CHAPTER II

THE MISSILE TEC.HNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

CHAPTER II

THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

To contain the proliferation of missiles which are perceived to be

menacing for international society in general and regional security in

particular, a system known as the Missile Technology Control Regime

(MTCR) was established on April 16, 1987. Comprising of a set of

guidelines, the MTCR was meant to prevent acquisition of missiles by

developing countries through indigenous means and external sources.

The MTCR - it was clarified - was neither a treaty nor an

executive agreement and did not require setting up of a new organization

to administer it. 1 Perhaps, this aspect led Brahma Chellany to remark

that, "the MTCR lacks international legitimacy, although it is the main

pillar of the U.S. - led missile - non proliferation system" .2 He further

2

Frederick J. Hollinger, "The Missile Technology Control Regime: A Major New Arms Control Achievement", World Military Expenditures' and Arms Transfers 1987 (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1988), p.25.

Brahma Chellany, "The Missile Technology Control Regime: Its Challenge and Rigours for India" in Francine R. Frankel (ed.) Bridging the Non-proliferation Divide: The United States and India (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1995) p.225.

38

added, "the regime is not backed by any international accord and does not

have the sanction of the United Nations. It remains a surreptitiously

formed cartel of white nations, many of them former colonial powers. It

was these powers, now harping on the dangers of the diffusion of dual-use

technologies, who with the advent of the Industrial Revolution used

superior military strength derived from industrial technological advantage

to colonize and ravage the world's ancient civilizations" .3

Initially, the underlying reason to control missiles of a certain

category was the fear that missile-carrying nuclear warheads could increase

international insecurity. Later on, the argument for regional security also

gained much ground among these countries. In the words of Richard

Speier, "Missiles, when combined with mass destruction warheads, can

usher in what forty years ago was called Push-Button War, death coming

out of a distance with no warning, and at present, with no way of stopping

it" .4 Experience gained from the Operation Destrt Storm made the

countries party to the MTCR realise the need to come together to address

4

Ibid.

Eric H. Arnett et.al., Technology Advance and the Arms Control Agenda (Washington D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990), p.255.

39

the menace of chemical weapons. As a result, on January 7-8, 1993, the

MTCR was amended to allay the fears of all weapons of mass destruction

- nuclear as well as chemical.5

Provisions:

Now, the MTCR contains an Annex which is further divided into two

categories encompassing 20 items.6 Two items on the Annex are

exclusively devoted to the category one. The item one provides

information about complete rocket and unmanned air vehicle systems

which can deliver at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km.

The complete rocket systems include ballistic missile systems,space launch

vehicles and sounding rockets, whereas unmanned air vehicle systems

include cruise missile systems, target drones and reconnaissance drones.

The item one also refers to the specially designed production facilities for

these systems.

5

6

Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines Revised, US Department of State Dispatch, January, 18, 1993, vol.4, no.3, pp. 41-2.

For a detailed discussion of all items see Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Equipment and Technology Annex, July 1,1993 (New Delhi: USIS, 1994); Enclosed as Appendix 1.

40

The range factor became totally irrelevant on the presumption of

denial. Even earlier a 300 km range limit was not considered very

stringent. Presently if any country feels that a missile below the range of

300 km is being purchased to be equipped with Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) the seller country can prohibit sale of the missile.

The subsystems which can be used in the systems of Item I are

included in Item 2. These are specially designed production facilities,

production equipment, individual rocket stages, re-entry vehicles, solid or

liquid propellant rocket engines, guidance sets capable of achieving system

accuracy of 3.33 percent or less of the range, thrust vector control

subsystems, warhead sating, arming, fuzing and firing mechanisms and so

on.

Many details pertaining to these equipment, components and

technology, which were left out of these two Items, have been included in

Item 19 and 20. However, there is a provision of relaxation on certain

goods like guidance sets, thrust vector control subsystems and warhead

sating, arming, fuzing and firing mechanisms.

41

There is a greater emphasis on ballistic missiles.ln the coming

years, with the increasing commercialisation of satellite navigation, there

is a possibility of shifting of focus on cruise missiles, too. A specialist

like Richard Speier is " ... concerned with the spread of ballistic or cruise

missiles regardless of what they are called. Space Launch Vehicles or

sounding rockets beyond a certain size are ballistic missile capabilities.

Target drones or reconnaissance drones or remotely piloted vehicles

beyond a certain size, are cruise missile capabilities."7

But he sounds different while writing,"A sounding rocket has a

relatively inaccurate quidance system on it in order to travel more or less

vertically and to do physics in the upper atmosphere or beyond. A space

launch vehicle has a more accurate guidance system on it to go into orbit.

A ballistic missile has a more accurate quidance system and a re-entry

vehicle on it" .8 He concludes that "in all three cases, much of the

technology is identical, and much of the hardware is interchangeable" .9

7

8

9

In Arnett no.4, p.256.

