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CHAPTER IV

INDIAN NAVY’S MARITIME DOCTRINE

MARITIME HISTORY OF INDIA

India has a maritime history roughly dating back to 7,600 years.1 In Indian

mythologies, the ocean is considered as the primordial source for creation of the

universe. Indian folklore, ancient Indian texts and Buddhist Jatakas, all allude to the

fact that the Indus Valley civilization of Mohenjo-

daro, Lothal and Harappa thrived due to maritime

activity between India and the countries of Africa,

Arabia, Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean.

Trade and navigation, both oceanic and riverine,

grew significantly in 4th

Century BC.2 The word

‘navigation’ originates from the Sanskrit word

Navagati, meaning sea travel. Indian cultural and

religious interplay were naturally intertwined with trade. The earliest known

reference to an organisation of ships in ancient India is to the Mauryan Empire.

Kautilya’s Arthasastra devotes a full chapter on the state department of waterways

under Navadhyaksha (Sanskrit for Superintendent of Ships).3 The term, Nava

Dvipantaragamanam (Sanskrit for sailing to other lands by ships, i.e. Exploration)

appears in this book in addition to appearing in the Buddhist text, Baudhayana

Dharmasastra as the interpretation of the term, Samudrayanam. In the subsequent

period, Indian history witnessed significant maritime activity in form of trade, naval

expeditions and pilgrimage (Haj), which is illustrative of sound navigational

techniques.

Map 4.1: Indus Valley Civilisation

(Source:en.academic.ru)

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When Vasco da Gama landed at Calicut in 1498, a new dimension was added

to the maritime power of India, i.e. the military component. The Portuguese were

followed by Dutch, the British and the French, who rode into Indian waters on the

back of ‘blue water’ naval capability. Some of these extra-regional navies were

successfully challenged by the ‘brown water’ coastal navies of Indian Kingdoms. In

the early 18th

century, the Marathas enjoyed many tactical successes against western

navies. Notable among these was the ‘Maratha blockade’ of British-held Mumbai

port that led to British East India Company ceding a ransom of 8750 pounds. In

1721, the Maratha Navy even defeated a Portuguese – British combined assault on

Alibagh. A British historian noted, “Victorious alike over the English, Dutch and the

Portuguese, the Maratha Admirals sailed the Arabian Sea in triumph”.4 The 17

th

century Maratha Warrior king Chhatrapati Sivaji Raje Bhosale is considered the

Father of Indian Navy.

However, during the colonial period the Indian kingdoms were mostly engaged

in land fighting trying to protect their territories. Secondly, the European powers

never resorted to seaward invasion of Indian kingdoms. Thus Indian kingdoms did

neither pay much attention to the maritime realm as source of threat nor felt the

urgency to build their maritime power. As a result, though subsequently Indian states

could chase European navies away from Indian coast time and again, the latter

always proved stronger with their blue water navies, moving freely in the waters of

northern Indian Ocean. With sea control of these waters firmly in European hands,

the domination of these colonial powers over India’s maritime trade – subsequently,

even on its sovereignty – ensued in logical progression, ultimately resulting in

colonisation of Indian sub-continent by British Raj for almost three centuries.

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The journey of independent India’s navy to become a competent Maritime

Power with a well-defined Maritime Doctrine of a Sovereign; Democratic Republic

would be pursued in the subsequent pages.

MEANING AND DEFINITION OF A DOCTRINE

The word ‘doctrine’ has originated from the Latin word ‘doctrina’, which

implies ‘a code of beliefs” or ‘a body of teachings’, which provides a framework of

beliefs and teachings that guide a group in its actions. Military organisations and the

nature of military operations relate to group, rather than individual, activities.5

Their functioning is dependent upon a proper and common understanding of

collective activities and adherence to uniform procedures and practices. Also, there

will be multiple doctrines for a military force, each respective sphere must be able to

provide a common, authoritative approach to warfare and the employment of military

power and be in synergy with other related doctrines. Doctrine flows from

‘concepts’. A concept is innovative, but a tentative idea to solve a problem based

upon inferences drawn from observed facts. Concepts when proven, would develop

into ‘doctrines’. Military doctrines can thus be understood as sets of proven concepts

and principles related to the use of military power. These provide a common

reference point, language and purpose that guide military forces in their actions.

Maritime doctrines fulfill this function primarily in the maritime domain, at and from

the sea.

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NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS AND MILITARY DOCTRINE

A Maritime Doctrine depicts the National Security concepts and elaborates

how the National Values and Aims determine the National Interests, Security

Objectives, Security Policies, Strategies etc.

National Values evolve from a nation’s culture and history. The National Aim

is derived from the Constitution of India and amplified through political directions.

Together, national values and national aim give shape to National Interests which in

turn, determine National Security Objectives.

National Security Policy (NSP) is formulated by viewing the national security

objectives and the components of national power in the domestic and global

environment, both prevailing and predicted. It provides the policy guideline for

development of strategies in the exercise of national power.

National Strategy is the plan for employment of various tools of national

power in accordance with the national security policy, to achieve the national

security objectives in support of national interests. The national strategy provides

basis for further development of the Military Strategy, with its constituent Joint,

Land, Maritime and Air Strategies.

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The relation between a doctrine and a strategy can be explained thus: Doctrine

is evolved from government’s policies. Strategy is derived from the doctrine. If a

strategy brings success, it reinforces the doctrine. If on the other hand it leads to

failure, the doctrine is modified to achieve the laid down National interests and

objectives.6

Maritime power is the ability of a nation to use the seas to safeguard and

progress its national interests. As such, it is a pillar of national security policy and is

a key enabler in the formulation and implementation of viable National and Military

Strategies.7

Table 4.1: National Security Concepts

(Source: Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009)

NATIONAL VALUES NATIONAL AIM

NATIONAL INTERESTS

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

NATIONAL STRATEGY

JOINT MILITARY STRATEGY

UNDERPINNED BY JOINT MILITARY DOCTRINE

LAND/MARITIME/AIR STRATEGIES

UNDERPINNED BY LAND/MARITIME/AIR DOCTRINES

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Navy and Maritime Doctrine: The Navy is the prime instrument and

manifestation of the maritime power of a nation-state. The raison d’etre (French

phrase for ‘reason for existence’) of a navy is to safeguard the nation’s use of seas

for its legitimate sovereign purposes, whilst concurrently guarding against inimical

use of the sea by others. Maritime Doctrine, therefore, focuses on that dimension of

maritime power, which enables use of the seas by all stake holders.

Indian Maritime Doctrine

Maritime is an all-encompassing word, including everything that is connected

to the seas. The Indian Maritime Doctrine (INBR 8) however, deals specifically

with concepts and principles of employment of India’s Naval Power. It focuses on

the application of naval power across the spectrum of conflict - including war, less

than war situations and peace. It reflects on the concepts, characteristics and context

for employment of combat power at and from the sea. It is aimed at evoking a

common understanding amongst all stake-holders in the development and

employment of India’s maritime military power, so as to unite their actions in

support of India’s national interests and national security objectives. Hierarchically,

INBR 8 is the capstone doctrinal publication for the Indian Navy (IN), which should

serve as the ‘guiding light’ for the service in all its maritime endeavours. The Indian

Maritime Doctrine (IMD) leans on and draws directions from the Joint Doctrine for

the Indian Armed Forces published by the headquarters of the Integrated Defence

Staff (IDS) in 2006. The Joint Doctrine articulates India’s envisaged national

interests, security objectives and policies.

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National Interests and National Security Objectives

The National Aim provides the basis for defining national interests. India’s

national aim, as derived from the Constitution, is the unhindered economic progress

and socio-political development of the nation and its citizens.

