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minor princes getting unavoidably embroiled in the conflict. It turnedItaly into the battlefield of Europe. The second was the Lutheran revolt.In 1517 Martin Luther had nailed his famous 95 theses to the church doorof the Wittenburg Cathedral. From the Diet of Worms (January 1521) tothe Second Diet of Speyer (1529), his dramatic opposition to Rome drew

Europe into the `vortex of religious strife'. He threatened the dominanceof the Holy See, while `German evangelicalism threatened LatinCatholicism'.

From a theological and spiritual protest, Lutheranism had been allowedto grow into òrganized Churches'. The Order's years of vagrancycoincided by and large with the moderate progress of the Reformation,whose devastating effects on Hospitaller estates would be experienced intheir fullest magnitude after 1530.The third factor was the challenge offered by the formidable power of an

expanding Ottoman Empire. On 28-29 August 1521, Belgrade, the òuterwall of Christendom', was treacherously forced into surrender by theyoung sultan's large and well equipped army on his first campaign. Thedbcle extinguished at one stroke the false perceptions hithertoentertained of Suleyman by the Western Powers (including Venice) as anunwarlike and peace-loving ruler.2 Having reconfirmed peace withVenice by treaty of 11 December 1521, Suleyman's next target was thestrategically-placed island of Rhodes. It simply lay in the logic of theempire's expansion. Although Mehmed II had failed in a vast attemptupon the fortress forty years earlier, its conquest had now become `botheasier and more necessary' in view of the Ottoman establishment in Syriaand Egypt since their prestigious conquest of 1516-17. The westernpowers were too fully occupied with their own affairs to assist theHospitallers. In the winter of 1522, therefore, Europe watched theRhodian fortifications quake and shake slowly towards destruction bythe Ottomans, as it would by `the young king (Louis II) and the unrulynobility of Hungary' in 1526. On 26 August that year, the battle of theMohacs stretched the Ottoman front to the very domains of theHabsburgs. In 1529 Vienna was under siege.In a sense, these three factors mutually re-inforced one another. Whilethe Lutheran revolt and the ensuing struggle which it provoked withintraditional Christian unity invited Charles's ùnrelenting hostility'3,Suleyman's attacks upon central Europe and the attitude of certainGerman princes helped foster Lutheranism. Added to these, theVenetians' fear of conflict with the Grand Signore, who mostuncomfortably shared with them some two thousand miles of

borderland, was an insuperable obstacle to the crusade as envisaged byHadrian VI or by his wavering successor Clement VII. This spirit ofdissension, so widespread and pervasive throughout Europe, could not


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spare leaving its evil effects on the internal affairs of the Order of St Johntoo.


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A crisis of the highest calibreThe experience of 1522 constituted for the Order not only a profoundcrisis, but one of the highest calibre. It was a crisis of identity in the firstplace, one which questioned the institution's relevance to contemporary

Christendom; indeed, its material and physical capacity to continue torealize its traditional raison d'tre. The Pope's fear of the extension ofimperial power in Northern Italy forced him to take sides in the struggleand in December 1524 he concluded a treaty with Francis I againstCharles V, seriously damaging the papacy's traditional neutrality. Itshook one of the most delicate principles which the Order had soreligiously endeavoured over the years to observe. It was this threat toits neutrality which gradually began to promote dissension among the`national' constituent elements within the Order, later also evident in thenarrow streets of Birgu. It was a crisis which witnessed the debilitating

trend of having Hospitaller estates in various parts of Europeconfiscated, their sources of revenue exploited for the warlike ends ofkings, popes, and princes - as happened, for example, with some of theOrder's property in Portugal, Naples, Savoy, and elsewhere. It was acrisis which paralysed the generally smooth functioning channels ofadministration, breaking up the necessary ties of communication

