CHAPTER IV

Conflict And Cooperation Over Indo-Bangladesh

Transboundary Water Resources

Bangladesh has an area of 55,590 square mile. It is geographically

bounded by the Indian states of West Bengal on the west and Assam on

the north and the east with Myanmar to the southeast and Bay of Bengal

to the south. Bangladesh is a humid low-lying alluvial region, which is

dominated by combined delta of numerous streams, distributaries and

tidal creeks, forming an intricate network of waterways.l

Bangladesh has 57 transboundary rivers of which 54 are shared with

India, in respect of all of which Bangladesh is the lower riparian. Out of

54 common rivers, the Ganga-Brahmaputra and Meghna are the three

major river systems, which India and Bangladesh share. India is the

upper riparian in all the three river systems of the region. Bangladesh,

being the lower riparian, offers an outlet for the combined volume of the

three-river system of the region in the rainy season.2 The hydrographs of

the main rivers are characterised by monsoonal features. The peak

discharges are reached in July or August, the lowest in March- April. The

range between high and low flow is significant. Bangladesh is

characterized by abundance of water during rainy season and scarcity of

during monsoon season. The average flood flow of the Brahmaputra

reaches 20 times and that of Ganges up to 30 times of the respective dry

season flows.

Hossain Khan and Shahidulah Miah, "The Brahmaputra River Basin Development" In Munir Zaman [ed.J River Basin Development, Proceedings of National Symposium on River Basin Development 4-10 December, 1981, Dacca, Bangladesh, Tycooly International Publishing Limited, Dublin 1983.p.89

2 Q.K.Ahmed, Nilufar Ahmed and K.B. Sajjadur Rasheed, Resources, Environment and Development in Bangladesh with Particular Reference to the Ganges Brahmaputra and Meghna Basin, Academic Publishers, Dhaka, 1994,p.ll5.

131

Importance of transboundary water for Bangladesh

Bangladesh is predominantly an agrarian economy where land and water

resource play critical role in socio-economic life of the nation. The present

population of Bangladesh is 120 million and it is witnessing rapid

growth, putting tremendous pressure on the land and water resource.

Bangladesh depends heavily on the surface water from the major rivers

namely, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and their numerous tributaries

and distributaries.J Among the river basins the Ganges is the most

important transboundary river. The Ganges basin is home to about one

third of Bangladesh population who inhabits the Gangetic plain, are

dependent on this river for agriculture, domestic and municipal uses of

water, fisheries, industries, forestry and navigation. The Ganges also

provide for the biodiversity in the environment and maintenance of the

delicate balance in the ecosystem of the southwestern region of the

country where the Sunderban, the largest mangroves forest of the world

is located. Historically, the water flow through the Gorai river, the only

the distributary of Ganges in the Bangladesh, serve to flush down the

intruding salinity upstream from the Bay of Bengal. The balance between

Man and Nature in the Ganges river basin essentially rests on the

Ganges water.4

The Ganges River Regime

The precipitation over the Ganges basin is mainly due to the southwest

monsoon. s The monsoon regime is characterized by the uncertain and

unevenly distribution of rainfall. This leads to the heavy seasonal

fluctuation in the flow of the Ganges .The floods during the monsoon and

scarcity during the dry season are the extremes flows. About 80 percent

3 G .R Chaudhary and Tauhidul Anwar Khan, "Developing the Ganges Basin", in Munir Zaman [ed.J River Basin Development, Tycoolly International Publishing Limited, Dublin, 1983,p.33

4 Nahid Islam "Indo Bangladesh Common Rivers-The Impact on Bangladesh" Contemporary South Asia, Vol. [2], 1992, p.204.

s Nandita Bhatnagar, "Development of Water Resources in South Asia", in Bhabani Sen Gupta [ed.J Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia, Vol. 2, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1986,p.232.

132

of the annual rainfall of the Ganges plain occurs during the monsoon

{June to September}. The flow of water is also the highest at this time of

the year reaching about 25 million cusecs at Farakka while during the

dry season the flow come down to 55-65 thousand cusecs. The uneven

distribution of rainfall put serious constraint on the availability, and its

planned development. Bangladesh faces serious scarcity of water during

the dry season.

Intensive use of the Ganges water in India and Bangladesh, coupled with

variable nature regime has led to conflicting interest of the riparian

countries. While for the most of the year the average discharges are

adequate, the lean months [especially April to mid May] pose difficulty in

meeting requirements of both India and Bangladesh. Hence any major

harnessing of the Ganges water during the dry season upsets its natural

equilibrium and brings about whole chain of important and interrelated

repercussions.6 It is perhaps this dramatic seasonal variation in the flow

that more than any other fact has provided the cause of the water

dispute between India and Bangladesh.7

The Ganges Water Dispute

The dispute on the Ganges has been influenced and accentuated by the

factors arising out of the geographical location, the historical background

and the political situation of the riparian countries, namely India and

Bangladesh.

The Ganges water dispute dates back to 1951, when Bangladesh formed

the Eastern Province of the Federation of Pakistan. India then planned to

construct a barrage at Farakka, 18 kilometers upstream from the East

Pakistan -Bangladesh border on the grounds of preservation and

6 Islam M. Rafiqul, The Ganges Water Dispute: Its International and Legal Aspects, University Press Limited Dhaka, 1987, p.2.

7 Munir Zaman, "The Ganges Basin Development: A Long Term Problem and Some Term Options", in Munir Zaman [ed.] River Basin Development, Proceedings of the National Symposium on River Basin Development 4-10 Dec., Dacca, Bangladesh, Tycooly International Publication, Dublin, 1983, p. 100.

maintenance of Calcutta port by improving the regime and navigability of

the Bhagirathi Hooghly river system .The Indian plan included a 38

kilometer canal to take off from the barrage in order to supplement the

lean season flow of the Bhagirathi Hooghly. 8

Thus the water dispute between India and Pakistan was essentially

related to the shortage of water in the Calcutta port, which had

necessitated for India to make alternative arrangements in order to

maintain the flow of waters. The Calcutta port had a key position in the

trade based economy of the Britishers. The port has inherited its

economic importance after independence. However, because of siltation

in the riverbed there was gradual shifting in the course, which had

resulted in the scarcity of waters in the Calcutta port thereby adversely

affecting navigational activities. There was an urgent need to make a

strong current of water flow so as to flush down the silt deposit in the

Calcutta port .It had been suggested in number of survey reports and

expert opinions that problem would be solved by constructing a barrage

across the river Ganges at Farakka.9 Some alternative suggestions were

made, like [a] to dig a canal between Calcutta and Diamond Harbour [b]

excavate a ship canal through the Sunderban linking the port with the

sea, however, they didn't find favour with the Indian authorities .The

Indian decision to go ahead with Farakka was based on prolonged and

careful studies, model tests and was certified by an international tidal

hydraulic expert of Germany Walter Hensonlo. However, Farakka barrage

has been perceived differently among the water resource experts of

Bangladesh. Mr. B. M. Abbas writes, "the real purpose of the barrage is

to control the river for supplying Ganges water to the Indian states of

Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.ll A more recent theory has been propounded

by Khursida begum, she views "Farakka has a very strategic position

s Ashok Swain, "Conflicts Over Water-A Case Study of the Ganges Water Dispute", Security Dialogue, Vol 24 [4], 1993, p.8.

9 B.C. Upreti, Politics of Himalayan River Waters, Nirala Publication, New Delhi, 1993,p127.

IO B.G. Verghese, Waters of Hope, Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, p. 355. 1 1 B.M. Abbas, The Ganges Water Dispute, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1982,p.14

134

with regard to Ganga- Brahmaputra link canal for which is part of India's

greater national plan for irrigational development". She writes "it is now

evident that the Farakka barrage was undertaken by India to serve a

broad perspective plan of India on irrigation development.l2

Though it was decided in 1951 to construct a barrage at Farakka, the

project was actually begun in 1961 and competed in 1975[the feeder

canal from the barrage to Bhagirathi river was completed in 1975]. The

barrage is 2240 .40 mts. in length. Main features of the Farrakka

barrage is as follows-

A. A barrage at Farakka on the Ganges with road cum Rail Bridge.

B.A head regulator on the right bank for the feeder canal.

C. A feeder canal taking off from the head regulator.

D A barrage at Jangipur across the Bhagirathi River.

E. Four navigation locks.

D. Road cum rail and Road Bridge across the feeder canall3.

The Ganges river dispute and negotiations.

The Ganges river dispute became pivotal in influencing the political

relation between India and East Pakistan and later Bangladesh in coming

decades. The entire period of negotiation over the Ganges water can be

divided in three phases.

1950-1975 Phase: Ganges dispute between India and Pakistan

The partition of India in 194 7 and creation of East Pakistan caused the

political division of the Ganges -Brahmaputra river basin. The political

boundaries created diverging interests between nation over control and

12 Khursida Begum, Tension Over the Farrakka Barrage-A Techno Political Tangle in South Asia, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1987 ,p. 75.

13 n. 11, p.15.

135

..

Map 7 The Ganges ~iver and its Basin Area in india and Bangladesh

r-')

l. ·-.

Key In.ternational Boundary (approx.) Rtver Barrage

c H N A

TSANGPO

. r-'

..r ./ \ r

r· s

(

_.,) (

·-"''V

1" = 160 miles

use over water resources of the Ganges. Both India and Pakistan and

later Bangladesh approached the dispute from the point of their own

national interests, which made solutions very difficult.

