University of Utah Western Political Science Association
Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro
Author(s): Richard R. Fagen Source: The Western Political
Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, Part 1 (Jun., 1965), pp. 275-284
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CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY AND THE LEADERSHIP OF FIDEL CASTRORICHARD
R. FAGEN
Stanford University PART of Max Weber's sociology has been as
thoroughly overworked in discourse about politics as has his
concept of charisma. The appellation "charismatic"has been applied
to leaders as different as Stalin, Nkrumah, Hitler, and Gandhi, and
there has been a general tendency to equate the charismatic in
politics with the demagogic, the irrational, the emotional, and the
"popular." This luxuriance of meanings and attention is not, as one
commentator has already pointed out, simply a result of
intellectual faddism.1 Rather, it represents in part a very genuine
groping about for a conceptual framework which might be of service
in the analysis of twentieth-century politics. However, if the
concept of charisma is to serve in scientific political inquiry, it
cannot refer in blanket fashion to leadership styles as disparate
as those mentioned above. There is a need for explication and
parsimony. This paper attempts to provide a first step toward that
explication and to indicate, by example, how the concept might be
used in empirical inquiry.NOWEBER'S FORMULATION OF CHARISMATIC
AUTHORITY
As conceptualized by Weber, charisma (the gift of grace)
referredto "a certain quality of an individual personalityby virtue
of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed
with supernatural,superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional
powers or qualities." 2 The concept was, of course, taken from the
idiom of early Christianity, and in Weber's sociology charismatic
authority was one of the three pure types of legitimate authority -
the other two being rational-legal and traditional.3 There are at
least five elements of Weber'sformulation of charismaticauthority
which must be taken into account in any political research using
the concept. These elements, stated in propositionalform, follow:
1. The charismatic leader is always the creation of his followers.
That is, charismatic authority (in common with all other types of
legitimate authority) is rooted in the belief system of the
followers rather than in some transcendental characteristicsof the
leader.4 When no one is disposed or able to believe in the
omnipo'Carl J. Friedrich, "PoliticalLeadershipand the Problemof the
CharismaticPower,"Journal of Politics, 23 (1961), 3-24. 2 Max
Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,trans. A. M.
Henderson and Talcott Parsons(Glencoe: Free Press, 1947), p. 358.
3Weber's three-parttypology of legitimate authorityhas been
discussedso frequentlythat there seems to be no need to summarizeit
here. For a particularlycompactand cogent explication of the
typology see Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal
Organizations,A ComparativeApproach (San Francisco: Chandler,
1962), pp. 30-36. The most recent critique of Weber's typology is
Peter M. Blau, "Critical Remarkson Weber's Theory of
Authority,"APSR, 57 (1963), 305-16. Blau's essay contains a useful
listing of earlier critical appraisalsof the typology. 4 "It is
recognitionon the part of those subject to authoritywhich is
decisive for the validity of charisma." Weber, op. cit., p. 359;
see also p. 382. This aspect of the charismaticrela275
276
THE WESTERN
POLITICAL
QUARTERLY
tence, omniscience, and moral perfection of the leader, he
cannot be said to exercise charismaticauthority no matter how
strong, wise, or moral he perceiveshimself to be. 2. An "individual
personality" or leader capable of generating a charismatic
authority relationship in one context may fail completely to
generate that relationship in some other context. There are no
universal charismatics. This is clearly a corollary of the first
proposition and suggests that the set of followers is always
bounded by at least two factors. There are some who are never
reached (physically) by the messages of the leader and thus remain
at best what we shall call potential followers. And there are
others who, although reached, do not for a variety of reasons
respond in the prescribed manner. These individuals we shall call
the nonfollowers. 3. The leader does not regardhimself either as
chosen by or as solely dependent on his followers,but rather as
"elected"from above to fulfill a mission.5 He perceives his
followers as having obligations and duties toward him and he
perceives himself as deriving his morality and legitimation from
his special relationship with some more abstract force such as God
or history. Furthermore,those who resist or ignorehim the
non-followers are regarded as "delinquent in duty." 6
4. The behavior of the charismatic leader in power is
anti-bureaucratic7 "specificallyoutside the realm of everyday
routine and the profane sphere." Daily affairs,whether economic,
political or administrative,are treated with disdain by the leader.