between the central conventual authority and the peripheral prioralorganization. Once such vital organs stopped functioning, the crisiswould evolve into a painful process of dissolution, one which wouldhave caused the glorious institution `to disappear unnoticed' through thelethargy, indolence and indifference of warring Catholic Europe. It was acrisis that shook the very bone-structure of conventual life anddiscipline, one which threatened immediate institutional collapse, a massexodus of its professed members on a catastrophic scale and a markeddiminution in the number of new recruits. It was above all a crisis - likethat of 1291 at the loss of Acre - of finding oneself homeless and, as in1522, forced, cap in hand, into exile at the very heart of Europe's theatreof war, amid smiling, charming, Catholic faces subtly disguising achilling apathy. It was a crisis where all the glories of the past wereconveniently forgotten and all credibility put in doubt, where trust,confidence, and protection could only possibly be regained through asuccessful endeavour to reassert one's relevance. For the Order of St

John, this could only be achieved by again resorting to the performanceof its dual historic mission: immediate resumption of the holy waragainst Islam and the holy exercise of hospitality. L'Isle Adam's franticquest for a home - whether the old one on a reconquered Rhodes or anot-too-distant alternative on an island in the Morea, or still, if we are toaccept the Venetian Marin Sanuto's entry into his much celebrated Diarii4

(and there is no reason, of course, why we should not), a new one, either


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at the southern Adriatic port of Brindisi or on the central Mediterraneanisland of Malta - this frantic search for a home - new or old - was anecessary initial step, a spiritually and politically urgent one towards apossibly resuscitated stability.5 The experience of 1522 was a profoundupheaval on a massive scale - but the Order survived the loss of Rhodes,

as it did the loss of Acre in 1291, and indeed as it would (in a sense) theloss of Malta in 1798. There was only one explanation for that - theinstitution's `astonishing resilience', its innate ability `to maintain itscohesion'. What the Order lost permanently in 1798 - apart from theMaltese islands - was `its miltary raison d'etre'; and this not as theoutcome of Napoleon's military might, but `through the evaporation ofany genuine holy war in the Mediterranean'.6

The idea of MaltaHistorians, closely familiar with Giacomo Bosio's Istoria,7written in 1594,

build whole arguments in support of the view that the idea of Malta firstbelonged to Ettore Pignatelli, Charles V's Viceroy in Sicily, admitting, atthe same time, that the origin of this question cannot be traced back toany documentary evidence.8 On this matter, Bosio makes no passingreference to any form of documentation. Their arguments generally reston the difficulties which Sicilian viceroys had consistently encounteredin late medieval years in their endeavour to keep the Maltese islandsfrom falling into enemy hands. The cost of the islands' defence was soexorbitant, or so they claimed, the responsibility for it far too onerous,that they were only too zealous to part with them, to pass the unenviabletask to somebody else. And if this `somebody else' happened to be theOrder of St John, it would be a rare stroke of good fortune, anunexpected windfall, which it would be too naive to allow to passunexploited. The Hospitallers were traditionally renowned both for theiraudacity and bold defiance whenever and wherever they came face toface with the Muslim enemy, as well as for their brave expertise in navaland military affairs. The Knights' defence of the Maltese islands wouldconceivably, and indeed conveniently, extend to cover the entire centralMediterranean region that would include the coasts of Sicily, Sardinia,and Southern Italy, ever so exposed (as the smaller islands were) topiratical incursions. All this is attributed, without the slightest trait ofevidence, to l'Isle Adam's brief sojourn at Messina, other, of course, thanGiacomo Bosio, who was not a contemporary observer; nor was he amember of l'Isle Adam's inner travelling circle. It is, admittedly, anargument which sounds fairly valid and plausible, but which isunfortunately unacceptable to empirical historians. The whole questionof the Maltese islands, I think, should be approached within the widercentral Mediterranean and North African policy adopted by Spainshortly after the expulsion of the Moors from Granada in 1492. By the


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end of the fifteen century and the beginning of the next, the coasts ofAlgeria and Tunisia were rapidly developing into rallying grounds ofMuslim corsairs, seeking vengeance for their Christian persecution byattacking Christian ships and coasts. The shores of the Papal States, likethe whole western Mediterranean, were daily haunts of Moors and

