CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Religion plays a dominant role in the political life,

particularly in Third World. There can be no doubt that

belief system remains a powerful influence not only in

underdeveloped/ developing societies but even in the

supposedly modern secular nations. In fact at no point of

history, religion has completely been separated from

politics. As one scholar noted, "Politics involves a set of

active links, both positive and negative, between civil

society and institutions of power. In this sense there has

been little separation certainly none in our time, between

religion and politics anywhere".l The principle of seperation

of church from state remains an ideal construct. Even the

advanced . Western nations, which take pride in the claim of

. having a secular polity, do not fit into the"ideal-type"

category. The actual working of Buropean and American

po~itica~ system clearly violates the principle of

seperation.

Functional, if not legal, seperation between religions

and state authority is a pre-requisite of any modern state.

vary~ng degree of seperation between the two is to be found

among all kinds of society including the Muslims. But due to

the close and historical association of Islam with the state-

l.. Eqbal Ahmad, , Islam and Politics', Byron Heines, and Ellison Findly, Impact (Syracuse, 1984), p. 12.

285

in Yvonne Haddad, e d i .:T~h ... e",---=I~s~l-",a,-"m,,-,l.o:...· c~

system in Muslim societies, seperation between ecclesiastical

and temporal function has not been rationalized in legalistic

terms, unlike in separation the Christian society where

justification for the seperation between the two has been

found in the Biblical saying; "render upto to God which·is of

God and render unto Ceasar which is of Ceasar". Moreover, in

Muslim societies, the ruler has traditionally been looked

upon as protector of religio-moral order of society. Hudson

notes that for Muslims the model of politically developed

state remains the seventh century Islamic state founded by

Prophet Muhammad. 2

It is because of historic linkage between Islam and

political order that Muslim thinkers have always assigned the

study of politics to the related religious discipline of

jurisprudence (figh) and theology (kalam) As Patrick

Bannermann says, "Muslim jurist. have not been able to study

politics in isolation as a complex seperate discipline.

Issues such as the nature of the state, authority, power,

government, institutions, qualifications for rulership,

limitations on a ruler's power, and individual rights and

obligation could not be examined without reference to the

law. 3

The Third World soc~ety unlike the West, has never

2. Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and Political Development", in John. L. Esposito, edi Islam and Development: Religion and Socio- ·Political Change, (Syracuse, 1980), p. 7.

3. Patrick Bannerman, Islam in Perspective; A Guide to Islamic Society. Politics and Law (London, 1970), p. 78.

286

undergone the structural transformation unleashed by the

forces of Reformation, Renaissance and Industrialization.

Therefore, the political influence of religion in these

societies remained strong. This is true of the Muslim

societies as well. Though the Western-based socio-educational

and legal reforms, Western-style constitution, political

parties and technocratic bureaucracies definitely undermined

the clergy's position in the Thirq W~rld Society, these

reform packages have not eliminated religion as a major

source of legitimization of political system.

The legitimizing function of a religion depends upon the

ideological character of religion and the historical role

that religion has played in the particular society/country.

Islam is by far the most ideologically regimented religion

and hence a constant source of legitimation to the variety of

political system in the Muslim societies. Even in the West,

where the historical process of Reformation, Renaissance and

Industrialization has eroded the bases of political influence

of Christianity and reduced its role to the ' personal

affairs' the political system has not been completely de­

christianized. The phenomena of Moral Majority in the United

States, the king as the Head of Anglican Church in England,

the Catholic influence in the Irish r"epublic all these

point to the legitimizing functions of religion in varying

degrees. In other words the religious establishment has

adjusted its role with the emerging secular - political order

in the Western society. But religion as a factor in the

public arena has never been eliminated, though its intensity

287

and degree of participation in the state polity has

definitely been reduced.

