signs offered by the senses; otherwise, "every sensation

would be true, even contradictory ones. There would be no

means of distinguishing reality from ilfusion" (Carré 85).

It is only by evaluating each sign that the mind can form

the phantasm, or perfect sign.

Once the phantasm has been internalized and judged, it

is possible for the individual to acquire knowledge:

That wnich is the universal nature of things, and

is the final object of knowledge Thomas properly

calls the q u i d d i t a s of things. . . . The cognitive process appears as a specific movement from the

individual. (res) to the universal ( q u i d d i tas) . . . . The quiddity is comrnunicated to the possible intellect as the content of the intelligible

species by the agent intellect. (Pellerey 95)

In other words, the q u i d d i t a s represents the essence of the

object. However, there are limitations to a person's

knowledge of an objectfs quiddity: "Men, [Aquinas] States,

do not know natural objects perfectly, even those objects

accessible to the senses, since they . . . can make mistakes about them8* (Colish 175). When attempting to gain knowledge

about God, these limitations are compounded because His

nature is unknowable and inexpressible. However,

Thomas frequently quotes St. Paul's dictum: "The

invisible things of God are clearly seen, being

understood by the things that are made" [Romans

1:SOJ. It i s important . t h a t w e know t h e

world accura te ly ; otherwise w e rnight rnisconstrue

t h e na tu re of God. (Colish 182)

Thus, desp i t e t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r mistakes, it is s t i l l

possible f o r s i g n s t o represen t an ob jec t accura te ly ; it is

a l s o poss ib le f o r o b j e c t s o f God's c rea t ion t o represen t t h e

nature of God t r u l y , although incornpletely.

Because Aquinasf works a r e e s s e n t i a l l y theo logica l ,

f a i t h takes precedence over philosophy. Colish expla ins t h a t

"the publ ic and p r i v a t e goa ls of theology make it e s s e n t i a l

t h a t i t be a l i v i n g dialogue between t h e contemplator and

God, and not rnerely an a b s t r a c t d i sc ip l ine" ( 2 0 7 ) . Aquinas

emphasizes t h e importance o f f a i t h : 'so t h a t man rnight have

a f irmer knowledge of Him, God revealed c e r t a i n th ings about

Himself t h a t t ranscend the human i n t e l l e c t " (SCG 4.1.4).

Reason can be appl ied t o f a i t h i n an at tempt t o understand

b e l i e f s t h a t a r e a l r eady held; however, "the g r e a t e s t

demerits go t o persons who re fuse t o be l ieve what they

cannot understand s c i e n t i f i c a l l y by dernonstrative proof"

(Colish 2 0 0 ) . God can be known through knowledge based on

f a i t h , not through knowledge based on philosophy, because

humanityfs understanding o f t he exis tence and na ture of God

i s lirnited by t h e f i n i t e nature of t he human rnind: it can

corne t o no abso lu te r a t i o n a l bas i s f o r b e l i e f . People must

r e l y on t h e s igns found i n nature f o r evidence o f God.

Colish s u m a r i z e s : "The more adequately t h e s e s igns s i g n i f y

God, t h e less they r e l y on reason, and t h e more c l o s e l y

correlated to the mystery of the Godhead they become" (222).

Thus, despite the differences of their theologies, &quinas

and Augustine come to the same conclusions about the

necessity of faith: reason and philosophy cannot provide

ultimate answers, and the individual must rely on faith and

grace to enlighten imperfect knowledge.

According to Aquinas, because knowledge is imparted by

the senses and depends upon the individual's judgment of

sensations, it is possible to interpret reality in more than

one way; he observes,

there is no reason why there should not be several

different images of one thing; it is thus that one

man is seen by several. Hence, the existence of

several intelligible species in several persons is

not incompatible with the intellect's knowledge of

the universal, (SCG S : X : 9 )

This potential for multiple interpretations of sensory

experiences was taken to extremes by William of Ockham and

the Nominal-ists of the fourteenth century in their rejection

of universal forms; yet, despite their insistence that

universals were mere creations of mind, the Nominalists also

acknowledge that "the insights of faith, though they cannot

be proven by reason, are not therefore contrary to reason,

but sirnply go beyond it" (Peck 747).

4 , William of Ockham (c.1285-1347)

Unlike Augustine and Aquinas, William of Ockham

rejected al1 forms of Realism, clairning that universal Ideas

and Forms existed only in the mind. He believed that the

Realist arguments for the actual existence of universals

were paradoxical, and his response to the Realist premise

that universals were part of the existence of individuals

was that "there would be as many universals as there are

individuals. And this would mean a denial of universals;

there would be no comrnon nature" (Carré 109) . To Ockham, the perception of universals is an act of the intellect, which

"stands for things outside the mind or for other things in

the mind, just as the spoken words stand for them by

convention" ( 4 7 ) . William Ho Watts and Richard J. Utz note

the significance of Ockham's position on universals:

In asserting the ontological primacy of particular

things over universals, Ockham relegates

universals to the status of linguistic signs;

hence, universals have no substantial existence

outside of the human mind, (148)

His insistence on the individuality and subjectivity of al1

forms of being is the basis of Nominalism.

However, Ockham himself was not an extreme Nominalist;

he declared that, as creations of the rnind, universals have

logical, if not actual, being. Ockham believed that all

knowledge was grounded on the "direct apprehension of

i n d i v i d u a l o h j e c t s " ( C a r r é 1 1 2 ) . I n other words, u n i v e r s a h

s u c h as t h e c o n c e p t "humanity"

refer t o " i n t e n t i o n s " of t h e mind, t o concepts .

They canno t refer t o real i t ies . , . , V e n c e t h e

e r r o r of t h o s e who believed t h a t t h e r e w a s

someth ing i n r e a l i t y besides the s i n g u l a r e n t i t y

and who h e l d t h a t humani ty d i s t i n g u i s h e d from

s i n g u l a r i n s t a n c e s is someth ing t h a t exists i n

l n d i v i d u a l s and is related t o t h e i r e s s e n c e (Summa

T o t i u s L0gicae.i. 66) ." (Carré 115)

Ockham divided e x i s t e n c e i n t o e x t e r i o r and i n t e r i o r

rea l i t ies . E x t e r i o r r e a l i t y i s t h e p h y s i c a l world o u t s i d e

t h e mind, e x p e r i e n c e d th rough t h e s e n s e s . I n t e r i o r r e a l i t y

i s t h e wor ld of t h e mind, i n which s e n s a t i o n i s i n t e r n a l i z e d

and c o n s i d e r e d . F u r t h e r , " [ e l x t e r i o r r e a l i t y is knowable;

i n t e r i o r r e a l i t y i s what is e m p i r i c a l l y known and reknowable

th rough r e f l e c t i o n and a b s t r a c t i o n " (Peck 7 4 7 ) . According t o

Ockham, t h e r e are t w o stages i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge

abou t t h e e x t e r n a l world: f i r s t " t h e mind i n t u i t s ; it t h e n

reflects" (Peck 748 ) ; i n t u i t i o n i s b o t h sensory and

i n t e l l e c t u a l . C a r r é e x p l a i n s t h a t ' [t] he s e n s o r y f a c t o r

t e l l s u s t h a t t h e t h i n g e x i s t s , t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l f a c t o r

a l l o w s u s t o r e c o g n i z e it; and any p e r c e p t i o n r e q u i r e s bo th

e lements" (110) . However,

it i s n o t only objects p e r c e i v e d by means of t h e

e x t e r n a l s e n s e s which can be d i r e c t l y known.

A c t u a l l y it i s t h e region of i n n e r expe r i ence ,

comprising acts of will, pleasure, or sorrow, that

are most imrnediately and convincingly known.

Judgrnents based on these processes carry greater

certainty than any other class of contingent

propositions. (Carré 111)

As Carré suggests, Ockhamrs theory of intuitive

knowledge is not without qualification. Ockham explains that

the perceptions of the inner senses are more reliable than

those of the external senses because while it is possible to

doubt sensory experience, the existence of the individual in

the world is beyond doubt to that person. Carré says this

qualification of the external senses leads to the second

qualification of Ockhamfs empiricism:

For intuitions may sometimes be clear without

giving guarantee of their existence. . . . [W]e may continue to see a star after it has been

destroyed. And God can give an intuition of an

object that has no real existence. (111-12)

Despite these contingencies, intuitive knowledge is the most

precise for Ockham: in its immediacy, it can give true

knowledge of reality.

The second stage in the acquisition of knowledge is to

abstract the information provided by the senses, which Peck

de£ ines :

From intuited information, the intellect,

motivated by the will, abstracts words, images,

and concepts which it holds in the minci for

f u r t h e r a b s t r a c t i o n a n a c o n f i r m a t i o n . Through

r e p e t i t i o n t h e s e p r o c e s s e s leaa t o p r i n c i p i e s and

h a 8 i i s which c o n s t i t u i e e a c h i n a i v i d u a l f s s e n s e of

r e a i i t y . ( 7 4 8 )

Abstract Knowleage i s less reliaoie t h a n intuitive because

such Knowieage is iess c e r t a i n when it has p a s s e a i n t h e

i n t e l l e c t from i r n m e a i a t e t o past e x p e r i e n c e ,

[ f i o r even mernory images are classifiea as

abstract i n t h i s s t r i c t empi r i c i sm. When 1 see a

w a i i o r t o u c h a fiame, 1 know c e r t a i n l y t h a t t h e

w a i l o r f i a m e e x i s t s . Bu t i f i reca l l them or

imagine them I a m n o t s u r e t h a t t h e y e x i s t .

(Carre 1 1 0 )

Thus, the accuracy of a h t r a c t Knowieage r ema ins p r o b l e m a t i c

because "it a o e s n o t e n a 8 l e u s t o know the e x i s t e n c e of what

a o e s e x i s t o r t h e non-ex i s t ence o f what d o e s n o t e x i s Y p

(Gckham 2 7 j . Feck e l a b o r a t e s on the problem, s u g g e s t i n g t h a t

t h e d e g r e e t o which e x p e r i e n c e refiects i n d i v i d u a f t r u t h

depends upon t h e p e r c e p t i o n of t h e ind iv idua l : "The w i l l can

motivate, but it can a l s o i n t e r f e r e , and t h e i n t e l l e c t may

be weak, t h u s o b s c u r i n g judgment. E r r o r may l i e i n b o t h t h e

a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d t h e j udgment" ( 7 4 9 ) . W h i l e l i m i t i n g t h e r o l e of u n i v e r s a l s l i k e "good" and

"evil, " Ockham i n c r e a s e s Godr s active r o l e i n t h e worid,

a s c r i b i n g t o him u n l i r n i t e d power. Ockham inçists t h a t God's

poten t i a ordina ta d o e s n o t restrict His potentia absoluta.

In fact, His potentia ordinata is c o n t i n g e n t upon the

covenant God has made with humanity, and not at all the

result of necessity (Oberman, "Shape" 12). As a result,

[t] he combined effect of Ockharn's restriction of

the ontological status of universals and his

elevation of the power of God is to render al1

creatures and things utterly contingent upon their

creator not only for their existence, but also for

the circumstances that govern their existence. If

universals have not substantial existence, then

God is the final source and guarantor of truth

just as he is the final source and guarantor of

laws concerning physical bodies. (Watts and Utz

149)

The result of the limitations irnposed on universals and the

elevation of God's power is that all of his Creation depends

on Him alone for existence and truth. However, the

distinction between Godfs two powers becomes problematic:

OckhamCs declaration that God's absolute power is unlimiteci

by his ordained power removes al1 limitations £rom the

divine volition. In other words, the distinction between

morality and immorality is based not upon inherent universal

concepts of "good" and "bad" but upon the particular

intention of God's will. As Courtenay explains,

God coufd have established and still could

establish a different moral order in which rnurder

and adultery would be virtuous acts. God could

even cause a man to hate him and accept such

actions as meritous. The moral order which

presently pertains, therefore, is dependent solely

on the arbitrary will of God and can be altered.

(29)

The apparently arbitrary nature of the moral order

leads to the possibility of skepticism and religious

pessimisrn. Since abstract cognition is not reliable and God

has the power to make people perceive things that do not

rea l ly exist, even intuitive cognition can be unreliable

(which makes abstractive cognition doubly so). Humans rely

on God for Truth, but Truth is a universal without real

existence and so is dependent on particular situations

which, in turn, depend upon the arbitrary will of God.

Ultimately, people cannot know the world with any certainty

because "there is no assurance that universal ideas and

words bear any resemblance to the real world" (Watts and Utz

149). Even language itself becomes problematic: Holly

Wallace Boucher observes that, because of Ockhamrs

theorizing,

[t] he firm bonds between signifier and signified . . . had unraveled: so had the necessary tie between sign and reality. . . . Words could no longer be assumed to fit the shape of reality

because of their origin in a real world of ideas

beyond the rnind. Language . , . has become a skewed grid that may not fit the scheme of

reality- (215)

Because of the contingency of language and the problem of

abstract generalizations already existing in the minds of

both author and reader, interpretation becomes problematic,

A personrs interior reality can be altered and separated

from the initial perception of external reality, since the

two forms of existence are coterminous only in the mind.

When the two are disunited or, as Peck says, when " [t] he

f i c t a in the brain fail to correspond exactly with the

phenornena," there is a danger that, lost in the confusion

between the inner and outer worlds, people can become

imprisoned by their own ideas or become trapped by someone

else's words (757) ,

It is possible to interpret Ockhamrs discussions of the

inability to know anything with certainty as a proper

Christian awareness of the individual's dependence on God

(Watts and Utz 149). Sturges writes that "Ockhamfs

philosophical world is inhabited by radically individual

beings separate from a l 1 others. Since God is separate £rom

humanity, human knowledge is severely limitedO' (27) . Sturgesf statement is qualified, however, by the theory that

"the giver of foms rnay be seen in the forms, " suggesting

that God can be known, to some degree, through His creation,

and especially through the human mind (Peck 750). The result

is that Christians rejoice in their dependence on a God

whose nature can be known, though imperfectly. However, when

placed in the context of the Nominalist b e l i e f that this

universe is created according to the arbitrary decisions of

t h e d i v i n e w i l l , a n d t h a t i t is possible f o r God t o c a u s e

p e o p l e t o p e r c e i v e t h i n g s t h a t do n o t ex i s t , t h e faith of

t h e i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n may waver and t u r n t h e f o r m e r

believer i n t o a s k e p t i c . Fo r t h e N o m i n a l i s t , f a i t h i s

e s s e n t i a l : "The i n s i g h t s o f f a i t h , t hough t h e y c a n n o t b e

p r o v e d by r e a s o n , are n o t t h e r e f o r e c o n t r a r y t o r e a s o n , b u t

s i m p l y g o beyond it" (Peck, p r e v i o u s l y cited, 7 4 7 ) . God is

u n d e r s t o o d t o be a r a d i c a l l y free and omnipo t en t

c r e a t o r , s u b j e c t t o n o t h i n g e x c e p t non-

c o n t r a d i c t i o n , free o f a l 1 l a w ( even h i s own), t h e

a b s o l u t e n e c e s s a r y be ing who migh t command h i s

chosen one (Abraham) t o s l a y h i s o n l y s o n (Isaac)

w h i l e j u d g i n g hirn a c c o r d i n g t o h i s f i d e l i t y tU

t h a t s i n g u l a r d i v i n e command a n d d i s c o u n t i n g a n y

mere m o r a l law p r o s c r i b i n g s u c h a n act .

( D e l a s a n t a 212 )

Wi thou t f a i t h to s u s t a i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e

u l t i m a t e b e n e v o l e n c e of God a n d t o g u a r a n t e e t h e t r u t h of

t h e Word, t h e Norn ina l i s t is l e f t a l o n e i n a u n i v e r s e w i t h o u t

c e r t a i n t y o r rneaning.

5 , John W y c l i f (c. 1330-1384)

John W y c l i f f s " u l t r a - r e a l i s m " ( D e l a s a n t a 214 ) domina ted

the l a t t e r part of t h e f o u r t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Norninalism had

dismissed u n i v e r s a l s and d i s c o u r a g e d m e t a p h y s i c a l

c o n t e m p l a t i o n , and t h e c e r t a i n t y p r o v i d e d by u n i v e r s a l s w a s

r e p l a c e d by s k e p t i c i s m :

when the universal is understood to exist solely

as a sign in the human intellect, such an

epistemology does violence to the essentiality of

tbe real and impedes any intellectual

accessibility to a metaphysical or moral order,

(Delasanta 214)

Consequently, Wyclif's restoration of the universal and his

claim that philosophy could provide absolute proofs to

questions such as the existence of God were very appealing

to his contemporaries, especially as a counter to the

Nominalist suggestion that nothing could be known with

certainty. Robson summarizes the two most important aspects

of Wyclif's metaphysics: "that we can obtain absolute

certainty of knowledge, and that the basis of ultimate

truth, including divine truth, lies in 'pure philosophyf "

(142) . Wyclif, like Augustine, believed that al1 human

knowledge was grounded on immutable universal ideas that

exist in the divine Mind. As Delasanta observes,

this was standard Augustinian doctrine, and as

such was not particularly remarkable, except that

Wycliffe redefined these archetypes as ideas

participating in God's own being. . . . By making the individual's archetype share God's being,

Wyclif conferred upon it the same attributes of

eternity, necessity, and indestructibility as God

enjoyed. (214-5)

Wyclif takes Augustine's Realism to extremes. His belief in

the indestructible nature of individuals led to h i s

rejection of Transubstantiation which, in turn, contributed

to his attacks on the clergy. As Knapp says, his

"uncompromising realism drove him to attack the doctrine of

transubstantiation, which posited that the substance of the

bread disappears in the sacrament of the Eucharist" (Chaucer

66) . Unlike some of his followers, Wyclif affirmed the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist. He argued that the

spiritual being of Christ is added to the physical elements

of bread and wine; there is no physical transformation.

Wyclif was concerned with the meaning of the sacrament, not

the "accidents and subjects" (Hudson Premature 282). In his

sermons, he reasons that, should a rnouse eat a consecrated

wafer, 'a mous etip not Cristis body, al ?if he ete pis

sacrament, for De mous fayliD gostly witt to chewe in hym

Dis beleue" (EWS 206/24-25). Like the mouse, an unrepentant

sinner is unable to receive spiritual benefits from "Cristis

body": the sacrament depends upon the spiritual condition of

the communicant rather than of the priest.