Turks, and indeed French pirates too. It was in response to these pirateraids, that Spain, under the forceful impulse of Cardinal Francisco

Jimnez de Cisneros, the militant Archbishop of Toledo, ventured onextending her reconquista in Africa, on occupying a number of strategicport towns along the Moroccan and Algerian coasts, east of the Pen deVlez which the Spaniards seized in 1508. In 1497 Spain had capturedMelilla; in 1505 Mers-el-Kebir; in 1509 Oran; then Bougie; a year laterthey took Algiers and Tripoli. `The form ofpresidio,' we are told, `that theSpaniards set up was a garrison isolated from the hostile hinterland inwhich it was set, and demanding a firm link with Spain by sea.'9

It was this series of Spanish conquests, with which violence and brutalitywere so intimately associated, that ushered in the process `by whichOttoman power was [gradually] extended to the area'. It was the time ofthe famous two Barbarossa brothers, a strife marked by their equallydevastating activities. It was a time when, as a result, possessions alongthe Barbary Coast were lost and won `with sometimes bewilderingrapidity.' It was in fact the year before the Order settled on Malta that the

presidio in the harbour of Algiers was forced to surrender. Collectively,thesepresidioswere in practice synonymous to a broken chain of militarygarrisons, planted haphazardly on the North African shore. They couldhave hardly been expected to offer any effective resistance to thewestward advance of the Ottomans. `It is often forgotten,' EdwardArmstrong observed in 1902,10 `that the African coast round Tunis liesnorth of Southern Sicily, and the distance between the two is so slightthat the Western Mediterranean at least might have been closed, whileaid could have been given to the outposts of Christianity further east,'like the Knights of St John at Rhodes, for example, or the Venetiansettlements in the Morea and the Archipelago, in Crete and Cyprus.'Ferdinand the Catholic (of Aragon) had failed to appreciate the need forthese isolated fortified garrisons to be formed into one `connectedSpanish province, paying its own way, and drawing its own suppliesfrom the interior.' There was no intercommunication between them, noco-ordination, no territory in the hinterland. `Unsupported advancedposts' as these were, they were rendered incapable of assuming anyoffensive policy. After the death of Isabella in 1504, this was a reflectionof Ferdinand's attitude towards North Africa, determined (so to speak)

by metal more attractive. Dynastic problems, the discovery of the NewWorld, the contest that was developing in Italy among the EuropeanStates, and not least his spirit of tolerance, left him hardly any room for


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adventure let alone for conquest. His was a policy of `containment'rather than conquest, à policy of limited occupation',11 one that wouldeventually be again adopted by Philip II, but for which Spain in lateryears would have `to pay a heavy price'. The renunciation of Jimnez'scrusading philosophy in Spain's North African policy made possible the

rise of the Barbary Regencies. Indeed, it created them. In the longinterval between the reigns of these two Spanish monarchs, Charles Vendeavoured to venture on à forward policy' towards North Africa, afeeble continuation, perhaps, of that of Jimnez.12

Malta, `the missing link half-way between Sicily and the Maghrib',13

fitted in neatly within this policy. It formed an important military zonewhose strategic value, explains Fernand Braudel, `derived from itsposition on the central axis of the sea. It was Italy's maritime frontagainst the Turk.'14 There is no doubt that the Maltese `haven' whichCharles was offering the Order was meant to `serve as a deterrent to the

