CHAPTER SIX

URDU LANGUAGE AND RECONSTITUTION OF MUSLIM IDENTITY IN

INDEPENDENT INDIA

The focus of this chapter is on the process of redefinition and reconciliation of

identity of Muslims in independent India. Since the symbols of identity

claimed by the Muslims to justify their demand for a separate state were

altered by the very process of partition, the status of Muslims who remained

in India had to be redefined.

6.1 Situation of Indian Muslims after Independence

Between 1940-1947, through the vigorous activities of the Muslim League

for the creation of Pakistan based on the ideology of two nation theory, the

symbols of Muslim identity that included Urdu language were fixed. Noorani

(1998: 125) points out that by then, to be sure, the theory had spread far and

wide in the minds of millions and caused damage far more grave than the

Partition of India. The damage occurred because of the image of Muslims

that emerged as a consequence of these events. For their opponents, all

Muslims appeared to be separatists and anti-national. The association of

Muslims with these images would persist as part of their identity long after

the Partition.

After the formation of the new state, Pakistan, Muslims were forced to

reconstitute their identities. Reconstruction meant redefining the status and

role of Aligarh Muslim University, Urdu language and Sharia etc after

independence. The Muslim League leaders mostly from the predominantly

Hindu provinces, like UP in undivided India, who created these identities

and symbols, left for Pakistan.

At the time of partition according to the 1951 census, 64 million Muslims

went to Pakistan while 36 million decided to stay in India. Das Gupta

(1970:27) says that if one were to accept the principle set forth by the leaders

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of Muslim separatism that religion was the basic criterion of a nation, one

could understand the problem of status which the creation of Pakistan

undoubtedly posed for the Muslims in new India.

Mohamed Raza Khan, who was a member of the League Council since 1943,

and of the Madras Legislature from 1946 to 1962, describes the Muslim

mood at Partition as follows;

Having worked for the creation of Pakistan, they found themselves left without an organization and leadership, with nobody to guide them, Mr. Jinnah left for Karachi to lead the new State. Most of the top leaders, who were on the League Working Committee and prominent Leaguers in different States, either left for Karachi to build up their own careers, as they felt they had no political future in India, or went into complete retirement. A fear complex had overtaken the Muslim community throughout the country. They could not think in terms of their political rights or their material welfare. All that they wanted was that there should be no communal trouble in their areas. They practically lost all interest in politics and wanted that they should be left to themselves. This mood of withdrawal lingers till today (Quoted in Noorani, 1998: 129).

Some of the leaders who stayed behind added to the confusion. According to

Noorani (1998:126), one of them, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, offered support

to Jawaharlal Nehru's motion on the national flag and implicitly pledged

loyalty to the new state, which was contrary to the previous Muslim League's

policy and guidance to the Muslim masses. The League leader and former

premier of Bengal, H. S. Suhrawardy, raised an important question, which is

still relevant, in his letter to Khaliquzzaman on 10 September 1947.

What I fear is, will they have respect for you if you have not strength, that is to say if you give up your particular group solidarity? At the same time, any attempt to acquire solidarity and strength will raise suspicion in their minds as regards of bona fides (Noorani, 1998: 126).

This dilemma was experienced even by the League and Jinnah himself,

perhaps in a more embarrassing manner. Jinnah had repeatedly counselled

them to organize themselves and professed that they should chalk out their

own future, which is precisely what he afterwards prevented them from

doing. The League Council met on 14-15 December 1947 in Karachi and

decided that there shall be separate Muslim League organizations for

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Pakistan and the Indian Union (Noorani, 1998: 127). Accordingly he said

that there must be a Muslim League in Hindustan. If they were thinking of

anything else then they were finished. If they wanted to wind up the League

they could do so but he thought it would be a great mistake. He said he knew

there was already an attempt to do that (Noorani, 1998: 127). These remarks

raised a question as to why Indian Muslims had to maintain the League,

which was meant for the creation of Pakistan when there was no need of

another Pakistan under the secular policy of Indian Union.

The Muslim's dilemma was also reflected in the Hindu leaders' comments

against them. In relation to the dispute raised by Pakistan regarding the

status of Kashmir, Vallabhbhai Patel in a public meeting on 6 January 1948,

angrily questioned the Indian Muslims' alleged silence on the issue. He

asked them why they did not open their mouths on the Kashmir issue. He

wondered why they had not condemned the action of Pakistan (Noorani,

1998: 130). Noorani points out that it was obvious that Patel was prescribing

a loyalty test to Muslims- support to the Government of India's stand on the

Kashmir dispute with Pakistan (1998: 130-31). Though the League continues

in India, it is as a regional body with strong base in only Tamil Nadu and

Kerala (ibid.: 132).

All Muslim identities and symbols, which were created during the colonial

period in one way or another, lost their objectives and relevance. Muslim

masses were left behind without leaders. Noorani (1998: 133) comments on

the Indian Muslim condition after the Independence by pointing out that no

grievance was redressed and no reform carried out. The insecurities yet

remain. Muslims continue to perceive their identity to be under threat. The

principal gainer was, of course, the League leadership. Thus they had no

choice but to reconstitute/reconcile their identity.

In the next section the role of Urdu language in the reconstruction of

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identity is examined.

6.2 Decline in the :instrumental power of Urdu

6.21 Internal Factor: State Language Policy

As we have seen already, policy can create hierarchies both at social and

psychological levels. UP State language policy had two negative effects on

the instrumental power of Urdu language. First the language was denied a

legitimate status on account of being a minority language and secondly the

reluctance to provide protection to the minority language meant an

impediment on its development and a decline in its use.

In addition it is important to note that central and state policies toward

linguistic minorities especially in the case of UP are contradictory. While

central government policies are designed to promote national unity by

accepting linguistic and cultural pluralism, State government policies seek

to pursue the same objectives by encouraging homogenization on the basis of

the dominant regional cultures. Brass, (1975: 216-17) argues that in this way

state governments seek to avoid the implications of linguistic and cultural

pluralism and the political demands of linguistic and religious minorities for

privileges which foster separate cultural identities. In other words, as

Kirpalani Committee says in the case of UP, the State Government is one

which is concerned about the interests of 'national integration' by rejecting

the 'national policy'. As far as the second status of Urdu is concerned,

technically the government of Uttar Pradesh, did not deviate from the norm

that was agreed upon by the states in the Indian Union, since the State

Reorganization Commission in its report (1955) had suggested that before a

language could be considered as a second state language, the population

speaking the language should be 30 percent of the total population of the

state and the Union government. Through a memorandum the Ministry of

Home Mfairs agreed with this proposal and advised the state governments

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accordingly (Das Gupta, 1970: 148). On this basis they could legally deny

Urdu a legitimate status as the second official language.

This imposition of majority's language and culture on the minority in UP

had a second dimension. The step they took was to provide poor or no

facilities for Urdu education and discouraging and de-linking it from higher

education and administrative services. In this way the UP state government

succeeded in restricting Urdu to .the poor or inferior sections of society

leading to a decline in the image and status of Urdu.

This neglect and discriminative policy of the state therefore prevented Urdu

speakers from feeling part of or joining the mainstream society and created a

sense of deprivation among the Muslims. In the next section, we see how all

these factors have affected Muslim identity.

6.22 External Factor: Effect of Globalization-

As shown in the discussion above, legitimate power provided through policy

determines both the symbolic and instrumental significance of languages

especially in the context of relations between different linguistic groups.

Without any support of the state however, English remains a powerful

language because of its association with the market institution through

which languages enter the arena of legitimation (Singh, 2000: 149).

Languages of significant value in the market context like English have

increased in importance due to the process of globalization.

While policy creates the internal divisions and hierarchy among languages,

globalization works as an external factor to change 'in' and 'out' group

language categories since 'in' and 'out' relationships are not absolute.

Although Urdu and Hindi fall into separate categories in relation to each

other because of different statuses accorded by the state as well as the

emotional rivalries between the cultural groups associated with them, when

viewed externally in relation to English they fall into the same 'in' group as

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Indian languages. Singh, (2000: 163) therefore observes that the new phase

of economic development not only alters the market situation for languages

externally (outside the country) but also within the society. He notes further

that; The crucial factors which govern the viability of a language for the internal

market are: modernization of teaching in the language and its orientation to services and the integrative capacity within the linguistic community to absorb in its educational system the skills and vocations that the emergent new economies may require. The responses to· these new demands in education influence the market prospect of a language (2000: 163).

