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120 CHAPTER IV THE CONCEPT OF MITHYËTVA IN ADVAITASIDDHI PART I According to Advaitin the entire world is mithy¡ (false). Brahmasatyam jaganmithy¡of áa´kara is the very important controversial concept among the other philosophers. The falsehood of the world does not mean negation. But the world has no ultimate reality. Advaita concepts were supported by ¿ruti. The ¿rutis like ekamev¡dvit¢yam, neha n¡n¡sti kiμcanaetc.are support the Advaita and refute Dvaita. The word mithy¡ indicates the sense of anirvacan¢yat¡ because it is neither completely sat nor asat and it is even both sat and asat. According to Advaitins the world appearance is rejected and can be understood as the ultimate reality. This rejection is possible through adhy¡sa. Adhy¡sa is superimposition. The lokavyavah¡ra is made possible by superimposition. The Advaitins hold that the entire world is false. They prove the falsity of the world on several grounds. 1. The world is false because it is an object like illusory silver. 2. The world is false because it is limited in space, time and content like the illusory silver. 3. The world is false because it is insentient like illusory silver. All these arguments states that the world is the pakÀa, falsity is the s¡dhya and the shell-silver is the ud¡hara¸a.

CHAPTER IV THE CONCEPT OF MITHYËTVA IN ADVAITASIDDHI PART Ishodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/5768/10/10_chapter 4.pdf · THE CONCEPT OF MITHYËTVA IN ADVAITASIDDHI PART

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120

CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF MITHYËTVA IN ADVAITASIDDHI

PART I

According to Advaitin the entire world is mithy¡ (false). ‘Brahmasatyam

jaganmithy¡’ of áa´kara is the very important controversial concept among the

other philosophers. The falsehood of the world does not mean negation. But the

world has no ultimate reality. Advaita concepts were supported by ¿ruti. The

¿rutis like ‘ekamev¡dvit¢yam’, ‘neha n¡n¡sti kiµcana’ etc.are support the

Advaita and refute Dvaita. The word mithy¡ indicates the sense of

anirvacan¢yat¡ because it is neither completely sat nor asat and it is even both

sat and asat. According to Advaitins the world appearance is rejected and can

be understood as the ultimate reality. This rejection is possible through adhy¡sa.

Adhy¡sa is superimposition. The lokavyavah¡ra is made possible by

superimposition. The Advaitins hold that the entire world is false. They prove

the falsity of the world on several grounds.

1. The world is false because it is an object like illusory silver.

2. The world is false because it is limited in space, time and content like the

illusory silver.

3. The world is false because it is insentient like illusory silver.

All these arguments states that the world is the pakÀa, falsity is the

s¡dhya and the shell-silver is the ud¡hara¸a.

121

To know the Advaita, first it is to know what is dvaita. Advaita is

obtained by the dvaita mithy¡tva because, only through dvaita mithy¡tva Advaita

is established.1

4.1. Vipratipattiv¡kya

Advaitasiddhi is based on v¡dakath¡. In v¡dakath¡ the mediator shows

the vipratipattiv¡kya. The vipratipattiv¡kya of mithy¡ is-‘Brahmapram¡tirikta

abadhyatve sati satvena prat¢tyarham citbhinnam pratipannop¡dhau

traik¡likaniÀedha-pratiyog¢ na v¡ p¡ram¡rthikatv¡t k¡ra¸oktaniÀedhapratiyog¢

na veti.’2

The object is not sublated without the knowledge of Brahman, it is the

subject of prat¢ti like sat and it is different from sat, these type of mithy¡ object,

is it traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyog¢ in its very locus? It consists in being the

negation of a negation, for the three periods of time-past, present and future, in

the locus in which it appears.

Brahmapram¡badhya-means the object which is sublated only through the

knowledge of Brahman. It is not sublated by the other knowledge. Here the

world is sublated only through the knowledge of Brahman.

1. Advaita siddherdvaitamithy¡tvap£rvakatv¡t dvaitamithy¡tvameva

pradhamamupap¡dan¢yam. A.S., p. 6.

2. A.S., p. 2.

122

Satvena prat¢tyarham- means it is the object of the cognition sat. The

mithy¡ object is the object of cognition as sat. Here the world that is mithy¡ is the

object of cognition as sat from the empirical level.

Cidbhinnam-means it is different from cit. Here the world is cidbhinna because

according to Advaitin Brahman is only cit and all others different from this are

acit.

Traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyog¢ - means the world is

traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyog¢. The world also is false in the sense that it is

eternally negated in Brahman which is the locus of its appearance.

After the vic¡r¡´gatva discussion of vipratipattiv¡kya, the vic¡r¡´gatva is

agreed.

The other philosophers criticized the jaganmithy¡tva of Advaita Ved¡nta.

Vy¡sat¢rtha the author of Ny¡y¡m¤ta gives twelve definitions of mithy¡tva and

then refutes it. Citsukha shows nine definitions like the opponents.3 Then he

gives the tenth definition like siddh¡nta pakÀa without any fault.

Vy¡sat¢rta shows faults to the above mentioned definitions. Then shows

the faults of the five definitions which were contributed by major philosophers.

According to him these definitions are not suited for mithy¡tva. To clear the

opponents doubts post-áa´kara Advaitins gave some definitions for mithy¡.

Among these the five are very important.

4.2. Five definitions of mithy¡tva

3. Sasikant Pandeya, Advaita ved¡nt mem m¡y¡v¡d, p. 370.

123

1. ‘Sadasadanadhikara¸atvar£pamanirv¡cyatvam’ is taken from

Paµcap¡dik¡ of Padmap¡da.

2. Pratipannop¡dh¡vabh¡vapratiyogitvameva mithy¡tvam.4 is taken

from – Paµcap¡dik¡vivara¸a of Prak¡¿¡tman. (Pratipannop¡dhau

traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyogitvam mithy¡tvam-is the modified form

of mithy¡tva brought forth by Madhus£danasarasvati.)

3. Jµ¡nanivartyatvam v¡ mithy¡tvam5 is taken from

Paµcap¡dik¡vivara¸a of Prak¡¿¡tman.

4. SarveÀ¡mapi bh¡v¡n¡m sv¡¿rayatvena sammate.

Pratiyogitvamatyant¡bhavatvam prati m¤À¡tmat¡.6

(sv¡¿rayaniÀ¶ha atyant¡bh¡vapratiyogitvam.)

