Plessy v Ferguson

Brief Fact Summary: A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal accommodations for its Black and White passengers. The Plaintiff, Plessy, was prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train reserved for whites.

Synopsis of Rule of LawA law, which authorizes or requires the separation of the two races on public conveyances, is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution unless the law is unreasonable.

Facts: A Louisiana statute required railroad companies to provide separate, but equal accommodations for its Black and White passengers. An exception was made for nurses attending to the children of the other race. Plaintiff, who was seven-eighths white, was prosecuted under the statute after he refused to leave the section of a train reserved for whites. The alleged purpose of the statute was to preserve public peace and good order and to promote the comfort of the people.

Issue: Was the statute requiring separate, but equal accommodations on railroad transportation consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?

Held: Yes.

The State Supreme Court is affirmed. Justice Henry Brown (J. Brown) stated that although the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to enforce the equality between the races, it was not intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce a commingling of the races in a way unsatisfactory to either. Laws requiring the separation of the races do not imply the inferiority of either. If the law “stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority,” it is because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. Therefore, the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the States’ police powers.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution does, however, require that the exercise of a State’s police powers be reasonable. Laws enacted in good faith, for the promotion of the public good and not for the annoyance or oppression of another race are reasonable. As such, the statute was reasonable.

Dissenting OpinionJustice John Harlan (J. Harlan) said that everyone knows that the purpose of the statute was to exclude the colored people from coaches occupied by whites. The Constitution is color-blind. It neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.

DiscussionThis case marks the beginning of the “separate but equal” doctrine. It is later overturned by Brown v. Board of Education.

Brown v Board of Education of Topeka (Kansas)

Brief Fact SummaryBlack children were denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. The children sued.

Synopsis of Rule of LawSeparate but equal educational facilities are inherently unequal.

Facts: This case is a consolidation of several different cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. The Plaintiffs, several black children, were denied admission to public schools attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation according to the races. Plaintiffs, through their legal representatives sued, seeking admission to public schools in their communities on a non-segregated basis. The plaintiffs alleged hat segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue: Do separate but equal laws in the area of public education deprive black children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?

Held: Yes.

Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that segregation of children in the public schools solely on the basis of race denies to black children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the physical facilities and other may be equal. Education in public schools is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the role of public education in American life today. The separate but equal doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, which applied to transportation, has no place in the field of public education.

Separating black children from others solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The impact of segregation is greater when it has the sanction of law. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law tends to impede the educational and mental development of black children and deprives them of some of the benefits they would receive in an integrated school system. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority and any language to the contrary in Plessy v. Ferguson is rejected.

Yick Wo v Hopkins

Facts: Yick Wo was convicted and imprisoned for violating an ordinance of the city of San Francisco, California, which made it unlawful to maintain a laundry "without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors, except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone." The 1880 ordinance was neutral on its face, but its purpose and its administration appeared suspect to Yick Wo and other Chinese. Most laundries in San Francisco were owned by Chinese and were constructed out of wood. The few laundries owned by whites were located in brick buildings. At the time the ordinance was passed, Chinese immigration had brought around 75,000 Chinese to California, half of whom lived in San Francisco. The white population became increasingly anti-Chinese and sought ways to control the Chinese population.

In 1885 the San Francisco Board of Supervisors denied Yick Wo and two hundred other Chinese laundry owners their licenses, even though their establishments had previously passed city inspections. After he was denied his license, Yick Wo continued to operate his business. He was eventually arrested and jailed for ten days for violating the ordinance. More than one hundred and fifty other Chinese laundry owners were also arrested for violating the ordinance.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Yick Wo argued that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as the law denied him equal protection of the laws. He pointed out that only one-quarter of the laundries could operate under the ordinance, with 73 owned by non-Chinese and only one owned by a Chinese. San Francisco contended the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police powers granted by the Constitution to cities and states.

Issue: Whether or not the statute or ordinance issued by the city of San Francisco, California is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Held: Yes.