Like language policy, globalization provokes a sense of identity. Due to

globalization, homogenization of cultures takes place in several aspects of

cultural life of the people but this process also accelerates the growth of

cultural self-consciousness and cultural identities (Singh, 2000: 98).

In a sense, globalization and the influence of English has helped to reduce

the gap in instrumental power between Urdu and Hindi. Due to

comparatively little power of both Hindi and Urdu in the market sphere (in

the instrumental sense), their symbolic power have increased tremendously.

That is why 'angrezi hatao' 1 by Mulayam Singh eased the process of

recognition of Urdu as a second language in UP.

Even if Muslims have strong attachment to Urdu, identity claims can not be

sufficient reason for the language retention. The linguistic identity needs

'legitimation'. Singh (2000: 166-7) says that a major loss to Urdu language in

India during the past fifty years has been due to its displacement as a

language of symbolic domination as well as major changes in policies of

states towards Urdu language which have adversely affected its market

value. One of the reasons why, during the British period, the Muslim elite

tried to defend the continued use of Persianized Urdu in the courts, offices

1 This political slogan expresses sentiments against English and support for Indian languages

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and schools of the northern provinces was that it enabled the Muslim elite to

maintain their dominance and limit others' access to positions of dominance

in the ruling institutions of the provinces (Brass, 1975: 179).

Especially after independence, the apathy of the upper and the middle class

Muslims towards Urdu and the tendency in the Muslim community to

appropriate it merely as a religious-cultural phenomenon has reduced its

utilitarian as well as ideological appeal. It is no longer patronized by the

state, or the market as in the past. The job opportunities for graduates in

Urdu have become negligible except for a limited number of teaching

positions. All this signifies the loss of symbolic domination or instrumental

value of Urdu language (Singh, 2000: 167). This erosion in its symbolic

domination is 'as a result of ascendance of English' and this results from its

precarious linkages with the market, now in the process of economic

globalization (ibid.:168). This effect of globalization applies as well to other

Indian languages including Hindi which otherwise enjoy considerable state

patronage and articulate higher degree of cultural domination in the social

space (ibid.: 167). That is one of the reasons why English still occupies a

dominant position in language hierarchies in India in spite of its lack of

official status in many regions.

The process of globalization produces dual and contradictory trends in the

usage of the languages, which can be applied to Indian situation. Muslim

elite patronize English-medium, private or convent schools while professing

oral commitment to education through Urdu medium (ibid.: 174). This

happens even in Pakistan, where Urdu is the national language of the

country. Rahman, (1999: 98) notes that English remains the language of

power and high social status in Pakistan. At the rhetorical level, however,

the ruling elite appears to support Urdu. Thus this process produces new

hierarchies of power among languages.

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A brief review of the situation in Pakistan could be used to illustrate this

point. Rahman, (1997: 177) writes that Pakistan is no doubt an ideologically

inspired state and Urdu was a part of this ideology. The situation of Urdu is

however not so stable even in Pakistan. Though as a national language, it

enjoys considerably high status like Hindi in India, the effects on Urdu from

the internal regional divisions and external factors are tremendous. Except

for relatively better situation of Urdu in Pakistan than in India, these

external and internal factors undermine the importance of Urdu as a single

dominant national language.

Symbolically Urdu has a strong ideological and official support in Pakistan

because of its centrality in national integration. Though this is the same

with Hindi in India, which is supposed to be a symbol of national integration,

the presentation of this issue takes a secular approach while in Pakistan,

Urdu language is often associated with religion. Thus in Pakistan, the

Perso-Arabic roots are used in order to stress the Muslim aspect of the

Pakistani identity and, in keeping up with the two-nation theory,

differentiate Pakistani Urdu from India Hindi which is becoming more and

more Sanskritized (Rahman, 1999: 266). At the same time, now it is being

used to counter the hegemony of Western culture and Anglicization (Rahman,

1999: 291).

After partition and independence of Pakistan, the Muslim League leaders

who formed the government associated Urdu with Islamic and Pakistani

identity. Moreover, they also felt that only Urdu could be used to integrate

the diverse nationalities of Pakistan. Thus they propounded the uni-national

thesis - that Pakistanis are one people - and chose Urdu as the national

language (Rahman, 1999: 9). This policy has remained almost the same

either at educational level or administrative level and has been followed by

several political parties, though their motives could be different. However

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there have been several regional linguistic movements including the Bengali

movement against Urdu language and Urdu speaking dominant group.

Rahman, (1999: 289) observes that at the same time, however, for all

lucrative and high-powered positions, it is English, which is required as it

was in the days of the British Raj. In that context, Urdu is ghettoizing.

Hence, whereas highly placed state functionaries support Urdu in their

official roles, they privately use English and educate their children in it. In

fact even middle class people who support Urdu for ideological reasons adopt

the pragmatic policy of learning English and teaching it to their children.

This dual and contradictory attitude is a universal feature of elite and

middle classes in almost all marginalized speech communities and is related

to linguistic ideology, which is mobilized at two levels, namely, general

(communicative) and specific (symbolic), with the structure of social

stratification and division of classes in a speech community (Singh, 2000:

143). With the dominance of English as the global language and the

recognition of Hindi as the official language in India, Urdu's position as

legitimate language in the communicative ~ense is weakened further.

6.3 Urdu as a Symbol in Identity Reconstitution

The denial of legitimate status to Urdu especially in UP has not only

affected the instrumental power of Urdu but also created an acute identity

crisis among the Muslims in India. The government policies especially on

language have not only affected Muslims in economic spheres but have also

stirred their human consciousness especially where policy decisions are

unfair and unjust. After independence, the role of Urdu language in the

constitution of Muslim identity has been enhanced in last five decades by the

official neglect and even suppression of the language itself. This political

neglect and denial of legitimate status to Urdu is strongly connected with the

image, which surrounds Urdu language and its identification with Muslims

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and Islam. In the next section the discussion focuses on how this image has

been created and is maintained.

6.32 Social Construction of Image

Human beings understand themselves through interaction with others. In

the process of identifying others, human beings can identify themselves. If

they can not identify others, their own identification is also not clear. Thus

the role of others become a very important factor for the identity formation.

Creation of image or myth is not only an outcome of direct interaction but

also a result of indirect information transmission. In indirect method of

image creation, the power of language and media like journals and the press

plays a crucial role. They can give idea about what people know they are,

what they think they ought to be, and what others think they really are.

They create the image and even contribute to the creation of myths.

Through interaction, people begin to have certain 'images' about others and

vice versa. This 'others' perceptions might or might not be congruent with

the self-image. Normally human beings have their own self-perception about

their own image and seek to present it that way. However it depends on

various factors whether others also interpret it the same way. When it is

incongruent and especially when others are in powerful position, like a

majority, they can enforce their version of image. The projection or

transference of image and status from majority to minority and

appropriation of cultural symbols or values of dominant groups in society

plays a crucial role in the constitution of identity.

Thus as Noorani (1998:121) says, a minority's sense of identity is shaped by

its understanding of its own history. Its self-image is influenced, no less, by

the image the majority groups have of the minority - an image shaped, in

turn, by their understanding of history. Not infrequently, historical

perceptions clash. History does not address itself in the same language to

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different peoples.

Through the nationalistic movement followed by the birth of Pakistan, the

interaction between Hindus and Muslims has led each group to have certain

images of each other. Their behavior towards each other in present times

majorly depends on the image, which was created during that time.

Since colonial period basically Indian Muslims, especially in northern parts,

have always been seen in opposition to Hindus. Thus a number of elements

of their identities are also the creation of this interaction. The emergence

and continuation of an identity is sometimes supported by a counterpart.

Since this majority and minority group relationship has always been marked

by conflict, their identities are also constructed in that context. Thus when

identity has a counterpart in this manner, it increases attachment to one's

in-group.

There are several identities, which are attached to each of these socio­

cultural groups. Several of these identities were created during the colonial

period and some of them have persisted in India to this day. For Muslims in

contemporary India, the status of Aligarh Muslim University, the oispute

over Muslim Personal laws, and the Urdu language are major identity issues.

Among them, Urdu has a unique position in the constitution of Muslim

identity especially in relation to Hindus, since it has a counterpart, Hindi. In

order to understand the uniqueness of such identities, a comparison is made

here between the aspects of identity, which have counterparts in other

groups and those that do not have.