5. Satyabhinnatvam mithy¡tvam-Ny¡yad¢p¡val¢ of Ënandabodha.

Sadviviktatvam (modified form of Madhus£danasarasvati)

4.3. Seven explanations of mithy¡tva

The seven explanations of mithy¡

1. anirvacan¢yatvam.

2. asatvam

3. sadviviktatvam

4. P.P.V., p. 212.

5. A.S., p. 160.

6. Citsukhi, p. 39.

124

4. pram¡¸¡viÀayatvam

5. apram¡¸a viÀayatvam

6. avidy¡tatk¡ryayoranyataratvam

7. sva atyant¡bh¡vasam¡n¡dhikara¸atay¡ prat¢yam¡-natvam.

4.4. First Definition of Mithy¡tva

áa´kara in his adhy¡sabh¡Àya states that ‘adhy¡so mithyeti bhavitum

yuktam.’ (The adhy¡sa is said to be mithy¡.) Based on this, Padmap¡da says in

his Paµcap¡dik¡ that mithy¡ has two meanings, apahnavavacana (denial) and

anirvacan¢yatvam (indescribability).7 Here mithy¡ means

anirvacan¢yat¡vacanaÅ.8 Mithy¡ is distinct from both reality and unreality.

What is the locus of being-non-being is indescribable that is mithy¡. This means

it is either sat nor asat and not even sadasat. The author of Ny¡y¡m¤ta gave

three interpretations of sadasatva anadhikara¸atva. But later he says that these

three interpretations are not acceptable.

4.5. Three Interpretations of sadasattva anadhikara¸atva

The opponent admit three different interpretations of sadasattva

anadhikara¸atva and says that none of them are not acceptable.

The first interpretation sadasattva-anadhikara¸atva means- negation of

non-being as characterized by being (satvavi¿iÀ¶a asatv¡bh¡va)

7. P.P.V., p. 67.

8. Mithyetyanirvan¢yocyate, Padmap¡da, P.P., Madras, 1958, p.23.

125

The second interpretation of sadasattva-anadhikara¸atva means-The

absolute absence of being and the absolute absence of non-being

(satv¡tyant¡bh¡va asatv¡tyant¡bh¡var£pa dharma-dvayam)

The third interpretation of sadasattva-anadhikara¸atva means-The

absolute absence of non-being characterized by the absolute absence of being.

(satv¡tyant¡bh¡v¡satv¡tyant¡bh¡var£pa-vi¿iÀ¶am)9

4.6. Defects of three interpretations

The opponents point out that these three interpretations are not suitable

definitions of mithy¡. The worldly things are sat not asat. Asat is that which

cannot be seen.10 Where sattva exists asattva does not exist there, likewise where

asattva exists there sattva cannot be seen. It is so because they are opposite to

each other.

According to Naiy¡yika the universe is real (satya). According to Madhva

sublation is asattva and ab¡dhyatva is sattva. The shell-silver is completely asat

because it is b¡dhya. Madhva states universe is pari¸¡m¢ not mithy¡. Universe is

satya because it is not sublated like shell-silver. They do not accept

9. Karu¸¡bha¶¶¡c¡rya, Advaitasiddhi translation, Indian Council of Philosophical

Research, New Delhi, 1992.

10. Asat cet na prat¢yeta.

126

pr¡tibh¡sikasatya. His opinion is that shell-silver is a½¢ka like sky- flower.

They do not accept pr¡tibh¡sikasatya.

The second interpretation is not acceptable because it violates the law of

contradiction and arth¡ntara. If this definition is accepted the s¡dhya cannot

not presented in the example. The locus of being and non-being means the

absence of sattva and the absence of asattva. Sattva means not sublated in past,

present and future. According to Advaitin there is the absence of sattva and the

absence of asattva in mithy¡ object. Brahman is not sublated in past, present

and future, so Brahman is the only sat. These type of sattva is absent in mithy¡.

Asat is not presented as ‘is’, i.e. sky-flower. Rajjusarpa is not trik¡l¡b¡dhya like

Brahman and not asat like sky-flower. These types of sattvabhava and

asattvabhava are seen in the object of mithy¡. The object which is mithy¡ is not

sat like Brahman because it is sublated.11 Mithy¡ is not asat because it is the

subject of knowledge (prat¢tiviÀaya).12 Asat cannot be perceived. So the second

interpretation is also faulty.

The third interpretation is also not accepted because the absolute

absence of sattva and the absolute absence of asattva are contradictory. Where

11. Sat cet na b¡dhyeta.

12. Asat cet na prat¢yeta.

127

there is the absolute absence of sattva there is the absolute absence of asattva.

Here arth¡ntara, s¡dhyavaikalya, vy¡gh¡ta takes place. Here the probandum

(s¡dhya) is mithy¡tva that is not being the locus of being non-being

(sadasadanadhikara¸atva).

If a detailed study of the second interpretation is made, from the three

alternatives, the two dharmas that are the absolute absence of sattva and the

absolute absence of asattva then the defects which are mentioned earlier cannot

be found. The defects of s¡dhya aprasiddhi does not happen because s¡dhya

prasiddhi is obtained by the use of anum¡na. Among the sattv¡sattva dharmas

the absence of one should certainly be there in a dharm¢. For example, in the

presence of r£pa and rasa is in v¡yu. In r£pa or rasa there is dharmatva r£pa

hetu. So it can be considered as a part of anum¡na. The pakÀa of the above

mentioned anum¡na is sadasattva. There pakÀav¤ttitva of hetu can be seen.

The s¡dhya sattv¡satv¡nadhikara¸atvar£pa is obtained by s¡m¡nya. So the defect

of aprasiddhi does not happen.

4.7. The opinion of the opponents

It is accepted that r£pa and rasa are in the v¡yu. But the being and non-

being is not like this. They oppose each other. Where there is being there is the

absence of non-being like this where there is non-being, there is the absence of

128

being. According to Madhva universe is pari¸¡m¢ not mithy¡. Universe is not

sublated like ¿uktirajata, so it is real. They do not accept pr¡tibh¡sikasatyatva.

So if the ‘sattv¡sattva anadhikara¸ar£pa mithy¡tva’ is accepted there will be

vy¡gh¡ta.