In fact religion constitutes an important ingredient of

social ethos of any country which in varying degree shapes

the government's policy. The social ethos sets the informal

values and norms within which a polity is supposed to

operate. No government or regimes, however secular, would

like to deviate from society norms and values, which to a

large extent are derived from religion. 4 The regimes which

deviated from the operating values and norms of society had

to face the people's wrath. Because in any societal the

significant issue is not whether inequality exists or the

degree of political participation per-se but whether the

degree to which such features "exist" is considered just or

unjust in forms of the shared values. It is within this

framework that one has to understand the people's reaction

against the Shah of Iran and Anwar-al-Sadat in Egypt and also

the Grand Mosque incident (1979) in Saudi Arabia. Both Shah

of Iran and Sadat became the target of Islamic movement

because of their too much identification with Western powers

and value system, while paying lip service to Islam.

Communist regimes in the erstwhile Soviet Union and East

Europe tried to suppress the religion based social ethos

which finally proved to be counter-productive to them.

The legitimising role of religion varies from country to

4. See, Dawa Norbu, Culture And Politics of Third World. Nationalism, (London & New York, 1922).

288

country depending upon the social ethos of that country.

Va:z;-ious constitutions of the world have accorded different

position to religion depending upon the particular religion's

influence in that country.As Hudson has shown, "to the extent

that structural legitimation, an independent belief in the

validity of the structures and norms prevails over

'ideological' and/or -- 'personal' legitimacy, religion may

not be functional alternative for politics. Where structural

legitimation is the norms, there are usually a greater number

of avenues for the articulation of political demands and/or

protests. ,,5 To a large extent this form of structural

legitimization is found among the advanced Western capitalist

nations.

In Third World countries, influence of religion is still

pervasive and predominant. The conventional modernization

thesis t~at as societies industrialize, urbanize and are led

by secular leaders, religion will increasingly appear as an

anachronism, doomed to privatization and ultimately

disappearance has not proved correct in the context of Third

Wo:t;:"ld countries. Rather the modern technology of mass

communication has strengthened the religious consciousness.

It is because of pervasive influence of religion that the

various rulers/ruling regimes and leaders in 'many Third

World countries sought to use religion as an instrument to

acquire power, to legitimise the rule and to consolidate the

5. Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (London, 1977), p. 39.

289

position. 6

Contemporary Muslim societies including that of

Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia do not differ in this general

pattern. Though, over the years, due to reforms in the legal,

educational, socio-cultural and economic field, the political

status, of the ulama and its influence in the society has been

tremendously reduced, but the reduction in influence does not

mean that the contemporary political system have been de-

Islamisized as had been claimed by many of the scholars

belonging to the modernization school; Ira M. Lapidus, one

such scholar, while examining the impact of Western

secularism and 'liberalism on Muslim societies in post-Second

World War period, went to the extent of declaring, "Islam has

been de-established from its historic role in the

identification and legitimization of state regimes. 7 The

contempora~y Islamic revivalist 'movement proved such

declaration wrong Islam 'remains the basis of individual and

collective identity and also as the governing principle of

society.

Most Muslim state constitutions feature Islam as the

basis of the society, as the national religion, and Sharia as

the basis of law. Therefore, Islam as an ideological system

remains the principal legitimising instrument of the ruling

regimes in Muslim countries, especially in the Middle Eastern

6. See, Donald E. Smith, Religion and Political Development, (Boston, 1970), esp. Ch. V.

7. Ira M. Lapidus, The History of Islamic Societies, (Cambridge, 1988), p. 884.

290

nations. Right from the Abbasid dynasty in 9th century A.D.

to the emergence of territorial nation-state system of today,

various rulers whether they called themselves secular,

semi-secular, liberal or religious have used/manipulated

Islamic symbols, values, institutions, groups and individual

leaders in order to acquire power, to enhance the legitimacy

of the regime, to eliminate the opposition and to consolidate

their position. Arnold's classic The Caliphate clearly shows

how the symbolic values of the institution of the Caliphate

has been used by various rulers/ dynasties to buttress their

Islamic character. It was for this reason that Caliphate was

reta~ned for many centuries even after the Mongols had tried

to destroy its power in 1258 A.D. In modern period various

Muslim regimes sought to revive the Caliphate purely for

political purposes until it was officially abolished by Kemal

Ataturk in" 1924.