The Eucharist was not the only sacrament Wyclif

scrutinized; he also turned his attention to confession. He

declared that only God can forgive sin because only God can

know if the sinner is truly penitent, which suggests that

the priest who serves as intermediary betwsen humans and God

is again unnecessary. Hudson explains that "[alt the root of

the offender's state of mind 4s his state or' grace, a state

dependent upon h i s predestination to salvation or his

foreknowing to damnation; only God knows this state"

(Preinature 294) . As a result, ?if we han synned neuere so myche, and neuere so

longe han lyghged in synne, axe we God mercy in

oure powyt, and haue we sorwe for P i s synne, and

God is redy to for3yu it, howeuere pat preestus

fayfon. (ERS 82/106-09)

Wycliffite writers objected to the practice of oral

confession because contemporary practices of confession were

not in keeping with Biblical examples, and because of the

abuses to which the laity and the clergy were exposed. All

foms of simony in the sacraments were deplored; by making

the individual ultirnately responsible for his or her own

salvation, Wyclif effectively reduced the importance of the

clergy. As Tuchman observes,

Wyclif reached the point of denying the validity

of the priesthood itself as necessary to

salvation. . . . From there the rest followed--the non-necesshty of the Pope, rejection O£

excommunication, confession, pilgrimages, worship

of relics and saints, indulgences, treasury of

merit. (289)

Out of Wyclif's criticisms of the sacraments and the

clergy corne two of the most important aspects of his

theology: the concept of predestination and the preeminence

of the Bible. Both aspects are important to Wyclif's vision

o f " d i s p l a c i n g t h e c e n t u r i e s - o l d c l a b t h a t C h r i s t i a n i t y i s

founded on b o t h t h e B i b l e and t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e Church

and s u b s t i t u t i n g the B i b l e a l o n e as t h e a u t h o r i t y which must

e s t a b l i s h C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e and p r a c t i c e " (Knapp, Chaucer

6 5 ) . P r e d e s t i n a t i o n played a n impor t an t r o l e i n what Wycl i f

s a w as t h e d i m i n i s h i n g a u t h o r i t y of the Church and t h e

c lergy. For Wycl i f , t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l chu rch w a s divided

between t h e congrega tio predes t i n a torum, those " p r e d e s t i n e d

f o r s a l v a t i o n " and who belongeci t o t h e " t rue" church , and

t h e congregatio prescitorum, t h o s e " d e s t i n e d t o damnation"

and who were n o t rnembers of t h e " t rue" church . Congregatio

predestina t o r u m and congrega t i o presci t o r u m b o t h p o s s e s s e d a

combina t ion of virtue and vice; t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e

two depended on t h e i r f i n a l ends , which c o u l d n o t be known

by any human be ing . Robson p o i n t s o u t t ha t

no c r e a t u r e p r e d e s t i n e d t o s a l v a t i o n can m e r i t

e t e r n a l punishment, however g r a v e l y h e may s i n ,

n o r any foreknown t o r e p r o b a t i o n evade it, however

p l e a s i n g h e may be t o God i n t h i s l i fe . For i f w e

allow temporal m e r i t t o e l i c i t i ts reward, t h e

reward i t s e l f canno t be heaven ly but o n l y

t empora l . (212)

I n o t h e r words, s a l v a t i o n is n o t t h e r e s u l t of v i r t u o u s

behav io r ; r a t h e r , "God n a t u r a l l y j u s t i f i e s men t o e t e r n a l

life before t h e p r e d e s t i n e d show m e r i t i n t h i s world"

(Robson 208) .

The i n a b i l i t y o f humans t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h o s e

who are s a v e d and t h o s e who are damned had d i s t u r b i n g

consequences f o r t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e church . As Hudson

remarks ,

[t] he i n s t i t u t i o n a l church , t o a medieval. o u t l o o k ,

c o n t a i n e d t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n . . . . But it w a s

u n r e a s o n a b l e t o t h i n k that t h e whole p o p u l a t i o n

w a s predestinatus; it w a s equally u n l i k e l y even

t h a t a l l t h e E n g l i s h c l e r g y were, l e t a l o n e t h e

c l e r g y o f t h e whole Roman church . Where, amongst

t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l chu rch , w a s t h e t r u e chu rch . . . t o b e found? . . . [ A ] u t h o r i t y , whe the r o v e r

i nan ima te goods o r o v e r a n i m a t e n a t u r e , depended

upon the s ta te o f grace of t h e man w i e l d i n g it.

(Premature 315)

A cleric who w a s n o t i n a s t a t e of grace had no a u t h o r i t y ;

any d i s p o s i t i o n s made by such a person were n e i t h e r legal

nor b i n d i n g . Wyclif i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e B i b l e w a s t h e s o l e a u t h o r i t y

of p r o p e r doctrine and p r a c t i c e i n the cnurch . H e found t h a t

[ t l h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l chu rch b e a r s t h e p e r f e c t l y

r e a d a b l e m a r k s o f d i v e r g e n c e from a p o s t o l i c t r u t h s

in t h e B i b l e : it errs i n d o c t r i n e , n o t a b l y

Eucharistie d o c t r i n e , and i n p r a c t i c e , by a b u s i n g

p r o p e r t y and power (ecclesiastical p r o p e r t y ,

n e g l e c t of t h e poor , p a p a l w a r s ) . (Knapp, Chaucer

68 1

The c l e r g y w a s u n r e l i a b l e b e c a u s e many mernbers were guilty

of v a r i o u s a b u s e s a n d c o r r u p t i o n s ; even p a p a l decrees c o u l d

n o t be t r u s t e d b e c a u s e of t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e m o r a l i t y of many

popes . Hudson o b s e r v e s t h a t t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y w a s f a r more

d e t r i m e n t a l t o the i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e chu rch t h a n w a s t h e

condemnation o f a b u s e s , which c o u l d be i d e n t i f i e d and

remedied, Accord ing t o Hudson, once t h e a u t h o r i t y and

i d e n t i t y o f t h e c h u r c h were q u e s t i o n e d , any a t t e m p t s at

reform were s u b j e c t t o t h e same d o u b t s . She conc ludes , "As

e f f e c t i v e l y as la ter P r o t e s t a n t t h e o l o g y , Wycl i f ' s v iews

forced t h e i n d i v i d u a l C h r i s t i a n i n t o making h i s own

-judgments" ( P r e m a t u r e 3 1 6 ) .

Wyc l i f ' s v iews p l a c e d new r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on t h e

i n d i v i d u a l and p r e s e n t e d a need f o r a n E n g l i s h v e r s i o n o f

the B i b l e . Nowhere, Knapp w r i t e s , i s Wycl i f more c l e a r l y

i n v o l v e d w i t h

t h e s o c i a l world of active l a y p i e t y , o f

i n c r e a s i n g l a y l i t e r a c y , o f i n c r e a s i n g l y b l u r r e d

b o u n d a r i e s between t h e estates, a n d o f changing

a s se s s rnen t s of womenrs r o l e s t h a n i n h i s

e g a l i t a r i a n opennes s a b o u t Bible r e a d i n g and

s c r i p t u r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . (Chaucer 7 3 )

Wycli f a r g u e d t h a t e v e r y C h r i s t i a n s h o u l d be free t o read

and s t u d y t h e B i b l e . H e b e l i e v e d t h a t the B i b l e s h o u l d b e

a c c e s s i b l e t o everyone , and t h a t t h e c l e r g y s h o u l d f o l l o w

C h r i s t ' s example a n d p r e a c h t o t h e p e o p l e i n t h e i r own

l a q u a g e . H e believed t h a t anyone i n a s tate of grace who

approached the scriptures with rneekness and humility would

be able to interpret and understand them correctly, while

anyone in a state of sin would be unable to discern true

meaning (Gellrich 9 5 ) . This belief in the importance of

grace in guiding the interpretation of the Scriptures is

similar to Augustine's theory of divine illumination; Wyclif

wrote:

[ w ] e schulde not trowe in p i s enke, ne in Pese

skynnys pat is clepud booc, but in pe sentence pa t

Dei seyen, whyche sentence is De booc of lyf; for

al ?if per ben manye trewpus and diuerse resonys

in De gospelus, nepeles eche of pes trewbus is pe

substaunce of God hymself. (ENS 94/19-24)

Also like Augustine, Wyclif favored literal

interpretations of the Bible but also recognized the need

for allegorical readings; he argued, however, that

when a figure is undeniably the intention of the

divine author, it may be counted as literal. . . . His Latin treatise De V e r i t a t e Sacrae Scripturae

defends the literal truth of the Bible by making a

distinction between what is literal (proper) in

human language and what is literal (proper) in

divine discourse,-which in some cases overrides

ordinary grammatical and sentantic usages.

(Knapp, Chaucer 72)

Wyclif argued that the Scriptures should be presented to

people without the standard readings of the patristic

g l o s s e s , t o which h e o b j e c t e d on t h e grounds t h a t they

obscured the t r u t h . However, ecclesiastical a u t h o r i t i e s a l s o

claimed t h a t t h e W y c l i f f i t e glosses were e q u a l l y

o b f u s c a t i n g . T h e r e s u l t of t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y was a

r e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e word glose; Knapp e x p l a i n s :

glose i s u s e d by b o t h sides t o rnean ' s p e c i o u s o r

s o p h i s t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' (Middle E n g l i s h

Dictionary) , a l o n g s i d e i t s p o s i t i v e meanings. . . . Once a l y inq g l o s s is able t o b e c o n c e i v e d of,

t h e p a t r i s t i c t r a d i t i o n takes i t s p l a c e , i m p o r t a n t

b u t n o t a l o n e , among other i n t e r p r e t i v e sys tems .

(Chaucer 7 5 )

Wyclif's emphas is on a l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e B i b l e

w a s based on h i s belief t h a t " t h e Word o f S c r i p t u r e w a s God

H i m s e l f , an emanat ion of t h e Supreme Being ' t r a n s p o s e d i n t o

w r i t i n g ' " (Robson 1 4 6 ) . I n o t h e r words, t h e B i b l e c o n t a i n s

Tru th ; it i s up t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l gu ided b y f a i t h t o

i n t e r p r e t i t .

Like t h e Nomina l i s t s , Wycl i f leaves t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r

s a l v a t i o n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l . Kowever, h i s " u l t r a - r e a l i s t "

belief i n u n i v e r s a l s p r o v i d e s a n o b j e c t i v e T r u t h which g i v e s

t h e Wycliff i tes a s o u r c e of s e c u r i t y t h a t t h e N o m i n a l i s t s

d id n o t have. Wycl i f ' s ideas seem t o i n d i c a t e a r e t u r n t o

Augus t ine and h i s t h e o r i e s of u n i v e r s a l s , which ra t i f ies

Augus t ine ' s impor t ance i n any d i s c u s s i o n of f o u r t e e n t h -

c e n t u r y ph i lo sophy .

6. Twentieth Century Theorists

Every time period is dominated by "large-scale

conceptual frameworks" which Richard Harland, a critic of

structuralist and post-structuralist theory, calls

"epistemes" (105) . An "episteme" is the a priori upon which

any new idea or discovery is based, whether that idea is

true or false. It is a cultural foundation that consists of

al1 pre-existing perceptions and understandings of the world

that inform the minds and ideas of the people living in a

given society. An episteme shapes the ways in which people

define and think about their world, causing them to share

common understandings and questions about the way the

universe works, These conceptual frameworks contain al1 the

discourses which exist during a given period of time; Peggy

Knapp appropriates Catherine Belseyrs definition of

discourse, using it

to indicate, "a domain of Ianguage use; a

particular way of talking (and writing and

thinking) " which "involves certain shared

assumptions which appear in the fomulation that

characterize it."' Ideology is always implied in

discourse; we must make assumptions about the

world in order to Say anything. (2)

Catherine Belsey, Cri t i c a l Prac t i ce (London : Methuen, 1980) 5.

Knapp is r e f e r r i n g t o p a r t i c u l a r ways o f l ook ing a t and

u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e world . These i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s c a n be

c o n f l i c t i n g as w e l l as harmonious; ideas which oppose e a c h

o t h e r p r o v i d e a l t e r n a t e p e r s p e c t i v e s from which a s o c i e t y

c a n be unders tood . Any d i s c u s s i o n of l a t e - f o u r t e e n t h c e n t u r y

ideas must acknowiedge how l i t e r a ry works are i n e v i t a b l y

informed by t h e works and t h o u g h t s o f o t h e r a u t h o r s . Because

t h e ideas o f S t . Augus t ine , S t . Thomas Aquinas, Wi l l i am of

Ockhani, and John Wyclif i n f o r m t h e v a r i o u s f o u r t e e n t h -

c e n t u r y s c h o o l s o f r e l i g i o u s and p h i l o s o p h i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n ,

Chaucer would have been a t least aware o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s

t h a t t h e y p r e s e n t .

Within any episteme, t h e r e are peop le who a r e i n

p o s i t i o n s o f power; one way of p r e s e r v i n g t h a t power i s t o

undermine oppos ing p o s i t i o n s . Language, whether w r i t t e n o r

spoken, can e i t h e r reveal o r c o n c e a l power. The re fo re , t o

c o n t r o l c o n f l i c t i n g v iew-poin ts , one need o n l y c o n t r o l t h e

language, t h e r e b y l i m i t i n g what c a n and cannot be said. A

society can p r o h i b i t and e x c l u d e c e r t a i n d i s c o u r s e s which

t h r e a t e n t o expose t h e weaknesses o f i t s own p r i v i l e g e d

p o s i t i o n s t h rough a p r o c e s s of d i v i s i o n and r e j e c t i o n : i t

divides t r u t h from f a l s i t y , r i g h t £rom wrong. A d i s c o u r s e

becomes a u t h o r i t a t i v e when enough p e o p l e b e l i e v e that it

r e v e a l s t r u t h . However, i f s o c i e t y rejects t h e " r e s t r a i n i n g

language" (Har land 1 0 0 ) t h r o u g h which a n a u t h o r i t y d e f i n e s

i t s v e r s i o n of r i g h t and wrong, that a u t h o r i t y i s r e n d e r e d

power less . Thus, when affimed by enough people , one

position is considered "true"; the rnarginalized position is,

necessarily, considered false because, in such an

exclusionary system, there can be only one truth. It is also

possible for a false premise to be accepted as true if

people believe it because of the power of language and the

individual's will to believe. Truth is a convention, not a

universal. As Paul Rabinow observes, "there is no external

position of certainty, no universal understanding that is

beyond history and society" (4) . Like tzuth, language is also subject to convention. As

Ferdinand de Saussure says in his Course in General

Linguistics, language is an already existing "collection of

necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social

body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty [of

speech]" ( 9 ) . Language does not exist in an individual but

in a group of individuals; as a result, it is beyond the

power of an individual to change language. Because of its

arbitrary, conventi~nal nature, the distinguishing

characteristic of a sign is that "in some way it always

eludes the individual or the social will" (Saussure 17).

Saussure explains that every language system is made of

"distinct signs corresponding to distinct ideas" ( 9 ) . A

"signf' is the combination of two parts: the signifier which

is a word, and the signified which is the concept to which

the word refers. Saussure says of the arbitrary connection

between signifier and signified:

the whole system of language is based on the

irrational principle of the arbitrariness of the

sign, which would lead to the worst sort of

complication if applied without restriction. But

the mind contrives to introduce a principle of

order and regularity into certain parts of the

mass of signs. . . . (Saussure 133)

In contrast to Saussure, post-structuralists do not

believe that the mind is able to impose order on language or

on anything else: for post-structural theorists, as for

Augustine, irrational complications and disorder are

inevitable because the conventions linking the signifier to

the signified

can be changed, disregarded, broken, . . . [Words] are able to point to the truth but do not possess

it. And consequently, al1 kinds of slips are

possible between the speaker, his language, and

his audience. (Dinshaw 171)

Thus, it is possible to free signifiers from the things they

signify. It is through the freeing of signifiers from

definite meaning that authoritative positions can be

destabilized; for example, in the late fourteenth century,

the Wycliffites atternpted to redefine the doctrine of

"transubstantiation" by demonstrating how logically

impossible the transformation was, then redefining the terms

that originally meant a physical alteration to suggest a

symbolic presence.

T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l n a t u r e of l a n g u a g e means t h a t

i n d i v i d u a l s are lirnited by t h e e p i s t e m e i n which t h e y l ive:

t h e i r means o f e x p r e s s i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g are i n s e p a r a b l e

from t h e c o n c e p t u a l framework which i n f o r m s t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n

o f t h e world. I n o t h e r words, "C13anguage is no l o n g e r a

p u r e t r a n s p a r e n c y , b u t f i l l e d w i t h 'hidden' f o r c e s t h a t t h e

l anguage u s e r n e v e r d i r e c t l y e x p e r i e n c e s " (Har land 112).

T h e r e f o r e , t h e u s e r of l anguage c a n n e v e r e x h a u s t a l 1 t h e

p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f meaning c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t l anguage ,

Language c a n n o t c o n t a i n a l 1 t h e p o s s i b l e meanings o f a

s t a t e m e n t ; as a r e s u l t , s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d i n

i s o l a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , w i t h i n e v e r y e p i s t e m e t h e r e are

" [ r l e l a t i o n s between s t a t e m e n t s ( even i f t h e a u t h o r is

unaware of them; even i f t h e s t a t e m e n t s do no t have t h e same

a u t h o r ; e v e n i f t h e a u t h o r s were unaware of each o t h e r r s

e x i s t e n c e ) " ( F o u c a u l t 2 9 ) - Each s t a t e m e n t reflects on and

changes t h e meaning of t h e o t h e r s t a t e m e n t s i n e v e r y

episteme. A u t h o r s r i n t e n t i o n s may i n f l u e n c e t h e

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r wosds; t h e i n t e n t i o n , however, does

n o t domina te t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

L i k e any a u t h o r i t a t i v e d i s c o u r s e c o n t r o l l e d by

language , t h a t of t h e Medieval Church c o n t a i n s c o n f l i c t i n g

ideas, i n c l u d i n g t h o s e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s and t h e o l o g i a n s

d i s c u s s e d earlier. And, like o t h e r authorities, t h e Church

c l a i m s t o be objective b u t , b e c a u s e it creates t h e c r i t e r i o n

by which it i s t o be judged, it c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d

a n y t h i n g b u t s u b j e c t i v e . Thus, o r t h o d o x dogma is p r i v i l e g e d ,

whereas positions such as Nominalism are marginalized. To

control and subjugate such positions, the Church uses words

such as heresy, sacrilege, and sin. The subversive elements

resist the Churchrs language by creating their own language,

countering accusations with "logic" and "rationalism."

As Augustine observes, Godf s presence in nature is

sub jected to multiple interpretations; therefore, many

interpretations can exist simultaneously that either oppose

or support the privileged position, Harland's comments are

applicable to the Medieval period:

What we now see as the natural world appears . , . as a great artifice, a great book, in which God,

as the Word itself, inscribes signs and ches and

an endless play of overlapping resemblances for

men to interpret. (109)

For example, Chaucer uses religious satire and wordplay to

raise questions about religious orthodoxy from various

alternative positions. Each of these marginalized positions

translates the authorityfs words into its own language,

thereby revealing the weaknesses of the orthodox position.

The result of this revelation Y s to discredit the clergy

[who follow these orthodoxies] . . . by showing its learning as a cynical exploitation of the word with which it is

entrusted" (Knapp, "Deconstructing" 75). By discrediting the

clergy, Chaucerrs satire attempts to raise doubts about

Catholic truths. His undermining of Church ritual and

language leads to questions about the Churchfs authority. A

loss of faith in Church doctrine leads to a loss of

confidence in the Church itself which, in turn, can create

the state of confusion, fear, and despair, exhibited by

Chaucer' s skeptical and nihilistic Pardoner. The result is

the alienation of humanity: people are estranged from God,

nature, and society, as well as from their sense of self,

resulting in the absolute psychological isolation (hence

alienation) of each individual.

This theme of the alienation of humanity becomes the

central theme of twentieth-century existential philosophy.

Barrett itemizes the historical conditions that produced

existentialism:

Alienation and estrangement; a sense of the basic

fragility and contingency of human life; the

impotence of reason confrmted with the depths of

existence; the threat of Nothingness, and the

solitary and unsheltered condition of the

individual before this threat. (31)

The conditions created by the crises of the fourteenth

century appear analogous to those described by Barrett:

disillusioned by the failure of the systems on which they

had relied, people began to question the authenticity of

these systems. Although Chaucer cannot be called an

existentialist, many of the questions and ideas raised in

his works are similar to those of the existentialists.