The idea of constructing a dam at Farakka had been first mooted among

official circle in India in 1950.In 1952,a committee of eminent Indian

hydrologist and experts under the chairmanship of Mr. Sriman Singh

studied the models and recommended the Ganges Barrage project.l4 The

Pakistan government drew the attention of the government of India to

press reports of India that New Delhi had decided to construct a dam at

Farakka in Murshidabad District. The contemplated Indian project would

divert large amount of Ganges water during the dry season, to augment

the flows of the Bhagirathi-Hoogly River that served the Calcutta port. 15

Pakistan apprehended that it might have adverse effects on East Pakistan

and requested India in letter dated Oct 29 1951, to consult it before

operating any such scheme. India replied on 8 March 1952, that the

project was under preliminary investigation and described Pakistan's

concern over its probable effects as purely hypothetica1.16

However again in May 1952, Pakistan quoted press reports that India

was engaging in multipurpose scheme envisaging the large divergence of

waters of Gandak, a tributary of the Ganges, for irrigation scheme in

Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Nepal. Pakistan argued that these withdrawals,

combined with the reported Barrage to be constructed across the Ganges

at Farakka would have ruinous effects on East Pakistan (now

Bangladesh). India replied later in May 1953, reassuring that the reports

where unfounded since the feasibility of the project proposals were still

under examination, India view was that East Pakistan had sufficient

water and there was no scarcity of water. On the other hand, India a.lso

proposed cooperation and collaboration between the two nations over

14 Ben Crow, Sharing the Ganges: The Politics and Technology of River Development, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1995,p.29.

Is Green Cross International, National Sovereignty and International Watercourse: Green Cross International Publication, The Hague, 2000, p. 78 .

16 n. 12, p.90.

136

development of water resources of the Ganges .It indicated towards the

proposed Ganges-Kodabak project, which was to irrigate 2 million acres

of land. Pakistan also suggested in 1954 a joint survey of the upper

reaches of Ganga and Brahmaputra. India's reply was that Pakistan

should consider a survey of the river on their side.17

Subsequently, series of correspondence was carried out during 1957-58

period between India and Pakistan. Pakistan made three important

proposals: (a) both the party should secure the advisory and technical

services of a U.N., body to assist for cooperative development of Eastern

rivers. (b) That the projects of the two countries be jointly examine by

experts of two countries before their implementation. (c) The Secretary

General of U.N., be requested for the appointment of an engineer to

participate the meetings at expert level, organized to discussed various

aspects of water resource development. 18 India did not agree to these

proposals, particularly the idea of arbitration by the third party. During

the period of 1960-1970, India and Pakistan had several meeting where

exchange of data and other technical issues were discussed. In January

1961, the government of India formally informed Pakistan about it

intension to go ahead with the plan to build a barrage across the river

Farrakka. There were four technical exchanges in 1 961, and fifth in

1968, and then five meetings were held at Secretariat level between 1968-

1970. But still there was no high level political meeting. 19 These meetings

where disjointed which indicated the lack of seriousness with which

either sides addressed the matter. The July 1970 agreement was

significant in one term-for the first time India recognized the Ganges as

an International river and therefore accepted the principal of sharing of

its water. In the last secretarial meeting in July 1970 some more progress

were made. The two sides agreed ·that the point of delivery of supply to

Pakistan of such quantum of water as may be agreed upon will be at

Farakka. Some agreements on quantity of water to be realized were also

17 n.12,p.91. 18 n.9, p.130. 19 n. 14, p. 85.

137

expected in the next meeting. However, next meeting was never held

because of emergence of Bangladesh independence struggle.

The period between 1950 -1971 was fruitless as far as cooperation on

Ganges water sharing was concern. Many reasons have been extended.

There is wide spread believe among the intelligence that from 1950 to

1971 the Pakistan government deliberately neglected the Farrakka issue.

They often assert that government in Islamabad was more interested in

working on its own water sharing formula with India over the Indus river

basin than in resolving the Farrakka problem. That line of argument may

be justified to some extent in the light of Islamabad's over all policy of

giving scant attention to East Pakistan interest. 20 Further, B.M Abbas

views, that India maintains that: (1) Ganges was all most Indian River

and not an international river. (2) East Pakistan problem was excess of

water and not the lack of it. It has been also be suggested that the issue

of sharing the Ganges water did not take serious turn because the

Farrakka Barrage scheme was yet to be implemented and East Pakistan

did not have a large scale irrigation system at that time which would had

been disrupted due to construction of Farrakka Barrage. The India

government perceived as determine by the over all state of relation

between the two countries. Ben Crow views, "Its seems reasonable to

conclude that there was Indian strategy of procrastination in force until

at least 1971. One factor influencing India's choice of that strategy may

have been the perception by the India's leaders of a general state of

hostility between India and Pakistan.

The Ganges Dispute During 1971 -1975

Bangladesh emerged as sovereign nation state in 1971.The emergence of

Bangladesh opens up a new vista of political relationship and power

balance especially in south Asian region. 21 The government of

Bangladesh and India tried to look bilateral issues in new perspective,

2o Ishtiaq Hossain, "Bangladesh-India Relations: The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty And Beyond", Asian Affairs, Fall, 1998. p.133.

21 n.12, p .107.

138

particularly under the euphoric atmosphere of independence the active

association of India in the liberation war of east Bengal paved the way for

amity and friendship and close cooperation between the two

neighbours.22 The cooperation in all maJor spheres between the two

nations began to move faster than ever before.

In March 1977 Mrs. Indira Gandhi visited Bangladesh where two

countries signed Treaty of Friendship for 25 years, which among the

other military issues also highlighted the need for joint action for

irrigation, flood control and hydroelectric development. The most

important step towards formulating a comprehensive plans was taken in

1972,when the Prime Ministers of both the countries agreed to establish

the Joint River Commission [JRC] on the permanent basis.23 Its members

were drawn from both countries and the Commission was asked to carry

out a comprehensive survey of the river systems shared by both

countries m the projects of flood control and water resources

development for the mutual benefits. The joint declaration stated that

"experts of two countries are directed to formulate detailed proposals on

advance flood warnings, flood forecasting study of flood control and

irrigation projects of the major river systems, and examine the feasibility

of linking the power grids of Bangladesh and adjoining areas of India so

that the water resources of the region can be utilized on an equitable

basis for the mutual benefits of the people of the two countries".24 Within

a few months, the Commission completed a joint aerial photographic

survey of the Ganges below Farakka. The related hydrographic survey

from the ground was completed in 1973-74.

The phase of bonhomie was however short lived as India and Bangladesh

had diverging interest and strategies f?r the development of the Ganges

water resource. By the 1974 as the Farakka barrage was nearing

22 n. 12, p.108. 23 Jagdish C. Pokharel, Environmental Resources: Negotiation Between Unequal Powers,

Vikas Publishing Pvt. Ltd. , New Delhi, 1996, p. 84. 24 Tariq Karim Ahmad "The Bangladesh Treaty On Sharing QL the Ganges Water:

Genesis and Significance", BIISSJoumal,Vol, 19,No2, 1998, pp.219-221.

139

completion the issue began to surface in Bangladesh domestic politics.

The opponents of Sheikh Mujib, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh,

accused him of surrendering in the country's interest to India as a pay off

for India's support to him and his ruling party. Anti India sentiment were

on the rise and Farakka issue served as a catalyst.

In July 1974, at a ministerial level meeting with Bangladesh, India agreed

that a mutually accepted solution would be arrived at before operating

the barrage.2s Gradually the Farakka issue became the single issue to

dominate the relationship between the nations which no political leader

could ignore .In May 1974, Sheikh Mujiburrahman, Prime minister of

Bangladesh visited India During the talks with Indian PM, Mrs. Indira

Gandhi he demanded that issue be resolved quickly. In a joint

declaration after the visit the two sides agreed on basic principles for the

future agreement on Ganges water sharing issue i.e. [a] There was need

to increase the volume of Ganges during the minimum flow to meet the

full needs of both India and Bangladesh. [b] The augmentation of water

would be through optimum utilization of the water resources available to

both the countries. The responsibility of finding a solution was left to the

Joint River Commission. India also requested for a test run of Farakka

barrage to which Bangladesh agreed.26 In the era of Sheikh Mujib and

Mrs. Indira Gandhi this ad hoc agreement to test run the feeder canal

was the last significant development in the history of the Ganges water

dispute. Instead of a solution of the dispute, a stage was set for the

further complications to develop. The two countries differed

fundamentally on [ 1] how to augment the water of the Ganges, [2] the

amount of Ganges water Bangladesh would be allotted during the lean

months. The augmentation question was left to the Joint River

Commission [JRC]. The Commission accordingly took up the

augmentation issue. However, vastly differing perception held by the two

sides prevented the JRC from arriving at any agreed solution.

25 Harun Ur Rashid, India Bangladesh Relation: An Insider View, Har Anand Publication Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi 2002, p.35.

26 n. 7,p.101.

140

Both India and Bangladesh have prepared two separate schemes to

augment the dry season flow of the Ganges. The experts from Bangladesh

proposed to augment the Ganges flows by building storage facilities in

the upper Ganges basin. These reservoirs in India and Nepal would store

monsoon waters for the release during the dry season thus could

significantly augment the flow. The Indian side did not like the

Bangladesh proposal, as the plan would have required involving Nepal in

the negotiation process. India perceived the Ganges water dispute as

purely bilateral one. The construction of dam in Nepal will naturally

make the issue multilateral one. The Indian side was also opposed to

considering the question of constructing reservoir in Nepal on the ground

that proposal was outside the scope of the JRC.

India proposed alternative scheme of augmentation of the Ganges flow by

constructing a Brahmaputra -Ganga link canal, to divert the water from

the Brahmaputra to Ganges. This suggestion was unacceptable to

Bangladesh on the ground that link canal excavation will cause loss of

fertile land as well as involve displacement of population. Regarding the

amount of water JRC estimated that during the dry season the average

minimum discharge below the Farrakka was 55,000 cubic feet per

second [cusecs].Indian side maintained that it needed at least 40,000

cusecs of that to flush the Hoogly river ,leaving the rest for possible use

of Bangladesh. However, Dhaka demanded the entire 55,000 cusecs

during the dry season. The deadlock over amount of water to be shared

continued.

On 18th April 1975 the adhoc arrangement was made for sharing the

Ganges for 41 days. India agreed to a very low amount of diversion

ranging from 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs, cont~ary to their original demand.

On the other side, Bangladesh was to receive progressively increasing the

amount of water, 44,000 cusecs to begin with, leading to 49,500 cusecs

during the last part of the lean period. This agreement was not received

well by many Indians. According to Indian position the release of 11,000

to 16,000 cusecs of water in the lean season is nothing in comparison to

the needs of 40,000 cusecs to flush the heavily silted Hooghly .At the

same time Bangladesh saw it as another pro Indian act of the

Mujiburrahman government.