4.8. Six alternatives

As the reply of opponents doubts the Advaitin asked one question, that

is, what is the hetu of vy¡h¤ti? That means- is vy¡khy¡ta paraspara virahar£pa

or paraspara virahavy¡paka or paraspara virahavy¡pya.13 The author of

Laghucandrik¡ divided these three into two. Thus he put forward six

alternatives

1. The absolute absence of sattva.

2. The sattva is the absence of asattva.

3. The vy¡paka of satv¡bhava asatvar£pa

4. The absence of asattva is the vy¡paka of sat.

5. The absence of sattva is the vy¡pya of asattva.

6. The absence of asattva is the vy¡pya of sattva.14

13. Sa hi sattv¡satvayoÅ parasparavirahar£patay¡ v¡ paraspara virahavy¡pakatay¡ v¡

parasparavirahavy¡pyatay¡. A.S., p. 50.

14. L.C., p. 50.

129

The first two alternatives which are the hetu of vy¡gh¡ta are not

opposed by the Advaitins because they do not accept the parasparaviraha of

sattva and asattva. There is no rule that everything different from sat is asat

and everything different from asat is sat.

According to Advaitin sat is not sublated in past, present and future.15

Asat is not perceived anywhere as sat.16 The pot and the like are the subject of

cognition because cognition can happen from the knowledge of Brahman also.

In satbrahman the knowledge of the pot happens through t¡d¡tmy¡dhy¡sa.

Superimposition occurs due to the ignorance. This superimposition is mithy¡.

The effect of ignorance like pot, cloth etc. is sublated by the knowledge of

Brahman like ¿uktirajata. The pot, cloth etc. is mithy¡ because it is sublated and

belongs to the object of knowledge (prat¢tiviÀaya). So in the

‘sadasadanadhikara¸ar£pa’ is mithy¡. So the defect of vy¡gh¡ta does not occur.

Like this the absence of each other (parasparavy¡pakar£pa) of being and non-

being cannot be accepted. Asattva is the vy¡paka of the absence of sattva. So

where the absence of sattva is there, asattva will also be there. Like this the

15. Trik¡l¡b¡dhyatvam satvam

16. Trik¡l¡b¡dhyavilakÀa¸atve sati kvacitapi upadhau satvena

prat¢yam¡natv¡nadhikara¸atvam asatvam.

130

sattva is in the absence of asattva. In ¿uktirajata the sattva which is sublated in

past, present and future is not there because when the knowledge of ¿ukti

happens, then the knowledge of rajata is sublated. ¿uktirajata is not asat

because above mentioned definition is not there. So the sattva is not the vy¡paka

of asattva. ¿uktirajata is not sat because there is absence of sattva. The defect of

Vy¡gh¡ta cannot be stressed here because sattv¡satva virahavy¡paka. This cannot

be accepted because there is the absence of gotva and asvatva which can be seen

in mahiÀa. If the gotva and asvatva are parasparavirahavy¡pya, these dharmas

can happen in mahiÀa.

4.9. Refutation of Arth¡ntara

Arth¡ntara means getting a meaning different from supposition. The

opponents states that here Advaitins tried to be stated mithy¡tvasiddhi but the

answer is that the world is sat like Brahman because it can also be said as the

absolute absence of sattva and asattva in this context. The Brahman is

nirdharmaka. It has no sattv¡sattvadharma. But it is said to be sadr£pa.

Likewise if sattv¡sattva dharma is absent in the universe then universe can not

be said to be sadr£pa.17 The jµ¡na like san gha¶aÅ etc. shows the sadr£pata of

universe.

17. N.A., p. 24.

131

According to Advaitin the world is mithy¡ because it is different from sat

and asat. It is effortless to measure the sadr£pa of each and every object. When

related to all objects, it is easy to imagine the sadr£pa of Brahman, which is in

all objects in universe. The sadr£pa Brahman exists in all worldly things. So the

cognition san gha¶aÅ, san pa¶aÅ etc. are obtained. There are a lot of ¿rutis to

support them.18 There occurs the defects of ¡nandasadr£pata to show the

sadr£pat¡ of Brahman. Advaitins hold that Barhman devoid of the property of

sattva. The imagination of only one Brahman the experience (vyavah¡ra) of

sadr£pa takes place. Like this the sadr£pakalpan¡ of the universe is sublated.

So there is the defect of arth¡ntara does not happen.19 The sadr£pata of

Brahman is original, but not bhr¡nti. But the sadr£pa of the universe is the

cognition mixed with Brahman. San gha¶aÅ, san pa¶aÅ etc. originates from

the knowledge which is the identity (t¡d¡tmya) of sadr£pa. The satt¡ of

Brahman is spread over all worldly things because it is the basic satt¡. The

universe seems to be sat because of adhiÀ¶h¡na is not the ¡ropitasatt¡ of

universe

18. Aitad¡tmyamidam sarvam, idam sarvam yadayam¡tm¡, brahmaivedam sarvam

¡tmaivedam sarvam.

19. A.S., p. 55.

132

In the example of ¿uktirajata the defect of s¡dhyavaikalya does not exist.

Sat is the aprat¢yam¡natva in a distinguishing locus. So the above mentioned

sattva is not there. Rajatajµ¡na is sublated by ¿uktijµ¡na. So the above stated

sattva does not exist. The s¡dhya which is the absence of sattva and asattva is in

the ¿uktikarajata. So there is no s¡dhyavaikalya. ¿uktirajata is s¡dhyaprasiddhi.

So aprasiddhi does not occur. So the definition ‘sattv¡satv¡nadhikara¸atva

r£pamanirv¡cyatvam’ is faultless.

4.10. The second definition of mithy¡tva

The Paµcap¡dik¡vivara¸a of Prak¡¿¡tman states that

‘pratipannop¡dh¡vabh¡vapratiyogitvameva mithy¡tvam n¡ma.20 To clear the

definition, Madhus£dana used the negation of past, present and future instead

of absence. The definition is ‘pratipannop¡dhau

traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyogitvam mithy¡tvam.21 This definition is based on the

upaniÀadic text of ‘Neha n¡n¡sti kiµcana.’ Mithy¡tva consists in the pratiyogin

of a negation which is traik¡lika (past, present and future) in the locus in which

it appears. The ativy¡pti does not happen in the sky-flower because the word

20 P.P.V. p. 212

21 A.S. p. 94

133

pratipannop¡dhi is used in this definition.22 The a½¢ka like ¿a¿aviÀ¡na does

not belong to any kind of prat¢ti. Ativy¡pti does not occur in Brahman because

Brahman is the locus of all objects. But Brahman is niradhiÀ¶h¡na. That

means Brahman has no locus. In the example of shell silver, the silver which is

seen in the shell is just an imagination. Actually it is not there. The knowledge

of rajata is absent in past, present and future in the locus i.e., shell. Here the

lakÀya of the definition is universe. This definition is suitable in the lakÀya that

is universe because according to Advaitin the universe is based on Brahman. So

it is mithy¡ because it is based on other (an¡¿raya). The word pratipannop¡dhi

signifies whatever is presented as an object in cognition. Is this prat¢ti fact or

myth? If the prat¢ti is real, that means one object is in its locus which is self-

dependent then the absolute absence of that object in its locus does not to be

place. There fore how can object become the pratiyog¢ of the negation of past,

present and future? If this prat¢ti is accepted there will occur the defect of

siddhas¡dhanat¡. Where there is an absence of an object, there the absolute

absence of that object does not exist. This is also accepted by the opponents.