Chaucer was doubtless aware of the alienation of humans

because " [ s ] uch matters as anxiety, death, the conf lict

between the bogus and the genuine self, the faceless man of

the masses, the experience of the death [Le., the removal]

of God are . . . themes of life" [Barrett 9). Nothingness is the void created by humanityrs sense of its alienation and

homelessness in the world. Religion provided a "framework, "

a structure that encompassed manr s life, providing

him with a system of images and syrnbols by which

he could express his own aspirations toward

psychic wholeness. With the loss of this

containing framework man becarne not only a

dispossessed but a fragmentary being. (Barrett

3 5 )

The danger of nothingness is that the individual may remain

incomplete and desperate. Humanity is left seeking

wholeness; for some existentialists like Sartre, the

solution was to find a project, a cause for action that

could fil1 the void with meaning and lend significance to

existence. As Sartre says, "Man is nothing else but that

which he makes of himself" (28).

Existential philosophers question the meaning of

religion and religious faith "in relation to the individual.

Each has put religion itself radically in question" (Barrett

15). The decision to either affim or deny faith rests on

individual judgment, and existentialism is a philosophy of

individual responsibility and freedom. Sartre explains that

human existence is grounded on the individual's actions and

experiences: "Man is al1 the time outside of himself: it is

i n p r o j e c t i n g and l o s i n g h i r n s e l f beyond h i m s e l f t h a t he

makes man t o e x i s t ; and, on the o t h e r hand, it is by

p u r s u i n g t r a n s c e n d e n t a i m s t h a t h e h i m s e l f i s able t o e x i s t "

(55) . L i k e Thomas Aquinas a n d t h e Nomina l i s t s , S a r t r e

believes t h a t e x i s t e n c e precedes e s s e n c e . I n o t h e r words,

i n d i v i d u a h E i s s t exis t , t h e n c r e a t e t hemse lves t h r o u g h

e x p e r i e n c e , a n idea n o t u n l i k e t h a t e x p r e s s e d i n Chauce r ' s

"Wife of Bath's Prologue," i n which the e x p e r i e n c e s which

have shaped t h e Wife become h e r a u t h o r i t y . And, s i n c e humans

must ground t h e i r e x i s t e n c e o n t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e a n d i n t h e i r

own a c t i o n s , t h e y are r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e i r own lives. Thus,

f o r S a r t r e and, pe rhaps , for Chaucer , t h e o n l y r e s p o n s e t o

t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of n o t h i n g n e s s is n o t n i h i l i s m b u t a c t i o n :

i n a n u n c e r t a i n u n i v e r s e , t h e o n l y way t o l ive a mean ing fu l

existence is t o choose t o act. I will argue t h a t , f o r

Chaucer, w r i t i n g The Canterbury Tales is t h e n e c e s s a r y

a c t i o n ; h i s r e sponse t o the r e c o g n i t i o n o f u n c e r t a i n t y a n d

n o t h i n g n e s s i s t h e q u e s t i o n i n g of h i s own f a i t h i n "The

M i l l e r r s T a l e , " "The C l e r k r s T a l e , " and "The Pa rdone r ' s

T a l e . "

CEIAPTER TWO

"THE MILLER'S TALE" AND "THE CLERKr S TALE"

A u t h o r i t i e s l i m i t and govern speech by r e c o g n i z i n g a n d

u s i n g t h e power o f language. These a u t h o r i t i e s a t t e m p t t o

c o n t r o l what can be said; however, as Chaucer's sa t i r ic u s e

of l anguage demons t r a t e s , t h i s c o n t r o l is a n i l l u s i o n . I n

"The M i l l e r ' s Tale" and "The C l e r k f s T a l e , " Chaucer e x p o s e s

t h e s e false appea rances o f c o n t r o l , r e v e a l i n g t h e power of

l anguage t o undermine t h e d i s c u r s i v e f o r m a t i o n s which

comprise t h e f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y ep i s t eme , and showing t h e

e a s e w i t h which a p p a r e n t l y r e a s o n a b l e p remises can b e

i n v e r t e d and m i s i n t e r p r e t e d . S o - c a l l e d " u n i v e r s a l t r u t h s "

a r e shown t o be d e c e p t i o n s created by a u t h o r i t i e s t o

m a i n t a i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s ; t h e r e f o r e , d e f i n i t i v e answers t o

q u e s t i o n s o f n a t u r e and e x i s t e n c e a r e u n a t t a i n a b l e u s i n g

r a t i o n a l means a l o n e . A s a r e s u l t , Chaucer ' s sa t i r ica l

t r e a t m e n t o f r e l i g i o u s themes dernons t ra tes t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r

skep t i c i s rn and d e s p a i r t h a t can result from t o o heavy a

dependence on r e a s o n . H e shows t h a t , u l t i m a t e l y , i n d i v i d u a l s

can f i n d t r u t h and s u b s t a n t i a t e the i r beliefs, b u t o n l y

th rough a n act o f p e r s o n a l fa i th .

I n "The M i l l e r ' s Tale" a n d "The CLerkrs Ta le , " words

becorne t h e means through which t h e c h a r a c t e r s test b o t h

t h e i r knowledge o f t h e wor ld a n d t h e a b i l i t y o f t h a t

knowledge t o reveal t r u t h . The M i l l e r t e l l s t h e ta le of a

s t u d e n t o f a s t r o l o g y ( m i s ) u s i n g h i s knowledge t o dupe h i s

l o v e r ' s husband who, i n h i s "p ious ignorance" of t h a t

science, is willing to believe what he cannot understand. By

warning that people should not inquire too deeply into

"Goddes pryvetee" (31641, "The Miller's Tale" becomes an

exploration of the ability of human authorities, such as

those of "The Knightrs Tale's" assertions of certainty in

Theseusr Prime Mover speech1 or of Church doctrine, to

provide fundamental assurances about the nature of God and

the Divine Mysteries. The tale seems to conclude that such

an exploration leads to disillusionment because nothing can

be known definitively. "The Clerkrs Tale," too, explores the

possibility of answering such unanswerable questions. The

Clerk examines God's relationship with His creation through

the description of Walter's \experimentr using Griselda as

the subject. But the Clerk only calls into question the

extent to which such a philosophical exercise can provide a

reliable understanding of the human relationship with God:

in the end, the ways of God still remain a mystery. Both

Walter and Nicholas use language to create illusions of

reality contrary to what they know to be true to achieve

their own ends: Walter attempts to rneasure his wife's

constancy by subjecting her to three cruel tests, and

Nicholas falsely predicts a flood so that Alisoun "sholde

slepen in his a m al nyghtw (3406). The lies and

Theseus ascribes the events that lead to Arciters death, for which (as the audience knows) Saturn was responsible, to Jupiter; Theseusf misapprehension undermines the idea of order that he presents.

m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h a t are e s s e n t i a l t o t h e u n f o l d i n g of t h e

c h a r a c t e r s ' schemes are a l s o m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of t h e

u n r e l i a b l e n a t u r e of l a n g u a g e .

The Canterbury T a l e s b e g i n s w i t h t h e Knigh t b e c a u s e his

s o c i a l s t a t u s i s t h e h i g h e s t among t h o s e on t h e f ic t ive

p i l g r i m a g e a n d h i s t a l e reflects his p o s i t i o n . "The M i l l e r ' s

Ta l e " is a r e a c t i o n against t h e a r t i f i c i a l c o u r t l y love and

s o c i a l o r d e r t h a t t h e Knigh t u p h o l d s a n d recreates i n h i s

ta le . Here, t h e M i l l e r ' s l o w social s t a t u s a n d imp ious

a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s t h e K n i g h t ' s t a l e p r e s e n t s a n a l t e r n a t i v e

t h a t s u b v e r t s the K n i g h t ' s c o u r t l y a n d c o n s e r v a t i v e p o s i t i o n

e v e n as i t acknowledges t h e power o f t h a t p o s i t i o n . A s

Hanning says, t h e M i l l e r p i e r c e s " t h r o u g h facades t o l a y

bare p r y v e t e e , e x p o s i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c f i c t i o n s t h a t are

t h e r e b y shown to be a c e n t r a l p a r t of l i fe" ( 1 1 2 ) . The p l o t

of "The M i l l e r ' s Ta le" i s complicated by t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f

Abso lon , whom P r i o r describes as "at first j u s t s i m p l y

David's Absalom, b e a u t i f u l b u t doomed" (61 -2 ) . H e is a

p a r o d y o f t h e c o u r t l y c h a r a c t e r s i n "The Kn igh t r s Ta le" b u t ,

i n "The M i l l e r ' s Ta l e " where e v e r y t h i n g is i n v e r t e d , t h e

" p r i z e i n t h i s c o r n p e t i t i o n d o e s not g o t o t h e p a t i e n t ,

s e l f - r e s t r a i n e d s u i t o r , . . b u t t o t h e one who s e i z e s t h e

main chance" (Knapp, Chaucer 38 ) ; i r o n i c a l l y , however,

Absolon is more s e l f - r e p r e s s e d t h a n "self- r e s t r a i n e d " :

' soo th t o seyn, h e w a s somdeel squaymous/ O f f a r t y n g , and of

s p e c h e daunge rousw (3337-8) .

A s a r e s u l t o f A b s o l o n f s o v e r c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s c o u r t l y

r o l e , h i s " f a n t a s y b e g i n s t o o u t r u n p e r c e p t i o n , t h e

imag ina ry t o u s u r p t h e real" ( G a l l a c h e r 4 4 ) . Consequent ly ,

h e i s u n a b l e t o conce ive o f t he p o s s i b i l i t y o f A l i soun as a n

independen t , p h y s i c a l b e i n g w i t h a very u n l a d y l i k e s e n s e o f

humor; h e is misled by the p romise o f a k i s s and f a i l s t o

r e c o g n i z e h i s m i s t a k e u n t i l " w i t h h i s rnouth he k i s t e h e r

naked ers/ F u 1 savour ly" (3734-35) . The s c e n e i s a parody o f

a p a r i s h clerk worsh ipp ing , n o t t h e V i r g i n Mary

whom he s h o u l d have been worsh ipp ing , but a n

e a r t h l y woman. . . And it is no a c c i d e n t t h a t ,

as he p r e p a r e s h i m s e l f o u t s i d e h e r wlndow t o

receive A l i s o u n f s k i s s , Absolon "doun sette hym on

h i s knees" (A 3723) and asks for A l i s o u n r s "grace"

(A 3726) . (Be id le r 9 4 )

I n s w e a r i n g revenge, t h i s pa rody of the c o u r t l y l o v e r whose

language c o n f i g u r e s him as a weak, c o r r u p t f i g u r e o f Solomon

a n d o f C h r i s t i n a parody o f t h e Song of Songsr2 becomes a

f i g u r e of Judas when he r e t u r n s f rom t h e f o r g e w i t h a " k i s s

o f b e t r a y a l " ( P r i o r 6 3 ) . Absolon r e t u r n s t o A l i s o u n r s window

w i t h a h o t c o u l t e r ; h i s words, "Spek, sweete bryd, 1 noot

n a t where t h o u art" (38O5), c u e N i c h o l a s r thunderous f a r t

I n t h a t moment, a l l speech is r e n d e r e d mean ing le s s as words

R. E. K a s k e d i s c u s s e s Chaucerf s p a r o d i c t r e a t m e n t o f t h e "Canticum Canticorum, " p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Absolonr s r e f e r e n c e s t o "hony-comb" (3698) , "bryd" and 'my sweete cynamome" (36991, and "lemman myn" (3700) ( K a s k e 481-2 ) .

and p e r c e p t i o n s a r e shown t o be mis t aken ; when the

c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n between s i g n i f i e r s a n d their

s i g n i f i e d s i s broken, speech is r e d u c e d t o t h e "ey r ybroken"

o f The House o f Fame (765) . The M i l l e r rejects t h e u n i v e r s a l

ideals and c o u r t l y manners r e p r e s e n t e d by the Knight, and

reaffirms h i s own p o s i t i o n , s t r i p p i n g

t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e d i s c o u r s e of i ts e x a l t e d s t a t u s

by p o i n t i n g o u t what h e takes t o be t h e comrrton

needs o f a l l people--John's ungovernable c u r i o s i t y

a b o u t Nicholas , b o t h s u i t o r s ' s e x u a l a p p e t i t e s ,

A l i sounf s desire f o r a young l o v e r , N icho la s r s

g e t t i n g u p "for t o pisse," a n d t h e l i k e . (Knapp,

Chaucer 4 2 )

Thus, Absolon embodies t h e f a i l i n g s r a t h e r t h a n t h e v i r t u e s

o f t h e c o u r t l y lover who is more conce rned w i t h h i s r o l e a n d

t h e i d e a l i z a t i o n o f h i s l o v e r t h a n w i t h t h e l o v e r h e r s e l f .

When Absolon makes A l i s o u n "the o b j e c t of h i s ' l o v e

longyngs, ' h e r e i n f o r c e s h i s own l anguage and se l f - image by

r e d u c i n g A l i s o u n t o a r e f l e c t i o n dependent on his flattery

and d i s c o u r s e f o r h e r own i d e n t i t y " (Donaldson 1 4 5 ) . B y

expos ing t h e s e f i c t i o n s , t h e M i l l e r shows t h e i n s t a b i l i t y of

t h e c o u r t l y ideal and i t s language .

T h i s exposu re r e a c h e s i t s climax w i t h Absolon 's

unexpected reappearance , when N i c h o l a s l o s e s his a b i l i t y t o

c o n t i n u e t h e d e c e p t i o n , cu l rn ina t ing i n t h e "fart/ As g r e e t

as it had been a thonder-dent" (3806-713 which s i g n a l s the

m e t i n g o u t of v a r i o u s p e n a l t i e s t o c h a r a c t e r s t o o c o n f i d e n t

i n t h e i r own a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l l anguage a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

R e f e r r i n g t o t h i s i n s t a b i l i t y , Peggy Knapp declares:

The s t o r y p r o c e e d s b e c a u s e Nicho la s , i n h i s con o f

t h e c a r p e n t e r , p l a y s fast and l o o s e w i t h the f a i t h

t h e dominant d i s c o u r s e had p l a c e d i n t h e

r e v e l a t o r y power of words. (Chaucer 4 8 )

Through t h e sa t i re i m p l i c i t i n t h e tale, Chaucer ' s n a r r a t o r

is able t o " r e a p p r o p r i a t e l anguage f o r [ h i s ] own cunning and

i r r e v e r e n t u s e s . . . . [Tl h e s i g n i f i e r s Robyn e x p l o i t s

a l r e a d y have t h e d o u b l e edge t h a t a l l o w s h i s o u t r a g e o u s

l i n g u i s t i c alchemy" (Knapp, Chaucer 4 1 ) . T h a t is, words can

create and reveal i l l u s i o n s b y combining b o t h t h e sacred and

t h e s a c r i l e g i o u s i n a s i n g l e s i g n i f i e r .

T h e M i l l e r a l so i n t e n t i o n a l l y misxses s i g n i f i c a n t

e l e m e n t s of r e l i g i o u s l e g e n d t o undermine i t s a u t h o r i t y . H e

p r o p o s e s t o t e l l a double-edged " legende a n d a l y f / Bothe of

a c a r p e n t e r and o f h i s w i f e " (3141-2)- As B e r y l Rowland h a s

p o i n t e d o u t , " Cl] egend is t h e r e g u l a r t i t l e f o r t h e l i f e o f

a s a i n t . . . [ and] t h e a u d i e n c e would probab ly i d e n t i f y t h e

s a i n t w i t h t h e famous c a r p e n t e r . . . S t . Joseph, t h e

husband o f t h e V i r g i n Mary" ( 4 4 ) . T h e double-edge of t h e

N i c h o l a s r fury i n t e r n a l , which so o f f e n d s Absolon, works as a parody of P l u t o r s " f u r y i n f e r n a l " (KnT 2684) which c a u s e s Arcite t o be thrown f rom h i s horse ; i n b o t h cases, a rurnbling in t h e bowels (of e i t h e r N icho la s or o f the earth) is c r i t i ca l t o t h e denouement of t h e p lo t .

religious satire "pushes to the blasphemous extreme the

similarities between the Creator, the Saviour, and the

Saved, on the one hand, and their antitypes the Avenger, the

Tempter, and the Fallen, on the other" (Prior 60) . In the tale, Nicholas sings the Angelus ad virginem, which places

him in the role of Gabriel speaking to the Virgin, but the

allusion to the sacred event is undermined by association

with Nicholas' lascivious intentions: e-g., as when "prively

he caughte hire by the queynte" (3276). Through Nicholas'

appropriation of the Annunciation, "[the Miller] depicts

clerical learning as a cynical exploitation of the Word with

which the religious state is entrusted" (Knapp, Chaucer 40).

a depiction, incidentally, consistent with Wycliff s distrust

of the clergy.

Prior claims that Alisounrs role as 'a type of the

Virgin Mary . . . is primarily suggested through her relationship to . . . Nicholas" (61). However, the allusions to refigious symbols in Alisounfs description also associate

her with the Virgin Mary:

Fair was this yonge wyf, and therwithal

As any wezele hir body gent and smal . . . White was hir smok, and broyden al bifoore

And eek bihynde, on hir coler aboute,

Of col-blak silk, withinne and eek withoute.

The tapes of hir white voluper

Were of the same suyte of hir coler; . . . (3233-42)

Rowland e x p l a i n s t h a t A l i soun is compared t o t h e weasel

which "conceived b y t h e ear a n d gave b i r t h t h r o u g h t h e

mouth" as t h e V i r g i n conce ived Godrs Son, the Word made

f l e s h . A l i s o u n is dressed i n b l a c k a n d whi te , which are t h e

" c o l o u r s of ho l iness" ; s h e is "softer t h a n t h e wolle i s of a

wether" (MIT 32491 and wool i s " t h e most famous of a l 1

symbols of t h e V i r g i n Mary" (Rowland 4 7 ) . However, when

t h e s e images are c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e l e c h e r o u s

"swalwe" (3258) , Al i sounf s c o l t i s h s p i r i t , h e r p lucked

eyebrows, and h e r " l i k e r o u s ye" ( 3 2 4 4 ) , t h e r e l i g i o u s

symbols o f wool and weasel are rningled w i t h t h e i r n a t u r a l ,

sexual c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and are t h e r e b y undermined. Also, t he

n a r r a t o r f s a s s e r t i o n t h a t s h e w a s "a prymerole , a

p iggensnye , / Fo r any l o r d t o l eggen i n his bedde,/ O r y e t

f o r a n y good yernan t o wedde" (3267-70) s u b v e r t s t h e

r e l i g i o u s i l l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e V i r g i n Mary

create. A l i s o u n cornes t o resemble " t he e t e r n a l Eve" (Rowland

4 7 ) , e a s i l y seduced by Nicho la s p l a y i n g t h e r o l e o f t h e

Ternpter.