India’s National Interests are expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution,

and are centred on the preservation of the nation’s core values from external

aggression and internal subversion. They can be summarised as follows:-

Sovereignty, Unity and Territorial Integrity of India

Democratic, Secular and Federal character of the Indian Republic

Secure and stable internal and external environment that is conducive to safety,

security and development of the nation and its citizens

Socio-cultural and economic well-being of the nation and citizens

National Security Objectives flow from the national interests, and may be

summarised as follows:

Ensure security of national territory, territorial space, citizens, resources and

maritime trade routes

Maintain a secure internal environment to guard against threats to national

unity, core values and development

Strengthen co-operation and friendship with other countries to promote

regional and global stability

Maintain a strong and credible defence posture and capability to safeguard the

national aim and interests

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National Security Policy (NSP) is formulated by the Cabinet Committee on

Security (CCS), with inputs from the National Security Council (NSC) and other

agencies. It is framed in line with the national security objectives, the imperatives of

prevailing and predicted domestic, regional and global security environment, various

factors that impinge on the same and the constituents of national power. It provides

the policy guidelines for framing strategies for supporting national interests and

achieving national security objectives. The military component of the NSP is issued

by the Raksha Mantri to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), in Op Directive.

THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

The Spectrum of Conflict denotes the full range of situations in which military

forces may be called upon to operate - ranging from stable peace to nuclear war. The

position of a specific conflict in the spectrum depends on its ways, means and ends.

The best condition that can be highlighted in the spectrum of conflict is the condition

of non-violent conflict, as long periods of absolute peace are not natural characteristic

of nation-states. The non-violent character of such condition is often disrupted by

various forms of hostilities. At the lower end of the spectrum lie the non-

conventional hostilities. They include; low-intensity conflicts (LICs) such as

insurgencies/counter insurgency operations, guerrilla warfare and terrorism; and civil

war. At the higher level, lies the conventional inter-state armed conflict (combat),

followed by a nuclear war at the highest end.

The spectrum of conflict may be diagrammatically depicted in Table 4.2.

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Table 4.2: Spectrum of Conflict

(Source: Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009)

Non Violent

Conflict

Violent Conflict

Non-Conventional

Hostilities

Conventional

Hostilities

Nuclear Hostilities

External Conflict Combat

General Nuclear War (Tactical/

Theatre/ Strategic

Peace Keeping Enforcement Limited

Political Confrontation

Internal Conflict LIC

(incl insurgency)

Guerrilla warfare

Terrorism

Civil War

Subversion

Political,

Ideological and

Economic

competition

Peace, Security and Stability

Peace refers to a condition wherein there is absence of violence. Maintenance

of peace is a pre-requisite for a country’s growth and development. It requires

development of conducive internal conditions and external environment. While this

is primarily done through social, economic and diplomatic strategies, military power

also plays a supportive and deterrent role. Where peace is broken by the action of

external actors, military power can be used to restore peace on terms favourable to

one’s own national interests.

Security refers to a condition where a state and its citizens have freedom from

threat of violence. The degree of security is proportional to the level of such

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freedom. The retention of state control over the instruments of violence, and

development of state capability to prevent or counter the use or threat of use of

violence from internal and external actors is necessary for higher security. Military

power is a central factor in the attainment of desired level of security. Maritime

security relates to the freedom from threat at or from the sea.

Stability refers to a condition where violence is experienced, but the degree is

at a sufficiently low level that does not obstruct the pursuit of development and

progress by the state, and normal way of life of its citizens. The military power of a

state provides it the ability to suppress the violence suffered by taking suitable

counter-action against the perpetrator.

Peace, Security and Stability are vital national interests, as they are primary

conditions governing a nation’s survival and development. Military power plays a

central role in the national strategy developed towards attainment of this prime

objective. Military Power provides the instrument; Military Doctrine provides the

conceptual framework for the development and employment of this instrument; and

Military Strategy defines the manner and scope of application of the instrument.

Conflict and Combat

A conflict is the contemplation or outbreak of organised violence for political

reasons. If localised to areas within the borders of a nation-state and exceeding the

controlling capacity of the nation’s police and Para-military organisations, a state of

Internal Conflict may be said to prevail. If the conflict bears an inter-state character,

it is termed as External Conflict. Armed Conflict refers to a condition of

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heightened confrontation wherein a non-state group or state resorts to the use of

violence to settle a dispute or advance its interests. Based on the ways and means

which govern the nature of conflict, it can be categorised in terms of intensity.

Higher intensity of conflict entails mounting of violence at higher scale and

tempo, which requires the overt employment of regular military forces. Conflict

waged by a regular military force of a state is termed as Combat. The purpose of

combat is to help achieve political objectives of the state by the use of force.

Limited and Total War

War may take the form of General or Total War involving nearly all

resources of a nation. In a total war, the protagonists aim for annihilation or total

subjugation of the opponent. The last total war was the Second World War, which

had unconditional surrender as the stated aim of the Allied Powers, and witnessed the

use of atomic bombs against Japan and repeated strategic bombing of civilian

populace by most belligerents.

When the armed conflict is limited in terms of time, space, objectives and types

of forces and methods used, it is said to be a limited war. All wars fought by India

since her independence in 1947 have been limited wars.

Levels of War

There are four traditional levels of war addressed by national and military

planners for determining the quantum and manner in which national power in

general, and military power in particular, is to be applied. These are:

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National Strategic Level. The national strategic level is in essence, the political

leadership of a nation. At this level, all resources of the nation - diplomatic,

military, economic information, technological etc. are directed towards

attainment of national security objectives.

Military Strategic Level. At the military strategic level, the national military

leadership determines the manner of employment of military power in

accordance with the national strategic decisions. Political strategy should be in

synergy with the military capability and situation. Similarly military objectives

and strategy should lead to attainment of the political objectives.

Operational Level. The operational level is directed by the Commanders of

Armed Forces, primarily the Commanders-in-Chief of geographic single and

joint Commands. At this level, campaigns and major operations are planned,

conducted and sustained to accomplish military-strategic objectives within

dimensions and areas of operation.

Tactical Level. The tactical level involves the direction of military resources to

achieve specific operational objectives. The role of the tactical commander is

to ensure the most effective use of units under his command and control

towards accomplishment of operational missions and realisation of higher

commander’s intent.

The boundaries between different levels of war often overlap, especially in

maritime domain, where tactical actions may lead to a strategic effect. This is due to

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inherent attributes of maritime forces, particularly Reach, Versatility and Presence,

wherein the mere presence of a nation’s maritime forces in an area is representative

of national interest and political intent.

Purpose of War

The purpose of war and use of military forces is always political, not military.

The justification for war is enshrined in the national security policy, which directs

‘when’ and ‘why’ military force is to be used. The political objectives of the war are

set in accordance with this policy, and govern determination of the national strategy

for prosecution of the war, including ‘where’ and ‘how much’ military force is to be

used. Military objectives are defined in support of the political objectives. The

military strategy is shaped for attainment of these objectives, within the larger

political objectives and in keeping with the national strategy, and determines ‘what’

and ‘how’ military force is to be used. Hence, there must be synergy between the

political and military objectives and the national and military strategies.

CONCEPTS OF WAR

Attributes of war

Maritime Doctrine further gives an account of certain attributes of war which

affect all the components of war and maritime power of a nation-state. The important

attributes of war are:

Friction: In war, military activities experience unexpected difficulties due to the

environment of war, in which there are external resistance by the enemy and internal

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resistance from own weaknesses. This can be reduced by robust systems, training

procedures and yet needs long term planning and execution.

Fog of War: The atmosphere generated due to incomplete, inaccurate or

contradictory information and knowledge of events is termed as ‘fog of war’. With

the aid of technological solutions like ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target

Acquisition and Reconnaissance) and constant preparations for contingencies and the

ability of leadership at all levels of war to manage changes, the ‘fog of war’ can be

reduced.

