CHAPTER 8: JAPAN AND PACIFIC RIM EXPERIENCEonlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_rpt_52-g.pdfChapter 8 — Page 2 (indeed, exceeded in many ways) its bold 1985 rail expansion plan

Chapter 8 — Page 1

CHAPTER 8: JAPAN AND PACIFIC RIM EXPERIENCE

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 8's organization and bulk reflectcareful consideration by the author andother investigators on the best way topresent this research. Except for high speedintercity railroad ventures, there is a dearthof readily available research material and ageneral lack of familiarity with Japaneseand Pacific Rim rail transit (in comparisonwith that of western Europe, for example).The nature and extent of Oriental sharedtrack practices are particularly obscure.Accordingly, more detail is provided thanis customary in an issue-based researchassignment.

Shared track cannot be researched oraccomplished in isolation. All Pacific Rimrail information, therefore, is presented herein the context of joint use. The Japanesecase studies, lessons learned, conclusions,and descriptions of unique railway featuresare structured around this study's first fourchapters; institutions/regulation, operations,physical plant, and vehicles. This brings thereader up to the same level of understandingof the Pacific Rim experience that is offeredfor the North American joint useexperience. The "Lesson" section of thischapter mimics directly the first fourchapter headings and the key issues thatthey raise on application to the NorthAmerican rail environment.

Six case studies were selected todemonstrate a variety of shared trackarrangements and the characteristics ofJapanese culture, institutions, andcommerce which encourage joint use.Selected case study rail operators weresurveyed during the course of this research,but response has been disappointing withinthe time allocated for the survey. Becauseof the diversity of the Japanese joint useexperience, the bibliography and glossaryare distinct units and appear as appendices

to Chapter 8. Several of the mostcommonly used terms are, however,incorporated into the master glossary ofthis report.

Simply put, joint use of track is generallythe operation of one entity's trains overanother entity's tracks without the passengerhaving to change trains. Reciprocal runningis the operation of passenger trains by twoor more railways over the tracks of the othercompanies. Such operation serves manypurposes and necessitates certainpreparations. With respect to electricrailways and rapid transit lines, there isfrequently the need to enable passengers toboard at different-height station platforms,and adapt to the partner's electrification andother systems. Throughout Japan and inother Pacific Rim metropolitan areas, theseand other problems of reciprocity have beenresolved in different ways, offering lessonsto any North American urban areaconsidering joint use of track. The practicehas permitted and encouraged the rapidgrowth of electric railway services in majormetropolitan conurbations and on ruralrailways. Positive results are achievedranging from lower cost rail transitexpansion by avoiding financing andbuilding duplicate facilities, to rescuinglightly-used branch lines fromabandonment.

Of Tokyo's thirteen fully- or partially-finished rapid transit lines, only five do nothave reciprocal running. Of them, theGinza and Marunouchi lines are toocrowded, and Line 12 is a low-profile linethat is physically incompatible with anyother rail line so cannot participate inreciprocal running even though it employscommon 1435mm (4'8½") track and1,500Vdc catenary. Extensions are underconstruction that will tie two more of thelines to interurban tracks for throughrunning. Tokyo has almost consummated


(indeed, exceeded in many ways) its bold1985 rail expansion plan and is shiftingattention farther in future efforts; 531.7 km(330.40 miles) of new railways are to bebuilt, including more planned withreciprocal through services, and focusingnew rail lines on Yokohama, Chiba, andKawasaki. Transportation officials haveconcluded that with only modest publicclamor to improve existing lines,uncooperative residents along proposednew alignments and public funds in shortsupply, they must stay with availablerailway rights-of-way. Reciprocal runningis therefore well-established and thepractice is expanding based on favorableresults thus far.

The organization of railroads and railtransit in Japan is different than both NorthAmerican (where the railroads have longbeen pillars of private enterprise) andEurope (where the railroads have long beennational government entities). In at leastone way, Japanese railways are becomingmore like those in North America. Until adecade ago, the principal Japanese railroadnetwork was a department of the nationalgovernment. It is now well advanced in itstransition to geographic groups of private-enterprise railroad corporations. JapaneseNational Transportation policy, however,has been more like Europe where attentionand resources are more balanced betweenrailroads, public transportation andhighways. On national railroad networks,freight dominates in North America, and isimportant throughout Europe. In contrast,freight is decidedly subordinate topassenger service on the Japanese nationalrailroad system.

