Chapter 9 - Preparedness for Emergency Response

8/10/2019 Chapter 9 - Preparedness for Emergency Response

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CHAPTER 9

PREPAREDNESS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE

This chapter begins with an examination of the basic principles of emergency planning and outlines theprocess of assessing the emergency response organizations ability to perform four basic functions

emergency assessment, hazard operations, population protection, and incident management. Communitiesare most effective in preparing to implement these functions if they follow eight fundamental principlesof emergency planning. In addition, emergency preparedness is supported by three recent organizationalstructuresthe rban !reas "ecurity Initiative, #etropolitan #edical $esponse "ystem, and %ationalIncident #anagement "ystem. The latter is implemented through the Incident Command "ystem and the&urisdictions 'mergency (perations Center. The chapter continues with a discussion of 'mergency(perations )lan development and concludes with a discussion of emergency preparedness by households,businesses, and government agencies.

Introduction

'mergency preparedness can be defined aspreimpact activities that establish a state of readiness

to respond to extreme events that could affect the community.It establishes organizational readiness to

minimize the adverse impact of these events by means of active responses to protect the health and safetyof individuals and the integrity and functioning of physical structures. !s indicated in Chapter *,

emergency preparedness is achieved by planning, training, e+uipping, and exercising the emergency

response organization. That is, members of the '#C establish the basic plan, annexes, and appendixes

of the &urisdictions '(), train members of the emergency response organization to perform their duties,

and test the plans effectiveness with emergency exercises. They must also ac+uire the facilities,

e+uipment, and materials needed to support the emergency response. -inally, the '#C should develop

comparable organizational structures, plans, and preparedness for the disaster recovery phase. $ecovery

preparedness will be addressed in Chapter .

'mergency planning is most li/ely to be successful when it is viewed, either explicitly or

implicitly, from a systems perspective 0indell 1 )erry, 2234. This entails an understanding of the goals

of the emergency response, the resources of the community as a system, and the functional interactions of

the different units within the system. Theprimary goal of the emergency response is to protect the health

and safety of the emergency responders and the public. In addition, the emergency response should

protect public and private property and the environment, as well as minimize the disruption of community

activities. The resourcesof the community include trained personnel, and emergency relevant facilities,

e+uipment, and materials. The units of the system are the elements that ta/e action 0households,

governmental agencies, private organizations4, while organizational functionsare defined as the 5most

general, yet differentiable means whereby the system re+uirements are met, discharged or satisfied6

07e8reene, 29:, p. ;24. In the case of emergency response organizations, the description of system

functions can then be elaborated into operational event se+uences and component processes that include

the identification of &ob operations, together with personnel positions and their associated duties 0 ?uc/le, #ars 1 "male, 3:::4. In the conceptual design stage of a system, analysts define

broad constraints that human limitations are li/ely to exert on system operation. !s the system design

develops in detail, the analysts develop correspondingly more detailed statements of the re+uirements for

personnel +ualifications and training, wor/group organization, wor/space layout and e+uipment design,

and &ob performance aids 0Chapanis, 29:> indell, et al., 2;34.

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"uch analyses are typically applied to the normal operations of complex technological systems

such as high performance aircraft and the control rooms of nuclear power plants, but they also can be

applied in similar form to the problems of community emergency planning. @hether a novel

technological system is being developed for use in a normal environment or a novel social system such as

an emergency response organization is being developed to respond to an unusually threatening physical

environment, the rationale for systems analysis is the samethe opportunities for incremental ad&ustment

through trial and error are extremely limited. The analysis of a social system conducted for an emergency

management program must first identify the range of hazards to which a given community is vulnerable

and the demands that the hazards would place upon the community.

The often expressed opinion 5every emergency is uni+ue6 is true but the usual conclusion 5we

can improvise during an emergency rather than plan beforehand6 does not follow. It is true that

emergency responders must always improvise to meet the demands of a specific situation, but it is

important to understand that there are different types of improvisationreproductive, adaptive, and

creativethat differ from organizational continuity 0continuation of normal organizational routines4 and

organizational contingency0implementation of an '() 0@achtendorf, 3::A4. "pecifically, reproductive

improvisation responds to a deficiency 0e.g., failure of a siren4 by using a substitute 0e.g., police officersgoing doorBtoBdoor4 to achieve the same emergency response ob&ective. Adaptive improvisationinvolves

modifying normal routines or contingency plans to achieve operational goals. In this context, 5adaptive6

only means a change, not necessarily an improvement. Creative improvisation responds to an

unanticipated disaster demand by developing a new course of action.

It is important to recognize that improvising and implementing response actions ta/es more time

than implementing preplanned actionsand time is usually very limited in an emergency. #oreover,

improvisations can impede or duplicate the response actions of other organizations. -or example, )erry, et

al. 02;4 reported that firefighters fed and sheltered flood victims because neither they nor the victims

/new about a mass care facility that had been activated not far away. Conse+uently, emergency managers

should develop community emergency preparedness so they can limit the amount of unnecessaryimprovisation even though they cannot eliminate improvisation altogether.

In fact, research has identified many regularities in the demands emergencies place upon response

organizations 07ynes, 29:> 7rabe/, 2;> Tierney, et al., 3::4. 'mergency managers should identify

the functions that must be performed to respond to these demands and the resources re+uired to

accomplish the response functions. The resources re+uired for emergency response can then be compared

with those maintained within the community. !ny special actions re+uired to ensure the continued

availability of the emergency response resources can be made an integral part of the emergency

preparedness program.

(ne very important aspect of the systems assessment for emergency response operations arises

from the environmental conditions that prevail during ma&or disasters. !t such times, response personneloften confront confusing and conflicting cues about the current status of hazard agent and its impacts, as

well as ma&or uncertainties about the future behavior of the hazard agent and impacts yet to come. 7uring

the 292 nuclear reactor accident at Three #ile Island and the chemical plant accidents in 2;A at ?hopal,

India, and in 2;D at Institute, @est =irginia, the inability of plant personnel to accurately assess the

status of the emergency severely impeded their ability to communicate appropriate protective action

recommendations to offsite agencies. ! similar inability to conduct timely and accurate assessments on

the #t. "t. Eelens volcano led to casualties and property destruction. In all of these cases, the complexity

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of the situationtogether with time pressure and the severity of the potential conse+uencescreated

conditions that were unforgiving of error and, thus, highly stressful for emergency response personnel.

To increase organizational effectiveness when there is enough time to respond, but not enough

time to improvise a coordinated response plan, communities must engage in emergency preparedness .!

ma&or component in emergency preparedness is the development of preimpact '()s that provide

emergency responders with the resources they need to ta/e prompt and effective response actions. This

chapter will examine '() development, emphasizing that plans are only a part of preparedness. The

primary focus is on the planning practices of local agencies having explicit emergency response missions

0e.g., emergency management, fire, police, and '#"4. The chapter begins with the guiding principles of

emergency planning and then turns to a discussion of the supporting analyses needed to adapt the plan to

local conditions. It continues with an examination of the principal organizational structures involved in

emergency preparednessthe rban !reas "ecurity Initiative 0!"I4, #etropolitan #edical $esponse

"ystem 0##$"4, and %ational Incident #anagement "ystem 0%I#"4. The latter is implemented through

the Incident Command "ystem 0IC"4 and the &urisdictions 'mergency (perations Center 0'(C4. The

chapter concludes with a discussion of preparedness by households, businesses, and government agencies

that do not have explicit emergency management missions.

Guiding Principles o E!ergenc" Pl#nning

)reparedness is best thought of as a processa continuing se+uence of analyses, plan

development, and the ac+uisition of individual and team performance s/ills achieved through training,

drills, exercises, and criti+ues 07ynes, et al., 293> there is a specific assignment of responsibility to an office having an identifiable budget. In

other communities it is informal> responsibility is poorly defined and a limited budget is dispersed among

many agencies. #oreover, the planning products might be either written or unwritten. To some extent, the

emergency planning process correlates with the size of the community in which it ta/es place. arger

communities characterized by an elaborate structure of governmental offices, many resources and

personnel, and perhaps higher levels of staff turnovertend to evolve formalized processes and rely more

heavily upon written documentation and agreements. In smaller communities, the planning process might

generate few written products and rely principally on informal relationships. -ormalization of the

planning process is also li/ely to vary with the fre+uency of hazard impact. In communities sub&ect to

fre+uent threats, emergency response may be a practiced s/ill rather than a hypothetical action. In one

fre+uently flooded community, the fire department evacuates residents of the low lying areas 0in the usual

manner, by fire truc/, to the usual location, the local school4 when the flood water reaches a certain street

0)erry, et al., 2;4.