Regimes have always sought to patronize a section of

higher ulama in order to secure their ideological suport to

the regimes. Traditionally the patronization came in the

forms of tax-free land grants, religious endowments,

donations and gifts. In modern times they are given the

higher posts in the state administration. Now the ulama has

been completely bureaucratized, atleast in the Sunni Muslim

societies. In short, throughout the history of Islam, regimes

through the instrument of ulama have manipulated the Islamic

doctrines to suit the needs of the ruling elite.

Following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire

various new nation-states emerged in Middle East. Islam was

291

pressed to suit the localized national context. Post-Second

World War period witnessed the emergence of nationalist

version of Islam. There was more emphasis on the Arab

character of Islam during the inter-war periods and even

afterwards. Pan-Arabism became the ideological instrument in . the hands of ruling elites to acquire power in the individual

state. However, Islam was not delinked from the ideology of-

pan-Arabism. The basis of Pan-Arabism - language, history,

culture and tradition remained Islamic though the Islamic

content of Pan-Arabism varied from country to country

depending upon the social ethos of each country.

Aware of the mobilizing capacity of Islam, the regimes

have traditionally sought to control the instruments of

political mobilization i.e. - the mosque and its Friday-

Sermon. Hence the mosque in principal to~s and its. staff

(particularly preacher) have' always been mai~tained by the . ~

governments. Similarly the content of Friday sermon are often

officially controlled. Also, the mosques and its Friday

sermon have been used by the regimes to justify their

domestic as well as foreign policies. Through the Ministry of

Religious Affai~s/Endowments and similar other departments

the state regimes kept a watch-full eye on the activity of

various Islamic organizations and also promoted the official

version Of Islam. In short, the state regime, especially in

the Sunni Muslim society, has harnessed the ulama's hierarchy

through financial dependence and political favouritism and

made them a subservient tool of central government.

292

Therefore, in the context of Islamic societies, secularism

has meant state control of religion and state efforts to use

religion in the service of its nationalist and developmental

goals.

The contemporary political system of most Muslim <..

countries, (particularly Middle Eastern states) including

Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia suffers from "chronic legitimacy

crisis ... 8 The basic righteousness of leaders, regimes and

political system is not widely and deeply accepted.

Therefore, the successive regimes in the contemporary Muslim

nations have increasingly resorted to Islamic themes, values

and symbols to legitimize the rule and its policies. For the

same reason the Muslim state has always been involved in the

promotion of Islam or Islamic establishment mosques,

teachers, educational programming, religious

endowment,s, Islamic conferences etc. Thus the process of

Islamization has continued throughout -the Islamic history.

Therefore, the phenomenon of "Islamic revivalism" essentially

becomes merely a problem of "legitimacy crisis" at official

level. As Hudson noted, "If there is any thing new in the

instrumental use of Islam as a legitimizing political

ideology by incumbent regimes, it is a difference of degree

rather than kind".9

However Islam, by virtue of its high ideals and relative

lack of structural hierarchy (particularly in Sunni Islam),

8. Hudson, n. 5.

9. Hudson, n.2, p. 18.

293

does not lend itself to long-term monopoly by incumbent

regimes. It nevertheless appears to be increasingly effective

as a destabilizing instrument. In other words, Islam can be

quite effective in legitimizing an opposition movement as

well. Thus, both the incumbent leaders as also the opposition

politicians constantly invoke Islamic symbols in daily

political discourse to fortify their respective positions.

The Islamic opposition groups accused the ruling regimes for

non-implementation of Sharia, thereby challenging their right

to rule. The incumbent regimes denounced the opposition as

, Kharij"ite' and 'deviant' and even do not hesitate to crush

the latter.In fact what lies behind the politics of Islam is

the non-religious issue, essentially the pursuit of political

power. Metin Heper noted, "Past Order cannot be resurrected.