The importance of cow to Hindus and Sharia to Muslims constitute symbols

of identity that belong to this category that lacks counterparts in the

opposite group. Both of them are central factors in the identity of each

religious group. Sharia is therefore used as a symbol of Muslim identity in a

manner similar to the use of the cow by Hindus (Brass, 1996: 97). Even

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though each group views its own elements of identity with high regard and

reverence, there is a contradictory perception about the same elements by

the rival community (ibid.: 99). In this sense, these symbols are viewed

different from the way Hindi and Urdu are viewed.

There seems to be a tacit agreement between Hindus and Muslims in

contemporary India that so far as Hindus do not interfere about the cause of

Muslims, the Muslims also do not interfere with Hindus. Brass (1996:99)

notes that; Hindus revere the cow and Muslims are brought up to eat it, but dietary habits are changed more easily than religious beliefs. Consequently, Muslims may change their primordial attachment to eating beef for the sake of the Hindu primordial attachment to the sanctity of the cow, particularly if Hindus agree not to tamper with those attachments that Muslim value more than the Hindus, such as the Sharia. Now, this particular bargain, though not an explicit one, surely exists tacitly in contemporary in India. It is at least certain that the ulema will not rise up in a body to defend cow sacrifice as long as there is no interference with Muslim personal law.

This point should be considered from the character of each symbol. While

eating cow is not mandatory for Muslims, it is mandatory for Hindus to

worship cow. In the same way, to support Sharia does not harm Hindus since

there is no importance for them. In short, protection of the Sharia does not

affect the cause of cow protection and vise versa. On the other hand, the

promotion of Urdu, especially giving the second official status, which gives

the practical opportunity for Muslims to get jobs, definitely threatens the

cause of Hindi, even if the numbers are not so high. Especially in north India,

where Hindi is widely spoken, the more the number of Urdu speakers reduce,

the more the numbers of Hindi speakers increase, which is evident from the

census (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 183).

Thus between the issue of Sharia and cow, there can be tacit agreement,

while that agreement is impossible between Hindi and Urdu. At the same

time, the issue of Sharia is complicated and divisive among the Muslims but

not between them and Hindus. Brass (1996:97) therefore observes that

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unlike the symbol of the cow for the Hindus, however, the Sharia is a divisive

symbol within the Muslim community itself. One would be hard put to find

many Hindus who think it important to slaughter cows but many secular

Muslims consider it essential to modernize the Sharia and to adopt a

uniform civil law administered by the state.

However this division in the community 1s generally overlooked or

neglected by others and even by their own people. Once multiple symbols are

attached to a particular group, those who belong to the group will be

considered to have accepted all the symbols. Hasan, Zoya (1994:63) notes

that; Over the years, the salient features of minority identity found expressions

in maintaining the status quo on personal law, besides defending places of worship, and promoting Urdu. But what is often ignored is that Muslims are by no means a homogeneous community; they do not exist in Indian society as separate and isolated entities, they operate within the social structure as segments of a composite social framework. Equally significant is the tendency towards pluralism in matter pertaining to the Shariat.

Whenever a collective identity is externally assigned by a group outside the

one whose identity is in question, then it is assumed that all members share

those attributes or attach the same value to them. This has been the case

with Urdu. According to statistics, Urdu is not the language of all Indian

Muslims. According to the census of India, 1991, only 42.73% of the total

Muslim population could claim it as their mother tongue, although most

people assume that all Muslims are Urdu speakers.

However because of the tragic experience during the partition, anything

related with Muslims and Islam has always been seen through this

particular perspective by Hindus. Any demand related with Urdu or

otherwise has always been viewed with suspicion and always raises

questions of Muslim loyalty to India. Thus Muslim political leaders who

wished to demand protection for Muslim minority rights were now on the

defensive, forced to defend not only their rights but their loyalties, which

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were called into question by Hindu communalist leaders whenever Muslim

demands became assertive (Brass, 1975: 183). Mayer, (1983: 9) observes that

substantial numbers of Hindus still believe that Indian Muslims owe their

primary loyalty to Pakistan. In turn, Muslims always feel discriminated

against whether it is true or imagined. Mayer (1983:10) citing Imtiaz Ahmad

comments that; ... the important thing is not that there is discrimination against Muslims in the economic structure. What is important is that Muslims have felt so insecure as to believe themselves to be the target of continuos economic discrimination. The fact of their belief has been crucial to their social adjustment in the country.

About Urdu, it was worse than any other symbol of Muslim identity since

it was connected exclusively with Muslims by Muslim themselves, especially

beginning with the Muslim league. It was used to assert differences rather

than commonness and it played a critical role in the ideology of Pakistan

movement, and it was eventually declared. the national language. of Pakistan.

It is also at the center of different interpretations of history between the two

communities. According to Brass (1975:186) in the eyes of the more militant

Hindu supporters of Hindi as the sole official language of India and the north

Indian states, this attachment of Muslims to Urdu and its script is an

attachment to a 'foreign' script and an alien culture by a communal minority

whose loyalties to India are suspect. On the other hand, Urdu supporters

deny this charge and argue that Urdu is an indigenous language just like

Hindi and is spoken by both Hindus and Muslims and is thus a symbol of

unity of the two communities (ibid.). While Urdu speakers' claim is genuine,

there is another aspect, which is not always mentioned. It is that the special

heritage of Indian Muslims and the religious literature as well as the

cultural achievements of Indian Muslims are mostly in Urdu (ibid.: 187).

This is the very reason why it is mostly Muslims who defend this language.

Thus the harder Muslims try to defend Urdu, the more the suspicions of

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Hindus increase and get confirmed that Urdu is a Muslim language.

From this brief observation of the interaction between two communities,

there seems to be a consensus between Hindus and Muslims on the basis of

the image that Urdu is a language of Muslims. liowever complications arise

when both communities want to see the issue from completely opposite

perspectives. While some may want to emphasize the inclusive aspect of the

language, others may want to do the same from an exclusive perspective.

In the next section, the place of Urdu in the interaction between these two

communities is examined on the basis of presentation and interpretation of

community image.

6.33 Muslim Identity: The Self-Image

Attitude of Non-Urdu speaking Muslims to Urdu

As explained in the introduction, only a few states have Muslim population

of more than 1 million according to the 1991 census. Among them, UP, Bihar,

Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan accounted for 43% of the total Muslim

population in India. This indicates that more than 50% of the Muslim

population were spread throughout India.

In the same way, Urdu speakers were also dispersed all over India. Eight

states, each with more than one million Urdu speakers, accounted for more

than 93% of the total Urdu speakers in India. The states were UP, Bihar,

Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and

Madhya Pradesh. In each of these states however, Urdu speakers constituted

a minority linguistic group.

These figures indicate the extent of diversity of customs, culture, history, and

languages even among the Muslims. Following the linguistic reorganization

of Indian states in 1956, cultural differences and regional distinctions

especially on the basis of language have become sharper.

Since Urdu language was and is more associated with Northern Muslims

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rather than the south, Muslim attitudes towards Urdu as a factor in identity

is more strongly and emotionally displayed in the north. However there is

evidence that south Indian Muslims are also increasingly adopting Urdu as

part of their Islamic identity.

Table 10. Urdu Speakers and Muslim Population (in Millions) since 1971. 1971 1981 1991 Number Urdu % of Number Urdu % of Number Urdu % of of Speakers Urdu of Speakers Urdu of Speakers Urdu Muslims Speakers Muslims Speakers Muslims Speakers

among among among Muslims Muslims Muslims

India 61.418 28.621 46.60 75.512 34.941 46.27 101.596 43.407 42.73

Uttar 13.677 9.273 67.80 17.658 10.208 57.81 24.110 12.493 51.82 Pradesh Bihar 7.594 4.993 65.75 9.875 7.287 73.80 12.788 8.542 66.80

Andra 3.520 3.300 93.75 4.534 4.208 92.81 5.924 5.560 93.86 Pradesh Karnata 3.113 2.637 84.71 4.105 3.611 87.97 5.234 4.480 85.59 ka Mahar a 4.233 3.662 86.51 5.806 4.583 78.94 7.629 5.734 75.16 shtra Sour~: Censuses oflndia 1971, 1981, and 1991.

The censuses from 1971-91 show that the proportion of Urdu speakers in

Muslim population in the non-Hindi speaking states is higher than in the

Hindi speaking states. According to Farouqui (1992:101) observes that the

condition of Urdu in UP is worse, while in Maharashtra and southern India

it is comparatively encouraging. This fact can be understood from the fact

that in Andhra Pradesh, the official status to Urdu was granted much earlier

than in both UP and Bihar (Khalidi, 1995: 141).