7espite the many superficial variations in '()s, researchers have identified some consistencies

in emergency planning. The following prescriptions, derived from Fuarantelli 02;3b4, can be described

as fundamental principles of community emergency planning that are systematically related to high levels

of community preparedness 0see Table 2B4.

Managing Resistance to the Planning Process

'mergency planning is conducted in the face of apathy by some and resistance from others 0!uf

der Eeide, 2;2, #c'ntire, 3::*, Fuarantelli, 2;3b4. ! basic reason for apathy is that most people,

citizens and public officials ali/e, donGt li/e to thin/ about their vulnerability to disasters. ! common

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ob&ection to planning is it consumes resources, that, at the moment, might seem li/e more pressing

community issuespolice patrols, road repairs, school expansion, and the li/e. )lanning mandates help

0for example, radiological emergency planning after the Three #ile Island nuclear power plant accident

and chemical emergency planning under the 'mergency )lanning and Community $ight to


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This obviously should include public safety agencies such as emergency management, fire, police, and

emergency medical services. Eowever, it also should include organizations that are potential hazard

sources, such as hazardous materials facilities and hazardous materials transporters 0pipeline, rail, truc/,

and barge4 and organizations that must protect sensitive populations, such as schools, hospitals, and

nursing homes. Coordination is re+uired because emergency response organizations that differ in their

capabilities must wor/ in coordination to implement an effective emergency response. To perform their

functions effectively, efficiently, and promptly re+uires members of the community emergency response

organization to be aware of one anotherGs missions, organizational structures and styles of operation,

communication systems, and mechanisms 0such as agreed upon priorities4 for allocating scarce resources.

Rely on Accurate Assumptions

'mergency planning should be based upon accurate /nowledge of community threats and li/ely

human responses to those threats. !ccurate /nowledge of community threats comes from E=!s. !s

discussed in Chapter , emergency managers must identify hazards to which their communities are

vulnerable, determine which geographical areas are exposed to those hazards 0e.g., :: year flood plains

and toxic chemical facility =ulnerable Hones4, and identify the facilities and population segments located

in those ris/ areas. They also need to understand the basic characteristics of these hazards such as speedof onset, scope and duration of impact, and potential for producing casualties and property damage.

When identifying the hazards to which their community is exposed, planners

and public ocials freuently recognize the limits of their expertise! "hey recognize

their lac# of accurate #nowledge about the beha$ior of geophysical, meteorological,

or technological hazards and contact experts to obtain the information they need!

%nfortunately, the same cannot usually be said about accurate #nowledge about

li#ely human beha$ior in a disaster! &s a familiar saying goes, the problem is not so

much that people don't #now what is true, but that what they do (#now) is false! &s

noted in the pre$ious chapter, *uarantelli and +ynes -.72/ and Wenger, et al!

-.01/ ha$e described widespread myths regarding peoples disaster response thatpersist despite research refuting them! 3elief in disaster myths hampers the

eecti$eness of emergency planning by misdirecting resource allocation and

information dissemination! or example, ocials sometimes cite expectations of

panic as a reason for gi$ing the public incomplete information about an

en$ironmental threat or withholding information altogether! "his response to the

myth of panic is actually counterproducti$e because people are more willing to

comply with recommended protecti$e actions when they are pro$ided with

complete ris# information! or these reasons, the planning process must be rmly

grounded not only on the physical or biological science literature on the eects of

hazard agents on human safety, health, and property, but also on the beha$ioralliterature describing indi$idual and organizational response in emergencies!

-inally, household, business, and government agency emergency plans must be based on accurate

assumptions about aid from external sources. In ma&or disasters, hospitals might be overloaded>

destruction of telecommunication and transportation systems 0highways, railroads, airports, and seaports4

could prevent outside assistance from arriving for days> and restoration of disrupted water, sewer, electric

power, and natural gas pipeline systems could ta/e much longer. Conse+uently, all social units must be

prepared to be self reliant for as much as a wee/.

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Identify Appropriate Actions hile !ncouraging Improvisation

!n effective preparedness process must balance planning and improvisation 0


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7isaster planning should also provide a training and evaluation component. The first part of the

training process involves explaining the provisions of the plan to the administrators and personnel of the

departments that will be involved in the emergency response. "econd, all those who have emergency

response roles must be trained to perform their duties. (f course, this includes fire, police, and emergency

medical services personnel, but there also should be training for personnel in hospitals, schools, nursing

homes, and other facilities that might need to ta/e protective action. -inally, the population at ris/ must be

involved in the planning process so they can become aware that planning for community threats is

underway, as well as what is expected of them under the plans. !s noted previously, they need to /now

what is li/ely to happen in a disaster and what emergency organizations can and cannotdo for them.

It is also essential that training include tests of the proposed response operations. !s noted above,

emergency drills and exercises provide a setting in which operational procedures can be tested. They also

facilitate interorganizational contact, thus allowing individual members to better understand each others

professional capabilities and personal characteristics. -urthermore, multifunctional exercises constitute a

simultaneous and comprehensive test of emergency plans and procedures, staffing levels, personnel

training, facilities, e+uipment, and materials. -inally, multifunctional exercises produce publicity for the

broader emergency management process, which informs community officials and the public that disasterplanning is underway and preparedness is being enhanced.

Adopt a Continuous Planning Process

-inally, effective emergency planning is a continuing process. Eazard vulnerability,

organizational staffing and structure, and emergency facilities and e+uipment change over time, so the

emergency planning process must detect and respond to these changes. nfortunately, this point is

fre+uently not recognized. @enger, et al. 02;:, p. *A4 have found 5there is a tendency on the part of

officials to see disaster planning as a product, not a process6, a misconception that confuses tangible

products with the activities that produce them. (f course, planning does re+uire written documentation,

but effectiveplanning is also made up of elements that are difficult to document on paper and are not

realized in hardware. These include the development of emergency respondersG /nowledge aboutresources available from governmental and private organizations, the ac+uisition of /nowledge about

emergency demands and other agencies capabilities, and the establishment of collaborative relationships

across organizational boundaries. Tangible documents and hardware simply do not provide a sufficient

representation of what the emergency planning process has produced. -urthermore, by treating written

plans as final products, one ris/s creating the illusion of being prepared for an emergency when such is

not the case 0Fuarantelli, 2994. !s time passes, the '() sitting in a red three ring binder on the

boo/shelf loo/s &ust as thic/ and impressive as it did the day it was published despite the many changes

that have ta/en place in the meantime. -or example, new hazardous facilities might have been built and

others decommissioned, new neighborhoods might exist where only open fields were found previously,

and reorganization might have been ta/en place within different agencies responsible for emergencyresponse. In short, the potential for changes in hazard exposure, population vulnerability, and the staffing,

organization and resources of emergency response organizations re+uires emergency plans and

procedures to be reviewed periodically, preferably annually.

Function#l C#p#$ilit" An#l"sis

To ensure ade+uate emergency preparedness, emergency managers should analyze their

emergency response organizations capability to perform its basic emergency response functions.

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Eistorically, these functions have been categorized as agent generated and response generated demands

0Fuarantelli, 2;a4. The agent generated demands arise from the specific mechanisms by which a hazard

agent causes casualties and damage, whereas response generated demands arise from organizing and

implementing the emergency response. indell and )erry 0223, 22b4 elaborated Fuarantellis typology

by drawing on federal emergency planning guidance 0%ational $esponse Team, 2;9> " %uclear

$egulatory Commission-ederal 'mergency #anagement !gency, 2;:4 to define four basic emergency

response functions. These are emergency assessment, hazard operations, and population protection 0which

are agent generated demands4 and incident management 0which encompasses the response generated

demands4. !mergency assessment consists of those diagnoses of past and present conditions and

prognoses of future conditions that guide the emergency response.Hazard operationsrefers to expedient

hazard mitigation actions that emergency personnel ta/e to limit the magnitude or duration of disaster

impact 0e.g., sandbagging a flooding river or patching a lea/ing railroad tan/ car4. Population protection

refers to actionssuch as sheltering inBplace, evacuation, and mass immunizationthat protect people

from hazard agents. Incident managementconsists of the activities by which the human and physical

resources used to respond to the emergency are mobilized and directed to accomplish the goals of the

emergency response organization. The operational aspects of implementing these functions will beaddressed in more detail in the next chapter, but rest of this section will address the actions that must be

ta/en to prepare to implement them. These preparedness actions involve analyzing the disaster demands

to identify the personnel, procedures, facilities, e+uipment, materials, and supplies the emergency

response organization will need.