A review of the evolution of the formerJapanese National Railways into thepresent Japan Rail Group shows how, bycontrast, the North American experiencehas tended to separate complementarytransport and non-transport activities. Thiscondition is traceable to anti-trustlegislation, regulation, and a common

business philosophy of separating public-deficit passenger transport from privateincome-producing real estate.

While joint use of track/reciprocal runningmight be expected to be small as part ofany nation's overall railroad network, it isextensive in Japan. To put this intoperspective, Table 8-1 shows the extent ofJapan's railroad network in terms ofoperating entities, the number of them, andthe number participating in joint use oftrack. These are not just different corporateand public entities sharing track, as in U.S.trackage rights. The following joint trackuses are between railways of differenttypes which would be regarded asincompatible, physically and operationally,by North American standards.

As Table 8-1 shows, among the Japan RailGroup, the one freight and all six passengercompanies participate in joint-use/reciprocal running. Among the privaterailway companies, 43 do so (including 6municipal systems). Among the Third-Sector entities, 35 do. This sum of 85amounts to 55% of all the rail operatingentities in Japan participating in some formof joint use. Thirty-four other entities thatoperate fixed-guideway modes that cannotparticipate in joint use of track orreciprocal running, because of guidewayincompatibility (people movers) of whichhalf are funiculars, bringing the totalnumber of Japanese operating entities to189. There are also other freight-onlyrailroads and industrial railways.

This chapter also explores the remainder ofthe Pacific Rim to find examples of joint-use of track. While there is growingpassenger-rail development activity in theemerging Third-World nations, theestablished industrial/economic hubs ofHong Kong and Seoul provide the bestexamples of joint-use of track.


Table 8-1Tally of Entities Providing Rail Service in Japan

HSR = high-speed rail (Shinkansen); ICR = intercity rail; ECR = electric commuter rail;DCR = diesel commuter-rail; INT = interurban railway; HRT = heavy rapid transit; LRT =light-rail transit; StR = street railway; FRT = freight

* Because any entity might provide more than one kind of service, the row totals areadjusted to remove duplication.


8.2 OVERVIEW OF JAPANESE RAILTRANSPORTATION

8.2.1 Cultural Context

It is essential to understand how joint useevolved and how Japanese rail projectshave been conceived, planned andimplemented. Consider these with cautionregarding wholesale transfer of Japanesesuccess in these ventures to America.

Politics are similar to America at all levels.Japan's constitution, instituted by theMacArthur administration following WorldWar II, makes Japan one of the morepurely democratic nations of the world. Asin the United States, free enterprise issignificant. Several things do set us apart.

One difference is that education is theresponsibility of the municipality, but athigh-school level, parents can enroll theirchildren in any school that they can reachdaily as a practical matter. Significantly,this contributes in great measure to ridingon public transportation. In lieu of localschool buses there are school-tripper trains.Some students travel very long distances,up to several hours each way, to attend theschool of their choice. Student fares areaccordingly very low. Otherwiselowdensity branch lines survive in partfrom such functions now uncommon in theU.S. Railbus services in joint use flourishmodestly in such environments.

Tokyo's highways and publictransportation facilities are highly used andvery crowded – usually running at two tothree times capacity even at Oriental levelsof tolerance. But, one need travel onlyrelatively short distances away fromTokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya to find amplecapacity on roads and publictransportation. Most of Japan is rural, andmost cities are small. Yet in the grouping ofplaces of 50,000 population or more (thefundamental definition for U.S. UrbanizedAreas (UZAs), only 14 of the 118 such

places are without rail transit in someform, and most of those are on outlyingislands, and include only one large city –Naha on Okinawa.

It is important to appreciate that many ofthe Japanese rail projects, if subjected tothe U.S. process of Alternatives Analysisand Major Investment Studies, probablywould not be built. At the same time, thenotion that public transportation is betterfor the environment than automotive travelis well accepted without successive studies.Indeed, there has been some overexuber-ance to build and some resulting mistakes.The overexuberance is demonstrated by anational landscape marked by unfinishedrailroad projects – vacant bridges, viaducts,tunnels. These unfinished projects play arole in emerging third sector railways andthe joint use enterprise they generate willbe described.