Apart from that, the number of students who study in Urdu medium and

the facilities for education are far better in other states, especially in the

south than in UP, where the highest number of Urdu speakers live. In a

sense, instrumental power of Urdu is more prominent in the south than in

the north. These trends are borne out by the following data.

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Table 11. The comparison of Urdu Primary and Secondary educational facilities in UP and Maharashtra in 1992-1993

Number of Number of pupils Number of teachers Year: Primary schools studying in Urdu employed for imparting 1992-1993 instruction through

Urdu

UP 1573 268056 10068 Maharashtra 2170 525973 13735 Year: Number of Number of pupils Number of teachers 1992-1993 Secondary schools studying in Urdu employed for imparting

instruction though Urdu

UP 218 75115 7430 Maharashtra 430 174647 6297

Source: 33ro Report of Comnnss10n for Linguistic Minorities in India. Note: Bihar, AP, and Karnataka governments did not furnish the data regarding the minority educational facilities. However from previous reports there was evidence that generally the southern parts of India provide better facilities and enroll more students compared with UP.

Thus it is important to see how Muslims in other states other than UP see

the issue of Urdu. Here some patterns of development of Islamic culture

especially in the south that have influenced attitudes towards Urdu

language are examined.

The advent of Islam in south India can be categorized into three phases.

First, after establishing their power in northern part of India, Muslim rulers

started penetrating deep into the south. Secondly, there were local converts

through missionary activities.

Thirdly, and perhaps primarily, the long-standing trading relations with the

ancient Romans, Greeks and Arabs gave them chance of assimilation. Islam

in southern India actually owes its origin primarily to its direct contact with

the Arab traders, who contracted marriage alliances with indigenous coastal

women.

In the first case, during the penetration of the Muslim rulers into the south,

a large number of soldiers, poets and administrators came and settled in

south India from the Deccan and north India. These settlers and their

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descendants, who were mainly Urdu speaking, made south India their home

but did not sever their historical, cultural and ethnic ties with their northern

Muslim brethren. They were never able to identify themselves fully with the

predominantly non-Urdu-speaking local populations. In the second and the

third cases, they remained as Tamil or its derivative Malayalam speakers

(More, 1995: 336).

There was considerable influence through the Muslim League movement on

Tamil Muslims to awaken and propagate their Islamic identity. More

(1995:338) says:

In 1906, the All India Muslim League was founded in Dacca to protect Muslim interests in India. Its Madras branch was founded in 1908. The very next year, separate electorates were accorded to the Muslims. Until about 1930, Muslim politics in the Presidency was dominated by the Urdu-speaking aristocratic merchant elite, centred in Madras city. The situation of the Tamil Muslims, who had their own powerful merchant elite and who until the launching of the Non-Cooperation and Klclafat Movements in the 1920s were impervious to national and pan-Islamic sentiments and usually kept a low political profile, underwent a sea-change. In fact, Khilafat Movement drew the Tamil Muslims into national and international issues and made them join hands with the Urdu-speaking Muslims. They thus became conscious of their Islamic identity and there was certainly an awakening of their political consciousness, too.

In the same way the Hindustani controversy had also arisen in south even

before the installation of the Congress government in 1937. The Hindi versus

Urdu controversy of the United Provinces was well known. Since the

Congress party assumed office in 1937 in the Madras Presidency, with the

Tamil Brahman, C. Rajagopalachari as Prime Minister, naturally the

Muslims of Madras feared that they were being obliged to learn a

Sanskritised Hindi in the name of Hindustani2 (ibid.: 351).

In Madras Legislative Assembly, there was no unanimity of opinion against

Hindustani among the Muslim League members. It was indeed on this

2 The anti-Hindustani movement in the south brought together the non-Brahman who were against Hindi that was supported by Brahmans and the Tamil speaking Muslims who were against Urdu speaking Muslims' dominance. See More, 1993: p333-61.

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question of Hindustani that real cleavage between the Tamil Muslims and

the Urdu-speaking Muslims became apparent (ibid.: 352).

Some Urdu speaking Muslim League Assembly members could see an

advantage in this controversy. They thought that in the name of Hindustani,

they could promote their own language, Urdu, since Hindustani meant both

Hindi and Urdu as Gandhi had said. Prominent leader Basheer Ahmad

Sayeed even insisted that there was no controversy over this. In his view, the

government wanted to propagate this spoken language (Hindustani) which

was a Muslim language. They could therefore get the facilities for the speedy

learning of this language (More, 1995:352-3). More observes that; The support that Urdu-speaking Muslims extended to Hindustani is

understandable. Though Urdu was the cultural language of the vast majority of Muslims in India, it was not the cultural language of the non-Urdu­speaking Muslim majority of the Madras Presidency. The maintenance and the propagation of Urdu as the cultural language of all the Muslims of the Presidency was absolutely essential for the survival of the Urdu speaking Muslims as a political force in the Presidency, for without the predominance of Urdu, the Urdu-speaking Muslims knew that it would be more and more difficult for them to stake their claim for the leadership of the Madras Muslims or to play an important role in Madras Muslim Politics. Many Urdu­speaking Muslims saw in the proposal to introduce Hindustani a golden opportunity to propagate their language among the other Muslims and thus maintain their influence (1995: 353).

For the Tamil speaking Muslims, Urdu!Hindustani was the symbol of the

linguistic and cultural dominance of the Urdu speaking Muslims. Learning it

would only prolong their cultural subordination to Urdu-speaking Muslims

in spite of the latter being a minority among Muslims in the Tamil country

(ibid.: 354).

In Mappila Muslims of Kerala, Miller (1992: 173) describes their

relationship with north Indian and other Muslims as follows: The Mappilas3 were cut off from Indian Muslims by the barriers of language

and culture as well as by geography. Aside from Bengal the bulk of Indian

3 The Mappilas are all located in a narrow belt along the southwest coast of India. Not only geographically, but also linguistically and culturally, the Mappila Muslims are for all practical purpose identified with Kerala (Miller, 1992: 1).

221

Muslims was Urdu speaking, and their cultural affinities lay to the north and west. These Muslims had no visible interest in the Mappilas ... Few Mappilas, in turn, knew Urdu, and today only a minority show interest in the language. Mappilas had little knowledge of the leaders of north Indian Muslims, and less of their writings. At practical levels the contacts were marginal, and distance, language and culture remain as blocks to regular communication and larger contacts today.

This means that although the number of Urdu speakers among the Mappila

Muslims is small, they are aware that there is the dominant image that

Urdu is a Muslim language and that Urdu symbolizes unity of Muslims in

India, or at least the language is treated in that way. The question that

arises is why the Mappila Muslims would think of Urdu as a symbol of

Muslim identity in India if their contact with the northern Muslims is

limited.

In order to answer this question it is important to revisit the history of

colonial India. During the colonial period Muslim League's influence was

widespread among the Muslims all over India. As it was in Tamil Nadu's

case, in Kerala also, the Malabar branch of the Muslim League fully

supported League policies as they developed in relation to the partition

proposal (ibid.: 162).

Although the Muslims in Kerala and Tamil Nadu prefer to identify with the

culture and dominant languages of these two regions, they are at the same

time conscious of their larger ideologically constructed 'Indian' rather than

'regional' Muslim identity. A similar pattern can be observed nearer north

in Gujarat. In the case of Gc.jarat, Misra (1964: 168) notes that;

... almost all Muslim in Gujarat speak Gujarati with fluency and Urdu with a varying degree of ease. Among most fluent are the Syeds and other foreign Muslim communities who speak Urdu as the first language and Gujarati as the second. Amongst others like Patani Vohras and Tais, in the Urdu they speak as the first language, the Gujarati imprint is so heavy (except for some words) that it appears almost indistinguishable from Gujarati. Being the language of the Islamized elite and also because it is nearer to the

languages in which the Islamic sacred lore is couched, Urdu has come to be regarded as one of the indices of Islamization. It has also been advocated as a factor of Muslim unity and in actual fact, before and after partition, there was a strong movement urging the Muslims to declare Urdu as their mother

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tongue in the census questions. The result has been a greater awareness of Urdu as a peculiarly Islamic language and an effort on the part of average Muslims to speak it with reasonable degree of purity and competence. It will be noted that peculiarly enough, this competence is limited to speech

alone.

