31

CHAPTER-II

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN AS A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION

The history of South-East Asia bears testimony to the fact

that from the very beginning the Southeast Asian countries have

always tried hard to ensure regional cooperation. In spite of this,

regionalism could not be developed there until the region became

free from external control. Before 1945, only Siam1 was an

independent state, but later on all the countries of the region

became sovereign nations. In this way, the precondition for

developing a meaningful regionalism had been fulfilled.

The most significant Economic Organizations with Southeast

Asian membership-the United Nations Economic Commission for

Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was formed in 1947 with its

headquarters in Bangkok (Thailand). After the end of the Second

World War, these countries took many initiatives in their endeavour

to form a regional association to ensure security of the region. The

feeling of insecurity had increased with the Communist victory in

China in 1949 and with the increasing strength of the Communist

forces in North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and the

Philippines. Thailand was one country of Southeast Asian countries

attached with the United States for the purpose of security, which

led to the signing of the South Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)

in 1954, further consolidating the anti-Communist sentiment and

activities in Thailand.2 The organization's main thrust was on

military security in Southeast Asia.The Colombo Plan was formed

in January 1950 to promote cooperation of the member countries

32

and raise the living standards of the people and develop the region.

Another significant security arrangement of this period was

the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) which came into

effect with the independence of Malaya in 1957.3 The first purely

South-East Asian States organization on government level, the

Association of South-East Asia (ASA) was established by the Prime

Minister of Malaya, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, and the

President of the Philippines in 1961. The objective of this

organization was economic and cultural progress through mutual

cooperation and assistance among its members. ASA's life-span

was somewhat short. Established in Bangkok in July 1961, it too

ceased to function, at least temporarily, because of the Subah

territorial dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over the

right to exercise sovereignty over Subah (British North Borneo)4.

In August 1963, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines had

found another regional association, Maphilindo by signing the

Manila Declaration. Maphilindo was founded to enhance fraternal

relations, cooperation and trade in order to promote economic

progress and social well-being in the region and to put an end of

exploitation of man by man and of one nation by

another.5Maphilindo broke up before it could function. It received a

mortal blow a month later, when Malaysia came into being. Neither

the Philippines nor Indonesia recognized the new federation.

Sukarno soon launched a guerrilla war against Malaysia, a bitter

and sometimes bloody confrontation policy-konfrontasi (1963-65)

that lasted until Sukarno's fall in 1967. The downfall of Sukarno

and his "New order" in both domestic and foreign policy were the

crucial factors and it gave impetus to the formation of ASEAN.

33

'MAPHILINDO' was only one of the many causalities of this conflict,

which created the most serious divisions in South-East Asia until

the prolonged war in Vietnam reached new heights shortly

afterward.6 Even more ill-fated, and even more irrelevant from the

point of view of regionalism in South-East Asia, was the Asian and

Pacific Council (ASPAC), organized in 1966 at the initiative of

President Park Chung-Lee of South Korea.

ASPAC's members were Australia, Japan, Malaysia,

Nationalist China, Taiwan, New Zealand, The Philippines, South

Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand (with Laos having an observer

status). Only four of its members were Southeast Asian states and

that the largest nation of the region, Indonesia refused to join.

ASPAC was, in fact, neither given more than half hearted support

by any participating members except South Korea, nor were its

main objectives and areas of concentration ever clear. In a joint

communiqué issued at the close of the organizational meeting in

Seoul, the participating countries announced their determination to

preserve their integrity and sovereignty in the face of external

threats; but at the same time they agreed that the new organization

should be non-military, non-ideological, and not anti-Communist.

Even the most closely knit regional organization would face

difficulties in working towards these conflicting objectives, and

ASPAC was anything but closely knit. It is not surprising that it

survived for only seven years. ASPAC was dissolved early in 1973.7

During 1961-66 many other regional organisations and

institutions were established. The most important was the Asian

Development Bank (ADB) established in 1966 with headquarters in

Manila. Other outfits established in this period with membership

34

from Southeast Asia included the Asian Productivity Organisation

(APO) of 1961, the Asian Institute for Economic Development

Council (AIDC) of 1966. Still others were established like South-

East Asian Ministers of Education Organisation (SEAMEO) in 1965

which promotes cooperation among the member countries through

education, science and culture and the Ministerial Conference for

the Economic Development of Southeast Asia (MCEDSEA) in 1966

which holds annual meetings to discuss economic progress and

regional problems, the Southeast Asian Central Group (SEACBG) in

1966, an annual Conference of governors to discuss monetary

policies, Banking, capital and market development.8 The formation

of ASEAN was also partly due to the failure of the ASA and

Maphilindo to function as viable regional associations.

ASEAN was formed on August 8, 1967 amid great uncertainty

in the region. Against the background of long standing internal and

partial control, limited cooperation and the failure of these

experiments in organized regional cooperation was certainly no

occasion for surprise. Indeed, any other outcome would have been

regarded at least a minor miracle, which might not be repeated.

But the miracle was repeated, on a much grander, more inclusive

and comprehensive scale, with the founding and evolution of the

ASEAN. By 1967, the non-Communist South-East Asian States

were able to resolve their differences at least at the political level

because the governments willed peace.9 ASEAN had started their

work under these circumstances.

Apart from border disputes, at the domestic level all the

countries faced problems arising from insurgency and secessionist

movements, communist activities, and spill-over effects of the Indo-

35

China War. Instability in the region leading to a sense of insecurity

and the desire to achieve security through regional cooperation

resulted in the formation of the Association of South-East Asian

Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. The five foreign ministers, Adam Malik of

Indonesia, Narciso R. Ramas of the Philippines, Tun Abdul Razak of

Malaysia, S. Rajasthan of Singapore, and Thanat Khoman were the

founding fathers of probably the most successful inter-

governmental organization in the developing world today.10 These

five ASEAN countries did not have the same race, religion, history

and language. They had different political systems, with fragile

economies. They were mindful of the existence of mutual interest

and common problems among themselves and therefore felt the

need to strengthen the bounds of regional solidarity and

cooperation, in the spirit of equality and partnership.11 ASEAN was

initially designed to promote economic growth, and to reduce

tensions between Southeast Asian non-Communist states. ASEAN

emerged as the region’s pre-eminent institution during the Cold

War period. The aims and purposes of ASEAN, when the

organization was founded, were:-

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and

cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in

the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen

the foundation for a prosperous peaceful community of

Southeast Asian nations.

2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding

respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship

among countries of the region and adherence to the principles

of the United Nations Charter.

36

3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in

matters of common mutual assistance and in matters of

common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical,

scientific and administrative fields.

4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training

and research facilities in educational, professional, technical

and administrative affairs.

5. To collaborate more effectively for greater utilization of their

agriculture and industries, expansion of their trade including

the study of their problems of international commodity, trade,

improvements of their transportation and communication

facilities and raising of living standards of their people.

6. To promote Southeast Asian Studies.

7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing

international and regional organizations with similar aims

and purposes and to explore all avenues for even closer

cooperation among themselves.12

ASEAN was expected to serve well the foreign policies and

style of diplomacy of the member countries. Jakarta saw ASEAN as

an institution, which might be helpful in reducing its dependence

on foreign economic aid and improving the national economy.13 It

was the first general, indigenous, and politically neutral effort in

Southeast Asian regional cooperation. It came into existence at a

time when British involvement was gradually declining and the

American role was growing in Asia.

External threats played a prominent role in ASEAN's creation

and survival since the founding states wanted to minimize

manipulation and domination by major powers, most notably the

37

United States and China. The Chinese aggression against India in

1962, detonation of the atomic bomb in 1964, continued supply of

military assistance to communist forces in Indochina, China and

Soviet Union were assisting North Vietnam and the Viet Cong and

maintained relations with the North Korean Communists,

Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia were main reasons of

genesis of ASEAN.14 They were also concerned about Chinese-

supported Communist insurgencies and about separatist

movements, but deliberately chose not to create a military alliance.

ASEAN's founders were well aware of the profound historical,

cultural, and economic circumstances that divided them, but they

recognized the advantages of regular consultation and cohesion.