Fluidity: While each stage in a conflict is unique, no stage can be viewed in

isolation. Rather each one merges with the others that precede and follow it. This

condition is called ‘fluidity of war’ and offers unforeseen reversals and fleeting

opportunities. This situation could be managed successfully with a high state of

readiness, with an aggressive mind set that seeks to quickly recognise opportunities

and rapidly seize and hold the initiative.

Disorder: The above said conditions may cause a war to gravitate towards a possible

disorder. Plans might go awry, instructions may get misinterpreted, communications

may fail and unforeseen events would be commonplace. It depends on a force to use

its training and cohesion to build and maintain a high tempo of operations to create

and exploit disorder in the opponent.

Violence and Danger: The determined use of violence and constant exposure to

danger and suffering is the very essence of war fighting. But victory is possible only

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by a series of tactical engagements that involve use of and exposure to high amounts

of violence. This needs to be imbibed in the planning, preparation and prosecution of

war at all levels.

Concepts Related to Use of Force

Destruction and Attrition: The use of military force to physically destroy an

opponent’s war-fighting capability including military equipment, troops, command

etc. is termed as Destruction. Partial but progressive destruction of the opponent’s

military forces, thereby steadily reducing his war-waging ability, is termed as

Attrition. In the context of maritime warfare, naval forces are endowed with

composite and multi-dimensional force packages for effecting Destruction and

Attrition.

Compellance: The use of force to induce an opponent to change behaviour is termed

as Compellance. It requires superior force to be brought to bear on the opponent in

escalatory steps and clear demands communicated on what action is required of the

opponent to stop the use of force.

Coercion: The threat of use of force against an opponent in order to bend his will so

as to achieve acquiescence is termed as Coercion. In this case, credible force is kept

poised and ready while psychological pressure is built up on the opponent that force

could be used. This aims to shake the opponent’s confidence and will to continue in

defiance.

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Deterrence: Deterrence is preventing aggression by convincing a potential aggressor

that the cost of coercion or conflict would be more than its likely gains. This can be

done either by raising the costs or by denying the gains. While the former is known

as ‘deterrence by punishment’, the latter is termed as ‘deterrence by denial’.

Deterrence can also be defined in terms of posture, i.e. active or passive. Passive

deterrence is implicit in the maintenance of military capability and strategy, while

active deterrence requires a more overt posture in terms of deployment and

readiness.

Disruption: The inability of a protagonist to function cohesively in combat as a

result of actions by the opponent is termed as a Disruption. It can be caused by

targeting the component elements, such as command and control, communications,

logistics, surveillance, network centric operations, etc. Naval power is capable of not

only disrupting the adversary war-fighting potential through economic warfare, but

also severely dislocating its military-strategic infrastructure in the littoral areas

through shore strike.

Escalation: Increase in the intensity of conflict during the course of an operation is

termed as Escalation. It can be caused by an increase in the quantity and quality of

forces used and their targets. Horizontal Escalation entails an increase in the

geographical area of operations while Vertical Escalation indicates a higher level of

violence. During the 1999 Indo-Pak Kargil Conflict, India chose Vertical Escalation

by introducing air power into the conflict. However, it retained control over

horizontal escalation by limiting the use of force to Indian Territory and on the

Indian side of Line of Control (LOC). During Operation Parakram, 2002, India

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signalled her intent to de-escalate by recalling its deployed warships to harbour,

thereby indicating the versatility of naval forces for control of escalation.

Embroilment: Embroilment is the condition wherein, upon taking recourse to the

use of force to attain its political objectives, a protagonist finds itself in a situation

entailing use of force on a larger scale, of greater intensity, or longer duration than it

had envisaged or was prepared for.

Persuasion and Dissuasion: Persuasion is convincing another state, by diplomatic

means and without the threat or use of force, to carry out certain actions that are in its

own interests, by emphasising the benefits of the action to that state. Dissuasion is

convincing another state, by diplomatic means and without the threat or use of force,

to desist from carrying out certain actions that are inimical to own interests. Due to

its inherent attributes and roles, naval power is ideally suited for Persuasion and

Dissuasion.

Laws and Rules of Armed Conflict

Like any other game or action, the conduct of war too is governed by some

laws. In ancient times, for example, the Mahabharatha, warfare was restricted to

between sunrise and sunset, to be fought between equals, on a designated

battlefield, with attack prohibited against defenceless or wounded persons.

Kautilya’s Arthasastra (322-298 BC) conceptualised the justification for war and

described in detail the various conditions and rationale for going to war.8 There are

similar views broadly accepted as modern laws of armed conflict in the West which

are as follows:-

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UN Charter on the Right to Use Force - The concept of Jus ad Bellum relates to the

justification for resort to armed force. The principal justification is the right to

individual or collective self-defence, which is an inherent right laid down in the

United Nations (UN) Charter (Article 51) and the Constitution of India. These

legitimise the use of force to defend one’s own territory, forces and nationals in

various conditions, such as response to an armed attack. In addition to the provision

of self-defence, the UN Charter (Article 42) also authorises the collective use of

force to preserve international peace and security. Article 43 makes it obligatory for

UN members to make available to the Security Council inter alia their armed forces

for the purpose.9

Rules on Conduct of Armed Conflict

Geneva Conventions. The concept of Jus in Bello10

relates to the conduct of forces

in international armed conflict. It is governed by the four Geneva Conventions of

1949, Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 and Additional Protocol III of 2005.

These are also called ‘International Humanitarian Laws’ and are aimed at protecting

persons who do not, or are no longer taking part in the conflict, such as the wounded,

sick or shipwrecked, prisoners of war and civilians. These laws place some

restrictions on the ways and means of use of force which must be governed by the

two cardinal principles of ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’.

San Remo Manual. The latest codification of the laws of armed conflict at sea is

contained in the San Remo Manual of 1994, published by the International Institute

of Humanitarian Law. It takes into its fold the technological development in naval

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warfare, besides the provisions of the UN Charter and conventional state practices

with regard to these issues. Though the manual, prepared jointly by naval

practitioners and legal experts, does not wield legal authority nonetheless serves as a

useful operationally relevant guide.11

CONCEPTS OF MARITIME POWER

Seas are the common heritage of mankind, which offer every nation legal

access to entire globe. A maritime nation must have freedom of action to use the seas

in order to further its national interest. Concepts and techniques that protect this

freedom and enable use of the seas are applicable across the entire spectrum of

maritime activities during peace and war. Moreover, it is important to emphasise that

since humans and societies flourish on terra firma (firm/solid earth; dry land), the

nation’s political objectives – and thus its military objectives – are inextricably

linked to events on land. In the broader sense, therefore, whatever concepts that

maritime forces adopt must eventually impact affairs on land.

Attributes of Maritime Forces

The attributes are derived from the characteristics of the maritime environment.

Naval forces are capable of carrying out multifarious tasks due to their inherent and

unique attributes. These enable the deployment of maritime forces in areas of interest

without any constraints.

Access: Since two-thirds of the world’s mass is water, naval forces would have

high degree of access to their areas of interest across the globe.

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Mobility: Naval forces can move hundreds of miles every day over the entire

sea-mass. A naval task force is capable of moving 300 – 600 nautical miles per

day. In our context, the task force operating off the 8- Degree Channel could be

Off the Gulf of Aden within the next 36 hours and could arrive at the entrance

of the Persian Gulf the following day. This mobility enables maritime forces to

move quickly across large distances and use the access potential of the seas to

deploy to the particular area of interest

Sustenance: Maritime forces have integral logistic support including fuel, oil,

lubricants (FOL), provisions, water, machinery & electronics stores,

ammunition & armament, and repair & medical facilities. These can be

augmented through composite task forces with specialist logistic ships which

permit replenishment at sea. The time taken for ships to be replenished in own

or friendly ports overseas is all minimal – usually one to two days for a full

operational turn round (OTR). This permits naval forces to sail at short notice,

deploy to the area of interest using access and mobility and remain there for

extended periods.