!mergency Assessment

)reparedness for emergency assessment re+uires the emergency response organization to detect

and classify an environmental threat. "ome natural hazardssuch as many flash floods and earth+ua/es

are detected and classified by local agencies. (ther natural hazardssuch as hurricanes, tornadoes,

ma&or floods, and tsunamisare detected and classified by federal agencies. #oreover, incidents at fixed

site facilities are usually detected and classified by plant personnel, whereas transportation incidents aredetected by carrier personnel, local emergency responders 0e.g., police and fire4, and sometimes by

passersBby.

The local emergency manager should review the community E=! to identify all hazards to which

the community is exposed in order to determine how detection is li/ely to be achieved and transmitted to

the appropriate authorities. ocally detected hazards re+uire the emergency manager to ensure the

necessary detection systems 0e.g., stream and rain gauges for flash floods4 are established and maintained.

-or hazards detected by other sources, the emergency manager must ensure that a report of hazard

detection can be called in to a community warning point that is staffed around the cloc/, usually the

&urisdictions dispatch center.

!nother important aspect of emergency assessment is hazard monitoring, which re+uirescontinuous awareness of the current status of the hazard agent as well as pro&ections of its future status.

The technology for performing hazard monitoring varies by hazard agent. In many cases, continuing

information about the hazard agent is provided by the same source as the one that provided the initial

hazard detection. -or example, the %ational Eurricane Center provides hurricane updates every six hours

0or more fre+uently, if needed4. "imilarly, plant personnel should provide continuing information about a

hazardous materials release.

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!nvironmental monitoringis also needed when the geographical areas at ris/ are determined by

atmospheric processes. !s noted in Chapter D, toxic chemicals, radiological materials, and volcanic ash

are carried downwind, so changes in wind direction, wind speed, and atmospheric stability must be

monitored to determine if the area at ris/ will change over time. Thus, procedures must be established and

e+uipment ac+uired to obtain current weather information and forecasts of future weather conditions.

'nvironmental monitoring is also needed for hazmat spills into waterways because, for example, the

speed and direction of ocean currents determine which sections of shoreline will be affected.

#oreover, damage assessmentis needed to identify the boundaries of the ris/ area and initiate the

process of re+uesting a )residential 7isaster 7eclaration. Eere also, personnel, procedures, and

e+uipment must be designated to perform this function. -inally, population monitoring and assessmentis

needed to identify the size of the population at ris/ if the number of people in the ris/ area varies over

time 0e.g., tourists present in the summer but not in the winter4. This re+uires emergency managers to

maintain calendars of ma&or events, such as festivals and athletic contests, that bring large numbers of

people into their &urisdictions. It also necessitates wor/ing with schools, hospitals, and nursing home

administrators to monitor the progress of special facility evacuations and with traffic engineers to monitor

evacuation routes for ris/ area residents.Hazard &perations

)reparedness actions for hazard operations vary significantly from one hazard agent to another. In

some cases, hazard operations re+uire e+uipment that is normally available within the community. -or

example, preparedness for structural fires, conflagrations, and wildfires mostly re+uires e+uipment that

local fire departments use in routine methods of hazard source control. Eowever, some hazard agents

re+uire special preparation. -or example, chemical incidents might re+uire special foams to suppress

vapor generation. !reaprotection or#sare another type of hazard operations that is best illustrated by

elevating levees during floods. The large number of sandbags needed for such operations also re+uires

advance preparation. #oreover, some hazard agents such as earth+ua/es re+uire special preparation for

postimpact operations to implement building construction practices andcontents protection practices. -orexample, heavy construction e+uipment is needed to stabilize buildings, extricate victims, and protect

building contents from further damage.

Population Protection

)reparedness for population protection sometimes re+uires emergency managers to develop

procedures for protective action selection. -or some hazard agents, there is only one recommended

protective action. )eople threatened by tornadoes or volcanic ashfall should shelter inBplace whereas

those threatened by lava flows, inland floods, storm surges, and tsunamis should evacuate. In other cases,

such as toxic chemical and radiological releases, the appropriate protective action depends on the

situation 0indell 1 )erry, 223> "orensen, "humpert 1 =ogt, 3::A4. Conse+uently, communities exposed

to such hazards should develop procedures for protective action selection in advance."imilarly, emergency managers should devise procedures for arningthe ris/ area population for

each of the different hazards identified in the community E=!. In slow onset incidents, such as main

stem floods, there is li/ely to be ade+uate time for mechanisms such as faceBtoBface warnings. Eowever,

rapid onset incidents such as toxic chemical releases might re+uire the ac+uisition of siren systems.

'mergency managers should also prepare forsearch and rescueby considering whether special training

and e+uipment is needed for swiftwater rescue from floods, heavy rescue from buildings collapsed by

earth+ua/es, and other specialized circumstances.Impact zone access control'security( hazard exposure

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control( and emergency medical carere+uire special protective e+uipment for emergency responders in

C?$ hazards so emergency managers should prepare for these hazards as well.

Incident Management

?ecause incident management activities are directed toward the response generated demands of

an incident, preparedness for this function varies relatively little from one hazard agent to another.

Agency notification and mobilization re+uires the ac+uisition of e+uipment such as pagers and the

development of procedures such as the designation of watch officers to ensure that /ey personnel are

notified rapidly. Mobilization of emergency facilities and e)uipment is achieved by ac+uiring critical

documents 0e.g., maps, plans, and procedures4 and storing these in close proximity to the room that will

be activated as the '(C 0if the &urisdiction does not have a permanent installation4. Communication and

documentationare supported by the ac+uisition of radios, telephone systems, and personal computers as

well as the establishment of procedures for message routing and recording. 'mergency managers prepare

for many of the emergency response organizations specific activities such as analysis'planning, internal

direction and control( logistics( finance'administration(and external coordinationby identifying the ways

in which personnel will perform tas/s or have reporting relationships that differ from the ones they

encounter in normal conditions. The emergency manager can wor/ with personnel assigned to theemergency response organization to devise organization charts, tas/ chec/lists, telephone lists, and other

&ob performance aids that will assist them in their emergency duties. )reparedness for public information

can be facilitated by identifying a &oint information center 0JIC4, providing extra phone lines for media

personnel, and developing basic bac/ground information about the &urisdiction, its hazards, and the

emergency response organization.

Org#ni'#tion#l Structures or E!ergenc" Prep#redness

There are many organizational structures that have been developed to support emergency

response to environmental hazards. Three of the most important are the #etropolitan #edical $esponse

"ystem 0##$"4, rban !reas "ecurity Initiative 0!"I4, and %ational Incident #anagement "ystem

0%I#"4. ##$" and !"I are federally funded programs that support inter&urisdictional collaboration.

%I#" includes a standardized structure for emergency preparedness and response titled the Incident

Command "ystem 0IC"4 that must lin/ effectively to the &urisdictions 'mergency (perations Center

0'(C4. 'ach of these organizational structures is discussed below.

Metropolitan Medical Response *ystem

The #etropolitan #edical "tri/e Team program was initiated in 229 by the 7epartment of

Eealth and Euman "ervices 07EE"4, (ffice of the !ssistant "ecretary for )ublic Eealth 'mergency

)reparedness. The program +uic/ly changed its designation to the #etropolitan #edical $esponse

"ystem to reflect both integration into local incident management systems and the extensive involvement

of multiple governments, not &ust municipal agencies but also private sector organizations. (f the original

3 ##$" cities established before 222, only two 0!tlanta, 8eorgia, and @ashington, 7.C.4 retained the

stri/e team framewor/. In #arch, 3::A, 3A city and regional ##$" programs had been established.