The core principle of ASEAN was non-intervention in the internal

affairs of other members.15 For most of its first twenty years,

ASEAN's primary focus was on regional peace and stability. ASEAN

emerged as a multipurpose organization. Multipurpose

organizations are characterized by the range and scope of their

functions, aims and activities.16

ASEAN was dominated by the foreign ministers from its

beginning and took the form of state-to-state co-operation, where

diplomacy was the main instrument. Its main aim was to prevent

inter-state conflicts between the members. In the first nine years

till 1976, ASEAN's efforts were mainly to know each other and to

learn how to co-operate with each other. It was also a time to

develop a consensus on strategic views about the region, because

there were real differences among members. Two members, namely

Thailand and the Philippines were alliance partner of the United

States, and they had U.S. bases on their territories. Two other,

38

Singapore and Malaysia, while recognizing non-aligned policies,

were members of the five-Power Defence Arrangement with the

United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Only Indonesia was

genuinely a non-aligned country.17

The ASEAN countries had largely settled their traditional

disputes and developed machinery for negotiating day-to-day

problems. The initial objective of promoting regional security

through reconciliation had largely been achieved with an emphasis

on consensus and not confrontation. Individual members generally

remained unwilling to sacrifice political or economic nationalism to

regionalism, but sought friendly co-operation.18

During the period of 1967 to 1975, the performance of ASEAN

was low key, lackluster and little concrete achievements could be

credited to it. It disappointed ASEAN leaders as well as their well

wishers outside. However, during the first decade ASEAN leaders

and officials were beginning to know one another and nurturing

personal contacts. They were forging institutional ties and

cultivating habits of consultation. This was the beginning of a new

diplomatic culture which stood them in good stead when the

crunch came in April 1975.19 The ASEAN meet in November 1971

in Kuala Lumpur took a momentous decision to neutralize the

region. The resulting compromise, the Zone of Peace, Freedom and

Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the Kuala Lumpur meeting of 1971,

committed ASEAN's States to exert initially necessary efforts to

secure the recognition and respect for South-East Asia as a

ZOPFAN, free from any manner of interference by outside powers.20

A committee of senior officials was set up to pursue steps to

implement the decision. The declaration of ZOPFAN was widely

39

appreciated in the Afro-Asian world. India was one of the countries

which immediately expressed its support to this declaration.21 At its

next meeting in Manila in July 1972, ASEAN reaffirmed its faith in

ZOPFAN and reiterated it in the joint statement the ZOPFAN was

the prime responsibility of the countries of the region. The ASEAN

foreign ministers meeting were held at Pattaya in Thailand in April

1973. Here again they reiterated their support to ZOPFAN.22

Within the first decade of it existence, ASEAN had

transformed the mood of South East Asia. Where earlier ties with

external powers were stronger than their links with each other,

ASEAN member states had by 1975 become true neighbours, more

conscious of their common destiny, more aware of their shared

traditions and histories, and more determinate to work together

towards higher levels of cooperation. ASEAN had in the process

become a viable organization. Over the years it had successfully

coped with initial problems of adjustment. It had gained

international recognition as a genuine regional organization of

considerable promise. These were not inconsiderable achievements

for an organization that was supposed to have withered into

irrelevance.23

The year of 1976 turned out to be a crucial turning point. Far

from dying, ASEAN gave itself a new lease of life. ASEAN decided to

hold their first summit meeting in Bali in February 1976. Issues of

cooperation were discussed seriously. An effort was made towards

their implementation. There was no imminent military threat from

Vietnam. Nor was any more dominions likely to fall in Southeast

Asia. The United States gracefully accepted to withdraw its troops

from South Vietnam and allow the fall of that country along with

40

other Indo-Chinese countries to that of Communism.

The Bali meeting was convened to invest ASEAN with a

political identity.24The summit attempted to reconcile national pre

occupations and perceptions to evolve common regional policies.

During this summit, the ASEAN leaders signed the Treaty of Amity

and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia. They also signed a

programme of action on ASEAN cooperation called the Declaration

of ASEAN Concord. The Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA)

was designed to stimulate the low level of trade among them and

eventually lower tariff. During this summit ASEAN Secretariat was

also established in Jakarta, Indonesia to act as a central

administrative organ for the association and provide for greater

efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN organs and for more

effective implementation of ASEAN projects and activities. 25

In June 1976, the ASEAN foreign ministers met in Manila and

decided to combat the drug menace and cooperate with each other

at the time of natural disasters. The ASEAN summit in Manila

agreed to extend preferential trading facilities. The main aim of the

PTA was to encourage closer regional cooperation through an

expansion of intra regional trade. It was only at the first ASEAN

summit in 1976 that economic cooperation began to receive

attention. The five measures affecting PTA were established. These

were: granting tariff preferences, long term quantity contracts,

preferential terms to finance imports, preferential procurement by

governmental agencies, and liberalization of non-tariff barriers. Of

these tariffs preference was the most widely implemented.

Under the tariff preference agreement, each nation

volunteered a list of products for tariff concession from other

41

countries but the specific preference margin for each item was

negotiated product by product. These preferences were offered a 10

percent cut in existing tariff rates, no increase in tariff rates for five

years and no tariff imposed on items that did not already have

one.26

In August 1977, ASEAN completed its first decade of

existence nearly coincidentally with a ‘Summit Conference’ of the

heads of states of its members held at Kuala Lumpur. The decision

to withdraw Philippine’s claim to Subah was singular achievement

of the Kuala Lumpur summit meeting of ASEAN. It dispelled the

cynicism and skepticism concerning ASEAN which doubted not

only its viability but also the capacity of its member states to

sacrifice aspects of national interest to promote regional amity,

harmony, and cooperation.27 To eliminate the feeling of insecurity

and the threat that unresolved disputes posed to Southeast Asian

interests, the Association created the ASEAN Dialogue Partnership

System (ADPS). The system linked the Association's membership to

key global partners via an ongoing forum that sought to settle

disputes between ASEAN and external entities and, when possible,

to prevent disputes from arising. ASEAN launched its dialogue

program at its second summit in 1977.28 However, 1978 and the

following years brought back instability to the region. In this year

the Vietnamese joined the COMECON and signed a friendship

treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Cambodian problem became more complicated in 1978

when Vietnam sent occupation troops into Cambodia and the three

Cambodian groups that opposed the Hun Sen government, which

Vietnam had installed in their country, were unable together to

42

form a tentative grouping to work for self determination. ASEAN

had a real stake in Cambodia's stability because foreign

intervention in the region could present a much bigger threat.

ASEAN used legal and diplomatic means on Vietnam to remove its

occupation troops from Cambodia. At times, diplomacy seemed to

promise results but Vietnam was changeable and belligerent from

time to time. In 1979, ASEAN presented a resolution to the United

Nations Security Council for non-interference in the internal affairs

of Cambodia and for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. The

Soviet Union expectedly vetoed the resolution. When the General

Assembly met, it recognised Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea as

the legitimate government instead of Vietnamese installed Hun Sen

government and passed the ASEAN Resolution 34/22 for the

withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia.29 In 1977 ASEAN

broadened its contact to East Asia and New Zealand. This practice

soon became a standardized procedure. These countries were

entering the dialogue process of ASEAN under the scheme of ADPS.

Each "dialogue partners” signed cooperation agreements

and/or established a Joint Business Council (JBC) with ASEAN.

This kind of cooperation also started developing with the other

nations as well. The Indo-Chinese Foreign ministers met in Phnom

Penh Cambodia in 1980 and offered to engage jointly in an

exchange of views and to sign non-aggression treaties with the

governments of the individual ASEAN countries and Burma as well.

The countries treated the proposal as a propaganda ploy.

Thailand's foreign minister flatly rejected Non-Aggression Treaty

proposal declaring that since "we have no intension of attacking

anyone" there was no necessity "to sign any non-aggression pact

43

with anyone".30 The combination of external shocks caused

widespread economic recession in ASEAN. In response, the ASEAN

leaders looked for internal economic strength to revive the

economies. ASEAN economic co-operation was thought to be an

internal force that could be relied upon by different member states.

When ASEAN was about to deliberate on these proposed economic-

cooperation schemes, world economic events turned positive. Oil

prices and interest rates fell.31The success of the Newly

Industrializing Economies (NIE's) had begun to have a significant

demonstration effect on policy makers in ASEAN and China. They

had increasingly looked upon a liberal trading regime as well as the

inflow of direct foreign investment as a quick way to jump-start the

process of industrialization.32

The third ASEAN summit meeting was not held till 1987. One

of the reasons for delay was continuing differences between

Malaysia and the Philippines over Subah. In the third meeting in

Manila the ASEAN leaders signed Manila Declaration of 1987,

which speeded up ASEAN cooperation in the political, economic,

social and human development fields. The year 1987 started with

somewhat of a surprise when the Soviet Union revealed that it had

asked for formal talks with ASEAN about becoming a dialogue

partner. A number of countries, intrigued by the success of ASEAN

and the pace of development in member nations, expressed an

interest in linking themselves to the dialogue process.

What attracted the attention of foreign government officials

and entrepreneurs alike were not the success of intra-regional

relations but the economic potential of the ASEAN member states.

This included the geographic location as well as market size of a

44

300-million population (which in 2009 become 580 million), a past

average regional growth rate of 7 per cent, an aggregate ASEAN

demand for foreign goods of US $ 70 billion per year, natural

resources of rubber, palm oil, tin, copra, copper and natural gas

constituting more than one half of the world's supply in 1986-87,

an industrious labour force with competitive wages rates, an

adequate infrastructure, and a strong belief in private enterprise

and rudimentary rules of democratic procedures33. ASEAN

achievements could be seen in a regionally accepted driver's

license, a marine cable network, an emergency oil sharing plan, an

ASEAN air force scheme, and a drugs and narcotics prevention

scheme.