enterprise of the Barbary pirates and as an outpost to help defend theSpanish realm of the Two Sicilies'.The island's geographical proximity to ènemy' territory, renderingpossible the continuation of the holy war; its spacious harbours; and itsconveniently safe distance from the Catholic mainland, safeguarding theOrder's autonomy and neutrality without involving it in too manyinternational complications - all must have favourably counterbalancedin l'Isle Adam's mind the island's military, political, and economicliabilities: the poor quality of the soil, the meagre yields of its Crownlands, its dependence for continuous food supplies and raw materials onHabsburg Sicily, the despicable state of the fortifications, and itsrepulsive exposure to Muslim corsair attacks.L'Isle Adam had had bitter first-hand experience of current Ottomanmilitary power, of its naval strengths and strategies. Syria and Egyptwere fairly recent examples. Belgrade was another. Rhodes was still toopainfully fresh. If a similar force or an armada of some 50 to 100 galleyswere to be employed against the Maltese islands - militarily threadbareas they then were - it would be a far greater humiliation to the Orderthan that of a few months earlier. The Grandmaster appears to have beenfairly familiar with the situation on the islands. It was still October 1523,when the Prior of Castile and Leon (Fra' Diego de Toledo) and the Bailiffof Santo Stefano (Fra' Gabriel Todino de Martinengo) were about to bedespatched to the court of Charles V, nearly a whole year (that is) beforethe eight-men Commission submitted its report to the VenerableCouncil. The two extraordinary ambassadors were instructed to seekpermission for the Order to settle temporarily for three or four years atSyracuse (Saragoza de Sicilia) or anywhere else within the Empire untilthe Maltese islands were adequately fortified to withstand any enemyassault. A second request concerned the grant of the necessary tratte,


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franchi, liberi et exempti d'ogni dacio et gabella, for the regular export ofwheat, ship biscuits, wine, and all sort of other victuals from Sicily andthe Kingdom of Naples, necessary for the upkeep and propermaintenance of the fortress, the Convent, and the rest of the island. Bothrequests show the realistic image which l'Isle Adam entertained of Malta:

they also provide valuable insight into his initial hopes regarding thenew island.These issues constituted two major flaws not only in the mind of themilitary strategist but also in the eyes of the shrewd politician. Theircombined negative potential would be even more disconcerting whenthe two basic weaknesses - in defence and essential food supplies -marked the government of an island State. There were very sharpcontrasts between Rhodes and Malta which help one understand howdistressful these issues must have been to l'Isle Adam. They woulddepressingly haunt every single Grandmaster on Malta. To these two

requests, which featured prominently in the two ambassadors'instructions, a third was added, one which was equally disturbing at thispoint in time as it as throughout the Maltese phase of the Order's history.It concerned the universal recognition of its status as an exempt Order ofthe Church. The Hospitaller institution felt it needed the Emperor'sprotection against other kings' and princes' gradual usurpation of itsrights and privileges; the suppression of its sources of income; theconfiscation of its lands. It was on these factors, as well as on the politicalprotection extended to it by the Great Powers, that the Order depended,not only for its survival but also for the performance of its sacred duties,for the realization of its mission. In brief, this was the form, defined bythe three qualifying requests, which in l'Isle Adam's mind Charles's offerof Malta could be accepted in October 1523.

The inclusion of TripoliAt the court of Charles V things ran differently from the way l'IsoleAdam thought they would. The conditions attached to the donation wereharsher than expected. To Malta and Gozo, Charles V now added theNorth African city and fortress of Tripoli which had been in Spanishhands since 1510. This has been generally interpreted as reflecting theEmperor's innately hostile attitude towards a French-dominated Order(of the eight Langues, three were French) which in turn was answerableonly to the papacy whose current incumbent - the Medici Clement VII -was unwittingly betraying signs of anti-Spanish tendencies. However,the inclusion of Tripoli in the proposed deal need not necessarily have

been thus motivated, although the possibility cannot be ruled outaltogether. Tripoli was one other North African `post' which theEmperor wished to see revitalized, and this was a golden opportunityinadvertently presenting itself in support of Charles's policy. Roberto