The Japanese maintain a high standard ofdiscipline. Failure is related to trust andless to endeavor. The slogan, "SafetyFirst," is carried to high levels in Japan.Yes, there are sophisticated systems ofJapanese train control apparatus, but themain link in the safety chain is the integrityof the individual operating employee andsupervisor. A review of Chapter 6 accidentreports indicates a prevalence of humanfailure as a cause. One cannot dwell on thebenefits of joint use of track and reciprocalrunning without an appreciation of thesimplicity and steadfastness of operatingdiscipline in Japan. In North America, itmight be regarded as a risk mitigationessential for joint use.

There are other factors at work that in someway have an impact upon the continuingdevelopment of the transportation systemand of joint use potential. One is personallongevity. Japanese have long been at thetop of world demographics with respect tolifespan. Accustomed to extensive qualitymobility and having disposable income thateasily covers travel costs, the elderly do alot of traveling, much by train,


providing market even in remote areaswhere joint use thrives on the third sectorrailways.

In addition, Japan is land-shy. In generalterms, the nation has half the U.S.population in the space of the square milescomprising Montana, and more than 80%of Japan is not developable – being steeplysloped mountains. Most of the populationoccurs in the contiguous coastalconglomerations of the Kanto (Tokyo-Yokohama-Chiba-Kawasaki), Tokai(Nagoya), and Kansai (Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe) regions. The joint use case studiesthat follow cluster in these land-scarceareas and are therefore organized by theseregions.

What do these cultural characterizationshave to do with joint use of track andreciprocal running? It is simply the questfor mobility for a growing travel habitconstrained by land values that force theexamination of making greater use ofexisting railroad infrastructure. Theadvantages of joint use of track arebecoming more acute in Japan. To theextent that cost and lack of spaceconditions become critical in NorthAmerica, the advantages of joint usebecome more pronounced. It's important tounderstand the institutional and politicalenvironment in Japan that permits (andencourages) joint use.

There is really no equivalent of U.S. statesor Canadian provinces in Japan. The firstlevel of government below national is theken ('prefecture"), of which there are 47. Inturn, prefectures are subdivided into gun("county") and counties into combinationsof shi ("city"), machi ("town"), and mura("village"). For general reference, thenation is separated into the four majorislands of Hokkaido (which is also a singleprefecture), Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku,and is divided into nine regions. Oneregion, Ryukyu, is distant from the othersand contains the island of Okinawa. It is

worth mentioning that the Japanese do notcredit themselves with original thinkingregarding public transportation policies andpractices. They readily acknowledge thatthey learned from overseas. With respect tojoint use of track and reciprocal running,America was a principal source of learning.Every feature we might consider adoptingfrom Japan, North America once had herein some measure.

8.2.2 Evolution of the Japanese National Railway tothe Japan Rail Group

Joint use of track evolved in several formsin large part because of the way that theJapanese railway ownership andinstitutions have evolved. This evolution issometimes recorded as a cultural trait, butit reflects more societal changes whichultimately translate into goods and servicedelivery. Understanding unique Japaneseinstitutions, practices, and equipment helpsto grasp the environment which fostersjoint use. Accordingly, Third-Sectorrailway joint use installations, railbuses,and other features of Japanese railoperating practice are explained below.

North American Contrasts

In the United States and generally inCanada, the railroad companies have beenprivate enterprise corporations thatfunction differently than most corporationsin that they had been regulated by theInterstate Commerce Commission, theFederal Railroad Administration (FRA),and by individual State public utilitiescommissions. Now the SurfaceTransportation Board and FRA primarilyregulate U.S. railroads.

Throughout Europe and much of the rest ofthe world, railroads are or were entities ofthe national governments. There are alsolesser private-company railroads that feedthe national network and are dependentupon it. There is seldom rail-to-rail competition remaining within


corridors under this national railroadstructure. In Japan, until a few years ago,the railroad network evolved briefly asindividual companies that were earlyamalgamated into a nationwidegovernment-owned and operated network.However, many private companiescontinued to be formed and were onlyselectively merged into the national JNRnetwork. As in most countries, each suchrailroad needed government sanction eitherthrough specific concession or franchise, orthrough articles of incorporation, endorsedthrough legislation and limiting the ventureinsofar as terminal points or routes aredefined.