Ideas and systems liberal, Marxist Muslims, whatever

become a.cover for power, an apology for decay. Behind the

labels lurk the struggle for power and the fea·rs and

ambitions of men.... Religion often justifies rather than

determines politics. 10

The political history of Islam is riddled with the

exploitation of Islam for power-struggle. Commenting on the

relationship between Islam and politics in contemporary

Muslim countries, Fazlur Rahman noted that an important

problem that has plagued Muslim societies is the. peculiar

relationship of religion and politics and the pitiable

10. Metin Heper, "Islam, East" in Metin Heper and Politics in the Sydney, 1984), p. 5.

294

Politics and Change and Raphael Israeli; Modern Middle East

in Middle ed., Islam (London &

subjugation of the former to the latter. For, instead of

setting themselves to genuinely interpret Islamic goals to be

realized through political and government channels, what

happens most of the time is ruthless exploitation of Islam

for party politics and group interest that subjects Islam not

only to politics; but to day to-day politics. According to

him, Islam thus becomes sheer demagoguery. Unfortunately, the

so-called Islamic parties in several countries are the most

blatantly guilty of such systematic political manipulation of

religion. The slogan, , in Islam, religion and politics are

inseperable', is employed to dupe the common man into

accepting that, instead of politics or the state serving the

long-range objectives of Islam, Islam should come to serve

the immediate and myopic objectives of party politics. 11

The preceding analysis of contemporary Egypt, Iran and

Saudi Arabia does not differ from this general pattern.

Mehmet Ali came to acquire power in Egypt through the support

of ulama. Once he consolidated his position he completely

undermined the po~ition of ulama. Nasser,. himself a devout

Muslim and supposedly having link with. the Muslim Brotherhood

before 1952, did not hesitate to suppress the Brotherhood

because the latter was the religio- political organization

capable of challenging the Nassirite regime. Sadat used Islam

to enhance his own personal legitimacy and to de-Nasserize

the system. He used Muslim Brotherhood initially to eliminate

the Nassirite and the leftist threat to his regime and later

11. Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity; Transformation of Intellectual Tradition (Chicago, 1982), p. 150.

295

to check the growth of more militant Islamic groups in Egypt.

However, the Sadat regime did not hesitate to suppress the

Brotherhood when it became too powerful to challenge the

regime.

Over centuries, AI-Azhar had emerged as the principal

ideological instrument of ruling regimes in Egypt. Thus,

while Nasser used AI-Azhar to justify his socialist and

nationalization measures and anti-imperialist posture, Sadat

used it to justify the market economy (infitah), his pro'­

American foreign policy and even the peace treaty with

Israel. Similarly in Iran Muhammad Shah acquired throne with

the support of Shii ulama. However his modernization

programme led him to undermine the socio-economic position of

the Shii ulama. Reza Shah, too, consolidated his throne, when

challenged by the liberal nationalist like Mossadeq in 1953,

with the support of the ulama. But the support of the Shii

ulama did not prevent him from implementing his controversial

'White' Revolution' which definitely aimed at undermining the

privileged position of .sllti ulama. Ayatollah Khomeini used

Islam to oppose the Shah and later to legitimise his

personalitic rule. He ruthlessly suppressed all other Islamic

organizations, learned muj tahids and political

opposed his claims to be the Valeyat-a-Fagih.

parties who

Ibn Saud in

Saudi Arabia used Ikhwan to expand the territory of Kingdom,

to consolidate his regime and to crush the opponents. Once

the stated objectives were fulfilled, Ibn Saud ruthlessly

suppressed the Ikhwan movement wi th the support of the ul"ama

because the latter started opposing some of the policies of

296

Ibn Saud. Since Ibn Saud till the present ruler, Islam has

been used as an instrument to achieve the political cohesion

of the country and to legitimise the socio-economic and

technological change in the society.

Thus the evolving conunon pattern indicates that the

state cannot tolerate an autonomous religious domain that

might compete with it for loyalty. This is true even in so­

called Islamic states like Saudi Arabia and Iran where

religious opposition is crused probably more ruthlessly than

the secular states. At the same time, the state extends its

authority to the religious domain and utilizes religious

leaders and institutions to perpetuate its policies.