From examples of these three states, we can see the different patterns of

attitudes among Muslims towards Urdu language. The conclusion one may

draw here is that among Muslims the attitude to Urdu can be assessed at

two levels; the inter-community and intra-community levels. For non-Urdu

speaking Muslims they recognize Urdu as part of their identity when it

comes to inter-community relations but do not necessarily accept the same

identities when it comes intra-community relations. In Tamil Nadu for

example, the Urdu speaking Muslims were the ones who were dominant and

their imposition of identity on non-Urdu speaking Muslims would be more

strongly presented than the non-Urdu speaking Muslims' refusal to accept

the identity. We can see here how political power can transfnrm the symbols

of a handful of people into an entire community's symbols.

This process of adoption of symbols of part of a community by the entire

community gives an insight into how Urdu has played a crucial role in the

constitution of Muslim identity across India especially after independence.

The significance of the language is particularly evident in the higher

percentage of Urdu speakers or better Urdu education systems among

Muslims in the southern parts than tne northern part. In this sense

Farouqui (1995:93) notes that without doubt, today the Muslims of south

India and west Bengal are recognizing Urdu as their language and a symbol

of their religious identity in the changed political milieu, even if Urdu was

never their language and in the past they were greatly distanced from the

Muslims of north India. Siddiqui (1979:27) explains this phenomenon by

stating that;

This common identity as a result of a common religion as practiced, subject to sectarian variations, and a sort of psychological unity and a growing sense of

223

common destiny within the socio-political life of the country is partly expressed in the process of Urduisation to a considerable extent among the non-Hindustani speaking Muslims, drawn not only from the Indo-Aryan speaking areas of north and north-west India but also the Dravidian speaking south, as well as from the delta region of which Calcutta is a natural part. Even those who have retained their mother tongue such as Bengali, Rajasthani, Malayali and Tamil tend to become bilingual and adopt Hindustani as a second language for conversation outside their homes or with people other than their own linguistic group.

According to some scholars, the views discussed above about the Muslims'

perception of Urdu is only partial and should not be construed to apply in all

situations. Hasan, M. (1998: 17) points out that in reality, the commitment of

some Muslim groups to specifically Islamic ideas and symbols does not

indicate a unified structure of consciousness or a community acting in unison.

What should not be assumed is a monolithic conception of Islamic ideology

and practice or a teleology dictating the actions of the Muslims or a general

acquiescence in the actions of few.

It is an undeniable fact however, that the Muslims are generally seen and

judged by others as a collective group through these Islamic ideas and

symbols that are created by 'some Muslim groups'. These ideas and symbols

are the ones, which dominate other people's understanding and perceptions

of Muslim identity and often come to be accepted even by Muslims

themselves. The Muslim identity is created on the basis of an image that is

assumed to apply universally to all Muslims across India. Since the people

who create or hold such images are usually powerful or in the majority,

people come to believe in these images and treat Muslims accordingly.

Urdu movement in UP

Farouqui (1995:93) observes that Muslim politics in contemporary India is

not particularly different from what it was in the past. The hold of north

India Muslims on Muslim political campaigns even after independence has

been strong. This view could apply to Urdu movement as well.

After independence, as discussed in the previous chapters, Urdu lost the

224

dominant power in the field of administration, education and employment as

it was during the colonial period. This loss of legitimation was an outcome of

policies that were implemented by the state governments especially in UP.

All these reactions were connected with the history of nationalistic

movement and the birth of Pakistan.

However the loss was not just concerning the legitimate status of the

language. Since Urdu was a key component in the ideology of the Pakistan

movement it lost its place in independent India as a consequence. Now

Muslims in India had to struggle for reconstitution of identity and especially

to redefine the place of Urdu.

There was a consensus at least in UP and Bihar on the dangers

overshadowing the future of Urdu. This was taken seriously by the some of

the Muslims who saw it as neglect and attack on their identity and further

spurred Urdu movement in the northern part of India especially in UP in

1950s and 1960s.

Brass (1996:90) observes that in the post-independence period, as Urdu lost

some of its hold in the government schools in the north, the Ulama rushed to

the defence of Urdu, which came to be seen as part and parcel of Muslim

social and cultural identity and their spiritual inheritance. The Jamiyat al­

ulama jumped into the fray as its foremost defender. At a conference in

Lucknow, Maulana Hifzur Rahman and Syed Mahmud made fiery speeches

on this subject (Hasan, 1997: 191).

The Majlis-i Mushawarat (the federation of various Muslim organizations)

released a nine-point manifesto in July 1966. It records that Urdu was being

ignored in schools as a medium of instruction. The manifesto constructs

Muslim identity in terms of endangered yet chosen emblems such ::1s Aligarh

Muslim University, Urdu and Muslim Personal Law. Constituted as social

and cultural simulacrum, this ensemble of objectified emblems denotes the

225

Muslim community (Talib, 1998, 307-8).

Some considered it as an opportunity for reviving the League (Hasan,

1997:191). Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan announced that they had

recently demanded religious training and Urdu as the medium of expression

in primary schools for those whose mother tongue was Urdu, but the

majority community was against them. He wondered how their demands

could reach the Government through the majority community organizations.

It was therefore necessary that the League revive its political activities

(ibid.).

The most famous movement, however, was the signature camprugn of

Anjuman-i- Talaqqui-i- Urdu led by Zakir Husain. Das Gupta (1970: 142)

writes that the sense of neglect as felt by the Urdu speech community led the

working committee of the Anjuman Taraqqui-i-Urdu (Hind) to lead a

campaign on behalf of the Urdu-speaking people of Uttar Pradesh for the

acceptance of Urdu as a regional language in the state. Ten thousand parents

and guardians, worried over diminishing employment prospects for their

wards, petitioned the state education minister (Hasan, 1997: 191). On 15th

February 1954, a deputation of the Anjuman led by Zakir Husain and others

met President Rajendra Prasad and presented a memorandum signed by

over 2, 700,000 persons (Noorani, 2003: 19). The memorandum submitted by

the Anjuman requested the president to issue a directive under Article 34 7 of

the Constitution of India that Urdu be recognized as one of the regional

languages of UP (ibid.: 299). However the crucial difference between this

movement and the one led by the Ulama and potential League revival

campaigners was that the Anjuman did not approach this issue through a

separate identity factor, while former tried to associate the issue of Urdu

with Muslims for different motives. The memorandum read as follows;

We submit that Urdu, which through centuries has developed a style and a

226

literature which any people can justly be proud of, is today the spoken language of a large number of men and women of all faiths and creeds in Uttar Pradesh, who rightly claim it as their mother tongue or their literary language. All these people while anxious to learn and write Urdu in its own script and for, very good reasons, wish to preserve this national heritage (ibid.: 300).

This approach of the Urdu speaking Muslims, which seeks to present the

issue of Urdu from the perspective of a composite culture, has been observed

in several fields. The stated purpose of the reorganized Anjuman in

independent India is also to adopt all possible measures for promoting Urdu

and to popularize its simpler form, the Hindustani (Das Gupta, 1970: 209).

As Singh (2000:195) notes, most scholars continue to view Urdu language

and literature as a part of composite Indian culture shared both by the

Muslims and non-Muslims and they do not associate Urdu either exclusively

with Islam or with Muslim community. This includes even some of the

eminent Hindu leaders like Inder Kumar Gujral.

By emphasizing that Urdu is an Indian language (and therefore not only for

Muslims), they try to present a perspective which would be acceptable to the

other Indians. This signifies a reconstitution of Identity - from Muslim

identity to a composite Indian cultural identity. As a part of Indian identity,

they try to increase the instrumental power of the language also.

These efforts could however not be sustained for long nor could they secure

the support from Muslims in other states. This could be explained first by

the dispersal of the population of Muslims and Urdu speakers in several

states. Oommen (1997b:158) explains it in terms of the disjuncture between

Urdu and Islam that has further muted the possibility of Urdu nationalism

emerging as an authentic force in independent India. In this case while

Islam remains a unifying factor for Muslims throughout India, they cannot

be similarly united on the basis of a common language, Urdu. Apart from

this fact, there is no ideological consensus among the Muslims on how to

present the issue of Urdu and there is no strong leadership or organization to

227

do that. The 'secular' Muslims and the Ulama's presentation of the issue of

Urdu are completely at variance. While the Ulama still prefer to promote

Urdu exclusively as a Muslim identity, 'secular' Muslims seek to emphasize

the composite culture of India, though their approaches are similarly

motivated by the desire to uphold the Muslim cultural distinctiveness.