In August 1975 Sheikh Mujiburrahman and his family member were

assassinated in military coup carried out by a group of military officers.

The junta, which executed the coup, was anti Indian in their political

stance. This affected bilateral issues including sharing of Ganges water.

Bangladesh witnessed great internal political turmoil during 1975-76.In

the mean time the timeframe for an adhoc agreement expired [31st May

1975], but India continued the withdrawal of water at Farrakka.27 A letter

of protest was sent by Bangladesh in January 1976 against Indian

withdrawal at Farrakka even after the expiry of 1975 temporary

agreement.2s A further note was sent in February 1976 bringing to the

notice of the Government of India that low water levels of the Ganges in

Bangladesh had been affecting the river flow and causing adverse

consequence in Bangladesh. India, however, showed cool response

perhaps because of killing of Sheikh Mujiburrahman and the political

stance of the new leaders. Bangladesh, while taking up the Farakka

dispute with India tried to internationalize the issue by raising it at

different international forums and seeking their cooperation to pressurize

India. Bangladesh raised this issue at the Islamic Foreign Ministers

Conference at Istanbul in May 1976;at the Colombo Summit of Non

Aligned Countries in August 197629. At the 31st Session of United

Nations in September, 1976 Bangladesh argued that unilateral diversion

of water of Ganges by India was violation of rules and principles related

to sharing of international rivers. India, however, maintained it was a

bilateral, technical and legal issue; the internationalization would further

complicate and delay its solution. India had reservations on the stated

adverse effects and felt that Bangladesh was politicizing and

21 n.l2, p.161. 28 Heather L. Beach et. al. [eds.] ,Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution, United

Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2000 ,p.99. 29 Sangeeta Thapliyal ,"Water and Conflict: The South Asian Scenario", Strategic

Analysis, October 1996,p.1040.

142

internationalizing the Farrakka issue, and using it for propaganda

against India, both within Bangladesh and having failed to resolve the

problem with India, Bangladesh took the issue to UN for settlement in

Nov.197630. Bangladesh argued for UN intervention in the issue on the

basis of its security and the environmental implications of the dispute of

the region. The UN Special Political Committee consulted both the parties

and suggested a bilateral solution based on consensus. However,

internationalization of the issue was taking a toll on India, which couldn't

have afforded to be labeled as the big tyrant of the subcontinent. Neither

could it ignore its real interest in the region-to develop the water

resource. Thus to avoid any conflict India and Bangladesh made attempts

to restart the talks without preconditions. During the period of 1976 and

1977 several rounds of bilateral discussions took place.

Negotiations During 1977-1984

In March 1977 Indian parliamentary elections Congress party was

defeated. Mr. Morarji Prasad, who replaced Mrs. Indira Gandhi, took

special interest in resolving the major irritant in Indo- Bangladesh

relation. Indian Minister Mr. Jagjivan Ram led a mission to Dhaka to

push forward the negotiations on Farakka. It was followed by series of

ministerial and secretary level meetings.

On Nov.5, 1977,India and Bangladesh signed an Agreement on sharing of

the Ganges waters at Farakka and augmenting its flows.31 There were

many important components of the Agreement, [ 1] the Treaty was to

remain in the force for five years but was extendable by mutual

agreement, [2) it defined the lean season flow period between 31st

January to 31st May, [3] the amount of water for Bangladesh was to be

30 Amjad Hossein Khan, Development and Management of International River Basin: The Ganges Issue, Seminar Proceedings, Management of International River Basin and Environmental Challenges, 22Mar.1994,Dhaka, Academic Publishers, Dhaka, 1994, p.48.

31 Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third world: Conflict and Cooperation in The International River Basin, United Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1999, pp. 177-178.

143

calculated from recorded flows of the Ganges at Farakka from 1948 to

1973.The agreement incorporated a guarantee clause under which

during the leanest period [from April 21 to May 31]in case of

exceptionally low flows (Below 55,000 cusecs), Bangladesh was to be

guaranteed at least 80 percent (27 ,600 cusses) of her stipulated share for

the concerned 10 day period (Paragraph 11 of Article II). 32 This provision

was significant for Bangladesh. Further, Article VIII laid down the scope

for long-term solution of augmentation problem. It stated "the two

governments recognized the need to cooperation with each other in

· finding the solution to the long term problem of augmenting the flows of

the Ganges during the dry season.

The Treaty was significant on many accounts. Firstly, Bangladesh after

unsuccessful attempts of internationalization of the Ganges dispute

resolved back to bilateralism. The agreement has firmly established

bilateralism as the basic tenet of India's South Asian diplomacy. India

sent clear message to Bangladesh that its leaders must seek solutions to

the problems with neighbour on a bilateral basis. However, the Treaty

invited criticisms in India. Condemnation was heaped upon it for having

compromised India's national interest to Bangladesh advantage.33 It was

cited as a case of poor diplomacy shown by newly elected Janta Party

government. Many experts thought India conceded more than it should

have. The Communist Party of West Bengal complained against the

Centre for ignoring their interest and lack of prior consultation with the

state government.

Bangladesh was clear benefactor of the Treaty. The Treaty firmly

established the right of Bangladesh over water of the Ganges as a

downstream country. The amount of water allotted to Bangladesh was

much beyond the expectations of the negotiators from Bangladesh.

Further, the inclusion of guarantee clause meant that at least for the

32 Text, Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and The Government of the Republic of India on Sharing Ganges Water at Farrakka and On Argumentation of its Flows Nov~mber 5, 1977.

33 n.5,p. 234.

144

next five years India could not unilaterally withdraw water from the

Ganges. The agreement also demonstrated India's acceptance of the

withdrawal of Farrakka did have some adverse effects on Bangladesh.

There was also commitment on the part of New Delhi for finding a long­

term solution of problem of Ganges water. The Treaty was criticized in

Bangladesh for its temporary nature. The agreement was for 5 years. It

was not a solution of the dispute. The agreement excluded the desirable

transboundary water resource development objectives for example flood

control, power development or silt limitation. It was product of its

historical circumstances and disputes, which forced the countries to

enter into agreement. Authors like Khursida Begum view that negotiators

from Bangladesh were anxious for a Treaty but they failed to take

advantage from India's liability for a reasonable solution of the bilateral

negotiation.34 Though Ganges dispute was technical in nature, the

problem turned out to be matter of diplomacy and international politics.

Criticism apart, the Agreement had a welcome part that both sides

recognized the need for a solution to the long-term problem of

augmenting the flows of the Ganges. Both the countries realized that

lean season flow could not be sufficient to satisfy their needs.

Negotiations During 1976- 1991

The 1977 agreement assigned the task to JRC to find the solution of

augmenting the dry season flows at Farakka, within period of three

years.35 The JRC made several meetings to discuss the issue. The Indians

and Bangladesh exchanged their respective proposals for augmentation

in Mar. 1978.Both the countries reiterated their previous positions.

Bangladesh proposed the building of upstream storage dams in Nepal,

while the Indian plan was to divert water from the Brahmaputra River to

the Ganges through a link canal across Bangladesh territory. While

34 n.l2,p.185 35 The Word Bank ,Salman.A.Salman and Kishore Uprety ,Conflict and Cooperation on

South Asian International Waters: A Legal Perspective , World Bank Publication, Washington D.C ,2002, p.157.

1 A C

Bangladesh rejected Indian proposal as legally unjustifiable, technically

unfeasible and economically disastrous. India always desired to keep the

issue strictly bilateral, while Bangladesh wanted to bring the upstream

country Nepal into the arrangement. Bangladesh went a step ahead to

pursue their "regional approach". In 1978, Nepal's envoy traveled to

Nepal to convince the King for the regional approach. Bangladesh also

reached out to the World Bank and the political leaders in UK and USA to

gather support for their approach. Both sides took the rigid positions,

which made the negotiation difficult. 36 The divergence of the views on the

augmentation issue propelled negotiations into a vicious circle, as the

duration of the Agreement was tied with the two parties agreeing to a

mutually acceptable means of augmentation. The political dimensions of

the dispute compounded the difficulty of the negotiation. The

deteriorating political relationship between the two countries made the

negotiation intractable one particularly because it had become a major

issue in domestic politics in Bangladesh. In the meanwhile the Treaty

was allowed to lapse in May 1982.The countries signed a Memorandum

of Understanding [MOU] on the Ganges water issue in October 1982 in

order to avoid the agreement vacuum. The MOU extended the term of

Treaty for another two years. The two significant departures of the MOU

from prev10us Treaty was[1]dropping the m1mmum guarantee

scheme[2]adoption of burden sharing clause for exceptionally low flows

i.e. if the lowest flow Farakka fell below 75 per cent of the standard flow

which governed the schedule , the difference between that and the

standard flow was to be shared on 50:50 basis by the two sides.

The 1982 MOU expired after 18 months. As the 1985 dry season period

was a vacuum period, President of Bangladesh and Prime Minister of

India agreed to·sign a new MOU for three more dry seasons of 1986,1987

and 1988, which preserved the terms of 1982 agreement.37 This MOU

36 Ashraf -Ul-Alam Tutu, "The Farakka Barrage: Diary of India's Coercive Diplomacy", Praxis Journal Vol 1[1], 2003,p.38.

37 Rafiqul Islam, "The Ganges Water Dispute" Asian Survey, Vol 27, No.8, August 1987, p.180.

146

also provided for the two sides to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution

for augmentation. Even this 1985 MOU expired on 31 May 1988 leading

to a long period of agreement vacuum. It reflects the slump in political

relations between India and Bangladesh.

In the 1980's political events in both India and Bangladesh as well as

South Asian region as a whole was not conducive for long-term solution.

General Zia-ur-Rahman was assassinated in military coup on 31st May

1981 and new military group took over the reign. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was

assassinated in 1984 and her son became the new PM of India. India was

struggling hard against terrorism in the state of Punjab. India was

involved in military adventure in SriLanka. It send its army to SriLanka

to suppress the Tamil rebels and then to Maldives to quell the rebellion

by some stray mercenaries.