Justice Stanley Matthews struck down the ordinance. Matthews looked past the neutral language to strike down the ordinance as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. He found that the division between wood and brick buildings was an “arbitrary line.” Moreover, whatever the intent of the law may have been, the administration of the ordinance was carried out "with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state" of equal protection of the laws.

Matthews held that: “Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appliance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”

Because the unequal application of the ordinance furthered "unjust and illegal discrimination,” the Court ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.

People v Vera

EQUAL PROTECTION AND VALID CLASSIFICATION. This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of the laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

A LAW MAY APPEAR FAIR ON ITS FACE OR IMPARTIAL IN APPEARANCE, YET IF IT PERMITS UNJUST AND ILLEGAL DISCRIMINATION, IT IS STILL SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION. - In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purposes of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of a probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year — and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation in subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand".

Yrasuegui v Philippine Air Lines

Facts: Armando Yrasuegui, an international flight steward was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of Philippine Air Lines. In 1984, Yrasuegui’s weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight, but the problem recurred. In 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. He was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with. In 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same. On 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated. The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties. CA held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed.

Issue: WON he was validly dismissed.

Held: Yes. A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL. The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “voluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Art. 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Art. 282 (a), (c), & (d).”

Notes: The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.” The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees. The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.

Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.

Ceniza v COMELEC

“Equal Protection” – Gerrymandering **”Gerrymandering” is a “term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power.” **

Facts: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51, COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885  insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

Held: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

League of Cities of the Philippines v COMELEC

Action: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by LCP, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws.

Fact: During the 11th Congress, HOR enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the HOR of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. But the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the HOR re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. But the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.On 2006, the HOR approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) without the President’s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issues: Whether Cityhood Laws violate Sec.10, Article X of the Constitution; and whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held: The Cityhood Laws violate Sec. 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because it took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Sec. 6, Article X because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Sec. 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Sec. 450 of the LGC. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Sec. 450 of the LGC, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Nu ñ ez v Sandiganbayan

“Equal Protection” – Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Facts: Nuñez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was

accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in

connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuñez that PD1486, as

amended, is violative of the due process,  equal protection, and ex post facto  clauses of the Constitution.

He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuñez’s right to equal protection, because – appeal as a

matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to

questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction,

by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as

a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be

concerned.

Held: The SC ruled against Nuñez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall

have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution

specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem,

the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may

thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present

Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner

is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it “must be based on substantial distinctions

which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing

conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan

are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices – a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably

carefully reached than other trial courts.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon

Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by petitioner PASEI, a firm “engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement”. It challenges the constitutionality of Department Order (DO) No. 1 (Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers) of DOLE. It contends that said Order is a discrimination against male or females, that it only applies to domestic helpers and females with similar skills and is violative of right to travel. It further contends that it is an invalid exercise of lawmaking power where police power should be legislative and not executive.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 3, Art. XIII of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting rights and benefits provided by law and DO No. 1 was passed without prior consultations which is claimed to be in violation of Charter’s non-impairment clause in addition to great and irreparable injury. On behalf of the respondents, Solicitor General informed the Court that Labor Secretary lifted the ban in certain states and invoked the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether or not Department Order No. 1 is valid under the Constitution as a police power measure?

Held: As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.

The Court is called upon to protect the victims of exploitation by sustaining the Government’s efforts. The same cannot be said of male workers. Insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Said Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist.

International School Alliance of Educators v Quisumbing

Facts: Private respondent, pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. It authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires. When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School.

Issue: Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires. Ruling: No. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Art 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees; (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights. The petition is given due course. The petition is granted in part.

Department of Education v San Diego

Facts: Private respondent, Roberto Rey San Diego is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process and equal protection.

Held: No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

Mendoza v People

Facts: Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a special law known as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be (dura lex sed lex).The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, the court the Court transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.

Issue: Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the President, the grant of executive clemency to a convict?