The Soviet Union began its withdrawal from Afghanistan in

1988/89 after realizing that it would be unable to continue

supporting a communist regime in Kabul, despite playing a huge

price in blood and money. South, South-East Asia, the Soviet-

backed Republic of Vietnam had also pulled out the last of its

forces in Cambodia in September 1989, paving the way for a

Cambodian peace settlement in 1991. This ended the confrontation

between the then six ASEAN members of South-East Asia-

Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and

Thailand. With the end of Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet

Union together the whole hearted embrace of free market

economies in the former communist countries, it appeared that the

Asia-Pacific would enjoy a peace dividend. There were even hopes

that a genuine pacific security community would result.34

The ASEAN countries, who viewed Vietnam and Soviet Union

as the major source of their security threat, found that Vietnam

45

was ready to accommodate ASEAN views in toto. Vietnam was

ready to abide by the ASEAN directions on the question of the

Spratlys35, Cambodia or the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Vietnam introduced major reforms in the economic policies to have

greater interactions with the ASEAN countries. All these

developments prompted ASEAN to take Vietnam in its fold on July

28,1995.36 The Cambodia's dispute was ended after the Paris Peace

Agreement in 1991. ASEAN played a significant role to settle the

Cambodia dispute.37 ASEAN countries entered the 1990s with new

confidence. Their organization, the most fully developed

collaborative forum in the region, had survived the Cold War, the

conflict in Indo-China, and numerous bilateral tensions among its

member states. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand begin to record

very high rates of economic growth in the mid 1980s.38

Fear from new external threats led some ASEAN policy-

makers to rethink their options for military-security cooperation.

Thus, it was suggested that a multilateral ASEAN defence

arrangement would be a necessary response to the prospective

withdrawal of US bases from the Philippines and the growing navel

strengths of China, India and Japan, all of whom had the ability to

threaten regional stability in Southeast Asia. It was in this context

the Singapore advocated ASEAN military exercises, and opposition

to an ASEAN military arrangement weakened among the region's

policy-makers. In March 1991, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Ali

Alatas, rejected a suggestion by the Philippines that ASEAN should

form a regional security alliance. According to Alatas, ASEAN

should remain true to its essence and that is economic, social,

cultural and even now political cooperation, but not a defence pact.

46

But the rapid evolution of bilateral military-security ties led to the

emergence of what the chief of Indonesia's armed forces described

as an ASEAN defence spider web.39

The post Cold War era ushered a new thought of great

powers. They no longer showed interest in the regional conflicts

that continued to beset the world. In the post cold war era the

Southeast Asian countries in the region no longer faced the danger

of getting embroiled in an East-West confrontation or the threat of

great powers interference in the context of East-West competition.

The end of Cold War created a more peaceful international climate

in the Asia-Pacific region than during the Cold War period.

In the changed strategic landscape in the region after the end

of Cold War, the ASEAN states were apprehensive about the

prospect of a future security threat from China. Many Southeast

Asian states believed that the most effective way of safeguarding

regional security was to encourage major powers to actively engage

in the region so that they could counter balance each other and

assumed that no power could become too dominant.

ASEAN embarked on a new area of economic cooperation in

1990. These included cooperation on standards and quality, foreign

investment, intellectual property, services, infrastructure, and the

development of small and medium enterprises.40The fall of the

Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War meant the security

issues would, in most parts of the world no longer be of paramount

importance. The economic issues moved to the top of the global

agenda. The search began for new glue which would be the focal

point for ASEAN unity.

After many years of slow progress in ASEAN economic

47

cooperation, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement was signed at the

Fourth ASEAN summit meeting in 1992. The purpose of ASEAN

Free Trade Area (AFTA) was to enhance production efficiency, cost

effectiveness and promote trade and investment in manner

consistent with GATT principle and rule and to make a global

market through tariff reduction and elimination of non-tariff

barriers. The strategic view point of AFTA was to increase the

ASEAN region's competitive advantage as a single production unit.

The AFTA was achieved through Common Preferential Effective

Tariff (CEPT) agreement.41

Malaysia's Defence Minister, Najib Ton Razak, suggested that

ASEAN and its dialogue partners should encourage greater

transparency in weapon acquisitions and create a regional arms

register, so that "suspicions among each other could be minimized,

and managed”. Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, called on

Asia-Pacific countries to adopt Confidence-Building Measures

(CBMs) like reducing the frequency and size of their military

exercises and inviting representatives from non-participating

countries as observers. In addition, he proposed greater

transparency in military arrangements through regular exchange of

information among the major powers on their military budgets,

doctrines and future projects.42

In Singapore summit in 1992, ASEAN leaders broke new

ground by agreeing to hold formal multilateral discussions on

security issues for the first time in the group's history. This historic

decision could provide a necessary basis for consideration of

confidence building and arms control measures within the

framework.43 During the 1993 ASEAN ministerial meeting, it was

48

decided to establish the ARF with membership including ASEAN

members, its dialogue partners, China, Papua New Guiana, Russia,

Vietnam and Laos. The ASEAN Regional Forum became an informal

dialogue of 25 members that seeked to address security issues in

the Asia-Pacific region. The ARF met for the first time in 1994.44

The ARF was modelled on ASEAN and promoted the Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as the code of conduct for regional

state behaviour. It was meant to employ techniques of diplomacy

developed within ASEAN to the Asia-pacific region.45The ARF

included all of the great powers and provided regional states with

an opportunity to build social and political connection and defuse

conflict situations before they became dangerous.

ASEAN has been the main driving force of ARF. Dialogue

partners46 of the ARF meet annually on the guidelines of the annual

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), in what are called ARF

ministerial meetings. Issues of importance to the peace and

security of the Asia-Pacific region are discussed by members and

dialogue partners of the ARF in an atmosphere of friendship and

goodwill. The Asia-Pacific region was a region of turmoil in the Cold

War era where serious differences between the major actors in the

Cold War arose. In that connect the war on the Korean peninsula,

the Vietnam War and the war in Kampuchea (Cambodia) can be

cited as examples.

In these war's, USA, USSR and China were involved directly

or indirectly, and mutual suspicions and mistrust characterized

their relationships. In this atmosphere, they at times reached the

brink of nuclear conflict. The end of cold war removed the major

irritant in way cold war removed the major irritant in way of

49

building trust and confidence, i.e., the ideological conflict, and in

the changed scenario the need for a process arose for making

attempts at creating trust and the peace and security of the Asia-

pacific region.47ARF was a step in that direction.

The ARF forum has been successful in this drive to a great

extent, it is a the testimony to the fact that countries like China,

North Korea, Vietnam, Russia sit together with countries like USA,

Canada, the EU, with ASEAN as a parent body and get the

opportunity to share their perceptions regarding security in the

Asia-Pacific, in a friendly atmosphere. Thus the ARF is quite helpful

in ensuring trust and transparency among the countries of the

region; trust and transparency so necessary for security needed.48

ARF suits to the interests of all the major powers, at least for the

present. It gives Japan an entry into regional security dialogue

which it has long sought, it gives Russia a similar entry and say in

Asia-Pacific security discussions which the Soviet Union had tried

in vain to obtain, it allows the Americans to be part of a new

multilateral institution without compromising their bilateral

military arrangements in the region, and it gives China a new

forum to interact with its neighbors and other Asia-Pacific

powers.49

Strengthened ASEAN military capabilities are intended for

both conventional defence and deterrence. By contrast, the ARF is

concerned solely with deterrence or conflict avoidance through the

application of ASEAN dialogue and consensus principles to the

wider East Asia/Pacific region. ARF is a security organization only

in the sense that it is concerned with developing understanding

and substituting dialogue for conflict.50The ARF began annual

50

meeting in 1994 with twenty-one countries in Asia and around the

pacific participating.

The ARF has promoted dialogue on the Spratly Islands

disputes and Korean denuclearization, and has advanced CBMs,

including publication of white papers on defence policy and the

promotion of high level contacts and exchanges between military

establishments. In 1995 ARF approved concept paper identifying

an evolutionary approach towards a conflict–resolution mechanism

and reaffirming ASEAN role as the driving force in the ARF.51 In

1995 the ARF approved three stages of development; CBMs;

Preventive Diplomacy(PD); and the ‘elaboration of approaches’ to

development conflict resolution mechanisms.

The first step in widening AFTA took place in the fifth ASEAN

summit meeting on December 15, 1995 in Bangkok, when Vietnam

simultaneously joined ASEAN and acceded to the CEPT agreement.

Thus Vietnam, like the ASEAN-6, was given 10 years to reduce its

tariffs of 0-5 per cent.52 Within three years from the launching of

AFTA, exports among ASEAN countries grew from US$43.26 billion

in 1993 to almost US$80 billion in 1996, an average yearly growth

rate of 28.3 percent. In the process, the share of intra-regional

trade from ASEAN's total trade rose from 20 percent to almost 25

percent. Tourists from ASEAN countries themselves have been

representing an increasingly important share of tourism in the

region. In 1996, of the 28.6 million tourist arrivals in ASEAN, 11.2

million or almost 40 percent came from within ASEAN itself. 53 In

the fifth ASEAN summit meeting in Bangkok, for the first time the

seven ASEAN leaders (ASEAN+6 and Vietnam) and their

counterparts from Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar signed the treaty

51

on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone (SEANWFZ) the

leaders of the ten Southeast Asian countries.

The ASEAN leaders decided to raise their cooperation on

human and social development, called functional cooperation, to

the same level as their economic and political cooperation. The

treaty clearly stated that no parties will use nuclear energy

programmes, state parties shall subject their programmes to

rigorous nuclear safely assessments, conforming to guidelines

recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The parties were prohibited from developing, testing,

manufacturing or otherwise acquiring, possessing or having control

over nuclear weapons.54 Each party also undertakes not to dump at

sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the zone any

radioactive material or waste.