1987-1988 Floods

In 1987 and 1988 Bangladesh witnessed an unusually severe annual

monsoon floods causing huge loss of lives, property and infrastructure. 38

President described the flood as" a man made curse "which resulted due

to water mismanagement and asked for international assistance. He

refused to accept help from India and tried to internationalise the water

management issue by bringing it to the UN, the Commonwealth and the

SAARC.39 The President also visited the other riparian states, including

China for talks about their cooperation. Bangladesh government

continued to blame water mismanagement in India and diversion at

Farakka for flooding. In Bangladesh however, many new explanations of

unusual floods emerged later. Some attributed it to historical cycles of

the flooding; other attributed it equally to Brahmaputra River. Different

solutions were also offered while the old line continued to argue for

regional cooperation and upstream reservoirs. The new line [reflected in

the international technical reports of the flood policy] argued for

38 A.R Khan and N.I. Nazem, "Abundance and Scarcity of Water in Bangladesh: Issues Revisited," BliSS Journal, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1988, p.460.

39 n. 8,p.9.

147

measures to implemented within the Bangladesh borders. It included

range of approaches like building embankments along the Ganges and

Brahmaputra through their length as well as Flood Plain Zoning, River

Training etc. 40

Thus the period of 1981-1990 was period of domestic and regional

turmoil where transboundary water resource only invited ad hoc

arrangements. Political stability returned in India and Bangladesh during

the 1991-1992 period. The newly elected Prime Ministers of both the

countries in May 1992 agreed to make fresh initiatives for achieving an

acceptable long term and comprehensive arrangement for sharing the

water of the major rivers on the basis of discussions, including interim

arrangement for sharing the dry season flow of the Ganges. They also

agreed to jointly monitor the release at Farakka and Teesta.The May

1992 decision was followed by series of ministerial and secretary level

meetings in the coming years. However, the question of augmentation

remained unresolved. The situation dragged on until the1995. In the

mean time water and environmental resources experts in the Bangladesh

kept reporting about adverse consequences of Farakka withdrawals over

the country.

The Effects of Farakka Barrage

The Farakka Barrage, which comprised of a barrage at Farakka and a

feeder canal from the barrage to Bhagirathi-Hooghly River, was

completed in 1975.1n April 1975 the Farrakka barrage went on a test

operation for 41 days under a temporary agreement. India, however

continued to withdraw water from 1975-77 .In 1977, a five year

agreement was signed for Ganges water sharing, which was later

extended under MOUs. There was no sharing arrangements in between

1988to 1996.Bangladesh protested unilateral withdrawal and harmful

effects of the Ganges diversion. Vast amount of literature appeared on the

40 Richard Kettleman, "Conflicts and . Cooperation Over the Floods in the Himalayan Ganges Region", Water International, Vol15,1999,p.l92.

148

claimed harmful effects of the Farakka diversion particularly in post

1975-77 withdrawal period well as during 1988-1996 period. The

literature included Bangladesh government White Paper on the Ganges

diversion, researches done by the water and environment related

institutes, [national as well as international]. These claimed harmful

effects were used as potent studies to pressurize Indians for more

beneficial agreements as well as to internationalise the Farakka dispute.

The Ganges system directly serves about 37 percent of the total area of

the Bangladesh. In the southwestem part of the Bangladesh, the steam

flow from the Ganges system forms the largest component of water

resources. The districts of Ganga, Rajshahi, Pabna.Kushthia, Faridpur,

Jessore, Khulna and Barisal etc in Bangladesh almost entirely depend on

the Ganges flow.

Bangladesh claims that Farakka diversion has brought harmful

geographical changes as well as adversely affected the economic

conditions of the people of the region. The claimed negative impacts on

the various aspects are as follows-

1. Impact on hydrology- owing to the Ganges diversion the minimum

discharge of the Ganga at Hardinge Bridge fell below the minimum

ever recorded. The minimum discharge of the Ganges reached a record

low of 23,000 cusecs as compared to historical average of 64,430

cusecs. In April 1976 a discharge of 25,700 was recorded. On an

average Ganges flow was reduced by 45 percent for the months of

Feb-April of 1976 and 1977.The records of discharge for the River

Gorai Railway Bridge during the months from Nov to June was

consistently below the average for those months. In the months of Feb

to May 1976,the average flow was only 14 percent of the average

previously recorded. The discharge of the river Arial Khan also below

average in the dry season of the two years in question. The unusual

low flow in these two tributary can be attributed most probably to the

reduced flow of the Ganges.

149

2. Impact on the ground water-In the White Paper the Bangladesh

government claimed that the hydraulic cycle of surface and ground

water are interdependent. In the 1976 the ground water level in the

highly affected area went down by 5 feet on average with a range of 3

to 8 feet below normal. During the years 1995-96,ground water level

data were collected from 152 selected piezometric wells. It is observed

that from the analysis of water level data of 1995-96 that compared

with 1978 position, most of the well have registered considerable fall

in the groundwater level. The fall of ground water level is highest in

the districts of Rajshahi, Kustia, Khulna and Jessore.41

3. Increase in Salinity- Bangladesh claimed that since the late

seventies, the Southwest region has been facing the critical problem of

salinity intrusion from the Bay of Bengal as a result of the drastic

reduction of freshwater flows in the Gorai river -the major distributary

of the Ganges. 42 The increased intrusion of seawater in the surface

water of Southwest Bangladesh was one of the most substantial

effects claimed by Bangladesh to be result of Farakka withdrawals.

The saline intrusion in the estuary is natural phenomenon, which is

offset by strong surface freshwater flow. Bangladesh claimed that due

to heavy upstream diversion the region receives very insignificant flow

to check the salinity. In 1968 the minimum discharge of water at

Hardinge Bridge was 58,800 cusecs and the salinity of the Passur

River was 1000 micromhos per centimeter. In 1976 the water level of

the bridge came down to 23,200 cusecs whereas the salinity of the

river increased to 1,36,000 micromhos per centimeter. In 1982 the

water discharge was 31,400 cusecs and the salinity decreased to

11500 micromhos per centimeter.43 According to the concerned

department, in April and May 1992 and 1995 the salinity at Khulna

41 A.M Dewan and K. Nizamuddin, "Impact Of Ganges Water Diversion on The South­West Part of Bangladesh: A Perception Study," BliSS Journal, Vol20, No 2, p.178.

4 2 T. A. Khan, "Water Based Disasters in Bangladesh", in Q.K. Ahmed [ed.] Bangladesh Water Vision 2025, Masro Printing, Dhaka, 2000, p-57.

43 Nahid Islam, "Environmental Challenges To Bangladesh", BIISS Journal, No .13, July 1991, p. 26.

150

station was recorded as high as 29,500 micromhos per centimeter,

which was 1800 per cent higher than pre diversion stage. Bangladesh

claims that salinity intrusion has vastly affected the Khulna region.

The reduced dry season flow has caused excessive riverbed siltation,

leading to frequent changes of river regime and devastating floods

during the monsoon.

4. Impact on Irrigation: Bangladesh claimed that the reduced \Vater

flow and penetration of salinity in the fresh water assumed to be the

damaging factor in agriculture, the most important sector of the

economy. Bangladesh reported that Indian diversion of water had

resulted in a loss of rice output of 236,000 tons in 1976.It was

attributed to the reduced river flow leading to [a] depleted soil

moisture [2] delay in crop planting and shortened growing season. The

Ganges-Kodabak project, which is providing irrigation to 142,000

hectares of land from the mid 1960's, had been severely affected due

to withdrawal of water at Farakka.44 Bangladesh Agriculture Research

Council spelled out that direct loss of agricultural products is due to

soil moisture depletion, delayed planting and increases in the salinity

amounts.

5. Effect on the Industry: The reduced water level and subsequent

increase in the salinity have adversely affected the industrial sector

specially the thermal power stations and the paper mills situated in

the South Western region of the country.45 The government of the

Bangladesh alleged that Goalpara thermal power station in the

southwestern part of the country has to be closed for some time

because of an increased cost of pumping fresh water by barges from

long distances. Similarly the paper mill and jute processors were

unable to use highly saline water and suffered the damage. The

country's only news print mill is situated in Khulna and due to the

high salinity in the Rupsa and the Barisal, the industry has to procure

44 n. 41, p.170. 45 n. 43, pp .31-35.

151

fresh water from upstream. The government of Bangladesh claimed

that the forest of Sunderban which provide raw materials for

newsprints mills, paper mills, match factories, furniture factories and

all varieties of construction activities is affected by salinity causing a

heavy loss.

6. The Impact on the Fisheries- The Gangetic water system supports

over 200 species of freshwater fish. The fisheries not only support

economy but also form the staple diet of large population. Bangladesh

claimed that diversion of the Ganges and the pollution upstream has

adversely affected the fish catches. Environmental experts from the

Bangladesh claimed that reduced water availability significantly

reduced the landing of fish probably because of disturbance of the

historic food chain and inability of fish to tolerate shallow depths and

the unprecedented levels of salinity. At the three key landing points

namely, Khulna, Goalundo and Chandpur, the percentage of the

reduction in the landing of fish during Feb -June 1976 compared to

the corresponding period of 1975 was 75 percent, 34percent and

46percent respectively.46

7. Effect on the Navigation- The inland navigation on nver waters

through the country boats, ferries, mechanized cargo etc., is the major

mode of transportation in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government

claimed that Farakka diversion has led to fall in water level in the

navigation channel, seriously disrupting the navigation. The reduced

flow in the Ganges after Farakka meant that the sediment in the river

section in Bangladesh was not being flushed out sea, thus making it

difficult for ferries to ply the river.47 During 1976 various newspaper

brought the report of decline in water level in various section of the

Ganges system and disruption of inland water navigation.

46 Text, Government of Peoples Republic of Bangladesh White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute, September 1976, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

47 Bhim Subba, Himalayan Waters: Promises and Potential, Problems and Politics, Panos Institute Publication, Kathmandu, 2001 ,p.200.