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Valentini attributes the idea of including Tripoli in the deal with theOrder to the Sicilian Viceroy, refering to it explicitly on two separateoccasions (`dietro consiglio del Vicer di Sicilia' and `dietro le insistenze delPignatelli'), but without citing supporting evidence on either.It was at this stage - towards the end of June 1524 - that a Commission,

representative of the eight Langues, was entrusted to visit each of thethree `posts' collectively on offer and to report back to the VenerableCouncil. The Order needed time to assess Charles V's magnanimity inthe form it had now assumed, to evaluate it, to reflect and to resolve. Theinstructions these Hospitallers received and the report they subsequentlydrew up are widely known to those familiar with the history of theOrder at this stage in its evolution and need not be repeated here.15

Quintessentially the Order was advised to accept Malta and Gozo but todecline the offer of Tripoli, as this was too isolated and too dangerouslyexposed to the assaults of the Barbaresques. Its walls were weak and

could not withstand any artillery attacks. To rebuild them and thefortress was costly and would take long. History is full of ironies, andthe Commission's strong recommendation to reject Tripoli was definitelyone such. For when the Order eventually found itself on Malta, it was tothis same fortress city of Tripoli that in 1548 the future Grandmaster Jeande la Valette, then Governor of Tripoli, had succeeded in convincing theChapter General to have the Convent transferred the North African`post'. The project failed to materialize simply because the Ottomanarmada had captured the city in August 1551.16

Delaying tactics ?Following the submission of the Commission's report and theirrecommendations, negotiations over the cession ground rapidly to analmost complete halt. Was there any viable alternative to Charles V'soffer ? It would appear that it was in reaction to the stalemate that l'IsleAdam begins to contemplate the reconquest of Rhodes. Is there solidevidence of any serious talk about it earlier than 1525. Hadrian VI is attimes mentioned within the context of a proposed counter-expedition. Ifthis is correct, what real progress had been registered by 14 September1523 when the pope died ? l'Isle Adam proceeded personally to CharlesV's court in Spain for his support and in search for the necessary funds tosubsidize the campaign. Almost simultaneously, on 20 May 1525, theEmperor despatched Don Pietro Fernandez d'Eredia to the HospitallerConvent at Viterbo, where, since December 1523 (when Clement VIIestablished them there), the Order had had its magistral palace, aconventual church, a hospital, and the auberges for the Langues.Charles's envoy indicated in a sense the Emperor's eagerness toreactivate an offensive policy for his otherwise idle and passiveMediterranean posts. The Spanish appear to be pressed for time. On theother hand, was the Grandmaster's idea of reconquering Rhodes -


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plausible though this might very well have been, and indeed to allappearances politically legitimate and correct - part of his delayingtactics in the hope of not reaching a definite resolution before theoutcome of the war in Italy might very well mitigate Charles'sconditions? But then time was not in the Order's favour, either. If from

April 1525 through 1526, the Order was deeply involved in a Europe-wide fund-raising campaign for the Rhodian enterprise, it was asfrantically endeavouring to observe and maintain absolute neutralityand to be seen doing strictly so by the warring kings and princes andtheir respective allies. In February 1525, Francis I had fallen captive tothe imperial forces at Pavia, while `the better part of the French chivalry,'says G.R.Elton,17 `lay dead.' After a year's imprisonment, he was forcedto sign the treaty of Madrid (14 January 1526), promising (among a hostof other details) to renounce all his claims to Milan and Naples andsurrender Burgandy. These excessive demands created the Holy [anti-