Reach: The attributes of access, mobility and sustenance together accord naval

forces the ability to apply national maritime power at long distances from home

base and for extended periods. This sustained reach of naval forces enables a

wide spectrum of usage of maritime power in areas of national interest

overseas, which would be otherwise beyond the sphere of the nation’s

influence using other components of national and military power.

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Flexibility: The above attributes of reach, access, mobility and sustenance

enable a high degree of flexibility in the application of maritime power by

naval forces. Warships can calibrate their response in terms of visibility,

intensity and longevity as required. They can be rapidly positioned in an area

of interest, remaining over the horizon or be clearly visible to signal latent or

direct national interest, as required. Ranging from friendly port visits,

combined exercises and maritime assistance and support to coercive power and

direct application of combat power, these signal national intent in a given

scenario.

Versatility: The various attributes also enable the naval forces to be highly

versatile and adapt to a wide range of roles that may be required of them in

their capacity as sovereign instruments. These include benign, diplomatic,

constabulary and military roles. Further, warships can easily change their

military posture, undertake several tasks and roles, concurrently and be rapidly

redeployed for others.

Ability to Influence Events Ashore: Naval forces can influence events on

land – both directly and indirectly. Although it flows from ‘versatility’ of naval

forces, this important attribute merits treatment in greater details. Mostly naval

forces influence events ashore indirectly by shaping the maritime environment,

which affects the well-being and growth of the state and its population. On

occasion, however, naval forces can also apply maritime power directly on

land, either by means of transporting land forces to the land area of interest, or

by delivering ship-borne ordnance on to land using integral weapons, systems

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and ship-borne aerial platforms. This attribute is based on the earlier attribute

of reach and has two components of Sea-Lift and Shore-Strike.

Composite Force Package: Naval task forces constitute a composite force

package bearing platforms, weapons and sensors that find applicability across

all dimensions of military operations – sea, undersea, air, land, space and

electromagnetic spectrum. Further, these components are integrated through

command and control systems which also span all dimensions. Their ability

includes various elements of combat power and support that may be required

for undertaking a range of roles, which may change or be added even during

the period of their deployment at sea. This contributes to naval forces’ attribute

of versatility as mentioned above.

Resilience: Warships have high resilience. They are designed to absorb

substantial damage and still be able to carry out their role. While a loss of

fighting capability by damage can degrade operational performance, ships are

designed and her crew trained to restore fighting efficiency as quickly as

possible.

Maintenance, Refit and Life Cycles: Naval ships and submarines are packed

with technologically advanced weapons and sensors, sophisticated engineering

and electrical equipment, which require regular maintenance. Ships and

submarines are periodically dry-docked for underwater cleaning of hull,

painting and repairs. Refits and maintenance require that the significant portion

of the naval forces, which would vary from a quarter to one-third, are laid up at

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any time and are not available for operation. Ships have long lifecycles ranging

from 20 – 50 years depending on their size and class. Hence, there is need for

modernisation and upgrades which also take time and financial commitment.

The periods of non-availability for maintenance, refits and upgrades have to be

catered for when planning force levels to cater for future contingencies.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

Medium for Power Projection: The Maritime realm is the legally used medium for

power projection. The ability of a nation to ensure free and full use of the seas, for

trade, transportation and to meet resource needs is critical to her increased economic

growth. The environment accordingly offers power and dominance to those who are

strong at sea. Therefore, it is not surprising that the seas have remained a medium of

intense competition between nation-states. This competition ranges from wielding

political influence, fishing and mineral rights, off shore economic activities like quest

for oil and gas etc. to denying potential adversaries use of seas by various ‘hard’ and

‘soft’ measures. While hard measures primarily include the use of military power and

some times stringent economic power; soft measures include extension of diplomacy,

friendship, financial assistance, and assistance in civil constructions pertaining to

development of ports and airstrips. Hence, a nation needs to develop adequate

maritime power to effectively safeguard and progress its national interests.

Anarchic Nature: The natural tendency of nation-states is to establish control over

their environment and inhabitants, be it political, economic or physical. The most

striking feature of the modern world is that with an exception of landmasses like

Antarctica, the rest of it is politically organised as sovereign states. However, the

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natural condition of the sea is different from that of land mass and leans towards lack

of political control. By nature, the Sea is not to be controlled the way land is

controlled. Even if maritime nations may seek to establish their influence or

dominance over the seas as per their interests, such control is not permanent.

Moreover, the high seas offer such freedom that vessels of any state can move over

them. Hence, they are justly described as the ‘great common’.

Legal Dimension: The growing importance of the maritime realm is reflected in

inter-state friction over its use. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, sought to reduce tensions by conceding expanded jurisdiction

to states over their adjoining maritime zones like territorial waters, contiguous zone,

Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and Legal Continental Shelf (LCS), including for

exploitation of living and non-living natural resources. The significance of UNCLOS

is that it attempts striking balance between attendant restrictions and the traditional

principle of Mare Liberum (freedom of the sea). International law provides vessels of

all nationalities (including warships) free access to entire ocean realm, comprising

International Waters, which includes the Contiguous Zone, EEZ and LCS of all

coastal states i.e. a naval task force, can legally approach a foreign country up to 12

nautical miles from its coast, as a neighbour and influencing strategic frontiers of

both nations. Further, the Law provides the right of ‘innocent passage’ through

foreign territorial waters and the right of ‘transit passage’ through international straits

and/or archipelagic sea, even if these waters constitute the territorial seas of the

adjoining state or states. While some restrictions are posed on the ship undertaking

‘innocent passage’, its rights of unimpeded ‘transit passage’ remain unfettered. For

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example, whereas a submarine must surface for an ‘innocent passage’, it may

undertake the transit passage in divided mode.12

Hydrography and Climatology: The sea is known to have a direct influence on

climatic conditions, global warming etc. Man has sought to unveil the secrets of this

medium through oceanographic, meteorological and hydrographical studies. This

expertise is essential for exploiting the maritime environment fully and properly,

while learning to minimise its adverse effects especially regarding safety of life at

sea. The devastating and debilitating effects of the Asian Tsunami in December 2004

could have been considerably reduced if prior knowledge of its likelihood or

occurrence had been available.

Characteristics of Military Maritime Environment

Multi-Dimensional: The oceans are essentially a three –dimensional battle space in

which naval forces must operate, i.e. on, below and above the sea surface. They must

also be able to use outer space and the electronic medium. Naval power thus finds its

expression through surface ships, submarines and aircraft. Weapons can be delivered

from maritime platforms through any of the three primary mediums, with

considerable use of space assets and the electronic spectrum. These weapons may

even have to travel through the interface of two mediums as in the case of submarine

launched missiles, air launched torpedoes and depth charges. Depth charges were

the earliest weapons designed for use by ships against submerged submarines. This

multi-dimensional nature affects every facet of maritime warfare, that is,

surveillance, classification, localisation, targeting and weapon delivery, wherein the

threat can come from any direction and dimension.

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Challenge of Surveillance: Unlike on land, there are no defined battle lines. A threat

can emerge from any direction or dimension. The challenges to effective surveillance

are as follows:

Surface and Air Surveillance: There is increasing traffic on and over the seas,

with thousands of ships traversing the Indian Ocean every year. The vast

spaces and volumes of traffic challenge the ability to monitor the sea and air

spaces, and maintain a recognisable maritime and air picture over the oceans.