Ibid, p. 256-7.

Ibid, p.256.

42

Category II begins with the Item 3 propulsion components and

equipment that can be used for the systems of Items 1,2, 19 and 20. It

includes small and fuel-efficient lightweight turbojet and turbofan engines;

ramjet, scramjet, pulsejet and combined cycle engines, rocket motor cases,

interior lining, insulation and nozzles; staging mechanisms, separation

mechanisms and interstages; liquid and slurry propellant control systems,

and hybrid rocket motors.

Item 4 includes propellants and constituent chemicals for

propellants like hydrazine with a concentration of more than 70 percent

and its derivatives, unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), Ammonium

perchlorate, spherical aluminum powder, nitro- amines, percholrates, liquid

oxidizers, polymeric substances, composite propellants such as moulded

glue propellants and propellant with nitrated bonding; high energy density

propellants, bonding agents, curing agents and catalysts, burning rate

modifiers; nitrate esters and nitrate plasticizers, and 2- nitrodiphenylamine

and N-methyl-P-nitroaniline and so an. Item 5 deals with production

technology of Item 4. This includes production, handling or acceptance

testing of liquid propellants or propellant constituents as well as

production, handling, mixing, curing, casting, pressing, machining,

43

extruding or acceptance testing of solid propellants or propellant

constituents.

It lists batch mixers or continuous mixers both with provision for

mixing under vacuum in the range of zero to 13.326 KPa and with

temperature control capability of the mixing chambers. The controlled

batch mixers must have a total volumetric capacity of 110 liters or more

and at least one mixing kneading shaft mounted off centre whereas

controlled continuous mixers must have two or more mixing kneading

shafts and capability to open the mixing chambers.

Item 6 deals with equipment, technical data and procedures for the

production of structural composites. It alludes to filament winding

machines, tape laying machines, interlacing machines, equipage for

converting polymeric fibers, the vapor deposition of elements or

compounds on heated filament substrates, the wet spinning of refractory

ceramics like aluminum oxide, special fibre surface treatment or for

producing prepreges and preforms besides information for the regulation

of temperature, pressure or atmosphere in autoclaves or hydroclaves, while

producing composites or partially processed composites.

44

Item 7 refers to equipment and technology required for pyrolytic

deposition and densification. It covers technology for producing

pyrotytically derived materials formed on a mould, mandrel or other

substrate from precursor gases that decompose in the 1,300 degrees C to

2, 900 degrees C to at pressures of 130 Pa (1mm Hg) to 20 K Pa (150 mm

Hg) including technology for the composition of percursor gases, flow

rates, and process control schedules and parameters. Besides, specially

designed nozzles and software needed for the purposes are also included

in it.

Item 8 discusses structural materials, composite structures,

laminates, and products from that source like resin impregnated fibre

prepregs and metal coated fibre preforms made either with organic matrix

or metal matric utilizing fibrous and filamentary reinforcements having a

specific tensile strength greater than 7.62 x 104 m (3 X 106 inches) and a

specific modules greater than 3.18 x 10 6m (1.25 x 108 inches), resaturated

pyrolized materials designed for rocket systems, fine grain recrystalised

bulk graphites, ceramic composite materials, tungsten molybdenum and

alloys of these metals, and maraging steels.

45

Equipment systems, specially designed components and software

as well as associated production and test equipment for instrumentation,

navigation and direction finding come under Item 9. Integrated flight

instrument systems, gyro-astro compasses, accelerometers, different types

of gyros, inertial or other equipment using accelerometers, scatterometer,

reflectometer, profilometer, Inertial Measurement Unit module tester,

platform tester, stable element handling fixture, platform balance fixture,

gyro tuning test station, gyro dynamic balance station, gyro run-in /motor

test station, gyro evacuation and filling station, centrifuge fixture for gyro

bearings and so on, are also included in this Item.

Item 10 encompasses flight control systems and technology along

with their supportive accoutrements. In it come hydraulic, mechanical,

electro-optical, electro-mechanical, flight control systems including

fly-by-wire systems, attitude control equipment and so forth. But relaxation

is made for manned aircraft and satellite uses.

Item 11 consists of avionics equipment, technology and

components. Radar and laser radar systems, including altimeters, passive

sensors for determining bearings to specific electromagnetic sources or

46

terrain characteristics, Global Positioning System (GPS) or similar satellite

receivers, electronic assemblies and components for military use and

operation at temperatures in excess of 125 degrees C, and design

technology for protection of avionics and electrical subsystem against

electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and electromagnetic interference (EMI) from

outside fall under this category II.