He surrounds himself with disciples chosen for their devotion
rather than a staff selected by more formal means. 5. Charismatic
authority is unstable, tending to be transformed (routinized) 9
through time.8 This "natural entropy of the hero's charisma" occurs
in part because his image of infallibility cannot be maintained in
the face of inevitable failures, and in part because the demands of
ruling cannot be met through time without more rationalized
involvement in the mundane affairsof state.'0tionship was
stressedin an importantarticle by James C. Davies, "Charismain the
1952 Campaign,"APSR, 48 (1954), 1083-1102. Using data from the
SurveyResearchCenter of the University of Michigan, Davies
identified and analyzed 32 respondents (out of 1,799), who
perceived Eisenhoweras a charismaticleader. Davies' insights and
approach do not seem to have been followed up by
scholarsinterestedin the rapidlychanging political
environmentswhere the concept would be of more researchvalue.Weber,
op. cit., pp. 359-61.6Ibid., p. 360. 7Ibid.,8
p. 361. See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. and trans.),
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology manuel Wallerstein et al., The
Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Washington,
9The
(New York: Galaxy, 1958), pp. 248-50. phrase is from Immanuel
Wallerstein, "Evolving Patterns of African Society," in Im-
10Notice that our five propositionssay nothing about the social
and political conditions con-
D.C.: George WashingtonU., 1959), p. 6.
ducive to the establishment of charismatic authority. This
reflects a gap in Weber's thought structure which has been
succinctly pointed out by Blau: "In short, Weber's theory
encompassesonly the historicalprocessesthat lead from
charismaticmovementsto increasingrationalizationand does not
include an analysisof the historicalconditionsand social
processesthat give rise to charismaticeruptions in the social
structure. He has no theory of revolution." Blau, op. cit., p. 309.
Davies, op. cit., discussesthe genesis of the
"charismaticphenomenon,"but only in the context of politics in the
large modern state.
CHARISMATIC
AUTHORITY
277
These five propositions serve to direct us toward a set of
empirical questions which should prove useful when confronted with
a suspected instance of charismatic authority in the real world.
The first proposition focuses our attention on the attitudes and
perceptions of the followers as crucial determinants of the
existence or non-existence of the charismatic relationship. The
second proposition suggests that deeper understandingof the
relationshipwill result if we can map these perceptions and
attitudes against the distribution of social and personality
characteristicsin the society. The third directs us to an
examination of the leader'sperceived relationship both to his
mission and to his followers. The fourth and fifth propositionsare
predictive; the former states that the leader in power will behave
in certain ways, and the latter states that the charismatic
relationship will inevitably be transformed. This is clearly a
mixed bag of propositions, and any thorough investigation of one or
more cases would of necessity have to concentrate on some elements
to the partial or complete exclusion of others.l1 Nevertheless in
the following examination of the Cuban case whatever data were at
hand - no matter how unsatisfactoryare presented in order to offer
at least a brief exploration and discussion of each proposition.
This exploratory posture is assumed because it best serves the twin
purposes of suggesting investigatory strategies appropriate to the
propositions and of organizingwhat little we actually know about
the leadership of Fidel Castro.THE CUBAN CASE
1. The charismaticleader is the creation of his followers There
is no lack of reports which mention that in the early stages of the
Cuban Revolution Castro was regarded by large segments of the
population as the heavensent savior of the nation.'2 The religious
overtones of this relationship have been emphasized by many
commentators, and one prominent Presbyterian minister in"12
Except for the first proposition which cannot be ignored because
it is at the core of the definition under which we are operating.
Among the book-length studies in English which stress the
charismatic elements of Castro's relationship with his followers I
would mention the following ten: Teresa Casuso, Cuba and Castro
(New York: Random House, 1961) ; Jules Dubois, Fidel Castro
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1959); Leo Huberman and Paul M.