This is compounded by the legal status of the oceans which allows access to

most water parts and permits free movement across the vast ‘great common’.

All this makes the identification of the vessels difficult adding to the problems

of use of force even in self-defence.

Under water Surveillance: The sea is very nearly opaque to a majority of

sensors. In addition the temperature, pressure profile and salinity conditions of

the sea seriously impinge on the performance of underwater surveillance

equipment. Submarines, for example, routinely use these conditions to their

advantage which are more pronounced in warm, saline waters.

Geographic Influence: The geographic conformation, including the sub-surface

component, plays a vital part in shaping the maritime environment. The confluence

of International Shipping Lanes (ISL) close to a country’s shores, especially through

important straits, gulfs, bays and other choke points, attribute to it a strategic

significance which has to be taken into account by its potential adversaries.

Similarly, the seas offer free access to vulnerable areas of the adversary which are

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not accessible by land. Unlike the threat on land or in the airspace over it, the threat

at sea is not confined to international boundaries. In a naval warfare the enemy at sea

need not be a neighbouring country and navies are meant to fight wherever the

nation’s interests are threatened.

Presence of Neutrals: In a land battle there are generally no neutrals crowding the

battle space. But on the sea, this is not the case wherein the ‘great common’ is

regularly used by all nations. The presence of neutrals in the battle space at sea is

likely, which may tend to confuse the maritime picture and cause misidentification.

This can lead to two disadvantages, firstly, of not engaging a belligerent due to

hesitation that it may be neutral and suffering loss to own forces, and secondly, of

attacking a deemed hostile who may later turn out to be neutral. The advanced

technology and initiatives such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long

Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) can simplify the identification of neutrals

to some extent.

Mobility and Fluidity at Sea: In contrast to the land, the sea is a medium for

movement. It cannot be occupied and fortified. Navies cannot dig in at sea, or seize

and hold ocean areas that have great intrinsic value. Though the objectives of naval

operations involve control or influence over sea areas to varying degrees, they do not

involve occupation of sea areas on a permanent basis. Hence there are no positional

defences at sea, nor are there battle lines to indicate the progress of an operation. The

only measure of combat effectiveness at sea is the successful use of ocean areas or

the denial of the same to an adversary, all aimed at furthering national interest, in war

and peace.

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ISL versus SLOC: Sea trade is carried by merchant ships along the most suitable

sea routes, which are usually the shortest navigable routes that provide the best

environmental conditions and proximity to staging ports enroute. These

internationally used sea trade routes are called International Shipping Lanes (ISL).

However in times of tension and conflict, a nation may prefer other sea routes for its

merchant traffic or to sustain a maritime or expeditionary operation which it can

protect from interdiction by the adversary. Such routes which may coincide in part,

full, or not at all, with ISLs, are termed as the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)

of that nation.

Medium for Influencing Battle Ashore: The maritime environment offers a

medium to military forces to influence land battles. This may be achieved directly by

projecting military power from the Sea, or indirectly by projecting such power at sea.

The former method is by delivery of ordnance or troops ashore, which includes land

attack by sea-based guns, missiles and aircraft, and also by transporting land forces

across the seas onto the land, i.e. by amphibious operations. The latter method is by

interdicting the adversary’s shipping to deny him the essential commodities required

for waging the war.

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INDIA’S MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

“The vital feature which differentiates the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic or the

Pacific is the subcontinent of India, which juts out far into the sea for a thousand

miles. It is the geographical position of India that changes the character of the

Indian Ocean.”

-KM Panikkar

Indian Ocean

The Indian Maritime Environment is shaped principally by the geographical

contours of the Indian Ocean and by the historical forces that have impacted upon

Indian maritime ventures. The Indian Ocean, with an area of 68.56million sq.km, is

the third largest body of water in the world and covers about 20% of the earth’s

surface. It is separated from the Atlantic Ocean by the meridian of 20 degrees East

and from the Pacific by the meridian of 147 degrees East.13

The northernmost extent

of the Indian Ocean is the Persian Gulf, at the approximate latitude of 30 degrees

North. Extending down to the parallel of latitude 60 degrees South at its

southernmost reaches it may be seen as being walled off on three sides by land.

Africa forms the western wall, while Malaysia, Myanmar, and the insular

continuations of Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Australia form the eastern side.

The southern part of Asia forms a roof over its northern extent, and distinguishes it

from the Pacific and the Atlantic, which lie from north to south like great highways

without any roof. The Indian Ocean is nearly 13,500 km from the Persian Gulf to

Antarctica. The great landmass of India, jutting out for around a thousand miles,

characterises the Indian Ocean and gives it its name.

The Indian Ocean accounts for the transportation of the highest tonnage of

goods in the world. The Maritime Zones of India (MZI) include the territorial waters,

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contiguous zone and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The country’s EEZ is

2,013,410 sq. km. in area (equal to 66% of the land mass). The MZI are repository of

substantial wealth in terms of oil, gas, minerals as well as other living and non-living

resources.

Choke Points in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

Bounded by landmasses on three sides, the Indian Ocean has some unique

features. These include the absence of seas beyond 25 degrees N, while land areas

south of 10 degrees exist only in Africa, Australia and Antarctica. Operations by

small vessels during monsoons become hazardous due to high sea states. The density

of traffic at choke points makes surveillance irrelevant unless backed by suitable

means of identification. Access to the Indian Ocean can be controlled by several

choke points, through which much of the world’s commerce flows.

Nine important passages provide access into the Indian Ocean, of which five

are key energy Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Choking any one of them

would cause disruption of seaborne trade, and uncontrolled volatility in oil and

commodity prices. This may lead to upheavals in the global economy as nearly

1, 00,000 ships traverse Indian Ocean annually.14

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The major choke points are:

The Strait of Hormuz. Hormuz is undoubtedly the world’s most strategic

choke point with

around 17 billion

barrels transiting

through this strait

every day.15

Connecting the

Arabian Sea to the

Gulf of Oman and the

Persian Gulf, it has

channels 2 nautical miles (nm) wide for both inward and outbound traffic with

a 2 nm wide buffer zone in between. Closure of this strait would require the use

of alternative pipeline routes at increased transportation costs. However, much

of the vulnerability for consumers has been reduced by giant pipelines to

Yanbu, which provide off-take in the Red Sea.

The Suez Canal and the Red Sea. The Suez Canal is the gateway between

Europe and Asia. It is 105.4 nm long and, being entirely at sea level, does not

require any locks for its operation. Closure of the Suez Canal would cause

traffic to be diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, thereby increasing the

transit time and transportation costs.

The Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and Horn of Africa. The Bab-el-Mandeb

connects the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Closure of the Bab-el-Mandeb

would keep tankers loaded in the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or

the Sumed Pipeline, forcing them to round the southern tip of Africa instead.

Map 4.2: Major Choke Points

(Source: www.opinion-maker.org

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The Malacca Strait. The Malacca Strait is the primary route, through which

more than 50,000 vessels transit annually.16

It links the Indian Ocean with the

Pacific Ocean. Being on the shortest sea route connecting the Persian Gulf with

East Asia and USA, it is a critical choke point in the IOR. Closure of the strait

would entail re-routing of nearly half the world’s fleet, generating a

requirement for additional vessel capacity and resulting in immediate increase

in worldwide freight costs.

The Lombok Strait. At a minimum channel width of 11.5 nm, the Lombok

Strait has sufficient width and depth and is far less congested than the Malacca

Strait. Ships too large for the Strait of Malacca use this passage.

The Sunda Strait. An alternate route to the Malacca and Lombok Straits is the

Sunda Strait, which is 50 nm long and 15 nm wide at its northern entrance.