In 1997-98 ASEAN countries and rest of the Asian countries

suffered set back of Asian Economic crisis. The crisis began in July

1997 when, taking advantage of financial distortions and the

massive external debt of government and private sectors, currency

traders attacked the Thai baht. Before long, the currency crisis had

spread across Southeast like a contagious disease. From this one

event, panic spread through the financial market of Asia and

beyond. Banks became insolvent or just stopped lending and the

bewildered people of the region were plunged almost overnight from

an atmosphere of plenty into what amounted to an instant

depression in Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand and rest of

ASEAN countries also affected by the Asian economic crisis.55

The financial crisis in Asia hit the ASEAN countries hard and

provided perhaps the first test for the Association’s cohesiveness.

52

Bilateral relations between some members were not at their best.

ASEAN, as a group was powerless to stem the rapid depreciation of

regional currencies. Although Singapore showed their willingness to

help other countries by pledging financial support (as part of an

international rescue package), ASEAN as a regional organization

was caught unprepared and had no collective strategy for dealing

with what was the most serious banking and financial crisis to hit

the region.56The ASEAN finance ministers began meeting regularly,

and ASEAN and APEC fostered agreement on a set of principles for

surveillance of capital flow and financial management that

effectively put the Asian Development Bank in charge of monitoring

the region.57The impact of the economic crisis on the region inside

and outside was that the ASEAN position was weaker in dealing

with outside world, particularly in dealing with China on disputed

islands in the South China Sea. In the words of Singapore’s Foreign

Minister, S. Jaya kumar ASEAN was going through a very testing

period as the financial crisis strained bilateral relations.

Notwithstanding the ASEAN members continued to cooperate on

ASEAN matters.58

Soon after the crisis erupted, in December 1997, the ASEAN

Manila framework agreement created an innovative surveillance

mechanism designed to prevent potential crisis through ‘peer

pressure’. The Manila framework also reflected a commitment to

avoid protectionist responses, to deepen capital market, and to

promote further liberalization and foreign investment, as well as

pressing for global solutions to negative externalities of

international financial flows, including a stronger International

Monetary Fund (IMF).59 The ASEAN countries resolved this problem

53

in their own way. They also proposed to establish a separate US $

50 billion Asian fund to be independent of control by the IMF and

its big donors.

The smoke haze from Indonesia’s forest fires in 1997 that

affected neighboring countries served as an alarm bell calling

attention to the environmental problems facing Southeast Asia. The

fires that were started as an inexpensive way of clearing forest

cover for palm oil plantations also pointed to the problem of

resource management in the region. It was just one example of the

ASEAN governments’ pro-development policy to the neglect of

preserving natural resources and being conscious of environment

impact. The forest fire also made it evident that the environmental

issues had become a security issue both for the states and people

in terms of economic cost and impact on the health and general

well-being at the populace. It was recognized also that

environmental degradation as a security issue was closely linked to

other security issues that included deforestation, water and food

scarcity, and migration. 60 This was a big problem of Southeast

Asia. ASEAN was affected from this problem.

The sixth ASEAN summit was held in Hanoi, Vietnam. The

Head of government adopted the “Hanoi Plan of Action”,61 and for

the first time committed the Association to broad middle term plan

specifying an array of activities aimed at the achievement of its

development goals for the year 2020. The pacing of the activities

within the Hanoi Action plan was meant to address the Asian

financial and economic crisis and to prevent its recurrence and the

Hanoi Plan of Action firms up the ASEAN answer to the crisis

which was to step up economic integration of the ASEAN countries

54

into a single market and investment area where goods and services,

as well as investment capital, are allowed free and easy flow.62

Even before the events in East Timor in 1999 reached crisis

proportions, the existing regional mechanisms to deal with political

and security matters found in both ASEAN and the ARF had come

in for much criticism for their ineffectiveness. It was the ASEAN's

one of the biggest problems. Within and outside ASEAN circles,

critics had argued that “the ASEAN way”, which had served the

grouping well in the past, was no longer adequate and was in fact

becoming a serious obstacle into responding to certain conflicts. In

particular, the principle of non-interference was singled out as

needing re-adjustment under a much–changed external

environment.63

The United Nations Security Council had passed Resolution

1272,on 25 October 1999 to authorize UN Secretary General Kofi

Annan to set up the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor

(UNTAET) in order to “exercise all legislative and executive

authority including the administration of Justice” in East Timor

until formal independence. UNTAET’s mandate was to provide

security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of

East Timor; to establish an effective administration; to assist in the

development of civil and social services; to ensure the coordination

and distribution of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and

development assistance; to support capacity building for self-

government; and to assist in the establishment of conditions for

sustainable economic development.64

ASEAN officials responded to the criticisms by declaring that

only the UN had the legitimacy and the capabilities to undertake

55

any peacekeeping operation and mobilize the requisite resources

necessary to respond to a crisis such as that in East Timor. What

ASEAN had done instead was to “undertake consultations, arrive at

a consensus, and let individual members decide on what specific

contributions to make to the UN effort”.65 In 1999 ASEAN

established the ASEAN Troika, which was an adhoc body

comprising the three ASEAN Foreign Ministers of the present, past

and future chairs of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), which

would rotate in accordance with the ASC’s Chairmanship. The

main purpose of the Troika was to enable ASEAN to urgent and

important political and security issues in a timely manner.

However, the work of the Troika, as stipulated, was to be

compatible with the principles enshrined in the TAC, particularly

the core principles of consensus and non-interference in the

domestic affairs of member states. Since its inception, nothing

much has been said nor reported about its progress.66 Cambodia

entered ASEAN as a tenth member in April 1999. It was the last

member of ASEAN.

Thai-Myanmar relations became increasingly conflictual due

to failure to demarcate the joint border, cross-border fighting

between the Myanmar army and various insurgent groups, flow of

drugs from Myanmar into Thailand and suspension of Thai fishing

rights in Myanmar waters. In February 2001 there were serious

border clashes. However, ASEAN Troika was not involved in this

case. In April regional border meeting was convened. In June 2001

Premier Thaksin Shivanatra visited Myanmar. The two sides signed

a Joint Communiqué agreeing to strengthen economic and

technical cooperation and normalize border–crossing regime as also

56

cooperation in narcotic drug control.67 The ASEAN Troika did not

clearly have a mandate as to how, where and when the Troika may

be employed.

The ASEAN Economic Ministers and the ASEAN leaders

signed a draft on e-ASEAN framework agreement, in Singapore on

November 24, 2000. The aims of e-ASEAN were to promote

economic growth, social development, and better governance;

enhance access to information and news worldwide; boost

economic growth and employment; provide better access to a range

of government services; provide distance learning and education

and delivery of health services; and promote cross-border business

and network. The e-ASEAN agreement had the following objectives

to strengthen and enhance the economic competitiveness of ASEAN

through harnessing information and communication technology

ICT, in the private and public sector to create a common market-

place of half a billion people for ICT produce and services through

trade liberalization; and to improve the living standards of the

ASEAN people through ICT and narrowing the digital divide.68

Information could be exchanged and goods and services traded

much faster and cheaper through increased connectivity and it

served as high-speed direct connection among ASEAN countries.

The seventh ASEAN summit was held in Bandar Seri

Begawan, Brunei Darussalam on November 2001. The leaders

discussed the immediate concerns of addressing a severe world

economic slowdown while contributing to international efforts to

combat terrorism and at the same time agreed on the need to

identify new priorities and respond decisively to longer term

challenges facing Southeast Asia. They also discussed about AFTA

57

and investment area, deepening market liberalization for both trade

and investment.

The Eighth ASEAN summit was held in Phnom Penh

November 2002 in Cambodia. In this meeting the four themes were

discussed: (i) Collaboration with the greater Mekong sub-region

programme to accelerate ASEAN integration, (ii) ASEAN as single

tourist destination,(iii) ASEAN solidarity for peace and security

especially in the fight against terrorism and lastly (iv) bold steps in

sustainable development and natural resource management,

including satisfaction of the Kyoto protocol by all ASEAN members.

The Declaration called the ASEAN leaders to build on the specific

measures outlined in the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to

counter terrorism which was adopted in Brunei Darussalam in

November 2001. ASEAN states continued to increase their efforts

against terrorism. These included Thailand's accession to the

Agreement in information exchange and establishment of

communication procedures between Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines and Cambodia, the arrest of persons plotting to commit

acts of terrorism and the implementation of the work plan adopted

by the special ASEAN ministerial meeting on terrorism in Kuala

Lumpur in May 2002.69

The ARF faced the new and broader challenges of the time; to

start with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United

States which placed on alert the whole security environment. It

supported the collective and concerted global campaign against

terrorism and reaffirmed the principles in the UN Security Council

resolution on the prevention and suppression of Terrorist acts and

issued a statement on measures against terrorist financing.

58

The ninth ARF meeting also considered security measures for

areas with heightened tensions. In the incidents between North and

South Korea, the ARF stressed the need for the easing of tensions,

the use of CBMs and reconciliation and cooperation, full

implementation of the 1994 project of the Korean peninsula energy

development organization and the code of conduct in the South

China sea as ASEAN's new approach to work closely with China in

the spirit of self restrains and with a view to peaceful settlement of

disputes in the South China in conformity with international law.70

The ninth ASEAN summit was held in Bali, Indonesia in

October 2003. ASEAN leaders declared Bali Concord II which

announced its attention to create by 2020 on ASEAN communities

compromising ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN

Security Community (ASC) and ASEAN Social Cultural Community

(ASCC).