Gravity meters, gradiometers designed or modified for air borne or

marine use and having a static or operational accuracy of 7 x 10-6m/ sec2

or better with a time to steady state registration of two minutes or Jess,

telemetering and telecontrol equipment, precision tracking systems and

other equipment, facilities and soft ware for supporting launch are put in

Item 12.

Item 13 mentions Analog computers, digital computers and digital

differential analyzers which are rated for continuous operation at

temperatures from below minus 45 degrees C to above plus 55 degrees C

or designed as ruggedized or radiation hardened. For manned aircraft and

satellite even this item has the provision for relaxation in rules. Analog-to

digital converters marked with certain characteristics are placed in Item 14

of the Annex.

47

Item 15 has been specified for test facilities and test equipment. The

detailed components of the list are as follows:

u (a) Vibration test equipment using digital control techniques, and

feedback or closed loop test equipment therefore, capable of

vibrating a system at lOg RMS or more between 20HZ and 2,000

HZ and imparting forces of 50 KN (11,250 lb.) or greater,

(b) Wind-tunnels for speeds of Mach 0.9 or more

(c) Test benches/stands which have the capacity to handle solid or

liquid propellant rockets or rocket motors of more than 90 KN

(20,000 lbs) of thrust, or which are capable of simultaneously

measuring the three axial thrust components,

(d) Environmental chambers and anechoic chambers capable of

simulating the following flight conditions.

(1) Altitude of 15,000 meters or greater, or (2) Temperature of at least

minus 50 degrees C to plus 125 degrees C, and either

(3) Vibration environments of 10 g RMs or greater between 20 HZ and

2000 HZ imparting forces of 5 KN or greater, for environmental

chambers, or

48

( 4) Acoustic environments at an overall sound pressure level of 140 dB

or greater (referenced to 2xl05 N per square meter) or with a rated

power output of 4 kilo watts or greater, for anechoic chambers.

e) Radiographic equipment capable of delivering electromagnetic

radiation produced by "bremsstrahlung" from accelerated electrons

of 2 MeV or greater or by using radioactive sources of 1MeV or

greater, except those specially designed for medical purposes." 10

Item 16 refers to software and hybrid computers for modeling,

simulation and design integration, while Item 17 charts out software,

materials and devices for reduced observable like radar reflectivity,

ultraviolet/infrared signatures and accoustic signatures, namely, stealth

technology. Radiation hardened, microcircuits and detectors as well as

radomes designed to withstand a combined thermal shock greater than 100

cal/sq em accompanied by a peak overpressure of greater than 50 kpa for

use in protecting rocket systems and unmanned air vehicles against nuclear

effects such as Electromagnetic Pulse(EMP),X-rays,combined blast and

thermal effect come under Item 18.

10 MTCR, Item 15.

49

Membership:

Initially, only 7 countries were members of the MTCR. These were

the US, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and the United

Kingdom. 11 The Regime, because of various reasons, continued to get the

support of many other countries. Some of these countries became its

full-fledged members, while many remained its mere adherent to it. A few

of the adherent countries however also turned full-fledged members

subsequently.

The countries, which joined the regime in the beginning or applied

for the membership subsequently and got it, or had been straightway

recruited for attending the closed circle, came to be called members. 12 On

the other hand, countries which declared to abide by the MTCR guidelines

and make laws accordingly came to be known as adherent countries. There

exist two types of adherent countries - official or formal and non-

official. 13

II

12

13

Hollinger No.1, p.25.

Deborah A. Ozga, A Chronology of the _Missile Technology Control Regime, The Nonproliferation Review, vol.l, Number 2, Winter 1994, p.67.

Ibid, pp. 67-68.

50

Earlier, the US had made it obligatory for any nation willing to

become an official adherent to enter into a bilateral agreement with the US

but it is no longer the case now. Nevertheless for an official adherent, the

status has to be approved by the MTCR member - countries.

China ,Israel and Ukraine are adherent countries. 14 At present, the

MTCR comprises 28 members 15 with the recent additions being South

Africa, Brazil and Russia.

There is a provision for holding three types of meetings amongst

the MTCR - member countries!6 most important of which is the plenary

meeting. At least one plenary meeting is scheduled to be held each year.

In this meeting, members exchange intelligence information related to

missile proliferation and discuss mechanisms to enhance the regime's

capability to counter proliferation.

14

15

16

The Arms Control Reporter, ldds/96, p.706. A.2.

Ibid.

Ozga, No.l2.

51

The second type of meeting is technical in nature where the

specific control parameters are evaluated so that the annex can be refined

and expanded. The third type of meeting is the special meeting which is

convened for the purpose of recruitment. The decisions regarding

membership and change in annex are based on the principle of consensus

and all meetings are held in camera.

National Legislation

Like other regimes, the MTCR can also be implemented through

domestic laws of a country. Without national legislation, the MTCR will

have no meaning. Consequently, effects of different customs and political

cultures have made the MTCR laws variegated in operation.