JNR Formation

The mainline Japanese railroads werenationalized in 1892. Japanese GovernmentRailways (JGR) was created in 1906 forthe main purpose of extending railroadsinto areas where they could not becomeprofitable soon enough to attract privateinvestors. JGR was replaced on June 1,1949 by Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo (JapaneseNational Railways —JNR).

With the advent of electric railwaytechnology in the form of street railwaysand interurbans, local railways blossomedthroughout the developed world. This latterdisadvantage has been overcome byingenious methods of interchange in morerecent years.

In Japan, private railroad companies weregranted unfettered free enterprise.Nevertheless, by specific actions, national,prefecture, and municipal governmentscould legislate limitations. This intentionof enforcing efficiency and economy wasalso imposed upon manufacturers,establishing zaibatsu – single-purpose orsingle-region conglomerates. Anunintended result was the creation ofenormous comprehensive monopolies.Following WWII, Japan dismantled thesezaibatsu as a means of returning tonormalcy. As Japan is a refined laissez-

faire free-enterprise system, in time themajor corporations re-created thesemonopolies through inter-companyagreements. These monopolies and inter-company agreements created thecomprehensive transportation, finance, realestate, retail, recreation, and utilityconglomerates similar to those whichhelped develop U.S. suburbs prior to anti-trust initiatives. This diversity also createda climate of cooperation between businessinterests which encouraged joint use offacilities, including tracks.

Japanese Regulation and Competition

A word about competition is useful tounderstand joint ventures and joint use.Japanese transport companies can diversifywithout fear of anti-trust retribution. In theU.S., companies are usually limited to theirinitial purpose. In Japan, one companyenters diverse lines of complementarybusinesses. In this way, companies adjustto changing markets and business costcenters that can complement one-another.Like North American enterprise, Japanesecompanies look after their primary needfirst, to earn a reasonable profit.Secondarily, businesses are dedicated tothe welfare of the community. A balance isachieved, so that neither objectivesmothers the other. A private railwaycompany's intended business is to providea useful transportation service. Becausethere is a point at which it would becomeunproductive for a transportation companyto raise its fares to the level which woulddrive away customers, the management isobliged to find more and other ways tomake money. There being no anti-trustlaws, the railway companies diversifyextensively to subsidize theirtransportation services. Until recentdecades, they did not compete with theprivate automobile. If bus service waswarranted, the railways provided it; theydid not have to compete with separate buscompanies. But they competed fiercelywith each other, not on parallel routes, but


in different territories on the basis of"Come live and work in our service areabecause we offer the best travelopportunities and our area offers the finestquality of living." Joint use of track andfacilities can thrive where suchenvironments converge.

In the largest conurbations, the interurbanscompete aggressively. In Tokyo-Yokohama-Kawasaki, each serves differentquadrants of the region and competes in thesense of "Come and live, work, and play inour territory because we render superiorservice." In Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe, interurbanscompete point-to-point on differingalignments between the same pairs of cities.In most instances, these independentcompanies compete with Japan Railmainline or branch line service, too. Thiscompetition extends beyond schedules andlevels of service. Every time one interurbanannounces a new feature, another will go towork to top it. The traveler benefits asimprovement after improvement isintroduced. The interurban's managementshave stretched their imaginations to producemarvelous circular tours. In spite ofcompetition, they also cooperate with eachother and with Japan Rail when theirbusiness interest is being served commonly.The interurbans own what would ordinarilybe competing bus routes and coordinatethem with the rail lines. To varying extents,these companies must compete with theprivate automobile. In Tokyo, this is ofminor concern. But, in Nagoya — Japan'sautomobile manufacturing center— railoperators provide more comfortable seatingwith greater leg room and other passengeramenities such as clean antimacassars onthe seat backs of transit vehicles. Thesuburban city of Toyota has one of theworld's most modern downtowns, with anattractive mall and multi-level skywalksbetween the stations of the two interurbanlines that serve it. The centerpiece of this21st-Century development is one of Japan'slargest department stores (owned, in fact, bySanyo–another interurban company) all

reflecting the great spending power of theauto workers who reach the Toyota plant byeconomical electric trains.