152

8. Ecology and Health- Bangladesh claimed that Farakka withdrawal

has initiated process of environmental degradation particularly in the

Sunderban, which are already endangered species. Further,

Bangladesh argued that withdrawal had impact on domestic and

municipal water supply and public health .The Ganges River is the

main source of domestic and municipal water supplies to the Ganges

dependent area in Bangladesh. The people use both surface water and

groundwater for domestic purposes. As claimed, due to drastic

reduction of surface water, the people have been totally dependent on

groundwater. But the availability and quantity of the groundwater

have become constrained too, due to lowering of the groundwater

table and salinity intrusion. During the pre-diversion period, the water

quality was well within the acceptable limits; later these limits were

regularly violated. Increased salinity in the area has caused adverse

effects on the general health of the people living there. The increased

salinity has given rise to an increased incidence of various ailments

among the people using waters in the saline affected areas.

Waterborne diseases like Typhoid, infectious hepatitis, diarrhoea,

cholera, etc. among the inhabitants of the southwestern region have

been reported in the increasing numbers.

India's response to these claims from Bangladesh government has largely

been defensive. Indian government claimed that adverse impact claimed

by Bangladesh is not usually supported by facts and figures. They are

overestimated and scientific methodology has not been used for the

evaluation. Both the countries have documented their respective cases

and there were several inter-governmental discussions on their respective

claims and counterclaims. 48 Later studies argue that there can be direct

link· between declining navigation, disruption of Sunder ban ecology and

Farakka diversion, but in other cases like health, ecology, agricultural

production, the causative chain cannot be established. Most of sectors

48 B.G.Verghese et. al. [eds.], Converting Water Into Wealth: Regional Cooperation in Harnessing Eastern Himalayan Rivers ,Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 1994,p .22.

153

discussed are formed of complex factors and calls for comprehensive,

integrated and multidisciplinary approach for impact assessment studies.

The Bangladesh experts poses the question" why India did not make an

integrated, multilateral approach for comprehensive evaluation on all

aspects of such problems while it formulated its plan and programme for

the diversion of the Ganges"?49 The Ganges water issues [construction of

the Farakka barrage, unilateral action of India, harmful impacts of the

diversion, etc] have been the recurrent themes in the domestic politics of

Bangladesh. The political parties whether in opposition or the in the

government blamed and targeted the Indian actions and stands. The

opposition political parties besides condemning India also criticized the

government of Bangladesh for toeing the Indian line and failing to force

India to give Bangladesh its due share. Awami League leader used to

criticize the Bangladesh National Party during the 1991-1995 tenure for

its failure to reach any agreement with India for country's legitimate

share in the waters of the Ganges despite making noises about it before

coming to the power. The Awami League always emphasized the fact that

during its regime, under the 1975 Agreement it managed to realize the

maximum amount of water [40,000 cusecs] as compared to successive

period [34,000] cusecs. However, the Awami League had to face the

blame for consenting to the Farakka withdrawals in the first place.

Subsequently, Awami League always felt the pressure to undo the

damage. On the other hand, BNP leaders used the Farakka issue as an

instrument to mobilize public opinion in favour of her party. She even led

Farakka March on many occasions where she used to describe Farakka

as an Indian conspiracy, which the people of the Bangladesh would not

yield to. Unfortunately the techno political issue of Ganges water sharing

became one of the major issues in the electoral politics in of Bangladesh.

The BNP projected Awami League as a pro Indian party and called for the

mandate. The BNP used the water issue as an effective electoral

campaign resulting in the negative role for the Awami League and played

a major role in the victory of BNP.Thus, Indian action of the Farakka

49 n.12, p.l48.

154

barrage construction and the withdrawal of water has caused origin and

growth of the anti India feelings in Bangladesh, which was fuelled and

harnessed by the political parties for political gruns. In Bangladesh,

Farakka politics are part of the national psyche and the anti- India

sentiment whipped up around the issue has been used by the successive

governments to consolidate power.so The Ganges issue has been one of

the most frequently appearing themes in the public debate, in the leading

dailies and weeklies and research publications by various professional

groups in Bangladesh. The general feeling grew that Farrakka withdrawal

benefits India at the expense of Bangladesh. India being the upstream

country can withdraw and release water wherever necessary, while

Bangladesh, as the lower riparian country is unable to protect its socio

economic and environmental interests. The government was continuously

put under pressure to resolve the issue.

The 1996 Ganges Water Treaty: The Stalemate Broken

During the 1991-1996 no substantial progress was made over the

Ganges water issue because of the political uncertainties in both the

countries. However, in mid 1996 various factors worked together to work

for the closer cooperation on the conclusion of an agreement. In May

1996,The United Front led coalition government came to the power in

India with Mr.H.D.Gowda the Prime Minister and Mr. Inder Kumar Gujral

as the External Affairs Minister. In Bangladesh the Awami League was

voted back to the power again after 20 years and Madam Sheikh Hasina

assumed office as the prime minister. The Prime Ministers of Bangladesh

and India signed the historic Treaty on the sharing the Ganges waters in

New Delhi on 12 Dec 1996, during the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina

three day state visit to India. Various factors and circumstances

facilitated the conclusion of the historic treaty. Firstly, both the sides

realized the urgency of the matter. They conveyed to each other the

political commitment to address and resolve the issue on priority basis.

Secondly, serious discussions for arriving at a solution to the problem

so New Scientist, Dhaka, Nov 30,1996.

l'i'i

began only after the change of government taking place more or les at the

same time. Thirdly, Sheikh Hasina showed the personal commitment to

find an acceptable solution to the Ganges water sharing issue. Her

decision not to internationalize the issue pleased India. Mrs. Sheikh

Hasina took the major strategic risk by avoiding internationalisation of

the issue. 51 Fourthly, the Foreign Minister of India Mr.I.K Gujral attitude

towards India's neighbours had already been soft. The Gujral doctrine

that India should be prepared to give more and get less rather than insist

reciprocity with its smaller neighbour has evidently been at work in

forging the Ganges Treaty.52 The new foreign policy doctrine transcends

the narrow book keeping approach of short-term gains and losses and

invests in future promises of regional cooperation 53. Fifthly, following the

approach, Mr. Gujral, the Foreign Minister gave a pleasant surprise

during the September 1996 visit to Dhaka by telling the Bangladesh

government that India no longer linked water to transit issue.54 This was

a major departure from Congress government long standing policy to link

water with exit facility, which Bangladesh vehemently opposed.

Their position was that a fair share of the Ganges water was their

legitimate right as a lower riparian country. Providing exit through their

own country was for them a matter of sovereignty: no one could claim the

right to exit through another country in the postcolonial world order.

The sub national politics also contributed in the conclusion of the

Ganges Treaty. West Bengal was the Indian state that would be most

affected by an agreement .Any increase in the releases from Farakka to

Bangladesh must necessarily mean a corresponding decrease in the

availability of water for irrigation in West Bengal and for keeping Calcutta

port operational. Thus it was imperative for it to support any agreement

over the Ganges waters. Mrs. Sheikh Hasina strategically involved Mr.

Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, in the negotiation

51 The Times oflndia, New Delhi, Dec 15, 1996. 52 The Pioneer, New Delhi, Dec 12, 1 996. 53 Frontline, Chennai, April, 4,1997 ,p.17. 54 Dhaka Courier, Dhaka, Dec 20, 1996.

156

process.Mr.Jyoti Basu made personal visit to Bangladesh in Nov.

1996.He visited the Ganges dependent areas and held critically important

discussions with politicians and officials. Mr. Basu's Communist Party of

India was supporter of Mr.Deve Gowda's United Front government in New

Delhi. The Bangladesh, India and West Bengal governments worked

collectively to conclude a treaty in Dec 1996. In return Mr. Basu sought

an assurance from the Prime Minister that no more dams would be built

on the upper reaches of the Ganges and that additional facilities would

be provided for dredging the port to ensure clear shipping paths. He also

sought an action against unauthorized withdrawal of water by Uttar

Pradesh and Bihar, which led to decline in the amount of water reaching

Farakka. 55 The King of Bhutan offered to augment water supplies to the

Calcutta port. For augmentation India will have to dig a canal from a

river flowing down to the western flanks of Bhutan quite close to

Bangladesh border. The assured facility provided a cushion for India to

sign the Treaty. While the top level political leadership showed the

commitment, officials of the Joint Committee formed under the foreign

offices of the two countries met several times to look into the

technicalities involved. Finally the Prime Ministers of Bangladesh and

India signed the historic Treaty on sharing of the Ganges water in New

Delhi on December 12, 1996.

The major features of the 1996 Treaty

1. The duration of the Treaty is 30 years [valid from the day of signingj.56

It is subject to review by the two governments at five-year intervals or

as required by either party.

2. It would be open to either party to seek the first review after two years

to assess the -impact and working of the sharing arrangement as

contained in the Treaty.

55 Outlook, New Delhi, Dec 25, 1996, p .34. 56 The Pioneer, New Delhi, Dec 26,1996.

157

Water Sharing

1. The Treaty essentially focuses on the Ganges water sharing for the

lean season. In this treaty the issue of augmentation of lean season

flow at Farakka has not been made contingent upon the sharing

arrangement. However, the Treaty does stipulate the need to cooperate

with each in finding a solution to the long-term problem of

augmenting the flows of the Ganges during the dry season.

2. The quantum of water agreed to be released by Indian to Bangladesh

will be at Farakka.

3. Article 2,assures every effort would be made by the upper riparian to

protect the flows of water at Farakka in the 40 years average

availability [ 1949-1988]. 57

4. The sharing of the waters will be ten days periods from January 1-

May 31 every year.

5. The sharing of waters will be on 55:50 basis if the availability at

Farakka is 70,000 cusecs or less [which is a fair principle].