Knapp e x p l a i n s t h a t , i n t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f Noah's

Flood, N icho la s f scheme h i n g e s upon "us ing i n a d i s t o r t e d

way t h e dominant d i s c o u r s e o f o b e d i e n c e t o b ib l ica l

i n j u n c t i o n s " (Chaucer 36 ) , r e i n f o r c i n g t h e v a l i d i t y of

Augus t ine ' s conce rn fo r t h o s e who believe w i t h o u t

q u e s t i o n i n g . N i c h o l a s t a k e s advan tage o f J o h n f s faith i n

what h e believes to be S c r i p t u r a l truth and h i s belief i n

t h e power o f words t o p o r t r a y t r u t h and r e a l i t y , r e l y i n g on

h i s "pious ignorance":

[ i ] n Nicholas ' t r i c k , t h e p r e d i c t i v e power of

s c i e n c e , i n t h i s case a s t r o l o g y , and the sacred

power of s c r i p t u r e ( t h e Noah s t o r y ) are used

c y n i c a l l y t o a u t h o r i z e a scarn c o m p l e t e l y of

Nicholas ' s own manufac ture . (Knapp, Chaucer 39)

Again, N icho la s seems t o play t h e r o l e o f Godfs messenger

[ i f no t o f God h i m s e l f ) as h e p r e d i c t s a n o t h e r f l o o d t o

John. However, N icho ia s p r o v i d e s what Wyclif would cal1 a

" l y i n g glose'' t o h i s own text; John is deceived by hav ing

t o o g r e a t a f a i t h i n words, and i n t h e dominant r e l i g i o u s

and s c i e n t i f i c a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t Nicholas e x p l o i t s .

Nicholas i s able t o conv ince John t h a t h i s p r e d i c t i o n

o f t h e approach o f a n o t h e r f l o o d i s t r u e b e c a u s e John

b e l i e v e s i n t h e B i b l e stories: he does n o t q u e s t i o n

Nicholas ' s t o r y , b u t cries, " A l l a s , m y wyf!/ And shall s h e

drenche?" (3522-31, i l l u s t r a t i n g h i s immediate and a b s o l u t e

faith i n Nicholas ' words. A s Knapp e l a b o r a t e s , ' [t] h e whole

scam relies on John 's belief i n t h e t r u t h of t h e B i b l e ,

which i n t u r n rests on i t s p e r v a s i v e n e s s and a u t h o r i t y i n

h i s c u l t u r e ( f o r John is a simple and u n o r i g i n a l man)"

(Chaucer 4 0 ) . And, it i s John 's s i m p l i c i t y and lack of

o r i g i n a l i t y t h a t a l l o w Nicholas t o manipulate and s u b v e r t

t h e p r i v i l e g e d r e l i g i o u s p o s i t i o n , w h i l e p r o v i d i n g a n

a l t e r n a t i v e which must re ly on John 's f a i t h and h i s

incomple te knowledge o f t h e B i b l e f o r i t s v a l i d a t i o n .

Nicholas recognizes that the discourses he manipulates are

very powerful, but he also has to be aware of their

weaknesses: if he believed that Bible stories about the

punishment of sin were true, "the chance he takes with his

blasphemy would be too great. . . . Nicholas is not afraid of the consequences of diverting authorized discourses--

biblical and astrological--to his own ends" (Knapp, Chaucer

40).

The religious satire in the Tale appears to be inforrned

by the Nominalist idea that the power of words can create

illusions of goodness that can disguise underlying

corruption. As Knapp observes, " [t] he Tale should be called

Nominalist because words--signifiers--are irreverently pried

loose from what they signify. No guaranteeing order is

assumed to prevail to keep everything in place" (Chaucer

48). "Hende" Nicholasf references to divinely-inspired

events create illusions without substance: his test of his

own cleverness and the manipulation of his clerical

knowledge fail when he is unable to see through Absolon's

words and is "scalded in the towte" (3853). Nicholas

orchestrates the events and initially seems to control the

illusions he creates with his words, but the language on

which he relies f a i l s him; as Knapp says, he "should have

trusted the stability of language less, not more. . . . He is vulnerable to unpredictable accidents and the

machinations of his rivals in this chaotic world" (Chaucer

4 0 ) . In the end, Absolonrs cour t ly persona, John's faith in

the p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n of r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y , and

N i c h o l a s r d e c e p t i o n s are w o r t h no more than a fart. A l i s o u n

a l o n e g o e s unpunished f o r her d i s l o y a l t y t o h e r husband,

p a r t l y b e c a u s e she i s t h e o n l y o n e who is unconcerned w i t h

words. She is i n v o l v e d only w i t h t h e t a n g i b l e reali t ies of

sex, and n o t w i t h t h e a b s t r a c t i o n s o f s c i e n c e o r ph i lo sophy .

L i k e A l i s o u n , the M i l l e r seems t o embody a p r i n c i p l e of

a c t i o n a n d a conce rn f o r what is real. H e l a u g h s a t t h o s e

who fa11 i n t o t h e rnarle p i t o f " p i o u s ignorance ."

I n "The C l e r k ' s T a l e , " as i n "The M i l l e r f s Ta le , " one

c h a r a c t e r s u b v e r t s a n a u t h o r i t y C s u s e o f l anguage t o

o r c h e s t r a t e e v e n t s as though he w e r e a god. I n t h e C l e r k ' s

n a r r a t i v e , Walter u s e s words t o deceive, t o man ipu la t e , and,

i n t h e end, t o j u s t i f y his d e c e p t i o n s and m a n i p u l a t i o n s .

Knapp o b s e r v e s t h a t Walter desires "Griselda's ' sadnesse f o r

t o knowef i n o r d e r t o p u r g e h i m s e l f o f something t h a t looks

v e r y much l i k e i n t e l l e c t u a l doubt" (Chaucer 138). However,

Ockhamfs Nomina l i s t view o f knowledge s a w

a s e v e r e r e s t r i c t i o n on what c o u l d be p r e d i c a t e d

a b o u t God and d i v i n e t h i n g s by t h e una ided

r a t i o n a l hurnan rnind. The emphas i s came t o be

placed on a n ever w i d e r s c o p e f o r f a i t h i n

d e f i n i n g t h e n a t u r e of God. (Stepsis 132)

I n t h e t a l e , Walter's i n e f f e c t u a l e x p e r i m e n t d e m o n s t r a t e s

t h a t r e a s o n a l o n e is n o t enough t o d i s p e l i n t e l l e c t u a l

doubt ; he i s no more c e r t a i n o f Griselda's cons t ancy i n t h e

e n d t h a n he w a s a t the s tar t .

L i k e "The M i l l e r f s Taf e, " "The C l e r k f s T a l e " seems to

rnove towards t h e moral t h a t "[rnlen s h o l d e n a t knowe of

Goddes pryve tee" ( M i l T 3 4 5 4 ) . With i t s r e f e r e n c e s to Job

(871-2, 932) and s i t u a t i o n a l parody o f Abraham's

a c q u i e s c e n c e t o Godfs demand that h e sacrifice h i s son

(501-4) , "The C l e r k r s Tale" seems t o a d v i s e i n d i v i d u a l s t o

a c c e p t i n j u r y w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n , and t h a t t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l

w i l l s should be i n comple te con fo rmi ty w i t h God's. The

r e l a t i o n s h i p between Walter and Griselda reflects t h e

r e l a t i o n s h i p between God a n d hurnankind: " s i t h a womman was

s o patient/ Unto a m o r t a l man, w e l moore u s o g h t e / Receyven

a l i n g r e e t h a t God us s e n t " (149-51). This r e l a t i o n s h i p

i rnp l ies t h a t i t is best t o a c c e p t t h e Lord's w i l l w i t h o u t

q u e s t i o n . However, by showing t h e p o s s i b l e consequences of

b l i n d a c c e p t a n c e a n d p i o u s i gno rance , the tale s u b v e r t s i ts

own moral .

T h e C l e r k r s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n i n g o f Walter as God

i s p rob lema t i c : as S t e p s i s s a y s , Walter is " c r u e l , v a i n ,

c a p r i c i o u s , and u n f e e l i n g " ( 129) . Wal te r reflects t h e

Norninal is t v i s i o n of t h e a b s o l u t e freedom o f God; as S t e p s i s

obse rves , " [ t l h e o n l y a b s o l u t e l y t r u e s t a t e m e n t s t h a t man

can make abou t God i s t h a t H e can do whatever H e w i l l s and

H e can w i l l a n y t h i n g because h e knows eve ry th ing" (135). AS

a r e s u l t , God cari a l s o de t e rmine what is good:

that which is good is not good per se, but is good

because God willed it to be good; and since his

will is free and all-powerful, it is entirely

conceivable that He could will something to be

good, rather than that which is now the good.

(Stepsis 134)

Chaucer's portrayal of Walter as constrained only by His own

will forces his readers to question the orthodox doctrine of

the appropriateness of subrnissive responses to Godfs

seemingly arbitrary decisions to test his people. For

example, Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son seems

unnatural and is reflected in Griselda's equally unnatural

subrnission to her husbandrs whims. Griselda rernains constant

to her lord despite his cruelty and, by consenting to the

murciers, actually becomes an accomplice in the crimes.

Walter considers Griselda's consent to what she believes is

the murder of her children a virtuous act, creating a

paradoxical situation in which murder can be at once

virtuous and unvirtuous. Thus, the tale challenges the

morality of such conformity and also of the tests that

Walter attempts to justify as he manipulates language.

Through the testing, Griselda supposedly becomes

an emblem of the patient human sou1 in its ideal

response to the adversities visited on it by God

or as a figure of the Virgin, Job, or Abraham in

their obedience to the apparently arbitrary

demands of the Lord. (Stepsis 1291

She vows t o conform h e r w i l l e n t i r e l y t o Walter's; S t e p s i s

writes t h a t , "[hluman f reedom resides i n the a b i l i t y of t h e

c r e a t u r e t o conform h i s w i l l t o t h e i n f i n i t e l y free w i l l of

t h e Creator" ( 1 3 4 ) . A s a r e s u l t , a p e r s o n ' s a c t i o n is

v i r t u o u s n o t i n i t se l f b u t b e c a u s e of t h e c o n s c i o u s d e c i s i o n

t o d o God's w i l l , w h a t e v e r God's w i l l happens t o be. Thus,

Griselda's u n v i r t u o u s b e h a v i o u r becomes v i r t u o u s a c c o r d i n g

t o W à l t e r ' s r e w r i t i n g o f e v e n t s .

Once Griselda h a s made h e r vow o f con fo rmi ty , a l l s i g n s

o f h e r f o r m e r l i f e are erased and s h e " t r a n s l a t e d was i n

s w i c h r i c h e s s e " (385) . T h e Middle Englisk? Dictionary d e f i n e s

" t r a n s l a t e d " as " [ t ] o change t h e n a t u r e , c o n d i t i o n , o r

a p p e a r a n c e . . . , t r a n s f o r m , a l t e r . . ; a l s o , a d v a n c e

( o n e ' s p o s i t i o n ) " (983) . David Wallace w r i t e s t h a t

" [ t l r a n s l a t i o n i n Chaucer is a term t h a t is c u s t o m a r i l y

hedged w i t h n e r v o u s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , . . . Every t r a n s l a t i o n

c o n t a i n s a trace o f i m p u r i t y b e c a u s e n o t r a n s l a t o r can

g u a r a n t e e a p e r f e c t t r a n s f e r be tween languages" ( 1 9 7 ) .

T r a n s l a t i n g i n e v i t a b l y changes t h e e s s e n c e of the o r i g i n a l

" t e x t " b e c a u s e the t r a n s l a t o r c o n t r o l s t h a t t e x t a n d imposes

h i s o r her own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o n t 0 it. Thus, Griselda is

t r a n s f o r m e d by h e r vow, p h y s i c a l l y and s p i r i t u a l l y : as

F innegan s a y s , "Griselda d e l i b e r a t e l y creates h e r s e l f i n

Walter's image, a d c p t i n g h i s ends, and a c c e p t i n g p e r f o r c e

t h e r e b y his means t owards thern" ("She" 307). She verges on

" t h e edge of vowing t h e e x t i n c t i o n of h e r s e l f as a p e r s o n -

Such e x t i n c t i o n implies t h e a b r o g a t i o n of c o n s c i e n c e , of t h e

a u t h o r i t y t o make moral d e c i s i o n s " (Finnegan, "She" 3 0 6 ) .

H e r o b e d i e n c e is a f o m o f "p ious i gno rance , " a n

u n q u e s t i o n i n g a c c e p t a n c e o f wha t Walter demands o f h e r which

d e m o n s t r a t e s h e r b l i n d f a i t h i n someth ing beyond her

u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Because s h e has become a r e f l o c t i o n o f

Wal t e r ' s own beliefs and i n t e n t i o n s , h i s test r e v e a l s more

a b o u t h i m s e l f t h a n i t does a b o u t Griselda: th rough t h e

tes t s , Griselda becomes a l i e n a t e d f rom b o t h h e r s e n s e of h e r

self and f r o m Wal t e r (and, t h e r e f o r e , from God) . I n fact ,

Walter's t r a n s f o m a t i v e test is doomed t o fail because h e

"has made G r i s e l d a unknowable t o h i m s e l f by t h e very comrnand

on which t h e m a r r i a g e i s based" (Kirk 1 1 6 ) :

1 s e y e t h i s : be ye r e d y w i t h good h e r t e

To a l my l u s t , a n d t h a t 1 f r e l y may,

As m e b e s t t hynke th , d o yow l aughe o r smerte,

And n e v e r e ye t o g rucche i t nyght ne day?

And e e k whan I s e y 'ye, ' n e sey n a t 'nay,'

N e i t h e r by word ne frownyng contenance? (351-356)

"The C l e r k ' s T a l e " f u r t h e r c h a l l e n g e s t h e d o c t r i n e o f

p a t i e n c e and a c c e p t a n c e t o which Griselda s u b s c r i b e s by

t a k i n g h e r submis s ion t o ex t remes . She te l l s Walter,

If 1 hadde p r e s c i e n c e

Youre w y l t o knowe, er ye youre l u s t m e tolde,

1 wolde it doon w i t h o u t e n n e c l i g e n c e ;

But now I woot youre l u s t , a n d what ye wolde,

Al youre p l e s a n c e ferme and s t a b l e 1 holde;

For w i s t e I t h a t m y d e e t h wolde do yow ese,

Right gladly wolde 1 dyen, yow to please.

(659-665)

Griselda acknowleCges a willingness to f u l f i l l Walter's

desires even before he tells thern to her; she insinuates

that if she had known he wanted to kiLl their son, she would

have committed the murder herself. She is even willing to

commit suicide. Griselda is willing to sacrifice not only

her own life and her children's lives but I t appears that

she is also willing to sacrifice her soul, The Clerk

demonstrates the double edge of this doctrine of

unquestioning acceptance and "pious ignorance": religious

philosophy fails to provide an adequate solution to Walter's

tests, and the individuals within the artistic frame--and,

by extension, the audience outside--are left to consider the

nature of the relationship between God and humans for

themselves.

Van says that Walter's "relentless testing of Griselda

is an examination, by surrogate, of his own spiritual

interior" ( 215 ) . Like Nicholas, Walter seeks to test his own

knowledge of philosophy and human nature. He claims that his

people are dissatisfied, that he intends to remarry, and

even that he has the power to obtain Papal bulles with which

he convinces Griselda that the Pope approves of his planO4

The ambiguity of the bullesr authenticity is irrelevant because, as Wyclif observed, the binding power of any bulle depended upon the moral state of the Pope who issued it; even if the bulles came from the Pope, he was clearly in Walter's service and probably guilty of the simony that

I r o n i c a l l y , h e te l l s G r i s e l d a t o ' [ t l a a k heede o f eve ry word

t h a t y yow seye8' ( 4 7 5 ) even though he l ies t o h e r throughout

t h e tests. H e man ipu la tes Griselda and imposes a r e c r e a t i o n

o f r e a i i t y on h e r . I n e v i t a b l y , t h e tests fa i l , even though

G r i s e l d a does e x a c t l y what Walter r e q u i r e s . As Van observes ,

" [b] ecause [Walter] is look ing f o r o c u l a r p roof o f what

cannot b e seen . . . he will never know f o r c e r t a i n " ( 2 2 1 ) .

Walter wants p roof of Griçeldars v i r t u e , b u t t h e evidence

causes him t o q u e s t i o n h e r v i r t u e even f u r t h e r ; as Finnegan

states,

Walter i s now t r o u b l e d by Griselda's conduct,

wondering whether h e r ' pac ience r i n r e sponse t o

h i s ' ternptingr does n o t e x h i b i t '. . . some

s u b t i l i t e e , . . . o f ma l i ce , o r o f c r u e e l corage.

. . (691-92) . Thus t h e t e m p t e r h i m s e l f fears he

has been t o o s u c c e s s f u l and he, t h e n a r r a t o r a n d

w e are f o r c e d t o c o n s i d e r whether G r i s e l d a , i n

keeping h e r promise, has n o t l o s t a b s o l u t e l y h e r

fo rmer ly v i r t u o u s c h a r a c t e r . ("She" 316)

A t t h e v e r y least, G r i s e l d a is permanent ly changed by t h e

t e s t i n g : Finnegan compares h e r t o a c o i n t h a t h a s been ben t

t o test i t s worth, remarking t h a t "once having been tested

t h u s , the bent c o i n can never be r e c o n s t i t u t e d t o i t s

p r i s t i n e , i t s innocent , cond i t ion" ("She" 3 1 9 ) . Walter's

Wyclif desp i sed . I n t h a t case, even a u t h e n t i c b u l l e s would have had no t r u e power.

philosophy fails to remove his intellectual doubt. In fact,

he is l e f t in more doubt about his wife; he may even have

destroyed that which he valued most in her. The tests f a i l

to prove anything.

"The Clerkfs Tale's" subversion of orthodox religious

ideology demonstrates the failure of language to express the

nature of God. Steinmetz states that "God is guided by H i s

own inner sense of justice, which, even if it cannot be

predicted, comrnends itself to human reason as

self-consistent and reasonable, once it is revealed" (41).

In the end, Walter reveals his intention, and his behavior

seems to be justified because Griselda appears to have

passed the tests. By manipulating language, he creates the

illusion that the tests were part of a plan and attempts to

demonstrate his omnipotence.

In the tale, the Narrator observes that "[tlhis markys

i n his herte longe th so/ To tempte his w y f " (451-2); "tempt"

carries with it the dernonic implications of enticing a

person t o sin.5 However, Walter is a l s o connected with God

and the Clerk observes that God does not tempt men, he

"preeve that he wroghte" (1152), thereby proving that their

intentions and faith are genuine (MED 1277 ) . Because

Griselda passes the tests by avoiding the sin of

The M i d d l e E n q l i s h Dictionary defines "tempt" as " [t] he act of testing t h e faith or character of a person. . . . The act or condition of being ternpted by the devil, fleshly desires, etc." (197). The act of "tempting" is generally associated with the Devil.

disobedience, Walter is able to translate "tempt" into

"assai" through a process of linguistic alchemy that

transforms Griselda and alters the people's interpretations

and thus their mernories of the events. By the end of the

Tale, "assai/"' with its ceremonial and religious

connotations, has replaced "tempt": Walter insists,

1 warne hem wel that 1 have doon this deede

For no malice, ne for no c rue l t ee ,

But for tr assaye in thee thy wommanheede,

. . . Ti1 1 thy purpos knewe and al thy will. (1073-8)

Walter redefines the concepts of "tempting" and "testing" to

reconfigure the events that occur during his testing of

Griselda, much as Nicholas does at the end of "The Miller's

Tale" when he and Alisoun "tolden every man that [John] was

wood" ( M i l T 3833). Walter also transforms the ideal of

virtue to create the illusion of a happy ending- Despite the

fact that Griselda's virtue lies in her blind submission to

external forces, rather than in an intrinsically motivated

devotion to what is good, she has proven to Walter that she

is virtuous in the ways he required, so she is reinstated as

his wife and her children are returned to her. Ironically,

"Assai" is defined as 'a testing of character or persona1 traits (such as faithfulness, f r iendsh ip , fortitude); trial, ordeal ; . . . A test of arms, combat; an attack or s a l l y ; . . . a sa l ly (as of the Devil or an enemy)" (MED 4 3 6 ) - This form of "testing" carries with it connotations of ceremony and formality.