Another reason why Urdu movement cannot be sustained is the lack of goal

orientation as was the case during the colonial period. Instrumentally they

can ask at most for the second (official) status in the states or better

educational facilities where Urdu speakers are in substantial numbers.

Symbolically they can ask for the protection of Urdu so long as Urdu is not

identified as the language of Muslims only (Brass, 1975: 430). Thus this

movement led by Zakir Husain could not continue because Urdu was seldom

the main plank of any organized or sustained agitation by UP Muslims

(Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 183). According to Noorani (2003:20) what followed is

recorded in documents - speeches full of anguish at the plight of Urdu; a

succession of delegations and memoranda; and steady banishment of Urdu

as a medium of instruction at the school level in Uttar Pradesh.

In the early 70s, again Urdu speakers mounted renewed pressure on the

government through seminars, public meetings and petitions to the state

government. These demands received some attention from the central

government, which appointed the Gujral Committee to explore the problems

faced by Urdu speakers (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 183-4). The report made

recommendations in several fields including education and administration.

However the result as found by the Jafri Committee was that most of the

recommendation were not implemented even more than 15 years later ( Jafri

Committee Report).

Muslim legislators lobbied the government to push through the legi$lation,

but there was no sustained movement (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 184). The UP

228

Anjuman failed to exert any autonomous pressure on the ground to accord

Urdu its due, while in neighbouring Bihar the Anjuman conducted a

successful democratic movement for the recognition of Urdu and functioned

as an intermediary group in mobilizing voters and pressurizing the new

Bihar Government to act on its electoral promise (ibid.: 184-5).

Although the Urdu movement may have weakened, it does not necessarily

mean that the efforts were fruitless. The percentage increase between 1951

to 1961 in the number of Urdu speakers was 71.3 in India. Considering that

the percentage for all the languages in the same duration was 21.6 %,

possibly Urdu consciousness increased among the Urdu speakers (Pandey,

1997:85). Eventually Urdu acquired the second official language status in

UP in 1990, as we have seen above. There is no doubt that because of these

movements, Urdu started regaining some instrumental power, though in de­

secularized form. The impact of this new power has however been slow and

not so obvious.

Although secular nationalists from among the Muslims insist that Urdu is

part of India's composite culture, they in fact are conscious of its unique

association with their identity. While it is true that Urdu is spoken by non­

Muslims and is a symbol of composite Hindu and Muslim culture, it is a

special heritage of the Indian Muslims and that religious literature as well

as the cultural achievements of Indian Muslims are mostly in Urdu. Thus it

is not Hindu-Muslim unity which is threatened by the decline of Urdu, but

the cultural vitality and sense of identity of the Muslim community, which

the Muslim elite of north India wish to preserve and strengthen (Brass,

1975: 186-7).

There is almost a consensus among Muslims on this account. While

logically they are aware Urdu is not exclusively for Muslims, they have

greater emotional attachment to it than non-Muslim speakers of the

229

language do. Khalidi (1995:131-2) elaborates this view by stating that;

Few topics among Muslims invite such emotional outpouring as does Urdu. This is one of the few subjects over which there is near unanimity among "progressive", "moderate", "modernists" and "orthodox" Muslims. Among the progressive academics, Muhammad Mujib asserts that "stability and progress, national dignity and individual character all require that we should appreciate the true value oflndian Muslim culture and the Urdu language as the most precious heritage of our past and our greatest support in the future." A moderate and a modernist" like Sayyid Abid Husain opined "the learning of Urdu for Indian Muslims is not only a vital cultural but also a religious necessity ... It would be nothing less than intellectual and spiritual suicide to give up Urdu." Abid Husain's views do not seem greatly diferent from an "orthodox" Maulana Muhammad Ali Jawhar who "confessed in the end that Urdu is the irreducible minimum to which the most compromising Muslim would consent" The declining fortunes of Urdu were neatly summed up by a leading authority on Islam, Prof Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "the community is in danger of being deprived of its language, than which only religious faith is a deeper possession.

Since the association of Urdu with Muslims has never been in question,

anything that adversely impacts on Urdu is considered as an attack on the

Muslim community itself. It spurs the Muslims to seek to protect Urdu more

strongly. Thus it is assumed that to protect Urdu is equivalent to protecting

Muslim identity.

The efforts to safeguard Muslim identity through the establishment of Urdu

medium schools, the demand for grant of official status for Urdu, signature

campaigns or memoranda and seminars, all constitute a modified post­

independence Urdu movement. It is different from the pre-independence

movement that aimed to separate Muslims from non-Muslims and led to the

creation of Pakistan.

In addition the Urdu movement or Urduisation of non-Urdu speaking

Muslims can be understood as a part of Islamization or Islamic revivalism.

Singh (1994:76-7) elaborates that; Islamization, in the form of religious revivalism, distantiated Muslims from the cultural ties existing with Hinduism, and the increased identity conscious and political mobilization of the community was the normal sociological process for this minority group under type of political and sociRl situations to which it was exposed after the partition. Some of the studies which are available on this problem suggest that Islamization, in the form of a solidaristic movement reinforcing communal, cultural and political

230

consciousness, is going on among the Muslims in India.

This increased tendency towards horizontal consolidation of ranks is

triggered by the threat to the group. Culturocide, Oommen (1990:59) says,

can be one of the major reasons for t:PJs consolidation. Culturocide according

to Oommen describes a situation of cultural annihilation. Singh (2000: 145)

notes that during the first decade following independence Muslim identity in

India could be characterized as being involuted and repressed. It was during

this period that Muslim leadership was co-opted in the system to help

formulate language policy. Institutional apparatuses were created to

promote Urdu both as a literary heritage and as an element in the

edu<'..ational and administrative processes in India. Probably because of the

peculiar identity crisis from which Muslims and their leadership were going

through, they became acutely self-conscious in their responses to formulate

and follow-up a vigorous policy for promotion of Urdu. Thus the feeling of

general relative deprivation reinforces the issue of language as an element in

Muslim identity. Identity being a complex and composite phenomenon, the

perceptions of Muslims about the present neglect and decline of Urdu is

bound to constitute an organic element in the formation of their collective

identity (Singh, 2000: 153). This sense of neglect or discrimination can be

explained in factors like low representation of Muslims in various sections of

the administration, education, and employment. Other real or perceived

threats to Mus~s take the form of communal riots, 'minoritization' through

policies, 'culturocide' and so on. All these feelings of deprivation can be

understood by the Muslims as a threat to the group and may provoke strong

consciousness among them.

However this ideological commitment is not necessarily followed by the

practical commitment. Singh (2000: 142-3) explains that it is common

knowledge that members of elite and middle classes, while professing strong

231

verbal commitment or loyalty to a language of their community to derive

political or ideological support in behaviour, deviate markedly from such

norms when they send their own children to educational institutions where

the medium is a language of symbolic domination, e.g., Hindi or English for a

Urdu speech community. Such behavioural duplicity is a universal feature of

elite and middle classes in almost all marginalized speech communities.

After independence, especially in the northern parts of India, the upper and

middle class Muslims made verbal and ideological commitments to the

promotion of Urdu language without any practical commitment. The lower

class Muslims on the other hand made practical commitments with or

without ideological motivations by sending their children to Urdu medium

schools or madrasas, either because of religious reasons or financial reasons.

In an extensive survey of Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and

Maharashtra Farouqui (1994:784-5) discovered that there was not even a

single non-Muslim student enrolled for studying Urdu even as an optional

subject at the primary or secondary level, or opting for Urdu as the medium

of education. Furthermore he observed that most of the c:Pildren enrolled in

Urdu medium schools came from lower middle classes except in

Maharashtra where even middle class Muslims preferred Urdu education

unlike other states. This could be attributed to the business background of

middle class Muslims in Maharashtra that made Urdu medium education

more or less sufficient for their purposes apart from the relatively high

standards of Urdu medium education in the state.

In this way, it becomes clear that both instrumental (communicative and

not legitimacy) and symbolic power of Urdu have been maintained but at

different levels by the different classes. The upper and middle class Muslims

contribute ideologically while the lower classes contribute practically by

sending their children to Urdu medium schools. These complementary roles

232

give the impression of complete commitment of Muslims to Urdu as part of

their identity.