Sweezy, Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1960) ; Herbert L. Matthews, The Cuban Story (New York:
Brasiller, 1961); Warren Miller, 90 Miles from Home (New York:
Crest, 1961); C. Wright Mills, Listen Yankee (New York: Ballentine,
1960); R. Hart Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox (New York:
McDowell, Obolensky, 1959); Nicolas Rivero, Castro's Cuba, An
American Dilemma (Washington, D.C.: Luce, 1962); JeanPaul Sartre,
Sartre on Cuba (New York: Ballentine, 1961) ; William Appleman
Williams, The United States, Cuba, and Castro (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1962). These books, which otherwise represent a wide
range of interpretations of the Revolution, are in consensus on the
charismatic basis of the leader-follower relationship - at least in
the first year or two of Castro's rule. For two brief scholarly
analyses which make the same point see Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "The
Revolution Next Door: Cuba," Annals, 334 (1961), 113-22, and George
I. Blanksten, "Fidel Castro and Latin America," in Morton A. Kaplan
(ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (New York: Wiley, 1962).
The two most scholarly sources on the Revolution and its
antecedents are Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett, Cuba, Its
People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962), and
Dudley Seers (ed.), Cuba, The Economic and Social Revolution
(Chapel Hill: U. of N. Carolina Press, 1964). A critical and
well-documented treatment of many aspects of the Revolution can be
found in International Commission of Jurists, Cuba and the Rule of
Law (Geneva: The Commission, 1962).
278
THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY
Cuba published an article in which he wrote: "It is my
conviction which I state now with full responsibilityfor what I am
saying, that Fidel Castro is an instrumentin the hands of God for
the establishmentof His reign among men." 13 Only one study,
however, is actually based on the type of systematicdata needed for
a more thorough analysis of the charismatic elements in the
relationship of Cubans to Castro during the first few years of the
Revolution. This is a sample survey conducted by Lloyd Free in Cuba
in April and May of 1960.14 Under the direction of Free, a Cuban
research organization interviewed a cross section of 500 residents
of Havana and another cross section of 500 residents of other urban
and semi-urban centers. The 40 per cent of the Cuban population
living in rural areas was not representedin Free'ssurvey. Free
classified86 per cent of his respondents as supportersof the
regime. Of all supporters,one-half (or 43 per cent of all
respondents) were sub-classifiedas fervent supporters. In
"more-or-lesstypical quotations from the interviews" Free suggests
the articulated content of fervent support: " 'Fidel has the same
ideas as Jesus Christ, our protector and guide.' 'I would kiss the
beard of Fidel Castro.' '[My greatest fear is:] That some mean
person might kill Fidel. If this happens, I think I would die.' 15
Now these are clearly responseswith charismaticovertones. But it
would be an unwarranted inference simply to assume that all of the
fervent supporters are also charismatic followers. Rather, in the
absence of an analysis specifically designed to identify the
sub-set of charismaticswe can only speculate on how closely it
mightcoincide with the set of all fervent supporters. In any event,
two points stand out: First, in the early stages of the revolution
Castro was perceived as a charismatic leader by some "sizable"
fraction of the Cuban population. Second, in the absence of survey
research designed especially for the purpose, it is impossible to
determine with exactitude just how sizable this fraction was, or
how it might have changed in size and composition through time.16
2. The distribution of charismatic followers illuminates important
characteristics of the relationship One striking aspect of the
Cuban Revolution is the thoroughness and frequency with which the
voice and visage of Fidel Castro have blanketed the island.
Through"Rafael Cepeda, "Fidel Castro y el Reino de Dios," Bohemia
(July 17, 1960), p. 110 (my translation). An American observer
noted: "In many Cuban homes a picture of Fidel has an honored
place; in some of them it is a photograph of a bearded youth who
seems to be wearing a kind of halo; the resemblance to portraits of
Christ is notable." Irving P. Pflaum, "By Voice and Violence," Part
I, American Universities Field Staff Reports, Series V, No. 3
(August 1960), p. 16. See also MacGaffey and Barnett, op. cit., pp.
