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Copyright © 2011 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 9 Noncompetitive Markets and Inefficiency

Chapter 9 · PDF file• If Weis chooses Low, what should Giant do to make the most money? Giant’s Advertising Expenditures Low Expenditures High Expenditures Weis’

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Chapter 9 Noncompetitive Markets and Inefficiency

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FIGURE 9.BP.1 Market Structures and Their Characteristics

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Monopoly •  Monopoly Characteristics:

–  1 firm, no close substitutes, so the firm can set Price.

– Downward-sloping Demand Curve •  The monopoly’s D curve is the mkt. D curve

– Barriers to Entry: factors keep out competitors

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Barriers to Entry

•  Economies of Scale (Natural Monopoly): –  More efficient to be big –  Declining LRAC curve, better to have only 1 firm

•  Exclusive Ownership of a Unique Resource –  Alcoa & Bauxite, Diamonds & DeBeers

•  Govt. Granted Monopoly –  Franchises granted to cable co., electric co., post office

•  Patents & Copyrights –  Monopoly on a drug formula (AZT), operating system (Windows),

etc. •  The existence of Barriers to entry means that a monopolist

CAN earn economic profit in long run

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Profit Max. for a Monopolist: produce as long as MR�MC, but MR�P

Perfect Competition, MR=P Monopoly, P>MR

P Q TR MR P Q TR MR

10 1 10 10 10 1 10 10

10 2 20 10 9 2 18 8

10 3 30 10 8 3 24 6

10 4 40 10 7 4 28 4

10 5 50 10 6 5 30 2

10 6 60 10 5 6 30 0

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•  When P is fixed, P=MR •  When P� as Q�, P=MR at Q=1, and then

P>MR –  As the firm lowers prices to sell more units,

•  each unit makes you more $, •  but you lose some money by lowering P

–  2nd unit sells when P=$9; MR is only $8 b/c the firm had to lower P by $1 to sell another unit => make $9 more, lose $1 from lower prices

–  3rd unit sells if P=$8; but MR is $6. •  Profit Max now occurs where MR=MC, not where

P=MC.

Price & Marginal Revenue

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D & MR under Perfect Competition vs. Monopoly

D=MR

D

MR

P P

Q Q

Perfect Competition Monopoly

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FIGURE 9.3 A Monopoly Firm in equilibrium earning an economic profit (shaded area)

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Table illustrating a monopolist

Q TC MC ATC P TR MR

0 5 12

1 9 10

2 10 8

3 12 6

4 16 4

5 25 2

6 39 0

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Table illustrating a monopolist

Q TC MC ATC P TR MR

0 5 12 0

1 9 4 9 10 10 10

2 10 1 5 8 16 6

3 12 2 4 6 18 2

4 16 4 4 4 16 -2

5 25 9 5 2 10 -6

6 39 14 6.5 0 0 -10

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Graph of the same monopolist

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Q

ATC

D

MR

MC

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Another Monopoly Example. 1. Computer TR.

Q P TR MR TC MC

0 20 28 1 19 39 2 18 48 3 17 55 4 16 64 5 15 75 6 14 88 7 13 104 8 12 124 9 11 149

10 10 181

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2. Computer MR=ΔTR/ΔQ

Q P TR MR TC MC

0 20 0 28 1 19 19 39 2 18 36 48 3 17 51 55 4 16 64 64 5 15 75 75 6 14 84 88 7 13 91 104 8 12 96 124 9 11 99 149

10 10 100 181

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3. Compute MC

Q P TR MR TC MC

0 20 0 28 1 19 19 19 39 2 18 36 17 48 3 17 51 15 55 4 16 64 13 64 5 15 75 11 75 6 14 84 9 88 7 13 91 7 104 8 12 96 5 124 9 11 99 3 149

10 10 100 1 181

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4. Determine the Profit Maximizing Level of Output and Compute Profit or Loss