ASEAN members strengthened the ASC concept further the

following year. At the 10th ASEAN summit in November 2004,

ASEAN leaders launched the Vientiane action programme (VAP).

The VAP was the second mid-term (2005-10) Plan; it succeeded the

Hanoi plan of Action that ended in 2004. The programme contained

clearer goals and strategies for realizing the AEC; the completion of

integration in the eleven priority sectors before 2010 and tariff

elimination for products by 2010 for old ASEAN members and 2015

for new ASEAN members. In this meeting ASEAN member countries

reiterated their commitment to combat drug abuses in their

respective countries and achieve the goal Drugs- free ASEAN region

in 2015.71

The first East Asia Summit held in Malaysia in December

59

2005 was an epochal meeting that added momentum to the

formation of regional community. However, the scope of the

summit's membership was not yet clear. Originally the East Asia

summit was supposed to be held within the context of ASEAN+3

(China, South Korea and Japan) which was formed to strengthen

the economic resilience of the developing countries in East Asia.

However, it adopted a broader 16-nation framework with the

participation of India, Australia, and New Zealand.72 The sixteen

countries attending the first EAS Summit already agreed in the

Kula Lumpur Declaration that the summit would be held annually.

Many efforts and lobbies by diplomats and governmental

representatives and number of ministerial meetings as preparation

for this East Asia Summit have been conducted.

In a speech prior to the EAS on his "Asian strategy" Japanese

Foreign Minister Taro Aso made a bid for the leading role, declaring

Japan's ambition to be" a thought leader" in Asia. He emphasized

the importance of the US- Japan alliance, saying Japan was "a

stabilizer' whose readiness enables it to provide security, the

cornerstone for Asian prosperity, in the areas of both economic and

regional security.73

The 12th ASEAN summit was held in Cebu. In the Philippines

on January 13, 2007. After discussion and deliberations on a

diverse range of issues regarding the future strategic initiatives,

perspectives and approaches to be adopted by the association

leaders of ASEAN signed the Cebu declaration towards one caring

and sharing community and committed to promote a socially

prosperous community within the region. The ASEAN member

countries’ leaders endorsed the preparation of the Track-II

60

feasibility study of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership

(CEPEA) of EAS involving EAS countries. CEPEA could target

liberalizing regional trade and investment regime in a phased

manner by 2020 with provisions for safeguarding for sensitive

products and special and differential treatment for countries at

different levels of development. An attempt should be made to

narrow the development gap between countries and regions

through capacity building and resource transfer. In this year the

foreign exchange holding of EAS countries actually exceeded $ 3

trillion. The Cebu declaration cited the need to reduce poverty,

protect the rights of children and woman, improve education and

cherish the environment on their way to the economic integration

by 2015.

The New charter of the ASEAN was adopted at the thirteenth

summit was held in Singapore on November 18-22, 2007. Which

highlighted the following objectives of the ASEAN:

1. To maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and

further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region;

2. To enhance regional resilience by promoting greater political,

security, economic and socio-cultural cooperation;

3. To preserve Southeast Asia as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and

free of all other weapons of mass destruction;

4. To ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in

peace with the world at large in a just, democratic and

harmonious environment;

5. To create a single market and production base which is stable,

prosperous, highly competitive and economically integrated

with effective facilitation for trade and investment in which

61

there is free flow of goods, services and investment; facilitated

movement of business persons, professionals, talents and

labour; and freer flow of capital;

6. To alleviate poverty and narrow the development gap within

ASEAN through mutual assistance and cooperation;

7. To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the of

law, and to promote and protect human rights and

fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and

responsibilities of the member States of ASEAN;

8. To respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of

comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational

crimes and Tran boundary challenges;

9. To promote sustainable development so as to ensure the

protection of the region's environment, the sustainability of its

natural resources, the preservation of its cultural heritage and

the high quality of life of its peoples;

10. To develop human resources through closer cooperation in

education and life-long learning, and in science and technology,

for the empowerment of the peoples of ASEAN and for the

strengthening of the ASEAN Community;

11. To enhance the well-being and livelihood of the peoples of

ASEAN by providing them with equitable access to

opportunities for human development, social welfare and

justice;

12. To strengthen cooperation in building a safe, secure and drug-

free environment for the peoples of ASEAN;

13. To promote a people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of

society are encouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the

62

process of ASEAN integration and community building;

14. To promote an ASEAN identity through the fostering of greater

awareness of the diverse culture and heritage of the region; and

15. To maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the

primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its

external partners in a regional architecture that is open,

transparent and inclusive.74

Third East Asia Summit was held in Singapore whose the

Heads of State showed their concern about the adverse impact of

climate change, socio-economic development, health and

environment in developing countries. The member states

reaffirmed their commitment to take an effective approach to the

inter-related challenges of climate change, energy security and

other environmental and health issues. They signed Singapore

Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment

which aims to support the work to achieve a common

understanding on a long-term global emission reduction goal to

pave the way for a more effective post-2012 international

agreement. The Leaders also agreed to promote environmental

education to enhance human resource capabilities to address the

challenges of ensuring sustainable development in EAS

participant’s countries. The Heads of States also agreed to the

establishment of the Economic Research Institute of ASEAN and

East Asia (ERIA) to be temporally accommodated at the ASEAN

secretariat.

The 15th ASEAN summit with partners concluded at Cha-an-

Hua, Thailand on October 25, 2009. The leaders agreed on the

importance of continued and more effective representation in this

63

group of the world’s twenty largest economies. They agreed upon to

cooperation to enhance food production and distribution. They

reaffirmed their position that parties to the UN Framework

Convention on Climate Change should protect the climate. The

summit also agreed to recommendations of both the East Asia Free

Trade Agreement and Comprehensive Economic Partnership for

East Asia studies. They adopted Cha-an-Hua Hin Declaration on

the Integration of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on

Human Rights (AICHR) to welcome the establishment of the AICHR

as mandated by Art.14 of the ASEAN Charter.

The Sixteenth ASEAN summit was held in Ha Noi, Vietnam on

April 8-9, 2010. The leaders signed the Protocol to the ASEAN

Charter on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms. They adopted and

signed the Protocol as well as the Agreement on the Privileges and

Immunities of ASEAN.

Seventeenth ASEAN summit was held at Ha Noi in Vietnam

October 28, 2010. The summit highlighted the role of Economic

Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) for their work in

promoting regional integration by providing useful research and

practical policy recommendations on regional connectivity, trade,

investment, energy and the environment ASEAN Information Fund

(AIF) finalized in this summit, as a manifestation of ASEAN’s

determination and self-reliance, to mobilize financial resources with

ASEAN to add support for regional infrastructure development.

Summit has reaffirmed the importance of the Declaration on the

Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) signed between

ASEAN and China, which embodies the collective commitment to

promoting peace and stability in this area through dialogue and

64

cooperation and peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with

universally agreed principles of international law including the

United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982)

and other relevant international maritime law.

The 18th ASEAN summit held in May 6-7, 2011, Jakarta. The

leaders discussed the issues of food security and energy security.

ASEAN receives huge support from the EU and due to Myanmar’s

human rights issues especially as perceived in the West; they

wished not to further provoke the international community.

Moreover Human Rights Watch had launched a schathing rebuke

of ASEAN’s proposal to appoint Myanmar as Chair of the

organization. In 2006, therefore, the offer to Myanmar was

withdrawn. The issue of connectivity has been dominant in most of

ASEAN discussions. By improving its connectivity and linkages,

ASEAN has created economic value for itself on a regional basis

instead of only on a country‐wide basis. It has been relatively

successful in its economic integration, which is a result of neither

government policy nor a conscious effort, but a function of global

capital, multinational companies and investors. Connectivity

outside and within Southeast Asia, Food and Energy Security,

Disaster Management and Sub-regional cooperation were the other

main focus areas during the 18th ASEAN summit. Failure of the

ASEAN to convince Thailand and Cambodia to cease hostilities was

a major failure of the 18th summit, highlighting ASEAN’s inability

to deal with internal differences among member countries.