Financing Rail

The Japanese free-enterprise system allowsthe railways to establish credit and borrowas needed. There are no capital grants tohelp expand or public subsidies to maintainoperating margins. To eliminate gradecrossings by dropping into subways orrising onto aerial structure, they must payfor the new facilities themselves, althoughthey often negotiate cost sharingarrangements with communities wheremutual benefit can be demonstrated. (Forthe severe damage of the Kobe earthquake,for example, the Hanshin railroad had tosell real estate in order to raise the funds torebuild bridges, overpasses, viaducts, andtunnels, re-lay its track, and re-erect itscatenary.) Most infrastructureimprovements are therefore accompaniedor motivated by joint-development projectswhich produce immediate capital andongoing revenue. While the new JapanRail Group companies are obliged to seekconsent of the Ministry of Transport toraise fares, they need no consent to makeinvestments. Joint use is thereforeunconstrained by business regulation. Highcost and high density tend to encouragejoint use ventures.

In the U.S., the railroad network is a groupof competing corporations which do notrely on public subsidies. The U.S. railroadsystem is envied by overseas governmentsfor its self-sufficiency. The JapaneseNational Railway had become anenormous financial and social burden onthe federal government. Railroadoverstaffing was a principal means ofkeeping the populace employed. While therailroad sysº tem was vital, it neverthelesshad numerous lines that were an economicdrain on the rest of the network."Privatization" was long pursued inEngland as a conservative political


philosophy. Japan examined all otherplaces' efforts and decided on a differentpath. Its simplicity is the hallmark of itsrapid implementation and evident success.In summary terms, the nationalgovernment divided the Japanese NationalRailway infrastructure and managementinto six geographic-area corporations (andthree other special-purpose companies),granted to them all the privileges andcorporate regulatory freedom of a privaterailway company, and directed theirmanagements to strive to becomeprofitable as quickly as possible so that thegovernment could sell its ownershipthrough shares on the open market.

The Japan Rail Group companies can nowdiversify to earn revenue through variousmeans in addition to the transport farebox,can negotiate with other private railwaysjust as those railways have negotiatedcooperative agreements among themselves,and are enabled to cast off the worstearners among their branch lines. (See thesection on Third-Sector Railways.) Noticethat the old concept of the zaibatsu prevails– monopolies within geographic areas.Within the context of joint-use of track,take notice that one of the newcorporations is Japan Rail-Freight. Freightcontinues to be managed and operated on anationwide basis. But, unlike the U.S., thefreight operation is consistently the tenanton the passenger railroads.

Institutional Rail Changes

The new companies, temporarily 'owned'until offered by the government, are:

Hokkaido Passenger Railway Company(Hokkaido Ryokaku Tetsudo Kaisha)(Japan Rail-Hokkaido)

East Japan Passenger Railway Company(Higashi-Nihon Ryokaku Tetsudo Kaisha)(Japan Rail-East)

Tokai Passenger Railway Company(Tokai Ryokaku Tetsudo Kaisha)(JapanRail-Tokai)1

West Japan Passenger RailwayCompany (Nishi-Nihon Ryokaku TetsudoKaisha) (Japan Rail-West)

Kyushu Passenger Railway Company(Kyushu Ryokaku Tetsudo Kaisha) (JapanRail-Kyushu)

Shikoku Passenger Railway Company(Shikoku Ryokaku Tetsudo Kaisha) (JapanRail-Shikoku)

Freight Railway Company (KamotsuTetsudo Kaisha) (Japan Rail-Freight)

Shinkansen Property Corporation(Japan Rail-Shinkansen)

The former Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo(Japanese National Railways, JNR, or"Kokutetsu") continues as a corporation inthe form of Kyu Kokutetsu (Old NationalRailway) as holder of debt and disposer of2,600 Ha (6,424.6 acres) of surplusproperty.

