CHAPTER III

EVOLUTION OF THE EU:

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

78

Introduction

The European Union has strengthened its status as the champion of regional

integration in Europe over the past six decades which has moved towards to embrace all

countries from the Baltic Sea to the southern shores of the Mediterranean and from the

Atlantic to the western borders of Russia (Bhutani 2004: 45). The history of European

integration can be traced in successive waves and divided into three epochs. First, the

Luxembourg compromise1 period that is between 1958 and 1987. During this phase the

Council was a futile collective institution with the system of national vetoes protecting

the sovereignty of member states. On the other hand, legislative grid-lock in the Council

facilitated Court activism and the freedom of the Court to interpret the Rome Treaty was

thus the prime force impelling European integration all through the Luxembourg

compromise.

The second episode of European integration began with the ratification of Single

European Act2 (SEA) explicitly 1987 to 1992. At this time the Council became a

successful legislative institution at the cost of national sovereignty of individual

governments. The ratification of SEA effectively removed national vetoes in the Council

which enabled the Commission3 to act as a leading force behind European integration.

At the same time its legislative proposals respected the preferences of the crucial

members of the Council4 under Qualified Majority Voting5 (QMV) and the Parliament6

under the cooperation procedure (Hancock and Guy 2002: 473). The third and current

era of European integration began with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The Parliament

is now a powerful legislator, coequal with the Council under the reformed co-decision

procedure. In this present epoch all the four major institutions of the EU such as the

Council, the Parliament, the Commission and the Courts occupy vital positions in the

functioning of the European Union (Tsebelis and Geoffrey 2001: 359).

Neo-realism, Functionalism, Neo-functionalism, Intergovernmentalism, Liberal

Intergovernmentalism, Transactionalism, Federalism, Constructivism and Multi-level

Governance are the major theories of European Integration. Each school of thought

enlightens significant elements of the integration process as well as working together

79

Figure 2.1 Map of the European Union

80

and they will more fully capture the range of institutional dynamics at work in

contemporary Europe. Neofunctionalism has been regarded as the foremost integration

model of European integration. The process of spill over is the prominent feature most

closely associated with the neofunctionalist approach to the study of European

integration. In Haas’ formulation spill over refers to a situation where 'policies made in

carrying out an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is

expanded'. Neo-functionalism explained the process of integration as a set of functional

(i.e. economic) spill overs, leading to economic and political integration, with actors

transferring their expectations, and loyalties to a supranational central authority.

Historical Development of European Union

Robert Schumann, the then French Foreign Minister made an indirect suggestion

in 1950 that the process of integration and the formation of a new Europe would take

place in a gradual manner by saying that ‘the single Europe will not be made all at once,

or according to a single comprehensive plan. Rather, it will be built through a series of

concrete achievements, each of which will create a de facto solidarity (Johari 1986: 167;

Pinder and Simon 2007: 9).’ After the 1939-45 war, there was a strong desire among

policy planners to turn towards both regional and functional areas of narrower concern

in their endeavours to overcome the inability of the individual national states to achieve

economic well being and military security on the basis of its own strength. As noted

down by Jean Monnet, the French technocrat, success of this new approach is evident in

the new relationship between European countries which for centuries have been locked

in rivalry and strife and this new relationship is already transforming the international

scene as a whole. It is the fact that within each regional system their exist forces of

tension and conflict as well as factors of cohesion and cooperation. Furthermore it is the

degree to which adjustment of these forces can be achieved that determines the degree

of viability of each system (McLellan et al. 1974: 69).

The beginning of the European integration venture has come out into view in the

western part of the European continent after the Second World War. Since the Second

World War, European politicians established institutions such as the Western European

81

Union (WEU) in 1947 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development6 (OECD) in 1948 (Berend 2010: 12). In 1951, six countries namely France,

Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands formed the European Coal

and Steel Community (ECSC) through the Treaty of Paris, that was an incarnation of the

designs for a united Europe envisioned by Jean Monnet and influentially proposed by

Robert Schuman (Curtis and Joseph 2011: 2; Nau 2012: 505). For the first time, this inter-

state cooperation had opened the door to a formula of integration or put differently,

some of the powers of the member states had been transferred to a community organ

(Johari 1986: 168).

Founders of the ECSC pursued the intention that the community should

contribute to the economic prosperity, increasing employment and living standards in

all member states. Coal and steel industries were removed from full national

competencies and placed under supranational authority which had built a decision

centre for production, investments, social conditions and to a certain extent prices as

well (Suchacek 2002: 4). Then the Treaties establishing the European Economic

Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were finally

signed at Rome in 1957 (Aust 2010: 431). The Treaty of Rome is known as the bible of the

European Community, which provides the ultimate authority for the greater part of its

decisions and responsibilities. Under the Treaty of Rome, four main institutions were

established to give effect to the provisions of the treaty namely; the European

Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the European Court

of Justice7 (ECJ). Subsequently, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has adopted in

1962 by the European Council to establish a single market for agricultural products. It

has aimed at the managing of EC’s market for agricultural products (Boyd and Joshua

2007: 39).

The Merger Treaty of 1965 successfully blended the three Treaties of Rome

namely ECSC, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the

European Economic Community (EEC) which provided for a Single Commission and a

Single Council of the then three European Communities (Moga 2009: 798). They became

82

jointly known as the European Community (EC) although the abbreviation EEC

remained in common use to denote the combined organization. In the 1960s the

European Community (EC) dealt with a wide range of economic and related policies

through an institutional framework constituted under the Treaty of Rome (Curtis and

Joseph 2011: 2-3). During this period intra-Community trade leapt ahead, increasing by

28.4 percent annually and the average increase of imports from third countries was 10

percent.

International economic crises and recession of the 1970s exposed some of the

limitations of the European economies and signalled the need for a change for example,

in the structures of capital and labour markets in order to overcome barriers to

knowledge transfer due to different national technical standards (Hudson 2003: 52).

During these years all the member states suffered from mounting inflation and

unemployment, and most of them saw their balance of payments fall into severe deficit.

Furthermore, efforts to co-ordinate energy policies of the member states proved vague,

besides the attempts to find a common economic strategy to enable the Community to

hoist itself out of the recession. The member governments all felt constrained to

implement austerity policies in their own countries, and it became increasingly difficult

to persuade them to release resources for the introduction of new common policies

under the auspices of the Community. In the 1974 Paris summit of EC an agreement was

reached on the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund, whose

purpose was to help close the gap between the most disadvantaged and the more

favoured regions within the Community. It also instituted the European Council to

consider important foreign policy questions as well as the affairs of the Community and

decided that the European Parliament should be elected by direct universal suffrage

from 1978 onwards (Leonard 2005: 14-15).

The EC’s focus on monetary affairs in the 1970s resulted in the establishment of a

European Monetary System8 (EMS) in 1979 (Berkofsky 2004: 6). It was devised primarily

as a means of stabilizing currency fluctuations within the EC. The processes of

deepening economic integration and creating a common market in a virtual sense

83

entered a new phase with the functioning of a new treaty called the Single European

Act9 (SEA) of 1987, the EMS that supported the stability of European currencies and the

Schengen arrangements10 to facilitate intra-EU migration and promote labour mobility

etc. The pace of the process of European integration thus once more accelerated from the

1980s onwards via new forms of supranational regulation in response to growing

tendencies of globalization (Hudson 2003: 52). In addition the SEA called for the

completion of a single European market and undertook significant institutional reforms,

including a return to majority voting in the Council of Ministers and an enhancement of

the powers of the EP, the members of which had been directly and democratically

elected since 1979 (Curtis and Joseph 2011: 2-3; Hudson 2003: 52). These were the first

substantial amendments to the Treaty of Rome in its first 30 years in operation.

