Chapter one

1

LAGOS STATE UNIVERSITY, OJO, LAGOS

POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIONS

(ISLAMIC STUDIES UNIT)

TITLE OF DISSERTATION:

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY OF WILAYATU’L-FAQIH IN THE

LIGHT OF IMAM KHOMEINI’S HOKUMAT-EL- ISLAMI

M.A. in Islamic Studies

(ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT)

2009/2010 Academic Session

ABDUSEMIU OLATUNJI AJANI ALKILANY

Matriculation No: 09/9A/02B/002

BA (Hons.) Ilorin, PGDE (Kaduna)

BEING A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR

THE AWARD OF MASTER’S DEGREE IN ISLAMIC STUDIES

2

Title Page

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY OF WILAYATU’L-FAQIH IN THE

LIGHT OF IMAM KHOMEINI’S HOKUMAT-EL-ISLAMI

BY

ABDUSEMIU AJANI OLATUNJI AJANI ALKILANY

BA Arabic (Ilorin), PGDE (Kaduna)

BEING A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR

THE AWARD OF MASTER’S DEGREE IN ISLAMIC STUDIES.

DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIONS, ISLAMIC STUDIES UNIT

2009/2010 ACADEMIC SESSION

3

Certification

This is to certify that this dissertation was carried out by

ABDUSEMIU OLATUNJI AJANI-ALKILANY under my supervision this

day- 24th September, 2011 in the Department of Religions (Islamic

Studies Unit), Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria.

Dr. S. L. Jimoh

---------------------------------------------------

BA (Ilorin), MA, PhD (Ibadan)

4

Dedication

This work is humbly dedicated to my spouses, kids, and indeed my

parents of blessed memories:

ALHAJI CHIEF ABDURAHIM OLAJUBU AJANI-ALKILANY (d.2001)

And

MADAM MUHIBAH ADUNNI AJANI-ALKILANY (d.1993)

I invoke Allah to reward and admit them into His mercy and favours

Aamin.

“There is for them, rest and satisfaction; and a Garden of Delight”

Q.56: 89.

5

Acknowledgements

“Say: praise is to God, and peace is on His chosen servant, who is better? Allah or the false

deities they associate with His”. Q27: 59.

The foremost unalloyed gratitude goes to Allah; the all-Seeing, the all-Hearing and the all-

Knowing who has made it possible for me to finish this dissertation, despite all dissuading

odds on my ways; before and during the Master’s programme, I can only wish for God’s

resounding support of prosperity, favour and grace thereafter.

The influence of my parents was highly enchanting and contagious for their persuasion

and persistence on me to pursue this path in life. I drew a number of inspirations from

them, specifically the traits of perseverance and contentment in life. All my teachers of

ages and levels are hereby acknowledged for nurturing and tutoring me to be someone

who can rear his head and conduct his limbs before other scholars both home and abroad.

Of special note in this dispensation is the Supervisor of this work who coincidentally was

the Postgraduate Co-ordinator for 2009/2010 academic session and the Chairman of the

plenary session of my presentation; Dr. Sheikh Luqman Jimoh who benevolently stood by

me throughout the programme from the onset of conceiving, reframing and preparing the

pre-field seminar on the topic at the departmental level. He always spurred me thus: “this

is your work tide it up well so that you can make the best out of it in future”.

The contributions of other teachers who have served me with their knowledge,

experience, skills and expertise are duely acknowledged. Professors M. O. Opeloye, D. F.

6

Asaju, M. A. Muhibbu-Din for exposing me into the realm of the Interaction of the Living

Faiths, Research Methods and Theological Thoughts respectively. Associate Professors I. L.

Akintola, M. O. Raheemson and L. M. Adetona for spicing into me issues on Islam and the

Modern World, Hadith Literatures and Criticism and Islamic Political Thoughts which

thematically forms the bedrock of this work. Drs. M. G. Haroon, T. M. Salisu and D. O.

Laguda for imparting advanced thoughts on Islamic Comparative Law, Advanced Study of

the Qur’an and Exegesis, Sociology of Religions and African Religious Thoughts

accordingly. The candid advices of Professors A. O. Sanni and I. A. Lawal as well as Drs. T.

Yaqub, S. O. Timehin, N. O. Lawal and N. O. Onibon, all of the Arabic Unit, Department of

Foreign Languages are eminently noted.

The brotherhood spirit and relationship enjoyed from my colleagues are highly noted and

appreciated. Messrs Hakeem Akanni Lawal, Dauda Olumide Lawal, Abdulwasiu Ibrahim,

Ahmad Babatunde, Abdurauf Makinde, Abdulfattah Adejumo, Abubakar Abdulqadir, and

Hajia Muhibah Olaolu Ajagbe, the only female and lady of the class.

The efforts and encouragements of a life-long companion in respect of Alhaj Mustapha A.

Bello are hereby recognised; his constructive criticisms have greatly helped in shaping the

contents of this work. Also Drs. K. A. Adegoke and K. O. Paramole for updating my

thoughts on the subject matter of this dissertation. Messrs Mubin Olatoye, Mikhail Sanni,

and Dauda Oniyide are immensely appreciated for their moral supports.

I am indebted to my employers; Nasru’llahi-l-Fatih Society of Nigeria Headquarters for

granting me study permissions to finish this programme. His Eminence, Sheikh Abdullahi

’Gbadegesin Adigun Akinbode deserves a special commendation for his interest in my

career growth and development. The National Mission Board and the Zonal Mission

7

Boards, specifically Zones 1 & 2 (Lagos) and Zones 3 (Ogun), the National Executive Council

and the National Council of Elders respectively are kindly acknowledged.

The special roles of my maternal uncle and step-brother are glowingly noted for their

prayers and spirituality on me; High Chief M. A. Tomori-Bakare, the Baale of Abepaaki, Ifo

District, Ogun State and Sheikh J. A. O. Kelani.

My greatest indebtedness goes to the many libraries and research centres which put their

treasures at my disposal as indicative in the bibliographical lists. The joint fellowship

grants from the Islamic Cultural Relations Organization (ICRO) and the Institute for the

Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini Works, (ICPIKW), Qum and Tehran

respectively enabled me to spend more than two weeks in both Istanbul, Turkey and

Tehran, Iran in the Spring of 2009. These were used for research in the libraries of

Istanbul, Mashhad, Qum, and Tehran. The trip facilitated a ceremonial participation in the

Iranian parliamentary sessions with other visiting scholars and guests in the Islamic

Republic of Iran. I must thank the Cultural Attaché of the Iranian Consulate, Lagos for

allowing me to use the Consulate library to complement the previous research undertaken

in Iran and Turkey respectively.

