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8/12/2019 Chapter01 Game Theory
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2008 Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Chapter 1
Game Theory
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In t roduct ion
Game: a contest involving two or more
decision makers, each of whom wants to win.
Game theory: the study of how optimal
strategies are formed in conflict
Games classified by:
Number of players
Sum of all payoffs
Number of strategies employed
Zero-sum game: the sum of the losses must
equal the sum of the gains
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Payoff Tab le
Y1
Use radio
Y2
Use newspaper
X1
Use radio
3 5
X2
Use newspaper
1 -2
Game player Ys strategies
Game
Player
Xs
Strategie
s
+ entry, s X wins and Y loses
- entry, Y wins and X loses
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Outcomes
Store Xs Strategy Store Ys Strategy Outcome % change in
market share)
X1Radio Y1Radio X wins 3
Y loses 3X1Radio Y2Newspaper X wins 5
Y loses 5
X2Newspaper Y1Radio X wins 1
Y loses 1X2Newspaper Y2Newspaper X loses 2
Y wins 2
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Minimax Criter ion
In a zero-sum game, each person canchoose the strategy that minimizes themaximum loss
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Minimax Criter ion
Y1 Y2 Minimum
X1 3 5 3
X2 1 -2 -2
Maximum 3 5
Minimum of maximums
Maximums ofminimums
Saddle point
Note: an equilibrium or saddle point exists if the uppervalue of the game is equal to the lower value of the game.
This is called the value of the game.
This is a pure strategy game
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Pure Strategy
Whenever a saddle point is present, thestrategy a player should follow willalways be the same, regardless of the
strategy of the other player.
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Pure Strategy
Second Players (Y)
Strategies
Y1 Y2
First Players (X)
Strategies
X1 3 5
X2
1 -2
Ys purestrategy
Xs purestrategy
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Pure Strategy
Minimax Criter ion
Player Ys
Strategies
Minimum Row
Number
Y1 Y2
Player Xs
strategies
X1 10 6 6
X2 -12 2 -12
Maximum Column
Number
10 6
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Mixed Strategy Game
Y1P
Y21-P
Expected Gain
X1
Q
4 2 4P+2(1-P)
X2
1-Q
1 10 1P+10(1-p)
4Q+1(1-Q) 2Q+10(1-q)
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Solv ing for P & Q
4P+2(1-P) = 1P+10(1-P)or: P = 8/11 and 1-p = 3/11
Expected payoff:
EPX=1P+10(1-P)
=1(8/11)+10(3/11) = 3.46
4Q+1(1-Q)=2Q+10(1-q)or: Q=9/11 and 1-Q = 2/11
Expected payoff:
EPY=3.46
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Dominance
A strategy can be eliminated if all its
games outcomes are the same or
worse than the corresponding outcomes
of another strategy
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Dominat ion
Y1 Y2
X1 4 3
X2 2 20
X3 1 1
Initial Game
Y1 Y2
X1 4 3
X2 2 20
X3 is a dominated strategy
Game after removal of dominated strategy
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Dominat ion
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4
X1 -5 4 6 -3
X2 -2 6 2 -20
Initial Game
Y1 Y4
X1 -5 -3
X2 -2 -20
Game after dominated strategies are removed