The United States , the self-proclaimed leader, in an effort to

implement the export control regimes, has got necessary domestic laws

passed to give effect to the guidelines of the MTCR. In October 1990, the

Missile Technology Control Act (MTCA) was passed by the US and

consequently, the Export Administration Act of 1979 was amended. This

Act enables the President to penalise individuals, companies and

governments which violate the spirit of the MTCR. The period of sanctions

52

can vary from two to five years. It is stipulated that sanctions have to be

in at least one of the modes -denial of US export licenses, prohibition of

contracting with the US government, and/or a prohibition on procuring

products or services from the US government.

The President is empowered to waive sanctions, too, ifthe product

or services are found necessary for national security, the recipient of the

sanctions is the sole supplier of a product or service and the product or

service is supplied to the US government, or is supplied under a defence

co-production agreement or a NATO programme of cooperation} 7 Again,

it needs to be mentioned that intensity of sanctions for Category I is

different from the Category II items.

As required by the Regime, not only the US but all member

countries also have had to pass domestic legislation to implement

guidelines of the MTCR. Some of the countries, which before formally

becoming members, were adherents of the regime, subsequently passed

their national legislation. Others did it after becoming members. Many of

17 U.S. National Defence Authorisation Act of Fiscal Year 1991, Public L1w: 101-510, 5 November 1990, in Strategic Digest, July 1992, pp 777-85.

53

these countries are not important sources of acquisition of missile

technology. Their laws either prevent transshipment or express solidarity

with the important supplier countries. Denmark falls into the former

category, where the Ministry of Justice handles Category I items of the

MTCR, whereas the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in combination

with the Ministry of Justice deals with Category II items.18 The Decree

on the Export and Transit of Defense Material of the Finnish Council of

State falls in the latter19 category, although there is a complete absence

of agreement on this point.

In July 1992, Germany's Customs Criminology Institute or Zoll

Kriminal Institute (ZKI) started its Kobra Early Warning Database to help

identify sensitive exports to 34 countries which are called the H-List of

proliferation concern. The items of the MTCR have also been placed in the

data base. Around 1,000 applications for export of MTCR controlled items

to H-list countries are received each year, of which only 40 percent are

approved. 20

IS

19

20

Royal Government of Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, November 15, 1990.

Ozga No. 12, p.78.

"Germany sets up Export Control Data Base", Mednews, July 6, 1992, pp 4-5.

54

Canada is guided by the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) and

Export Control List (ECL).Z' The MTCR list is one of the eight groups

of strategic and military goods covered under the ECL. The MTCR list is

known as Group 6 but the technologies covered in the Annex of the

MTCR can be found in other Groups also. Export permits for Group 6 are

valid for two years without any provision for further extension generally.

For this group of items, "an exporter may use an export permit for more

than one shipment to the consignees specified to on the export permit

maximum of three consignees per permit are allowed and upto the value

and quality noted on the permit, unless otherwise indicated on the export

permit".n

Evolution and Development

Established as the MTCR was in 1987, still there is no unanimity

among scholars regarding the period when the effort to control spread of

missiles actually began. It was in the 1970s that attempts to control the

spread of missiles and missile technology were initiated. However, it needs

to be mentioned that the COCOM which had come into existence in 1949

21

22

Canadian Export Control Law and Policy. A Guide to Canada's Export Controls, April 1994.

Ibid, p.vi.

55

too contained provisions to curtail missile proliferation.z.1 Many other

countries simply fell in line with the United States, willingly or

unwillingly, with enthusiasm or with a certain hesitation.

Primarily to control the technology needed for missile development,

American Government promulgated NSDM-187 in 1972. 24 This policy

directive prohibited the export of SLY technology and provided for a

review of export requests on an individual basis. In 1981, the U.S.

assigned an inter-agency with the task of evaluating the degree of missile

proliferation.25 The United States had been concerned about it since the

Kennedy-Johnson years, but it was not until the November of 1982 that a

presidential directive created a US policy to hinder the proliferation of

nuclear-capable missiles and to work with other supplier nations in this

effort.

23

14

15

Kathleen C. Bailey et.al. Controls on Exports and Technology Transfer to Limit Missile Proliferation (Fairbox:National Institute for Public Policy, August 1991), pp. 6-9.

Ozga No. 12, p.74.

Jurgen Scheffran and Aaron Karp, "The National Implementations of the Missile Technology Control Regime - the US and German Experiences", in Hans Gunter Brauch et.al (eds.) Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology (Amsterdam: Vu University Press, 1992), p.236.