Large ships avoid passage through this strait due to depth restrictions and

strong currents.

The Six Degree Channel. The primary passage through the Andaman and

Nicobar Islands to the Strait of Malacca is through the Six Degree Channel or

Great Channel. Stretching from Indira Point on the Great Nicobar to the

northern tip of Aceh on the Indonesian island of Sumatra, it is an easy and wide

passage without any depth limitations.

The Nine Degree Channel. The Nine Degree Channel is the most direct route

through India’s Lakshadweep Islands for ships sailing from the Persian Gulf

bound for East Asia.

The Cape of Good Hope. The Cape of Good Hope is not a conventional choke

point since adequate depth of water lies to its south and the passage of ships is

not restricted by land. However, economic sense and unfavourable currents

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demand that ships pass close to land, which makes them susceptible to attack

and grounding.

Geopolitics

The sea power of a nation is a result of a number of principal conditions. The

famous historian and geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan enunciated these as:

Geographical position, Size of Population, Physical Conformation and Character of

the Government. Today we string them under one umbrella term: geopolitics. These

factors are worthy of close attention while painting the backdrop of a maritime

strategy in the IOR.

Diversities of IOR

Some facts about the IOR, which contribute to its unique position in the global

geopolitics are summarised here:

The IOR houses one-third of the world’s population, whereas it has only 25%

of the world’s landmass.

It holds 65% of the known reserves of strategic raw materials, 31% of the gas

and accounts for more than half of the world’s oil exports. Abundance of

natural wealth includes large deposits of uranium, tin, gold and diamonds. The

countries of this region are the largest producers of rubber, tea, spices and jute.

Other important minerals produced in the IOR include manganese, cobalt,

tungsten, coal, iron ore, etc.

It is the only region where extreme diversities of economies exist, where some

of the richest countries and some of the fastest growing economies coexist with

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some of the poorest countries in the world. The IOR has 56 littoral and

hinterland countries, most of which are developing countries.

The IOR is the de facto home of global terrorism, with many regional states

covertly or even inadvertently aiding and abetting subversive elements.

Maritime terrorism is another menace which is affecting the environment of

the IOR. The seaborne ingress of terrorists from Pakistan into Mumbai for

perpetrating the ‘26/11’ strikes in November 2008, indicates their growing

expertise and focused training being provided from sponsors of international

terrorism.

The region has been the arena for a large number of internal and external

conflicts in the post- Cold War period. Sovereignty and national pride have

resulted in enhancement of maritime capability.

Some of the worst-hit areas, as far as piracy, gun-running, human and drug

trafficking are concerned, lie in the IOR, particularly the Horn of Africa and

Southeast Asia. Piracy is the biggest scourge of modern day shipping, which

exploits the convergence of merchant traffic at choke points. In 2008, piracy in

the Gulf of Aden witnessed a steep rise

The IOR is the locus of 70% of the world’s natural disasters. In the 21st

Century, it has already witnessed natural disasters of immense magnitude, like

the Asian Tsunami in 2004, Pakistan earthquake in 2005, Indonesia

(Yogyakarta) earthquake in 2006 and the periodic droughts in Africa since the

1970s.

Extra-Regional presence has considerably increased in the IOR. Developed

and developing nations both depend heavily on an uninterrupted supply of oil

from the Gulf to sustain their economies, with the oil-flow through the Gulf of

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Hormuz itself being more than 40% of the global trade.17

The maritime arc

from the Gulf through the Strait of Malacca to the Sea of Japan has been

termed as the new ’Silk Route’.18

Apart from this, incidence of crime has

increased. The region has, consequently, seen high presence of extra-regional

forces to safeguard their strategic interests.

India’s Maritime Interests

India’s Maritime Interests can be specified as below.

Stability, Security and Safety at Sea: The diversities and dynamics of the IOR

Maritime environment emphasise the need for maintaining stability, security and

safety at sea. This would enable use of the seas to progress economic development

and provide the appropriate maritime environment for unfettered pursuit of national

interests. The absence of requisite level of safety and security adversely affects the

maritime environment and all activities therein, including maritime trade, shipping,

fishing, natural and energy resource extraction, security of sea-borne offshore,

coastal assets etc. The maritime statistics of India are given in Table 4.3

Coastal Security. A substantial amount of India’s industrial and economic activity is

located within 200km of its 7,516 km long coastline, including nuclear power

stations. The country’s 1,197 islands also have substantial economic potential. India

has 13 major ports, the latest addition being Port Blair in June 2010, and 187 minor

and intermediate ports with a large number of them under development.19

The

present port handling capacity of the major ports of more than 500 MMT (million

metric tons) is growing rapidly.20

The ‘26/11’ seaborne terrorist strikes at Mumbai

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re-emphasised the vulnerability of our coastal assets and the need to upgrade coastal

and maritime security.

Table 4.3: Maritime Statistics of India

(Source: Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009)

Total length of the Coastline

Mainland

Lakshadweep Islands

Andaman & Nicobar Islands

7,516.6 kms

5,422.6 kms

132.0 kms

1,962.0 kms

Island Territories

Andaman & Nicobar Islands

Lakshadweep Islands

Off India’s West Coast

Off India’s East Coast

1,197 Kms

572.0 kms

27.0 kms

447.0 kms

157.0 kms

Maritime Jurisdiction

Territorial waters

EEZ

Continental Shelf

Deep Sea Mining Area

UNCLOS ratification 29.06.1995

45,450 sq.nautical miles/1,55,889 sq.km

5,87,600 Sq. nautical miles/20,13,410 sq.km

Approx 5,30,000 sq.km (being demarcated)

150000 sq.km, Pioneer Investor, August 1987

Position 180 Cape Comorin 1080 nautical miles

Stations at Antarctica Dakshin Gangotri(700 05’ S; 12

0 00’ E)

(Set up in 1984 – dismantled in 1990)

Maitri (700 46’ S; 11

0 50’ E)

(Set up in 1989)

Bharti (Larsmann Hill)

(Set up in 2012)

Seaborne Trade. More than 90% of India’s trade by volume and 77% by value is

transported over the seas, and for a growing economy seeking new markets

worldwide, these figures are only likely to touch newer heights.

Indian Shipping. Indian merchant ships are valuable maritime assets for

transporting trade, especially in times of armed conflicts where they would be

essential for transportation of strategic commodities under Naval Cooperation and

Guidance to Shipping (NCAGS). In 1998, India’s merchant fleet comprised 480

ships with 6.98 million tons GRT (gross register tonnage). By 2008 this had

increased to 839 ships with 9.07 million tons GRT.

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Sea Resources. About 10-15% of the population of India living in coastal areas are

engaged in fishing as the sole means of livelihood.21

The security aspect of fishing

entails safeguarding our EEZ against poaching, SAR cover and protection against

use of fishing as a cover for inimical activities against the state, as seen in the ‘26/11’

terrorist strikes in Mumbai in 2008.

Seabed Resources. Presently India is depending mostly on imports for resources like

nickel, cobalt and copper. With the International Seabed Authority (ISA) according

pioneer investor status to India, and using advanced technology in deep sea mining,

in future India may be able to harness its own seabed resources.

Energy Security. India is the sixth highest energy consumer in the world, and needs

assured supply of adequate energy to sustain its growth. While this includes oil, gas

and coal etc. the requirement of hydrocarbon sources of energy is on higher side.

Purchase of overseas hydrocarbon fields is part of energy security.

Security of Energy implies safety of the various energy assets, including supply

sources, production infrastructure and means of transportation that belong to the

country. The Persian Gulf and Africa are the major sources of India’s oil and gas

imports which are carried by the sea. And also considering that India is keen on

investing hydrocarbon assets worldwide which need to be transported by sea lanes,

security of energy will remain the prime national concern.