6. Bangladesh will get 35,000 cusecs and India the balance flow if the

availability at Farakka is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs. In case

of availability of 75,000 cusecs or more India will rece1ve

40,000cusecs and Bangladesh the rest. During the most critical

month of April, Bangladesh will get a guaranteed flow 35,000 cusecs

in the first and last ten days of April. Bangladesh was politically

anxious to get the magic figure of 34,500 cusecs during the leanest

period of April 20-30 or 80 per cent thereof [or 27,000 cusecs] as a

minimum guarantee in a bad hydrological year, to which is entitled

under the 1977 Accord. 58 This has been accommodated. Though the

Treaty does not contain the Minimum Guarantee clause of 1977

Agreement, it has several scattered provisions, which together provide

a measure of security to Bangladesh. Firstly, there is guarantee of

35,000 cusecs to either side in alternate ten-day segment in the period

from March 1 to May lO.Secondly, if the flow falls below 50,000

57 The Pioneer, New Delhi, Dec 17, 1996. 5B The Economic Times, New Delhi, Dec19, 1996.

158

cusecs m any 10-day period; the two governments will enter into

immediate consultation to make adjustments in any emergency

situation. Thirdly, the Treaty has fail-safe provision agreement. While

the two sides are bound to meet every five years to review the Treaty

and make adjustments if so required; India is obliged to release

downstream of the Farakka barrage water at a rate not less than 90

per cent of Bangladesh share as enshrined in the Treaty, until such a

time as mutually agreed flows are decided. The Treaty has a provision

of setting a joint committee comprom1smg equal number of

representatives of the governments. It shall set up suitable teams at

Farakka and the Hardinge Bridge to observe and record daily flows

below the Farakka barrage; in the feeder canal and at the navigation

lock, as well as the Hardinge Bridge.

The terms of the Treaty have many beneficial features, for both the

countries. The Treaty has various outstanding features favourable to

Bangladesh, like-

1. Long duration validity which will help Bangladesh m long term

water resource planning and management,

2. Water sharing provision has been delinked from augmentation,

3. Fail safe arrangement safeguards Bangladesh's interest in case two

sides fail to arrive at an arrangement at the end of review period,

4. The 1996 Ganga Treaty provided much better deal in the term of

amount of water for Bangladesh in comparison to previous treaties,

5. The assured enhanced supply of water for the Ganges -Kodabak

irrigation project, North irrigation project etc.s9 The assured

instream flows in the Ganges, resulting from Ganges Treaty, has

offered Bangladesh the potential for surface water augmentation in

the Ganges dependent area at a point between the Hardinge Bridge

and the Ganges- Brahmaputra- Jamuna confluence. Although

59 Q.K. Ahmad, The Ganges Water Treaty: Cooperation for Mutual Benefits, Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, Impressive printing, Dhaka, 2001,p.7.

159

barrage construction has a long gestation period, this would be most

potential mean to abstract large quantities of water from Ganges.6°

Ganges Water Sharing, According to 1996 Treaty.

Availability at Farakka Share of India Share of Bangladesh

70,000 cusecs or less 50% 50%

70, 000-75,000 cusecs Balance of flow 35,000 cusecs

75,000 cusecs or more 40,000 cusecs Balance of flow

Sharing of Waters at Farakka between the 1st January and the 31st

May Every

1 2 3 4

Period Average of total flow India's Share Bangladesh's 1949-88 (Cusecs) (Cusecs) share (Cusecs)

Jan 1-10 107,516 40,000 67,516

11-20 97,673 40,000 57,673

21-31 90,154 40,000 50,154 Feb 1-10 86,323 40,000 46,323 11-20 82,859 40,000 42,859 21-28 79,106 40,000 39,106 March 1-10 74,419 39,419 35,000 11-20 68,931 33,931 35,000 21-31 64,688 35,000 29,688 April 1-10 63,180 28,180 35,000 11-20 62,633 35,000 27,633 21-30 60,992 25,992 35,000 May 1-10 67,351 35,000 32,351 11-20 73,590 38,590 35,000 21-31 81,854 40,000 41,854

6o Q.K. Ahmad, Bangladesh Water Vision, Bangladesh Water Partnership, Masro Publishing Ltd., 2000, p.l4

160

So far the Indian benefits are concerned, the sharing between the two

countries when the total flows reaching Farakka is 70,000 cusecs or

below will be in proportion of 50:50 and not 62.7:37.3 as provided m

1977 agreement. There is an arrangement for the diversion of 35,000

cusecs during the three ten day period of the lean season. These

provisions will have cumulative effect of better protecting the Calcutta

port than was possible under 1977 agreement. Another advantage for

India is that it can undertake projects for upstream utilization but justice

and fairplay would warrant that India should not unilaterally reduce the

total flows reaching Farrakka. 61

The historic Ganges Treaty of 1996 was welcomed in India and

Bangladesh, though major opposition parties in both countries criticised

the Treaty as unequal or sell out to either side.62 However, the opposition

gradually waned.

The treaty on the sharing of the Ganges can be viewed in the conflict

management perspective that aims to resolve the transboundary dispute

between India and Bangladesh. The treaty in many ways forms the

watershed in the bilateral relations. It has paved the way for fruitful and

mutually beneficial cooperation. The thirty year validity gives stability,

which denotes a sea change from the short term MOUs.To meet the

concerns of Bangladesh, India as the upper riparian country has

undertaken to protect the flows reaching Farakka, thus it has taken the

responsibility of regulating upstream uses .The Treaty has institutional

mechanisms for mutual consultations. There will be joint monitoring of

flows, which should eliminate or minimize the possibility of

disagreements. Disagreements will be referred to Joint River Commission,

which can further be referred to the governments.

The Treaty comes close to the established principles of international laws

on non -navigational use of international waters. The water sharing has

61 The Hindu, New Delhi, Dec 17, 1996. 62 The Indian Express, New Delhi, Dec 15,1996.

161

been done more or less on 50:50 sharing formula.63 The principles of

'fairness', 'equity', and 'no harm rule to either side' are mentioned three

times m the Treaty. The treaty also opens the gateway on the future

areas of cooperation like augmentation of the water of the Ganges,

sharing of water of Teesta and other common rivers, etc. The goodwill

generated by the Treaty will also have positive impact on other bilateral

issues like illegal immigrants,Chakma Refugees, insurgency operations,

border demarcation, transit, etc.

Experience of the 1997 Lean Season

In its actual working over the first year of the Treaty few problems arose.

These generated undesirable emotion and heat in Bangladesh and

heightened political opposition to the Treaty. The most important

problem was the occurrence of low flows soon after the treaty went into

the operation. This was a normal hydrological phenomena, however, the

unfortunate occurrence of the low flows in the first lean season was

interpreted by many in Bangladesh as the evidence of a failure of the

treaty or deficiency in it.

One of the most important features distinguishing the prev1ous

agreements and the 1996 Treaty is the basis for calculating the flows of

the Ganges reaching Farakka during the lean season. Under the previous

agreement, the average flow of the Ganges was based on 75 per cent

water availability from the observed data for the twenty-five years period

between 1948 to 1973. Under the 1996 Treaty, the figures under the

indicative schedule are based on the average total flow of the Ganges

under the Treaty for each ten day period exceeds the average flow under

the previous agreement for the same period, which means that the Treaty

assumed the higher level of availability than the previous agreements.

Moreover, the 1996 Treaty states that the "every efforts would be made

63 Ainun Nishat, "Development and Management of Water Resources in Bangladesh: Post 1996 Treaty Opportunities", in A. K. Biswas and Juha I. Uitto[eds.] Sustainable Development of the Ganges Brahmaputra Meghna Basin, United Nation University Press Limited, Tokyo, 2000,p.85.

162

by the upper riparian to protect flows of Farakka as m the 40 years

average availability mentioned above".

However, in the 1997 January to May lean season, the actual availability

was far less than the average flow of the Ganges for the period 1949-

1988, as reiterated in the indicative schedule under the Treaty. The first

reports of a decline in the flows of the Ganges stared circulating during

the last ten days of February 1997, when the flow was supposed to

favour Bangladesh. During this period, Bangladesh stated that it had

received only 24,559 cusecs, instead of 39, 106 cusecs stipulated in the

Treaty. 64 The situation became quite serious in late March and on March

27, the Ganges flow in Bangladesh recorded only 6,500 cusses. By early

April, the flow kept fluctuating between 10,000 and 25,000 cusecs and

by early May water availability at Farakka was only about 40,000 cusses,

instead of the 67,351 cusecs specified in the Treaty.6S This substantially

low flow occurred during the period in which India and Bangladesh shall

receive guaranteed 35,000 cusecs of water in alternate three 10 day

period and the indicative schedule under the Treaty shows the average

availability of more than 60,000 cusecs. The flow of the Ganges

continued to be below 50,000 cusecs. Bangladesh was without a

guarantee clause similar to that have 1977 Agreement or burden sharing

arrangements like those of the 1982 and 1985 MOUs. Thus, it asked

India for "immediate consultations" to make adjustments on an

emergency basis, as stipulated under Article II of the Treaty. India agreed

to hold immediate consultations with Bangladesh, and a series of

meetings were held in both Dhaka and New Delhi. During those meetings

Bangladesh demanded that India should ensure that Bangladesh receive

the 35,000 cusecs guaranteed under the Annexure 1 of the Treaty. It also

wanted to know what India was doing to protect the flow of water at

Farakka, as per Article II of the Treaty. On the other hand. India

confirmed that the flow at Farakka had slowed down but attributed this

situation to the normal hydrological cycle that occurs every four to five

64 People's Review Newspaper, Dhaka, May 8, 1997. 65 Dialogue, Dhaka, April 14, 1997.

163

years. India further argued that it is fulfilling its obligation under the

Treaty by agreeing to immediate consultations. However, aside from

reiterating the commitment of the two countries to the Treaty, those

meetings did not result in any adjustments to the share of either country,

nor in any concrete action on how to handle the situation.66

Meanwhile, and by mid May, unseasonal spring rains have eased the

crisis with river at the Hardinge Bridge back to levels that normally

develop later in the spring, when rising summer heat in the north Indian

plains melt snow in the Himalayas. In the mid June expert level meeting

of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission was held in Dhaka.

After three days of discussion that centered around the Treaty, the two

sides, recommended the formation of a scientific committee to study the

causes of the low flow of the Ganges during the critical period of the dry

season. Thus the 1997 ,dry season ended the mixed result, a reasonable

flow of the Ganges during the beginning and of the dry season, and an

unusually low flow during the critical period of the dry season.