56

Through a National Security Council Decision- Directive 70 of

President Reagan signed in November 1982,a investigating mechanism

came into existence. It also underlined the need to coordinate with the

United Kingdom. Later, beside the UK. the US also entered into

negotiations with Japan, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany and

Italy to standardize national export controls.26

In June 1983, the first multilateral meeting among all seven original

members was believed to have taken placeY In March 1985, these

countries arrived at a consensus to start controlling missile related dual-use

technology. The formal announcement, got delayed due the French

demands on the Treaty of Roratonga.28 It was only in December 1986

that the consensus was reached among the nations on the details of the

MTCR 29•

26

27

2S

29

Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1987.

Ozga, No. 12, p.74.

Richard H. Speir, "The Missile Technology Control Regime" in Trevor Findlay (ed.), Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p.l15.

Government of Canada, Missile Technology Control Regime, Backround Paper, April 16, 1987.

57

Developments after the Formation of MTCR

The year 1987 witnessed leveling of charges by Britain and the

U.S. against Italy for supplying missile technology to Argentina which

resulted in the imposition of sanctions.30 Late in April 1988, after getting

clarifications from Italy the sanctions were removed. Germany too was

accused of participating in the Condor II project.

In 1988, a few important meetings were held to discuss issues

related to the MTCR, one was an all European meeting between members

and non-members of the MTCR ~ 1 and the second, held on 26 September

1988 was between the US and the Soviet Union to gamer latter's support 32

for the regime. There was yet another meeting between the two countries

convened for the same purpose on December 1-2, 1988.~~ The MTCR

policy group itself met in September 8-9, 1988.34

30

31

32

Financial Times, (London) July 31, 1989.

Ozga, No.12, p.74.

"Soviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington", Department of State Bulletin, November 1988, vol. 88, No.21, pp. 28-31.

U.S. Efforts to Control the Transfer of Nuclear-Capable Missile Technology, General Accounting Office, NSIAD-90-176, June 1, 1990, p.16.

"Fact Sheet", Arms Control Todav, March 1992.

58

At the second plenary meeting on December, 5-6 1989, Spain

joined the Regime, after having become an adherent country earlier in

April . On April 25, 1990 Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands

decided to join the MTCR. Australia joined in July, Denmark did it on

November 15, in December of that year Austria became a member.

At the third policy meeting held in Geneva in July 1990, issues like

full membership of the Soviet Union, reporting methods,

comprehensiveness of the MTCR guidelines and annex, mechanisms of

coordination and exchange of relevant information and setting up of the

MTCR Technical Working Group were reported to have been taken up.

Meanwhile, several rounds of meeting were held between the US and the

Soviet Union in which the MTCR figured prominently.35 In June came

the joint statement in favour of the objectives of the MTCR:'6

On January, 1, 1991 Norway formally became a member of the

MTCR. Austria, which had already announced its decision to adhere the

MTCR, also acquired the status of a formal member on 13 February,

35

36

Ibid.

Defense News, February 17, 1992, pp. 31-2.

59

whereas on September 16, Sweden, and on October 11, Finland formally

joined the MTCR. Other activities of the regime included convening of the

three technical meetings, and two plenary meetings. The emphasis at all

these meetings was on the expansion of the scope of the MTCR. The need

for expansion was felt in the light of regularly updating technology at a

rapid speed and dissemination of information in many unexpected quarters.

The Gulf War added a new dimension to the already existing complexities.

There was a continuous demand for a stringent verification architecture.

It was agreed that all types of weapon of mass destruction would

be brought under the regime but without lowering the range parameter.

The Annex also consequently had to undergo changes. In fact, this was a

result of the recommendations made by the technical committees.

Definitions and further clarifications of technical parameters were

incorporated.37 The words, terms, and names of technologies such as•

Microcircuits', ·radiation hardened', 'specially designed', 'designed or

modified',' usable in','capable of' etc. were explained for understanding the

level, degree and extent of relevance to the concerned technology relating

to missile proliferation.

37 Missile Monitor, Spring 1992, pp 10-11, 76.

60

The amendment facilitated the coverage of all production instead

of just serial production for the category 'production equipment'.

Moreover, the phrase, 'specifically designed', replaced the phrase

'designed or modified' to give an effect to a wide array of dual use items.

Items 17 and 18 also became parts of the Annex.and Item 19 was

approved.

Besides, the year was full of activities related to sanctions under the

MTCR. On May 27, 1991, sanctions were imposed on two Chinese

organisations - the China Great Wall Industry Corporation and the China

Precision Machinery Import - Export Corporation - along with the

Pakistani organisation, Space and Upper· Atmosphere Research

Commission, for the sale of M-11 missile components and technology by

China to Pakistan.38 Although the sanctions had to stay for two years,

yet the announcement of lifting the sanctions came on November 17, 1991

within 7 months when the erstwhih~ US Secretary of State James Baker

returned from his visit to China with an assurance from the Chinese to

stem missile proliferation.39

38

39

Federal Register, vol.56, No. 137, July 17, 1991, p.32601.