Griselda' s reward seems to prove that " [a] dversity, no

matter how severe, never invalidates the principle . . [that] God is faithful to the sou1 who is faithful to Himtf

(Steinmetz 51). But Walter's behavior only seems to be

justified, and therefore the covenant he made with Griselda

and his people seems to be preserved; the manipulation of

language creates the illusion that Walter's tests have

proven her virtue and are thereby justified. Through

Walter's recreation of the events, the authority of orthodox

doctrine appears to remain intact: G o d f s actions, "while

mysterious and unpredictable, are finally just" (Steinmetz

51). However, Chaucer reveals the instability of the

orthodox position and undermines its authority through the

exposure of the illusions Walter has created through his

manipulation and creative "translation" of words.

Just as he uses satire to reveal the inconsistencies in

Walter's logic, Chaucer uses the double-edge of satire in

these tales to expose gaps in the logic of the privileged

position of the late-fourteenth-century Church. The

radically Nominalist conception of God, seen in the

characters of Nicholas and Walter, demonstrates the

inability of finite human reason to explain the infinite.

This Norninalist perspective challenges and empties

traditional readings; in the end, Norninalism is also emptied

of meaning when it becornes radically skeptical and unstable.

Thus, John warns Nicholas:

Ye, blessed be alwey a lewed man

Tha t nogh t b u t o o n l y h i s b i l e v e kan!

So ferde a n o t h e r c l e r k w i t h as t romye;

H e w a l k e d i n t h e feeldes f o r t o p r y e

Upon t h e sterres, what t h e r s h o l d e befalle,

T i 1 he w a s i n a m a r l e - p i t y f a l l e ;

H e saugh n a t t h a t . (3455-3461)

John s u g g e s t s t h a t becoming t o o i n v o l v e d i n abstract s t u d i e s

c a u s e s peop le t o lose s i g h t of real e v e n t s i n t h e t a n g i b l e

world. B u t John fa i l s t o heed h i s own warning; l i k e N icho la s

and Absolon, h e s u f f e r s f o r h i s c u r i o s i t y and h i s

ove r -conf idence i n t h e s t a b i l i t y of l anguage . Walter, too ,

f a l l s i n t o t h e "marle-pit" (3460) when h i s desire t o control

a n d unde r s t and h i s w i f e a l i e n a t e s Griselda f rom him and

m a k e s h e r u n r e a d a b l e . Both "The M i l l e r ' s T a l e " a n d "The

C l e r k ' s T a l e " d e m o n s t r a t e t h e d a n g e r s of depending t o o

h e a v i l y on t h e s t a b i l i t y o f a n y a u t h o r i t y when t h e y show how

a l t e r n a t i v e rea l i t ies can be created w i t h l anguage i n order

to s u b v e r t t h e s e a u t h o r i t a t i v e p o s i t i o n s w h i l e , a t t h e same

t i m e , seeming t o p r e s e r v e them.

T h e i l l u s i o n s t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r s create t o p r e s e r v e o r

recreate t h e i r v i s i o n of t h e world are hol low. The "moral

o r d e r n e i t h e r p u n i s h e s [Nicho la s ] n o r rewards John 's

gene rous concern f o r A l i s o n o r r e g a r d f o r t h e l a w " (Knapp,

Chaucer 41); t h e i r reward o r punishment is c o n t i n g e n t on

Absolon 's unexpec ted a c t i o n s , j u s t as his relies on t h e i r s .

Walter, t oo , i s p u n i s h e d b y t h e f a i l u r e o f h i s tests, n o t

because he w a s wrong b u t b e c a u s e of his o v e r c o n f i d e n c e i n

h i s a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l l anguage ; t h e t a le m e r e l y a p p e a r s t o

have a happy end ing . Al though t h e c h a r a c t e r s who s e e k t o

t e s t t h e i r knowledge are able t o m a n i p u l a t e o t h e r s ' "p ious

i gno rance" of c e r t a i n a u t h o r i t i e s w e l l enough t o r e w r i t e

t h e i r own e n d i n g s , their tests are u l t i m a t e l y u n s u c c e s s f u l .

Ph i losophy , r e l i g i o n , a n d s c i e n c e f a i l t o provide the

c o n c r e t e e v i d e n c e t h a t would f i l 1 t h e void created b y

i n t e l l e c t u a l u n c e r t a i n t y ; i n s t e a d , t h e c h a r a c t e r s who employ

t h e s e i d e o l o g i e s face t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of becoming f u r t h e r

a l i e n a t e d f rom t h e t r u t h t h a t t h e y s e e k b e c a u s e of t h e i r

r e l i a n c e o n a w o r l d created w i t h words- The words t h e y u s e

are i n s u b s t a n t i d , c h a n g e a b l e , and , f i n a l l y , n o t w o r t h a

f a r t . A s t h e C l e r k s a y s , d e r n o n s t r a t i n g his r e c o g n i t i o n o f

t h e weaknes se s o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y w h i l e s t i l l a p p r e c i a t i n g

t h e ac t o f t a l e - t e l l i n g ,

L a t noon h u m y l i t e e y o u r e t o n g e n a i l l e ,

N e l a t no c l e r k have c a u s e o r d i l i g e n c e

T o w r i t e o f yow a s t o r i e of swich mervaille

A s o f Gr i s i l d i s pacient and kynde,

L e s t Chichevache yow s w e l w e i n h i r e e n t r a i l l e !

(1184-88)

CHAPTER THREE

"THE PARDONERr S TALE"

The Miller and the Clerk demonstrate how authorities

use words to create the certainty and control t h a t maintain

their dominant positions; however, these seeming rational

certainties are only an illusion. For an authority, as well

as for individuals, these illusions are necessary: they

provide reassuring and meaningful answers to questions which

would otherwise be unanswerable. "The Miller's Tale" and

"The Clerkrs Tale" warn their readers not to inquire too

deeply into "Goddes pryvetee" because such questioning can

undermine and destroy the illusions to which people cling in

pious ignorance. However, both the Miller and the Clerk

intentionally subvert authoritative illusions and leave the

reader with the idea that not everything requires the

support of an authority for validation; some things, such as

the nature of God, can be examined rationally but,

ultimately, must be accepted on f a i t h alone. "The Pardoner's

Tale" demonstrates that the shattering of illusions c a n lead

people to skepticism and despair if they are unable to

discover their own fom of individual faith. The Pardoner

abuses and misrepresents the Churchrs ideah and sacraments

through his Nominalist manipulation of the mutable nature of

language. Chaucer creates in the Pardoner a character who

has been stripped of his illusions and h i s faith, and who is

left with only the tonnent of religious despair in the face

of fundamental uncertainty. In this chapter, 1 will first

examine the history of indulgences and penance in the

Catholic Church; then, I will discuss the ways in which the

Pardoner, in his despair, abuses and misrepresents these

doctrines through a manipulation of language similar to that

which I have discussed in my analysis of "The Miller's Tale"

and "The Clerkrs Tale."

The Pardoner abuses the power he gains through his

association with the Church. People relied on the clergy for

the sacraments that would put their souls in the proper

state of grace and that would ensure their entrance into

heaven. In other words, if a person committed mortal sins,

he or she could potentially be reconciled with God through

the sacrament of penance. The administration of this

sacrament generally required a member of the clergy with the

proper faculties to hear the confession, grant absolution,

and instruct the penitent in ways of avoiding future sin.

Divine forgiveness of a l 1 past sins was essential for

salvation; however, before they could receive divine

forgiveness, sinners had generally to fulfill the conditions

of contrition, confession, and satisfaction (Lea 2: 169) . Contrition, the result of intense self-examination and

Contrition is the sinners* sincere repentance for their sins: "Catholic teaching distinguishes a twofold hatred of sin; one, perfect contrition, springs from the love of God Who has been grievously offended; the other, imperfect contrition, arises principally £rom some other motives, such as loss of heaven, fear of hell, the heinousness of sin, etc." (Catholic Enclyclopedia 338) . Perfect contrition does not necessarily require the sacrament of Penance to reconcile people to God.

self- j udgment, i s s i n c e r e r emorse for o f f e n d i n g G o d .

C o n f e s s i o n is a n act of h u m i l i t y i n which s i n n e r s are

r e q u i r e d t o c o n f e s s t h e i r s i n s a n d any r n i t i g a t i n g

c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o a priest who would g r a n t a b s o l u t i o n o n t h e

c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e p e n i t e n t makes s a t i s f a c t i o n . S a t i s f a c t i o n

is t h e act o f a tonemen t i n which t h e p r i e s t prescribes a

series of p r a y e r s o r a c t i o n s whereby the s i n n e r c a n make

arnends f o r o f f e n d i n g God. The d o c t r i n e of p e n a n c e r e q u i r e s

that a l 1 three c o n d i t i o n s be m e t ; a b s o l u t i o n is d e n i e d t o

any p e r s o n who makes a s a c r i l e g i o u s c o n f e s s i o n b y

c o n s c i o u s l y c o n c e a l i n g e v e n a s i n g l e mortal s i n , f a i l i n g t o

feel c o n t r i t i o n , o r be ing u n w i l l i n g o r u n a b l e t o rnake

s a t i s f a c t i o n . L e a states:

T h e r e c a n be no p a r t i a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h God,

and t h e w i l l f u l o m i s s i o n o f a s i n g l e rnortal s i n . - . r e n d e r s t h e whole c o n f e s s i o n i n v a l i d and

u n s a c r a m e n t a l ; i n fact, r e c e i v i n g t h e s a c r a m e n t

t h u s i r r e v e r e n t l y is a new s i n , N o m o u n t of

c o n t r i t i o n a n d of l i f e - l o n g penance can wash away

a s i n t h u s c o n c e a l e d ; every c o n f e s s i o n a n d

communion is a f r e s h s i n , and it w e r e better fo r

t h e p e n i t e n t t o l ive and die w h o l l y w i t h o u t t h e

sac ra rnen ts . (1: 348)

To e n c o u r a g e p e o p l e t o meet a l 1 t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f

a b s o l u t i o n , i n d u l g e n c e s w e r e p r e s e n t e d t o those who h a d

received a b s o l u t i o n a n d who had g i v e n d o n a t i o n s t o s u p p o r t

t h e church. T h e i n d u l g e n c e s worked i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e

s a c r a m e n t of penance : o n c e t h e g u i l t of a s i n was f o r g i v e n ,

a n i n d u l g e n c e c o u l d r e m i t e i t h e r p a r t o r a l1 of t h e t i m e

s p e n t i n p u r g a t o r y wnich had been e a r n e d by h a v i n g s i n n e d

i n i t i a l l y ( L e a 3: 3 9 ) . There were t w o t y p e s of i n d u l g e n c e s :

p l e n a r y ( a b s o l u t e ) a n d p a r t i a l . P l e n a r y i n d u l g e n c e s

c o m p l e t e l y e x c u s e d t h e h o l d e r s f r o m punishrnent ; p a r t i a l

i n d u l g e n c e s e x o n e r a t e d them from o n l y part of t h e i r

pun i shmen t . I n d u l g e n c e s drew on t h e " T r e a s u r y of M e r i t " i n

which "the rnerits of f io ly men on earth [ b e g i n n i n g w i t h

C h r i s t a n d i n c l u d i n g a l1 t h e s a i n t s ] formed a £und f o r t h e

b e n e f i t o f t h e s i n n e r " (Lea 3: 1 9 ) .

T e c h n i c a l l y , people were n o t a l l o w e d t o buy o r sel1

i n d u l g e n c e s o r relics; however, t h e y c o u l d ( a n d t h e t r u l y

p e n i t e n t would) o f f e r goods o r money a f te r receiving a n

i n d u l g e n c e t o d e m o n s t r a t e g r a t i t u d e a n d c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t o f

t h e C h u r c h r s good deeds. The c i i f f e r e n c e be tween buy ing a n

i n d u l g e n c e a n d g i v i n g money i n a p p r e c i a t i o n of a n i n d u l g e n c e

is c r u c i a l : i n t h e l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n , t h e p e n i t e n t who

receives t h e i n d u l g e n c e h a s a c h i e v e d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e

p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d s p i r i t u a l s ta te ; i n t h e former, t h e p e r s o n

has p a i d t o make up f o r t h e i n a d e q u a c y of h i s o r her

c o n t r i t i o n , t h e r e b y cornrnitting t h e s i n of simony.

To e n s u r e t h a t n o one w a s d e p r i v e d of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y

t o do penance ( a n d t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c h u r c h ) , p a r d o n e r s

were h i r e d by t h e Church t o offer i n d u l g e n c e s a n d t o f u l l y

exp la in t h e i r b e n e f i t s t o "the f a i t h f u l " who w e r e " exho r t ed

t o p e r f o r m t h e service or g i v e the ' a l m s ' which would

p r o c u r e them" (Lea 3 2 8 4 ) ; however, t h i s p r a c t i c e w a s

g r o s s l y a b u s e d and w a s e v e n t u a l l y a b o l i s h e d i n 1567 by P i u s

V ( L e a 3 : 4 2 4 ) . Pardone r s were n o t o r i o u s l y c o r r u p t ; ' c o u n c i l s

everywhere t h r o u g h o u t Europe w e r e c o n s t a n t l y occup ied w i t h

the s u b j ect [o f p a r d o n e r s r c o r r u p t i o n ] , g i v i n g ample

e v i d e n c e of t h e e v i l r e p u t a t i o n of t h e clerics who f o l l o w e d

the trade of pardoner" (Lea 3:286). L e a q u o t e s from t h e

c o u n c i l of Mainz i n 1261 which condemns pardoners as:

in famous l iars . . , who a b u s e t h e word o f God f o r

f i l t h y g a i n . They o f t e n e x h i b i t as re l ics t h e

profane bones o f men a n d beasts, t h e y i n v e n t

miracles . . . and p r o m i s e r e m i s s i o n o f s i n s i n

s u c h f a s h i o n that scarce any one can r e s t r a i n

h i m s e l f f rom pu rchas ing , t o t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f

d i s c i p l i n e , f o r t h e r e are few who w i l l a c c e p t

penance f rom their p r i e s t s , b e l i e v i n g . . . t h e m s e l v e s t o be a b s o l v e d £rom t h e i r s i n s by such

i n d u l g e n c e s . And t h e gains t h u s s t o l e n f rom t h e

Church are s p e n t i n d runkennes s , f e a s t i n g ,

gambl ing, and l e c h e r y . ( 3 : 287)

B y p e d d l i n g false pardons and g r a n t i n g fa lse a b s o l u t i o n , a

p a r d o n e r n o t o n l y r o b s t h e p e o p l e of t h e i r material

p o s s e s s i o n s b u t p o s s i b l y c a u s e s t h e m t o lose t h e i r s o u l s as

w e l l . Peop le who bought f r a u d u l e n t i n d u l g e n c e s would

d i s c o v e r their error i n t h e a i t e r l i f e when t h e y received a

punishment t h a t t h e y t h o u g h t had been r e m i t t e d . Because o f

t h e terrible r e p e r c u s s i o n s of such abuse, p a r d o n e r s who t o o k

advan tage o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n f o r t h e i r own p e r s o n a 1 g a i n t o

t h e d e t r i m e n t of o t h e r s w e r e t h r e a t e n e d w i t h

excommunication. However, t h e threats w e r e se ldom carried

o u t because , as L e a n o t e s , t h e r e "were a lways g r e e d y

p r e l a t e s and needy chu rches t o d i s r e g a r d [ r u l e s and

t h r e a t s ] " (3: 288) . Between t h e r i g o r o u s s p i r i t u a l demands o f c o n f e s s i o n

a n d t h e p e o p l e ' s u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t t h e exact n a t u r e o f t h e

i n d u l g e n c e s t h e y w e r e r e c e i v i n g , t h e r e w a s g r e a t p o t e n t i a l

f o r c o r r u p t i o n i n t h e sacrament of penance. Because some

i n d u l g e n c e s w e r e wrongly b e l i e v e d t o pardon g u i l t a s well as

r e p e a l punishment , some p e o p l e rel ied on t h e power o f a n

i n d u l g e n c e r a t h e r t h a n a t t e m p t i n g t o a c h i e v e t h e p r o p e r

s t a te o f c o n t r i t i o n and g o i n g t o c o n f e s s i o n ; t h u s , t h e i r

s i n s would remain un fo rg iven . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , however,

c o n t r i t i o n i t se l f c o u l d lead t h e p e n i t e n t i n t o t h e s i n o f

d e s p a i r , the se l f - imposed alienation o f t h e s i n n e r from God.

Because s i n c a u s e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o be divided from God and

makes t h e i n d i v i d u a l incornplete , t h e p e n i t e n t must be truly

r e m o r s e f u l t o be r e u n i t e d w i t h God. However, a s P a t t e r s o n

e x p l a i n s , t h e remorse which l e a d s t o c o n t r i t i o n and

f o r g i v e n e s s may be overwhelming t o the s i n n e r . If the o n l y

way t o a t t a i n s a l v a t i o n is t h r o u g h

t h e i n t e n s i t y of [ the s i n n e r ' s ] remorse, he w i l l

e n t e r i n t o a p r o c e s s o f se l f - judgment i n which he

a l l o w s h i m s e l f no qua r t e r - -w i th t h e . . . r e s u l t

t h a t he w i l l become so overwhelmed w i t h

s e l f - l o a t h i n g t h a t h e no l o n g e r believes h imse l f

wor thy o f t h e s a l v a t i o n h e s o d e s p e r a t e l y desires.

(Pattersm, Chaucer 378 )

I r o n i c a l l y , t h e n , t he a t t e m p t t o reach t h e f rame o f mind

r e q u i r e d by t h e Church had t h e p o t e n t i a l t o drive t he

p e n i t e n t t o mortal s i n . Unable t o ask f o r f o r g i v e n e s s , t h e

s i n n e r remained a l i e n a t e d and l a c k i n g i n s p i r i t u a l

wholeness .

The dange r t o t h e c o n f e s s o r w a s a l s o g r e a t . H e c o u l d be

led t o s i n t h r o u g h t h e c o n f e s s i o n s o f h i s p a r i s h i o n e r s ,

p a r t i c u l a r l y , it w a s t h o u g h t , t h o s e of women c o n f e s s i n g

c a r n a l s i n s * L e a comments on t h e numerous warn ings g i v e n t o

p r i e s t s , i n s t r u c t i n g them n o t t o q u e s t i o n t h e i r p e n i t e n t s

t o o c l o s e l y a b o u t " s e x u a l a b e r r a t i o n s . . . l e s t b o t h

p a r t i e s be l ed i n t o t e m p t a t i o n " (1: 3 8 0 ) . The c o n f e s s o r had

also t o a v o i d t h e t e m p t a t i o n t o u s e h i s powers of a b s o l u t i o n

f o r m a t e r i a l g a i n e i t h e r f o r h i rnse l f o r i n a l l i a n c e w i t h

c o r r u p t pa rdone r s o r o t h e r c lergymen. Once tempted and

f a l l e n , t h e c o n f e s s o r , who would becorne t h e p e n i t e n t , was

e q u a l l y susceptible t o d e s p a i r .