Yet unlike the previous dry seasons when similar problems of low flow of

the Ganges persisted, this time the parties were activity engaged in the

discussions, under the umbrella of the Treaty, on how to handle the

situation. It is perhaps too early to tell whether this unusually low flow

of the Ganges River during the dry season of 1997 was an isolated

phenomenon, which could be attributed to the natural causes, or will

continue to be the trend. However, the year ended with satisfaction for

both the parties as the flow situation was brought within the expected

ranges and the flows received by lower riparian in 1998 was

satisfactory. 67

66 The World Bank ,Salman A.Salman, "Sharing the Ganges Water Between India and Bangladesh: An Analysis of the 1996 Treaty", in Salman. A.Salman and L.B. Chazoumes [eds.] International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict, World Bank Technical Paper No. 414., The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 1998.p.144-145.

67 n. 63, p.85.

164

The Alternate Ten-Days Pattern

The pattern of sharing (35,000 cusecs to either side in alternate periods

between March 11 and May 1 0) means a sharp variation in flows from

one ten day period to the next. There is a safety problem involved in this /

political solution, particularly when the flows reaching Farakka are low: a

drastic drop in the water level in the feeder canal on the Indian side, if

carried out rapidly, could lead to collapse of the canal side. 68 Engineers

on both sides seem to accept this. This safety factor, though known to

both sides from previous experience was not reflected in the letter of the

Treaty. In the absence of an understanding between the two countries on

this subject, there was an unfortunate muddle in 1997. A gradual

reduction in the canal level in the interest of safety resulted in a shortfall

in the releases to Bangladesh in the first ten days of April (compensated

within the next ten days period) and led to the charges of violation of the

Treaty. There is clearly a need for an early inter-governmental

understanding on this matter. It is expected that once a Ganges Barrage

comes up, this problem will be mitigated.

Farrakka-Hardinge Bridge Discrepancy

There was a puzzling discrepancy between the quantum of water released

at Farakka in India and quantum arriving at Hardinge Bridge ( 170 kms.

downstream) in Bangladesh. The releases at Farakka, which swelled with

regeneration at Hardinge Bridge, the other point of joint flow observations

under the Treaty, began to show substantial deficit at the Harding Bridge

observation point for some weeks after March.

This phenomenon caused a public outcry with allegations of Indian

malafides through excessive abstractions or faulty release at Farakka,

despite daily joint observations. If the observation at Farakka and

Hardinge Bridge were taken as reasonably reliable, and if there were no

significant abstractions of water in between (as both sides seems to

68 Ramaswamy R. Iyer, "Conflict Resolution: Three River Treaties", Economic and Political Weekly, June 12, 1999, p.1515.

165

agree) then it appeared possible that river water was finding its way into

underground aquifers in Bangladesh. It is usual hydrological phenomena

that there is an interchange from stream flows to aquifers when the

groundwater table is below river bed revels and vice versa when river

flows fall below aquifers levels. Regarding Farakka-Hardinge Bridge

discrepancy this may be a possible answer; and there may be other

factors at work. Similar discrepancies had occasionally been noticed in

the past too. Quite possibly, the problem was accentuated in 1997

because of low flows.

Other possible reasons extended was that approximately 100,000 tube

wells had been dug in an area of 7692 sq. km., from a point opposite

Farakka to Hardinge Bridge under the Borendra Project in the Rajshahi

district as the water pulled out from underground may have caused the

discrepancy. The evidence is not conclusive and the technical experts are

jointly investigating the matter.

Gorai Issue and the Ganges Barrage

Gorai is the major deltaic spill of the Ganges, which serves the South­

West Ganges dependent area. Bangladesh claims that Farakka diversions

have left the Gorai dry and denied sufficient headwater supplies to

operate the Ganges- Kodabak River lift irrigation system. This had

resulted in a sharp northward movement of the salinity front, which

reduced freshwater supplies for drinking purposes, irrigation and

industrial use and adversely affected agriculture, fisheries, navigation

and the Sundari mangrove forest.

Farrakka withdrawals can at best be secondary cause of this

environmental degradation. The entire Ganges System had been

migrating eastward over the past century. Only two rivers of significance

remains connected to the Ganges Padma, the Gorai serving the

Southwest region and the Arial khan serving the South-Central region.

The off take point of the Gorai river has been silting up, and over the

years a massive barrier has come up which prevents the entry of the

waters into this stream. This trend and findings long predate the

commissioning of the Farakka Barrage in 1975.69 The Gorai has virtually

stopped drawing water as the Ganges recedes after the floods and its

discharge falls below something around 50,000-70,000 cusecs. Thus, the

Ganges treaty of 1996 is not going to solve the problem, because even

35,000 cusecs will not enough for the purpose. It is only when the flow is

of order of 70,000 cusses that the water of Ganges enter the Gorai.

The short team solution lies in the dredging, which is partial but

expensive solution. The long-term solution could be a Ganges Barrage 15

km below the Gorai outfall at Pangsa and 60 km downstream of Hardinge

Bridge. The Ganges Barrage Project will pond the river within its bank

and thereby permits headwater supply back into the Gorai.

The Ganges Barrage is being investigated since 1963, prior to the

liberation of Bangladesh, to store the wet season flow of the Ganges for

use during the dry season. After the 1996 Treaty, the Bangladesh

government has accorded the highest priority to the Ganges Barrage for

the environmental regeneration of the South West especially because the

Gorai dredging cannot be enough for its restoration. 7°

The feasibility study carried out for the project reveals that water

supplies through the Gorai River would reduce saline intrusion around

Khulna, which will help solve the existing socio-economic and the

environmental impacts of the areas. The concept of project has

undergone some change. While the Gorai resuscitation, salinity control,

fisheries, navigation, mangroves restoration components remains, the

agriculture perspective is different. Rather than the use of barrage to feed

an elaborate state run canal system, current-thinking favours enabling

restored Gorai flows to enter and fill network of moribund spill channels,

oxbows, village tanks and wetlands, regulatory structures, drainage

69 B. G. Verghese, Waters of Hope, Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 2000. p. 414. 70 Q.K. Ahmed, "GBM Regional Water Vision, Bangladesh Perspectives", in Q.K. Ahmed

et.. al. (eds.], Ganges Brahmaputra Meghna Region: A Framework for Sustainable Development, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2001. p.SO.

167

improvements. The idea is to restore the former ecosystem of the region,

facilitate recharge and enable farmers to irrigate their fields through river

lift pumps and shallow tube wells. Further, this would protect drinking

water supplies currently affected by arsenic contamination.

India has offered full cooperation in the feasibility study for such a

venture and extends whatever technical sul?port it can towards the

Ganges Barrage construction. Countries like Italy, Japan Kuwait,

Netherlands and UK have committed their cooperation to successful

implementation of the proposed Ganges Barrage project. International

agencies like World Bank, Asian Development Bank have agreed to

provide the financial and technical support to carry out an extensive

study. 71

Cooperation on the Teesta

Ganges and Brahmaputra basin has large number of interlinking river

systems stretching over four countries. It would necessarily contain

issues or problems to the sharing of transboundary waters flows among

the upper, middle and lower riparians. Bangladesh and India share 54

transboundary rivers but the sharing arrangement has been agreed upon

only in the case of the Ganges. The two countries were preoccupied with

Ganges water disputes over Farakka barrage for the past two decades,

which led to neglect of other areas of cooperation.

The Ganges water sharing treaty of 1996 states in article IX states that

both Bangladesh and India should endeavour "to agree to conclude water

sharing treaties/agreements with regard to other common rivers, guided

by the principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party". As a

follow up to the Treaty of Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission

agreed in July 1997 to set up a Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) to work

out arrangements for sharing the water. JCE agreed to examine and

negotiate the sharing issues in phases. In the first phase seven medium

sized rivers are being considered, viz, Teesta, Dharla, and Dhudhkumar

71 Dhaka Courier, Dhaka, March 12, 1998.

168

m the northwest and Manu, Khowai, Gumti and Muhuri in the east.

However, JCE accorded priority to the sharing of the Teesta River.

The Teesta is one of the tributaries of the Brahmaputra. It rises m the

Himalaya, runs through Sikkim and West Bengal in India and crosses

over into Bangladesh, where it joins Brahmaputra. A project on the

Teesta was mooted in the 1940's. After 194 7, both India and Bangladesh

pursued their respective Teesta projects and both are now in advance

stages of completion and development. Both are based on the natural

flows of the river, but the lean season flows are insufficient for their

combined needs thus, potential for a conflict of interest is obvious. Past

efforts at arriving at an agreement on the sharing of the waters of the

Teesta were not successful.

The Bangladesh project comprises of 615 mts. long barrage across the

Teesta River at Doani, which is only a few km downstream of the Indo­

Bangladesh border. The Barrage construction was completed in 1990

while works related to canals and distribution system is still continuing

and are near completion. Bangladesh has planned to irrigate 7,49,000

hectares of land in the northwestern region of Bangladesh in the greater

districts of Rangpur, Dinajpur and Bogra.

The Indian project has been planned to provide irrigation ultimately to

0.925 million districts of West Bengal. The project comprises of a barrage

across the Teesta near Gajaldoba soon after the river emerges from the

hills. The planning of the crop pattern hectares, mainly in the Darjeeling,

West Dinajpur, Maida,

Jalpaiguri and Cooch Bihar and irrigation water requirements are such

that Indian project on full development will require most of the lean

season natural flows of the Teesta river. Bangladesh has sanctioned the

whole of its own scheme, which will also require all of these flows and will

even fall short in some periods. In addition there are uncertainties

relating to flow data as observed and computed at successive stations

along the river in India and Bangladesh has been done upto 1985.

Teesta issue has not reached crisis point so far mainly because the

lt::Cl

development of the canal system is taking longer than planned. The basic

difference that still remains relate to the water availabilities at the

different sites along the river Teesta in both the countries, the modalities

of sharing, period of sharing, monitoring the implementation and the

manner of ensuring benefit to both the commands.

As the Teesta has insufficient flows to meet the requirements of the twin

Teesta projects, the augmentation would render the Barrage in either

country more viable. The diversion from the Brahmaputra river system

could serve the purpose. India already has made proposal of

Brahmaputra- Ganga link canal in 1977, supplemented by storages m

the Brahmaputra system. This canal is capable of covering a large part of

the proposed Teesta command of Bangladesh.