The nineteenth ASEAN and sixth EAS summit was held in

Bali, Indonesia on November 17-19, 2011. The summit was

attended by leaders from 10 ASEAN member countries and eight

65

dialogue partners New Zealand, China, India, Australia, South

Korea, Japan, Russia and USA. The first declaration contains basic

norms and common principles taken from various previous

documents including the UN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation in Southeast Asia and other arrangements among EAS

participating countries. The second declaration includes

connectivity as one of the key area of cooperation of the East Asia

Summit besides the existing five priorities, namely finance, energy,

education, communicable diseases and disaster management. This

declaration will inter alia support and facilitate the further

cooperation between the ASEAN and other EAS participating

countries in the Connectivity initiative, and the development of a

regional public-private partnership development agenda and will

promote greater engagement and cooperation in people-to-people

connectivity. The South China Sea issue was discussed in this

meeting which is strategically important to everyone, with busy

international sea lanes, rich fishing areas and potential energy

reserves. China claims the area in its entirety and has been

accused of trying to intimidate boats in disputed waters. Myanmar

problem was also discussed in this meeting. An estimated 2,000

political prisoners are still held in Myanmar and the new

government has been slow to engage in meaningful dialogue with

the opposition or settle differences with long-persecuted ethnic

minorities. Leaders of the 18 countries talked about breaking down

barriers, improving infrastructure, and building seamless

transportation links between countries with vastly different cultural

and political beliefs.75

66

The Evolution of ARF

Among the regional organizations during the period of 1945 to

1967 to promote regional cooperation in Southeast Asia; only

ASEAN as a channel expanded its institutional structure. In fact,

despite the ambiguous description of the ASEAN charter and the

lack of consensus among the political leaders concerning ASEAN

affairs, the organization soon expanded its institutional structure,

and this led to the establishment of a secretariat in 1976. The

expansion of ASEAN's organizational structure, however, did not

come with a similar expansion in functions or abilities to promote

regional cooperation. Moreover, except for its institutional affiliation

with non-governmental organizations, ASEAN did not admit more

Asian countries.76

In 1997 at the ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) it was

decided to include defence officials in discussions on CBM's with

the intention of moving towards PD. As for its method and

approach, the Chairman's statement stipulated that' The approach

shall be evolutionary, taking place in three broad stages, namely

the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive

diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts.' This three-

stage approach, with the final goal of conflict resolution in mind,

was elaborated in the concept paper prepared for the second

meeting. This implies that participants had perceived the ARF as a

vehicle for conflict prevention and resolution. Akiko Fukushima has

depicted the ARF evolution through the diagram given below:

67

Figure 2.1 The evolution of the ARF

Stage IIIConflict

Resolution Mechanism

We are here

Stage II Preventive diplomacy

Continued implementation of CBMs

Stage I Confidence-Building Measures

Source: (Akiko Fukushima, “The ASEAN Regional Forum”, in

Michael Wesley (ed.), The Regional Organizations of the Asia-

Pacific-Exploring Institutional Change, Palgrave Macmillan,

London, 2003.)

ARF adopted three stage development process. The

ARF did not achieve the third stage it crossed stage I and II

only. The ARF introduced the following guiding principles on

participation of the members:

1. New member must subscribe to and work cooperatively

towards achieving the ARF's key goals as stated in the ARF

Enhanced role for the ARF Chairman A register of experts or eminent persons Annual security outlook Voluntary background briefing on regional

Dialogue on security perceptionsDefence publications such as White PapersParticipation in UN Conventional Arms RegisterEnhanced contacts and exchanges

68

concept paper annexed to the chairman's statement of August

1,1995.

2. Applicants must directly affect the peace and security of the

region.

3. The ARF will expand carefully and cautiously.

4. Participation should be decided by consultation among all

ARF participants.

The ARF has surely served the goal of stage I, which focused

on CBM's and has become the sole region-wide political-security

intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation framework.77

ACHIEVEMENTS OF ASEAN

The ASEAN experience started with a legacy of tense and

volatile relations among its founder members, and in the early

stages the peaceful resolution of intra-ASEAN conflicts as well as

the resistance to a perceived Communist threat were the overriding

concerns. Only in the late 1970s did economic issues become a key

aspect of ASEAN co-operation, both among members and with

regard to non-member countries and international organizations.78

ASEAN had signed TAC in 1976 in Bali. In the 1980's ASEAN also

made greater progress with tariff reductions. ASEAN had greater

with new industries, growing exports and bullish stock markets

1980's and early 1990's. By 1990 ASEAN was probably the most

effective organization in Third World. The economic crisis affected

the ASEAN in 1997. But the ASEAN countries controlled the

economic crisis rapidly.

As an aftermath of the 1997-98 currency crisis in ASEAN

countries an increased need for greater institutional cooperation,

transcending Northeast Asian neighbours through meeting with the

69

Heads of Government of China, Japan and South Korea every year,

together and individually was felt. This enterprise, known as the

ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and ASEAN Plus One processes, has

developed into the principal overarching framework for cooperation

between ASEAN and the three major countries of Northeast Asia.

The APT forum also offers an additional venue for the three

Northeast Asian states to deal with political and other problems

that they have among themselves.

ASEAN was at the centre of the group of Asia pacific countries

that put together the Manila framework on November 1997. Taking

advantage of their membership, ASEAN countries also secured the

support of other multilateral organizations, such as the APEC and

the Asia-Europe Meeting. The APEC leaders endorsed the Manila

framework, while the ASEM leaders issued a special statement on

the need for reforms in the international monetary and financial

systems, focusing on crisis prevention and reducing the

vulnerability of domestic financial systems to potential shocks,

including speculation-induced instability.79 Furthermore,

recognizing the economic interdependence of East Asia, ASEAN

welcomed the Chinese initiative to hold regular consultations

among finance and Central Bank deputies of ASEAN, China, Japan

and the Republic of Korea. For the long term, ASEAN reaffirmed its

commitment to the course of greater economic liberalization and

regional integration.80 Over the decades, ASEAN enhanced its sub-

regional cooperation with its major trading partners outside the

region as well as the regional groupings.

Thus the web of ASEAN's sub-regional cooperation involves

the Asia-Pacific economies (through APEC), Latin American

70

economies (through EALAF), EU economies (through the ASEAM),

and the SAARC economic grouping (by way of India's membership

in the ARF and being a dialogue partner of ASEAN since 1996).

Pakistan is a member of ARF only. However, the degree and

intensity of ASEAN's engagement with each of these groupings

varies considerably, depending upon strategic and economic

considerations of ASEAN.81

The distinct 'ASEAN way' became a model for other

experiments in international cooperation. The non-inference or

non-intervention precluded ASEAN from playing any type of role in

the East Timor crisis in 1999, leaving initiative to Australia and the

UN. ASEAN's predominant approach has been conflict management

by avoidance.

ASEAN created a framework for informing bilateral relations

towards the end of dispute resolution. There have been a few cases

of mediation, for example, Thailand's involvement in the Malaysian-

Philippines conflict over Subah with respect to the South China Sea

disputes that affected many members, ASEAN reached consensus

in 1992 on the declaration on the South China Sea and in 2002

concluded an agreement with China. The agreement was intended

to prevent further tensions over the disputed territories and to

reduce the risks of military conflict in South China Sea. The parties

stipulated their adherence to the principles of the UN Charter.

UNCLOS, the TAC and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence

and reaffirmed their respect and commitment to the freedom of

navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea.82They

agreed to resolve their territorial disputes by peace means.

ASEAN has moved away from the idea of ZOPFAN in the post-

71

Cold War era. ASEAN now views ZOPFAN as impractical because

international economic interdependence, and Southeast Asia's need

to access the world economy, requires that the region be closely

integrated with the rest of the world. The Southeast Asian countries

could not keep Soviet Union out of the region. The implication is

that regional security would best be ensured not through a

framework excluding the great powers as envisaged by ZOPFAN,

but through equilibrium among them and Southeast Asia.

The ASEAN way has been criticized by many scholars. The

"ASEAN Way" refers to a set of diplomatic norms shared by the

members of the ASEAN. It encourages the Southeast Asian

countries to seek an all incremental approach to co-operation

through lengthy consultations and dialogue. Its elements include

the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other

states, the non-use of force, and so on. Some scholars and

analysists have been calling for a modified interpretation of these

principles.83

ASEAN has developed an extensive "dialogue process" with its

major trading partners and major regional powers, which further

enhanced its diplomatic standing that paved the way for the

development at Asia- Pacific region wide processes, APEC and ARF.

China's intensifying engagement with ASEAN during 2004 was just

part of Beijing's broader strategy of multilateralism in Asia as a

whole, apparently aimed at leveraging its growing economic and

diplomatic clout to heighten the legitimacy of its regional security

role while minimizing that of the United States. China was host of

the ARF's Security Policy Conference for senior defence officials,

convened for the first time in Beijing.84 Capitalizing on the relations

that had developed through the annual ASEAN Post Ministerial

72

Conferences (PMC), ASEAN's dialogue relations have promoted

trade and investment, facilitated the transfer of technology and

know-how and improved access of ASEAN produce into the

markets of its dialogue partners. Economic cooperation has become

the most important area of cooperation of ASEAN's relations with

the dialogue partners. ASEAN's cooperation with its dialogue

partners has extended to industrial development, transfer of

technology, energy, communications, transport and tourism.85

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has proposed to adopt an

Asian Currency Unit (ACU) based on a basket of 13 Asian

currencies (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the

Philippines, Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Cambodia) plus

Japan, China, and South Korea (ASEAN + 3) as a yardstick to

measure variations in currency values. It will be a weighted average

of the members’ exchange rates. The ACU is supposed to help

monitor both the collective movement of Asian currencies against

major currencies (such as the US dollar and the euro), as well as

the individual movement of each Asian currencies against the

regional average presented by the ACU. The ACU has also been

modeled to enable economic interdependence in Asia, cooperation

on exchange rate stability and at a later stage, convergence of

monetary policy and the introduction of a single currency.86

The aims and purposes of organization depend very much on

the goodwill, seriousness and determination of each participating

country to cooperate with others. To the successful run of the

organization the feeling of togetherness, patience and continuous

efforts are needed from all member countries, based on reality and

pragmatism.87 An Indonesian plane was high jacked of on March

28, 1981, and it subsequently landed at Bangkok's Don Moang air

73

port. Indonesia had requested permission from the Thailand

Government to launch military operation to free the hostages.