imperialist] League of Cognac (22 May 1526), comprising Clement VII,Francis I, Venice, Francesco Sforza of Milan, and the Republic ofFlorence. It immediately led to war again in Italy. In August that year,and in view of these developments, it was resolved in the Order'sVenerable Council to disarm the Hospitaller galleys. This in turnrendered the institution for all intents and purposes militarily inactive.To all appearances, it distanced the Order from its raison d'tre and fromthe service it was widely expected to offer Christendom.L'Isle Adam returned to the Convent at Viterbo from his travels to Spainand France on 21 January 1527. The next year he was at the English courtof Henry VIII. Meanwhile, a Chapter-General would be summoned todecide on the cession issue. To overcome the friction generated by thegrowing political factions within the Order, Clement VII nominatedCardinal Egidio Cavisio to preside over the Chapter, meant to becelebrated in Rome on 23 March 1527, but then postponed to 28 April.This date was again inevitably cancelled as a result of the Sack of Rome.An imperial army, largely composed of Protestant soldiers, wreakedhavoc and destruction in what was until then the grandiose capital ofRenaissance genius. On that sad occasion, Gian Antonio Milesio, one ofthe Grandmaster's secretaries, was taken captive and some of thepriceless Rhodian tapestries and other rare valuable objects looted. Thecity, `a Babylon of confusion', was no longer the ideal place for theChapter to meet in. It was therefore held in Viterbo on 19 May 1527,when it was resolved, subject to papal approval, to accept Charles's offer.It was necessary that no further conditions were attached that wouldmake it difficult for the Order's princely protectors (especially those whowere politically averse to Spanish hegemony) to recognize the cession.The Order could not be allowed to be seen assuming the semblance of animperial vassal.


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Early in June 1527, with the wild spread of plague and an accompanyingmanifestation of famine (ùrgente epidemie morbo et omnium rerum penuria':l'Isle Adam's words to Clement VII), the Order had to leave Viterbo on

board its galleys and sail to Corneto. From here they were again drivenout for the same reason, the plague was following on their footsteps. On

7 October they anchored at the neutral port of Nice, which belonged toCharles III of Savoy. The Order's brief sojourn here (1527-29) wasuneasy, vis--vis its somewhat tense relations with the Duke, who hadconfiscated the two Hospitaller commanderies there (those of SanLorenzo and de Chier) and employed their resources for his ownpolitical and personal convenience.It was the Grandmaster's idea to set sail on the Rhodian expedition in thespring of 1529. To mislead the enemy, rumours were purposely spreadthat Malta was the destination of the Hospitaller fleet. And to makethings appear more convincingly plausible, the Order was indeed

prepared to sail towards Gozo where they would wait for the return ofAntonio Bosio and another person unidentified in the documents. Thesewould be sent ahead towards Rhodes for reconnoitering purposes. Infact, on 18 July 1529, the Order's fleet set sail from Villafranca, headingtowards the Maltese islands and reaching them on 29 August, butwithout landing. The news carried by Antonio Bosio `squashed,' we aretold, àll hopes of retaking Rhodes.' But what exactly was the news thatAntonio Bosio conveyed to l'Isle Adam in the Maltese waters?In 1524 as soon as Ahmed Pasha, the victor of Rhodes and the Sultan'srepresentative in Egypt, had suppressed the mutiny which had brokenout, he succumbed to the temptation of re-establishing the independenceof the Mamluk State and conspired against Suleyman.

Seeking aid from the Pope and the Hospitallers, he promised he wouldhelp the Knights retake Rhodes. For the rest of the episode, I quote

briefly from a recent account18:`The Ag of Rhodes, Ibrahim, was loyal to Ahmed Pasha andencouraged the movement. Intelligence that it would be easy torecapture the island also reached the Grand Master's ears from Rhodianmerchants who had met Ibrahim. Antonio Bosio made a secret visit toRhodes on behalf of the Knights, where he met the MetropolitanEuthymios, leading Greeks and the Turkish Ag and made arrangementswith them.' Charles V had offered 25,000 scudi for the campaign; theKing of Portugal, 15,000 ducats. However, with Ahmed Pasha'sassassination in Egypt, the Rhodians and the Ag `began to fear for theirlives'. Antonio Bosio travelled several times to and from Rhodes ùntilthe Turks, suspecting a conspiracy, replaced the garrison, arrestedEuthymios, the Ag and other Greek and Muslim nobles and executedthem all in 1529.' The Hospitaller squadron immediately left the vicinity