Because t h e r i s k s were s o great and the penalty f o r

f a i l i n g t o s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s w a s so h igh , c o n t r o v e r s y

a n d debate s u r r o u n d e d t h e sac ramen t o f penance. S c h o L a s t i c

t h e o l o g y a r g u e d t h a t c o n t r i t i o n b e f o r e c o n f e s s i o n w a s n o t

n e c e s s a r y , as t h e sac ramen t itself o f t e n b r o u g h t a b o u t the

a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e p e n t a n t s ta te o f mind ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer

3 7 4 ) . Normally, t h i s meant t h a t t h e peni tent depended on a

member of t h e c l e r g y t o a d m i n i s t e r t he sac ramen t , t o g u i d e

h i m o r h e r t h r o u g h t h e stages of c o n t r i t i o n , and , f i n a l l y ,

t o g r a n t a b s o l u t i o n . T h e r i t u a l t o o k r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f rom the

p e n i t e n t a n d p l a c e d it on t h e s a c r a m e n t and t h e c o n f e s s o r

which c o u l d be p r o b l e m a t i c b e c a u s e t h e p e n i t e n t becomes

d e p e n d e n t on t h e p r i e s t for g u i d a n c e . Wyc l i f , f o r example,

i n s i s t e d t h a t "a p r i e s t r s s o l e w a s p u r e l y declarative a t

b e s t ; a t w o r s t , when t h e p r i e s t r s d e c i s i o n w a s a t odds w i t h

t h e knowledge of God, it w a s of no force a n d w a s a

r n i s l e a d i n g and blasphemous a r r o g a t i o n of d i v i n e power"

(Hudson Premature 294) ; i n o t h e r words, it w a s p o s s i b l e f o r

a p r i e s t t o declare t h a t a s i n had b e e n f o r g i v e n when God

d e n i e d f o r g i v e n e s s , o r vice versa. Wyc l i f a r g u e d t h a t t h e

p r i e s t mus t be i n a s ta te o f g r a c e t o i n t e r p r e t c o r r e c t l y

Godr s w i l l ; and, s i n c e p r i e s t s w e r e n o t e x e q t f rom s i n ,

t h e r e w a s no way t o be c e r t a i n t h a t the c o n f e s s o r be longed

t o t h e congrega tio predestinatorum a n d w a s i n a s tate of

grace ( a n d t h e r e f o r e able t o g i v e t r u e a b s o l u t i o n ) . However,

t h e Church ' s off ic ia1 s t a n c e w a s t h a t as l o n g as t h e p r i e s t

declared t h a t t h e p e n i t e n t r s s i n s were a b s o l v e d , t h e y w e r e

f o r g i v e n : t h e p r ies t f s moral s tate w a s i r r e l e v a n t . T o

e x p l a i n t h i s s t a n c e , which was p r o b l e m a t i c b e c a u s e it d e n i e d

t h e n e c e s s i t y of a p r i e s t p r o v i d i n g a m o r a l example, Aquinas

' [ c a s t ] t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n God t o evoke good o u t of . . . evil , f o r g e t f u l t h a t h e [ w a s ] t h u s p r a c t i c a l l y d e n y i n g t h e

p r i e s t l y power" ( L e a 1:249). P a t t e r s o n summarizes t h e

debate :

d e s p i t e t h e e f f o r t s o f s c h o l a s t i c t h e o l o g i a n s t o

r e n d e r q u e s t i o n s o f t h e psychology of r e p e n t a n c e

moot b y d e f i n i n g penance as a l a r g e l y objective

a c t i o n , t h e p e r v a s i v e c o n t r i t i o n i s m of

late-medieval r e l i g i o u s t hough t r e i n s t a t e d t h i s

p sycho logy a t t h e c e n t e r o f s p i r i t u a l concern .

(Chauce r 384)

T h i s debate raised t h e q u e s t i o n of whether p r i e s t s had

any s p e c i a l power t o g r a n t a b s o l u t i o n ; Wyclif i n s i s t e d

" C r i s t e . . . o o n l y cLens iP man o f synne, and p r e s t e s ben

h e l p e r s w i P hyme. . . And s o bynde and vnbynde w i P hyme

whenne Dei haue pat power and De keye o f kunnyng

[knowledge], a n d el les pe i neper byynden n e lowsyn b u t

s c a t e r y n abrood8' (Hudson, Premature 2 9 5 ) . If t h e p e n i t e n t

d i d n o t need t o r e l y on t h e c o n d i t i o n o r t h e example of t h e

p r i e s t f o r a b s o l u t i o n , and t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y l a y w i t h t h e

i n d i v i d u a l (as N o m i n a l i s t t h e o l o g i a n s claimed), it f o l l o w s

t h a t " t h e sac ramen t i s n o t t h e causa efficiens of grace" b u t

rnerely a s i g n ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 377) ; t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

f o r p r o p e r c o n t r i t i o n l a y w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l . On t h e o t h e r

hand, if t h e p e n i t e n t d id depend on t h e p r i e s t b u t c o u l d n o t

receive t r u e a b s o l u t i o n f rom a p r i e s t who w a s i n a state o f

s i n and t h e r e f o r e u n a b l e t o i n t e r p r e t God's w i l l , t h e r e w a s

no way of knowing i f t h e p e n i t e n t ' s sins were f o r g i v e n . The

c o r r u p t i o n o f t h e p a r d o n e r s created t h e sarne problems;

peop le c o u l d n o t depend on t h e indulgences they o b t a i n e d ,

e s p e c i a l l y from a person who may n o t be licensed t o hear

c o n f e s s i o n s and whose indu lgences w e r e no t n e c e s s a r i l y

genuine. Rather t h a n a f i g u r e o f d i v i n e g r a c e and mercy, t h e

p r i e s t r i s k e d becoming a f i g u r e o f a r b i t r a r y d i v i n e j u s t i c e :

i f a b s o l u t i o n w a s e f f e c t i v e , t h e p e n i t e n t w a s among t h e

f o r t u n a t e ; i f a b s o l u t i o n w a s i n e f f e c t i v e , t h e s i n n e r

dese rved no b e t t e r f o r having s inned i n t h e f irst place.

Chaucer creates h i s Pardoner i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e s e

debates. The Pardoner perpetrates every cr ime

s t e r e o t y p i c a l l y a t t r i b u t e d t o pardoners: he " t e l l e [ s ] a n

hundred false japes" (394) ; h e preaches , c a j o l e s , and

blackmails t o sel1 h i s indu lgences and f r a u d u l e n t relics,

d e c l a r i n g t h a t anyone who h a s an unforgiven "synne h o r r i b l e "

(379) on h i s o r h e r consc ience " sha l have no power n e no

g r a c e / T o o f f r e n t o my r e l i k e s i n t h i s place" (383-4) ; he

open ly admi t s t h a t he does n o t c a r e i f " h i r s o u l e s goon

a-blakeberyed" ( 4 0 5 ) . H i s c o r r u p t i o n both symbolizes and

c a u s e s h i s skept ic i s rn and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t wi th t h e Church,

l e a v i n g him i n a p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e which reflects t h e

d a n g e r s o f t h e r a d i c a l l y Nominal is t p o s i t i o n . For t h e

Pardoner, t h e Church's d i s h o n e s t y has emptied its sacrarnents

of meaning and i n v e r t e d i ts sacred s i g n i f i e r s by s e v e r i n g

t h e m from t h e t h i n g s that they were thought t o s i g n i f y . The

Pardoner a t t e m p t s t o use t h e i n s t a b i l i t y of language t o

r e c r e a t e and c o n t r o l t h e i l l u s i o n s of c e r t a i n t y and power

su r round ing t h e Church and himself; h e promises m i r a c l e s i n

r e t u r n f o r "pens, o r elles g r o t e s " (3761, a d e s p e r a t e act o f

sirnony that depends upon the uncertain nature of language

which allows the Pardones's patrons to be deceived.

Readers as early as Kittredge have despised hirn and

labeled him a lost soul; however, the Pardoner is better

described as a figure of despair, a character who is

unredeemed because he has lost faith in redemption. As a

soul in despair, the Pardoner is the product of the

institution that he both represents and perverts. According

to Arieh Sachs,

He who despaired of his salvation was regarded as

being in the psychological and theological state

of discordia, disturbed, disordered, isolated, cut

off from the source of his being, and consequently

desiring universal discord and alienation. (232)

The Pardoner exhibits both his despair and his desire for

"universal discord" through the sale of false relics and the

indifference he shows towards the spiritual state of his

customers. His religious despair is compounded by bis

extreme cupidi tas, which Leicester def i n e s : "in the deep

Christian and Augustinian sense . . . [ c u p i d i t a s ] refers to

a consuming desire for that which one is lacking--it means

wanting in both senses" (45) .2 The Pardoner is inadequate as

a spiritual leader and he is lacking the spiritual

* The OED defines "want" as: '1.b. to fa11 short;. . . d. to fail . , . ; to give out; to be insufficient for (a purpose, etc. ) . 2. a. Not to have; to be without; to lack; . . . e. to be deprived of, to lose" (879).

connection with God that he tries to replace with material

wealth. Thus, the Pardoner appears to face a despair very

similar to that confronted by existentialisrn, which declares

that humans are removed from God and that the despair of

being alienated and insignificant in the universe is the

natural state of humanity.

As a false preacher, the Pardoner perverts the premises

of teaching, delighting, and persuading--Augustinef s three

criteria for a good speaker (OCD 4,143)--and gives rise to

what Augustine warns against in his discussion of the

potential dangers of locating multiple meanings in

Scripture. When he preaches that money is the root of al1

evil and causes people "soore to repente" (431), the

Pardoner reappropriates Church doctrine and uses it to

further his own purposes. His manipulations and deceptions

reveal the mutable nature of language and the "kinds of

slips [that] are possible between the speaker, his language,

and his audience" (Dinshaw 171) , These "slips" demonstrate

the Pardonerrs nominalist wordplay, "in which words and

deeds are at odds with one another" (Watts and U t z 153). For

example, the Pardoner admonishes "Rad ix mal orum est

Cupidi tas" (334 ) , hypocritically preaching against the sin

However, the existentialists, rather like Chaucer himself, respond to the recognition of nothingness and meaninglessness by developing their own personal systems of belief based on questioning, evaluation, faith, and action, whereas the Pardoner embraces his despair and becomes nihilistic and (self-) destructive.

t h a t he c o n s c i o u s l y and e a g e r l y commits: he w i l l Save them

from t h e dangers of m a t e r i a l i s m , " f o r t o make them free/ To

yeven h i r pens, and namely un to me" (401-402). H i s c l a im t o

be doing ' C r i s t e s hooly werk" (340) is i r o n i c and

blasphemous; he makes a mockery o f t h e Church's language and

r i t u a l s when " i n Latyn 1 speke a wordes f e w e , / T o s a f f r o n

w i t h m y p red icac ioun , / And f o r t o s t i r e hem t o devocionrr

( 3 4 3 - 4 5 ) . Even his relics, which are supposed t o he lp people

feel a connec t ion t o God, a p p e a l t o g reed and l e a d t o s i n :

he c l a ims t h a t h i s holy s h e e p f s bone w i l l c u r e any animal

t h a t h a s been poisoned by a snake, rnu l t ip ly a man's "bees tes

and his stoor" (3651, and c u r e j e a l o u s y i n husbands--even i f

t h e y know t h a t t h e i r wives have been u n f a i t h f u l and "taken

prestes t w o o r thre8' (371) . F i n a l l y , anyone who wears h i s

h o l y m i t t e n " s h a l have r n u l t i p l i y i n g of his grayn" ( 3 7 4 ) .

When he boasts t h a t " [bjy t h l s gaude have I wonne, y e e r by

y e e r , / An hundred m a r k s i t h 1 was pardoner" ( 389 -go ) , t h e

Pardoner puns on t h e words God and gaude, once again

jux tapos ing t h e audience ' s s p i r i t u a l i t y and c r e d u l i t y w i t h

h i s own verbal t r i c k e r y . H e i s t h e s e r p e n t who w i l l "stynge"

( 4 1 3 ) h i s enemies wi th h i s false preaching .

I n h i s tale, t h e Pardoner dernonstrates i r o n i c a l l y t h e

consequences o f having t o o much f a i t h i n words (though it is

u n l i k e l y t h a t h i s l i s t e n e r s r ecogn ize t h e danger they a r e i n

because o f t h e i r f a i t h i n t h e P a r d o n e r f s words): t h e r i o t e r s

t a k e t h e boy's d e s c r i p t i o n o f the anthropomorphic

p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e "p r ivee t h e f Deeth" l i t e r a l l y , and

f i n d o n l y an un t ime ly demise. Like t h e Pardoner h imsel f , t h e

o l d man s a y s what t h e r i o t e r s e x p e c t t o h e a r , b u t h i s words

mis lead and sa direct t h e r i o t e r s t o their d e a t h s ; a l s o , t h e

r i o t e r s f o a t h t h a t t h e y a r e "sworen b r o t h e r [ s ] " (809) is

rendered meaningless by t h e i r t r e a c h e r y . Thus, throughout

"The Pardonerf s Prologue8' and " T a l e , " t h e Pardonerf s

aud ience is p l a c e d 'in t h e s t r a n g e p o s i t i o n o f knowing and

n o t knowing s irnul taneously" ( P e c k 7 5 6 ) . I n such a p o s i t i o n ,

t h e meanings o f words t h a t t h e aud ience b e l i e v e s it h a s

hea rd a r e c o n t i n u a l l y a t odds w i t h t h o s e i n t e n d e d by t h e

Pardoner who, l i k e Walter, r e p e a t e d l y t e l l s h i s audience t o

"Taak o f my wordes keep, " ( 3 5 2 ) , even though e v e r y word is

false. By expos ing t h e P a r d o n e r f s c o r r u p t i o n a n d d e s p a i r

through s u c h wordplay, Chaucer q u e s t i o n s t h e a b i l i t y of t h e

Churchfs powerful h i e r a r c h y (as w e l l a s t h e r i t u a l s which

n e c e s s i t a t e and s u s t a i n i t ) t o p r o v i d e t h e i n d i v i d u a l wi th

answers t o q u e s t i o n s o f b e l i e f .

"The Pardoner' s Prologue" f o c u s e s on t h e Pardonerr s

r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of Penance and indu lgences , r e v e a l i n g t h e

p o t e n t i a l t o c o r r u p t b o t h c o n f e s s o r and p e n i t e n t t h a t is

i n h e r e n t i n t h e d o c t r i n e s and p r a c t i c e s themselves. A s t h e

Pardoner p l a y s t h e r o l e of confessor , h i s attempt t o f i l 1

h i s s p i r i t u a l Yack" with i l l - g o t t e n material wealth has led

him f u r t h e r i n t o s i n ; as a p e n i t e n t , t h e P a r d o n e r f s d e s p a i r

h a s led him t o s p i r i t u a l s t e r i l i t y th rough h i s s e l f - c r e a t e d

a l i e n a t i o n from God. H i s d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t he preaches "nat

but f o r t o wynne,/ And nothyng fo r c o r r e c c i o u n of synne"

(403-04) displays the Pardonerfs ability to manipulate

Church doctrine with such brilliance that he manages to

"maken oother folk to twynne/ From avarice and soore to

repente" (430-1) despite his self-serving inentions.

However, the Pardoner's

works are not the product of the faith--they are

the product rather of h i s "yvel entencioun" to

"wynne gold and silver." Hence the Pardonerrs

faith is without works, and "even as the body

without the spirit is dead, so also faith without

works is dead" (James 2.26). The Pardonerf s faith

is like his body, his body like his faith--there

but sterile, alive but dead. . . . (Shoaf 218)

In other words, his works are fruitless. Even the Pardoner's

confession to the sins of greed and hypocrisy is rnasochistic

and, therefore, an inverted and ineffective sacrament of

Penance. Further, the works he performs are inef fective

because he seems motivated to serve only himself rather than

the penitents, the Church, or God.

The Pardonerrs perversion of the doctrine of Penance is

the result of his inability to believe in any f o m of

spiritual redemption. The repetition of the word

"~ill"~--which he uses forty tirnes--shows his attempts to

The OED defines "will" as: "the power or capacity of willing; that faculty or function which is dircted to conscious and intentional action; power of choice in regard to action" (340-1).

c o n t r o l h i s ta le , h i m s e l f , a n d h i s a u d i e n c e . It also

e x e m p l i f i e s t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t Nominalism p l a c e s on

i n d i v i d u a l v o l i t i o n : t h e m o r a l i t y of any act depends upon

t h e i n t e n t i o n b e h i n d it. Aquinas also emphas izes t h e

impor t ance o f t h e r o l e o f w i l l i n acts of f a i t h : h e declares

t h a t , t o t h e mind, E a i t h

r e p r e s e n t s par t ia l knowledge . . . which c a n n o t be

verif ied i n a manner l e a d i n g t o s c i e n t i f i c

c e r t a i n t y . It i s t o overcome these i n t e l l e c t u a l

s c r u p l e s t h a t t h e w i l l now i n t e r v e n e s , s i l e n c i n g

t h e d o u b t s o f t h e i n t e l l e c t . I n t h e comple ted ac t

of f a i t h , t h e w i f l s u p p l i e s what is l a c k i n g i n t h e

i n t e l l e c t . . . . ( C o l i s h 1 8 7 )

The Pardoner is u n a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e t h e leap o f f a i t h t h a t

would overcome h i s d e s p a i r and s i l e n c e h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l

d o u b t s . H i s h y p o c r i s y i s b o t h t h e c a u s e and t h e r e s u l t o f

t h i s despair. S t r i p p e d o f t h e belief i n redempt ion t h a t

p r o t e c t s o t h e r C h r i s t i a n s f rom d e s p a i r , the Pardone r f i ts

Barrett 's d e s c r i p t i o n o f 'a b e i n g who h a s become t h o r o u g h l y

q u e s t i o n a b l e t o h imse l f " ( 4 1) because , as Shoaf e x p l a i n s ,

t h e P a r d o n e r "is n o t whole, and h e knows it; moreover, t h e

comrnunity i n which h e must l i v e c a n i n c l u d e him o n l y by

o s t r a c i z i n g hirn" ( 2 1 4 ) . A l i e n a t e d from God, h i s s o c i e t y , and

h i m s e l f , t h e P a r d o n e r f s " p s y c h i c ba l ance" is u p s e t and h e

becomes "no t o n l y a d i s p o s s e s s e d b u t a f r a g m e n t a r y being"

(Barrett 35), exposed t o t h e n o t h i n g n e s s t h a t is h i s

e x i s t e n c e . Unable t o e s c a p e f rom his empty state, t h e

Pardoner becomes like the Old Man in bis tale: homeless,

alone, existing in a living death.

The Pardonerfs "honest thyng" (328) begins with the

confession that he preaches his sermon against greed by rote

and that his intent is "nat but for to wynne,/ And nothyng

for correccioun of synne" (4 04 ) . But the Pardonerf s confession to the pilgrims is defiant and invalid because he

demonstrates no contrition nor is he willing to change his

ways: in his pride and despair, he inverts the sacrament of

penance by turning his confession into a boast; for example,

he declares,

I wol have moneie, wolle, chese, and whete,

Al were it yeven of the povereste page,

Or of the povereste wydwe in a village,

Al sholde hir chifdren sterve for famyne.