The interpretation of Islam varies according to the

political needs of ruling regimes and the oppositional

groups. The ' official' Islam, associated with the ruling

establishment - whether monarchial, revolutionary, religious

or liberal - tends to undermine the political role of Islam

and emphasizes more the' social' and 'individualistic' aspect

of Islam. In' contrast to it, the popular Islam, generally

associated with the oppositional groups emphasizes or "rather

glorify the political role of Islam. Official Vs Popular

Islam is the dominant political trend to be found in almost

all kinds of Muslim societies. As we have seen, contemporary

Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia are no exception to this trend.

Another common pattern is the nature of oppositional

role of the ulama. Though the ulama do not constitute the

class in economic term, neither did they act historically in

297

class manner. However, their opposition to certain measures

such as encroachment on Sharia jurisdiction, attempts to

control wagf revenue and the official extension of secular

education is clearly - class based. The common opposition of

the ulama to these measures is found among all Muslim

societies including Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. These

measures were the principal issues for the ulama's opposition

to the late Qaj j ar and the Pahalavi dynasty in Iran. The

ulama in Saudi Arabia successfully opposed any attempt of the

Saudi state to codify the Sharia law. Despite the

introduction of secular education in many fields,

particularly technical and professional subjects, the

educational system remains under the overall supervision of

Wahhabi ulama. In Egypt, ulama of all shades had opposed the

reform of curriculum of AI-Azhar and ~ during the inter­

war perio~s.The ulama's opposition to Nasser's modernization

programme persisted, but due to the authoritarion structure

of state, the opposition could not be expressed openly.

However, like any other religion the actual role of

Islam varies from country to country depending upon the

historical role of Islam in that country, the nature of

socio-economic formation and the political system of the

country, the degree of Western social, political and economic

penetration in that country, the ideological character of the

ruling regimes and the organizational structure of the

religious authority in that country. In short, the variance

in the role of Islam accounts for the variance in the social

ethos of each country. The preceding analysis of the role of

298

religion in state polity of contemporary Egypt, Iran and

Saudi Arabia clearly reflects this pattern.

Although in Sunni Islam, the higher ulama has

historically been associated with the ruling establishments,

the domination of state over Islamic establishment in Egypt

is far more greater in comparison to any other middle Eastern

state. The Egyptian state has over the last 150 years ~ried

to control, loosen, manipulate and exploit the relation

between religion and politics depending upon the exigencies

of tl').e situation. From Mehmet Ali to Nasser, the state

sponsored reform in legal, educational, and socio- economic

field completely undermined the political, social, economic

and religious basis of ulama' s influence in the Egyptian

society. The financial dependence and integration into the

state structure hindered the Egyptian ulama from playing an

active .and decisive role in the affairs of the state. ,

Consequently, the dominant tendency of Islam (official) in ,

Egypt is of providing legitimacy to the variuous regimes and

their policies. Unlike the Sau~ii Arabia, Islam was never

called to achieve the political cohesion of the country.

Egyptian nationhood exists since eternity. 'In addition, the

liberal pluralistic ethos of Egyptian society further

restricts the role of Islam in the political affairs of the

country. The interaction of Egypt with the Western World

further enriched the liberal ethos of the country. British

and French liberalism had a deep impact on the political life

of Egypt. Muhammad Abduh was the first systematic Muslim

299

thinker to express liberal Islamic ethos of the Egyptian

society. It is because of the absence of strong, cohesive and

autonomous religious institution and the existence of liberal

pluralistic ethos that Islamic fundamentalists are unable to

acquire the political power in Egypt. Foud Ajami underlined

this point when he says, "even if the dominant political

order in Egypt were to come unstruck, it is not likely that

Islamic fundamentalists would come to dominate the new world.