These tend to be concentrated in high population density areas and other areas that are high probability

terrorist targets, but A* states have at least one ##$" program, yielding very broad geographic coverage

and high levels of national population coverage.

The initial purpose of the ##$" program was to enhance local efforts to manage very large

mass casualty incidents arising from terrorists use of weapons of mass destruction 0)erry, 3::*4. In part

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the program mission was driven by the realization that, for local governments, specialized federal assets

for terrorist attac/s are A;B93 hours away even under the best of circumstances. The ##$" program goal

is to ensure cities can operate independently until support arrives and develop a strong local incident

management system that can effectively and efficiently integrate specialized extra community 0especially

federal4 resources. nli/e many federal programs, the ##$" purpose statement has evolved over time,

largely in ways that emergency managers consider constructive. The focus has come to include C?$

agents as well as any other agent 0natural or technological4 that could produce large numbers of

casualties> it has become firmly established as an all hazardsprogram. )erhaps the two most distinctive

features of the ##$" program from a local government perspective are funding and organization. 7EE"

allocated funds directly to cities, eliminating concerns about funding losses to intermediate government

levels and increasing purchasing flexibility for municipalities. The organizational constraint is that focal

cities must create programs that include broad participation by municipal departments 0not &ust fire and

police4, as well as county and state agencies and the private sector 0e.g., hospitals4. !lthough the funding

conditions are generally considered a blessing, the organizational issues have been treated as 0and

undoubtedly are4 significant challenges.

The most significant feature of an ##$" is that it lin/s multiple response systems. Eorizontallin/ages involve first responders 0e.g., firefighters, hazmat technicians, technical rescue technicians,

emergency medical personnel4, public health, emergency management, law enforcement, and medical and

behavioral health services. There also are vertical lin/ages> for example, public health participation

involves city, county, and state agencies. !lso, private sector organizations are included in the planning

process to establish contact with hospital emergency departments, environmental cleanup companies,

ambulance systems, funeral director associations, and similar organizations that provide critical services

in mass casualty incidents. ##$" cities must also plan for receipt and integration of important federal

assets by building a relationship with the %ational 7isaster #edical "ystem 0%7#"4 and developing a

capacity to receive pharmaceuticals from the national stoc/pile, as well as other specialized assets from a

variety of federal programs.@hether by design or not, the ##$" program has imposed a comprehensive emergency

management process on recipient cities. #unicipalities are re+uired to operate an incident management

system> lin/ it to a &urisdictional '(C> enhance mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities>

integrate county and state agencies> and conduct &oint planning, training, and exercises on a continuing

basis. ##$" program re+uirements address some mitigation and recovery issues, but emphasize

preparedness and response. !s a condition of declaring an ##$" 5fully operational6, each city must

conduct a full scale exercise with federal evaluation. !chievement of operational status is treated at the

federal level as only one milestone in the continuing developmentthrough planning, training, and

exercisingof an ##$".

In #arch 3::*, responsibility for the ##$" program passed from 7EE" to 7E". ltimatelyexcept for the %ational rban "earch and $escue )rogramthe ##$" program represents the only

federally devised model for disaster operations that has been tested through repeated exercises and

deployments. The challenge for the ##$" program is sustainability> to maintain 5ade+uate funding and

effective management of preparedness and efforts to /eep domestic preparedness as a policy priority6

08rannis, 3::*, p. 3:4. Through the years of 7EE" oversight, funds to sustain established ##$" cities

were made available, although on a highly variable basis. !n indicator of the strength of the program and

proof of serious local commitment is that cities /ept their ##$" programs alive, even during years of

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small federal allocations, by ma/ing hard choices about the distribution of local resources. -unds to

sustain the established ##$" programs have continued under 7E", but future federal support is no more

guaranteed for ##$" than for any other program. %o new ##$"s have been established since 3::*,

but this program appears to be one significant success in a long history of federal efforts to promote local

emergency management where successes have been rare. Interestingly, the -K3::D allocation for the

federal ##$" )rogram decreased to slightly more than L32 million, down from LD: million in -K3::A.

The 3::D allocation was also sub&ect to retention of 3:M at the state level, ma/ing the federal

commitment to the successful ##$" cities even more tenuous.

+rban Areas *ecurity Initiative ,+A*I-

In July of 3::3, )resident ?ush approved the ational *trategy for Homeland *ecurity as a

framewor/ for national efforts to prevent and respond to terrorist actions. ?eginning in 3::*, the 7E"

(ffice for 7omestic )reparedness 0(7), formerly part of the 7epartment of Justice4 inaugurated the

rban !reas "ecurity Initiative as part of the %ational "trategy for Eomeland "ecurity. In late 3::*,

)resident ?ush approved the -K3::A Eomeland "ecurity !ppropriations !ct, which continued and

expanded !"I at a funding level exceeding LA billion. "even urban areas were approved for funding in

3::*, and that number grew to D: in 3::A. -or 3::D, 7E" added seven new !"I &urisdictions while,without public explanation, discontinuing funding for seven urban areas that had been funded in 3::A.

The financial awards were substantial, ranging in -K3::D from a high of more than L3:9 million to %ew

Kor/ City to a low of LD million for ouisville,


13/32

8rants. "ome of the budget allocations appear to have increased, whereas others decreased from previous

years. It is clear that this new process gives states additional resources 0programs li/e ##$" which were

previously immune to the 3:M funds retention by the state under !"I are now sub&ect to the retention4,

but also a considerably greater administrative role and burden. It is not clear how effectively this

consolidation of programs will be implemented by the federal government and states, nor how well it will

be received by local governments.

-or the most part, emergency managers view !"I as promising. It provides substantial funding

for local needs 0rarely accomplished by previous federal programs4 and allows a degree of local choice in

planning, administration, and funding. !nother positive point is that A9 core cities of the D: !"I urban

areas already had existing ##$" programs. This means they had already engaged in substantial

emergency planning and, therefore, possessed an existing structure on which to build further capability.

Complaints include concern that federal authorities tightly define authorized expenditures within each

predetermined budget category and that local governments bear a substantial financial accounting load.

There is also concern that the passBthrough mechanism from federal to state and then to local agencies is

complex and administratively demanding, thus ris/ing the diversion of funds from emergency

preparedness to other uses. -inally, if !"I is to succeed in creating a functioning local emergencymanagement capability, there must be high levels of continuing cooperation among federal, state, county,

and municipal governmentsand particularly among the municipal governments within each urban area.

"ylves 0224 wor/ on the inherent difficulties with intergovernmental relations indicates the re+uired

agreements on operational plans and budget allocations will prove to be serious challenges.

!t the present time, there is little basis for &udging the success of the !"I program. %ot only is

the program new, but plans must be /ept secure to avoid divulging their contents to potential adversaries.

@hen combined with the usual administrative and operational hurdles to data collection, these obstacles

inhibit the amount of information available in the open literature that can be used to evaluate the program.

#ost urban areas funded in the -K:* budget cycle obtained federal approval of strategic plans, but

implementation re+uiring such intense intergovernmental collaboration and massive e+uipment purchasescan be expected to be slow under even the best of circumstances. There has simply not been time to

establish a capability that could be evaluated in functional or full scale exercises. !lthough many of these

urban areas have ##$" programs that provide emergency management system models, it is not clear if

the !"I strategic plans build upon these capabilities, revise them, or change them entirely.

%he ational Incident Management *ystem

The concept of incident management systems is neither new nor confined to traditional

emergency management. Incident management has military origins and law enforcement agencies have

long used the Incident Command "ystem 0IC"4 for large scale incident response. ?oth IC" and I#"

0Incident #anagement "ystem, ?runacini, 2;D4 are preplanned organizational structures for emergency

response that will be treated here as interchangeable, although there are small differences that will bediscussed in the next section. In fact, an important issue regarding I#"IC" is the confusion about

meaning> different professions, different professionals, and different times have embraced different

meanings. #unicipal fire departments use I#" and the %ational -ire )rotection !ssociation adopted a

standard 0%-)! D4 on emergency services I#"s in 3:::. "imilarly, the aw 'nforcement Incident

Command "ystem 0'IC"4 was systematized and endorsed by the )olice (fficers "tandards and Testing

organization 0?artosh, 3::*4. The Eospital 'mergency Incident Command "ystem 0E'IC"4, used in

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public health organizations, originated with the (range County, California, 'mergency #edical "ervices

!gency and has diffused widely through the medical community.