The 1992 Treaty on European Union popularly known as Maastricht Treaty

expanded the socio-political ambitions of the new European Union (EU) and outlined a

future Economic and Monetary Union11 (EMU) resulting in the 1999 adoption and 2002

circulation of a new single currency named Euro (Wood and Wolfgang 2008: 6). Other

provisions extended or defined more precisely the Community’s competences in other

policy areas. It amended the powers of various EC institutions thus once again

empowered the EP, renamed the Council of Ministers into the Council of the EU,

institutionalized the European Council for the gathering of heads of state and

government of EU member states and laid the groundwork for expanded membership

(Curtis and Joseph 2011: 2-3). It introduced the development of common foreign and

defence policies as a new concept of EC institutions.

The Maastricht Treaty established three pillars for the European Union. The

Pillar structure comprises the European Commission, the Common Foreign and Security

Policy12 (CFSP) and the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (Table 2.1)

(Stevens 2000: 147). The first Pillar embraced the three existing European Communities

treaties such as the ECSC, EC as well as Euratom, second Pillar contained new

provisions on a common foreign and security policy, and third Pillar provided for co-

operation between the member states on justice and home affairs. The first and second

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Pillars are not subject to the EC institutions and are organized on an inter-governmental

basis (Leonard 2005: 43). This treaty undoubtedly represented the most important

development in the EC’s history since the signing of the Treaty of Rome.

Other European countries began to take note of the economic success of the

Community. Thus the EEC, initially had six member states enlarged with its early

success by incorporating Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (UK) in 1973

(Nicholson 1998: 38), followed by Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Again

it expanded to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, ten Mediterranean and

Central or Eastern European countries in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and

lastly Croatia in 2013 (Axelrod et al. 2011: 214) (Table 2.2).

Table 2.1 Institutional Structure of the European Union

Source: Steve Wood and Wolfgang Quaisser (2008): The New European Union

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 was an amendment to Maastricht Treaty which

has given much emphasis on citizenship issues and individual rights and its major

achievement lies in the reform of legislative process and the consolidation and

European council (heads of state & government);

Council of ministries (representatives in policy areas)

European parliament (via European elections)

European Central Bank

(Common monitory policy for EMU

members)

European court of justice (formally independent of

other institutions; overrules national

legislation in defined areas

European commission (nominated by member

states; administers community policies)

CFSP (intergovernmental arrangements for foreign, security & defiance policy)

85

renumbering of the separate texts of the treaties (Aust 2010: 431). Amsterdam spreads

over into four policy areas: the first major policy area attend to inequalities between men

and women in a cadre of legal areas, which comprise employment, immigration,

asylum, and visas. The second policy area addresses the issue of developing the rights of

a European citizen by essentially creating rights for citizens ensured by the EU. The

third policy area dealt with the creation of a harmonized external or foreign policy,

concentrating on the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP). The final policy area

consolidated institutional questions by including national parliaments more in EU

decision-making (Hancock and Guy 2002: 477).

Nice Treaty of 2001 focused on the consolidation of EU institutions for an

eastward expansion as well as recalculating voting weights in the Council of the

European Union to make the EU more democratic and transparent (Paxton 2002: 675).

The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 took most of the changes that would be made under the EU

constitution and made the Charter of Fundamental Rights permanent. This Treaty

fostered the transparency of the EU decision making process, the role of EU Parliament

in policy formation and a closer relationship between the EU Parliament and the EU

Council. Moreover, the Lisbon treaty stood for a conciliatory approach in continuing

integration without ruffling too many nationalist feathers (Berend 2010: 73) (Table 2.3).

The EC institutions continue their function under the Treaty on European Union

or the Maastricht treaty and the Amsterdam treaty. In addition, powers have been

acquired by the European Union that are not subject to the institutions of the EC, but are

dealt with on an inter-governmental basis. These include a common foreign and security

policy and co-operation over judicial, police and immigration issues. Now, the EU is a

hybrid organization consisting of the EC, with its carefully defined division of powers

between its constituent institutions, and an additional inter-governmental component

(Leonard 2005: 45).

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Table 2.2 Enlargement of the EU

Original member

states

(1951)

Enlargements

First

1973

Second

1981

Third

1986

Fourth

1995

Fifth

2004

Sixth

2007

Seventh

2013

Belgium

France

West Germany

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Britain

Denmark

Ireland

Greece Spain

Portugal

Austria

Finland

Sweden

Czech Republic

Cyprus

Hungary

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Malta

Poland

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Bulgaria

Romania

Croatia

Source: Steve Wood and Wolfgang Quaisser (2008): The New European Union

87

Table 2.3 Milestones in the European Union

Event Year Content Achievement

Formation of

European Coal

and Steel

Community

(ECSC)

1951 Belgium, West

Germany, Luxembourg,

France, Italy and the

Netherlands became

members

The power to make

decisions about the coal and

steel industry in these

countries was placed in the

hands of an independent

body called the High

Authority

Treaties of Rome 1957 Creation of Atomic

Energy Community

(EURATOM) and the

European Economic

Community (EEC)

The member states set about

removing trade barriers

between them and forming

a common market.

Merger Treaty 1965 Merging of three

European communities

namely; ECSC,

EURATOM and EEC

It provided Single

Commission, Single Council

and the European

Parliament

European

Monetary System

(EMS)

1979 A system to manage

monetary affairs

Created an area of currency

stability throughout the

European Community

Single European

Act

1987 Partially liberalizes EU

economic space

Free flow of capital, goods,

labour and services

Plan for

Economic and

Monetary Union

(EMU)

1989

Exchange Rate

Mechanism (ERM)

Member countries agreed to

keep their government

borrowing and spending

under control with low

inflation and low interest

rates.

European

Economic Area

(EEA)

1991 European Community

and European Free

Trade Association

(EFTA) agree to form

EEA

Single European economic

area for free trade among

members

88

Maastricht Treaty

1993 Pillar structure in the

European Union

It comprises European

Commission, Common

Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP) and Police and

Judicial Cooperation in

Criminal Matters

Amsterdam

Treaty

1997 Amendment to

Maastricht Treaty

Emphasis on citizenship

issues and individual rights

European Central

Bank13 (ECB)

1998 Administration of

monetary policy

An authority to manage

monetary affairs

Euro 1999 Common currency Replaced national

currencies of EMU countries

Treaty of Nice 2000 Consolidation of EU

institutions

Laying down new rules on

the size of the EU

institutions and the way

they work

Treaty of Lisbon 2007 Treaty on the

Functioning of

European Union (TFEU)

Brought changes to EU

constitution and made

Charter of Fundamental

Rights permanent

Source: Gerhard Wahlers (2007): India and the European Union

Theoretical Perspectives on European Integration

Most of the theories in the study of regional cooperation or integration process

are developed to explain European integration. Europe is a region of the world, where

regional integration initiated in the early 1950s with the European Coal and Steel

Community (ECSC) in 1951 (Laursen 2008: 3). Most of the regional integration theories

present a macroscopic view of the dynamics and consequences of integration and they

reflect on the pattern, logic and implications of increased interactions among nation

states within a regional setting founded on systematic conceptual explanation (Amin

2010: 1070). Andrew Moravcsik’s edifying statement on integration process is that any

general explanation of integration cannot rest on a single theory but must rest on a

multi-causal framework that orders a series of more narrowly focused theories (Moga

2009: 805). Recently, there is a swift growth of studies of the external dimensions of

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European integration that can be seen as an obvious consequence of 1) the growth of

foreign, security and defence policy agenda 2) the emerging status of the Euro as an

alternative reserve currency 3) the widening issue base of international trade that has

forced issues of European integration such as the Common Agricultural Policy onto the

agenda of the WTO (Rosamond 2003: 5).

Each school of thought enlightens significant elements of the integration process

as well as working together and they will more fully capture the range of institutional

dynamics at work in contemporary Europe (Checkel 1999: 546). These theories of

European integration are based on assumptions and leading to explanations that are

supported as strongly as possible by their proponents against the challenges raised by

their opponents. This debate is definitely important for researchers because it is about

the ups and downs in the process of European integration (Puchala 1999: 318). In a

successful integration processes states voluntarily hand over part of their decision-

making powers to a supranational level and set up a new level of political power, which

supersedes the state.