Ruling: The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code which provides; ― Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

Salumbides v Office of the Ombudsman

Facts: Atty. Vicente Salumbides and Glenda Ara were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. In 2002, members of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Salumbides and Glenda and other elective officials. The administrative aspect of the case charged petitioners with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the Commission on Audit Rules and the Local Government Code (LGC). The Ombudsman denied the prayer to place petitioners under preventive suspension pending investigation. It denied the motion for reconsideration but dropped the mayor and Coleta, both elective officials, as respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted the case. The Office of the Ombudsman approved the 2005 Memorandum absolving Jason and Aquino, and finding petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of condonation is applicable in this case.

HELD: The CA decision is affirmed. Doctrine of Condonation – The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers’ previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people. The non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law. The electorate’s condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees. It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate.

Petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving their advice to their superior. The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, Salumbides failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when he advised the mayor to proceed with the construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters related to upholding the rule of law.

As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating rather than registering her written objection as municipal budget officer. Aside from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the improper itemization of the expense, held that the funding for the projects should have been taken from the capital outlays that refer to the appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local government unit. It added that current operating expenditures like MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal year. Denied.

Eliseo Soriano v Ma. Consoliza Laguardia

Facts: Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristo’s minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan):

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!] Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di ba[?] [‘]Yung putang babae[,] ang gumagana lang doon[,] [‘]yung ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa sa putang babae [‘]yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a “G” rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB.

Issue: Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art. III.

Held: No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be “context based” and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.”

The Supreme Court also said “that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a “form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent contents of his utterances in a “G” rated TV program.”

Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v Equitable PCI Bank

Facts: Goldenway Merchandising executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank over 3 parcels of land as security for a 2 million loan obligation granted to the petitioner. Petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, leading respondent to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage on Dec 13, 2000. A Certificate of Sale was later issued to respondent on Jan 2001. In a letter dated March 2001, petitioner offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check but petitioner was told that redemption was no longer possible since the certificate of sale had already been registered; the title to the foreclosed properties were consolidated in favor of the respondent on March 2001. Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages contending that the one-year period of redemption under Act 3135 should apply, and not the shorter redemption period under RA 8791 as applying RA 8791 would result in impairment of obligations of contracts and violate the equal protection clause under the constitution.

Issue: WON the redemption period should be the 1-year period provided under Act 3135, and not the shorter period under RA 8791 as the parties expressly agreed that foreclosure would be in accordance with Act 3135.

Held: The shorter period under RA 8791 should apply. The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale. In this case, the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon petitioner’s default and the latter’s entire loan obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance with Act 3135. Under Sec. 47 of RA 8791, an exception is thus made in the case of juridical persons which are allowed to exercise the right of redemption only "until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale" and in no case more than 3 months after foreclosure, whichever comes first. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. The legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act 3135. The difference in the treatment of juridical and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties foreclosed – whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. The General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe banking system. The amendment introduced by Sec. 47 embodied one of such safe and sound practices aimed at ensuring the solvency and liquidity of our banks. It cannot be disputed that the said provision amending the redemption period in Act 3135 was based on a reasonable classification and germane to the purpose of the law.

The right of redemption being statutory, must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective. Also, it has to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation. Such authority to regulate businesses extends to the banking industry which, as this Court has time and again emphasized, is undeniably imbued with public interest. Having ruled that the assailed Sec. 47 of R.A. 8791 is constitutional, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in holding that petitioner can no longer exercise the right of redemption over its foreclosed properties after the certificate of sale in favor of respondent had been registered.

Jesus Garcia v Drilon

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given time allowance to answer, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “exercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law. The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: 1. Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.2. Whether or not RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution.3. Whether or not RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to

barangay officials.

Held:1. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.2. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO ex parte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.3. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.   The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.  The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function. The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Philippine Judges Association v Prado

Facts: Petitioners are members of the lower courts, and they assail the validity of Sec. 35 of R.A. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its circular no. 92-28. They feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the foregoing measure. Apparently, said R.A. 7354 withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional, Metropolitan, and the Municipal Courts. Petitioners asserts the unconstitutionality of the R.A. 7354 on the following grounds:

(1) Its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose,(2) It did not pass the required readings in both houses of Congress xxx,(3) It is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the judiciary.