284-85. 14 Lloyd A. Free, Attitudes of the Cuban People Toward the
Castro Regime (Princeton: Institute for International Social
Research, 1960). 15 Ibid., p. 6. Free makes the point that such
expressions of devotion were not dictated by the political
exigencies of the open-ended interview situation. If a respondent
simply wanted to give a "safe" answer, it would have been quite
sufficient simply to express admiration for Castro and the regime.
16Of course the problems of conducting survey research in areas
undergoing rapid political and social change are immense. Free
mentions that the Cuban organization which originally promised to
undertake the field work backed out at the last moment when
informed by a government leader that it would be "suicidal." The
organization which finally undertook the research did so only
because it felt its days in Cuba were already numbered. Ibid.,
p.i.
CHARISMATIC
AUTHORITY
279
the extensive television systemand the mass rallies - which have
on occasion drawn as many as one million of Cuba's seven million
inhabitants into the plaza of Havana - the messages of the maximum
leader have been brought to almost 100 per cent of the
population.17 In our terminologythis suggeststhat there is only an
insignificant number of potential followers (persons not reached by
the leader's messages) in Cuba. We can therefore direct our entire
attention to the non-followers, those who have been reached but do
not respondin a charismaticmanner. Once again we must return to
Free's data as the best available for an analysis of the
distribution of charismatic followers in Cuba. As before, we cannot
identify the sub-set of charismaticsfrom the set of all fervent
supporters,but the patterning of fervent support by education,
social class, and place of residence is revealing. The tendency for
fervent support to be associated with low education, low social
class, and semi-urban residence is clear."' If rural respondents
had been included in the sample, we would expect the associations
to emerge even more strongly. Finally, Free found that the
distribution of fervent supporters was sharply skewed toward the
lower end of the age continuum - 43 per cent of all fervent
supporters were between 20 and 29 years of age.19TABLE 1SUPPORT FOR
CASTRO IN 1959 BY EDUCATION, SOCIAL CLASS, AND PLACE OF
RESIDENCE*
(in percentages) Fervent Supporters (43 per cent) Moderate
Supporters and Non-supporters (57 per cent)
(N= 1,000)
Education: Elementary or no schooling ........................
Secondary schooling .................................... University
training .............................. Social class: Lowest
socioeconomic class ...................... Lower-middle class
....................................... Upper-middle and upper
class ......................
49 35 29 48 39 34
51 65 71 52 61 66 51 66
Place of Residence: Outside of Havana
...................................... 49 In Havana ......-.......
............................ ..... 34
* Adapted from Lloyd A. Free, Attitudes of the Cuban People
Toward the Castro Regime (Princeton: Institute for International
Social Research, 1960), p. 7. have developed and documented this
theme of the modernity and pervasiveness of the Cuban communication
system in two other papers. See Richard R. Fagen, "Calculation and
Emotion in Foreign Policy: The Cuban Case," Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 6 (1962), 214-21, and "Television and the Cuban
Revolution" (Stanford: Dept. of Political Science, 1960), mimeo.
For a useful evaluation of Castro's television talents see Tad
Szulc, "Cuban Television's One-Man Show," in CBS (ed.), The Eighth
Art (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 197-206. S Our
inability to isolate the charismatics from the fervent supporters
is not too crucial here for it seems safe to assume that, if
anything, the charismatics would exhibit these tendencies to a
greater degree than the fervent supporters do. 19 Free, op. cit.,
p. 8.17I
280
THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY
Confirmation of this pattern of support for Castro also emerges
from data on a systematicsample of Cuban refugees in Miami - a
group which is presentlyunanimous in its expressed hatred of
Fidel.20 When asked how they originally had felt about Castro when
he came to power in 1959, 42 out of 191 refugees replied that they
thought "he was the savior of Cuba." Since the refugee community
represents a highly skewed sample of Cubans, a sample comprised
substantiallyof members of the middle and upper classes,Table 2 is
of special interest. Thus, even in this refugee sample the
association of strong support with lower education, semi-urban and
rural residence, and lower age is found.TABLE 2REFUGEE SUPPORT FOR
CASTRO IN 1959
(in percentages)(N= 191)
BY EDUCATION,
PLACE OF RESIDENCE,
AND AGE*
"Castro was Savior of Cuba" (N-=42)
All other responses (N=1 49)
Education: ....... 25 High school or less
.............................. At least some college
.................... ............. 12 Place of Residence:
75 88
Outside of Havana ................-...................... 27
Havana ............................................ ........ 19Age:
40 or younger .. .......................................... ....