In addition to the myriad systems currently available for incident management, the federal

government has now re+uired %I#". Eomeland "ecurity )residential 7irective %umber D 0E")7BD4, a

direct response to multi&urisdictional, multiorganizational problems arising in the response to the

"eptember thattac/s, established %I#" as part of the " %ational $esponse )lan. The 7epartment of

Eomeland "ecurity 03::Ab4 issued the documentation for %I#" on #arch , 3::A. E")7BD re+uired all

federal agencies to adopt %I#" immediately and all state and local organizations to adopt %I#" as a

condition for federal preparedness funding by -K3::D. The "tate of California negotiated with 7E" to

retain "'#" 0a standardized emergency management system it had developed before %I#"4, but the

overall reception of the %I#" among other emergency responders is currently un/nown.

@hile all I#"s focus on the operational response to an incident, %I#" addresses this issue and

also many others that are considered to be emergency preparedness rather than emergency response

activities. There are six components to %I#" 0" 7epartment of Eomeland "ecurity, 3::Ab4. The first,

labeled command and management, includes the traditional component of IC" 0%I#" here uses IC"

rather than the more conventional I#" term4, plus a definition of 5multiagency coordination systems6 and5public information systems6. The IC" described here appears to be almost identical to Californias

"'#" 0which also is more comprehensive than a simple IC"4 and similar to a traditional fire service

I#". @hat 7E" identifies separately as multiagency coordination systems and public information

systems overlap the structure of traditional fire services incident management. The conventional version

of I#" structurally accommodates the need to lin/ with incident management systems operated by

different classes of agencies and governments 0e.g., public wor/s, '#", law enforcement, hospitals4 and

includes &oint information systems to disseminate incident information to the public 0?runacini, 3::34.

These same features also characterize all municipal ##$" programs.

The second component of %I#" is labeledpreparednessand 5involves an integrated combination

of planning, training, exercises, personnel +ualification and certification standards, e+uipment ac+uisitionand certification standards, and publication management processes and activities6 0" 7epartment of

Eomeland "ecurity, 3::Ab, p. A4. #uch of this component appears to be conventional guidance that, to

maintain any IC" 0or I#"4, one needs to engage in planning, training, and exercising, as well as develop

mutual aid pacts. The parts that are both different and confining include the notion that 7E" will issue

standards and test personnel to certify their ability to perform 5%I#"Brelated functions.6 This certification

process also will be applied to e+uipment. -inally, this component specifies that forms used in IC"

including the incident action plan, organization assignment list, and many othersbe standardized by

federal fiat. Indeed !ppendix !, Tab 2 of the ational Incident Management *ystem reproduces

facsimiles of appropriate form formats 0" 7epartment of Eomeland "ecurity, 3::Ab, p. :DB3:4.

The resource management component of %I#" is complex and extensive. There is a re+uirementfor inventorying resources, along with a 7E" supplied 5resource typing system6, that provides specific

definitions of each type of resource and how it is to be categorized. There are also rules for determining

what resources are needed for an incident, as well as how they are to be ordered, mobilized, trac/ed,

reported, and recovered. -inally, there is a section re+uiring certification and credentials for personnel, but

it is unclear from the description whether this means resource management personnel must be certified or

whether they are charged with ensuring incident command personnel and e+uipment are properly

certified.

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The final three components of %I#" are less well defined than those &ust discussed. The

5communication and information management6 component develops standards for communications

0including interoperability between responder organizations4 at an incident and specifies processes for

managing incident information. The supporting technologiescomponent exhorts locals to ac+uire and

continually review the availability of new technology for incident management. The ongoing

management and maintenancecomponent 5establishes an activity to provide strategic direction for and

oversight of the %I#", supporting both routine review and the continuous refinement of the system and

its components over the long term6 0" 7epartment of Eomeland "ecurity, 3::Ab, p. 4

It is difficult to evaluate %I#" at this stage of implementation. @ith regard to its origins, 5?oth

%$) O%ational $esponse )lanP and %I#" have been developed in a top down manner, centrally

coordinated by 7E"Q OandP OvPiews differ on the scope and intent of sta/eholder involvement in

developing %$) and %I#".6 0Eess 1 Earrald, 3::A, p. 34. It appears that disaster research was

minimally considered, if at all, in the process of generating %I#". It is unclear how other guidance was

solicited by 7E", from whom, or how it was incorporated. 7rafts of the %$) were widely distributed via

electronic mail along with re+uests for comment and many of these messages reached municipal

emergency managers. @hat appears to be an even greater concern to municipal emergency managementand response agencies is the detail in which processes and protocols are specified within %I#". In what

could be regarded as a significant understatement, Christen 03::A, p. 24 states that, in the fire service,

5not everyone is happy with national standards and protocols that supersede local preferences.6 #ore

important is the +uestion of whether such detailed specification promotes or retards the effective and

efficient management of emergencies and disasters.

(n a practical level, the li/elihood of successful %I#" implementation is difficult to estimate.

There is no doubt 7E" can impose a re+uirement for agencies accepting federal disaster preparedness

funding to adopt %I#". Eowever, effective implementation is +uite a different matter from official

adoption. ! veneer of nominal adoption sometimes substitutes for the reality of an executable capability

at the local level. The IC" component is similar to the I#" that is used by most large fire servicesagencies in the nited "tates, although implementation by public wor/s, hospitals, and law enforcement

agencies is difficult to estimate. To effectively operate an I#", an agency must address the planning,

training, and exercising issues contained in other %I#" components. There are serious practical

challengesincluding a reliance on intergovernmental relationships that has plagued implementation

efforts for other federal programs. !s another example, immense resources will be re+uired for 7E" to

produce standards and annually test and certify every command officer in the nited "tates. If e+uipment

must also be certified, the tas/ will be even more daunting, especially when one remembers %I#" is

designed for federal, state, local, and tribal governments 0$idge, 3::A4. The )hoenix -ire 7epartment

operates a Command Training Center for certifying its own command officers 0and others from the

surrounding region4, but the simulation models, props, computers, and software re+uire a financialinvestment far beyond the resources of most fire departments. Eence, even if the certification and testing

were passed to local &urisdictions, many would be overwhelmed and would li/ely see the process as

another 5unfunded federal mandate6. -or local agencies that do not routinely use some IC" or I#" or use

it infre+uently, the additional resources re+uired to comply with %I#" will be substantial. 7E" has

created a 5%I#" Integration Center6 0with a @eb site at www.fema.govnims4 as part of the federal effort

to manage %I#" and answer +uestions regarding system adoption. In addition, the 7E"-'#!

'mergency #anagement Institute offers multiple online classes that address both %I#" and basic IC".

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Org#ni'#tion#l Structures or E!ergenc" Response

(rganizational structures for emergency response must be based on two basic principles. -irst,

the organizational structure used to respond to everyday emergencies will form the basis of an expanded

structure to deal with disasters. "econd, the local response structure must be flexible enough to readily

expand as additional external resources are added to match the increasing agent generated and response

generated demands of the disaster. The prevailing organizational structures for emergency response are

IC" and I#". These two organizational structures differ, but relatively slightly.

Incident Command *ystem'Incident Management *ystem

-or many years, the federal government provided state and local governments with criteria for

evaluating their '()s 0" %uclear $egulatory Commission-ederal 'mergency #anagement !gency,

2;:> %ational $esponse Team, 2;9, 2;;> -ederal 'mergency #anagement !gency, 2;;, 22:,

22b4. Eowever, it avoided re+uiringor even recommendinga specific structure for emergency

response organizations to meet those criteria. In part, that reluctance seems to have been based on the

principle that a federal system should allow state and local governments to meet the federal planning

criteria in any way that they deemed appropriate. #oreover, as a practical matter, state governments

across the country differ from each other in their normal organizational structures and resources, as dolocal governments. Conse+uently, the imposition of a single structure for emergency response

organizations might have seemed doomed to failure. The conse+uence of the federal governments

performance oriented 0rather than prescriptive4 approach was a proliferation of organizational structures,

positional titles, resource names, and operational procedures that sometimes impeded inter&urisdictional

cooperationeven among identical emergency response agencies 0e.g., fire departments4 from

neighboring &urisdictions.