Again in those subtle and mysterious ways in which societies

(particularly Egypt) understand their own dilemmas and

refrain from playing with fire, the likely outcome would be a

course dominated by liberal secularists and nationalists. 12

In comparison to Egypt, one find a much greater role of

Islam in the Saudi's political system. Owing to the remotness

of Saudi peninsula for long time, its association with the

birth of~slam and the existence of the two most holy shrines

within the territory of the kingdom, the influence of Islam

is very pervasive in the Saudi society. Moreover, the

existence of modern. Saudi Arabia owes greatly to the ideology ;

of Wahhabism. Therefore, the maintenance and promotion of

Wahhabi-brand of Islam is required· not only to ensure the

legitimacy of regimes but also to maintain the internal unity

of fragmented tribal society of the Saudi Arabia.Tribal

values are another source of political legitimation, apart

from Islam. The authoritarian political culture has been

12. Foud Aj ami, "In the Pharaoh's Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt" in Piscatori, ed; Islam in the Political Process, (Cambridge, 1983), p. 33.

300

consciously fostered by the Wahhabi ulama which suits the

needs of the monarchy. In other words, the interest of

monarchy go hand in hand with that of the Wahhabi orthodoxy.

It is because of these factors that Wahhabi ulama play

greater role in the country's political affairs. Though the

Saudi state dominates the religious establishment of the

country and over the years the Wahhabi ulama have been

integrated into the state structure, yet, unlike Egypt, the

position of the ulama has not been completely marginalized.

No technological innovation has been introduced without the

prior approval of the ulama. They still exercise considerable

jurisdiction over the educational and judicial system of the

country. They remain the custodian of Islamic morality,

tradition, custom and ethics. In fact since the Wahhabi ulama

have identified their interest with the interest of the

ruling re~ime, they take deep interest in the affairs of the

country and often interfere in the powe~-struggle among the

different factions of the ruling class.

In marked contrast of Sunni Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the, ,

conflict between the state authority and religious authority

in Iran is historical. The political tendency of Shii ulama

has been marked by their active participation in the

political affairs of the country. In fact, the specific

attributes of Shiism the symbol of sufferings and

oppression, the doctrine of illegitimacy, as well as the

financial independence of Shii ulama, their identification

with the Iranian nationalism, closer association with Bazzar

301

community and the institutionalized hierarchy of religious

authority has allowed the Shii ulama to play a greater

political role, unknown in the history of Sunni Islam.

However, despite· the Shii ulama' s strict insistence on the

doctrine of illegitimacy, various higher ulama had provided

the degree of Islamic legitimacy to the successive secular

authority kingship in Iran. In fact Shiism has played

different role in the different historic period corresponding

to the existing position of Shii ulama. Due to the

subservient position of Shii ulama during the Safavid period,

political tendency of Shiism was one of quietism. On the

contrary, the political assertion of ulama during the greater

part of Qajjar and Pahalavi dynasty leading to the abolition

of monarchy in 1979, was in· part due to the enhanced socio­

economic position of Shii ulama and partly due to the

specific ~evelopments in the country.However, once the clergy

acquired the state power, it behaved like apy other ruling

elite. It could not tolerate any other independent religious

organization or individual that might compete with it for

loyal ty . In fact the clergy used the state apparatus to

enhance its legitimacy, to consolidate its position and to

eliminate the potential opposition.

Until the time when religion ceases to be an important

instrument for acquiring and legitimizing power, it will

continue to be a maj or variable in politics domestic,

regional and even global. This is especially true of the

Islamic world in which religion is deliberately projected as

302

a major factor not only in domestic and regional politics but

also at the international level as represented by the OIC,

the Organization of Islamic Conference. It is an exclusive

international organization representing muslim

states/regimes, but not the Muslim people. In such a

situation it is natural that religion will continue to remain

an instrument of state power. It will also be used to compete

for greater role in intra-regional politics as is seen fr.om

current Saudi-Iranianrivalry to dominate the minds of Muslim

ununa. If seen as an intrinsic part of civilization it can

even be projected as a major variable in the so-called 'clash

of civilizations'. In this process religion loses its primary

theological framework and the basis of faith in God and a

means of conununion with God and degenerates as one of the

several instruments in the hand of unscrupulous

politicia~s. Thus rather than using religion ·as a pawn in the

game of politics, restoring it to its prima~ role as a means

of communion with God will not only help to purify and

strengthen religion per se but also indirectly buttress the

concep~ of secularism.

303