........................ 41 or older ......1..... * All respondents
currently in exile in Miami. 26 18
73 8174 82
But should we expect these particular socio-demographic patterns
of fervent support (and the less frequentlyencountered - though
similar- patterns of charismatic support) to be found in all cases
of charismatic leadership? That is, whenever a charismatic
political relationship is identified will the followers tend to
come from among the rural, the younger, the less educated, and the
lower classes? There is no simple answer to this question, but at
least three points should be noted: First, as
emphasizedpreviously,the communication system of Cuba has brought
all members of the society into contact with Fidel, giving them at
least the opportunity to become charismatic followers. In less
developed and less homogeneous societies, it would be precisely the
lower classes, the rural, and the poorly educated who would tend to
be cut off from the national channels and therefore from the
messages through which the leader might establish his claim to
legitimacy. Second, both the ideological focus and the actual
accomplishmentsof the Cuban Revolution20This derives from an
unpublished study by the author and Professor Richard Brody of
Stanford University. As part of the study, a self-administered
questionnaire was given to a of male Cuban heads of household
living in Miami (in March 1963). pre-selected sample The data in
Table 2 are taken from the completed questionnaires. Complete
demographic data on the refugees are reported in Richard R. Fagen
and Richard C. Brody, "Cubans in Exile: A Demographic Analysis,"
Social Problems, 11 (1964), 389-401.
CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY
281
have come to center on the rural and less privileged sectors of
the society.21 It is
natural to assume that those who perceive themselves as the
prime beneficiaries of Castro'sleadership should also tend to
relate most frequently to him in a charismatic manner. However,
just as all nations do not have Cuba's well-developed communication
system, so all charismatic political movements do not necessarily
benefit the rural, the poorly educated, and the lower classes.
Finally, the social groupingsmost likely to relate charismaticly to
Castro may well contain a disproportionatenumber of persons who as
individuals are predisposed to make a charismatic response. Davies,
for instance, hypothesizes four characteristicsof the
"charismaticaspect of personality structure,"22 and Doob has
suggested that the less educated and less westernizedmembersof a
society perceive and behave toward authority figuresquite
differently than do their more educated and
westernizedcountrymen.23It is perhaps at this level of
"personalityin social structure"that the Cuban experience will
prove to be most similarto other instancesof political charisma. 3.
The leader regards himself as elected from above to fulfill a
mission Only a close analysis of Castro's published and unpublished
thought could supply the richnessof detail which a full
investigationof his self-imagewould require. In the absence of such
an analysis,we can only note a few recurringand interrelated
themes. First, Castro perceives the Revolution as part of a greater
historical movement against tyranny and oppression. Castro
developed this theme long before he became a professed
Marxist-Leninist. More recently, of course, capitalism and
imperialism have replaced (domestic) tyranny and oppression as the
prime obstacles to a revolutionary cleansing of the world's
political landscape. Second, the Cuban leadership and Castro in
particular are seen as blessed and protected by the larger
historical movement of which the Revolution is a part.
Castro'sfamous speech ending, "condemn me, it doesn't matter.