The brotherhood euphoria displayed by the African and indeed the Nigerian communities

in Tehran, Zanbilabad- Qum, and Mashhad is profoundly appreciated. The hospitability

gesture of Messrs Ismai’l Abdullahi, Ya’qub Sulayman, Muhammad Zubayr, Abdur-

Rahman Al-Kanawy and their families are humbly recognized.

Similarly, I must not gloss over the assistance and understanding sustained by Mr. Abdul-

Fattah Ibn Raji and his family, specifically in the supply of relevant literatures and above

8

all his encouragement and assurances of good faith. May Allah accept and grant his heart

desires.

I appreciate my siblings, step-brothers and sisters that patiently stood by me; Messrs

Shakirah Ogunsola, Tawakalt Alabede, Miftah Rahim, and Habibah Olabode. Muqaddam

Mutiu Rahim, Hajias Madinah, Khadijah, Muflihah, Sherifah. Others are Mallams Yusuf

Rahim and Mustapha Rahim Alkilany.

Messrs M. B. Oyebanji, B. T. Salahudeen, ’Lanre Oke, Luqman Folorunsho, Sola Ayanfunso

Lateef Adejumo and Dr. Luqman Adedeji are highly appreciated. The staffs of the National

Secretariat are undoubtedly wonderful people to work with, notably Alhaj M. A. Agbaje,

Messrs Rufai Abdullahi, Rasheed Balogun, Ibrahim Olapade, Saheed Salami, Ishaq

Sulaiman, Ridwan Shoyemi, Azeez Sanni, Latifah Sonayon, Shakirah Badmus and Alhaj

Waheed Azeez. The spirited efforts of Messrs Lateef Olawunmi, Lateef Mogaji, Moshood

Agbalaya and Sulaiman Ajibola of our Tafsan Travels & Tours Ltd and Nurudeen Shekoni

of Tafsan Beverages Ltd are duely noted. To others l couldn’t mention for the human

inherent trait of forgetfulness or oversightedness, l say: “Jazakum ‘llahu khayran”- a

Prophetic big thank you.

In conclusion, it suffices to draw curtain of this acknowledgements by quoting a divine

testament: “...and the end of their prayers will be: “Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher and

Sustainer of the Worlds.” Q.10: 10.

9

10

ABSTRACT

This work examines the theoretical background of an Islamic- Shi’ite political concept and

thought tagged Wilayatu’l-Faqih as documented in a treatise titled Hokumat-el-Islam

written by Imam Khomeini. It gives an account of the life and times of the Imam. It then

discusses the concepts of legitimacy and legality, power and authority, amongst other

political appurtenance and as they affect the theory within the purview of Islamic political

thought, essentially the ideologies of the Sunni and the Shi’ites respectively. The

workability and applicability of the theory is then critically assessed; cases of power

frictions, vetoing and tussling as they affect the Supreme Leader and the President are

brought to the fore. The socio-political enunciations evinced in the treatise are studied in

relation with the theory accordingly and its ‘possible’ application into the Nigerian setting.

Thus the Iranian theo-democratization, ventilation of the Rule of Law, and

constitutionalism are carefully studied and depicted respectively.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

1.0: General Introduction

1.1: Background to the Study

1.2: Conceptual Foundations

1.3: Islamic Concepts of Governance

1.4: Legitimacy, Power and Authority in Islam

1.4.1: Concept of Legitimacy in Islamic Culture

1.4.2: Legitimacy in the View of the Ahlu-s-Sunnah

1.4.3: Legitimacy in the View of the Ahlu-s-Shi’ah

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1.5: Establishment of an Islamic Nation State

Notes and References

Chapter Two

2.0: BIOGRAPHY OF IMAM AL-KHOMEINI

2.1: Birth and Parentage

2.2: Educational and Professional Trainings

2.3: Socio-Political Perceptions, Thoughts and Activities

2.4: Works, Legacies and Eventual Demise

2.5: Peoples’ Opinions about Him


Chapter Three

3.0: THE THEORY: WILAYATU’L-FAQIH (GUARDIANSHIP OF THE JURIST)

3.1: Introductory Thoughts on the Political Theory in Shi’ism

3.2: Critical Appraisal of the Theory

3.3: Sparkles of the Theory in the Iranian Constitution

3.4: How Iran is ruled Under the Theory


Chapter Four 4.0: THE WORK: HOKUMAT-EL-ISLAMI (ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE)

4.1: Introduction, Features and Contents of the Treatise

4.2: Abridged Contents of the Treatise

4.2.1: The Necessity for Islamic Government

4.2.2: The Form of Islamic Government

4.2.3: Programme for the Establishment of an Islamic Government

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4.3: Critical Appraisal of the Treatise

4.4: ‘Applicability’ of the Treatise to the Nigerian Setting


Chapter Five

5.0: General Conclusion

5.1: Introduction

5.2: Summary

5.3: Recommendations and Suggestions


Bibliography

CHAPTER ONE

1.0: General Introduction

The popular protests and uprisings sweeping across nations of North Africa and the Middle East seemingly paints a people long suppressed and oppressed who have risen up to break chains and shackles that have subsumed them over time. What one hardly dreamt unrealisable seems to be coming to pass. It appears the people of North Africa and the Middle East have rekindled the flame of resurgences.

It has become humanity’s weapon to challenge injustice and abuse of power.

The ability of a people to organise themselves for rallies and role forward in

solidarity has become practicable and of course an effective source of

salvation and redemption from savagery and despotism. Protests and by

extension, revolutions symbolise a society in labour and about to give birth.

14

Thus, both are the physical practicalization of the desires of the mind. It is

the ideal in practice. It is the vogue and trend in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt,

Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen and to some

‘extent’ in the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and the Jordan.

In the beginning of the last century, wave of protests swept across most of

Eastern Europe and this established the socialist system. It was a people’s

revolt against capitalism and its attendant exploitation and repression. In the

late 1980s to early 1990s, a new wave of protests overthrew the socialist

dictatorships that ruled for over five decades.1

Precisely in 1979, the people of Iran also took the path of protest to free

them from the infamy of the Shah-King Muhammad Reza Khan of the Pahlavi

Dynasty. The nation descended into turmoil, the monarch attempted to

appease his critics through his White Revolution policy, which included:

Islamic reforms, a ban on trade with Israel and support for Palestinian state,

women’s suffrage, land reforms, nationalization of forests, privatization of

nationalized industries, profit-sharing schemes for factory workers and the

creation of a literacy corps, yet mutiny continued to spread inside the

monarch’s army and on 15th January,1979 the Shah went into self exile. On

1st February, Imam Khomeini arrives in Tehran to assert control over the

Iranian Revolution through the creation of a fifteen-man Revolutionary

Council. Following a popular referendum, the Islamic Republic of Iran was set

up in March, with Khomeini as its first Supreme Faqih (religious authority).In

August, a part-elected and part-appointed Majlis (National Assembly) was

convened, and confirmed the absolute powers vested in Khomeini.