-ollowing a ma&or series of wildfires in "outhern California in 29:, fire departments &oined to

address the lac/ of a common organizational structure, inade+uate emergency assessments, poorly

coordinated planning, uncoordinated resource allocation, and inade+uate interagency communications at

the incident scene. This led to the development of the IC", which can be summarized in terms of sevenbasic principles 0cf. Irwin, 2;2, see also %ational @ildfire Coordinating 8roup, 22A> %ational

$esponse Team, no date4. -irst, all &urisdictions use a common organizational structure that encompasses

standardized names and functions for subunits 0standardization4. This includes standardized names and

duties for individual positions to ma/e personnel from different &urisdictions interchangeable. "econd,

there is a division of labor, so each unit is assigned a specific function to perform 0functional specificity4.

Third, subunits are established to limit the number of personnel directly supervised by each unit manager

0manageable span of control4. This is usually five subordinates, but the number can range from three to

seven. -ourth, personnel from a given professional discipline 0e.g., police or fire4 are assigned to the same

unit in the emergency response organization to facilitate teamwor/ and also to simplify record/eeping

0unit integrity4. -ifth, most incidents are managed by a single Incident Commander 0IC4, but a nifiedCommand team manages the emergency response when multiple agencies have statutory authority and

responsibility for a specific type of incident 0unified command4. "ixth, senior incident managers develop

action plans that include specific, measurable ob&ectives and evaluate their effectiveness by monitoring

the achievement of these ob&ectives 0management by ob/ectives4. "eventh, the IC or nified Command

team direct the allocation of all resourcesincluding personnel, facilities, vehicles, and e+uipmentto

emergency response tas/s 0comprehensive resource management4.

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(ver the next decade, IC" received increasing support as a collection of organizing rules

designed to serve the needs of fire and police departments 0 esa/, 2;24. The basic system was very popular and promising, but

was used for several years only on ma&or multi&urisdictional emergencies, rather than for minor fire

department incidents. @ith support from the %ational -ire )rotection !ssociation, ?runacini 02;D, 3::34

adapted and enhanced the -I$'"C()' system so it could be used as readily in small events as large

ones. ?runacini changed the command function to include specialized advisors, expanded the operations

function to include routine departmental response demands 0hazardous materials response, technical

rescue, evacuation, etc.4, and included explicit connections to a municipal '(C and police incident

commanders. The advantage of this revised structure, called the Incident #anagement "ystem 0I#"4, was

that daily use on all incidentsminor and ma&orwould enhance the effectiveness of the system when it

needed to be used in the rarely experienced ma&or incidents. I#" is now widely used in the !merican,Canadian, ?ritish, and !ustralian fire services. -or more than a decade, the (/lahoma "tate niversity

-ire "ervices )rogram and the %ational -ire )rotection !ssociation have provided I#" instruction in the

" and internationally. 7E" is in the process of re+uiring all &urisdictions to adopt the %I#" version of

IC" as a condition for reimbursement of disaster expenses. 7espite this re+uirement, this chapter will

discuss I#" as it has been implemented by )hoenix -ire because the differences from %I#"I#" are not

substantial. In addition, Chapter : will show that both of these systems lac/ ade+uate structures for

managing large scale population protection tas/s effectively.

! principal conse+uence of I#" is to ma/e all resources of the &urisdiction available for every

incident, whether it is a routine emergency or a communitywide disaster. The resources are provided

automatically, as the IC escalates the response to meet the emerging incident demands. The I#" itself is afield structure that can manage resources at multiple impact scenes from an Incident Command )ost. In

such cases, the I#" might not necessarily be supported by activation of an '(C, especially in minor

incidents. In disasters that are diffuse and present no real geographic location for scene operations, the

&urisdictional '(C can assume the role of the onscene Incident Command )ost in using I#" to manage

the emergency response. This would be particularly li/ely in response to a terrorist attac/ involving a

biological agent where impacts might not be detected until long after the attac/, at which point the source

might be unclear and remain the sub&ect of investigation.

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The advantage of using the local I#" 0supplemented by a &urisdictional '(C4 as the basis for

emergency and disaster response lies in its enhancement of the ability to +uic/ly and effectively initiate

emergency operations. Thus, every incident is initially addressed by trained and e+uipped emergency

responders guided by an IC. These personnel are always on duty, responding to all calls. 'specially in

C?$ terrorist threats, this approach reduces the chance that untrained, unprotected responders will enter

an incident scene and become casualties themselves. @hether the incident is /nown to be a disaster 0such

as a ma&or flood, hurricane, or chemical plant incident4 or initially appears to be a routine incident that

becomes a disaster 0e.g., an emergency call for 5people down6 is the first indication that terrorists have

launched a chemical attac/4, I#" is an organizational structure for emergency response that is already

established and can be expanded to fit situational demands.

0asic IM* Principles

The I#" as a system is built around responsibilities vested in standardized roles rather than the

idiosyncratic abilities of individuals. The fundamental principle of I#" is that there must always be one

0and only one4 IC at every incident scene. In principle, any emergency responder may assume the role of

IC. In practice, however, the IC is usually the first arriving company officer 0usually of an engine

company or ladder company4 or ?attalion Chief 0supervisor4. Thus, it is the duty of the most seniorofficer who is first to arrive at the incident scene to assume command. (nce established, command may

be transferred to other more senior officers as they arrive. -igure 2B shows a fully implemented I#"

structure that would be appropriate for a ma&or disaster, but I#" size and composition expand as the IC

see/s to meet incident demands. Thus, the structure begins with the assumption of command and the

designation of specialized functional units to address the hazard at the scene. This includes responding to

agent generated demands that involve addressing the threat itself 0e.g., a fire> structural damage> victim

rescue, treatment, and transportation4. It also includes dealing with response generated demands that

involve supporting the emergency responders 0e.g., logistics of ac+uiring needed e+uipment and supplies>

rescue for endangered responders4 and coordinating with other agencies 0e.g., communicating information

about the incident to the '(C and the public4.Figure 9%&. "ample I#" (rganizational "tructure.

26-

(dministrationPlanning )ogistics*afety#perations

+edicalescue-ransport ire/azmat

0ncident ommand0ncident ommander, *enior (dviser, *upport #fficer

P )iaison

E# )iaisonP0#

(ir

+*

4round esearch

Entry

+onitoring

econ

Extrication

-reatment

-riage

*taging

ehab

(ccounting

esource


19/32

I#" uses the terms sections, branches( and sectors to describe different sized functional

groupings of personnel, e+uipment, and apparatus. In -igure 2B, Commandis shown with five sections

directly attached to it. The five sectionsPlanning, &perations,Administration, *afety, and"ogistics

are staffed as appropriate to the incident size and conditions. "ection chiefs in the Incident Command )ost

wor/ with the Command staff to formulate an overall emergency response strategy. The section chiefs

then direct and monitor tactical operations, whereas branch and sector officers implement tactical

operations. In a fully implemented I#", branches are established under sections and are functional

tactical areas relevant to each section. -or example, -igure 2B shows five branches under the operations

sectiontransport, rescue, hazardous materials, fire, and medical.

The naming of branches follows the specific activity they perform> the number of branches

depends upon the intensity of the demand for each of the functions needed in the incident response. Thus,

an I#" for an urban earth+ua/e would include a heavy rescue branch. "ectors are defined beneathbranches and execute specific tas/s. Typically, sectors contain fire companies or special teams. ?ranches

and sectors are activated in response to 0or, better still, in anticipation of4 incident demands. Eence, in

small hazardous materials incidents where few victims are present, the medical branch would be only a

single unit and is called a medical sector. In events where there is no fire, the fire branch would not be

activated. !lthough basic principles of I#" are easy to grasp, more advanced concepts provide a complex

method of allocating responsibility for response strategy, tactics, and tas/s 0?runacini, 3::3> Carlson,

2;*4.