Thailand government permitted the military operation. Indonesian

special commandos completed the mission within a short span of

time and released the hostages. This event was the proof of ASEAN

unity.

The ASEAN growth model can best be described in a figure of

concentric circles.(Fig. No.2.2) At the wider regional level in both

Asia and the pacific, APEC has been emerging as the dominant

force of economic co-operation, with members from either side of

the pacific. This first tier of the vision of a new structure of co-

operative relationships, as highlighted in the concentric circles that

the ASEAN has envisaged, propelling the concept of 'open

regionalism' into global prominence.88 The first tier is also inclusive

of ASEM.

Figure No. 2.2The ASEAN Growth model-A three-tier ASEAN Model

Source: (Abul Kalam, “Sub-Regional Co-operation in ASEAN and Role of Private Sector: Relevance for SAARC”, Bliss Journal, Vol.20, No.3, 1999).

APEC/EAEC/ARF

ASEAN(AFTA)

GROWTHTRIANGLE

74

The second tier but the most reckoning part of the new

structure of cooperative relationship is symbolized by the ASEAN,

the EU-type federal structure established in 1967 with five nations

but now expanded to ten with the inclusion of all the Southeast

Asian countries as members. An expansion programme has also

been underway in terms of sphere of activity. Southeast Asia is set

to establish an AFTA, with a commitment effort to promote trade

liberalization as well as to encourage a horizontal division of labour

both in building production networks and attracting investment.

The third or new structure at a lower level is the "Growth

Triangles" (GTs) of the IMS-Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore type is

projected as modified structuralism but does in a way combine

some elements of the federalist model of growth. It is also known as

"growth zones" or a regional "geo-economic mind-set" or "the third

wave," a living experiment in sub regional integration. Indeed closer

interaction and closer GT level of benefits would have spillover

effects, leading to greater intra-ASEAN cooperation, giving rise" to

more and perhaps even more effective forms of economic

cooperation between the ASEAN members.

Thus emergence of the IMS-GT has to be seen in the way the

ASEAN think and operate, building “a tighter web of economic

interdependence," with an outward growth structure of APEC being

built from below," a building bloc" of ASEAN and AFTA . Basically

the idea is to promote cooperation moving towards a common

economic regime, drawing the region closer together, though fully

taking into account the factor endowments, the perceived benefits

and distinguishing features of sub-regionalism that would benefit

all the participants.89

75

Southeast Asia created three more GTs between 1991-94,

Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), Brunei-

Indonesia-Malaysia-the Philippines-East ASEAN Growth Area

(BIMP-EAGA) and the Greater Mekong Sub region (GMS). Northeast

Asia created three such economic zones, and Central Asia proposed

one. The vital issues include the nature of model and

conceptualization, the steps taken by the parties, the policy inputs

and structures placed to make growth efforts operational, and their

results in terms of systemic change. These issues need to be

tackled in the light of sub regional growth efforts in the regions

among the states.90

ASEAN trade ministers have agreed to speed up service

liberalization and new incentives to achieve its ambitious plans to

create a European-style single market by 2015. Trade ministers

also agreed to remove all non-tariff barriers such as licensing

requirements, quantitative restrictions, technical, and control and

inspection measure by 2012.

The most important development was the formulation of the

ASEAN vision 2020 of “ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian

Nations, outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity,

bounded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a

community of caring societies”91.ASEAN’s vision 2020 describes

Southeast Asia as a community at peace with one another’ with

goal, by 2020, of the entire region being an ASEAN community

conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and

bound by a common regional identity.92

ASEAN shall have, by the year 2020, established a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia where each nation is at peace with itself and where the causes for conflict have been eliminated, through abiding respect for justice and rule of law and through the strengthening of national and regional resilience. ASEAN VISION 2020.93

76

REFERENCES

1. Siam is the name given to the kingdom by the foreigners

before 1939. The name Thailand was adopted between June

1939 and April 1946, after which it became Siam, until April

1949, when it again became Thailand. The Kingdom of Siam

occupied an intermediate position on the peninsula of Indo-

China, being situated between French Indo-China and

Burma. Of Siam’s 11,500,000 people, approximately

8,000,000 are Siamese. These are descendants of the original

“Thai” or “Free” people who gave their country the name,

“Nuang Thai’” or “Kingdom of the Free.” See in D.R.

Bergsmark, Economic Geography of Asia Vol.II, Mangal Deep

Publications, Jaipur, 1996, pp.265-67.

2. Mahavir Singh (ed.), Asian Annual 2004, Shipra Publications,

Delhi, p. 194.

3. Arnfinn Jorgensen Dahl, Regional Organization and Order

in South-East Asia , The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1982,

p. 10 .

4. For details see Paul J Davidson, ASEAN-The Evolving Legal

Framework for Economic Cooperation, Times Academic Press,

Singapore, 2002, p.14.

5. Ganganath Jha, South-East Asia and India-A Political

Perspective, National Books Organization, New Delhi, 1986, p. 65.

6. Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and The Asia

Pacific, Lexington Books, Canada, 1991, p. 64.

7. Ibid, pp.63-64.

8. Arnfinn Jorgenson Dahl, op. cit., p.11.

9. V. Yoga Jyotsna, “ASEAN-A Perspective”, in Rama S. Melkote

77

(ed.), Regional Organization-A Third World Perspective, Sterling

Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1990, p. 178.

10. "The Foundation of ASEAN" http://: www. aseanfoundation

.org.

11. Munmun Majumdar, Indonesia: Primus Inter Pares in ASEAN,

Rajat Publications, New Delhi, 2003, p.9.

12. Bangkok Declaration, August 8, 1967, Jakarta, Indonesia.

13. Chintamani Mahapatra, American Role in the Origin & Growth

of ASEAN, ABC Publication House, New Delhi, 1990, p. 24-26.

14. Ibid.

15. Margret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International

Organizations-The Politics and Processes of Global

Governance, Viva Books Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2005, p.191.

16. A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations-Principles and

Issues, Prentice-Hall International, Inc., New Jersey, 1991,

p.233.

17. Jasuf Wanandi, “ASEAN's Past and the Challenges Ahead:

Aspects of Politics and Security”, see in Simon S. C. Tay et.

al., Reinventing ASEAN, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Singapore, 2001, p.26.

18. Nicholas Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast

Asia, Vol.II, Cambridge University Press, U.K., 1991, p.313.

19. O Baid Ul Haq, "Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects,"

World Affairs, Vol.3, No.3, July-September 1999, p.27.

20. Janneie Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN ", Adelphi Paper,

No.328, p.18.

21. Ganganath Jha, op. cit., p.72.

22. Ibid.p.73.

78

23. Malcolm S. Adiseshiah (ed), Regional Economic Arrangements,

Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, p.76.

24. V. Suryanarayan, South and Southeast Asia in The 1990s-

Indian and American Perspectives, Konark Publishers Pvt.

Ltd., New Delhi, 1992, p.135.

25. Paul J. Davidson, op.cit, p.25. The Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation in Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s blueprint for

intraregional interaction, specifies the following fundamental

norms as guiding ASEAN’s members:

(i). Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all

nations;

(ii). Noninterference in the internal affairs of member states;

(iii). Settlement of disputes by peaceful means;

(iv). Renunciation of the threat or use of force;

(v). Effective cooperation among themselves.

(vi). The right of every state to lead its national existence free from

external interference, subversion or coercion.

26. Antonia Hussy, "Regional Development and Cooperation

through ASEAN", Geographical Review, Vol. 81. No.1. Jan.

1999, p. 90.

27. Alejandro Melchor, Jr., "Assessing ASEAN Viability in

Changing World", Asian Survey, Vol. 18. No.4. April 1978, pp.

425-26.

28. Thomas M. Leonard (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Developing

World, Vol.1, A-E Index, Routledge, New York, 2006, p.115.

29. Estrella D Solidum, The Politics of ASEAN - An Introduction to

Southeast Asian Regionalism, Times Media Pvt. Ltd.,

Singapore, 2003, pp. 104-5.

79

30. Vinayak Rao, International Negotiation-The U.N.'s in

Afghanistan & Cambodia, Manak Publishers, New Delhi ,

2001 , p.67.

31. Simon S.C. Tay et. al., op. cit., p. 37.

32. Chia Slow Yue and Marcello Pacini (eds.), ASEAN in the New

Asia-Issues & Trends, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Singapore, 1997, pp.1-30.

33. Hans H. Indorf, "ASEAN in Extra-Regional Perspective",

Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.9, No.2, Sept.1987, p.87.

34. See Joon Num Mak, "International Cooperation in Regional

Security: Non-Interference' and ASEAN Arms Modernization",

in Bjorn Moller, Security, Arms Control and Defence

Restructuring in East Asia, Ashgate Publishing, England,

1998, pp.79-80.

35. The Spratly Islands have rich resources such as oil, gas and

minerals etc. The Philippines and Malaysia established their

own military presence in the Spratly Islands .The claimants to

parts or all the Spratly have been the People's Republic of

China and the ASEAN states, most notably Malaysia, the

Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

36. Shams-Ud-Din, Perceptions on The Emerging World Order,

Gyan Publications, New Delhi, p.246.