This partial commitment by different classes cannot however contribute to

the healthy promotion of Urdu and relations among Muslims. This is

because both the classes are only compelled by different circumstances to

seek the promotion of Urdu. The dual attitude of the Muslim elite and

middle class can be explained by two major factors.

Firstly once one belongs to a particular group, one is expected to accept the

identity of the group. In case the group has multiple identities, all aspects of

identity of the group are supposed to be accepted by members. Even if some

people may not accept some particular aspects of the group identity other

people outside the group are still likely to associate them with such

attributes. Thus people are compelled to behave or act according to

particular 'images' and expectations about their identities that are

structured by the social context or implied by the behaviours of others

(Weigert et al., 1986: 40). In this way the Muslim elite aim to maintain a

bridge i<?the Muslim community for their safety net, since they still feel

insecure being a minority in India, while at the same time they want to

retain access to certain standards of life through English education. Thus so

far as they are supporting Urdu even if it is just a verbal commitment, they

are a part of the group -and they can secure their places in the in-group.

At the same time, if they can promote Urdu, since Urdu is considered a

symbol of Muslim identity, it can be interpreted as an achievement for the

Muslim community itself. Thus demanding the second official language

status has more symbolic meaning for these people than the commitment to

use them in their daily life. Consequently even if second official status is

gained, it does not necessarily mean that they would send their children to

Urdu medium schools.

233

These educated Muslims' dual attitude influences non-Muslims and non­

Urdu speakers' attitudes towards their cause. Since their outward/symbolic

commitment to Urdu language gives the impression of real or total

commitment, members of other communities continue to associate Urdu

exclusively with Muslim identity. This impression exists even within the

Muslim community in spite of the knowledge that inward or practical

commitment is not total. Within the community, this duplicity is often

challenged and leads to changes in in-group and out-group perceptions.

Since colonial period, Ashraf groups in north India have been considered as

superior among the Muslims. Farouqui (1995:93) observes that culturally,

north Indian Muslims always considered themselves different from Muslims

in the rest of the country. They also had a pronounced sense of superiority.

This cultural distance and the strong sense of superiority on the part of

north Indian Muslim$ became a great hurdle in linking them with south

Indian Muslims. Urdu has been one of the symbols appropriated to express

this notion of superiority.

There are studies that show that Urdu is treated as a status symbol among

Muslims. One of the famous cases is that of the Tyabji clan of Bombay. Along

with 'Ashrafzation' -the attempt to rise in the Muslim social status scale

through emulation of the life style of a higher classes, went 'Urduization', the '

replacement of the clan's original Gujarati tongue by the north Indian, and

largely Muslim, lingua franca of Urdu. This shift was already accomplished

through a Tyabji by family fiat in 1959. This decision stemmed from family

aspirations for all-India Muslim leadership (Wright, 1976: 227).

A field study among Calcutta's educated Bengali Muslim Middle class in

early 1970s indicates that the adoption of Urdu as their mother-tongue by

some Bengali Muslims and the familiarity of other Bengali-speaking

Muslims with the Urdu language reflected the importance of Urdu as a

234

means of communication within Calcutta's diverse Muslim population, as

well as the desire of respectable Bengali Muslims to identify with a language

and a literary culture which they considered to be the expression of Indian

Muslim culture and the Muslim community (Eade, 1983: 78). They could

claim prestige among fellow Bengali Muslims by speaking more

sophisticated Urdu and becoming acquainted with the rich heritage of Urdu

literature (ibid.: 66). This partly arose because the North Indian settlers

poured scorn on the 'unsophisticated' Urdu spoken by Bengali Muslims, even

those who were highly educated (ibid.: 69).

A study in the 1980s among the Dakkhini Urdu speakers in Mysore also

shows that the highly favourable attitude towards standard Urdu is in

consonance with its symbolic functions of identity and social status. As an

identity token standard Urdu is considered as an unequivocal symbol of

identity with Muslims in other parts of the country. 8imilarly, its acquisition

and use is considered as a mark of social status by all sectors of population,

though some groups emphasize its symbolic functions more than others (Dua,

1986: 75).

All these studies indicate that acquiring Urdu is the first step towards

Ashrafzation, followed by the ability to master 'sophisticated' or 'standard'

Urdu that determines people's positions in the Muslim social hierarchy.

Interestingly, the Ulama never sought to exclude non-Urdu speakers from

the Muslim community (Brass, 1996: 90), though Muslims themselves

started using Urdu to assess fellow Muslims whether they were Muslim

enough or not. Thus sharing the same identity does not mean equality and

homogeneity in society.

6.34 Muslim Identity: Interpretations by Others

Although there are internal differences among the Muslims including their

commitments to Urdu, there is only one common manner of interpretation of

235

their identity especially by people outside their community. This

interpretation is that Urdu is an exclusive symbol of Muslim identity in

India.

In this case even the Muslim demand for just and due recognition of Urdu

within the Indian Union is always interpreted as a challenge against Hindi

and Hindus. Khalidi (1995: 142-3) provides an explanation of how others,

especially Hindus, would interpret Muslims' attitudes and movements thus;

... the leadership of the Anjuman-i Tarraqi-yi Urdu, the main organization promoting the cause of Urdu, made the strategic error of demanding second official language status for Urdu in many states, instead of making the minimal demand- given the anti-Urdu climate -for the provision of teaching of Urdu as a required subject from primary through secondary school. The Anjuman officials argue that the demand for Urdu's recognition as the second oflicial language was made only to secure arrangement for the teaching of Urdu in school and for no other reason. The Anjuman did not realize that any demand for Urdu's official recognition would be seen as demand for a new Pakistan and would not be conceded. The leadership of the Anjuman failed to understand that demands such as the inclusion of Urdu in official signboards, use of Urdu in courts and administration were all demands of secondary importance.

This clearly shows the differences in perceptions between these two

communities. While, logically speaking, the Anjuman's demand is not

certainly unreasonable, it is take as an extraordinary favour, even as a

threat, by the strong Hindi supporters and from a 'Hindu' perspective. Thus

the second status is interpreted as of immense importance, even if there is a

huge margin between Hindi and Urdu speakers and thus no damage could be

done to the Hindi speakers. During the controversies arising out of the states

reorganization of 1956, writing to the chief ministers Nehru pointed out that;

The position of Hindi is absolutely assumed all over India. No language can rival it as an all India language, though no doubt the great provincial languages will play their full part in their respective regions. Urdu cannot possibly come in the way of the advance of Hindi. Why do some people in their misguided enthusiasm try to suppress Urdu. Millions of people in India speak Urdu or the variation of Hindi, which is called Urdu, and use the Urdu and Persian script. All these will necessarily have to learn Hindi and the Devanagari script. But they treasure Urdu as they are fully entitled to do. Memories are short and perhaps f~w people remember the great stress that Gandhiji laid on the question of Hindi and Urdu. It is true that conditions have changed since then, but basic principles do not change. We encourage

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the smallest tribal language in its own area, but many of us resent even the mention of Urdu, and yet Urdu is very much a child oflndia and is a vital and graceful aspect of our many sided culture (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 180).

This gives an insight into how the state governments through their policies

suppressed Urdu. The negative action which was taken against Urdu

especially in UP was therefore an outcome of 'their' interpretations and

perceptions of history. Government policy encouraged the identification of

Urdu with Muslims by refusing to support Urdu and thus forcing its

advocacy on the minorities (Hasan, Zoya, 1998: 187). At the same time,

regarding Muslims as a single constituency on the same issue (negative use

of Urdu) repeai;edly makes Muslims feel more and more insecure and aware

that they are a religious minority and confirms that Urdu is an exclusively

Muslim issue. Due to this affirmation ofUrdu-Muslim connection, giving any

status or safeguard to Urdu (positive use of Urdu) provokes anti-Urdu and

Muslim sentiments among some Hindi supporters. Negative reactions from

Hindus in this way become a further confirmation of the identification of

Urdu with Muslims. In other words, the issues related to Urdu, like

protection, status etc. are considered to be of significant symbolic importance

for the relations between Muslims and Hindus. There are many people from

both communities that seek to emphasize the secular side of this issue but

because of lack of an effective method to present it, their voices are not heard.