From this definition no new ideas can be got. The reply given to this definition

by Advaitins is that the prat¢ti which mentions the locus in which it appears is

22. áa¿aviÀ¡¸¡dyasatvy¡v¤tyartham pratipannatvamup¡dhivi¿eÀa¸am.

134

not bhrama, and not pram¡r£pa also. But it says the

‘bhramapram¡s¡dharanapratipatti’. No vi¿eÀyapratipatti can be seen here. It

has the defect of siddhas¡dhanat¡ and is presented. It is because, in the

knowledge of shell-silver the prat¢ti of

the knowledge of shell-silver is seen, that is through jµ¡nalakÀa¸asannikarÀa.

Even the ignorant can understand the knowledge of rajata in ¿uktika.

According to them the silver in shell is mithy¡ and the rajata in the shop

is satya. So the mithy¡jµ¡na of the shell-silver is absolute absence of the

pratiyog¢. The realization of this jµ¡na takes place. This is accepted by the

Naiy¡yikas. So the defect of siddhas¡dhanat¡ is present. Here the Naiy¡yikas put

forward the defect of siddhas¡dhanat¡. He cleared the objection through

examples of anum¡na ‘parvato vahnim¡n dh£m¡t.’ In this anum¡na, the hetu is

smoke (dh£ma). It will be the smoke in kitchen or the smoke in the mountain.

It cannot be accepted the smoke in mountain or the smoke in kitchen because if

take these two there will be defect. If accepted the smoke in the mountain, there

was the absence of the smoke of mountain in the example of kitchen. So the

example is s¡dhyavaikalya. Like this, if accepted the smoke in kitchen as hetu,

the absence of kitchen smoke in the mountain, which is the pakÀa. So the defect

of svar£p¡siddha hetv¡bh¡sa will happen. So only the smoke is the hetu not

135

kitchen, smoke or mountain smoke. Like this in this definition, there was

‘bhramapram¡s¡dh¡ra¸apratipatti’ is given.

The reply to this by the Advaitain is ‘sarvasmin pratipadhau’ instead of

‘pratipannop¡dhau’. Then there will be no defects. According to the opponents

the rajata which is in the shop, is not the pratiyogin of absolute absence. The

silver which is seen in the shop is mithy¡ because its locus is object to prat¢ti. It

is also said to be mithy¡ because absolute absence of pratiyogit¡. In the

pratipannop¡dhi there is vy¡vah¡rika and pr¡tibh¡sikarajata. So it is mithy¡.

Traik¡likaniÀedha means the absolute absence. Is the negation of past,

present and future t¡tvika (empirical), pr¡tibh¡sika (phenomenal) or vy¡vah¡rika

(relative)? If it is accepted as t¡tvika, then advaita h¡ni will happen because then

it should be accepted then, the negation of t¡tvika and Brahman is taken as

t¡tvika. 23 If the negation of at¡tvika is taken as pr¡tibh¡sika the defects of

siddhas¡dhanat¡ and arth¡ntara will take place. The negation of the pr¡tibh¡sika

universe is not the opposite of that reality of the pratiyogitva prapaµca. The

reality of the universe is accepted by the opponents.

4.10.1. Arth¡ntara doÀa

23. A.S., p. 94, 95.

136

If the negation of at¡tvika is accepted as pr¡tibh¡sika then the defects of

arth¡ntara happens. If the ‘gha¶¡bh¡vavat bh£talam’ is taken in this context

the negation of the gha¶apratiyogit¡ is pr¡tibh¡sika or this has defect. Like this

in the universe which is determined by Brahman, there the negation of the

pr¡tibh¡sika is the pratiyog¢ of the universe and the eternal (¡gantuka) defect of

superimposition can be obtained. If in the universe the negation of the pratiyogi

of superimposition is obtained, the mithy¡tva is not obtained which Advaitin has

also been forced to agree. Like this the opponents, states the defect of

siddhas¡dhanat¡ and arth¡ntara in the definition of the mithy¡tva of the

universe.24 If the negation of the universe is vy¡vah¡rika the Advaitins cannot

oppose these defects because the negation of the vy¡vah¡rika is sublated like

vy¡vah¡rikaprapaµca by the knowledge of Brahman. Vy¡vah¡rikaprapaµca is

mithy¡ because it is d¤¿yatva. Like this vy¡vah¡rikaniÀedha is not the opposite

of the t¡tvikasatt¡ of the universe. If the empirical reality of the world is accepted

then there will be the defect of arth¡ntara. Whenever the negation of the

vy¡vah¡rikasatt¡ is stated then pratiyog¢ prapaµca is entwined with the

p¡ram¡rthika satt¡.

24. Sidhivy¡khy¡, p. 95.

137

If the vy¡vah¡rika of the negation of past, present and future is accepted,

the defect of apr¡m¡¸yat¡ occurs. ‘Neha n¡n¡sti kiµcana’ ¿rutis and the like

declare that the universe is mithy¡. This ¿rutis states the negation of the

universe. If the negation of universe stated by this ¿ruti is the negation of

vy¡vah¡rika, the other ¿rutis which state the negation of mithy¡tva does not have

any importance. That means which ¿ruti shows at¡tvika that are not valued

because negation is sublated by Brahmajµ¡na. Therefore that is not t¡tvika.

The reply given to this by Advaitin’s is that the absence is

adhikara¸asvar£pa. But according to Naiy¡yika absence is a particular thing.

Advaitins opinion of ‘Bh£tale gha¶¡bh¡va’, is that there is no separate existence

which is different from gha¶¡bh¡va. But Naiy¡yikas opines that the absence of

gha¶a is different object from bh£tala. If the absence is accepted as t¡tvika, the

Advaitah¡ni does not happen. The universe which is seen around and its

locus is Brahman. In this Brahman the prapaµcaniÀedha is Brahmasvar£pa.