37. ASEAN and the Cambodian Peace Process: 1987-1991. For

details see Amitav Acharya, et. al. (eds.), Cambodia-The 1989

Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Documents,

Millwood, New York, 1991, pp. xxv-xiv, See also Carlyle A.

Thayer, “ASEAN and Indo-China: The Dialogue”, in Alison

Broinowaski (ed.), ASEAN into the 1990s, Macmillan,

Basingstoke, 1990, .pp.138-161. See also Amitav Acharya,

Contracting a Security Community in Southeast Asia-ASEAN

80

and the Problem of Regional Order, Routledge, London, 2001,

pp.91-92.

38. Johan Ravenhill, “The Growth of Intergovernmental

Collaboration in the Asia-Pacific Region”, in Anthony McGrew

and Christopher Brook (eds.), Asia-Pacific in the New World

Order, Routledge, London, 1998, p.262.

39. Amitav Achaya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in

Third World-A Conceptual Analysis of Relevance and

Limitations of ASEAN", Journal of Peace Research, Vol.29,

No.1, February 1992, p.13.

40. Gerald Tan, ASEAN-Economic Development and Cooperation,

Times Media Pvt. Ltd., Singapore, 2003, p.274.

41. Mari Pangesto, “The Future of ASEAN”, The Indonesian

Quarterly, Vol.XXV, No.4, Fourth Quarter 1997, p.368.

42. Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in post-Cold War Southeast

Asia? Prospects for Control, Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies, Singapore, 1994, p.43.

43. Ibid.

44. For details see Kapil Suri, ASEAN towards New Horizon,

Cyber Tech Publications, New Delhi, 2007, p.13.

45. Shaun Narine, "ASEAN and the Management of Regional

Security", Pacific Affairs, Vol.71, No.2, summer 1998, p.209.

46. ASEAN’s Dialouge Partners are Australia, Canada, EU, India,

Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,

Mangolia, North korea, Russia and US.

47. Shahid Ieyas, "ASEAN Regional Forum ARF: Its Role in

Confidence Building and Conflict Resolution ", Regional

Studies, Vol.XXIII, No.1, Winter 2004-5, p.28.

81

48. Ibid, p.48.

49. Chia Slow Yue and Marcello Pacini, op.cit., pp.136-37.

50. David B.H. Denoon and Evelyn Colbert, "Challenges for the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN", Pacific

Affairs, Vol.71, No.4, Winter 1998-99, p.514.

51. Etel Solingen, "ASEAN, Que Vadis? Domestic Coalitions and

Regional Co-operation", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.21,

No.1, April 1999, p.46.

52. Jayant Menon,"The Evolving ASEAN Free Trade Area-

Widening and Deepings", Asian Development Review, Vol.18,

No.1, 2000, p.52.

53. Kapil Suri, op. cit, p.11.

54. For details see ASEAN South East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free

Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ), Bangkok, December 1995, Jakarta,

Indonesia.

55. Zakara Haji Ahmed and Baladas Ghoshal," The Political

Future of ASEAN-After the Asian Crises", International Affairs,

Vol.75, No.4, October 1999, p.764.

56. Gerald Tan, op. cit., p.256.

57. Margart P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, op. cit., p.197. See

also Maria Weber (ed.), After the Asian Crisis-Perspectives on

Global Politics and Economics, Macmillan Press Ltd., London,

2000, p.62.

58. Prarlil M.C.Koh, “Enhancing Economic Cooperation: A

Regional Arbitration Centre for ASEAN?”, International and

Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.49, April 2000, p.392.

59. Etel Solingon, "ASEAN Cooperation: The Legacy of the

Economic Crisis" International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,

Vol.5, No.1, 2005, p.12.

82

60. Kusuma Snitwongse and Suchit Bunbongkarn, “New Security

Issues and their Impact on ASEAN”, in Simon S.C. Tay et. al.,

op. cit., p.150.

61. For details see Hanoi Plan of Action, December 16, 1998.

62. Paul J. Davidson, op.cit., p.22.

63. Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Partnership for Peace in Asia:

ASEAN, the ARF, and the United Nations", Contemporary

Southeast Asia, Vol.24, No.3, December2002, p.540.

64. "The United Nations and East Timor", http: /www.un

.org/peace /wtimor/untalt b.htm.

65. "Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN Way", Address by

ASEAN Secretary General Rodalfo Severino at the ASEAN

Scholars, Roundtable, Singapore, 3 July 2000, Quoted in

Mely Caballero-Anthony, op. cit, p. 543.

66. Ibid, pp.533-34.

67. Bharti Chhibber, op. cit, p.305.

68. Chia Slow Yue, "ASEAN in the Age of Globalization and

Information", see in Simon S.C. Tay et. al., op. cit, p.141.

69. Estrella D Solidum, op.cit, p.173.

70. Ibid, p.206.

71. Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, "Collective Action Problems and

Regional Integration in ASEAN", Contemporary Southeast

Asia, Vol.28, No.1 2006, p.124.

72. East Asia Strategic Review 2006, The Japan Times Ltd.,

Japan, 2006, pp.154-55.

73. Johan Chan, "East Asian Summit Plagued by Tension and

Rivalry", www.wsws.org.com.

74. http://www.13thaseansummit.org.sg/asean/index.php/web/

documents/agreements/charter.

83

75. “Key issues discussed at East Asian Summit”,

www.cbsnews.com/8301-501712_162-57328124/key-issues-

discussed-at-east-asia..).

76. Dennis P. Patterson and Cheng-Tian Kuo, "A Public- Choice

Theory of Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia", Pacific

Focus, Vol. X, No.2, Fall 1995, p.20.

77. Akiko Fukushima, “The ASEAN Regional Forum”, in Michael

Wesley (ed.), The Regional Organizations of the Asia-Pacific-

Exploring Institutional Change, Palgrave Macmillan, London,

2003, p.85.

78. Giuseppe Schiavone, International Organizations-A Dictionary,

Fourth Edition, Macmillan, London, 1997, p.39.

79. APEC Leaders' Meeting, November 25, 1997, Vancouver,

Canada and ASEM Leaders' Meeting, April 3-4, 1998,

London, UK. See M.C.Abad, Jr, “The Association of Southeast

Asian Nations: Challenges and Response”, in Michael Wesley

(ed.), op. cit., p.45.

80. Ibid, p.46.

81. K. Kesavapany and Rahul Sen, “ASEAN's Contribution to the

Building of an Asian Economic Community”, in Nagesh

Kumar (ed), Towards An Asian Economic Community: Vision of

a New Asia, RIS, New Delhi, 2004, pp.52-53.

82. For details see Kapil Suri, op. cit., pp.46-47.

83. Anindya Batabyal, "ASEAN, India and South East Asian

Security: A Critical Overview", Indian Ocean Digest, Issues.35-

36, Vol.18, No.1-2, Jan-December, 2003, pp.49-65.

84. Djisman S. Simanjuntak, The Search for Regional Architecture:

The Role of ASEAN as a Strange Attractor, RIS Discussion

Paper, April 2005, pp.8-9.

84

85. For details see in Chin Kim Wah and Daljit Singh, Southeast

Asian Affairs 2005, ISEAS, Singapore, 2005, p.16.

86. R Kannan and Mukherjee, "Does East and South-East Asia

Including India in Optimum Currency Area?” Economic and

Political Weekly, Vol. XLII, No.11, March 17, 2007. p. 955.

87. R. Nagi, ASEAN 20 Years, Lancers Books, New Delhi, 1989,

p.19.

88. Abul Kalam, "Sub-Regional Co-operation in ASEAN and Role

of Private Sector: Relevance for SAARC", Blliss Journal,

Vol.20, No.3, 1999, p.276.

89. Ibid.

90. Abul Kalam, "Subregional Cooperation in South Asia:

Replicating ASEAN Growth Model?', Regional Studies, Vol. XX,

No.3, Summer 2002, pp.77-78

91. News behind News, August 28, 2006, p.46.

92. Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN and the Growth of Regional

Cooperation in Southeast Asia”, World Affairs, July-

September 1999, Vol.3, No.3, p.16.

93. “ASEAN Vision 2020”, www.aseansec.org. “ASEAN Vision

2020” was supposed to be implemented through the Hanoi

Plan of Action, the Bali Concord II was meant to be

implemented by the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP)

adopted in November 2004. The VAP provided hope for the

realisation of a people-centered ASEAN in that it

acknowledged the important role of non-state actors in

promoting the ASEAN Community where the concerns of the

people are articulated in various action programs, particularly

those of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Since the

85

adoption of the ASEAN Charter in November 2007, however,

the VAP has been replaced by blueprints, due to the change

of the timelines for the community to be realised in 2015,

rather than 2020 as originally envisaged. The blueprint for

the AEC has been finished, but those for the ASC( now called

the ASEAN Security Community of APSC) and the ASCC were

finalized at the July 2008 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in

Bangkok. See also Carolina G. Hernandez, “A People’s

ASEAN: Pipe Dream or Potentially Realizable?”, India

Quarterly, Vol. LXIV, No.1, January-March 2008, p. 122.