With regards to petitioner’s argument that the assailed measure is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the judiciary, it is alleged as such because while it withdraws the franking privilege from the judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines; the Vice- President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC, among others. On the other hand, respondents aver that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. Indeed, the franking privilege was likewise withdrawn on from other offices such as the Institute of National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the PDIC, the National Historical Commission, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, among others.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed measure violates the right of petitioners to the equal protection of thelaws.

Ruling: Yes. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In other words, similar subjects should not be treated differently against others. On the other hand, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined to a valid classification.

In this case, there was a clear showing that the judiciary’s right to equal protection of the laws was infringed. As was established in the decision, it appears that the judiciary highly needs the franking privilege, as it is paramount to its operations. In evidence to such contention is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking requirements. The postmaster’s contention that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. In addition, the court held that if the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. Furthermore, it ruled that the problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

The court likewise ruled that in lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Tatad v Energy Secretary

Facts: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

Issue: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

Ruling: No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." – The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court. Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws." – It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

Serrano v Gallant Maritime

Facts: Antonio Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc. Ltd. under the POEA-approved Contract of Employment as Chief Officer, for 12 months. When he was deployed however, he was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer upon the assurance of his employer that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. When he was not made Chief Officer, he refused to remain as Second Officer. Thus, he was repatriated to the Philippines, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days out of his 12 month contract. He filed a case against his employer for constructive dismissal and for payment of his salary for the unexpired portion of his 12 month contract. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring the dismissal of Serrano to be illegal and awarding him, among others, payment of his salary for three (3) months only out of the unexpired portion of his contract of employment. Such award was based on the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042, which provides:

“Sec.10. Money Claims. – xxx In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.” 

Serrano maintained that he should be awarded his full salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract. He elevated his case to the Supreme Court on the ground that the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Sec. 10, R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Sec. 10, RA No. 8042 is unconstitutional.

Held: The SC held that limiting the award of salaries to 3 months only under the 5th paragraph of Sec. 10, R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of Sec. 1, Art. III, Sec. 18, Art. II and Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution. Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law. While, Sec. 18, Art. II and Sec. 3, Art. VIII grant all members of the labor sector full protection of their rights and welfare. These constitutional provisions accord equal protection to all Filipino workers. Meaning, similarly situated workers should be treated similarly.

Under the 5th paragraph of Sec. 10, R.A No. 8042, OFWs are classified into 2 categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year. In case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more. In case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.

Those OFWs belonging to the first category are put on a disadvantaged position compared to local workers with fixed-period employment who are entitled to the award of salaries for the remainder of their fixed-term employment, in case of illegal dismissal. Considering these circumstances, the SC held that the 5th paragraph of Sec. 10, R.A No. 8042 contains a discriminatory classification, since in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause unfairly singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage, thus violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Thus, Antonio Serrano won his case before the Supreme Court and he was awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Enrique Garcia v Executive Secretary

211 SCRA 219 – Political Law – Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

Facts: In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines.

In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.  Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: “

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

Issue: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

Held: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President to issue the said EOs.

Arroyo v Department of Justice

Facts: The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies

committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections. The COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the COMELEC. In its initial report, they concluded that manipulation of the results in the 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. They recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage. After the investigation, COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.2. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause.

Held: 1. The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid. Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the COMELEC. The grant to the COMELEC of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the COMELEC to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the COMELEC. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the COMELEC, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the COMELEC. Thus, COMELEC Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional body’s independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

2. The Joint Order does not violate the equal protection clause. Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Administration. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee. The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

Spouses Augusto and Ofelia Dacudao v Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales

Facts:  The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila.

Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.

Held: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural law.

Virgilio Almario et al. v Executive Secretary

Facts: In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1001 which created the category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In

1992, R.A. No. 7356 was signed into law establishing the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). The NCCA, together with the CCP Board of Trustees have been mandated by law to promote, develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino artists. The two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award. In 2009, several nominees were considered by a panel and, four names were agreed upon and were sent to the President. Meanwhile, the Office of the President also, allegedly received nominations from different sectors endorsing private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Caparas, Francisco Masa and Jose Moreno. The names were announced through a proclamation by Executive Secretary Ermita. Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA and CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the conferment on respondents be enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion of former President Arroyo.