(448-51)

Instead of attempting to Save himself, he condemns himself

further. Patterson describes the characteristics of a

typical person in despair: "Accused by his conscience, he

fears to be assailed; yet nonetheless he is always

increasing that by which he is assailed. He scorns his

return [to God] , despairs of grace, glories in sin" (Chaucer 382). He cannot humble hirnself to ask sincerely for

forgiveness because he does not believe it is possible: the

Pardoner despairs further and w i l l f u l l y re j ects the

possibility of redernption. Thus, as Sachs points out,

despair is also a sin of pride because the sinners believe,

i n t h e i r r e b e l l i o n , t h a t " t h e r e is more s t r e n g t h i n sin t h a n

v i r t u e i n God t o a n n u l it by f o r g i v e n e s s " (232) . The P a r d o n e r r s a l i e n a t i o n from God is m i r r o r e d i n h i s

a l i e n a t i o n from t h e p i l g r i m s . H e is, says Dinshaw, " t h e

defective man who m a k e s t h e g e n t i l s c ry o u t and object e v e n

b e f o r e h e b e g i n s t o speak0 ' (156) . As P e a r s a l l p o i n t s o u t , t h e

P a r d o n e r i s a f r a u d b e c a u s e he i s i n c o m p l e t e ; h i s s p i r i t u a l

l a c k i s a m p l i f i e d by t h e fact t h a t he i s a f r a u d . By

d e s c r i b i n g t h e P a r d o n e r as "a g e l d y n g o r a mare" ( 6 9 1 ) , t h e

N a r r a t o r i d e n t i f i e s t h e Pa rdone r " i n terms of a n absence of

sornething: e i t h e r m a l e s e x u a l o r g a n s . . . o r m a s c u l i n e

g e n d e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " (Dinshaw 157) . T h i s l a c k o f d e f i n i n g

s e x u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s is a r e f l e c t i o n of h i s s p i r i t u a l

c a s t r a t i o n ; h i s s i n s " r e s u l t i n i n s u f f i c i e n c y . . . d r a w i n g

him back t o t h e n o t h i n g n e s s f rom wh ich h e w a s o r i g i n a l l y

f a s h i o n e d . And i ts effect w a s t o a l i e n a t e him from God, f r o m

n a t u r e , a n d f r o m h i rnse l f " (Shoaf 370) . The Pa rdone r r s

s p i r i t u a l s t e r i l i t y and despair are e v i d e n t despite b i s

a t t e m p t s t o p o r t r a y h i m s e l f as a f i g u r e of excess i n h i s

'Prologue" and "Tale."5 S i n c e p e n a n c e i s t h e o n l y means b y

which s i n n e r s c a n receive g r a c e a n d restore t h e m s e l v e s t o

wholeness , t h e Pa rdone r , b e c a u s e he is u n a b l e t o a s k f o r

g r a c e , is i m p o t e n t and i ~ s f f ec t i ve as a s p i r i t u a l g u i d e . I n

The Pardonerrs l i c e n t i o u s n e s s and d e b a u c h e r y are a l so symptoms of his despair: Sachs says t h a t " t h e d e s p a i r e r m u s t w i s h a t least t o e n j o y h i s t e m p o r a l e x i s t e n c e , a n d t h i s desire w i l l drive h i m t o vo1up tuousnes s " (233).

fact , h e is n o t m e r e l y i n e f f e c t i v e , he is d e s t r u c t i v e

b e c a u s e h e sells what may be false pa rdons : h e c o n s c i o u s l y

and i n d i f f e r e n t l y dams t h e p e o p l e who b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y

have been pa rdoned when t h e y a c c e p t h i s i n d u l g e n c e s .

The P a r d o n e r r s p h y s i c a l a n d s p i r i t u a l l a c k s a r e f u r t h e r

c o n n e c t e d t h r o u g h h i s e x c l u s i o n from c o n v e n t i o n a l s e x u a i

i d e n t i t y . If t h e p a r d o n e r i s emascu la t ed , t he t y p i c a l gende r

c a t e g o r i e s o f m a l e a n d female do n o t a p p l y t o hirn. T h e

Pa rdone r b e l o n g s t o n e i t h e r category. Because h e is o u t s i d e

b o t h c a t e g o r i e s , h e is v u l n e r a b l e t o d e s p a i r i n y e t a n o t h e r

way: Sachs n o t e s t h a t D e s p a i r a r g u e s ,

God c a n n o t l o v e a n ug ly , odd c r e a t u r e l i k e

y o u r s e l f . You are d e f o m e d , i l l e g i t i m a t e l y

conce ived , a s t r a n g e r i n God' s o r d e r e d c r e a t i o n .

The o n l y l o g i c a l t h i n g t o d o i s d e s p a i r o f e v e r

becoming part o f it. ( 2 4 9 )

A s "a s t r a n g e r i n God's o r d e r e d c r e a t i o n , " t h e P a r d o n e r r s

d e s p a i r a n d t h e s e n s e o f h i s own e m p t i n e s s i s m a s k e d b y h i s

e x h i b i t i o n i s m . L e f t w i t h o u t a d i s c e r n i b l e i d e n t i t y , t h e

Pa rdone r u s e s h i s words as w e l l as h i s relics t o recreate

h i s s p i r i t u a l and p h y s i c a l i d e n t i t y . P a t t e r s o n a r g u e s ,

[ l l a n g u a g e is t h e means by which t h e Pardoner

creates h i m s e l f f o r o t h e r s a n d f o r h i m s e l f ,

w h e t h e r it b e t h e c o c k s u r e p r a t t l e w i t h which he

s i m u l t a n e o u s l y disguises and reveals h i s eunuchry,

o r t h e w i t t y a n d l e a r n e d sermon, e m b e l l i s h e d w i t h

t e l l i n g exernpla, w i t h which h e e s t a b l i s h e s h i s

a u t h o r i t y before the " l e w e d people . " (Chaucer

398)

As P e a r s a l l comments, t h e Pa rdone r " e x i s t s o n l y i n t h e a c t

of performance" ( 9 9 ) ; h i s i d e n t i t y is as i l l u s o r y as h i s

relics and h i s words.

By engaging i n Nomina l i s t wordplay, t h e Pardoner

a t t e m p t s t o create verbal d i v e r s i o n s t o h i d e what Dinshaw

would cal1 h i s "mascul ine lack" a n d t h e s p i r i t u a l impotence

it reflects. H e a lso masks t h e d e s p a i r created by h i s

s p i r i t u a l and p h y s i c a l d e f i c i e n c i e s by emphas i z ing h i s

concern w i t h f a s h i o n a n d wea l th ; as t h e N a r r a t o r o b s e r v e s i n

"The Gene ra l Prologue":

But hood, f o r j o l i t e e , wered he noon,

For it w a s t r u s s e d up i n h i s w a l e t .

Hym t h o u g h t e he rood a l o f t h e newe jet;

Discheve lee , Save h i s cappe, h e rood a l ba re .

(680-4)

Shoaf e x p l a i n s t h a t i f t h e Pardoner

takes C h r i s t ' s redernption " l i t e r a l l y , " r e d u c i n g i t

t o "real" c o i n s , h e c o v e t s "real" c o i n s i n p a r t

because of t h e i r m e t a p h o r i c i t y i n t h e t h e o l o g y o f

Redemption. . . . Because C h r i s t ' s s a v i n g work is

u n d e r s t o o d i n t e rms o f pu rchase , rnerit, t r e a s u r y ,

wea l th , a n d so on, t h e s e and related c o n c e p t s and

o b j e c t s hold a s p e c i a l a p p e a l f o r t h e Pardoner ,

who desires even as h e r e s e n t s and resists

C h r i s t ' s s a v i n g work. (218)

The excessive nature of the Pardoner's claims that '1 preche

nothyng but for coveitise" is part of the masochistic

attempt to draw attention from his nihilism and despair by

suggesting he is wholly evil and corrupt (Dinshaw 157). The

pilgrims do not realize that the "profit" he seeks and can

never find is wholeness; his emphasiç on greed and avarice

reveals his rapacious appetite for completeness that can

never be satisfied.

The Pardoner also attempts to use his relics and

indulgences as substitutes for his lost physical and

spiritual virility. As Dinshaw states, "he is filled with

the radical desire ( c u p i d i t a s ) for wholeness; he holds on to

these objects, even though they are false, in hopes that

they will complete him and make him part of the larger

group" (159). His preoccupation with his own incompleteness

is unintentionally revealed through the dismembered body

parts that appear in the Pardoner's speeches (Hoerner 75):

"nekke" (395) , "handes" and "tonge" (3981, "Our blissed

Lordes body they totere" { 4 7 4 ) , "wombe . . . bely . . . stynkyng cod" (534), "bones" (541), etc. Although he is

eloquent as a preacher, he reveals his obsession with

incompleteness and despair despite his attempts to conceal

them. The Pardoner plays roles, assuming personas which are

artificially active and virile: he interrupts the Wife of

Bath in her Prologue to "teche us yonge men of youre

praktike" (187) and daims to have "a joly wenche in every

toun" (453) . As Pearsall observes, even "the Surnmoner' s

'stif burdounr ("General Prologue, " 673) becomes a n obscene

doub le e n t e n d r e , i n d i c a t i v e o f t h e n a t u r e of t h e a s s o c i a t i o n

between t h e Summoner and t h e Pardoner" ( 9 4 ) . As Pearsall

s u g g e s t s , the Pa rdone r h a s not " los t t h e s e n s e of t h e

r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e words h e u s e s and t h e r e a l i t y t o

which t h e y refer" (100) ; i n fact, he u n d e r s t a n d s t h e

r e l a t i o n s h i p so w e l l t h a t h e a t t e m p t s a N o m i n a l i s t

r e c r e a t i o n o f r e a l i t y and hi rnse l f t h rough h i s language .

However, h i s words c a n n o t do what he r e q u i r e s of them a n d so

r e v e a l more o f h i m s e l f and h i s d e p a i r t h a n he i n t e n d s . The

Pa rdone r " p r e s e n t s a t h e a t r i c a l i z e d s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of

ev i l s o e x t r a v a g a n t t h a t it n e c e s s a r i l y ca l l s i tself i n t o

q u e s t i o n " ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 3 9 8 ) .

As he is i n h i s p ro logue , t h e Pardoner seems t o be

p r e s e n t i n h i s tale as a f i g u r e of l a c k r a t h e r t h a n as t h e

f i g u r e of e x c e s s t h a t he claims t o be ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer

402). The s e l f - d e s t r u c t i v e b e h a v i o r o f t h e t h r e e r i o t e r s who

"doon the d e v e l sacr if ise/ With inne t h a t develes t emple i n

curçed w i s e , / By s u p e r f l u y t e e abhominabf e" (469-71) ref lects

t h e Pa rdone r r s own p e r i l o u s s p i r i t u a l existence; they, t o o ,

take p r i d e i n t h e i r s i n s and are b r a z e n l y u n r e p e n t a n t , a n d

t h e y r e p r e s e n t t h e P a r d o n e r r s b e l i e f t h a t redempt ion a n d

atonement are impossible fo r t h o s e who have w i l l f u l l y

rejected God. The t h r e e r i o t e r s v o w that they "wol s l e e n

t h i s false t r a y t o u r Deeth" (699), " c a l l [ i n g ] up s u g g e s t i o n s

o f C h r i s t ' s sacrifice, which i s t h e unspoken a l t e r n a t i v e t o

t h e i r m i s l e d and u n r e g e n e r a t e q u e s t " (Knapp, Chaucer 83).

They a lso enact an i n v e r t e d E u c h a r i s t when t h e "yonges te o f

h e m a l l" ( 8 0 4 ) g i v e s t h e m t h e bread a n d p o i ç o n e d wine t h a t

b r i n g s d e a t h r a t h e r t h a n e t e r n a l l i f e t o those who eat and

d r i n k it [ P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 402) ; t h e p o i s o n e d wine is

a n a l o g o u s t o t he P a r d o n e r f s p o i s o n o u s words (Leicester 5 3 ) :

"Thus s p i t t e I o u t my venym u n d e r hewe/ O f h o o l y n e s s e , t o

semen h o o l y a n d trewe" (421-2). T h e i n v e r s i o n o f Christfs

sacrifice a n d t h e E u c h a r i s t i s s i m i l a r t o t he P a r d o n e r f s

p e r v e r s i o n of t h e i n d u l g e n c e s a n d relics which s h o u l d lead

t o s a l v a t i o n b u t lead i n s t e a d t o damna t ion .

I n t h e P a r d o n e r f s c o r r u p t i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e t h r e e

r i o t e r s are a n i n v e r t e d t r i n i t y : "we three been a l ones"

( 6 9 6 ) . T h i s p a r o d y of t h e T r i n i t y is pushed far ther when t h e

two older r i o t e r s s e n d t h e y o u n g e r " to t h e tounf' ( 8 3 7 ) ;

w h i l e h e i s away, t h e y p l o t h i s murder . When t h e r i o t e r

r e t u r n s , t h e other t w o k i l l him; t h i s s c e n a r i o is a

p e r v e r s i o n o f Godrs p l a n t o sacrifice His Son. I n t h i s

v e r s i o n of the T r i n i t y , no o n e i s saved by t h e s h e d d i n g of

blood: t h e r e is no r e s u r r e c t i o n . The o t h e r t w o r io te rs d i e

when t h e y ea t the bread a n d wine , a p o i s o n e d l a s t s u p p e r

s h a r e d w i t h i n s i g h t of t h e i r murde red f r i e n d f s c o r p s e . Like

t h e Pardoner , t h i s T r i n i t y i s s p i r i t u a l l y dead. Even the

a p o t h e c a r y , whose d u t y is t o h e a l p e o p l e p h y s i c a l l y j u s t as

a cler icr s d u t y is t o h e a l thern s p i r i t u a l l y , is w i l l i n g l y

deceived a n d sells t h e p o i s o n t o make a p r o f i t : he t e l l s t h e

young man t h a t h e will give him

A t h y n g t h a t , a l s o God m y s o u l e Save,

I n a l t h i s wor ld ther i s no c r e a t u r e

T h a t e t e n o r d ronken h a t h o f t h i s c o n f i t u r e . . . That he n e s h a l h i s l i f e anon f o r l e t e ;

Y e , sterve h e s h a l , a n d t h a t i n lasse w h i l e

Than t hou w o l t goon a p a a s n a t b u t a m i l e ,

T h i s poyson is s o s t r o n g and v i o l e n t . (860-6)

Not o n l y does t h e a p o t h e c a r y t e l l t h e r i o t e r t h a t t h e p o i s o n

i s s t r o n g enough t o k i l l a n y t h i n g , he even s u g g e s t s how f a r

away the r i o t e r c o u l d g e t b e f o r e his victim d i e so6

Every th ing wi th t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r good is made q u e s t i o n a b l e

t h r o u g h Nominal is t i n v e r s i o n s i n t h e ta le b e c a u s e t h e s to ry

i s to ld by a d e s p a i r i n g , s p i r i t u a l l y dead c h a r a c t e r who h a s

a t t e rnp ted t o r e p l a c e redempt ion w i t h t h e material

p o s s e s s i o n s o f t h i s world . S i n c e t h e sac ramen t s depend upon

grace, t h e Pardoner can o n l y i n v e r t them.

The o t h e r p rominent figure i n t h e ta le is t h e Old Man

whose words rnirror t h e Pa rdone r ' s s p i r i t u a l dismemberment:

"Lo how 1 van i she , f l e s s h , b lood , and skyn! / A l l a s , when

shall my bones ben a t r e s t e ? " (732-3) ; h i s a g e a n d i n a b i l i t y

t o die r e p r e s e n t t h e P a r d o n e r r s l i v i n g d e a t h . Accord ing t o

Purdon, t h e Old Man is t h e most " t h e o l o g i c a l l y a c c u r a t e

d e s c r i p t i o n [of] t h e punishment meted o u t t o t h o s e l i v i n g i n

d e s p a i r by s i n n i n g a g a i n s t t h e Holy S p i r i t " ( 3 3 5 ) . T h e Old

Man r e p r e s e n t s the "Ca in - l i ke wandering," P a t t e r s o n says ,

O f cou r se , t h e r io te r is killed b e f o r e he is able t o take advan tage o f t h e a p o t h e c a r y ' s sound advice.

t h e " l i v i n g d e a t h , wandering, and s t e r i l i t y " which 'are a l1

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f despair, and they are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s

s h a r e d by t h e O l d Man and h i s c r e a t o r and a l ter ego, the

Pardoner" (Chaucer 4 0 4 ) . The O l d Man a l s o r e p r e s e n t s t h e

P a r d o n e r f s n i h i l i s m : h e walks t h e e a r t h ,

. . . l y k a restelees k a i t y f ,

And on t h e ground, which is m y rnoodres gate,

1 knokke w i t h m y staf, bothe erly and late,

And seye , "Leeve mooder, leet m e i n ! " (728-31)

A s Leicester w r i t e s , t h e O l d Man r e p r e s e n t s t h e P a r d o n e r r s

desire

t o be r i d o f n o t p h y s i c a l d e c a y b u t consc iousness .

Al though h e sounds s u i c i d a 1 (727-331, t h e Old Man

i s n o t s o i n t h e o r d i n a r y sense. . . . What he

wants i s t o be swallowed up--"leeve mooder, leet

m e i n " (731) - - to becorne n o t h i n g , t o e s c a p e from

t h e restless c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f h i s p r i v a t i o n , h i s

c u p i d i tas. ( 4 9 )

Most E e a r f u l o f a l l , t h e O l d Man c a n be r ecogn ized as a

symbol o f t h e Nomina l i s t v i s i o n of d i v i n e j u s t i c e . The

r i o t e r s d i e w i t h a l 1 t h e i r s i n s on t h e i r heads and are,

t h e r e f o r e , damned. The O l d Man s e n d s t h e t h r e e t o t h e i r doorn

when h e directs them "up t b i s c r o k e d wey" (7611, b u t he

cannot b e viewed a s a demonic f i g u r e even though h i s a c t i o n s

may n o t f i t t h e m o r t a l concep t ion of d i v i n e mercy and

j u s t i c e ; t h e r i o t e r s were neve r d e p r i v e d o f t h e i r free w i l l

and rno r t a l s canno t know Godrs i n t e n t i o n for humanity. Thus,

Godfs w i l l i s served and t h e i r punishments are j u s t b e c a u s e

it is God's w i l l .

I n t e l l i n g h i s t a le , t h e Pa rdone r seems t o corne c l o s e

t o a moment o f s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n . H e p o s e s a q u e s t i o n i n h i s

sermon :

A l l a s , mankynde, how may it b i t f d e

That t o t h y c r e a t o u r , which t h a t t h e wroughte

And w i t h h i s p r e c i o u s h e r t e - b l o o d thee boghte ,

Thou a r t s o fals a n d s o unkynde, a l l a s ? (900-3)

H e c o n t i n u e s on w i t h h i s i n v o c a t i o n o f God t o f o r g i v e t h e

"goode men" ( 9 0 4 ) and warns t h e m t o be wary of avarice, b u t

he d o e s n o t i n c l u d e h i m s e l f w i t h t h e men whom God s h o u l d

pardon which, Sachs observes, is y e t a n o t h e r symptom of

d e s p a i r : " [ t l h e d e s p a i r e r p l a c e d h i m s e l f o u t s i d e t h e d i v i n e

o r d e r i n p r e c i s e l y t h e way L u c i f e r had rejected h i s honoured

p o s t i n

example

Godfs o r d e r e d kingdom" ( 2 3 2 ) . Another , more t e l l i n g

is his s t a t e m e n t t o t h e p i l g r i m s :

And Jhesu C r i s t , t h a t i s o u r s o u l e s l e c h e ,

So g r a u n t e yow h i s pardoun t o receyve ,

For t h a t is best; 1 w o l you n a t deceyve."