The success of either protest and or revolution is dependent on a number of

factors: the popularity of the cause; the number of people that turned out;

the sustenance of the protest; the spirit of the protesters (revolutionarists);

their tenacity, consistency and resilience; the conviction and organizational

skills of the leadership of the revolution; and above all, unwavering sacrifice

and publicity.

Governments all over the world respond to protests or revolutions in a

variety of ways. Dictatorial regimes out-rightly use brute force to kill and to

15

maim protesters. Most governments in the Maghreb or North Africa which

today fell to popular uprisings are no doubt tyrannical whilst most regimes in

sub-Saharan Africa are bogus democracies. Other than social indices of abject

poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy and general social decadence, most

nations in sub-Saharan Africa are ruled by corrupt, self-serving, and inept

clientele regimes that came to power through massive rigging of periodic

elections and systemic suppression of the opposition.

Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Zimbabwe and Eritrea

are all ripe for people’s uprisings based on their non-performing fledgling

democratic settings. Leaders of such nations rule for life and are determined

to exterminate all opposition to sustain their regimes’ hold on power. The

major impediments to achieving a mass upheaval against governments and

their policies in Nigeria and other black Africa is the institutionalized use of

divisive strategy and an entrenched decisive tendencies that deter a common

resolve and action from the side of the people. In this sense, religious clerics

play a mediatory role in neutralizing and eventual stabilization of the

stressed political culture and the tensed political climate respectively.2

Instances of this abound in the charismatic personality of Imam Ayatullah

Ruhullahi Khomeini (1902-1989) and of course Sheikh Uthman b.Fudi (1754-

1817) who established the Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria, amongst

others too numerous to mentioning. Their visionary, revolutionary and

revivalistic instincts were quite credible and inspiring.3

By the time socio-political scientists cast a look at the first three quarters of 2011 in the future, they will wonder at what energized the street tremors that have removed a few dictators from the comfort of their glided thrones. After 23 years in power, Tunisia’s Zayn-ul-‘Abidin bin ‘Ali is in exile. After 31years in power, Husni Mubarak has been sent packing from the throne he inherited from Anwar Sadat. He and his family members have been forbidden a touch of the huge fortunes they made whilst supervising their countries’ treasuries. Bahrain and Yemen are on the boil because the citizens are disenchanted with their leaders. Similarly, a war is raging between rebels and pro-government forces in Libya, where Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi has been in power for 42 years. The rulers of Saudi Arabia are not indifferent to the

16

raging fire of discontent in the nations around the Kingdom. Whilst sending thousands of troops to neighbouring Bahrain and Oman to assist the governments to manage the crisis, ageing King ‘Abdullah Fahd has pumped several billions of dollars into social infrastructures as palliative measures to make his own people happy and as well arrest and curtail insurgencies, especially from the minority Shi’ites. Since dictators started falling like toddlers who are just learning to walk, the question has been asked in many Nigerian homes as to whether the kind of anger being expressed on the streets elsewhere is possible here. Whilst many people in government have tried to dismiss the ‘street revolution’ syndrome as impossible here because Nigeria is a democracy, the opposition groups are of the view that in fact the nation is more than ripe for it. For it does not matter whether it is a dictatorship or a democracy, depravations, oppression and poverty share similar characteristics. Today the nation has hundreds of thousands of University graduates who are jobless. They roam the streets for non-existent jobs. Those Nigerians lucky enough to be employed are not happy either. It is not only because their pay packets are lightweight, the absence of basic infrastructure makes living an obscene lifestyle. Two decades ago, who would ever have thought of the militancy in the Niger Delta that nearly consumed the nation? Now in peacetime, bombs are exploding all over the place. Yet, some Nigerians are playing the ostrich, claiming that all is well. Their optimism is very much misplaced. The deep-seated anger out there is only waiting for something to fuel it. And unless politicians retrace their steps from the road of perdition, some day the tremor will strike.4 The aforementioned describes and paints a graphic picture of the state of the Iranian nationhood in pre-revolution years. Various dynasties and their monarchs came to usurp people’s rights and privileges and squander state resources and treasuries and brandishing them with heavy loans and indebtedness. They played into the hands of the West, imitate their lifestyles, and eventually became their stooges and puppets.5 Expectedly, socio-religious values, cultural mores, political stability and

nationalistic consciousness and enthusiasm were thrown into the winds, only

to be replaced by political complacency, gross corruption, and feeble

economy. Unemployment, staggering costs of living, indecency and crass

dilapidation of infrastructures were the order of day. The timely intervention

of the clerics and the masses brought the dictators to their knees after a

17

series of protests and revolutionary zeal. The unwavering doggedness was

not without its price, as many were killed, assassinated, maimed, tortured

and assaulted by the SAVAK security men.6

1.1: Background to the Study

The political propounders and theorists of Islam of the classical, medieval

and essentially during the modern epochs have tirelessly battled (and are still

battling) over the socio-political orders and stability, religio-cultural franchise

and security, economic empowerment and sustainability of Muslims. The

Islamic Ummah or Commonwealth therefore features prominently in their

thoughts, perceptions and discourses.7

Perhaps, the incessant turmoil and convulsions being witnessed and are still

ongoing in the Muslim world since the early 19th century appears to be a

resultant effects of the processes of colonization and westernization, have

been calling for a more radical method and approach, within the purview of

the Islamic ethical provisions.

The central theme of discourse therefore, was the query of relationship

between religion and state. The debate has brought to the fore a clear and

lasting divisions of secularists, modernists, and fundamentalists schools of

thoughts. In fact, the interplay of theocracy and democracy has been quite

discernible in some settings.8 It is however interesting and at the same time

disheartening that such symbiotic linkage seems threatened, trampled or

encroached upon either by state machineries and its operators and or both

forces. One of the reigning examples was that of the Islamic Republic of Iran

under the aegis and auspices of its Wilayat-ul-Faqih (Guardianship of the

Jurist) as championed and popularized by Imam Ayatullah Ruhullahi Musawi

al-Khomeini, (henceforth referred to as Imam Khomeini).

Few events of the 20th century caused greater global unease, or were more

widely misreported, than the Iranian Revolution. In February 1979 there

suddenly appeared on television screens worldwide the face of an elderly

cleric, who had apparently seized power in Iran. It seemed medieval-as did

18

his funeral ten years later, when his coffin, surrounded by thousands of

mourners was venerated. In fact, lmam Khomeini’s revolution was long in

planning, and was directed against a tyrannical regime only kept afloat by

the USA and Britain for the sake of Iran’s oil reserves, and to prevent Soviet

influence spreading. In its initial phases at least it enjoyed the support of

most sections of the Iranian people, and was projected a nationalist as well

as a religious uprising.