History will absolve me," is a classic, early articulation of this
idea.24 Finally, because the leader is seen as acting in concert
with larger historical forces not always visible to more ordinary
men, he alone retains the right to determine "correct"behavior in
the serviceof the Revolution.1 By actual accomplishments of the
Cuban Revolution we refer to such social gains as the educational,
health and welfare, and housing facilities which have been built
since 1959. For examples of the manner in which the Revolutionary
Government uses the themes of egalitarianism and social welfare,
see Richard R. Fagen, Cuba: The Political Content of Adult
Education (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1964). 2Davies, op. cit.
"2Leonard W. Doob, Becoming More Civilized: A Psychological
Exploration (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1960). 24This speech was
delivered by Castro at his trial for leading an attack on the
Moncada Army Barracks in 1953. It is available in English under the
title, History Will Absolve Me (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961). The
attack and the trial are well treated in Dubois, op. cit. The theme
of historical blessedness and protection received popular
reinforcement from the circumstances surrounding Castro's return to
Cuba from Mexico in 1956 with 82 men and the avowed purpose of
overthrowing Batista. Only Castro and 11 others escaped to the
Sierra Maestra where they launched the guerrilla action which
culminated in the downfall of Batista two years later. All the
elements of high drama and miraculous escape were attached to the
story of the guerrilla band during these two years. At one time,
Castro was reported dead, and subsequently a price of $100,000 was
set on his head.
282
THE WESTERN
POLITICAL
QUARTERLY
It is important to realize that these overtones of intellectual
Marxism and political authoritarianism preceded by many months the
introduction of Marxist economic determinism and Soviet bloc
alliances into the vocabulary and practice of Cuban politics.
Castro'sgrowing impatience during 1959 with his political
opposition was only one early manifestation of this particular
self-perception. More recently, as is suggested by his attack on
Anibal Escalante and the "old-line" Havana Communists,he has
exhibited much the same determinationto maintain his position as
chief interpreterof the correct meaning and interrelatednessof
events.25However, now it is (some) Communists in addition to (all)
anti-Communistswho are being rudely schooled in what it means to be
a follower in Castro'sCuba.264. The behavior of the leader in power
is anti-bureaucratic
Once again we find striking agreement among the various
interpretersof the Revolution that Castro is (or at least was)
highly disdainful of and uninterested in the routine processes of
public administration. Friends and foes of the Revolution differ on
whether this disinterestis "good" or "bad," "creative"or
"uncreative,"but few deny its existence. This characteristic of
Castro is thrown into ironic relief by the immensity and
pervasivenessof the bureaucratic structureswhich have been created
to direct the reorganization of Cuban society. For instance, the
National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), once headed by Castro
and often called the heart of the Revolution, directly or
indirectly controls 80 per cent of the farm land on the island.27
But Castro's behavior, both while chairman of INRA and after,
hardly fits Weber's model of rational-legal leadership. On the
contrary, his leadership was highly personalized and
un-hierarchical, and his choice of second-level administrators was
based primarilyon ascription (is he a trusted follower from the
Sierra?) rather than achievement criteria. Nowhere is the
personalized and un-hierarchical nature of Castro's leadership
better drawn than in an episode reported by Jean-Paul Sartre. In a
chapter called "A Day in the Country with Fidel," Sartre tells how
on a stopover at a rural tourist center Castro became upset because
his soft drink was warm.28 According to Sartre, Castro's ire was
not aroused by his personal inconvenience but rather by his
generalized irritation with a bureaucratic structure which was
created to serve "the people" but which frequentlysucceeded only in
frustratingthem. After "rummaging passionately around in a
refrigeratorthat was out of order.. ." and being unable to fix it
himself, "He closed with this growled sentence: 'Tell your people
in charge that2The crucial document here is Castro's television
speech of March 26, 1962. This is available in English under the
title Fidel Castro Denounces Bureaucracy and Sectarianism (New:
York: Pioneer, 1962). See also the discussion in Theodore Draper,
Castro's Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1962), Appendix Three. 2I
am simplifying a very complex and poorly understood relationship
(between Castro and the old-line Communists) for purposes of
emphasis. However, I think that the essential point remains valid;
i.e., Castro has fought very hard to maintain his position as the
prime interpreter of the larger historical importance and meaning
of events in Cuba, and thus he sees himself as a leader who is not
obligated to accept the interpretations of others with regard to
what his or their political roles should be. 27 International
Commission of Jurists, op. cit., p. 61. 2" Sartre, op. cit., see
pp. 122-3.