Neo-realism

In the late 20th century, Kenneth Waltz formulated the influential neorealist

theory of international politics which premised on the primacy of states and on a

structural analysis of an anarchic international system that required states to focus on

security, power, and relative gains (Choi and James 2002: 486; Pollack 2011: 3). Waltz

explained European integration as a side effect of the structural condition of US-Soviet

bipolarity. Again he argued that European integration became possible only after the

political power of the European states had started to decline. And the United States had

emerged as the guarantor of West European security in the face of the Soviet threat,

leaving the member states of the European Community free to pursue integration

without concerns about security threats from their European partners. In this

circumstances security was dependent on an external actor and the risk of war was

decreased among the European states (Archer 2000: 24).

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John Mearsheimer assumed relatively pessimistic assumptions about the

implications of anarchy, arguing that the security dilemma necessitates each state to

attempt to maximize its own power, seeking not only security but also hegemony, and

distrusting the intentions of other states. In Mearsheimer’s analysis of the prospects for

the EU after the Cold War, he predicted that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and

the going away of the United States from the defence of continental Europe would direct

to an increase in concerns about relative gains among EU member states, most notably

with respect to German power and intentions, and place a significant check upon the

future course of European integration (Pollack 2011: 3, 7). Neorealism may be capable of

explaining the international context of the beginning of the European integration process

precisely, but as a general theory of integration it encounters problems (Heinonen 2006:

62). The neorealist interpretations on the outcomes of the end of the cold war foresaw

problems for the European integration process. However, in reality the European

integration process continued to intensify after the end of the cold war and the

illustrative power of neorealism in relation to European integration process reduced. It

exposed the inability of the neorealist approach to explain further integration efforts of

the EU (Sangiovanni and Daniel 2005: 102).

They saw the process of European integration as a temporary arrangement

between European nation-states seeking to secure or to target strategic objectives and as

a sophisticated arena for intergovernmental negotiations. In their perception national

governments will always be the only key players in the process because they would not

delegate any of the functions to European supranational level which prevents them from

following their own national agenda (Lazea 2011: 3; Pinder and Simon 2007: 6). So it has

difficulties to explain the phenomena where states voluntarily hand over part of their

sovereignty to an international organization in an irreversible manner (Heinonen 2006:

62). Furthermore these assumptions have minimized the theory’s relevance even though

later theories have not replaced or subsumed the validity of neorealism, which have

continued to develop in recent years and remain more or less viable as theories of

European integration and EU politics.

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Functionalism

Functionalism and neofunctionalism are considered as the progenitors in the

field of regional integration. Functionalism is believed to represent the theoretical

impulse that preceded the drive to European integration. David Mitrany, the father of

functionalism published his famous work on the theory of functionalism A Working

Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization in

1943, which underpinned the ideas of Jean Monnet’s and Robert Schuman on European

integration (Lelieveldt and Sebastiaan 2011: 35). Mitrany warned against the logic of

territorial organization at the regional level and projected a universal rather than a

regional solution to collective problem that should weld together the common interest of

all without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each (Choi and James 2002:

482). The successful creation of ECSC in 1952 and EEC or Common Market in 1956

spurred the interest in David Mitrany’s functionalist theory and integration because EEC

seemed to hold out the promise for eventual political integration of Western Europe.

Moreover Mitrany held that economic unification would contribute to the development

of political integration as international integration based on cooperation in functional

plus non political areas developed, the chances for international peace would be

enhanced (Viotti and Mark 1987: 207).

Functionalism defied the state-centric worldview and was anxious that whether

nation-states are the optimal form of an organization to fulfil human needs. Though,

according to functionalist reasoning the most significant objective was not international

integration as such, they somewhat believe in the motto of form follows function. They

proposed to establish flexible task-oriented international organizations because human

needs change over time as well as vary across space and the design of institutional

solutions had to be open-minded. This could better accomplish human needs than

nation-states and at the same time, the probability of international conflict would be

considerably reduced. Charles Pentland generally defined integration as 'the process

whereby two or more actors form a new actor'. Functionalists accepted this definition by

taking nation-states as original actors and the new actor needed not to be a state in the

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same sense (Heinonen 2006: 55). Functionalism presumed that the absolute existence of a

mismatch between the territorial scale of human problems and of political authority

brings forth pressures for jurisdictional reform. And regional integration is a response to

the collective benefits of extending the territorial scope of jurisdictions, albeit the

divergence between collective welfare and the structure of authority does not speak for

itself. But Mitrany thought that the welfare benefits of supranationalism would propel

reform (Hooghe and Gary 2008: 3).

Functionalism has been criticized on the grounds that it is too naive, paying no

attention to the political side of arranging international functional organizations and

having a poor record of prediction (Heinonen 2006: 55). Anyway functionalism is still

important today not as a separate research programme but as an influential one on other

theories. It permits a strong autonomous role for international institutions and provides

a space for domestic actors to influence regional organizations as well as policies

directly. Also it provides a rival to realist explanations. In addition its messages has been

absorbed into theories of institutions as well as theories of preference formation which

are based on asset ownership, leading sectors and the distribution of economic

capabilities (Choi and James 2002: 486).

Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism has been regarded as the foremost integration model of

European integration which stemmed from functionalism. Ernst Haas, founding father

of neofunctionalism in 1958 through his book The Uniting of Europe elaborated the theory

of neofunctionalism for the first time. It was a theoretically oriented case study on the

ECSC and further elaborated the theory in his 1964 work Beyond the Nation-State

(Lelieveldt and Sebastiaan 2011: 35). His new vision focused specifically upon the

regional integration project in Europe.

Neofunctionalism has been looked upon as a composite theory with three

components such as background conditions, process conditions and conditions that are

likely to encourage or discourage task expansion. The background conditions observed

that integration was most likely to emerge first among countries with a certain type of

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domestic environment; for instance, liberal democratic countries with advanced

capitalist economies, differentiated social structures and highly pluralistic interest group

structures. The process condition implicates solid networks of economic exchange, trade,

labour migrations, tourism and free flows of productive factors. The third phase

involves spill over in which once integration begins in initial settings, there are prospects

for expanding cooperative habits into other areas. This process of task expansion is

labelled as spill over that could be purely functional with linkages among different

sectors serving as the transmission belts of integration (Choi and James 2002: 485).

Neofunctionalism has been viewed as the most insightful and helpful reflexive

theory that has been developed and refined over time in understanding European

integration’s underlying dynamics. It espouses a transformative ontology where it is

assumed that both the actors and the games that they play will change significantly

during the integration process (McGowan 2007: 3). Neo-functionalism explained the

process of integration as a set of functional (i.e. economic) spill overs, leading to

economic and political integration, with actors transferring their expectations, and

loyalties to a supranational central authority. Important elements in the theory included

the role of political actors (national and supranational), and the transfer of expectations

to a supranational institution that would be expected to meet the demands of actors and

economic agents (Farrell 2005: 7).

The process of spill over is the prominent feature most closely associated with

the neofunctionalist approach to the study of European integration plus a significant

advance upon functionalism. In Haas’ formulation spill over refers to a situation where

'policies made in carrying out an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if

the task itself is expanded' (Falkner 2011: 6). Another milestone in the history of

neofunctionlism was Leon Lindberg's The Political Dynamics of European Economic

Integration of 1963. According to Lindberg spill-over refers “to a situation in which a

given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can

be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a

need for more action, and so forth (Laursen 2008: 4).”

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Neofunctionalism perches on two inter-related claims. The first maintains that

integration happens when organized economic interests pressure governments to

manage economic interdependence by centralising policies and creating common

institutions. In this background neofunctionalists identified economic transactions and

welfare needs as the real source pushing positive inter-state co-operation and common

endeavours. The second core argument emphasizes that any initial decisions to integrate

in the above fashion produces, and unintentionally, both economic and political spill

overs that push regional integration forward (Frankel 1973: 55).