Q P TR MR TC MC

0 20 0 28 1 19 19 19 39 11 2 18 36 17 48 9 3 17 51 15 55 7 4 16 64 13 64 9 5 15 75 11 75 11 6 14 84 9 88 13 7 13 91 7 104 16 8 12 96 5 124 20 9 11 99 3 149 25

10 10 100 1 181 32

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Profit Max. Q = 5; TR = TC so the monopolist earns a normal profit

Q P TR MR TC MC

0 20 0 28 1 19 19 19 39 11 2 18 36 17 48 9 3 17 51 15 55 7 4 16 64 13 64 9 5 15 75 11 75 11 6 14 84 9 88 13 7 13 91 7 104 16 8 12 96 5 124 20 9 11 99 3 149 25

10 10 100 1 181 32

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FIGURE 9.4 (a) A Monopolist Incurring an Economic Loss

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FIGURE 9.4 (b) A Monopolist Earning a Normal Profit

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TABLE 9.1 Monopoly Revenue and Cost

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FIGURE 9.1 Monopoly Demand and Marginal Revenue

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FIGURE 9.2 Monopoly Demand, Marginal Revenue, Average Cost, and Marginal Cost

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FIGURE 9.5 Long-Run Equilibrium for the Monopolist

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FIGURE 9.6 Monopoly—Output Restriction and High Price

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Monopolistic Competition

Characteristics: •  Easy Entry and Exit

– No significant barriers to entry – No long term economic profits

•  Large number of firms – Firms can be small or large, but not dominant

•  Products are close but not perfect substitutes (product differentiation) – Non-price competition (advertising)

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Entry and Exit in Monopolistic Competition

•  Economic profits encourage more firms to enter – This creates more substitutes for existing brands – Decreasing the demand curve for existing firms – This process continues until firms earn a normal

profit

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Monopolistic Competitor Earning an Economic Profit

D

LAC LMC

MR

P

Q

D2

More substitutes → D shifts down and gets flatter

MR2

MR2 Starts out touching D and intersects MC directly below the tangency point.

P2

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•  This means fewer substitutes for remaining products

•  Increasing the demand curve for remaining firms

•  This process continues until firms earn a normal profit

Economic losses cause firms to exit

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Monopolistic Competitor with an Economic Loss

D

LAC LMC

MR

P

Q

D2

Fewer substitutes → D increases and gets steeper

MR2

MR2 starts out touching D and intersects MC directly below the tangency point

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FIGURE 9.7 Demand and Marginal Revenue for a Firm in Monopolistic Competition

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FIGURE 9.8 Short-Run Equilibrium for a Firm in Monopolistic Competition

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FIGURE 9.9 Long-Run Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition

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FIGURE 9.9 (continued) Long-Run Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition

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FIGURE 9.9 (continued) Long-Run Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition

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OLIGOPOLY •  Key Characteristics:

– Substantial Barriers to Entry – Dominated by a FEW LARGE FIRMS –  INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG FIRMS

•  Interdependence generates non-price competition (ads) and potentially

•  INCENTIVES TO COLLUDE, merge

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Kinked Demand Curve

P

Q D

←D curve if firm raises price and rival firms do not

←D curve if firm lowers price

and rival firms match price cuts

Market P

Firms avoid raising prices (unless they think their rivals will follow suit. They avoid price cuts for fear of starting a price war. The likely outcome is adopting similar prices, and “testing” price increases to see if rival firms will follow suit (attempting Price Leadership).

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Game Theory illustrates the interdependence of firms, and the incentives they face

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Payoff matrix showing profits of two firms when both have dominant strategies

Giant’s Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures High Expenditures

Weis’ Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures

Weis Profits: $300,000 Giant Profits: $300,000

Weis Profits: $100,000 Giant Profits: $400,000

High Expenditures

Weis Profits: $400,000 Giant Profits: $100,000

Weis Profits: $200,000 Giant Profits: $200,000

A dominant strategy exists if profits are higher no matter when the rival does.

Both Weis and Giant have a dominant strategy: High Ad Expenditures.

In this case, an equilibrium solution occurs in the lower right hand cell of the payoff matrix.