Wall Street Journal, December 23, 1991, p.A6.

61

On September 27, 1991 the sanctions were imposed against a South

African firm for promoting missile proliferation activities.40 Basically, the

charge against the firm was, that it had been getting assistance in critical

missile technology from Israel. However, on October 3, 1991, the sanctions

against Israel were removed after it gave the assurance to follow the

MTCR guidelines in its arms and crucial technology transactions. On

December 24, 1991, with the announcement made by the Israeli Ministry

of Defence regarding adherence to the MTCR, Israel became the first

Middle East Country to do so. 41

In reality, Israel started adhering to the MTCR from January 1,

1992. In 1992 itself, four more countries became formal members of the

MTCR. These countries were Portugal which joined the ranks on May 11,

Switzerland on May 19 Greece and Ireland on June 22. Later, Romania

and Hungary too applied for the membership. In April 1992 a technical

meeting was held, to look for ways and means to incorporate missiles

capable of carrying chemical and biological warheads and for determining

. u

Federal Register, vol. 56, No.199, October 16, 1991, p.51734 .

Proliferation Issues, January 31, 1992, p.23.

62

criteria for the purpose.42 At the plenary meeting held in Norway issues

like the necessity to amend the guidelines and the Annex ,the provisions

for licensing retransfer control and greater focus on the regions

undertaking missile development programmes, etc.,too were discussed.43

In that year itself, India had to suffer because of the MTCR. The

US imposed a two-year sanctions on the Indian Space Research

Organisation (ISRO) along with the Russian Glovkosmos for two years for

the business deal both entered into to supply cryogenic engines needed for

the peaceful Indian space programme.44 On May 11,1992, it was

annonced that the period of sanctions was for two years. There was an

uproar against the sanctions all over as the measure was considered unjust

and unfair. Dr. U.R. Rao, the erstwhile chairman of the ISRO dubbed it as

"blatantly discriminatory".45 1t was illegal because the 'end use' guarantee

given for the peaceful space programme was permitted in the guidelines

and the Annex of the regime. The two original authors of the Missile

42

43

45

Ozga, No.12, p.83.

Government of Norway, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, June 2,1992.

The Times of India (New Delhi), May 12, 1992.

The Sunday Times of India (New Delhi), July 26, 1992.

63

Technology Control Act, Senator John McLain and Representative Howard

L. Berman also felt the sanctions against the ISRO had created confusion

and fear among the American exporters.46

It was reported that the sanctions were imposed because of the.

American industrial pressure as India had refused to purchase technology

offered by two American firms owing to the high costs.47 Also on July

7, 1992, the Lyongakasan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation

and Changgwang Credit Corporation of North Korea as well as the Syrian

Scientific Research Centre, and the Ministry of Defense of Syria too were

put under sanctions for missile proliferation related activities.48 This was

the second time that sanctions were imposed on the Syrian organisations.

In January, 1993, the famous amendment emphasising

presumption of denial as well as Weapons of Mass Destruction was made

primarily to blur the limit parameters. In 1993, Iceland, Argentina and

Hungary became formal members of the MTCR. Russia and South Africa

46

47

48

John McCain, U.S. Senator and Howard L. Berman, US Representative, "Letter to James Le Munyon", Acting, A<>sistant Secretary of State for Export Administration, August 27, 1992 cited in Ozga No.12, p.85.

"The Search Within", Frontline, June 5, 1992, p.119.

Arms Control Reporter, idds 7-96, p.706.013.

64

too announced their adherence to the Regime.At the two plenary sessions,

one expert meeting and technical committee meeting ,nothing besides the

issue of how to strengthen the Regime was discussed.

In August, 1993 the US imposed sanctions on China and Pakistan

under Category II of the MTCR. It was to affect 10 entities in China and

Pakistan.49 But subsequently, sanctions were lifted from China.50 There

were reports based on American intelligence data concerning the transfer

of M-11 missiles but the US did not impose sanctions on either of the

parties.

In 1994, Ukraine and China declared their intentions to adhere to

the regime. Brazil also decided to follow the MTCR guidelines. South

Africa too decided to end its Category I missile programme and its

space-launch vehicle programme, and abiding by the MTCR guidelines

after entering into an agreement with the US on October 3.51

49

50

51

The Hindu, April 9, 1993.

The Arms Control Reporter, idds 1-94, p.706.A.3.

The Arms Control Reporter, idds 11-94, p.706.B.l77.