!s indicated earlier, there are some differences between I#" and IC" structures. nder IC",

there is neither a "enior !dviser nor a "upport (fficer. Instead, there is a "cientific (fficer in the

Command "ection and the "afety function is staffed by a single officer in the Command "ection ratherthan by a separate section. #oreover, IC" has only a single iaison (fficer rather than separate police and

'(C liaisons. -inally, IC" defines -inance and !dministration as two separate sections rather than

combining them as in I#".

IM* Implementation

In larger incidents, the IC may be supported by a "upport (fficer and "enior !dvisor. "enior

officers typically fill these two additional roles within the I#" Command section as they arrive at the

scene. !fter assuming command, the IC establishes a command post and, throughout the incident,

performs seven activities.

Conduct initial situation evaluation and continual reassessments Initiate, maintain, and control communications Identify the incident management strategy, develop an action plan, and assign resources Call for supplemental resources, including '(C activation 7evelop an organizational command structure Continually review, evaluate, and revise incident action plan )rovide for continuing, transferring, and terminating command

Through these duties, the IC develops and maintains the strategy and resources that will be

needed to terminate the incident. The "enior !dvisor and "upport (fficer perform duties assigned by the

ICincluding reviewing, evaluating, and recommending changes to the incident action plan. In

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particular, the *enior Advisorfocuses on the overall incident management or 5big picture6 issues. This

officer monitors the overall incident, evaluating possible responses to current and future incident demands

in order to determine the need for activating additional branches or sections. The "enior !dvisor also

evaluates the need for liaison with other &urisdictional departments, outside agencies, public officials,

property owners, tenants, and other parties impacted by the incident. In addition, the *upport &fficer

provides direction related to tactical priorities, critical factors, and safety. Thus, this officer assists with

creation of tactical wor/sheets 0written plans4 for control and accountability and evaluates the viability of

the response organization and span of control. The "upport (fficer also evaluates the need for additional

resources at the scene and assigns logistics responsibilities.

@hen there is a ma&or emergency or a communityBwide disaster, most &urisdictions provide for

the Command staff to be supported by an onscene Public Information &fficer0)I(4 and aPolice "iaison

to the law enforcement command posts In addition, there is an !&C "iaisonwho is responsible for

coordination between the incident scene and the '(C. The goal of anArticulated Commandis to spread

the functions to specialists where possible, permit effective communication with responders on scene and

emergency authorities off scene, and allow the IC to focus on the incident demands.

!s soon as it is practical, Command establishes a Public Information *ectorto deal with the massmedia and provide the information the media will need to accurately report the status of the incident and

the response to it. The staff )I( directs the sector, establishes a media area that does not impede

operations 0as necessary4, and gathers information about the incident. In a ma&or incident, the onscene

)I( coordinates with the '(C )I( and )I(s of other responding agencies to insure consistent, accurate

information dissemination and to avoid release of potentially sensitive information.

In complex incidents, particularly suspected or identified terrorist attac/s, Command assigns a

Police "iaison *ector. ! police supervisors presence may be re+uested in the -ire Command )ost or

communications may be directly established with the )olice Command )ost. The )olice iaison "ector

deals with all activities re+uiring coordination between the two departments, including 0but not limited to4

traffic control, crowd control, incident scene security, evacuations, crime scene management, and personsinterfering with -ire 7epartment operations.

@ithin the I#" structure, Command delegates responsibility for implementing its emergency

response strategy to the five section chiefs. The Planning *ection is charged primarily with technical

liaison, forecasting incident demands, and other planning functions. The )lanning "ection serves as the

Incident Commanders 5clearinghouse6 for information. In C?$ incidents, this function is particularly

critical because specialized information from a variety of specialists 0e.g., toxicologists and physicians4

will flow to the scene, and the )lanning "ection relays information from these sources to Command.

The &perations *ectiondeals directly with all hazard source control activities at the incident site.

In addition, this section is responsible for the safety and welfare of personnel wor/ing within the section.

! critical administrative duty of the (perations "ection is to establish branches that accomplish specifictas/s to meet incident demands. The (perations "ection creates and oversees as many branches as needed

depending on the demands of the specific incident. ?ranches typically include primary operational

functionsN transport, rescue, hazmat, fire, and medical. Transport ?ranch is responsible for transporting

in&ured persons from the incident scene to hospitals for definitive care. $escue ?ranch is charged with

search and rescue and extrication of firefighters who become lost, trapped, or endangered. This branch

may oversee a potentially large number of units serving as $apid Intervention Crews 0$IC units4

commensurate with the size of the incident. $IC units stage, at full ready, with the exclusive

26=


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responsibility of first responder rescue. In addition, an 'vacuation ?ranch or "ector can be created to deal

with endangered citizens.

The Eazardous #aterials ?ranch typically houses four sectors representing the four principal

functions of research, monitoring, decontamination, and site entry. In a hazmat incident, the Eazardous

#aterials ?ranch addresses critical response priorities> identifies the hazard agent> designates hot, warm,

and cold zones> and coordinates with law enforcement resources for site access control and special

services 0e.g. ?omb "+uad or "pecial @eapons and Tactics4. To assist in agent identification, this branch

is supported by the )lanning "ection, onscene toxicology specialists 0if appropriate4, and other specialized

personnel operating in the '(C. !n 'ntry Team "ector is responsible for hot zone entry and is supported

by a ?ac/up Team "ector. The latter is present for relief or rescue of the entry team. !lthough emergency

decontamination of victims can begin with the first units on scene, the Eazardous #aterials ?ranch

assembles specialized decontamination lines and e+uipment and performs technical decontamination.

-ire ?ranch is charged with the management and suppression of fires and, as appropriate,

operates sectors 0a tactical or tas/ level function4. -ire ?ranch is charged with the suppression of fire in

the incident. @hen fire occurs in context of other hazard agents such as explosives or hazardous

materials, -ire ?ranch confers with the Incident Commander to identify priorities. In some cases, -ire?ranch will operate in a defensive posture until other hazards have been addressed and then shift to

offensive operations to extinguish fire. In the operational phase, -ire ?ranch operates a safety sector that

includes one company in reserve for rapid rescue of trapped firefighters. ?uilding related 0e.g., inside,

lobby, outside4 sectors are used in high rise incidents to control access and conduct inside firefighting.

7irectional sectors 0e.g., north, south, roof4 are established for both defensive and offensive attac/s. !fter

the fire has been declared to be controlled and flames are /noc/ed down, the (verhaul "ector is

established to search for and extinguish any remaining active fire. 7epending upon the materials burning,

the (verhaul "ector will remain at the site for long periods to extinguish spontaneous combustions.

The #edical ?ranch coordinates the activity of sectors andor units to address extrication, triage,

and treatment of patients. The 'xtrication "ector is responsible for locating, extricating, and removingpatients to treatment areas. Triage "ector performs the initial assessment of patient conditions and

treatment needs. In hamat incidents, this function may be performed before, simultaneously with, or after

decontamination. The toxicity of the agent determines victim assessment and, in the case of nerve agents,

the timing of antidote administration. Triage and initial treatment may also be performed within the

'xtrication "ector, depending upon the stability of the area where patients are located. "imilarly,

contingent upon the agent, antidote administration may be appropriate at the earliest moment. In such

cases treatment and extrication personnel with appropriate personal protective e+uipment 0))'4 would

begin administration prior to or during mass decontamination. @hen time is not critical to survival,

antidote administration may ta/e place at treatment areas, which can also serve as patient collection areas.

Triage tags are used to categorize patient in&uries and record treatments administered in the field. Thetriage tag number also becomes the trac/ing mechanism for patients.

)articularly in a hazmat incident, ?ehavioral Eealth will operate as a sector within the #edical

?ranch. These personnel and units may be assigned in a variety of activities at the scene. The onscene

?ehavioral Eealth Coordinator wor/s through the #edical ?ranch (fficer while maintaining liaison with

the )lanning "ection and the '(C 0if the latter has been activated4. ?ehavioral Eealth units, with

appropriate ))', may oversee and assist patients awaiting decontamination, during decontamination, in

treatment, and during transportation.

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The Transportation ?ranch can expand as incident demands escalate, typically to four sectors.

Transport north and south represent different directional movement points for ground transportation to

local hospitals or mass care facilities 0usually established through the $ed Cross contact in the '(C4.