(916-18)

The t o n e of t h e l i n e s is self -mocking; h e h a s a l r e a d y

exc luded hirnself from t h e "goode men" who need t o be ( o r

even c a n be) saved-he s a y s "yow" n o t "us," even though he

h a s admitted t h a t he h a s many u n f o r g i v e n sins. H e r e c o g n i z e s

C h r i s t as t h e redeemer yet he p a r o d i e s t h e h e a l i n g t h a t he

d e s p e r a t e l y needs and wants ( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 223) . S i n c e

he c a n n o t c o n f e s s , he r e t u r n s t o h i s o u t r a g e o u s of fer of

p a r d o n s and relics th rough which, as Finnegan observes

("Eschatology" 308), he u s u r p s t he power and p o s i t i o n o f God

w i t h t h e d e c l a r a t i o n , "1 yow assoil le, by myn h e i g h power."

L i k e Walter and Nicho las , t h e Pardoner becomes a pa rody o f

the unknowable and u n p r e d i c t a b l e God that Chaucer s u g g e s t s

i s r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e c o r r u p t and c o n t r o l l i n g c l e r g y .

P e e r i n g f o r a moment i n t o h i s own " s p i r i t u a l abyss"

( P a t t e r s o n , Chaucer 388) , t h e Pa rdone r sees t h e d e p t h of h i s

despair a n d a l i e n a t i o n . H e faces a crisis o f f a i t h : t h e

Pa rdone r ' s d e s p e r a t e c r a v i n g f o r s a l v a t i o n r e s u l t s i n

the fear o r the b l a n k awareness that cornes when

you r e a l i z e t h a t you are o n l y one . . t h a t

t h e r e was only y o u r s e l f t o deal w i t h a l 1 t h e tirne.

With t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n , w i t h t h e l a c k o f a g e n u i n e

"o ther , " you c o l l a p s e i n t o n o t h i n g n e s s , (Shoaf

216)

Even a f te r h i s c o n f e s s i o n and r e v e a l i n g tale, t h e

Pa rdone r rejects h i s own advice t o t h e p i l g r i m s t o l o o k t o

God for pardon and f a l l s back on t h e r i t u a l h e knows. His

"sickness . . h a s becorne a l m o s t comfor tab le" (Shoaf 223 ) .

H i s moment of s i n c e r i t y becomes a s a d o m a s o c h i s t i c attack: if

t h e y are awed by h i s r h e t o r i c and buy h i s false relics s o h e

c a n "assoille" them, he t r i umphs over them, If t h e y c o u n t e r

his attack, h e r e l i s h e s t h e m a s o c h i s t i c p l e a s u r e o f h i s

false a tonement , L i k e h i s c o n f e s s i o n , t h e Pa rdone r ' s act of

a tonement has been i n v e r t e d . H e h a s n o t humbled h imse l f ;

rather, he has revealed his pride and his contempt.

Leicester paraphrases the Pardones's sales pitch (919-45):

1 am what the pope licenses, what the church

supplies for your spiritual needs; 1 am the

instrument of Christr s mercy, the representative

of the Holy Ghost among you; I am what you kneel

to, whose relics you kiss. . . (57)

The Pardonerfs expression of this attitude both undermines

the authority of the Church and his own role in it, and

draws Harry Baileyfs attack. His masochism creates a mask

behind whish he can hide and control what his audience sees.

Masochism is a perversion of humility, just as his

sacrilegious confession is a perversion of penance in which

he is punished but never forgiven. Divided from God, the

Pardoner suffers

insatiable longings for the inversions of God, for

the created rather than the Creator, for

peripheral accidents . . . that serve to consolidate the Pardonerfs illusion of the proud

self as center. (Hoerner 81)

The Pardoner inverts the images of God and the sacraments

because, in his despair, he both longs for them and, because

he cannot have them, hates them. He wallows in his spiritual

pain which serves as both a perverse act of atonement and a

confirmation of his existence (in a nominalist and an

existential sense), and which lends significance to his

otherwise meaningless life.

The Pardonerrs despair makes him dangerous because he

has no hope and no desire to Save himself or anyone else. He

also has the potential to stop the pilgrimage permanently

which, as a spiritual journey, seeks the way to heaven. If

St. Thomasr relics are replaced by the Pardoner's false

ones, the pilgrims would have no reason to continue, and

would be in the same spiritual condition as the Pardoner.

Fortunately, the Host's aggressive declaration that "1 wolde

1 hadde thy coillons in myn hand. . . . 1 wol thee helpe hem carie; They shul be shryned in an hogges toord!" (952-55)

"disarms" the Pardoner (Patterson, Chaucer 409) by rendering

hirn speechless and breaking the spell that the Pardoner has

attempted to cast with his words; the danger is averted and

the pilgrimage continues.

By revealing the danger implicit in depending too

heavily upon supposedly sacred ceremonies that are

administered by another imperfect being, "The Pardoner's

Tale" allows Chaucer to challenge the legitimacy of

confession and, by extension, the rest of the Church' s

sacraments by demonstrating the ease with which they corrupt

and can be corrupted. He makes blind obedience to Church

doctrine impossible by forcing his readers to question an

institution that would place such a destructive man in a

position of power over God's flock and, through the

Pardoner, to question the necessity of a r i t u a l that has the

potential to drive people to despair. Through the Pardoner's

corruption, Chaucer reveals the illusions that the Church

attempts to maintain:

In every case what ought to be a manifestation of

divine power, mercy, care, and love is shown to be

cheapened and undone by human stupidity or malice,

unthinking literalism or calculating

self-interest, What the Pardoner is making fun of

is the way the putative transcendence of the

institutions of the church is continually reduced

to a set of merely human practices. (Leicester

4 3 )

"The Pardonerrs Tale" demonstrates the spiritual abyss

created by the l o s s of faith in iliusions of certainty:

because the Pardoner has no faith, he cannot operate within

the ideology of the Church, nor can he create his own

alternative set of beliefs, as do the Miller and the Clerk,

each in his own way.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUS I O N

I n T h e Canterbury Tales, Chaucer reveals the f a i l u r e of

any a u t h o r i t y t o p r o v i d e a d e f i n i t i v e s o l u t i o n , based s o l e l y

on r a t i o n a l a n d e m p i r i c a l ev idence , t o q u e s t i o n s of

e x i s t e n c e and belief. Only a n act o f f a i t h , whe the r s e c u l a r

o r r e l i g i o u s , c a n p r o v i d e t h e fundamenta l a s s u r a n c e s o f

s i g n i f i c a n c e a n d meaning which are a b s e n t f r o m t h e M i l l e r ' s ,

C l e r k ' s , and P a r d o n e r ' s tales; u n l i k e t h e i n s u b s t a n t i a l

i l l u s i o n s r e q u i r e d t o s u s t a i n m o r t a l a u t h o r i t i e s , o n l y f a i t h

can p r o v i d e t h e i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a u t h e n t i c answers t o

q u e s t i o n s o f belief o r disbelief . Chaucer ' s a p p l i c a t i o n of

Nominal i s t p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e s e ta les d e m o n s t r a t e s the

weaknesses o f t h e o r t h o d o x medieval Church d o c t r i n e by

showing t h a t u n i v e r s a l s - - i n c l u d i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between

s i g n i f i e r s and s i g n i f i e d s , and t h e c o n c e p t s o f good and

evi l - -might n o t ex i s t and, t h e r e f ore, can p r o v i d e no

c e r t a i n t y . However, Chaucer a l s o shows t h a t Nominalism is as

u n s t a b l e as o r thodoxy : i n i t s radical form, Nominalism is s o

c o n t i n g e n t on i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and e x p e r i e n c e t h a t

it, too, can lead t o s k e p t i c i s m , d e s p a i r , and even , as t h e

Pardoner i l l u s t r a t e s , n i h i l i s m . Without t h e p r o t e c t i v e

i l l u s i o n s that t h e Church o r o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s a t t e m p t t o

m a i n t a i n , p e o p l e must f i n d t h e i r own c e r t a i n t y t h r o u g h t h e i r

own f a i t h . The e x p o s u r e o f t h e i l l u s i o n s of c e r t a i n t y

i n h e r e n t i n a n y i d e o l o g y t o which i n d i v i d u a l s c l ing- -whether

r e l i g i o u s , p h i l o s o p h i c a l , o r s c i e n t i f i c - l e a v e s t h o s e

individuals in fundamental doubt. As Leicester explains, the

individual who becomes engulfed in a desire "to become

nothing" (49) faces a crisis of despair and alienation which

is essentially analogous to that of the existentialists

(49). So, while the Miller and the Clerk manage to avoid

falling into the "marle-pit" ( lY i1T 3460) created by

insecurity and disillusionment, the Pardoner cannot; he,

like the O l d Man in his tale, despairs. Chaucer himself may

have responded to this recognition of despair by embarking

on his own spiritual pilgrimage in writing The Canterbury

Tales.

Chaucer's depiction of the depair that results from the

loss of confidence in fundamental beliefs and authorities is

not limited to the Miller's, Clerkrs, and Pardonerrs tales.

Chaucer demonstrates throughout The Canterbury Tales how the

power of any authority resides partly in its ability to use

words: he tests the ability of religion, science,

philosophy, language, and individualsr perceptions to reveal

truth. Even literary tradition is questioned in The Tales.

Chaucer the pilgrim tells two tales: "Sir Thopas" undermines

the conventions of Romance poetry by creating two hundred

and six frivolous lines of outrageous rhymes and limping

rneter. When the Host cornplains that Chaucer's "drasty rymyng

is nat worth a toord!" (930) , Chaucer responds with "The

Tale of Melibee," which is a "practical demonstration of the

ways in which the author can manipulate his discourse and

how that resultant text can be variously apprehended by the

audience" (Waterhouse and Grif fiths 34 0) . The pilgrimç' ecstatic response to the moral quality of the tale calls

further attention to this parody of literature and language

because, as Waterhouse and Griffiths point out, "as a moral

lesson, the talef s 'sentense' /signification is finally

indeterminable" (339)

Sirnilarly, the Wife of Bath manipulates the words of

anti-ferninist authors to serve her own purposes, one of

which is to justify her actions. She begins her tale by

invoking experience as her authority; but, in her

"Prologue, " the Wife turns the words of authorities to her

advantage, thereby revealing not only the flaws in the logic

of the patriarchy but also the weaknesses in her own

argument. She attempts to recreate herself in her "Prologue"

and "Tale," but the inconsistencies and contradictions in

her language work against her by revealing the discrepancies

in her story and, ultirnately, by causing the illusions she

wishes to create about herself to fail- This failure calls

to mind the Norninalist contention that only in irnmediate

experience are things known; once an experience has been

transferred to memory, the individual's knowledge of events

becomes unreliable.

Waterhouse and Griffiths explain that "Melibee is reconciled with the world, the flesh, and the devil. . . . Thus there is an irreconcilable gap between the narrative discourse and its story on the one hand and the potential allegory to which we are alerted by Dame Prudence herself on the other, since coherent parallels that fit into the syntagmatic line of each level do not exis t" ( 3 4 6 ) .

The Wife of Bath is not the only character who

reinterprets events to suit her own purposes. In "The

Merchant's Tale," young May is able to reconfigure the

events that old January witnesses in the garden so that he

distrusts his own eyes and doubts what he actually has seen.

When he declares with absolute conviction that, "He swyved

thee; I saugh it with myne yen,/ And elles be 1 hanged by

the hals!" (2378-79) ' she convinces him that he had "som

glymsyng, and no parfit sighte" (2383); his statement, "me

thoughte he dide thee so" (2386) shows his growing

uncertainty, May finally convinces hirn that "[flul many a

man weneth to seen a thyng,/ And it is al another than it

semeth./ He that mysconceyveth, he mysdemeth" (2408-10).

May's revision of events dernonstrates the potential for

deliberate misinterpretation and the power of a speaker to

intentionally lead people astray. Similarly, the alchemist's

ruse leads the priest astray in "The Canon's Yeoman's Tale,"

in which the alchemist's transmutation of base metal into

silver is nothing but a trick, accomplished through sleight

of hand and convincing language. The narrator larnents, "O

sely preest! O sely innocent! With coveitise anon thou shalt

be blent!" (1076-77) . The priest is blinded by his greed and

so is easily deceived by the alchemist, who takes advantage

of the priestrs desire to believe in the illusion that he

creates. This scientific practice is exposed as fraudulent;

l i k e Nicholas' astronomy and Walter's philosophy, its

success depends on blind faith and "pious ignorance." Thus,

t h e a l c h e m i s t ' s t r i c k w i t h si lver is a n a l o g o u s t o Walter's

t r i c k w i t h l anguage : h i s base t e r n p t a t i o n s o f Griselda seem

t o becorne v i r t u o u s t e s t s a n d Griselda seems t o be

" t r a n s l a t e d " p o s i t i v e l y , e v e n t hough s h e c o n s e n t s t o what

she believes are t h e murde r s of h e r c h i l d r e n .

Language i s a l s o shown as u n r e l i a b l e i n "The M a n c i p l e r s

T a l e " when Phebus, the God of p o e t r y , u s e s it t o r e c o n f i g u r e

t h e e v e n t s which led hirn t o m u r d e r h i s w i f e : h e c o n v i n c e s

h i m s e l f t h a t t h e crow s p e a k s f a l s e l y when it cries,

"Cokkow!" (243 ) and t h a t h i s own v i s i o n o f h i s w i f e r s

c o n s t a n c y is a t r u e r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y . Language i n t h e

t a l e i s u n a b l e t o r e p r e s e n t r e a l i t y a c c u r a t e l y b e c a u s e i ts

a b i l i t y t o create i l l u s i o n seems greater t h a n i ts a b i l i t y t o

r e p r e s e n t t r u t h ; l i k e o l d January, Phebus c l i n g s t o h i s

i l l u s i o n s r a t h e r t h a n f a c i n g wha t h e h a s done , Phebus is

able t o recreate f a l s e l y b o t h h i s w i f e and r e a l i t y b e c a u s e

anyone who c o u l d r e f u t e o r d i s p r o v e his r e t e l l i n g of t h e

e v e n t s h a s been s i l e n c e d : a n y a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n s have

b e e n overpowered b y t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e , The t a l e c o n c l u d e s

w i t h t h e n a r r a t o r f s d e s p a i r i n g cry f o r s i l e n c e :

Thyng t h a t i s s e y d is s e y d , and f o r t h it goo th ,

Though hym r e p e n t e , o r be hym n e v e r e s o

100th .

h'e i s h i s t h r a l t o whom t h a t h e h a t h s â y d

A t a le of which h e is now y v e l e apayd.

M y s o n e , b e w a r , and be noon a u c t o u r newe

Of t i dynges , w h e i t h e r t h e y been false o r t r e w e .

(355-60)

Thus, decep t ion and t h e fa lse r e c r e a t i o n o f r e a l i t y a r e no t

t h e on ly dangers i m p l i c i t i n t h e s l i p p e r y n a t u r e of

language. Users o f language r i s k f a c i n g a l i e n a t i o n from

o t h e r s because o f the i n a b i l i t y o f language t o f u l l y express

t h e i r i d e a s , and frorn thernselves through se l f -decep t ion . As

a r e s u l t , t h e i n d i v i d u a l rnust e i t h e r f i n d a way t o move

beyond t h i s ernotional and s p i r i t u a l v o i d o r fa11 i n t o

d e s p a i r .

The f i n a l t a l e is t o l d by t h e Parson. Chaucer 's

presence i s fe l t , a s i t is i n "S i r Thopas" a n d "The Ta le o f

Melibee," when t h e a u t h o r o u t s i d e t h e a r t i s t i c frame i s

recognized as t h e shadow o f Chaucer t h e p i l g r i m : "My shadwe

was a t t h i l k e tyme, as t h e r e / O f swiche feet as my l eng the

p a r t e d w e r e / I n s ixe feet e q u a l of proporcioun" ( 7 - 9 ) . The

journey cornes t o an end a s n i g h t E a l l s : t h e pilgrimage h a s

revealed t h e i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f v a r i o u s i l l u s i o n s t o which

many of i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s have clung, and shown t h e d e s p a i r

t h a t r e s u l t s frorn t h a t reve la t io-n . Because t h e cry , "be noon

a u c t o u r newe/ O f t idynges" ("Manciplers" 359-60) i s followed

by a sermon which seems t o r e p e a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l t each ings

o f t h e C a t h o l i c Church and because The Canterbury Tales ends

wi th Chaucer's r e t r a c t i o n s , there is a s e n s e of pe r sona l

conv ic t ion i n this f i n a l s e m o n / t r e a t i s e .

Scho la r s such as S h e i l a Delaney a rgue f o r Chaucer's

d e s p e r a t e r e v e r s i o n t o t h e old dogmas and b l i n d f a i t h i n t h e

Church because he "can f i n d no r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e " (118). It

c a n a l s o be a rgued t h a t the ta le e x p r e s s e s the a b s o l u t e

d e s p a i r of one who no l o n g e r believes i n h i s power t o create

o r f i n d meaning i n e x i s t e n c e and s o f a l l s i n t o a creative

v o i d by r e p e a t i n g t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e and t r a d i t i o n a l words o f

t h e Church (even though t h e i l l u s i o n s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s

i n h e r e n t i n t h o s e words have a l r e a d y been revealed i n t h e

o t h e r t a l e s ) . However, whe the r "The Parson 's T a l e " is read

as a s i n c e r e s ta te rnent o f f a i t h o r a h o p e l e s s d e m o n s t r a t i o n

of d e s p a i r , i t m a n i f e s t s Chaucer ' s r e a c t i o n t o the

u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e , and t o t h e

fundamental inadequacy o f f i n i t e m o r t a l r ea son ,

Because "The Parson 's T a l e " p r e s e n t s a p e r s o n a l s t a n c e

t h a t arises from q u e s t i o n i n g and con templa t ing t h e Church 's

d o c t r i n e , Chaucer does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have t o be pious,

solemn, o r or thodox. Thus, even i n his r e t r a c t i o n s , h e c a n

be i r o n i c and humorous b e c a u s e h e h a s freed h i m s e l f from

e a r t h l y a u t h o r i t y . * l When h e o b s e r v e s that ''Al that is

w r i t e n is w r i t e n f o r o u r e d o c t r i n e , ? and t h a t is myn

e n t e n t e " (1083), r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is once a g a i n p l a c e d on t h e

reader: because o f t h e m u t a b l e nature of language a n d t h e

i n e v i t a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t i s t h e

21 I n Nausea and The Outsider, S a r t r e and Camus r e s p e c t i v e l y are able t o f i n d humour i n the i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s O£ t h e absurdities o f human e x i s t e n c e ; l i k e w i s e , it would be p o s s i b l e f o r Chaucer t o a p p r e c i a t e , frorn even a p o s i t i o n of d e s p a i r , t h e i r o n y of humani ty 's a t t e m p t s t o find r a t i o n a l c e r t a i n t y i n a n u t t e r l y u n c e r t a i n u n i v e r s e .

readerfs own fault if he or she learns a bad lesson.

Ironically, Chaucer lists "many a Song and many a lecherous

lay" [1087]) instead of focusing his readerfs attention on

his didactic works: he refers directly only to "the

translation of Boece de Consolacione, and othere bookes of

legendes of seintes, and ornelies, and moralitee, and

devocioun" (1087). Again, because of the uncertain nature of

language and our inability to be completely sure of anyone

else's rneaning, it is up to the reader to determine whether

Chaucer's retraction is sincere. No rnatter how the reader

chooses to interpret "The Parsonrs Tale" and the retraction

(i .e,, as texts intended to be taken literally, ironically,

or both), Chaucer makes it clear that his philosophical

stance is his own: as "Geffrey" said, '1 wot myself best how

y stonde" (HF 1878).

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