There is nothing different from Brahman. In the example ¿uktirajata ¿uktika

which is the pr¡tibh¡sikarajat¡bh¡va that is vy¡vah¡rik¡bh¡va. When compared

the pr¡tibh¡sika object has more sattva than the vy¡vah¡rika object. Likewise

138

when compared pr¡tibh¡sika abh¡va has more satt¡ than the vy¡vah¡rika abh¡va.

Adhyasta rajata cannot be called satya rajata.

4.10.2. Sidhas¡dhanat¡ doÀa

If the negation is accepted as at¡tvika there will be no destruction because

of the defect of siddhas¡dhanat¡. As it is at¡tvika so the Advaitins do not accept

this as pr¡tibh¡sika. According to Advaitin the negation of the universe is

Vy¡vah¡rika25 If the negation of the universe is vy¡vah¡rika d¤¿ya is only

vy¡vah¡rika object. Like this the objects which are visible, are mithy¡. Sublation

happens only in objects which are mithy¡. The negation of the universe is mithy¡

because it is vy¡vah¡rika. If the absolute absence of the locus of the universal

objects like pots is mithy¡, then the universe should be real. There is least chance

for a doubt in the above statement. This rule is not applicable every where. This

can be explained by an example as follows- the wild animals seen in dreams.

These animals if sublated in dreams, they are ¡ropita in that state, when awake,

the dream of animals affect. So also in the effect of these animals are in sleep.

Both these sublations (badhas) are mithy¡. Likewise vy¡vah¡rikaprapaµca has

vy¡vah¡rikaniÀedha. So it is mithy¡. There exists a rule that pratiyog¢ is not real

when negation is real. If the negation is mithy¡, then pratiyog¢ should not be

real. In the empirical level locus and b¡dha is sublated, so they are mithy¡. The

25. A.S., p. 99.

139

sakÀ¡tk¡ra of empirical level niÀedha and pratiyog¢ are sublated. The negation

is alpasatt¡. So pratiyog¢ is real. Here the negation of the universe is alpasatt¡.

So that it is pr¡tibh¡sika. The universe is true based on adhikasatt¡ of negation

but here the object of negation and pratiyog¢ are samasatt¡ka.26 So there is no

chance for the defect of arth¡ntara. Here ¡ropitapratiyog¢ is the ¡ropitaniÀedha

of the universe. When vy¡vah¡rikat¡ of ¡ropitaniÀedha, is stated and then when

it is sublated, it is mithy¡. The d¤¿yatv¡didharma can be seen in the universe as

well as in its absence. So these are mithy¡. Here the negation of pratiyogin and

its negation happen. That means the niÀedhy¡vacchedakav¤tti is seen in the

pratiyog¢ and niÀedha.27 A pot is made of two kap¡las. The destruction of pot is

due to the destruction of kap¡las. When the kap¡las are destroyed, then the

absolute absence of the pot is absent so also pr¡gabh¡va. When there is a prat¢ti

of prior absence then it is ¡ropita.

The pr¡gabh¡vapratiyog¢ of pot is ¡ropita, that means pr¡gabh¡va and its

pratiyog¢ pot is also ¡ropita. So the vy¡vah¡rika of these two is said to happen.

The negation of Prapaµca pratiyogika is vy¡vah¡rika. Pratiyog¢ prapaµca is also

vy¡vah¡rika. The universe and its pratiyog¢ are vy¡vah¡rika. So in these two

mithy¡tv¡num¡navy¡pakad¤¿yatv¡dihetu is equal. Like this ‘pratipannop¡dhau

26 A.S. p. 101

27. A.S., p. 109, 110.

140

traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyogitvam mithy¡tvam’ this definition of mithy¡ happens

through d¤¿yatv¡dihetu.

On the basis of this mithy¡tva definition, the pot in bh£tala is

samyogasambandha. People accept the absence of pot through the

samav¡yasambandha in the same bh£tala. The pot which is the

samav¡yasambandha, the absence of pot through samyogasambandha is in

pratipannop¡dhi. So the defect of siddhas¡dhanat¡ is in the definition of

mithy¡tva.28 Whichever sambandhavi¿eÀa¸a and avacchinnavi¿eÀa¸a is the

reason for the adhiÀ¶¡nar£paprat¢ti, that takes place in that locus the

Advaitins said by the sambandhavi¿eÀa¸a as the same locus. Where there is the

cognition of something, in that locus through the sambandhavi¿eÀa¸a and

avacchinnavi¿eÀa¸a, that locus the absolute absence of the pratiyogitva is

mithy¡.29 Samyogavibh¡ga etc. has been said to have avy¡pyav¤tti. These

samyogavibh¡ga are situated in a particular locus, in that locus there is

avy¡pyav¤tti on the other side of the locus there is absence. The tree which has

kapisamyoga there is samyoga in ¿¡gh¡vaccheda and absence of samyoga in

root. So there is ativy¡pta in the definition of mithy¡tva and arth¡ntara also.

28. A.S., p. 150.

29. Ibid, p.150.

141

The reply of Advaitin is that, the tree on which the monkey sits and the

branch on which it sits are related. The author of Vivara¸a adds that the

presence of pratipannop¡dhi makes the defect of ativy¡pti as a mirage.

Madhus£dana states that an object which is in a particular locus, form and

relation, that object, if in absolute absence is said to have mithy¡tva. The tree

and the monkey do not have mithy¡tvalakÀya because of different locus. So

there is no doubt of ativy¡pti, siddhas¡dhanat¡ and arth¡ntara. To contradict

Madhva’s arth¡ntara and like defects Dharmar¡ja used the term y¡vat in his

Ved¡ntaparibh¡À¡.30 Ved¡ntin disagree the relation in avy¡pyav¤tti. So these

defects can be neglected. The p£rva uttaraprade¿a is the pratipannop¡dhi of

Ëtm¡. There is no dharmas like pratipannop¡dhi in Brahman because it is

nirdharmaka. So the definition of mithy¡tva is not ativy¡pta in Brahman.

Satyatva is the niÀedhar£pa of mithy¡tva. ‘cit’ is the niÀedhar£pa of ja·atva

and anardha is the niÀedhar£pa of sadness. According to Advaitin absence is

adhikara¸asvar£pa. It can be understood the dharma like vibhutva are absent.