Haas offered an analysis of the process and progression of European integration

through supranationality, sub-national actors and spill over. Spill over takes place on

account of the impact it has on differentiated actors, including multinationals, interest

groupings, the Commission and national organizations. These actors form alliances to

enhance EU decision-making in new sectors and increase integration in sectors where

agreements have already been attained. In most cases spill over is the result of past

policies created by Member States and remains central to the integration process and

continues to make crucial policy decisions in the EU (Howell 1998).

The general reproach against this school of thinking is that it is deficient in a

deeper understanding of the important role of EU level processes and institutions

beyond the Council as a result the governments’ power is overrated, at least for day-to-

day politics of the EU which in turn tends to be underrated vis-à-vis the grand bargains.

In addition it has come to mean different things to different people so its successors held

increasingly ad hoc reformulations, internal disagreements, and very selective and

narrow interpretations. But later on neofunctionalism failed to identify the causal

relationships between economic and political integration and between social values and

political behaviour (Falkner 2011: 6-7).

Intergovernmentalism

The intergovernmentalist school of integration theory emerged with Stanley

Hoffmann’s claim that the nation-state is far from being obsolete and has proven to be

obstinate (Pollack 2011: 12). Through his intergovernmentalist approach, he underlined

95

the importance of national governments and their roles in shaping the EC’s structure.

He emphasized that national governments would always endorse their interests within

a broader system (Lelieveldt and Sebastiaan 2011: 35). Intergovernmentalism

comprehends that states are basic actors in the integration process and regional

organizations are mere facilitators or agents carrying out the collective will of the

national governments. Again it implies that the member states are more authoritative to

the union than the EU institutions themselves, since no autonomous power is assigned

to these institutions (Miles 1995: 4). In this state-centric outlook, states act together to

realize common objectives and the will of the states are expressed through national

governments. Besides states are considered as centres of identity and are independent to

decide on major internal as well as external issues. In this situation no outside decisions

can be thrust upon them and no organization including regional organization can

replace the states. Therefore, intergovernmentalists argue that regional organization

could have forward march only if states consent it for common benefit indicating the

centrality of states in the integration process (Amin 2010: 1071).

When intergovernmentalism is applied to European integration, it explains the

direction and pace of the integration process mainly by reference to decisions and

actions taken by the governments of the European states. In addition there is an

appreciation that other actors, both within and beyond states, can exercise some

influence on developments that may not be crucial and influential. This focus on states

and their own distinctive national interests which they vigorously defend, especially in

the spheres of high politics such as foreign policy, security and defence resulted in

intergovernmentalists tending to emphasize on the logic of diversity rather than on the

logic of integration as Hoffmann put across years before (Nugent 2003: 482; Fabbrini

2012: 13). In the observation of intergovernmentalists like Paul Taylor, the few decisive

political agreements of the 1970s such as the formation of the European Council in 1974

and the creation of the European Monetary System in 1979 had actually taken the

Community back to a traditional intergovernmentalist style of decision-making because

96

these agreements retained the national veto and minimized the role of supranational

actors like the Commission (Pollack 2011: 12).

According to Hoffmann, the transnational logic of integration had not replaced

nation states and national interests in Europe, even if the first years of integration had

been promising. Instead he drew attention to the significance of national interests in

European politics and integration. His views rest on the perceptions that states are basic

units of the international system and their main objective is to promote their national

interests. Intergovernmentalism put the state at the centre of integration process and no

longer considered the integration as a process with its own logic, but viewed it as a

process that member states tried to control according to their own interests. (Heinonen

2006: 61).

Intergovernmentalism undermines the nuances involved in the integration

process and treats regional integration exclusively as state directed one. This denial to

admit the role and significance of other actors influencing integration process as well as

failure to look at organizations like EU from a discourse distinct from state versus

supranational and as a new entity constitute a clear limitation of intergovenmentalism.

Moreover EU possesses its own identity and the activities of its central institutions

nowadays influence the policies of the member states to a significant level (Amin 2010:

1074). Intergovernmentalist theorists reasserted the primacy of the nation-state within

EU institutions especially when the EC seemed to run into trouble in the 1960s. For a

second time this approach has given further impulse in the 1990s by the liberal

intergovernmentalism of Andrew Moravcsik, which remains influential even as other

scholars have attempted to build more complex institutional models on the core

assumptions of earlier theories (Pollack 2011: 1).

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

The founder and prominent exponent of liberal intergovernmental view of

regional integration is Andrew Moravcsik. In his 1993 work Preferences and Power in the

European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach, he outlined the major aspects

of liberal intergovernmentalism (Choi and James 2002: 488). Liberal

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intergovernmentalism has obtained the status of a baseline theory in the study of

regional integration and an essential first cut explanation against which other theories

are often compared. The first characteristic makes it a baseline theory is that: it has

founded on broader social science theory and draws up insights from traditional schools

in European integration studies that treat the European integration as a unique or sui

generic activity. Secondly, it is a grand theory that tries to find the broad evolution of

regional integration by linking together multiple theories and factors into a single

coherent approach appropriate to explaining the trajectory of integration over time.

Thirdly, it is parsimonious due to its simplicity and multi-causal explanation. It

deliberately seeks to simplify EU politics via stressing the essential but excluding certain

secondary activities. At the same time it elucidates integration with a minimum of three

theories, arrayed in a multistage model- one each of preferences, bargaining and

institutions. These characteristics make it a successful theory to an extent (Moravcsik

and Frank 2009: 66-67).

The three step model of Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism combines (1) a

liberal theory of national preference formation with (2) an intergovernmental model of

EU-level bargaining and (3) a credible commitments model of institutional choice. In the

book The Choice for Europe of 1998, he addressed this model by investigating the

evolution of the EU from 1955 to 1992, from Messina to Maastricht (Pollack 2011: 14;

Moravcsik and Frank 2009: 68). In the first stage of the model, national heads of

government aggregate the interests of their domestic constituencies as well as their own

interests, and articulate their respective national preferences toward the EU. Hence,

national preferences are complex, reflecting the distinctive economics, parties, and

institutions of each member state, and they are determined domestically, not shaped by

participation in the EU. In this circumstance, Moravcsik argues in substantive terms that

national preferences are driven by issue-specific and generally economic interests, with

at best a secondary role for geopolitical interests or ideology. In the second phase of

bargaining, national governments fetch their preferences to the bargaining table in

Brussels, where agreements reflect the relative power of each member state, and where

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supranational organizations such as the Commission exert little or no influence. At last

in the third stage, Moravcsik puts forward a rational choice theory of institutional

choice, arguing that EU member states adopt particular institutions such as Council,

Commission and the Court in order to increase the credibility of their mutual

commitments as pooling and delegating sovereignty through international

organizations allows states to commit themselves credibly to their mutual promises

(Pollack 2011: 14).

Liberal intergovernmentalism comprises of two components: a liberal theory of

how economic interdependence influences national interests, and an

intergovernmentalist theory of international negotiation. In the first component it

believes that national governments are not the only important decision makers in the EU

and the Commission of the European Communities as well as the European Parliament

also plays important legislative roles. It is only by evaluating the results of institutional

rules on the interactions among these institutions that one can understand the policies

that are produced every day in the EU and thus the nature of the integration processes

itself. In the second component it perceives that the governments as the sole crucial

decision makers in the process of European integration. The outcomes reflect their

interests, and there is a great danger that non-decision or clearly sub-optimal policies

evolve a situation of joint decision trap (Falkner 2011: 7, 20; Heinonen 2006: 64-65).

The main achievement of Liberal Intergovernmentalism lies in the apparent

accuracy of the substantive assumptions and empirical predictions it advances about

European politics (Moravcsik and Frank 2009: 68). It is more sophisticated than previous

theories but ignores the timing of certain decisions. For instance, the identification of the

national preferences of the main countries at the time of the grand bargains is made

retroactive. And the theory fails to say something about why and when a new one

should occur. Another shortcoming of liberal intergovernmentalism is the reduction of

the relevant actors to the most powerful member states (Castaldi 2007: 22).