CHARISMATIC AUTHORITY
283
if they don't take care of their problems, they will have
problems with me.'" And this, Sartre maintains, was typical of the
manner in which the "maximum leader" invested his energiesin the
administrationof Cuba. 5. Charismaticauthority is unstable, tending
to be routinized through time Now we come to a set of questions
which we have in part glossed over by pretending that the
legitimacy of Castro's rule has been relatively stable since 1959.
This is not the case, for there have been changes along at least
two dimensions. First, there has been some shrinkageof the set of
followers, both the charismatic and the non-charismatic. Most
simply, Castro's rule is not now as legitimate for as many Cubans
as it once was. However, we lack the data needed to document and
quantify the extent and distributionof this partial
disintegrationof legitimacy. Second - and this bears most directly
on Weber's concerns- there has been at least a partial shift as
predicted from authority relationshipsbased on charisma to
relationshipsbased on rules, law, and a nascent
"revolutionarytradition." This shift cannot be adequately
describedin brief compass,but central to the partial routinization
of charisma in Cuba has been a movement away from Castroas the
prime popular symbolof the Revolution and a concomitant movement
toward a heterogeneityof symbols which includes other leaders, a
whole spectrum of martyrs, revolutionary organizations,and
achievements. This movement away from Castro as the organizing
symbol of the Revolution incarnate is illustrated in Table 3, which
compares the frequency with which Castro'spicture appeared in two
successivesets of INRA, theTABLE 3IN OF ISSUES OFINRA PICTURES
CASTRO 22 AVAILABLE First 11 Issues Vol. I (1960) # 1 2 3 5 6 7
8.........-................-..
No. of Pictures
Second 11 Issues Vol. II (1961) # 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No. of Pictures
11 6 ........................... .............. ......... ...
..........................8 ..... ......... ......................
5 6 .................... 7 .............................. 10
..............................
. ............5........... . ... ... ..1........... ...
........................ ..............................
...................... ... ..............................
............ ..................
5 2 4 8 1 5 0 1 0
- 9 10 -----------6 11 - .......................... Vol. II
(1961) # 1 .............................. 12
11 .............................. 12 .....
Total -92 Mean*= 8.36*
Total = 3 1 Mean* =2.82
For differencebetween the means, t= 3.85, d.f. 20, p =.001.
284
THE WESTERN
POLITICAL
QUARTERLY
official monthly magazine of the National Institute of
AgrarianReform.29 Although these data do not constitute a test of
Weber's hypothesis, they do suggest that his statement that "in its
pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in the
processof originating. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either
traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both" 30 may
be susceptible to more rigorous investigation than it has hitherto
received. Certainly our understanding of politics and political
change in the emerging nations of the world would be much enhanced
by systematic research designed to explore the validity of this and
other segments of Weber's model of charismatic authority. This
paper has attempted to explicate that model in a way which might
prove useful for research. A brief look at the leadership of Fidel
Castro leads to cautious optimism regarding the usefulness of
Weber's ideas for the investigation of charismatic politics. But
much work is still needed before we can claim with any confidence
to understand the processesby which politicians like Castro bind to
themselves and their causes the men and women who as charismatic
followers constitute the primaryresourceof such regimes.
INRA is a large-format popular magazine of 108 pages. It
contains both pictures and text much in the manner of LIFE.
Although INRA concentrates rather heavily in the areas of current
events and recent history, it does publish essays, reviews,
fiction, and poetry. The original intent was to compare Volume I
(1960) with Volume II (1961), but two issues of Volume I could not
be located so the 22 remaining issues were split into two equal
sets of 11 each. 30 Weber, op. cit., p. 364.29