The extreme and de-secularized perspectives on these issues are always

connected with the history of independence struggle in India. A typical

example of this 'image' is portrayed in the comment of Home minister

Charan Singh in the Illustrated Weekly of India, 29 January 1978. He says

that;

You have referred to my remarks about Urdu being one of the principal causes of partition. The relative emphasis on the various causes that contributed to the partition of the country can be a matter of opinion. But it is a fact of history that one of the main reasons why the Muslim League and the late Jinnah Sahib insisted on Pakistan was their preference to have Urdu not only as their medium of instruction but as their official language. Indeed, Urdu

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was identified by the Muslim League and the late Jinnah Sahib as one of the factors, which made the Hindus and the Muslims two separate nations. The familiar argument of identifying the separate entity of a people as a separate nation relies heavily on the differences in their languages (Noorani, 2003: 336).

As we have seen in the previous chapters, though Urdu was incorporated

into the ideology of Pakistan and used as a symbol of Pakistan movement, it

was not the primary cause of two-nation theory. By emphasizing that Urdu

led to the partition of India because the separate entities, Muslims and

Hindus, relied on their languages to express their identities as separate

nations, Charan Singh affirms that Urdu is still a distinguishing factor

between them. He goes further to say that; ... as a language, Urdu should have no religious overtones because it is a medium of communication of Hindus and Muslims alike. Unfortunately, however, Muslims of the Hindi region do continue to identify Urdu with their religion. And it is this attitude which creates problems (ibid.).

Charan Singh refers to the script in which Urdu is written to emphasize

its differences with Hindi. He insists that this script is Persian in origin and

is, therefore, essentially alien to India. An unfortunate corollary according to

him was that the Muslims somehow came to identify themselves with the

script rather than with the content of the language (ibid.).

This argument is to a largely extent valid. Most Muslims seek to retain the

Persian script because it is supposed to give an authentic Islamic character

to Urdu language.

6.35 Differentiation and Exclusion

Devaluing Others' Cultures

While the stress of authenticity and glorification is given to Hindi as

'standard' Indian language, Urdu is devalued. Some examples can be cited to

illustrate this phenomenon.

Firstly Hindi and Urdu are always through the differences between them

rather than their similarities. After independence, the differences have been

emphasized more by the Hindus than by the Muslims while the reverse was

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the case before independence. Hasan, Zoya (1998: 181) notes that the choice

between Urdu and Hindi was presented as a choice between Hindustani and

Islam, nationalism and foreignness. From this point of view, P. D. Tan don

declared on 15th June 1948 in Sultanpux that the Muslims must stop talking

about a culture and civilization foreign to Indian culture and genius. They

should accept Indian culture. One culture and one language would pave the

way for real unity. To him, Urdu symbolized a foreign culture. Hindi alone

could be the unifying factor for all the diverse forces in the country (Khalidi,

1995: 138).

Secondly, Pant regarded Urdu as a language of poetry and literature, which

was not suitable for the conduct of official business (Hasan, 1998: 181).

Thirdly, Sampurnanand considered Urdu 'unnational if not anti-national'

and regarded it as the 'language of bazaar' (ibid.). Later he wrote in his

memoirs; My views have remained constant all through. I do not consider Urdu a separate language but merely a-style of Hindi in which words of Arabic and Persian derivation form a high percentage. I do not consider this style suitable for adoption as the official form of the national language. But I am not an enemy of it. In no country can the language of the bazaar serve as the nation's national language. Th give Urdu such a status would be a 'great insult' to the common people. By calling the language Hindustani the injustice could not be removed, but a fraud would be perpetrated on the people* (Hasan, 1998: 181-2).

This is how they disqualified Urdu in both instrumental and symbolic terms.

This ethnocentric attitude of the strong Hindi supporters was noteworthy

especially in UP. While devaluing Urdu, they simultaneously confirmed that

Urdu was part of Muslim identity.

Sankritization

While some non-Muslims were devaluing Muslims they at the same time

tried to separate and differentiate themselves from Muslims. The issue of

script, strengthened by the heavily Sanskritized form of Hindi was a clear

indication of separation, though this happened to even Urdu during pre-

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colonial period. The heavily Persianized form of Urdu was used as a means of

differentiation by the elite Muslim during that time. The language of the elite, then, was 'correct' while country dialects were 'wrong'. Such prescriptivism was obviously a boundary marker, an elitist symbol, a means of distinguishing the elite from the non-elite but it was taken as being intrinsically elegant, desirable, and superior. Norms of correctness were, indeed, used to suppress the common peoples' voice and even petitions written in the 'vulgar tongue' were rejected by the parliament in England (Rahman, 1999: 7).

The manipulation of language in this way has remained a common practice

even today. Thus an interest group is the one that creates the 'standard'.

Such standards do not however remain fixed forever. Language keeps

changing its structure, in terms of the vocabulary, meaning or grammar.

Since language by itself does not change, again interest groups are the ones

that create changes. Singh (2000: 132) also observes that it is the interest

groups that play a significant role in constructing myths and such myths

become the standards.

According to Cooper, changing the vocabulary of already existing standard

language is 'purification' and the process of purification is not a

standardization but re-standardization (Cooper, 1989: 154). Cooper

continues to say that;

The renovated language fulfills no new communicative functions. But if the new forms carry out old communicative functions, they also contribute to the nonlinguistic goals which motivated the linguistic renovation, whether the legitimation of new elite, the discrediting of old ones, the mobilization of political support, or the raising of consciousness. Whereas modernization permits language codes to serve new communicative functions, renovation permits language codes to serve old function in new ways (ibid.).

The interest elite group gains something from this re~ovation, whether in

the name of efficiency, aesthetics, or national or political ideology (ibid.).

Brass (1996:99) notes that when symbols (here the renovated language) are

brought especially into the political arena, it is likely that a particular elite

stands to gain from their use.

Thus symbol manipulation includes the manipulation of the structure of the

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language itself apart from the myth-making of language as a symbol. For

example this attempt at renovation for the non-linguistic goals, although it

may look as a purely linguistic phenomenon by the renovators and their

supporters, also happened to Urdu language during the colonial period.

Rahman (1999:9) explains that; The purpose Persianized Urdu served was that it became a maker of elitist identity for upper class (sharilj Muslims who felt politically impotent and threatened by the overwhelming majority of Hindus around them ... , from which the Muslims sought to be different and considered themselves superior. The new Urdu was, therefore, an identity maker, a badge of distinction, for the im.porverished sh!zrafa (gentlemen) of northern India who had little more than culture to fall back upon.

The concept of correctness was clearly based on the speech of the Muslim

elite. Thus it was applied as a strategy to discriminate against Hindus.

Among Muslims too one had to belong to Dellii or Lucknow. Even in these

.:!ities one had to belong to certain - generally Muslim - Sharif localities

(ibid.: 9-10).

This attempt at separation from others by making standard or pure

language can be seen even today, now among the Hindi supporters rather

than Urdu supporters. In this context Das Gupta (1970: 139) observes that

the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, after the consitution became effective, began a

systematic campaign to identify the official Ifindi with Sanskritized Hindi.

Rahman (1999:225) also notes that such actions help interest groups to

legitimize their rule through the symbol of the 'standard naticnal' language

because the legitimacy of the state itself gets transformed to that of language.

'Standard' therefore serves to confer authority and legitimacy on elitist

power, elitist institutions, and elite culture. They are seen as being

intrinsically superior rather than being powerful (ibid.: 164).

However in this case, the Sanskritization of Hindi was not just a matter of

legitimation because this interest group had another motive. Hasan, Zoya,

(1998: 188) argues that;

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The expansion of Hindi has occurred mainly through Sanskritization and a sharp disassociation of the written from spoken form which is closer to Hindustani, separating it increasingly from written Urdu whichc has developed through Persianization. Government poliey thus made Hindi a Hindu affair and Urdu a Muslim affair. Both developments reinforced the process of linguistic growth and conflict intersecting and overlapping with Hindus and Muslim religious revivalism.

Thus in this process, because of the connection of Persian with Urdu and

Sanskrit with Hindi, the issue of script was automatically incorporated and

connected with the language issue itself.

Summary

This chapter has examined the pattern of reconstitution of Muslim identity

on the basis of a common language, Urdu. It has been observed that the idea

behind this shift in ideology from the erstwhile Pakistan movement has been

to try and fit into the new socio-political circumstances. Unlike the pre­

independence identity claims, this is mainly influenced by the challenge

from the rival community namely Hindus to the Muslims to demonstrate

their loyalty to India and show their commitment to the policy of secular

nationalism.

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