Alternatively, instead of diversion from the mam Brahmaputra, the

western tributaries such as Sunkosh, Manas, Torsa, Raidak etc, could

equally serve the purpose. The proposed Sunkosh dam in Bhutan with a

deregulating dam, would, if approved by the Royal government, will

augment lean season flows. This could be transferred via the Teesta and

Mahananda Barrage/Canal to the Ganges for redistribution at Farakka.

This is an alternative that needs to be studied including the

environmental aspects, by the countries involved working in cooperation.

The expectation is that there will be a political settlement on sharing the

lean season flows of the Teesta to optimize the benefits by an integrated

operation of the Teesta barrages in India and Bangladesh. Parallel with

the sharing issue, the coriparians should also agree on the arrangement

whereby all the countries are kept informed of any operational ~

intervention on the international levels so that there is a transparent and

trusted partnership among all.

Long Term Augmentation Options

As the Ganges water is crucial to the basin states requirements in the

November -May dry season of meagre rainfall, reaching an agreement

over augmentation- is of fundamental importance. A major characteristic

170

of the Ganges flow is abundance of water in the monsoon season and

shortage in the dry season. Indeed the dry season shortage is key

element in the Ganges water sharing issue between Bangladesh and

India. This is attributable to the monsoon season flow and attests to the

argument that the augmentation problem is not only of resource

potential or availability in the basin but also the political one of

management. 72

As early as 1974, the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh had

recognized the need for augmentation of the dry season flows. The

Ganges water sharing Treaty of 1996 also includes a provision for the

governments "to cooperate with each other in finding a solution to the

long-term problem of augmentation the flows of the Ganga/ Ganges

during the dry season". A notable difference between the approaches of

the earlier agreements/MODs and the 1996 Treaty is that the former

envisaged short term sharing arrangements contingent upon an

argumentation scheme, while the latter is a long term sharing agreement

without a direct linkage to augmentation. One possible option for the

substantial augmentation of the Ganges flows, which could benefit Nepal,

India and Bangladesh, would be to construct large storages on the

Ganges tributaries originating in Nepal.

The terrain of the northern and middle belts of Nepal offers excellent sites

for storages reservoirs. Studies in Nepal identified 28 potential reservoir

sites -nine of which are classified as "large" having storage capacity of

over three billion cubic meters. They are: Sapta Kosi, Kali Gandaki 1, Kali

Gandaki 2, Trishuli Ganga, Karnali [Chisapani], Bheri3, Bheri4, Karnali­

IB and Pancheswhar (at Nepal-India border]. The sites include six of the

seven sites identified earlier in the Bangladesh proposal for augmentation

in 1983. The Institute of Integrated Development Studies [Kathmandu]

analysis shows that the augmentation potential in the dry season from

72 P. Sarvanamuttu, "The Ganges and the Brahmaputra", in Caroline Thomas and Darryl Howlett (eds.] Resources Politics: Freshwater and Regional Relations, Open University Press, and Buckingham, 1993. P.l22.

171

these mne large reservmrs would range from 3,588 Cumecs ( 126,692

Cusecs) to 2755 Cumecs (97 ,279 Cusecs) in May. These large reservoirs

have very high flow regulating potential.

Apart from flow regulation on these dams will have benefits like -

1. Generation of large amount of clean energy, which is crucial to meet

the growing energy demand of the region, there by making

tremendous savings over thermal energy generation costs.

2. Reduction in flooding in downstream reaches by impounding the

monsoon flows behind dams.

3. Expansion in dry season cultivation areas and reduction In salinity

intrusion from the increased water supply in the dry season.

4. Control of erosion and sedimentation by providing alternative sources

of energy.

5. The negative aspects are associated with issues of

6. (I) submergence [implementation of all the 27 potential projects would

entail submergence of about 1,878 km2 of land or almost 1.27% of the

total land area of Nepal. 73

7. Seismicity,

8. Large scale population displacement; resettlement and rehabilitation.

9. Environmental concerns, etc. The issue will need to be examined

critically in project planning and addressed constructively in project

implementation. These are the major concerns to Nepal, as the

displacement and resettlement issues associated with submergence

would be confined to Nepal, which has limited agricultural land.

Some of these projects have been studied at least to pre feasibility level.

Karnali (Chisapani) multipurpose project is the only storage project that

has been studied at a detailed feasibility level with detailed assessment of

environmental issues. A highly favourable project from Bangladesh

73 Augmenting the Lean Season Flow of the Ganges, Water Resources Development Phase II Series, Institute of Integrated Development Studies {liDS] Publication, Katmandu, 2000. p.41.

17?

perspective is the Sapta Kosi, which has the maximum possibility for

augmentation the flows at Farakka. The Kosi Dam will have significant

storage capacity that should provide both Bihar (India) and Bangladesh

with flood cushion and augmented dry season flows after meeting Nepal's

full irrigation requirements. Augmentation from the Brahmaputra river

system would also need to be studied. Several options and combination

of options can be thought in this regard, such as the old Indian link

canal proposal (of which Bangladesh had reservations). It entails

construction of a barrage on the Brahmaputra at Jogighopa in Assam

(India) supplemented by three storages and transfer waters through a

link canal, crossing Bangladesh territory and then re-entering India and

out falling upstream of Farrakka.

Second option is to divert waters from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges

through a link canal within Bangladesh. However, this option has not yet

been studied and examined in relation to such parameters as pond levels

of the barrages, length and the alignment of the canal, available gradient

etc. The third option is to link the northern tributaries of the

Brahmaputra (Manas, Sunkosh, Raidak, and Torsa) to Teesta and further

down to the Ganges above Farakka, after crossing the Mahananda. These

diversions are considered feasible in combination with storage projects in

Bhutan. The water stored behind the proposed Sunkosh dam (with a

power potential of 4,000 MW) could be released into a canal designed to

provide a two-stage link to the Teesta and Mahananda Barrages in West

Bengal. The augmentation of about 12,000 cusses [340cusecs] is

expected, part of which could supplement the water needs of the two

Teesta Barrages (one in West Bengal and other in Bangladesh) and a part

could reach the Ganges at Farakka. The option still awaits full

environmental assessment and Bhutan's consent. 74

74 Q.K Ahmed, A.K. Biswas and R. Rangachari, Ganges Brahmaputra Meghna Region: A Framework for Sustainable Development, The University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2001. p.20.

173

Jogighopa Diversions

Another option would be a barrage across the Brahmaputra at Jogighopa

in western Assam with a canal that could divert the water into the Teesta

and Mahananda, or down the karatoya- Atrai river courses leading to

proposed Ganges Barrage. It would irrigate considerable areas and

stimulate fisheries and navigation en route. A diversion barrage at

Jogighopa could be a less expensive proposition, for reasons of

topography. This might be acceptable to Bangladesh, as it has various

times contemplated a barrage at Bahadurabad from which it could

irrigate the central part of the country and service its Ganges dependent

region as well. India too has long-term interests in developing a national

water grid and diverting Brahmaputra waters west and south as part of

efforts to meet the emerging water shortages in large parts of country.75

Exaggerated Fears on Linking Rivers

India has proposed a programme of interlinking of its rivers in December

2003.76 Under the programme, dams are being conceived upstream

Manas and Sunkosh Rivers in Bhutan under Manas-Sunkosh-Teesta­

Ganga link. Already there is lot of media focus in Bangladesh on India's

. plan to interlink rivers. Some Bangladeshi professionals have written to

the Supreme Court to scrap the interlinking programme. 77 Bangladesh

State Minister of Water Resources Mr. Gautam Chakraborty has said,

"Bangladesh will become a desert" if India implements its · River

Interlinking Project.78 The Bangladesh government is reported to have

taken up the issue with the Indian government and has been assured

that international laws on water sharing would be adhered in the

interlinking programme.

Senior officials in the Ministry of Water Resources said none of the

projects was likely to affect Bangladesh in a manner that was being

7s B.G. Verghese, "From Disputes to Dialogue to Doing", in A.K. Biswas and Juha I.Uitto [eds.] Sustainable Development ofthe Ganges Brahmaputra Meghna Basins, United Nation University Press, Tokyo. 2000. p.180.

76 India Today, New Delhi, January 20, 2003. pp .28-30. 77 The Hindu, New Delhi, September 21, 2003. 78 The Daily Star, Dhaka, April 12, 2004.

174

. '

projected in Media. Water Resources expert from India, Mr. B.G.

Verghese argue that interlinking of river is not a project but a dynamic

concept; the recommended links can be realigned, telescoped or even

dropped, while reconciling to the divergent views and trade offs. The

Himalayan component will entail delicate diplomatic negotiations with

Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Open and frank consultations would

help remove lurking fears, misunderstandings, and emotions whipped up

through media.

Arguably, there is no real conflict of interests between India's idea about

interlinking of rivers and the vital interests of Nepal, Bhutan and

Bangladesh. 79 Bangladesh is by and large assured of stipulated quantum

of dry season flows below Farakka under the terms of 1996 Ganges

Treaty. Interlinking of river will augment lean season availability in the

Ganges from which Bangladesh could well bargain a share. Dhaka had

earlier expressed particular interests in the Sapta Kosi project as this is

well placed to provide augmentation and flood moderation as well as

navigation to the sea. A possible Sunkosh [Bhutan] -Teesta- Mahananda­

Farakka was referred to the signing of the 1996 Ganges Treaty and

effusively welcomed by Bangladesh as a potential source of augmenting

the lean season flows of the Ganga.

The Ganges water Treaty of 1996 forms a watershed as far as cooperative

development and management of transboundary water resources

between India and Bangladesh is concerned. The era of conflict, mutual

mistrust, lack of effective dialogues, excessive emphasis on national

interests, differences in perception have so long impeded the optimum

development of water resources. A new window of opportunity has

emerged in post 1996 Treaty era in favour of cooperation, consultation,

synergetic bilateral/multilateral interests, political goodwill and a shared

water vision. Now, both the countries must effectively work for

progressively strengthening cooperation on water based integrated

regional development for sustainable human development, and stability.

79 The Himal, Kathmandu, September 2003. pp.3-6.

175