Issue: 1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause in the selection of National Artists; and 2. Whether or not former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is guilty of grave abuse of discretion.

Held:

1. Yes. Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists. The special treatment accorded to respondents fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abad’s right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.

2. Yes. The recommendation of NCCA and the CCP Boards is subject to the President’s discretion. But, this discretion is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Sec. 17, Art VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President. They reviewed the guidelines for nomination, selection and administration of the award. Thus, the rules and policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies, including the President herself as chief executor of laws. GMA could not have properly considered respondents as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. The Proclamations issued are invalid and set aside.

PAGCOR v BIR

Facts: In 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the declaration of nullity of Sec. 1 of RA 9337 insofar as it amends Sec. 27(c) of RA 8424, otherwise known as the NIRC by excluding petitioner

from the enumeration of government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) exempted from liability for corporate income tax. In 2011, SC partly granted the petition insofar as it held that the BIR Revenue Regulation No. 16-2005 which subjects PAGCOR to 10% VAT is null and void for being contrary to the NIRC. It also held that Sec. 1 of RA 9337 is valid and constitutional. BIR issued RMC No. 33-2013 on April 2013 pursuant to the decision which clarifies the “Income Tax and Franchise Tax Due from PAGCOR, its Contractees and Licensees.”

It now subjects the income from PAGCOR’s operations and licensing of gambling casinos, gaming clubs and other similar recreation or amusement places, gaming pools, and other related operations, to corporate income tax under the NIRC. PAGCOR filed a Motion for Clarification in the case entitled PAGCOR vs The Bureau of Internal Revenue, et al., which was promulgated on March 15, 2011 which also prays for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of Preliminary Injunction against BIR in the implementation of BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 33-2013 dated April 2013. PAGCOR alleges that said RMC is an erroneous interpretation and application of the aforesaid decision.

Issue:1. Whether PAGCOR’s gaming income is subject to both 5% franchise tax and income tax?2. Whether PAGCOR’s income from operation of related services is subject to both income tax and 5% franchise tax.

Held:

1. Gaming Income: Franchise Tax – YES; Income Tax - NOUnder PD 1869, as amended, petitioner is subject to income tax only with respect to its operations of related services. Accordingly, the income tax exemption ordained under Section 27(c) of RA 8424 clearly pertains only to petitioner’s income from operation of related services. Such income tax exemption could not have been applicable to petitioner’s income from gaming operations as it is already exempt therefrom under PD 1869. There was no need for Congress to grant tax exemption to petitioner with respect to its income from gaming operating as the same is already exempted from all taxes of any kind or form, income or otherwise, whether national or local, under its Charter, save only for the five percent (5%) franchise tax. The exemption attached to the income from gaming operations exists independently would be downright ridiculous, if not deleterious, since petitioner would be in a worse position if the exemption was granted (then withdrawn) then when it was not granted at all in the first place.

2. Income from Operation of related services: Income tax - YES; Franchise tax - NOPetitioner’s Charter is not deemed repealed or amended by RA 9337; petitioner’s income derived from gaming operation is subject only to the five percent (5%) franchise tax, in accordance with PD 1869, as amended. With respect to petitioner’s income from operation of other related services, the same is subject to income tax only. The five percent (5%) franchise tax finds no application with respect to petitioner’s income from other related services, in view of the express provision of Section 14(5) of PD 1869, as amended. Thus, it would be the height of injustice to impose franchise tax upon petitioner for its income from other related services without basis therefor.

SC granted the petition and ordered the respondent to cease and desist the implementation of RMC No. 33-2013 insofar as it imposes corporate income tax on petitioner’s income derived from its gaming operations; and franchise tax on petitioner’s income from other related services.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Part v COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner is a national organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals. Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the

COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral grounds. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited religious passages in their decision and stated that since Ang Ladlad’s ways are immoral and contrary to public policy.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that “the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspiration of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s.” Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.”  That “the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have slipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.” COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under R.A. 7941.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation. Respondent mistakenly opines that the SC ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system.