65

The most important development in the year 1994 was the Chinese

decision to abide by the MTCR guidelines. After this decision the

sanctions against China were lifted.ln a joint statement China and the US

declared that China would not sell any surface-to-surface missiles which

met the parameters of the MTCR guidelines. The phrase, 'inherently

capable' was used for modifying the prohibited missile parameters so that

the confusion created by the M-11 missile that it was within the range of

300 kilometers did not arise.52

In 1994, a delegation of the MTCR visited the Indian subcontinent

to persuade India and Pakistan to abide by the MTCR guidelines. Nothing

fruitful resulted. Both countries were reluctant to follow what the

delegation asked for. 53

The plenary meetings of the MTCR, held in January-October of

that year, discussed the membership issue of Russia and South Africa. The

member-countries expressed satisfaction over the achievement of the

MTCR in "controlling the export of their missile-related technologies by

52 Ibid,

Hindu (New Delhi), September 1m 1994.

66

giving emphasis to dealing directly with the critical missile proliferation

threat emanating from outside the regime" .54

At the January 1994 meeting, all members expressed concern over

the Chinese missile, M-11 missiles transfer to Pakistan.55 A Canadian

suggestion to formulate a ballistic missile disarmament treaty was

unacceptable to many members including the nuclear weapon countries.56

With an intention to keep the MTCR's annex updated with advances in

technology, the meeting decided to implement amendments to the

Equipment and Technology Annex from July 1, 1994.57

Meanwhile, two more important developments related to the MTCR

took place, in 1994. First, the US Congress supporting a strict

interpretation of the MTCR in the financial year 1994 contained in

Department of Defence Authorization bill. It approved the conventional

treatment of equating missile technology to space technology for control,,

55

56

57

The Arms Control Reporter,, No.51, p. 7068.8.178.

Ibid, p.706.8.158.

Ibid, P. 706.8.157-8.

Ibid, p.706. B. 157.

67

for the inability in not only making a distinction between space launch

vehicle technology from missile technology under the regime but also

safeguarding space launch vehicle technology.58

Second, a CIA report revealed that China was to receive an

installment of$ 15 million from Pakistan for its sale of M-11 missiles to

the latter. It was also reported that in 1992 China had already been a

recipient of the first installment amounting to $ 83 million.59 However,

sanctions were not imposed on either of China or Pakistan.

In 1995, three countries Brazil, Russia and South Africa became

full-fledged members of the MTCR at the October Plenary session. Earlier,

on June 10, 1995, the Clinton administration had decided to waive

sanctions on Brazil and Russia for the transactions of microelectronics to

pave the way for their entry. Russia, apart from selling microelectronics,

also sold carbon fiber technology to Brazil.60 Interestingly, the US did not

disclose the names of these two countries but its later pronouncements

made the names of these two countries quite obvious.

58

59

60

Ibid.

Ibid, p.706.B.l71.

Jane's Defence Weekly, June 10, 1995.

68

At the plenary session, in addition to admitting new members, the

commitment to control exports was reiterated.A few minor amendments to

the Equipment and Technology Annex were made. 61 Bulgaria also

expressed its willingness to abide by the MTCR guidelines in 1995.62

Once again the issue of China as a missile supplier kept cropping up .Not

only fresh evidence regarding the sale of M-11 missiles was found but it

was also discovered that the country had shipped missile guidance systems,

computerized machine tools and rocket propellant ingredients to Iran.63

The General Accounting Office (GAO) of the US also passed strictures

against two departments of the US administration for negligence in

thorough monitoring of missile technology export to China properly.64

In 1996, the plenary session did not discuss anything new. Several

steps towards making South Korea a member of the MTCR were made

outside the plenary session. The US was in the forefront even this time. In

the meantime, the Chinese transfer of the M-11 missiles to Pakistan came

61

62

63

The Arms control Reporter, idds 11-95, p.706.B.192.

Defense News, July 21, 1995.

Defence News, July 21, 1995.

The Arms Control Reporter, No.61, p.706.B.186.

69

to be widely reported. The intelligence community of the US further

revealed that Pakistani army had not only been given the missiles but had

also been trained to handle them by Chinese experts so that fast

deployment of the missiles could take place.65 Later on, even the report

of the deployment of missiles did not evoke any sanctions on either of the

two countries.

Perspectives

Writers on MTCR have pointed out . several problems and

weaknesses inherent in the regime. The most prominent criticism of the

regime is that it is highly inconsistent in its implementation. The issues

like M-11, Arrow, waiving of sanctions from China, Israel, etc. are

regularly cited as cases in point.66 The fact that implementation aspect

is not accompanied by any international agency to monitor compliance,

confronts the regime with criticism, coupled as it is with the absence of an

enforcement mechanism.67

65

66

67

The Times of India (New Delhi), June 13, 1996.

Brahma Chellaney, "Non-Proliferation: An Indian Critique to US Export Controls", Orbis, Summer 1994, pp. 453-4.