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Transactionalism/Communication

Transactionalism is firmly associated with the works of Karl Deutsch, who was a

leading researcher on the theory. His pioneering work on transactionalism produced the

landmark publication of Political Community at the International Level in 1954. In this

book, he argued that international community can be ascertained and measured through

the volume, content and scope of international transactions between its hypothesized

members (Frankel 1973: 53). His subsequent empirical work on transactionalism in 1957

which resulted in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area validated his thesis. Its

theorizing was not based on any particular historical experience or occurrence; instead it

tried to draw its reasoning from an extensive body of historical evidence. So it has more

scientific rigour than any other classical models of political integration (Tooze 1978: 229).

Integration in transactionalism denoted foremost the creation of security communities.

For Deutsch, integration is “the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’

and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a

long time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its populations.” He has

concentrated upon the formation of security communities to terminate war as social

institution. Therefore a security-community “is one in which there is real assurance that

the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their

disputes in some other ways.” Thus, integration means the establishment of a security-

community (George 1997: 178).

Deutsch differentiated two types of security communities: the so-called

amalgamated and pluralistic. In amalgamation, integration had more or less the same

meaning as in other integration models. So it was a merger of two independent units

into a single larger unit, which would have a common government after amalgamation.

In pluralistic security communities, its constituent parts retained their independence.

However they were able to establish a security community, of which the Nordic

countries are a leading example. The desirability of pluralistic security communities

came up from the fact that they were easier to attain and easier to preserve than their

amalgamated counterparts (Deutsch 2000: 652-654). Deutsch and his group pointed out

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five essential requirements so as to enable the establishment of a security community: 1)

the compatibility of the main values 2) social communication between integrating units

3) mobility of persons between participating units 4) multiplicity and balance of

transactions 5) mutual predictability of behaviour. From the above formulations, one can

easily conclude that transactions and communications were important in the

achievement of a security community (Heinonen 2006: 52-53).

The state system is an actuality in the present international system.

Simultaneously transactional flows are a visible phenomenon in international life.

Transactionalists recognize that the state system cannot be abolished so easily while

other approaches try to dismantle the state system. This approach made an effort to

elucidate how such an unavoidable development can be channelled towards the creation

of peace and security in the relations among states. In other words, if the state system

cannot be abolished, then the only way to deal with the situation is to accept it as a fact

and work with developments over time. And it is assumed that a rise in the flow of

transactions can bring states closer and reduce the rivalry among them

(George 1997: 194).

Deutsch’s socio-causal paradigm of political integration holds that political

integration cannot occur until a process of social assimilation creates a homogeneous

transnational population. In order to illustrate the levels of political integration in

Western Europe, he argues that it needs only examine the data relating to the levels of

social homogeneity which characterize that region. For the purpose of measuring the

extent of social assimilation in Western Europe Deutsch examined the transaction flow

rates of trade, mail, travel, migration, and student exchange data and studies the

responses of mass and elite population samples to a complex series of survey questions.

These analysis of varied data leads to conclude that the levels of social assimilation in

Western Europe have i) remained constant for the past decade and 2) are too low to

permit institutional political integration to occur (Fisher 1969: 254-55; Sullivan 2001:

147-48).

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Donald J. Puchala brought a balanced judgment upon the relevance of

international transactions for regional integration (Frankel 1973: 62) through polishing

and widening the analysis by isolating indicative channels and patterns of political

transaction (Tooze 1978: 224). He observed that transaction flows indices are restricted to

available quantitative data therefore they exclude many transactions which are not

readily quantified such as informal political consultation and coordination carried out

between national governments. Besides, the transaction flows themselves are but a

reflection of integration rather than a cause of it. Thus they are useful to monitor the

progress of integration in various fields, but not particularly reliable for predicting

future systemic behaviour. Nevertheless, Puchala’s own findings indicate that since the

formation of EEC in 1958 the convergence in attitudes and a modest rise in transactions

have continued, and that European integration has not stagnated (Hodges 1978: 248-49).

Deutsch has contended that since the mid-1950s the structural or institutional,

political integration of Western Europe has come to a halt that means the halt of political

integration in Western Europe is the ending of any trend towards the development or

the expansion of the authority of supranational institutions to make major policy

decisions. So, political decisions will continue to be made by sovereign nation states and

not by any supranational European institutions. Deutsch did not make any conscious

endeavours to directly measure the decision making capability of any Western European

supranational institution even if institutional political integration is the central variable

in his analysis (Fisher 1969: 254). Transactionalism and the foundation of security

communities still remain fundamental in the field of integration theory because

European states have succeeded in the establishment of a security community and co-

operation within the EU which has consolidated the means of peaceful cooperation

(Sullivan 2001: 150).

Federalism

Federalism is a political ideology which supports the foundation of a political life

on such a model and it can also be applied to regional integration. Federalism has the

tendency to act as a political project as well as an academic approach to regional

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integration. It has played an important part in the thinking of pan-European and

resistance movements before and during the Second World War. The first initiative to

start an integration process after the War was made by the federalists that led to the

formation of Council of Europe (Heinonen 2006: 51). In the European integration

process, federalism usually refers to the idea of taking the process of integration forward

and increases the powers of the European Union. On the other hand, in federalism the

division between central and regional authority can also be found from the principle of

subsidiarity (Hodges 1978: 241).

Federalists identified the crucial role of national governments and political

considerations in the European integration process. They accept the possibility of

European institutions to play a specific role in the process including in the European

Parliament. The federalists have a political goal and organization which forces them to

continuously develop their analytical tools to make a realistic assessment of the

integration process in order to try to direct it towards their goal (Castaldi 2007: 4). Two

starting points can be differentiated in federalist discourses. The first foresee that

progress and peace are the outcomes of the interaction of peoples. The second predicts

that stability and harmony will be the upshot of enlightened constitutional design. These

two starting points lead to a clearly defined supranational state and federalists are likely

to view statehood as a desirable or inevitable mode of governance. The endeavour is to

achieve balance between rival levels of authority as well as efficiency and democracy on

the other. In the course of constitutional means multiple sovereignties are achieved by

the devolution of authority in certain selected policy domains (Tirkos 2010: 40).

Federalism engages in a multiplicity of established human beliefs and practices

at different levels both within and beyond traditional state boundaries. Yet again it is

regarded as a pact deriving from trust and implying an agreement that is freely and

mutually consented to, whereby each party surrenders a degree of autonomy in

exchange for some compensating advantage. Larry Siedentop, in his Democracy in Europe

published in 2000 speaks out that “in principle, federalism should offer a means of

combining the advantages of different scales of political organization offering small

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nations the security and strength of a large state while dispersing interests and

ambitions in a way that works against an excessive centralization of power and anything

like majority tyranny.” Moreover, federalism is a political system which makes it

possible to combine the advantages of small states and large states without at least some

of the disadvantages attaching to it (Cocodia 2010: 65).

Three strands of federalist theory discussed in the context of European

integration can be distinguished. The first pattern is founded on the ideas of Immanuel

Kant who saw expanding federation as the greatest constitutional safeguard against the

threat of war. The second strand is based on democratic theory and seeks to devise ways

of ensuring efficient governance within a democratic framework so that authority is

applied as close to the people as possible. The third pattern stands on the contemplation

of federalizing processes and tendencies. Background conditions and social movements

that induce federalist outcomes are also analyzed (Tirkos 2010: 39). Federalists gave

emphasize to the significance of common institutions which relates the transfer of

powers to the Union to deal effectively with problems that are far away from the reach

of existing states but have become transnational. Most of these problems encircle the

economy, the environment, and security and the states should retain control over these

matters if they can still cope up adequately. Besides, federalist perspective is based on

principles of liberal democracy, in particular rule of law, based on fundamental rights

and representative governments with the laws enacted and the executive controlled by

elected representatives of the citizens. These are the principles that would shape the

European institutions (Pinder and Simon 2007: 7).