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Determining a Dominant Strategy

Giant’s Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures High Expenditures

Weis’ Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures

Weis Profits: $300,000 Giant Profits: $300,000

Weis Profits: $100,000 Giant Profits: $400,000

High Expenditures

Weis Profits: $400,000 Giant Profits: $100,000

Weis Profits: $200,000 Giant Profits: $200,000

For Weis, if Giant chooses Low Expenditures, which option should Weis choose?

Answer: High Expenditures, b/c $400,000>$200,000

If Giant chooses High Expenditures, Weis should choose High Expenditures, b/c $200,000>$100,000.

Weis has a dominant strategy: High Expenditures.

How to solve a payoff matrix

•  Assume one player chooses one option, then determine what the other player should do

•  Do this for all possible options to determine if either player has a dominant strategy or a consistent strategy

Giant’s Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures High Expenditures

Weis’ Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures Weis Profits: $350,000 Giant Profits: $400,000

Weis Profits: $100,000 Giant Profits: $500,000

High Expenditures Weis Profits: $300,000 Giant Profits: $200,000

Weis Profits: $200,000 Giant Profits: $300,000

•  If Weis chooses Low, what should Giant do to make the most money?

Giant’s Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures High Expenditures

Weis’ Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures Giant Profits: $400,000 Giant Profits: $500,000

High Expenditures

•  If Weis chooses High, what should Giant do to make the most money?

•  If Giant chooses Low, what should Weis do to make the most money?

•  If Giant chooses High, what should Weis do to make the most money?

Giant’s Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures High Expenditures

Weis’ Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures Weis Profits: $350,000 Giant Profits: $400,000

Weis Profits: $100,000 Giant Profits: $500,000

High Expenditures Weis Profits: $300,000 Giant Profits: $200,000

Weis Profits: $200,000 Giant Profits: $300,000

This is a payoff matrix when Giant has a dominant strategy

Giant has a dominant strategy because high expenditures optimize profits no matter what decision Weis makes.

However, Weis does not have a dominant strategy. If Giant chooses low, Weis will choose low ($350,000>$300,000); if Giant chooses high, Weis will choose high ($200,000> $100,000).

The equilibrium solution depends upon the information Weis has about Giant. If Weis knows Giant’s dominant strategy, equilibrium solution will be high expenditures for both and profits will be $200,000 for Weis and $300,000 for Giant.

Giant’s Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures High Expenditures

Weis’ Advertising Expenditures

Low Expenditures Weis Profits: $350,000 Giant Profits: $400,000

Weis Profits: $100,000 Giant Profits: $500,000

High Expenditures Weis Profits: $300,000 Giant Profits: $200,000

Weis Profits: $200,000 Giant Profits: $300,000

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Collusion

•  Cartel –  Sellers join together to control output and/or prices. Illegal

in the US. –  Example 1: OPEC –  Example 2: Price fixing of Ivy League Schools –  Example 3: Coke and Pepsi agreement on which product

would be on sale which week of the year •  Price Leadership

–  Market leader establishes the price, other firms follow suit. •  Conscious parallelism

–  Firms adopt identical prices without communication.

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FIGURE 9.10 Oligopoly Pricing and Output with Economies of Scale

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FIGURE 9.11 A Cartel to Ensure Oligopoly Profits

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FIGURE 9.12 Sample Payoff Matrix

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TABLE 9.2 Share of Value of Shipments Accounted for by the Largest Companies in Selected High-Concentration Manufacturing Industries, 2002

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TABLE 9.2 (continued) Share of Value of Shipments Accounted for by the Largest Companies in Selected High-Concentration Manufacturing Industries, 2002

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TABLE 9.3 Share of Value of Shipments Accounted for by the Largest Companies in Selected Low-Concentration Manufacturing Industries, 2002

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TABLE 9.4 Concentration Ratios for Selected Non-manufacturing Industries

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TABLE 9.4 (continued) Concentration Ratios for Selected Non-manufacturing Industries

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