This movement may involve different vehicles as appropriate to patient needs, including buses for

uncontaminated or decontaminated 5wal/ing wounded6, as well as ambulances or other vehicles obtained

through the %ational 8uard, public transit, or other organizations. The &urisdictional fire department

might operate its own ambulance system, and formal agreements 0as well as mutual and automatic aid

agreements4 should be established for transport vehicles from local '#" providers and ambulance

services. The !ir "ector moves patients by rotary wing aircraft if this is safe, given the hazard agent

involved and the re+uirements of the patients conditions. -inally, the %7#" "ector prepares patients in

accordance with the local %7#" plan and moves them to the designated collection point for transport to

other locations.

The *afety *ectionis staffed by a "afety (fficer who is responsible for mobilizing this unit and

maintaining safe operations at the incident scene. This officers primary tas/ is to develop and implement

plans for rescue, incident scene safety practice, and environmental remediation after emergency response

operations have been terminated. In large incidents, the "afety (fficer is supported by additionalpersonnel who monitor reports from all incident scenes and report progress to the Command "ection. If

safety observers discover a pattern of unsafe practices, the "afety (fficer is authorized to stop operations

at an incident scene.

The Administration *ection focuses on procurement, cost recovery, liability, and ris/

management. These activities involve contracting with vendors to deliver services that cannot be provided

by the responding agencies and recording the time of use for rental e+uipment. They also include

establishing resource sharing agreements among responding agencies as well as documenting casualties

and property damage to settle later claims.

The"ogistics *ection is the support mechanism for the emergency response organization. This

section oversees a variety of functions and establishes sectors 0which operate at a tactical and tas/ level4to execute its functions. -igure 2B shows four principal sectors under ogisticsN "taging, !ccountability,

$ehabilitation, and $esources. "taging oversees the initial arrivals of unassigned companies 0units4.

!ccountability trac/s the units and individual crews responding to an incident to insure their safety. The

$ehabilitation "ector is responsible for the monitoring and care of deployed personnel, addressing both

physical and psychological ability to function effectively. This sector uses specialized e+uipment and also

provides food, fluids, and debriefing for personnel. -inally, the $esource "ector oversees all e+uipment

and apparatus, provides any needed communications e+uipment, and handles repairs and resupply. In a

hazmat incident, this sector will be responsible for supervising the movement of antidotes, other

pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, and e+uipment from local &urisdictional caches to the scene.

In summary, the I#" is a flexible structure for organizing emergency response. Its value lies inthe close lin/age between emergency plans and emergency response operations. To ade+uately plan for a

threat, it is imperative that the emergency response organization adapt to the specific demands of each

incident. The I#" both reflects and directs the capabilities of the organizations that respond to the

incident, so planning processes that account for the local I#" have greater flexibility and a greater

li/elihood of being successfully implemented in the field. The principal advantage of I#" over the earlier

IC" is that it provides for a better accounting of the activities that must be performed away from the

incident scene. -or example, I#" explicitly addresses activities such as warning, evacuation, and mass

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0-ederal 'mergency #anagement !gency, 2;A> indell, et al., 2;3> " %uclear $egulatory

Commission, 2;4 indicates '(C designers must perform the following tas/sN

. 'stablish the '(C design team.

3. !nalyze the organization of the '(C.

*. !ssess the flows of resources associated with each position.

A. 7etermine the wor/station re+uirements for each position.D. !ssess the environmental conditions needed to support each position.

. 7etermine the space needs for each position.

9. 7evelop a conceptual design for the '(C.

;. 7ocument the design basis for the '(C.

7uring Tas/ , a design team should be established that contains expertise from emergency

preparedness, information technology, ergonomics, and architecture. The design team should interview

representatives of all functional teams that will wor/ within the '(C to obtain the information needed to

develop the design basis. 7uring "tep 3, the design team should examine the '() and its accompanying

procedures to determine what are the functional teams into which the '(C is organized, the positions to

be staffed within each team, and how the positions are related to one another. In addition, the design team

should assess the flows of resources associated with each positionespecially the flows of information.

"tatic information such as '()s, plant layouts, evacuation route locations, and air infiltration rates for

local residential structures can be gathered ahead of time and stored for easy retrieval. 7ynamic

information about the status of hazard conditions 0e.g., flood forecasts, hazmat facility conditions4 must

be collected from the appropriate sources, routed to those who need it, and processed +uic/ly and

accurately to support critical decisions. ?oth static and dynamic information can be conveyed in three

different formatsverbal 0words4, numeric 0numbers4, or graphic 0pictures or figures4. The inherent

difficulty in transmitting some types of information 0especially graphic information4 can combine with

the volume of information transmitted 0especially large tables of numbers4 to severely strain the capacity

of '(C staff to perform their functions unless advanced telecommunication technologies such as

electronic mail and computer based information displays are used to manage the flow.

The flow of materials generally is not very significant unless paper is the medium by which

information is conveyed. "imilarly, e+uipment flows generally are minimal in dedicated '(Cs although

they can be significant if the '(C is located in a space that normally is used for another purpose 0e.g., a

conference room4. Eowever, flows of personnel are very intense during the '(Cs initial activation and

shift changes. #oreover, some positions re+uire a considerable amount of movement. -or example, many

emergency organizations have analysis teams whose leaders lin/ their teams with an 'xecutive Team or

'mergency 7irector 0e.g., mayor or city manager4, so the team leaders need to move bac/ and forth

between groups. ?ecause of this fre+uent movement, '(Cs must be designed to ensure the team leaders

remain informed about events that ta/e place in one group when they are with the other group, yet do not

disrupt others as they move bac/ and forth.

7uring "tep *, the 7esign Team should identify the wor/station re+uirements for each position,

especially for vertical storage space, horizontal wor/space, and the number of personnel using them

concurrently. It is advisable to provide seating and, in some cases, wor/ surfaces, whose height can be

ad&usted readily to accommodate differences in wor/ers body dimensions. "imilarly, /eyboard heights

and computer viewing angles also should be ad&ustable.

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7uring "tep A, the 7esign Team should assess the environmental conditions needed to support

each position. !ll positions within the '(C are li/ely to have similar needs for heating, ventilation, and

air conditioning, but there can be significant differences in the need for lighting and noise suppression.

=ariation in lighting needs can be accommodated by providing locally controllable tas/ lighting, and

noise suppression can be achieved with acoustically absorbent material. 7uring "tep D, the design team

should determine the space needs for each position. The space needed for each position will be

determined largely by the amount of horizontal wor/space and also by the re+uirement for circulation

space 0the area needed for people to move about freely in the wor/ area4. =ariation in the staffing needs

for different types of incidents generally re+uires a design that provides flexibility in space allocation

from one activation to another. In most cases, this flexibility can be provided by open space designs with

moveable partitions between team areas.

7uring "tep , the design teams architect can use the information flow to construct an ad&acency

matrix, which describes the degree to which each of the '(C teams needs to be located in close proximity

to each of the other teams. The ad&acency matrix, together with the information from the space analysis,

can be used to develop an idealized layout. In most case, this idealized layout must be adapted to the

physical constraints of an existing building in which the '(C will be constructed. 7uring "tep 9, the7esign Team should prepare a design basis document that summarizes the results of their analyses and the

resulting design. This document should be reviewed by those responsible for the '(Cs operations and by

a committee representing each team that will staff the '(C. This review will provide an opportunity for

users to verify the accuracy of the design basis and to provide a benchmar/ against which subse+uent

proposals for '(C renovations can be assessed.

!)uipment Ac)uisition and Maintenance

'ach agency should identify the e+uipment it needs to perform its assigned tas/s, paying special

attention to tas/s that are only performed during emergencies. "pecial purpose e+uipment that is not used

routinely will re+uire personnel to be trained and periodically tested in its proper use. In addition, such

e+uipment might need periodic preventive maintenance, battery chec/s, and recalibration. !n emergencymanager should maintain a computer database of emergencyBrelevant e+uipment that is owned by the

&urisdiction. To provide a capability for rapid search during an emergency, this database should contain

fields listing the euipments name, model and manufacturer, names and contact numbers for personnel

authorizing release of the e+uipment, names, and contact numbers for +ualified operators, contact

numbers for repairs, and critical dates such as preventive maintenance, battery chec/, and

Documents

Chapter 9 - Preparedness for Emergency Response