Mario Albertini construed federalism as a political thought or ideology looking

into the analytical aspects of European integration. Michael Burgess opines federalism in

the context of European integration is both a dynamic process as well as a goal to be

attained. He mentions several aspects of federalist thoughts used to build a new

framework theory but refuses to suggest an alternative theory of European integration.

The difference between the goal and the process allows federalist analytical thought to

evolve during the process to come to terms to the empirical realities of the process, even

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if the final federalist institutional goal did not change (Castaldi 2007: 4-5). John

McCormick (2005), in his book Understanding the European Union attributes that EU

displays the following federalist characteristics:

a. Some Member States have adopted a common currency (the Euro). By doing

so they transferred monetary policy from their national central banks to the

European Central Bank;

b. The EU budget gives EU institutions an element of financial independence

even though by comparison to national budgets the amount is small ($120

billion in 2004);

c. EU law supersedes national law in certain areas such as intra-European

trade, agriculture, social policy and the environment;

d. The European Parliament is a directly elected representative legislature. Its

powers are expanding in the area of European law-making. By contrast in

areas were its powers are expanding, national parliaments’ powers are

declining;

e. The European Commission may oversee negotiations with third parties in

areas it has been authorized to do so;

f. It has a complex system of treaties and laws that applied uniformly on the

EU and to which all Member States and citizens are subject. These are

interpreted by the European Court of Justice whose judgments and

decisions are binding.

Detractors of federalism point to the fact that concentrating on some governing

capacity at the European level generates a dangerous distance between governors and

the governed. At the same time they failed to empirically prove the argument that

federal constitutions act as the best means of guaranteeing individual freedoms (Tirkos

2010: 41).

Constructivism

The constructivist studies have focused on the socializing and identity-shaping

effects of European integration on national agents. Constructivists view integration as

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resulting from processes of social learning and ideational assimilation that lead social

actors to reorient their loyalties towards a new supranational community. In other

words integration has depicted as a revealed convergence towards a common regional

identity (Sangiovanni and Daniel 2005: 102). Constructivism is based on two important

assumptions: (a) The environment in which states or actors take action is social as well

as material; and (b) The environment can provide states and actors with an

understanding of their interests. The first assumption addresses that the material

structures, beyond certain biological necessities, are given meaning only by the social

context through which they are interpreted. The second reflects the basic nature of

agents, in particular, their relation to broader institutional environments. Constructivists

emphasize a process of interaction between agents and structures; the ontology is one of

mutual constitution, in which neither unit of analysis-agents or structures-is reduced to

the other and made ontologically primitive. Thus the EU is really what actors on all

levels make it, and the feelings, attitudes, or even identities that result from integration

are both shaped by the process and shape the process of integration itself (White 2010:

41; Jupille et al. 2003: 14).

Constructivists accentuate those individuals’ interests and identities are

fashioned by the social environment in which they exist similarly, they argue that the

social environment is shaped over time by the actions of individuals. Thus the

relationship is one of two-way interaction as well as mutually constitutive. On the other

hand, a constructivist history of the EU has cantered on the ongoing struggles,

contestations, and discourses on how to build Europe over the years and actors

including governments who also know what they want and are never uncertain about

the future and even their own stakes and interests (Bache & George 2005: 43-44).

Constructivists stress that EU’s political actors’ positions and even identities are

influenced not only by the rational pursuit of national or self interest but by the

bargaining process itself, especially the pressure to conform or reach consensus. Again it

focuses attention on socialization, transfers of loyalty and the process whereby actors

redefine their interests as a result of interaction within European institutions and social

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constructivists advocate that informal rules and norms can shape political actors’

behaviour (Bomberg et al. 2008: 13).

Social constructivism introduced Anthony Giddens’s social theory into

international relations theory and European studies which emphasized socialization and

the social construction of reality. In deviation to previous approaches, social

constructivism underlines the symbolic aspects of European integration such as

discourses, norms and more generally, the power of words and symbols to construct

two distinct political ontologies or legitimate political orders relative to Europe that is a

Europe of nation-states and a Europe of transnational processes (Kauppi 2002: 17).

Thomas Risse, through his book published in 2004, Social Constructivism and

European Integration set out three main ways in which social constructivism contributes

to the understanding of EU: first, highlighting the mutually constitutive nature of

agency and structure allows for a deeper understanding of the impact of the EU on its

member states and particularly on statehood. Second, emphasizing the constitutive

effects of EU rules and policies facilitates study of the ways in which EU membership

shapes interests and identities of actors. Third, focusing on communicative practices

highlights both how the EU is constructed discursively and how actors come to

understand the meaning of European integration. On the optimistic side, constructivism

has occupied a noteworthy position in highlighting the importance of ideas in shaping

both European integration and the more routine operation of the EU (Bache & George

2005: 44).

Social constructivism has its own limitations. A major one is the lack of a theory

of agency, as social constructivism concentrates on the agency-structure interaction

giving priority to structure, it neglects political action as situated action that is an action

in specific institutional settings. On the other hand its protagonists are eager to examine

the discursive processes informing European integration, identity, norms of behaviour

and so on, leaving largely untouched the key issue of the social characteristics of the

individuals and groups who, through their activities, construct this symbolic and

material entity (Kauppi 2002: 18). Maria Green Cowles (2003) described three criticisms

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of constructivism: 1) it lacks a theory of agency and shows a tendency to over-emphasize

the role of structures rather than the actors who help to shape those structures, 2) that

much of the early constructivist literature tended to focus its analysis on public actors to

the relative neglect of important non-state actors and 3) that there is tendency of some

constructivists to identify the good things that have been socially constructed rather

than the bad.

Multi-level Governance

Multi-level governance is a concept initially formulated for and directly applied

to the European Union, the unique form of new supranational governance evolved in

Europe since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. In the early 1990s Gary Marks

first used the phrase multi-level governance to capture developments in EU structural

policy after its major reform in 1988. Consequently Marks and others expanded the

concept to apply more broadly to EU decision-making (Stein 2008: 7). Marks developed

his approach by deriving insights from both the study of domestic politics and of

international politics (Archer 2000: 33).

The multi-level governance perspective is a recent addition to the theoretical

attempts to understand the EU though its roots are traced in the works of Ernst Haas

and Leon Lindberg. At the earlier times it has been described as a system of continuous

negotiation among governments at several territorial tiers such as supranational,

national, regional and local. This was distinctive of EU structural policy but the term is

now applied to the EU as a whole (Trnski 2005: 23). Emergence of this concept was

primarily due to a new wave of thinking about the EU as a political system rather than

as a process of integration that followed swiftly from the accelerated deepening of the

integration process in the mid to late 1980s (Stein 2008: 7). The metaphor of multi-level

governance captures the uniqueness of the EU in process policy terms. It seeks to avoid

two traps: The first is an emphasis on state-centrism and the second is the treatment of

the EU as operating at European level only in Strasburg and Brussels (Tirkos 2010: 32).

Multilevel governance is a dynamic process with a horizontal and vertical

dimension that does not dilute the political responsibility. If the mechanisms and

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instruments are appropriate and applied correctly, it helps to boost joint ownership and

implementation. Thus multilevel governance represents a political action blueprint

rather than a legal instrument that cannot be understood solely through the lens of

division of powers (European Union 2009: 6). Multi-level governance tries to capture the

complexity of European Union, and presents an alternative to earlier theoretical

approaches aimed at developing a single as well as all encompassing theory of EU.

Initially this approach in EU studies focused mainly on how regional actors have

become integrated into the EU’s decision-making system and are learning to represent

and reformulate their interests in this system. Scholars of multilevel governance have

mainly focused on regionalization by considering the rise of sub-national polities as

increasingly autonomous actors in European policy-making (Stein 2008: 20; Nugent

2003: 473).

Multi-level governance suggests that a new form of policy-making is developing

in the EU in which central governments remain vitally important to this policy-making

although they do not have a monopoly of decision-making power (Archer 2000: 33).