Imam Khomeini himself had waged an unrelenting campaign against the

Shah for twenty years, at first from the Faiziyyah madrasa (seminary) in Qum

where, as a teacher, he had sufficient followers to be acclaimed an Ayatollah

(literally, a ‘sign of God’) or a senior mujtahid. In 1965, following a term of

imprisonment and a fresh attack on the Shah’s decision to give US

servicemen based in Iran diplomatic immunity, the Imam was forced into

exile in Iraq. There, he published Vilayat-el- Faqih: Hokumat-e Islami

(“Islamic Government under the Guardianship of a Jurist”) hereafter referred

to as Wilayat-ul-Faqih in 1971, a series of lectures that, in line with Shi’ites

principles vehemently urged Iranians to adopt a wise jurisprudent as their

ruler. That wise man was of course, Imam Khomeini, whose sermons

continued to be distributed in Iran and beyond as audio cassette tapes. He

was perceived by many Shi’ites as the Hidden Imam.

Astutely, Imam Khomeini neither welcomed nor rebutted the title. Rather,

he put in place revolutionary machinery- a Supreme Council, a Revolutionary

Guard and local committees.9

The intent of this study, therefore, is to assess the relevance, compatibility

and adaptability of the theory of Velayat-el-Faqih in Persian or Wilayat-ul-

Faqih in Arabic (Guardianship of the Jurist) as enunciated in Hokumat-il-

Islami (Islamic Government) of Imam Khomeini, a treatise purposely

compiled to elucidate the necessity for a democratic cum theocratic

governance to oust the embattled monarchy under Shah Reza Khan of Iran.

The treatise throws light on the socio-political quagmires prevalent in the

Iranian nation and how far these were rescued. It equally chronicles the life

and times of one of the greatest Islamic ideologues of the 20th century named

19

Imam Khomeini and his modernized, if not more revolutionized Shi’itic school

of thought known as Khomeinism.10

The work does not gloss over a critical assessment of the theory within a

period of over three decades since its inception, i.e. 1979-2011. In addition

chronologies of key events were supplied as an addendum to reflect a

timeline and spotlight on the Iranian nation from its earliest emergence till

the 21st century. Consequently, unfolding events in recent times, especially

in the political arena of the Islamic Republic of Iran has caught the attention

of this study. Such incidents to some, presents a seemingly complex method

of governance, specifically on the issue of power vetoing. The Council of

Experts, of which the Supreme Leader is a member, still moderate the

activities of the President. Of course the Shi’ite religio-political background as

evinced in the packaging of the theory and as evidential in the treatise is

given a retrospect. It supposedly appears that such thoughts mark the

springboard for Imam Khomeini simultaneous actions activities.

It is instructive to note that ideological theory underscores a philosophical

programming on which socio-political structures of a society are based. It is

the thinking that informs the establishment and running of the political,

educational, commercial, and social institutions of any given society. In our

contemporary world, there are many ideological theories, three of which are

immediately relevant and germane in the context of this work.

These include secularism, theocracy, and pluralism. Whilst secularism and

pluralism share certain features, theocracy stands out. Secularism, for

instance, is a state of taking decisions on any human affair without reference

to religion or God. It is a state in which all the rules and regulations that

govern state affairs are religion blind. The United States of America and all

members of the European Union are secular societies. In contrast, theocracy

is a state of making a revealed book, like the Qur’an, the major source of

legislation in the society. It is a state where a given religion, like Islam, is

declared the state religion, thereby making the Islamic legal system the

parameter on which the government activities are run. The Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran are examples of theocratic states. In

20

the case of pluralism, there exists a miniature of theocracy and secularism

combined. This is a society that has features of both theocracy and

secularism. It is like a state of indecision and confusion. In a pluralistic

society, different religions are recognized and citizens are free to practice

which ever religion of their choice without any hindrance and without

imposition of a given religion at the expense of the other. In a pluralistic

society like Nigeria, the law of the land is derived from peoples’ cultural

practices and colonial heritage, whilst religions of Islam, Christianity and

African Traditional Religion are merely tolerated.11

1.2: Conceptual Foundations

The division of the community of Islam into Sunni and Shi‘i branches has

commonly been explained in terms of purely political differences. Its origins

have been attributed to basically political partisanship with regard to the

leadership of the Ummah, a partisanship which later exploded into conflict in

the civil war between ‘Ali and Mu’awiya. This war not only established the

Umayyads in power, but also supposedly marked the advent of Shi’ism as a

religious movement divergent from the mainstream Islam. Such an

interpretation grossly oversimplifies a very complex situation. Those who

thus emphasize the political nature of Shi’ism are perhaps too eager to

project the modern Western notion of the separation of Church and State

back into seventh century Arabian society, where such a notion would be not

only foreign, but completely unintelligible. Such an approach also implies the

spontaneous appearance of Shi’ism rather than its gradual emergence and

development within Islamic society. The recent occidental conception of “a

purely spiritual movement” is exceptional. Throughout most of human

history, religion has intimately involved in the whole life of man in society,

and not least in his politics. Even the purely religious teaching of Jesus-as it is

commonly regarded-is not without its political relevance.

Just as the Prophet was basically a religious and spiritual teacher and

messenger and, at the same time, due to the circumstances, a temporal ruler

21

and statesman, Islam has been, since its very birth, both a religious discipline

and, so to conclude, a socio-political movement. It is basically religious

because of the status Muhammad attained as the Apostle of God appointed

and sent by Him to deliver His message to mankind, and political because of

the environment and circumstances in which it arose and grew.

Likewise Shi‘ism, in its inherent nature, has always been both religious and

political, and these co-existing aspects are found side by side throughout its

history. It is therefore difficult to speak, at any stage of its existence, about

the “political” Shi’a as distinct from the “religious” one. Throughout the first

three or four centuries of Islamic religious and institutional development,

one cannot fail to see that all religious discussions amongst Muslims had

both political and social relevance. When we analyse different possible

relations which the religious beliefs and the political constitution in Islam

bear to one another, we find the claims and the doctrinal trends of the

supporters of ‘Ali more inclined towards the religious aspects than the

political ones; thus it seems paradoxical that the party whose claims were

based chiefly on spiritual and religious considerations, as we shall examine in

detail, should be traditionally labelled as political in origin.12

The term Shi’a, keeping in view its historical development, must strictly be

taken throughout this context in its literal meaning as: “followers, party,

group, associates, partisans”, or in a rather looser sense, the “supporters”. In

these meanings the word Shi’a occurs in a number of times in the Qur’an.13

In its applied meaning as a particular designation for the followers of ‘Ali and

the people of his house, and thereby a distinct denomination within Islam

against the Sunni, the term Shi’a was a later usage. In the infant years of

Islamic history, one cannot speak of the so-called “orthodox” Sunni and the

“heretical” Shi’a, but rather only of two ill-defined points of view that were

nevertheless drifting steadily, and finally irreconcilably, further apart. With

this meaning of the term Shi’a in mind, our main purpose is to trace briefly

the background of this support to ‘Ali and to investigate its origin and

22

perhaps its relevance to the religio-political theoretical stance that is

circumstantial till today amongst the Shi’ites.14

Shi’ism forms the most significant minority within Islam, today accounting for

perhaps ten percent of all Muslims, or around 100 million individuals. In both

Iran and Iraq, Shi’ites make up a majority of Muslims, while elsewhere there

are Shi’a enclaves spread across the globe.