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Antarctica. Antarctica is of maritime interest to India primarily because it enables

monitoring of meteorological data

towards prediction of the Indian

monsoon. India has set up two

stations in the frozen continent so

far, namely – Dakshin Gangotri

and Maitri. The former was

dismantled in 1990. A third

station, Bharti/Bharati, has been

built subsequently and was opened on 18 March 2012.22

NAVY OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA

The navy of independent India has originated from the Royal Indian Navy

(RIN) of the undivided British India. After independence from the British colonial

rule and subsequent partition of the sub-continent into Union of India and Islamic

Republic of Pakistan in 1947, the Royal Navy was split between them. The vessels

were also divided between the two nations and senior British officers continued to

serve with both navies for some period.

After India became a republic on 26th

January of 1950, the prefix ‘Royal’ was

dropped and the Navy became Indian Navy. All the Indian vessels were renamed

with the prefix of INS which denotes Indian Naval Service.

Picture 4.1: Station Bharti

(Source: stampsofindia.com)

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Vice Admiral Ramdass Katari Chief of the Naval Staff

(CNS) took over the command of the Indian Navy on 22

April, 1958. The first Indian to become an Admiral, he

has the proud distinction of holding many firsts in

academic and professional careers. He remained the CNS

till 04 June 1962. 23

Though it is difficult to acknowledge, the fact is that

it took almost six decades for Indian Navy to design a

full-fledged ‘doctrine’ of its own. Initial crises concerning territorial integrity,

intrusions at the borders, problem of the princely states etc. are some of the reasons

due to which the land forces were called upon to play active role. Naturally, the focus

of the defence forces of the country was more towards the land than towards the

oceans. The first engagement in action of the Indian Navy was against the

Portuguese Navy during the liberation of Goa in 1961. The 1962 Sino-Indian war

was largely fought over the Himalayas and the Navy had only a defensive role in the

war. Indian Naval activity in the Indo - Pakistan war of 1965 largely involved coastal

patrols. Following these wars, for a decade to come, India resolved to strengthen the

profile and capabilities of its Armed Forces. The dramatic change in the Indian

Navy’s capabilities and stance was emphatically demonstrated during the Indo -

Pakistan war of 1971, into which India was dragged and which was fought by the

then “East Pakistan” to be liberated into Bangladesh. Since then the Indian Navy has

played many decisive roles in times of war, crises, disasters, peace and stability

serving the purposes of not only India but her friends as well.

Picture 4.2:Ramdass Katari

(Source: www.irfc-

nausena.nic.in)

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Roles of Indian Navy

The naval forces of a country perform a wide range of activities, from high

intensity war fighting at one end, to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

operations at the other end. As such, the broad spectrum of operations envisaged for

Indian Navy can be categorised into four main roles. They are; Military,

Diplomatic, Constabulary and Benign. A brief explanation of these roles is as

follows:

Military: the essence of any navy is its military character. The navy’s military role is

characterised by the threat or use of force at and from sea. This includes application

of maritime power in both offensive operations against enemy forces territory and

trade; and defensive operations to protect own forces, territory and trade.

The Diplomatic Role: naval diplomacy entails the use of naval forces in support of

foreign policy objectives to build ‘bridges of friendship’ and strengthen international

cooperation on the one hand, and to signal capability and intent to deter potential

adversaries on the other. The larger purpose of the navy’s diplomatic role is to

favourably shape the maritime environment in the furtherance of national interests, in

consonance with the foreign policy and national security objectives.

Constabulary Role: the increasing incidence of maritime crime has brought into

sharp focus the constabulary role that navies have to perform. As the protection and

promotion of India’s maritime security is one of the prime responsibilities of the

Indian Navy, it includes a constabulary element, especially when the threats involve

use of force at sea. The tasks that Indian navy has to undertake in the constabulary

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role range from Low Intensity Maritime Operations (LIMOs) to maintaining good

order at sea. This further includes coastal security as part of India’s overall maritime

security. However, law enforcement aspects of constabulary role within the MZI

have been transferred to the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) 28, since its inception in

1978. Indian Navy is vested with those tasks which fall beyond the MZI. After the

26/11 terrorist attacks on Mumbai in 2008, the overall responsibility for coastal

security has been mandated to the Indian Navy in close coordination with the ICG,

State marine police and other central/state government and port authorities.24

Benign Role: the term ‘benign’ itself implies that violence has no part to play in the

execution of this role, nor is the potential to apply force a necessary prerequisite for

undertaking these operations. Tasks like humanitarian aid, disaster relief, Search and

Rescue (SAR), ordnance disposal, diving assistance, salvage operations,

hydrographic surveys etc. are best examples of benign role of the Indian Navy. The

inherent characteristics of naval task forces such as the mobility, reach and

endurance, in addition to their sealift capability - together enhance the capacity to

perform the functions mentioned above. Military mobility can come of use in no

better circumstances than the aftermath of a natural disaster wherein the

disbursement of food and relief material would prove biggest challenge. The ICG is

the designated national agency for SAR.

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SOME IMPORTANT LANDMARKS IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN

MARITIME DOCTRINE

The making and shaping of the Indian Maritime Doctrine was not done

momentarily. As and when the situations demanded the Indian, defence forces had

been performing their multifarious functions under the able guidance of the heads of

the forces. To understand the underlying principles and the spirit of our present

maritime doctrine, it would be appropriate to examine some important documents

issued earlier. They are as follows:

Strategic Defence Review: The Maritime Dimension-A Naval Vision 1998

The Ministry of Defence issued a document in 1998, following an internal

study conducted by the Indian Navy. The document which was dated 20 May 1998,

with the title “Strategic Defence Review: The Maritime Dimension - A Naval

Vision” stated; “The Indian Navy must have sufficient maritime power not only to be

able to defend and further India’s maritime interests, but also to deter a military

maritime challenge posed by any littoral nation, or combination of littoral nations of

the IOR, and also to be able to significantly raise the threshold of intervention or

coercion by extra-regional powers”.25

This clearly reflects not only the growing

concern of India towards her defence capabilities, but also her realisation of the

requirement of a competent maritime force structure. Late nineties was the period

when leading navies like the US and China began diverting their attention towards

Indian Ocean, causing concern and worry among Indian circles. However, the

nuclear concept of India has always been based on the policy of ‘no-first use ‘and

‘no-use against non-nuclear weapon states’.

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Indian Maritime Doctrine INBR 8:2004

The Indian Navy unveiled its first ever naval doctrine on 26 April 2004 at

Visakhapatnam. The Doctrine was released in April, but made public on 23 June. It

was an exposition of power projection beyond the Indian shores as an instrument of

state policy in times of peace and conflict. ‘The objective was to help India pursue

an independent foreign policy and exude the

confidence of a nation aware of its role in the global

hierarchy.26

The Indian Navy revised its earlier

defensive doctrine centred on coastal protection to

an aggressively competitive strategy. The Indian

Maritime Doctrine (IMD) 2004 clearly urged the

Navy to recognise its responsibilities towards

developing a credible minimum nuclear deterrence

(MND). Thus the navy had a strong case to acquire a “non-provocative strategic

capability” through the submarine. According to this doctrine the navy is

endeavouring to project power through “reach, multiplied by sustainability” across

its “legitimate areas of interest” stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca

strait. The significance of the IMD 2004 is that the Navy has stressed for the first

time the need for a submarine-based credible MND capability that is ‘inexorably

linked’ to India pursuing an independent foreign policy posture. A mention of MND

was actually made in 1998 when she had conducted the Pokhran II tests. India

declared then that its MND would be based on a triad of weapons delivered by

aircraft; mobile, land-based missiles; and sea-based platforms. 27

Picture 4.3: Inauguration of First

Naval Doctrine at Visakhapatnam

(Source:www.frontline.in)