On the contrary, policy-making responsibility is now shared among a variety of actors at

European national and sub-national levels. In this situation the European integration is a

polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influences are shared

across multiple levels of government that is sub-national, national and supranational.

Put differently, the states sacrifice some sort of their sovereignty and their national

competencies in order to gain achievements in other fields (Trnski 2005: 23, 25; Howell

1998). Multilevel governance is not simply a question of translating European or

national objectives into local or regional action, but must be understood as a process for

integrating the objectives of local and regional authorities within the strategies of the

European Union. Moreover, multilevel governance should reinforce and shape the

responsibilities of local and regional authorities at national level and encourage their

participation in the coordination of European policy, in this way helping to design and

implement Community policies (European Union 2009: 7).

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Garry Marks et al. (1996) elaborates the essential elements of multi-level

governance drawn from several strands of writing. This model does not reject the view

that state executives and state arenas are important, or that these remain the most

important pieces of the European puzzle. First, according to this model decision making

competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by state

executives. That is supranational institutions such as the European Commission, the

European Court and the European Parliament. They have independent influence in

policy making that cannot be derived from their role as agents of state executives.

Second, collective decision making among states involves a significant loss of control for

individual state executives. Decisions concerning rules to be enforced across the EU

have a zero-sum character and necessarily involve gains or losses for individual states.

Third, political arenas are interconnected rather than nested. While national arenas

remain important for the formation of state executive preferences, the multi-level model

rejects the view that sub-national actors are nested exclusively within them. Instead,

sub-national actors operate in both national and supranational arenas, creating

transnational associations in the process. The separation between domestic and

international politics, which lies at the heart of the state-centric model is rejected by the

multi-level governance model. States are an integral and powerful part of the EU, but

they no longer provide the sole interface between supranational and sub-national

arenas, and they share, rather than monopolize, control over many activities that take

place in their respective territories.

The Lisbon Treaty which entered into force in 2009 would represent an

important step towards institutional recognition of multilevel governance in the way the

European Union operates. Through this treaty territorial cohesion becomes a

responsibility shared between the European Union and Member States that must be

present in all sectoral policies and must become an incarnation of multilevel governance

(European Union 2009: 24).

Multi-level governance conceives regional integration as part of a more general

phenomenon that the articulation of authority across jurisdictions at diverse scales.

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Identity is decisive for multi-level governance in general, and for regional integration in

particular because this derives from the nature of governance. Governance has two

different purposes: first, governance is a means to achieve collective benefits by

coordinating human activity. Given the variety of public goods and their varying

externalities, efficient governance will be multi-level. Latter, governance is an expression

of community. Citizens care about who exercises authority over them. The challenge for

a theory of multi-level governance is that the functional need for human co-operation

rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community. Communities demand self rule,

and the preference for self rule is almost always inconsistent with the functional demand

for regional authority. Thus it has been argued that the European Union is part of a

system of multi-level governance which is driven by identity politics as well as by

functional and distributional pressures (Hooghe and Gary 2008: 3, 23).

Multi-level governance analysis postulates that the EU has become a polity

where authority is dispersed between levels of governance and amongst actors. There

are considerable sectoral variations in governance patterns. Its scholars also see the state

as an arena where different agendas, ideas and interests are contested. While autonomy

and control may be at stake, states are still significant but they are woven into the multi-

level polity by their leaders and the actions of both sub-national and supranational

actors. It reflects the contemporary reality and may be replaced by other dominant

patterns. It is an effort to portray complexity as the principle characteristic of the EU

policy system. It put emphasis on variability, unpredictability and multi-actorness

(Tirkos 2010: 32).

Globalization reinforces the relevance of multilevel governance in which the

process of European integration is continuing by abolishing borders, unifying markets

and bringing people closer together whilst respecting national sovereignties and

preserving identities. Multilevel governance actually gives out the fundamental political

objectives of the European Union: a Europe of citizens, economic growth, social

progress, sustainable development, and the role of European Union as a global player.

Concurrently, it reinforces the democratic dimension of the European Union along with

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increasing the efficiency of its processes. However it does not apply to all EU policies,

and when it does, it rarely applies symmetrically or homogenously (European Union

2009: 4).

Multi-level governance’s main weakness is its vagueness and that it is described

as a metaphor rather than as a theory. It appears at times to be nothing more than a

description of the EU decision-making system and a static model that cannot predict

change thus, it represents an account of the status quo (Tirkos 2010: 33). It is considered

as an amalgam of existing theoretical statements than a new theory of the EU. It lacks a

set of testable hypotheses. It does not explain the creation of Multi-level governance in

the EU, instead explains its perpetuation. It overstates the autonomy of sub-national

actors even in policy areas and focused exclusively on sub-national authorities rather

than other sub-national actors such as pressure groups. It ignores the all-important

international level of interaction, where the EU now has its own independent

institutional presence and a recognizable list of tasks (Jordan 2001: 201). Multi-level

governance theorists are prone to exaggerate the hierarchical and legal nature of

intergovernmental relationships prior to the emergence of genuine multi-level

governance. They tend to give priority to the objective of problem-solving capacity

rather than democratic input and accountability. It can describe indiscriminately any

complex and multifaceted political process thus commits the methodological error of

conceptual stretching (Stein 2008: 10).

Conclusion

The European Union has been successful in the last two decades since the end of

the Cold War by engaging in the process of both widening and deepening in spite of

occasional crises over the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and the financial

crisis of 2008-2010. It has been enlarged in the sense that membership increased from 12

to 28 members. It has deepened through the four major treaties such as Maastricht,

Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, institutional changes in the form of pillar system,

establishment of European Monetary Union and Euro, etc. Thus it became one of the

most influential powers in the contemporary world.

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The classical models as well as more recent theories of integration are in many

ways significant for the regional integration processes of the present day world. The

traditional theories such as transactionalism and functionalism defied the state centric

worldview. Intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are other two

theories of European integration which put across some interesting viewpoints on the

dynamics of the European integration process. Intergovernmentalism and liberal

intergovernmentalism has the opinion that these traditional integration theories alone

cannot offer sufficient explanation to the many basic questions of integration studies.

Neofunctionalism has considered as the one of the most important theories of

European integration and its key theoretical concept the spill-over is still imperative for

all integration schemes. The spill-over effect explains the situation when the actual

deepening of the integration process takes place. This has occurred on a regular basis in

the European context as well as taken turns with the enlargement of the integrating

regime. The neofunctionalist postulate that there is some sort of in-built logic in the

process, which continuously leads to new spill overs, may be unlikely. Each of these

theoretical approaches explains certain phenomenon or trends in the present

international system and claims that it holds the key to regional or global integration.

No single theory can explain the complex entity namely, the EU. But the study of EU

integration has provided fertile ground for theoretical development.

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Endnotes

1. The Luxembourg Compromise was signed in 1966. It ended the crisis between France

and its five Community partners and the European Commission, caused by the

gradual transition from unanimous voting to qualified-majority voting as

provided for in the Treaty of Rome with effect from 1966. The French

Government, which gave precedence to the intergovernmental approach,

expressed its disapproval by applying the ‘empty chair’ policy, i.e. abstaining

from Council proceedings for seven months from 30 June 1965 onwards.

However, the Compromise, which is only a political declaration by Foreign

Ministers and cannot amend the Treaty, did not prevent the Council from taking

decisions in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community,

which provided for a series of situations in which qualified-majority voting

applied. Moreover, qualified-majority voting has been gradually extended to

many areas and has now become normal procedure, unanimity being the

exception. The Luxembourg Compromise remains in force even though, in

practice, it may simply be evoked without actually having the power to block the

decision-making process (www.europa.eu› EUROPA › Summaries of EU

legislation › Glossary, Luxembourg compromise; Chalmers et al. 2006: 13-15).