In the centuries that followed, Shi’ism intermittently played a crucial role in

the development of Islam. In the 10th century, Ismaili Shi’ites, calling them

selves ‘Fatimid’s in honour of Muhammad’s daughter, created a breakaway

caliphate in Egypt; in the 16th century, the Safavid rulers of Persia made

Shi’ism the state religion; and in 1979 the Iranian Revolution of Imam

Khomeini was essentially a Shi’ite rebellion against the secularism of the

reigning Shah. Shi’ism has before then developed a messianic cult of saints

centred on the Imams; particularly the twelfth and last, or the ‘hidden’

Mahdi-Muhammad al-Muntazar who is believed to be in Occultation.15

1.3: Islamic Concepts of Governance

The question is quite often posed these days whether Islam is compatible

with democracy. Secular dictators of Islamic countries, abhor democracy by

virtue of their being dictators and have a vested interest in presenting

democracy to their Muslim masses as un-lslamic. Dictators who wear lslamic

garb and claim to be lslamic also propagate the view that democracy is alien

to the lslamic faith and have in their retinue and payroll religious scholars

who are willing to play that Machiavellian role. Traditional adversaries of

Islam in the West, both in the media and political circles, also are relentlessly

bent on featuring Islam as an anti-democratic religion that has no room for

democratic values. Their aim, of course, is to further alienate Islam from the

psyche of Western public opinion, making it both possible and palatable to

demonize Muslims in a way that facilitates the acceptance of harsh policies

and unjust positions held by their governments against Muslims. They often

raise the issue of the lack of democracy in the majority of Islamic nations.

23

The Qur’an spelled out explicitly the principle of Shura, which means that

issues are to be decided by joint deliberations and consultation. The practical

applications of this principle in the earliest days of Islam qualify it to be

considered the forerunner of democracy.16

It is equally not uncommon to hear Muslim scholars describing Islam as both

a religion and governance (dinun wa dawlatun). The implication of this

description is that Islam transcends rituals; rather it is a connotation of a

complete system of life. Thus, din and dawlah are twin parts of Islam with

the latter serving as protection (himayah) for the former. The dawlah

enlivens the din. It protects and safeguards it from disintegration and also

creates an enabling environment for its proper practice and dispensation. It

could, therefore, be safely said that for din to enjoy its prime place in the life

of Muslims, dawlah is highly indispensable. The dawlah (technically, Islamic

governance), however differs sharply from other existing systems of

government that seek to remove the ‘Hands’ of God absolutely from political

administrations. Democracy, for instance, is a form of government in which

the people hold and exercise political power either directly or through their

elected representatives. A simple and popular definition is that democracy is

a ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people.’ Democracy

as it is understood, practised and preached by the West has been adjudged

by Islamic scholars as un-Islamic. That is because its philosophical

foundation, which is the sovereignty of the people, is antithetical to Islam.

Islam repudiates the popular sovereignty, the implication of which is that

there is no need for divine intervention in matters of governance; the

legislations are to be made solely by the people in authority without any

consideration whatsoever to Divine Revelation. Those elected by the

electorates on the platform of political parties and through the means of

campaigns and voting become an independent authority legislating for the

people, thereby assuming the position of demigods (’aalihat). By virtue of

their authority, they may legalize what Allah has forbidden and forbid what

He has legalized. These people determine all affairs-legal, social, political,

moral, educational, and economic.

24

Since democracy is secular, its standards are not based on divine revelation.

The Islamic government both in theory and in practice derives its impetus

from divine revelation as earlier indicated. Its policy is based on the

foundations of the sovereignty of God and the vicegerency (Khilafah) of man.

Whilst it allows for the active participation of the entire Muslim population

in the running of its affairs, as does democracy, the Islamic government does

not leave absolute law making or the power of legislation in their hands.

Instead, Allah is the Lawmaker and its Dispenser. The law being partly rigid

and partly flexible only gives the ‘Ulu’l-’amr some limited opportunities for

participating in lawmaking. They are to see to the implementation of the

divine legislations contained in the Qur’an and the Hadith, thereby exercising

certain discretionary power, which, however, must not contravene the

principles of the Shari’ah, as entrenched in divine revelation.

Considering these facts, al-Mawdudi describes the Islamic system of

governance as follows:

“Theo-democracy; that is to say a divine democratic government,

because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular

sovereignty under the suzerainty of God”.

In sum, the Islamic system of government is based on the conceptual

principles of Tawhid (Unity of Allah) and the Khilafah (Vicegerency) of man;

mutual consultation,(Shurah) equality of mankind and social justice,(‘Adalah)

rule of law and respect for all fundamental rights,(huquq al-Insan) and

accountability (al-akhirah).17

1.4: Legitimacy, Power and Authority in Islam

The term ‘legitimacy’ emanates from the classic Latin ligitimus, meaning

‘legality’. In the English language, this term is the equivalent of ‘rightfulness’,

‘justifiability’, ‘legality’, and ‘authenticity ’, and etymologically belongs to the

same family as ‘legislator’ and ‘legislation’. In Arabic and Farsi (because of

the origin of the work under study), this term mostly denotes “what accords

with religion and what religion considers permissible.” This technically

explains “being according to religion” is only one meaning of the word

25

‘legitimacy’ at least in the context of this work. Therefore, the term

‘legitimacy’ has not been used as meaning ‘religious’, but rather what is

deemed ‘rightful’ and ‘legal’.

In political and sociological sciences “legitimacy and rightfulness are the

conscious and voluntary acceptance and subordination on the part of the

people towards a government or ruling power”. Therefore, legitimacy, or

rightfulness, is the hidden power that exists in a society or country which

urges the people to subordination without using force. Therefore, it can be

said that legitimacy, or rightfulness, in the political and social sense of the

word, is that “oneness and unity of the way that the leaders and rulers of a

society gain power according to the theories, concepts or beliefs (and

sometimes doctrines) of all or the majority of the people of the society, in a

particular place and at a particular time, the result of which belief is people’s

accepting the right to be dictated to by the rulers and citizens’ duty to obey”

Furthermore, legitimacy is equally the popular acceptance of a governing law

or regime as an authority. Whereas “authority” denotes a system of

government; so also governance denotes a “sphere of influence” Political

legitimacy is therefore considered a basic condition for governing, without

which, a government will suffer legislative deadlock(s) and collapse. In

political systems where this is not the case, unpopular regimes survive

because they are considered legitimate by a small, influential elite. In moral

philosophy, the term “legitimacy” is often positively interpreted as the

normative status conferred by a governed people upon their governors’

institutions; offices, and actions, based upon the belief that their

government’s actions are appropriate uses of power by a legally constituted

government.18

According to this technical meaning of the term ‘legitimacy’, meaning the

rational justification for the ruler to wield power on the one hand and the

subordination of the people on the other hand, to take rightfulness as its

equivalent is much more suitable than other literal meanings of the word.