As the court had explicitly ruled, the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation

Bureau of Customs Employees Association v Teves

Facts: Former President Arroyo enacted R.A. 9335, otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005 to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC

officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents. BOCEA contends that R.A. 9335 unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of other revenue generating government agencies which are not subject to attrition and that the assailed law inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets.

Issue: WON R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violates the rights of BOCEAs members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process

Equal protection of the laws Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

Security of TenureMoreover, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of R.A. No. 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.

Due ProcessThe essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side. BOCEAs apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors that may affect the level of collection. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.

People v Cayat

Facts: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of a non-Christian tribe, was found guilty of violating Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.

Issue: Whether or not Act 1639 is denies the equal protection of the laws; whether or not it is violative of due process clause of the Constitution; and whether the Act is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

(1) Substantial Distinction: It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

(2) Germane to the purpose of law: it is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

(3) It must not be limited to conditions: The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.

(4) Apply to all members of the class: that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.

Ormoc Sugar Association v Treasurer of Ormoc City

Facts: In 1964, the municipal board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, imposing a municipal tax for all productions of centrifugal sugar milled equivalent to 1% per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments were made under protest by Ormoc sugar Company.

Sugar Company filed before CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. In response, defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within the city's power to enact under Local Autonomy Act and the same did not violate constitutional limitations.

After pre-trial and submission of case memoranda, CFI declared the ordinance constitutional that it is within the charter of the city. Appeal was then taken to SC by the Ormoc Sugar Company alleging the same statutory and constitutional violations. Appellant questions the authority of the Municipal Board to levy such tax in view of the Revised Administrative Code which denies municipal councils to impose export tax.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; and Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity under the Bill or Rights. Held: We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise. The challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest.

Central Bank Employees Association v Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary

Facts: RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human resource management system and a compensation structure as part of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and –file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the “fiscal and administrative autonomy” of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board.  The Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision that the classification of employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to “establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.”

Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws of the BSP employees.

Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.

Rutter v Esteban

Facts: In 1941, Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of land. Esteban paid 3/4 of the purchase price and they constituted a mortgage over one of the parcels to secure the payment of the balance. However, the war broke out and Esteban was not able to pay the balance of the purchase price on the due date and so, on August 1949, Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance with the CFI. Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint but as a defense, he claimed that his obligation was a pre-war obligation covered by the moratorium embodied in R.A. No. 342.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that “all debts and other monetary obligations contracted before December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or any subsequent agreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission.” The CFI ruled in favor of the debtor Esteban. This brings us to the sole issue raised by petitioner on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 342, which declared a moratorium on certain pre-war obligations, is unconstitutional for violation of the Constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of contracts.

Held: Yes. R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional.

Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are generally constitutional“Western civilization has made use of devices for saving the credit structure, devices generally known as moratoria. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign power.” Such laws were often passed during or after times of financial distress such as wars and disasters. Some laws however, were declared unconstitutional where the period of moratorium prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable. The argument that moratorium laws impair the obligation of contracts does not hold water. It is justified as a valid exercise of the state of its police power.

In the US case, Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, it was held that: The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . .Similarly, where the protective power of the State is exercised in a manner otherwise appropriate in the regulation of a business it is no objection that the performance of existing contracts may be frustrated by the prohibition of injurious practices. . . .. . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.

Thus the “true test” of constitutionality of a moratorium statute “lies in the determination of the period of a suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.”

R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional for being unreasonableThe moratorium law, enacted in 1948, came on the heels of executive orders likewise declaring moratoriums. With its 8 year moratorium period, it is clearly unreasonable for creditors who have to “observe a vigil of 12 years” to collect on debts which have become demandable as early as 1941. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief. The court also noted that the reconstruction is paying off and that the Philippines is headed to better times. Hence the Supreme Court declared R.A. No. 342 unreasonable and oppressive and hence, null and void and without effect. Esteban was ordered to pay the balance with interest at the rate of 7% per annum with 12% attorney’s fees.