4.10.3. Apr¡m¡¸yaniÀedha

The negation in the past, present and future of the universe is

vy¡vah¡rika. This negation is at¡tvika because it is sublated by the real knowledge

30 V.P., p. 94

142

of Brahman. The things which are sublated by the knowledge of Brahman are

vy¡vah¡rika. The pram¡¸a is known as ab¡dhit¡rthabodhaka and the apram¡¸a is

known as b¡dhit¡rthabodhaka. If it is agreed this ‘ekamev¡dvit¢yam’, ‘neha

n¡n¡sti kiµcana’ ¿rutis are said to be apr¡m¡¸ya because it is

ab¡dhit¡rthabodhaka. Here ‘tatv¡vedakatvam pr¡m¡¸yam’ or ‘tadvati

tatprak¡rakajanakatvam’ is accepted the ¿rutis like ‘ekamev¡dvit¢yam’ ‘neha

n¡n¡sti kiµcana’ etc. are not apr¡m¡¸ya. The negation of past, present and future

in the pratiyog¢ is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. So it is atatva not

apr¡m¡¸ya. Therefore atatvabodhaka ¿rutis are apr¡m¡¸ika.

As a reply to this question Advaitin said that these ¿rutis have

vy¡vah¡rika pram¡¸a instead of p¡ram¡rthikapram¡¸a where there is no dharma

there the dharma bodha takes place then there the vy¡vah¡rika apr¡m¡¸ya occurs.

The universe and the negation of universe are mithy¡. Like this mithy¡ states, an

object in a certain locus becomes a mithy¡. How does this happen? The ¿ruti

which tells the negation of vy¡vah¡rika has tatv¡vedakapr¡m¡¸ya. The ¿rutis like

‘tatvamasi’ etc. show that the ¿uddhacaitanya is not sublated in the past,

present and future. The tattv¡vachedakatva of these types of ¿rutis have

lakÀa¸apr¡m¡¸ya.

4.10.4. Pratiyogit¡vaccedakadharma

143

Opponent’s question is that the word ‘n¡sti’ in the definition of

mithy¡tva and ‘neha n¡n¡sti kiµcana’ etc. are the negation showed by the prat¢ti

is the pratiyogit¡vacchedakadharma of that negation. This is questioned by

opponents.

Is this pratiyogit¡vacchedakadharma, svar£pa? or p¡ram¡rthika? The

s¡m¡nyar£pa of the negation of pratiyog¢ prapaµca is d¤¿yatv¡di and

viÀeÀasvar£pa is ¡k¡¿atv¡di. Whether in this type of negation of the pratiyog¢,

absolute absence of the svar£pa of the rajata seen in front or is it vy¡vah¡rika

and pr¡tibh¡sika? The Dvaitins opposed to accept the svar£p¡tyant¡bh¡va. If

they accept this, universe and pr¡tibh¡sika rajata the a½¢kattv¡patti will occur.

¿rutipram¡¸a is different because in the ¿ruti there is the discrimination

(var¸ana) of the universe.

Where there is the origin of the universe there is destruction. The

arthakriy¡samardha is the object which has vy¡vah¡rika satyatva. There is no

action from the sky flower etc. According to Madhva Advaitins accepted the

avidy¡ as the up¡d¡na of the universe to explain the asatvavilakÀa¸a.31 By

accepting the avidyop¡d¡na of the universe how can siddh¡nt¢ say that the

negation of past, present and future in its up¡dhi? It states the negation of

31. Aj¡mek¡m lohita¿uk½ak¤À¸¡m.

144

svar£pa of the negation of the universe, the knowledge of tattva is not tampered.

Like this its sadr£pat¡prat¢ti does not happen. But it happens. If the

p¡ram¡rthikapratiyogit¡vacchedaka dharma is accepted there occurs different

type of defects because the cognition of the universe and arthakriy¡k¡ritva etc.

cannot be stated. Accepting any change of the locus pot etc. which is situated

in the same locus for stating the pratipannop¡dhi, there is the absence of the

universe. ¿uktirajata is also like this. But through this type of sublation of the

b¡dha, the absence of ¿uktirajata will not occur, but in this there is the negation

of p¡ram¡rthika and the defect of anyony¡¿raya. The reason for this is, even if

the knowledge of ab¡dhitar£pa p¡ram¡rthikatva is there, p¡ram¡rthika-

tvagha¶itab¡dhyatvar£pa is seen. When the b¡dhyatvar£pamithy-¡tvajµ¡na

comes into being, then the b¡dhyatva abh¡var£pa ab¡dhyatvajµ¡na will happen.

It is jµ¡nagata anyony¡¿raya because of p¡ram¡rthikatva. So the knowledge of

mithy¡tva does not occur and the definition is not obtaining (asiddha).32 After

the rajatabhrama, the niÀedha cognition of rajata happens in three times that is

past, present and future. The negation of p¡ram¡rthikatvar£pa is opposite to

this anubhava.

4.10.5. Anavasth¡

32. P¡ram¡rthikatvar£pe¸a traik¡lika.

145

Here the defects of anavasth¡ and a½¢katv¡patti are mentioned. Above

mentioned p¡ram¡rthikatva is not self p¡ram¡rthika. P¡ram¡rthika means

b¡dhyatva abh¡var£pa ab¡dhyatva. This anubhava is b¡dhyatvanir£pita. So it is

vy¡vah¡rika the p¡ram¡rthikapakÀa in its vy¡vah¡rika mingles with the

vy¡vah¡rika pakÀa of mithy¡tva ¡num¡nikapakÀa.

Mithy¡tv¡num¡na creates pakÀa of all object of vy¡vah¡rika. P¡ram¡rthika

dharma cannot be the dharma of nirdharmaka Brahman. So one which is

different from Brahman is mithy¡. P¡ram¡rthikatva dharma is vy¡vah¡rika and

mithy¡. In this mithy¡tvasiddhi is obtained from the p¡ram¡rthikar£pa. There

the defect of anavasth¡ can be seen. So ‘svar£pe¸a

traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyogitvam’ atyant¡patti takes place. Here anyony¡¿raya

and anavasth¡ occurs, so this definition is not suitable. Here the

sidhas¡dhanat¡pakÀa states that the locus which is mentioned is

anubhavasiddha, which is the negation of the object. On this basis the universe

and ¿uktirajata is negation of past, present and future of the pratiyog¢ in the

svar£pa. In this mithy¡tva anum¡na, ¿uktirajata is an example. In the example

of ¿uktirajata, the svar£pa of the negation of past, present and future

pratiyogitva is obtained and so also in the vy¡vah¡rika prapaµca.33 The rajata in

33. A.S., p. 120.

146

¿uktik¡ after this bhramajµ¡na the realization happens and after this realization

rajata. It can be understood that there is absent in the present, past and future.