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of Malta and sailed to Augusta to bring to an end the negotiations thathad been temporarily interrupted. On 22 February 1530, celebrating histhirtieth birthday, Charles V was crowned Emperor at Bologna. Within amonth, on 23 March, he signed the donation deed at Castelfranco. TheOrder had accepted Charles's grant as a perpetual fief in return for the

annual gift of a falcon on All Saints' Day. In the long-term perspective ofhistorical development, the heart-felt desires and aspirations whichVenice had so gleefully entertained at the fall of Rhodes, and which wereso eloquently expressed by the humanist patrician Pietro Zen at themagnificent court of Suleyman, failed to materialize. The eviction of theHospitallers from the Aegean, however demoralizing the uprooting was,had failed not only to bring an end to the Order, since `the Hospital'sexistence did not depend upon the occupation of any particularterritory',19 but also to bring any permanent solution to the perenniallypoisonous problem of piracy and privateering. Suleyman, and each of

his successors at the Ottoman Porte, failed to sweep the sea clean of themalignant corsairing activity. And so did the Venetian Republic, whichfor the last three centuries of its existence had shown increasing signs ofweakness which the Knights did not scruple to exploit from distantMalta. Indeed, if there was any one factor which kept constantly souringrelations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire and between theAdriatic Republic and the Hospitaller Order of St John, it was preciselythe question of piracy and privateering in the Levant.


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Note

1E. Schermerhorn,Malta of the Knights. Surrey 1929.2 See K. M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571). 4 vols.Philadelphia 1984.3 G.R. Elton, Reformation Europe, 1517-1559: Fontana History of Europe(London 1963), 37.4Marin Sanuto, I diarii di Marin Sanuto, ed. R. Fulin et al. 58 vols. Venice1879-1903.5 In his early eighteenth-century description of Malta, the VenetianGiacomo Capello claims that the offer of Sardinia to the Order of St Johnhad been contemplated by Charles V before that of Malta, but he wasdissuaded by the Duke of Alva as the larger island would have given theHospitallers an easier chance to recover their military strength andassume all the attributes of secular sovereignty. Museo Civico Correr,

Venice, Don dalle Rose, 381/31(6), f.12v. For a critical edition of Capello'saccount, V. Mallia-Milanes, Descrittione di Malta, Anno 1716: A Venetian

Account. Malta 1988.6 A.T. Luttrell, `Malta and Rhodes: Hospitallers and Islanders', in

Hospitaller Malta 1530-1798: Studies on Early Modern Malta and the Order ofSt John of Jerusalem, ed. V. Mallia-Milanes (Malta 1993), 258-9.7 Giacomo Bosio, Dell'Istoria della Sacra Religione et Ill. Militia di S. Gio.Gierosolimitano. 3 vols: i (3rd ed. Venice 1695); ii (2nd ed. Rome 1629); iii(2nded.. Naples 1684).8 For example, Roberto Valentini, `I Cavalieri di S. Giovanni da Rodi aMalta: Trattative diplomatiche',Archivum Melitense, ix, 4 (1935), 137-237.9 Ann Williams, `Mediterranean Conflict', in Suleyman the Magnificent and

His Age. The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World, ed. Metin Kuntand Christine Woodhead (London1995), 39-54.10 Edward Armstrong, The Emperor Charles V: 2 vols.: i (London 1902),269.11 See J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716(Pelican Bks 1970).12 Ibid., 270.13Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the

Age of Philip II. Trans. S. Reynolds. 2 vols. London 1972-73.14Ibid., 849, 850.15 For the instructions, Bosio, iii,passim; for an English version of theeight commissioners' report, L. de Boisgelin,Ancient and Modern Malta, ii(London 1804), 15-18.16 See V. Mallia-Milanes, `Fra' Jean de la Valette 1495-1568 - AReappraisal', in The Maltese Cross, ed.T. Cortis (Malta [1995]), 117-29.17Elton, Reformation Europe.18Elias Kollias, The Knights of Rhodes: The Palace and the City(Athens1991).


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19 Luttrell, `Malta and Rhodes'.

Documents

Charlesv Donation