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The Maritime Dimension: A Naval Vision 2006

By now, the Indian Navy has reached a stage where it is highly regarded for its

professional competence. Induction of advanced platforms and technology, and

creation of modern infrastructure set to boost the capabilities of the navy even further

in the future. The Vision Document emphasised various factors which influence the

operating environment of our navy. They include geopolitics, emerging technologies,

and continuously evolving capabilities in our maritime neighbourhood. Due to these

factors, ‘crystal gazing’ (which means prediction) remains a hazardous task, making

it difficult to predict with any degree of certainty, the challenges that would arise in

future. In order to ensure that the Indian Navy continues to retain its relevance as a

prime instrument of state policy while facing an unpredictable future, it was

imperative to develop a flexible approach. At the same time, upgradation of our war

fighting capabilities and skills was also essential. Above all this, there was the need

to cultivate a propensity to embrace change when necessary. Considering these

requirements, Vision document 2006 had articulated the vision for the future of the

Indian Navy which is conveyed through the following statement:

Vision Statement

To support the nation’s growing strengths and responsibilities, it was

determined to create a three dimensional, technology enabled force organised

into a network. This force would be capable of safeguarding our maritime

interests on the high seas and projecting combat power across the littoral.

Relevant conceptual frameworks and war fighting capabilities to operate across

the full spectrum of conflict are to be evolved. The Indian Navy would also be

prepared to undertake benign and humanitarian tasks in its neighbourhood,

whenever required.

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Indian Navy’s operational endeavours shall be underpinned by continuous

upgradation of human skills of the uniformed and civilian manpower.

Enhancement of the quality of life and the well-being of the naval community

form the main aims of the navy.

Primary focus would be on ensuring combat readiness, professional

competence and willingness to transform by adopting change.

Keeping this vision statement in view, it is necessary that the Indian Navy is

guided by certain principles to be successful in its endeavours. These principles

can be explained as follows:

Broad Guiding Principles

Safeguarding National Interests: we (the Indian Navy) shall attempt to

promote an environment of peace and tranquillity in the IOR to further India’s

political, economic, diplomatic and military objectives. We will deter war

through strength but if deterrence fails, we must strive to achieve victory over

the adversary by our reach and firepower.

Full Spectrum Capability: the navy expects to operate across the full

spectrum from (a) low intensity maritime operations to (b) conventional war

fighting and (c) to nuclear deterrence. Our force planning process will therefore

take into account the ‘effects’ that are required to be delivered in all three

dimensions to accomplish Navy’s roles and missions.

Conceptual Frameworks: the quality and depth of intellectual endeavours has

a substantial impact on combat effectiveness. We will strive to foster strategic

organisation and processes. As indigenous production of hardware has been

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taken up, the same resolve must be shown in devoting sufficient intellectual

assets in a sustained manner to ensure that evolution of our concepts and

doctrines keeps pace with weapon and sensor inductions.

Management of Change: the most significant characteristic of future is that it

will only bring change. But resistance to change makes it very difficult to bring

it about and there is always a risk of modern hardware being neutralised by

obsolescence in our thinking. Therefore, the navy’s transformation is accepted

as it is demanded by the rapidly changing environment.

Maritime Cooperation: maintenance of a high degree of combat readiness,

and to be trained to operate across the full spectrum of conflict are very

essential. By performing the Benign role in times of peace, extending maritime

cooperation and humanitarian aid in times of disasters, the Navy must act as an

instrument of state policy.

Development of Human Resources: the Navy’s experience of past 60 years

tells us that it is the professional skills, ingenuity and initiative of personnel

that fulfills this maritime vision. Therefore, the selection, training and

indoctrination of both the ‘service’ and ‘civilian’ personnel must be in pace

with technology upgrades. Creating awareness among the people about the

uniqueness of navy, and enhancing the attractiveness of naval career, would

also be taken up.

Material and Logistics: constantly reinvigorating the technical practices,

maintenance philosophies and technology induction programmes would be the

navy’s endeavour. This will encompass modernising and maintaining the

platforms, and gearing up the logistics management system.

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Well-Being of the Naval Community: the attainment of this vision is possible

only by adopting a holistic approach to human resource management. While

aiming at effective harnessing of the potential of the personnel, it is also

necessary to maintain their motivation levels and morale. This requires the

naval leadership to devote adequate time, attention and resources for the well-

being of the Naval Community, and for ensuring a good quality of life.

Maritime environment began changing at a faster pace by the turn of the new

millennium. Regarding the Indian Ocean Region, two aspects began worrying India.

Firstly, the increasing presence of Chinese navy and secondly, growing rate of crime

such as piracy, gunrunning and maritime terrorism. Indian leaders by now felt the

need of our navy moving on to the high seas for conducting various exercises, and

revisiting our maritime doctrine accordingly. Thus a newer Naval Document was

brought out in May 2007 with the title, “Freedom to use the Seas: India’s

Maritime Military Strategy”, 2007.

As the name suggests, this document projects

India’s interest in improvising her maritime

military strategy which could be used for two

main purposes. Due to its training, strategic

positioning and robust presence, Indian Navy

apart from acting on its own, could lend

cooperation to other maritime nations in

maintaining peace and stability in the IOR. Also,

it could act as a strong deterrent to prevent

conflict, or to respond, should it become inevitable.

Picture 4.4: Cover page of Naval

Document, 2007

(Source:www.scribd.com)

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As a part an expanded role the Indian Navy began lending humanitarian aid to

those maritime nations affected by natural disasters such as Tsunami in the Bay of

Bengal and Andaman Sea littoral in 2005, non-combatant evacuation of Indian

citizens from Lebanon in 2006, launch of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

(IONS) to address common concerns of IOR navies in 2008, steps to safeguard

mercantile trade from pirate attacks in the western Indian Ocean since 2008, etc.

In the backdrop of these multiple roles that Indian Navy was playing, and the

rapidly changing scenario of the domestic and international arena, the need to revise

our maritime doctrine was but necessary. Thus a new edition of Indian Maritime

Doctrine was brought out and released on 28 August 2009. This new edition of the

Maritime Doctrine covers the fundamental framework of the principles, practices and

procedures that govern the development and employment of our maritime military

power. It provides a common language and a uniform understanding of maritime

concepts, and the foundation for the Navy’s operating, planning, organisational and

training philosophies. A conscious effort is made in this doctrine to move forward

from the commonalities of maritime thought applicable to most seafaring nations, to

address specific maritime concepts and developments applicable to India and Indian

Navy. These points were discussed in a detailed manner in the previous pages of this

chapter.

The basic purpose of any element of a nation’s power is to strive for the

development of the country and protecting her people and territory from any possible

internal or external crises. If self defence is the unspoken responsibility of a force,

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possessing the ability to attack an aggressor if there is an armed conflict is its

ultimate pre-requisite. Whether it is increasing dependence on the seas for

international trade, a shift in the foreign policies, or just an attempt on the part of

countries like China and the US to assert their influence with their presence – reasons

being many, there is a major shift in the geo-politics of the Indian Ocean. Some

global powers even reiterate that just the name Indian Ocean does not give any

advantage to India. The presence and movement of extra-regional navies in the

waters of IOR and growing rate of maritime crimes like piracy, hijacking and

terrorism are posing serious challenges to the security of not only Indian coastal

areas but also to its territorial interiors. It is high time that we recognise the

impending dangers and empower ourselves with the capacity and capability to meet

those challenges. The adequacy of the philosophy and approach of India in

developing her naval capabilities can better be understood through a study of the

security implications arising from the strategies that China had been adopting.

****

END NOTES

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