So in the svar£pa the cognition of the negation of rajata exists. ‘Neha nanasti

kincana’34

here the cognition which is vy¡vah¡rika and the negation of the

universe itself (vy¡vah¡rikaprapaµcasvar£paniÀedhaprat¢ti) comes into being.

After the rajatabhrama, rajata is absent. In this type of negation the meaning of

vy¡vah¡rika the laukikap¡ram¡rthikarajata is the pratiyog¢ of negation, when

compared with vy¡vah¡rikaniÀedh¡rtha. It is so because of the defect of

vyadhikara¸a. In ‘idam rajatam’, the cognition of pr¡tibh¡sika, ‘idam’ is

inseparable and indescribable pr¡tibh¡sika. The subject of bhrama is

pr¡tibh¡sikarajata and the subject of b¡dha is vy¡vah¡rikarajata. The defect of

vy¡vah¡rikar£pa is seen because the object differences of the locus of the two, is

different. When this is accepted the defect of aprasaktapratiÀedha exists. The

identity of ¿uktirajata is not accepted by the Advaitins. From experience the

sublation of rajata in ¿uktirajata is obtained. The opponents proclaim that the

pratiyog¢ of the negation of svar£pa is accepted, and then there occurs the

defect of asambhava of the origin of universe. Advaitins oppose this statement.

The vy¡pti of utpatti is not upaniÀad svar£patva. In a negation of svar£pa,

34 B¤. Up.4.4.19.

147

origin and the like, does not have any vy¡pti. So there vy¡pti bh¡va takes place.

According to Advaitin the d¤¿yatva of the prayojaka of origin etc. are different

from the locus of avidy¡. The only d¤¿yatva has utpatti, ‘Yato v¡ im¡ni bh£t¡ni

j¡yante’ this ¿ruti supports this utpatti and through the ¿ruti ‘neha n¡n¡sti

kiµcana’ the negation also happens. Through the anubhava and ¿ruti the

niÀiddhasvabh¡va of utp¡dyam¡na is obtained. The opponents questioned that

the object which is niÀidhyam¡na here the utp¡dyati does not happen because it

has no locus. How the vy¡pti which is aniÀithyasvar£pa and utpaty¡diimatya is

absent, like it is not vy¡paka? In ulpaty¡dimatya ¿uktirajata ‘¿ukto r£pyam

n¡sti’ this type of anubhava comes into existence. From the ¿ruti ‘yato v¡ im¡ni

bh£t¡ni j¡yante’35 the origin etc. of the universe is obtained. This universe is also

subjected to negation because of the ¿ruti ‘neha n¡n¡sti kiµcana’. The

niÀedhar£patva of utpaty¡dimat is obtained from experience and ¿ruti. The

utpaty¡dimat will not take place in the objects which undergoes negation, thus

the opponents argued. This is baseless. The arth¡k¡ryakriyatva takes place as

the origin etc. in negation svar£pa. As per the opponent commentators, the

present is applicable to pary¡ptaprayojaka of arthakriyas36

35 Tai.Up. 3/1

36. A.S. p. 443

148

Madhus£dana states in his Advaitasiddhi about pr¡tibh¡sikarajata where

the pratiyog¢ of negation is seen. Vivara¸¡c¡rya states that the niÀedhapratiyog¢

of ‘nedam rajatam’ is the rajata in the shop not the rajata of pr¡tibh¡sika. The

opponents states that the two ¡c¡ryas don’t have any religious unity but

contradicting this Madhus£danasarasvati says that the opponents have not

understood the writings of the ancient ¡c¡ryas to the full extent. The vy¡vah¡rika

of ¡pa¸astharajata is not accepted as pratiyog¢. The cognition of the

combination of pr¡tibh¡sikarajata and ¡pa¸astharajata is the pratiyog¢ of

pr¡tibh¡sikarajata. According to him mithy¡tva is pratyakÀam because the

rajata is seen in abh¡vapratiyogit¡r£pa in pratipannop¡dhi.37 The rajata which is

the negation of pratiyogit¡ in pratipannop¡dhi is pr¡tibh¡sika not vy¡vah¡rika.

To clear the defect of anavasth¡ the meaning of the world pram¡¸asiddhatvam is

taken as the knowledge which is not sublated. The object is not sublated by

knowledge, that vi¿eÀyajµ¡na of the object, is p¡ram¡rthikatvam. The object

which is not sublated by jµ¡na is Brahman and a½¢ka. So a½¢ka viÀeÀyajµ¡na

does not happen.

The buddhi which is qualified by Brahman is p¡ram¡rthika svar£pa, the

pratiyog¢ which states this is determination (avaccedaka). The buddhi which is

stated by vi¿eÀakasambandha is the determination of the pratiyog¢. The non

37. P.P., p. 113.

149

sublation of an object in Brahman is not sublated, which is subjected to

vi¿aeÀyat¡-sambandha and it is not the universe which is sublated by

knowledge. The dharma which is the determinate of the buddhir£pa is the

vyadhikara¸adharma of prapaµcaniÀedhapratiyogit¡ because the sublation of

the universe helps the occurrence of knowledge. There exists no defects like

anyonya because if the object of dharma which is buddhir£pa, which is said in

the vi¿eÀitasambandha, which is avacchinna from the dharm¢ which is

dh¢r£pa then the ‘traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyog¢’ is mithy¡. This is so because the

knowledge of dh¢r£pa avaccedakadharma is not related to the knowledge of

dvaitamithy¡tva.

Anavasth¡ does not happen in the above mentioned state. The

knowledge which is only nivartya of the dh¢r£pa is completely the negation of

the d¤¿ya. How the d¤¿ya in aniÀedhapratiyogit¡ is completely intermingled in

complete d¤¿yat¡ like wise in the buddhi, which is mentioned earlier, can be

seen. This is d¤¿ya. When d¤¿ya is negated by p¡ram¡rthika, then with all

d¤¿yas p¡ram¡rthika is also negated.

There is no need of another buddhi for negating p¡ram¡rthika. Even

after the negation of the universe, the p¡ram¡rthikatva is aniÀidhya. So there

the defect of anavasth¡ can be seen. Its negation happens along with d¤¿yatva.