However, as in conventional political language ‘rightfulness’ and ‘legality’ are

more frequently intended, hereafter used in this work in the technical sense.

26

As can be understood from the lexical meaning of the word ‘legitimacy’, one

of its definitions is ‘legality’. That is why some people take legitimacy to be

the same as legality. However, it should be borne in mind that legitimacy is

not the same as legality, because legitimacy of power does not only arise

from the law; rather, the legitimacy of the ruling power is sometimes

dependent on tradition and convention and sometimes on divine and

heavenly affairs. For instance, in law, ‘legitimacy’ is distinguished from

‘legality’ to establish that a government action can be legal, whilst not being

legitimate, e.g. a police search without proper warrant. Conversely, a

government action can be legitimate without being legal, e.g. a pre-emptive

war, a military junta. An example of such matters arises when legitimate

institutions clash in a constitutional crisis.

In the context of discourse on the concept of legitimacy with its

appurtenance of legality, acceptability, dominance, tradition, rationality,

force and efficiency, etc comes in the concept of power as it relates with

legitimacy. Thus, in defining power it is said that “power is a psychological

relationship due to which the will of one party is realized by the other party in

which potential talents are used to perpetuate that relationship.”

Therefore, power has the two dimensions of psychology and the tools and

means of powerfulness. Legitimacy is related to both of these dimensions, in

the way that if it is possible to explain and justify the psychological

relationship from the point of view of convention or the law, then the power

relationship will be legitimate, and the person to exercise that power will be

in possession of legitimate power. In other words, if the power relationship is

approved and justified by the society’s value system, it will be legitimate. In

the same way, facilities and tools and abilities used should enjoy a degree of

acceptability and legitimacy. Consequently, it is possible to assert that a

relationship which enjoys legitimacy and acceptability, both legally and

conventionally, both from the view point of psychology and of facilities and

abilities, is the relationship of the legitimate power, and the person

exercising this power enjoys “authority” or “command”. Therefore, it is

possible to thus illustrate the relationship between legitimacy and power and

the result of the combination of these two:

27

Legitimacy + Power = AUTHORITY.19

1.4.1: Concept of Legitimacy in Islamic Culture

As earlier noted, legitimacy in Islamic culture is equivalent to whatever

religion considers as permissible, admissible and above all spiritually or

religiously legitimate. Therefore, legitimacy means correspondence with

religion, and what is admissible and permissible according to religious law.

In the light of this interpretation, it is possible to affirm that in the political

sense, legitimacy refers to whether the political system is according to

religious law, (what God and the religion command) or not. In other words, a

legitimate government is a government based on accepted religious

traditions, and one which has found legality in the light of the religious laws

of Islam. Such a government has the right to rule over the people, and to

obey what is considered proper and correct.

It may be said that the origin of the legitimacy of a government among

Muslims started immediately after the demise of the Prophet (s) in Thaqifah.

Although all the Muslims who had gathered in Thaqifah emphasized the

necessity for a government and naturally an Islamic ruler, they were not

agreed on the methods of its establishment. Therefore, discussion on the

origin of legitimacy in Islam found a close relationship with the ways in which

the Islamic ruler is chosen.20

1.4.2: Legitimacy in the View of the ’Ahlu’s-Sunnah

Regarding the legitimacy of power, the Ahl-Sunnah believes that governance

is among the expediency of the common people. They therefore took the

view that the Prophet had practically left the issue of his succession

undecided and to the opinion of the people so that they could decide on the

most righteous person to be their leader. Accordingly, accepting the way

Abubakr (r) was chosen as the first Caliph in Thaqifah as one of the ways of

choosing a caliph led to the first theory about the origin of the legitimacy of

governance among the Ahl-Sunnah. The theory is based on the assumption

28

that those swearing allegiance to Abubakr had the status of the experts and

the elders in the affairs of the Muslims, and that their choosing him was one

of the ways of choosing a caliph. The issue of the number needed for

consensus, especially in the case of ‘Umar (r) which oscillates between five or

six Council members. The theory of succession which forms the basis of the

appointment of the second caliph by the first one is quite interesting. Here,

the caliph as the ruler of the Islamic society has the jurisdiction to appoint

the next person for the leadership of the society.

Another remarkable theory of the Ahl-Sunnah regarding the way succession

should be determined or the origin of legitimacy for the ruling power is the

theory of ascendancy, which historically goes back to the Umayyad period

and in particular to Mu’awiyyah himself. After the advent of the institution

of monarchy and emirates as independent of the caliphate in the period,

well-known Sunni scholars and jurisprudents such as al-Mawardi, Ibn

Qutaybah, al-Kittani, Ibn Arbab, and al-Farra’ amongst others21 decided that

the theory of ascendancy justifies the activities of the emirs and the

possessors of power. Heredity, is another theory worthy of consideration

amongst the Sunni theories, though borne out of the succession theory, it

has no great difference. In fact, the theory surfaces specifically in the case of