Shinkansen high speed lines are within thejurisdiction of only three of the companies– Japan Rail-East (JR), Japan Rail Tokai;which extends to downtown Tokyo [JR-East territory] in one direction and todowntown Osaka [JR-West territory] in theother direction; and Japan Rail-West,which extends well into Japan Rail-Kyushuterritory. By 1991, these three companiesthat operate Shinkansen had becomesufficiently profitable that they purchasedthe assets from Japan Rail-Shinkansen.Operation of the high-speed trains has longbeen a major profit base; the income fromShinkansen subsidizes those intercity andcommuter/suburban operations that incurlosses. The proceeds from these sales isbeing used to finance Shinkansenextensions inland to Nagano, north toAomori, and south to Kagoshima, as wellas to contribute to lowering the debt held


by the JNR Accounts SettlementCorporation.

The process has moved swiftly byc o m p a r i s o n t o c o n t r o v e r s i a ldenationalization of railroads in othernations. A JNR Rehabilitation SupervisionCommittee presented a report andrecommendation to the Prime Minister, andthe Cabinet met on July 30, 1985 toendorse the government's commitment tocarry out the recommendations. A primaryissue was the determination of how muchof the large JNR debt ought to betransferred to the new corporations. Acontroversial element was the drawing ofboundaries for the six geographic groups;the arrangement finally accepted was tokeep commuter-districts together ratherthan focus on continuity of intercity routes.This established a framework for futurejoint use.

The Shinkansen lines were treatedseparately at first to simplify the number ofregional companies that would beresponsible for them. Those who craftedthe details of turning the government-runnational railway system into regionalrailway companies were encouraged by"the success of the private commuter linesin keeping costs and fares down whileproviding a high level of service to theircustomers." The governmentacknowledged that at least three of theregional companies – serving the islands ofHokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku – weregoing to need public subsidy for a longperiod of time before they could becomeprofitable. Although the extant privaterailway companies anticipated some newcompetition, they did not resist themovement. The date of April 1, 1987 wasset for implementation, and the Minister ofTransportation was instructed to draft allthe necessary legislation.

The incentive splitting up of JNR andgiving the group corporations the ability tocompete on the one hand and therequirement to become self-sufficient on

the other hand has resulted in remarkableimprovements of all sorts, not the least ofwhich being the financial stature. Fastertrains, thoroughly refurbished older rollingstock, purchase of new rolling stock,modernized stations, and better customerservice brought increases in ridership andrevenues. Joint real-estate developmentaround stations, new passenger-trainservices, joint use arrangements with otherrailways, and diversified enterprise broughtin additional revenue.

Japan Rail-East typifies the rapidtransformation of the conservative JNRmanagement to an aggressive stride. Someof its aggressive changes apply joint use oftrack and facilities as a tool for rapidexpansion and improvements. Within onlya few years, it had:

! extended the north network ofShinkansen lines from outlying Uenoterminal to Tokyo [Central] station;

! increased the maximum operatingspeed for Shinkansen trains up to 275km/s (170.88 mph);

! worked with a Third-Sector railwayto bring direct rail service fromTokyo (by an interurban companyand Japan Rail-East) into theterminal buildings of NaritaInternational Airport, then expandedthe service to Shinjuku andIkebukuro by putting freight tracks topassenger use, and to Yokohama(cutting Narita-Tokyo travel timefrom 90-minutes by non-stop bus to53 minutes with capacious trains hasattracted more than 41,000 averagedaily riders);

! remodeled sleeping cars from openberths to compartments and scheduledovernight trains for convenientdeparture and arrival times;

! introduced double-deck high-speedShinkansen trains and bi-levelcommuter trains;


! introduced super-express trains fromTokyo to several shore resorts, some incooperation with interurban railways;introduced commuter/suburban servicethrough densely populated areas byusing freight tracks; added the 43 km(26.7 miles) Keiyo Line to the denseTokyo rail network;

! introduced high-speed Shinkansencommuter trains; extendedelectrification; improved signaling;developed ATP (automatic trainprotection) and ATS (automatic trainstop), then merged them into ATS-P– a form of moving block traincontrol;

! increased ridership by 13% since thecompany was established; and

! operated the company at a profit,thus fulfilling the underlyingobjective.