So anavasth¡ is nirm£la. If the silver in shop is accepted as the pratiyog¢ of

150

sublation then the defect of vaiyadhikara¸a in Brahman and sublation comes

into being. The person who is in bhr¡nti sees pr¡tibh¡sikarajata of the object

which is in front. He believes it to be in vy¡vah¡rikarajata and he tries to pick it

up. When he cannot pick this rajata, and with the vy¡vah¡rikarajata the

pr¡tibh¡sikarajata which is t¡d¡tmya is sublated. The b¡dhakajµ¡na like ‘this is

not rajata’ the pr¡tibh¡sika rajata is the negation of the pratiyog¢ because the

negation of vy¡vah¡rikarajata does not occur in ¿uktik¡. So the bodha of the

negation of the vy¡vah¡rikarajata happens that which is told by the p£rv¡c¡rya.

There ¿uktika is not the anuyog¢. Like this the pratiyog¢ vy¡vah¡rikarajata

anyony¡bh¡vasiddha. This, Citsukha describes in his Tattvaprad¢pik¡.38 In this

pr¡tibh¡sikarajata is different from vy¡vah¡rikarajata. Like this the pratiyogit¡ of

the negation of bhedar£pa is seen as vy¡vah¡rikarajata. How can the

vy¡vah¡rikarajata are seen in absolute absence of pratiyogit¡. Madhus£dana

clears the above mentioned two ideas. If in ‘nedam rajatam’ and the like, this

knowledge of b¡dhaka is taken for account as the anyony¡bh¡vaviÀaya,

¡rthikamithy¡tva, then the meaning of rajata ¡rthikamithy¡tva is obtained. This

type of bh¡¸a is obtained because in pr¡t¢tikarajata the bheda prat¢ti is present

in the p¡ram¡rthikarajata. The cognition of rajata is different from p¡ram¡rthi.

38. Thasmadlaukikam… C., p. 50.

151

So mithy¡tva which is ‘pratipannop¡dhiniÀ¶ha atyant¡bh¡vapratiyogi’ that is

the ‘bodhakokta bhedajanyalabhya.’ Vivara¸¡c¡rya states mithy¡ is the absolute

absence of the pratiyog¢ because of this reason. The bhedaviÀayaka

atyant¡bh¡va which is mentioned in Paµcap¡dika is the end of the absolute

absence of the knowledge of viÀayaka. So it is seen Paµcap¡dika showing

pratipannarajata is mithy¡ through bhedaviÀayakajµ¡na. Where there is the

experience of bhrama there the pratipannarajata is mithy¡. The sublation there

is no rajata also happens. This is obtained by anubhava.39

4.10.6. Atyantasatt¡patti

In ‘svar£pa traik¡likaniÀedhar£pamithy¡tva’ happens in the negation

of the universe. Like ¿a¿aviÀ¡¸a in universe there is atyantasatt¡patti taking

place because the whole universe is not situated in svar£pa which is different

from pratipannop¡dhi. This is accepted by all philosophers. The absolute

absence of the svar£pa of an object which is different from its original plane,

then a½¢katva takes place.40

In universe there is no asatvailakÀa¸a because asat is not stable

anywhere. So there the defect of arth¡ntara can be seen. As a reply of this,

39. A.S., p. 130.

40. Ibid, p. 134, 135.

152

Advaitin in their mithy¡tva definition has accepted the cognition which is sattva

prak¡raka viÀaya as pakÀavi¿eÀa¸a. In the above mentioned vi¿eÀa vi¿iÀ¶a

pakÀapratipannop¡dhi, the ‘traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyogitva’ is mithy¡. If this is

defined so, these definition cannot be said as a½¢katv¡patti in the universe. The

defect of arth¡ntara does not happen. The universe has

‘dharmaniÀ¶hasatvar£paprat¢ti’. A½¢ka is not the viÀaya of cognition like

sat. According to Advaitin a pr¡tibh¡sika object is the kalpita locus of sat.

A½¢ka is niradhiÀ¶h¡na. Before the sublation ¿uktirajata is satvaprat¢ta like

universe. So it is different from asattva.41 The equality of rajata in ¿uktik¡ and

the cognition of prapaµcat¡d¡tmya are in Brahman. This type of the cognition of

equality is not seen in a½¢ka. So ativy¡pti and arth¡ntara does not happen. The

word up¡dhi is seen in the definition of mithy¡tva points to sadvastu, which is

not sublated. The equality (t¡d¡tmya) of that universe is clearly viewed as sat.

Advaitins do not become ¿£nyav¡din even though they accept this.

According to Advaitin the anirvacan¢ya asattva of the universe and the asattva

¡k¡¿akusuma are different. The universe is anirvacan¢ya because it is not trik¡la

b¡dhyatva satt¡.

4.11. Conclusion

41. A.S., p.139.

153

Madhus£dana states that the universe is mithy¡ because it is different

from sat and asat. The refutation of Vy¡sat¢rtha is: all objects are either sat or

asat. SadasadvilakÀa¸atva is not seen anywhere. The reply of Madhus£dana

was that sat and asat are used with technical implications. Between the two

there is s¡kÀepasat. SadasadvilakÀa¸atva has a position. Mithy¡tva does not

have an object. In the object there is sat or asat. Advaitins point out that the

universal also have existence not only in our mind but also in the particular

objects of experience. This existence of universe is vy¡vah¡rika. The universal

constituted by the essential common characteristics of all the particular

individuals. So the universal is not distinct from the individuals but it is

identical with them in the point of existence.

In the second definition Vy¡sat¢rtha raised one question that-How the

cognition and negation happened in one and same place? Madhus£dana states

that cognition is not original, it is only appearance. The another question of

Vy¡satirtha is that if mithy¡tva is ab¡dhita then Advaita does not occur and when

mithy¡tva is accepted as b¡dhita then the jagat is satya? Madhus£dana

answered jµ¡na of mithy¡tva also becomes sublated. So the destruction of

Advaita does not happen. Mithy¡tva is only pratibh¡sa. So the jagat will not

become sat through the sublation of mithy¡tva. Brahmasatyatva takes place

through the sublation of mithy¡tva. The universe and its negation happens at

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the same locus. Through the niÀedhaniÀedha, adhiÀ¶¡nasatyatva is

established, not prapaµcasatyatva. So the world is mithy¡ and the definition of

mithy¡tva is faultless.