Yazid as the heir to Mu‘awiyyah. By extension; son, brother, or close relative,

as the case may be could feature in heredity political theory.22

1.4.3: Legitimacy in the View of the ’Ahlu’sh-Shi’ah

The Shi’ites, by accepting the principle of Imamate, based on the rule of

favour and traditions put the concept of legitimacy within a particular

framework. In the Shi’ite view, a legitimate ruler is the one that has been

appointed according to the divine source, preferably text and thus, the origin

of his legitimacy is confirmed by God, the Almighty. In their view, it is only

God who is the owner of the universe; nobody but Him has the right to make

decisions, unless it is with His divine permission. Based on this, the

government of an Islamic society should be by the permission of God, the

Almighty. This corroborates the Shi’ites’ belief that the legitimacy of the rule

29

of an Imam can only be received from God. The Shi’ite reasoning for such an

interpretation of the origin of legitimacy for the rule of an Imam has been

that they believe that what is of primary importance for the society is that,

first the members of the society look at the world and the human beings with

a realistic eye and recognize and perform their human duties. Secondly, a

truly religious government will establish and maintain the Islamic order in

the society in a way that people not worship anyone but God and enjoy

complete freedom and social justice. These according to them, should be

carried out by someone who has divine chastity and immunity; otherwise, it

is possible that those who take office and gain authority may not be free

from error of thought or betrayal in what they do, and gradually the just and

liberating Islamic rule may turn into an autocratic reign and a Caesar’s

domain, and pure religious knowledge, such as the knowledge of other

religions, may suffer distortion and change at the hands of selfish and

capricious scholars. Therefore, the Shi’ites reason, according to the rule of

favour, the same rational considerations that warrant the sending of

Prophets and messengers, necessitate the appointment of worthy rulers in

the absence of the Prophet to take on the responsibility of ruling their

followers. However, this argument was justifiable as long as the Infallible

Imam (‘a) was present. But with the Occultation of the 12th Imam (‘a), Shi’ites

faced a new question: “Who has the governance and the Imamate of the

Islamic society in the Occultation of the Imam”? To proffer answer to this

question, Shi’ite scholars started discussions and thereby proposed theories

on legitimacy in the course of history.23

1.5: Features of an Islamic-Nation State

Islam is a universal order. Its conception of an Islamic State is that of a World

State, for God is the Sovereign of All: Command is for none but God. Blessed

is He in whose custody is the sovereignty and He has power over all things.

Further, Prophet Muhammad (s) was sent by God as a Mercy to all mankind.

He was a universal Messenger of God for all, giving glad tidings, and warning

against sin. Believers are, therefore, enjoined to strive in the cause of God as

they ought to strive.

30

The ideal of Islamic State, as enunciated above, is a righteous life as is

further proved by the oft-repeated voice of the Qur’an-believe and act

righteously which forms its leading theme. In an attempt to achieve this ideal

and lofty goal, God declares: Let there arise out of you a band of people

inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is

wrong.24

Man, if separated from law, is the worst of all. The real purpose of a State

ought to be an association of men living together to achieve the best possible

life. The State of Madinah which the Prophet shaped was entirely based

upon Divine Laws that impart social justice; hence it was an ideal State. On

this account, the new State could not be styled as a kingship or monarchy,

much less a dictatorship, for neither the Prophet nor the Orthodox Caliphs

did ever assume this title. It was a democracy, fundamentally different from

that of the Athenians.25

In it no other criterion of superiority between the citizens was recognized

except that of righteous living. The Prophet has repeatedly asserts:

“No one is superior to another except in point of righteousness. All men

are descended from Adam and Adam was made of clay”. He said

further “An Arab has not superiority over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab

over an Arab; neither does a white man possess any superiority over a

black man, nor a black man over a white one, except in relation to

righteousness.”

This the ethical basis which marks off the Islamic State as superior by far to

the modern State which ignores the laws of morality in all its affairs and

thinks of sovereignty only in the human terms. Divine Laws which govern the

Islamic State are based upon righteousness. Righteousness is, indeed the

measure of greatness of men. This is addressed to all mankind and not only

to Muslims. The pride of ancestry and noble descent dwindle into

insignificance, for the noblest of men in the view of God is the noblest in

character. Here we refer to the memorable address delivered by the Prophet

31

when he performed his valedictory Hajj at the head of 120,000 devoted and

faithful followers declares:

“O ye people hearken unto my speech and comprehend it. Know that

Muslim is the brother of every other Muslim. All of you are on the

same equality; indeed ye are on brotherhood.”26

The above address serves to outlaw the distinction that exists between man

and man on the basis of material things. No individual under Islamic social

organization shall be handicapped or placed at a disadvantage on account of

birth or social status. He shall have equal opportunities to develop his

faculties and personality and there will be unrestricted scope for personal

achievements. This sort of society cannot tolerate dictatorship of any person.

The man at the helm of affairs is no despotic monarch, nor is he an absolute

ruler but a servant of Almighty God, neither enjoying special prerogatives of

the type that “King can do no wrong,” nor is he above the law. But he must

be a believer, for no disbeliever can be the head of Islamic State. Islamic

State, in its true perspective, is the Qur’anic State, neither totalitarian, nor

authoritarian. It may be described as a thorough going democracy, not the

type of the Athenians where absolute power or sovereignty itself lies in the

hands of the people. Life, in an Islamic State is treated as a composite whole,

all its component parts-politics, economics, reproduction amongst others are

managed and controlled by the Shari’ah. Social system of Islam is neither

collectivism nor individualism.27


1. See details on the current uprisings in the Arab world in the following materials: S. Sani,

“Protest: The Universal Religion”. TELL: Nigeria’s Independent Weekly. (12), March 28,

2011, p.61; L. O. Abbas, “ The Effects of the Arab Conflicts on the Muslim World”. AL-

32

MIRQAT (The Ladder), 1 (2), Muharram - J. Thanni, 1432/ January- June, 2011, pp. 34-8; F.

Abbas, “Islam Without the Arabs”. ibidem., pp. 16-9; N. Odebode, “Nigeria and the Arab

Revolutions”. The Punch, 17, (20,952), Wed., 24th August, 2011, pp. 9 & 16 respectively.

2. J. Wintle. The Rough Guide History of Islam. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2003, pp. 410-

411. See also: A. Rahnema, (Ed.). Pioneers of Islamic Revival. New Updated Edition.

London: Zed Books Ltd., 2005, pp .lv. ff.

3. S. Sani, op. cit. p.61 ff. See also references in supra no. 1 for details.

4. Detailed and incisive documentation on the intellectual, socio-religious and political

activities of Sheikh Uthman b. Fudi abound in the followings: A. M. Kani and K. A. Gandi,

State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate. Sokoto: Usmanu Danfodiyo University Press,

1990. A. M. Kani. The Intellectual Origin of Sokoto Jihad. Ibadan: Iman Publications, 1985.

5. A. Akinkuotu, “Playing the Ostrich”. TELL: Nigeria’s Independent Weekly. (12), March

28, 2011, p.62.

6. These are the secret security agents used by the Shah in executing his nefarious

activities during his reign.

7. The term Ummah as an Islamic socio-political order and a Commonwealth has been

well treated in A. R. Moten. Political Science: An Islamic Perspective. London: Macmillan

Press Ltd., 1996.

8. M. A. Muhibbu-Din, “Islamic Concept of an Ideal State.” R. D. Abubakre, et. al.(Eds.)

Religion and Politics in Nigeria. Ilorin: NASR Publications, p. 53, 1993. See also: M. G. A.

Raji, Background to Islamic Culture. Zaria: ABU Press Ltd., 1991, pp. 57-60.

9. S. L. Jimoh, “Religion and Community Development: The Islamic Perspective”. AJAIS:

Anyigba Journal of Arabic & Islamic Studies, 1 (1), 2004, pp.3-5. See also: A. M. Usman,

“Principles of Governance and Issue of National Integration: An Islamic Perspective”. ibid.,

pp.82-112; J. Wintle, op.cit., pp. 412-413 for details.