2. The Commission was set up under the articles of the Treaty of Rome (1957) giving it

wide ranging de facto powers which it has expanded as the authority of the EU

has spread. The Commission is the driving force of the EU and has many

different responsibilities. It is the only institution that has the power to propose

EU laws and is also responsible for enforcing them. It operates at a supranational

level and manages much of the day-to-day running of the EU. It has the financial

powers to draft the EU budget and distribute EU money to member states. It also

has a role representing all the members collectively in the negotiation of treaties

and the enlargement of the EU. It sits in on all decisions made about common

foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs policy and when

members don't implement EU law, it can take legal action against them. It has

114

often been a focus for public attention because of its far reaching powers and the

fact that it is not directly accountable to the electorate, leading to claims of a

democratic deficit (www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSPOL/AG3.htm, European

Commission).

3. Regular meetings of heads of state and governments were set up in 1974. Since then,

the European Council has become EU's most visible decision-taking body owing

to its high-profile summit meetings. It has often driven the EU's agenda forward

by signing constitutional treaties and making proposals for reform. The

European Council became a formal institution of the EU following the

implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. This EU institution is made up of

the member states' heads of state and government, the President of the

Commission, and it is headed by a President of the European Council (who is a

non-head of state). It meets for summits up to four times a year to discuss EU

policy and any controversial issues that may arise. It seeks to provide leadership

to the Council of the European Union and its meetings set the agenda for future

policy-making. However, the Council can also be a cause of disagreement,

because its desire to set the EU agenda can come into conflict with the leadership

role of the EU Commission (www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSPOL/AG3.htm,

European Council).

4. Qualified majority voting has existed right from the Treaty of Rome. All major treaties

have shifted some policy areas from unanimity to qualified majority voting. Thus

the rule of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of the European

Union applies to the adoption of proposals when issues are being debated on the

basis of Article 16 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 238 of the Treaty

on the Functioning of the European Union. Under the ordinary legislative

procedure, the Council acts by qualified majority, in codecision with the

European Parliament. The Treaty of Nice introduced a qualified majority system

based on a new weighting of votes and a “demographic verification” clause. The

number of votes allocated to each Member State was re-weighted, in particular

115

for those States with larger populations, so that the legitimacy of the Council's

decisions can be safeguarded in terms of their demographic representatives

(www.europa.eu › EUROPA › Summaries of EU legislation › Glossary, Qualified

majority; Chalmers et al. 2006: 12).

5. European Parliament was originally created as an appointed body under the Treaty of

Rome in 1957. It has gained greater prominence since it became a directly elected

body in 1979. Under the Single European Act (1986) it was given the power to

veto the entry of a new member state, and under the Maastricht Treaty (1992) it

gained the power of co-decision with the Council of the European Union. The

Lisbon Treaty (2007) extended the number of policy areas covered by co-

decision, so that the Parliament must also vote on all decisions made using

Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council. The European Parliament (EP)

is the only directly elected EU institution and is seen as providing democratic

legitimacy for the EU (www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSPOL/AG3.htm, European

Parliament).

6. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an

international economic organisation of 34 countries founded in 1961 to stimulate

economic progress and world trade. It is a forum of countries committed to

democracy and the free-market economy, providing a platform to compare

policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practices,

and co-ordinate domestic and international policies of its members. The OECD

originated in 1948 as the Organization for European Economic Co-operation

(OEEC) led by Robert Marjolin of France, to administer the Marshall Plan by

allocating American financial aid and implementing economic programs for the

reconstruction of Europe after World War II. The American recovery program in

Europe was a successful one that continued for the re-organization of OEEC to

OECD. Later, its membership was extended to non-European states. In 1961, it

was reformed into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development by the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation

116

and Development. Most OECD members are high-income economies with a very

high Human Development Index (HDI) and are regarded as developed

countries. The OECD's headquarters is in Paris, France (www.oecd.org/,

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)).

7. The ECJ was set up under the Treaty of Paris in 1951 to implement the legal

framework of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). When the

European Community was set up under the Treaty of Rome, the ECJ became its

court. When the European Union was created under the Maastricht Treaty, the

ECJ's powers were again expanded to cover the broader legal remit of the EU.

The Court of Justice of the European Union enforces EU law in areas covered by

EU. It is the highest court in the EU, outranking national supreme courts. Its

judgments can affect both member states and individuals, and it is the referee

between member states, institutions and individuals in disputes relating to EU

law (www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSPOL/AG3.htm, European Court of Justice

(ECJ); Whittington et al. 2008: 209-211).

8. The European Monetary System (EMS) was the forerunner of Economic and Monetary

Union (EMU), which led to the establishment of the Euro. It was a way of

creating an area of currency stability throughout the European Community by

encouraging countries to co-ordinate their monetary policies. It used an

Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) to create stable exchange rates to improve

trade between EU member states and thus help the development of the single

market. The EMS was launched in 1979 to help the ultimate goal of EMU that

had been set out in the Werner Report (1970). Since World War II, attempts had

been made to maintain currency stability amongst major currencies through a

system of fixed exchange rates called the Bretton Woods System. This collapsed

in the early 1970s. However, European leaders were keen to maintain the

principle of stable exchange rates rather than moving to the policy of floating

exchange rates that was gaining popularity in the USA. This led them to create

117

the EMS (www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSPOL/AG3.htm, European Monetary

System (EMS)).

9. The working of the common market in the European community led to the creation of

single market with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and its provisions

provided for the completion of a single market by the end of 1992. The SEA

celebrated the four freedoms that defined the single market: freedom of

movement for goods, services, capital and persons. The effects of the SEA have

come into action with the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, or

Maastricht treaty) in 1992 (www.europa.eu ›Institutional affairs › Building

europe through the treaties, The Single European Act).

10. The Schengen arrangement or Agreement is a treaty signed in 1985 near the town of

Schengen in Luxembourg that has created the Schengen Area within which there

are little or no border or visa controls. The Schengen Area operates like a single

state for international travel with external border controls for travellers travelling

in and out of the area, but with no or minimal internal border controls. It

currently consists of 26 European countries (www.europa.eu ›Free movement of

persons, asylum and immigration, The Schengen area and cooperation).

11. In 1989, member states set the process of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in

motion. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) made EMU part of EU law and set out a

plan for the single currency to be established by 1999. To be a part of EMU,

countries had to meet certain rules. They agreed to keep their exchange rates

within bands called the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and government

borrowing and spending had to be kept under control, with low inflation and

low interest rates. Finally, in 1998, 11 of the member states agreed to fix their

exchange rates together and handed over the power to set interest rates to the

European Central Bank (ECB). Three member states - Britain, Sweden and

Denmark - stayed out of this final stage of EMU. Euro is the currency launched in

2002 used by 17 member states of the EU that have signed up to full Economic

and Monetary Union (EMU). People in all of these countries use the same coins

118

and notes and business amongst companies in Euro zone states takes place in the

single currency (www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSPOL/AG3.htm, The Euro &

EMU).

12. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) control the efforts of EU member

states to act in a unified way on foreign policy and security affairs. The CFSP has

received extensive attention in recent years as the EU has attempted to carve out

an independent role for itself in foreign policy. Some member states, such as

France, see this as a way of making the EU as a superpower to balance the

strength of the USA. Other states view it as a way to improve the manner in

which the EU can cooperate with and support the USA. Because of these

differing agendas, progress in setting a clear direction for CFSP has been slow,

although important changes have occurred

(www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSPOL/AG3.htm, Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP)).

13. European Central Bank (ECB). The implementation and administration of the euro,

the main objective of the third and final stage of the Economic and Monetary

Union (EMU), required the creation of a new European Union (EU) institution,

the ECB. The ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) (the

national banks of the 25 EU member states and the ECB) began operation on 1

June 1998, in preparation for the launch of the single currency in its electronic

form. Its primary goal is to maintain price stability and prevent inflation, and it is

located in Frankfurt, Germany. The ECB determines the interest rate for the euro

zone member states (www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSPOL/AG3.htm, European

Central Bank (ECB)).

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