Kathleen C. Bailey, "Missile Proliferation: Demand- side Policies are Needed", in Jean-Francios Rioux, ed., Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies, (Ottawa: Carleton

70

In recent years, civil technology has developed at a faster pace than

military technology in the developed countries. This factor is understood

by some to be the reason behind the failure of the MTCR . Jacques

Battistella, Director deligue Pour La Politique industriels et les affaires

strategiques. Aerospatiale, Paris, remarked, "If you look at a launcher or

a missile, for example, you need more accuracy to launch a satellite into

geosynchronous orbit than that needed to launch a nuclear warhead to

2,000 kilometers. The same thing is true of processing capability today.

Any of the computers on your desk has more processing power than that

installed in the nuclear ballistic missiles which are now in the forces. This

is what is new. This is making dual - use and MTCR so difficult to

handle. The commercial technology is probably ten or fifteen years in

advance of comparable military technology in terms of performance."68

According to John Simpson, the MTCR teeters on the edge between

the two issue of disarmament and arms controls.69 Looking it from a

legalistic perspective, Gurdip Singh writes:

6S

6Q

University Press, 1992) pp. 127-136.

In Sverre Lodgaard and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Arms and Technology Transfers: Security and Economic Consideration Among Improting and Exporting States, UNIDIR/95/22 ( New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1995) p.84.

Ibid, p.86.

71

"The United States, the so-called father of the MTCR has

completely bent, twisted and tortured the provisions of the MTCR by

arbitrarily deciding an issue which does not fall within her domain. The

sanctions imposed by the US under her own national legislation on ISRO

and Glavkosmos have extra- territorial effect and are illegal, unjustifiable,

and inequitable. In a landmark case popularly known as "the S.S. Lotus"

decided in 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice recognised

that territoriality forms the basis for the assumption of criminal

jurisdiction. The concept of extra- territoriality, that is making export

activities by other countries, subject to U.S. law, renders the "territoriality

principle" meaningless and is violative of international law" 70•

Two Indian officials in their individual capacities point out certain

features of the approach of the MTCR in a joint paper. These features are:

"a) Instead of a Technology Control Regime arrived at through a wide

b)

70

spectrum multilateral international debate and consensus, a group

of seven states announced its subscription to the regime by

adopting the route of national legislative actions.

With the NPT in place and the development of nuclear weapons

Gurdip Singh, "MTCR as an Impediment to SLY Development: Legal Aspects, Strategic Analysis, Vol. xvi, No.5, August 1993, p.626.

72

eschewed by about 145 countries, the focus on missile clear vectors

is odd. Other vectors have been left out, inviting a valid comment

that the MTCR is a regime of imperfect scope and questionable

reach as an arms control measure." 71

They further write that blurring of the range parameters and making

it the' so-called "zero-zero decision", enlarges the circle of confusion

around the MTCR' .72

Another Indian commentator, Brahma Chellany views that "the

missile non-proliferation regime is even more inequitable and

discriminatory than the NPT, owing to an absence of any mutuality of

obligations between the missile and non-missile states. The MTCR

incorporates no commitment on the part of missile powers- akin to the

NPT's Article VI- to work toward complete missile disarmament." 73

71

72

73

K. Santhanam and Rahul Singh, "Contidence Restoring Measures for Indo-US Commerce in Controlled Commodities", in Francine R. Frankel, No.2.,p.320

Ibid.

Chellany No. 66, p.443.

73

Aaron Karp finds the MTCR its record •ambivalent', weaker, than

the nuclear regime but •far more robust', •mediocre performance in

slowing proliferation of short-range missile but better success against

long-range systems' .74 The difficulty of the regime, according to him

also Jay in the fact of its late formation. By then rocketry had already

spread on a wider scale.

The Regime is also criticized for being discriminatory and at the

same time unrealistic with a bureaucratic sense of decision making in

which a uniform code of response is implemented against different types

of political systems - democratic and non-democratic.75 It is felt that

many of the countries which are targeted have become self-reliant, if not

self-sufficient, in the technologies of the· MTCR. It is stated· by many

scholars that if the membership is not broadened and expanded to include

these countries, the objective and purpose of the Regime will get a jolt.

There are many who feel that positive incentives can discourage some

7~

75

Aaron Karp, "Controlling Weapons Prolifeation: The Role of Export Controls", Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 16, No.1, March 1993, pp. 30-2.

K. Subrahmanyam, "Export Controls and the North-South Controversy", Washington Quarterly, vol.16, No.2, Spring 1993, p. 135.

74

important and relevant countries from missile proliferation.76 However,

supporters of the MTCR credit it with cancellation of Argentina's Condor

II project, and the two Brazilian systems Avibras's MB series along with

delaying India's missile programme. It is also praised for coordinating the

non- proliferation efforts of the supplier countries and inculcating a sense

of national accountability regarding export of sensitive items.n

76

77

Ozga, No.l2, p.69.

Ibid.

75