10. This expression is lucidly coined out by distinguished scholars, for details see: F. R.

Siddiqe, The Concept of Islamic State: From the Time of the Four Caliphates till the 20th

Century. Beirut: DKI Publications. 1st Ed. 2009, pp.197-199, See also: B. Moin, “Khomeini’s

Search for Perfection: Theory and Reality”. A. Rahnema, (ed.) op. cit., p. 197.

11. One of the most recent instances is Al-Jazeerah Cable Network News television

broadcast on 8th May, 2011 at 18:00-19:00 GMT Hours that featured a special

documentary on the workability of Wilayatu’l-Faqih at the height of power

tussling/vetoing tension between the Supreme Leader and the President captioned:

Conflict between Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. I especially

33

acknowledge the duo of Messrs M. A. Bello and Dr. S. L. Jimoh for providing the hints and

postscript materials on this grey area.

12. M. A. Bidmos, A Manual for the Teacher of Islamic Studies. Lagos: University of Lagos

Press, 2010. 3rd Ed. pp. 1-2.

13. Details on the genesis and evolution of Shi’ism as a religio-political sect in Islam are

contained in S. H. M. Jafri, The Origin and Early Development of Shi’a Islam. Qum:

Ansariyan Publications, 1989, pp.1-2ff.

14. These verses are contained in Q.19:69; 28:15 and 37:83 respectively. See also: J.

Wintle, op. cit., pp.76-78.

15. See: S. H. M. Jafri, op. cit. Other corroborating sources include: P. K. Hitti, History of

the Arabs. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977. 10th Ed; J. J. Saunders, A History of

Medieval Islam. London: R&K Paul Ltd., 1980; and H. Hathout, Reading the Muslim Mind.

Illinois: American Trust Publications, 2002, especially pp.41-87 on ‘The Anatomy of Islam’.

16. See: H. Hathout, op. cit., pp.54-6. Details on the concept of democratic values in the

West is well documented in: What is Democracy? U. S. Department of State, Washington

DC: Office of International Information Programs, n.d., pp.1-31. See also: I. F. Esikot, Socio-

Political Philosophy: The Basics and the Issues. Lagos: Minder International, 2001, pp.128-

162 respectively.

17. Accurate analysis on the Islamic theory of governance could be found in: S.L. Jimoh,

“The Appointment of ‘Ulu’l-’amr in the Islamic Theory of Governance: A Recipe for

Democratic Nigeria.” Al-Ijtihad: The Journal of Islamization of Knowledge and

Contemporary Issues. 3 (2), July, 2002/1423, pp. 20-37. Kano: IIIT Office. See also:

T.M.Salisu, “Shura (Mutual Consultation): A Provision Par Excellence in the Medieval

Polity”. AJAIS, op. cit., pp. 32-56.

18. See the following materials: D. Sternberg, Legitimacy: Selection of Security-Political

Articles. Tehran: Research Centre for Strategic Studies, Vol. 1, 1999, pp. 305-312; M.

Dogan, Various Attitudes to the Issue of Legitimacy: Selection of Security-Political Articles.

Tehran: Research Centre for Strategic Studies. Vol. 2. 1999, pp.282-284; A.M. Abdulhamid,

Principles of Politics. Tehran: Tus Publications, 1991, pp. 244-245; see also the views of

some social theoreticians and sociologists such as John Locke, Seymour Lipset, Robert

Dahl, etc in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legitimacy_ (political).

19. Concepts of legitimacy, power and authority as prerequisite and paraphernalia of

office towards an ideal governance are well articulated in many works, see: A. Khaliqi,

Legitimacy of Power. F. Arjomand (Trans.) 1st Edition. Tehran: ICPIKW. International

Affairs Department, 2004, pp. 1-4; A. Abdulrahman, The Foundations of Politics. Tehran:

Ney Publications, 1994, pp.105-106.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legitimacy_

34

20. For generalities and appurtenance on the theories of Legality, Acceptability,

Dominance, Rationality, Ascendancy, and Efficiency, see: A.Khaliqi, ibid., pp. 5-19; C. A.

Leeds, An Introduction to Politics. Tehran: Ata publications, 1998, pp.28-29; R. Farhang,

What is Politics? How is it Defined? Foreign Policy Magazine. 4 (2), 1990, p. 4. Tehran:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

21. See details on Sunni’s scholastic views on the theory of ascendancy in the following:

al-Mawardi, al-’Ahkam ’s-Sultaniyyah. Cairo: Daru’l-Hadith, 2006; Ibn Qutaybah al-

Dinawari, al-Imamah wa’s-Siyasah. 3rd Ed. Beirut: DKI, 2009; al-Kittani, Nizam -ud-Dawlah

al-Islamiyyah. 2nd Ed. Beirut: DKI, 2008; al-Farra’, ’al-’Ahkamu ’s-Sultaniyyah. 2nd Ed.

Beirut: DKI, 2006; Ibn Arbab, Fiqh ’as-Siyasah ‘ala minhaj an-Nubuwwah. 1st Ed. Beirut:

DKI, 2010; al-Khatib, al-Khilafah wa’l Imamah: diyanah wa siyasah dirasah maqaranah lili-

hukm wa’l-hukumah fi’l-Islam. Beirut: Daru’l-Ma’rifah, 1987.

22. Details of the socio-spiritual perception and belief of the Sunnis on the Concept of

Legitimacy exist in A. Khaliqi, ibid., pp. 23-25.

23. The Shi’ite views on the issue of legitimacy are succinctly recoded in ibid., pp.25-39.

24. Q3:104. See other details on the nature, form and functions of an Islamic State in M.

Muslehuddin, Islam and Its Political System. New Delhi: International Islamic Publications,

1992, 1st Ed. pp.33-54.

25. See: ibid., pp.39-40. See also the following: M. O. A. Abdul, The Classical Caliphate:

Islamic Institutions. Lagos: IPB. 1988, pp. 263-9; L. M. Adetona, “The Muslim Theory of

the Caliphate”. The Muslim World League Journal. 22 (5), J/Ula 1415-Oct. 1994, pp. 24-8;

M.O. Raheemson, “Islamic Ethical Principles and Practical Living”. The Nigerian Journal of

Islamic Political Thoughts. 3 (1), 2006, pp. 90-99.

26. Quoted in M. Muslehuddin, op. cit., pp.37-9. See also the following: F. R. Siddiqe, op.

cit., pp.1-10; S. Al-Mehdi, “The Concept of an Islamic State” A. Gauhar (Ed.) The Challenge

of Islam. London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1978, pp. 114-133.

27. See: M. Muslehuddin, ibid in supra.

35

Documents

Chapter one