Japan Rail-East was the first of the JapanRail Group to be marketed to the public.By mid- to late-1993, two million shareswere put up in the Tokyo Stock Exchangeby the Japanese National RailwaySettlement Corporation. The issue was soheavily oversubscribed and the share valueinflated that the stock exchange had tosuspend sales. A starting share price offace value ¥50,000 started at ¥250,000 andskyrocketed to over ¥600,000. Cautiously,the government had held back 50% of thefour million shares. Japan Rail-East'simportance can be appreciated from thefact that it carries as many passengers asthe other five Japan Rail Group companiescombined (although not as many as thetotal of private railways), and passengerkmrose 23% from July 1, 1987 when thecompany went into business, to 1993.

On October 8, 1997, Japan Rail-Tokaistock was floated on the Tokyo StockExchange. The ¥385,000 for each of the800,000 shares was higher than theexpected ¥359,000, but lower than the saleprice of Japan Rail-East stock in 1996.

It is clear that deregulated, decentralizeddecision-making, and applying prudent yetaggressive business practices, createdinnovative new services and a climate inwhich joint ventures of many types,including joint use of tracks, is encouraged.

Emergence of Passenger Rail Supremacy

A paradox observed in Japan is that due todeclining freight loadings, JNR began andthe Japan Rail Group passenger companiescontinue to turn central-city team tracksand freight yards into revenue-producingjoint land developments at the same timethat Japan Rail-Freight's main endeavor isto increase the rail share of cargomovement throughout the nation. Tonnekmhad declined by 1988 to only 37% of the1970 level. Adding to this dilemma is theintroduction of intensive passenger serviceon former freight-only lines in the majormetropolitan areas and relegating freightmoves to nighttime, only because of hightraffic density, not incompatibility. ButJapan Rail-Freight has joined with NipponExpress, All-Japan Express Company, andindividual Japanese shippers to formKukusai Kamotsu Tetsudo System – a sea-rail venture between Japan and Chinawhich will also – under agreement withChina's Ministry of Railways – operatefreight service within China and participatein container and parcel service betweenJapan and Vietnam, Mongolia, Kazakstan,and Russia. Within Japan, Japan Rail-Freight maintains a fleet of 593 electriclocomotives and 283 diesel locomotives.

While the Japan Rail Group companies arepressing for the lifting of certainrestrictions which were introduced into thelegislation creating these companies, thegovernment has been helpful in otherways. A way was found to write off aconsiderable portion of JNR's debt insteadof passing it along to the companies. Thetax threshold on monthly tickets wasdoubled, making it more worthwhile forcommuters to choose Shinkansen; Japan


Rail-East Shinkansen commuters increasedfrom 3,800 in 1986 to 106,000 in 1989.One of the restrictions the Japan RailGroup wanted discontinued was aprohibition against abandoning 1067mm(3'6") lines after opening 1435mm (4'8½")Shinkansen lines in the same corridor.Japan Rail-Freight was against thiscapability because key links in a freightnetwork would be lost; its only recoursewould be to acquire and continue operationof such lines. In turn, because local stationswould be bypassed by the high-speedtrains, this would place Japan Rail-Freightin the undesirable position of having tosupply passenger service. When in late1997 the Nagano Shinkansen service wasstarted, Japan Rail-East was enabled to anddid discontinue the old line. A related factwas that the line contains a 6.7% gradient –once operated with rack-and-pinion –which is less economical for freight thanlonger lines that climb the mountainselsewhere. The section from the top of theslope at Karuizawa to Nagano, however,was transferred to the new ShinanoRailway as a ready-made Third-Sectorelectric interurban line. So, Japan Rail-Freight access is preserved to the citiesalong the way.

For the first several years of their separateexistences, the Japan Rail Groupcompanies were exempted from taxes ontheir assets. Then this immunity was liftedon a sliding-scale basis.

Blending Transport and non-TransportVentures

Japan Rail-East, again, is used as anexample of how individual companies havebeen diversifying. Initially, the non-transportation (but transportation-related)income is being used to construct newstation buildings (which in turn createmore opportunities for this diverse incomesource). By 1996, in spite of heavyexpenditures of this new-found income, theRelated Business department contributed4% of Japan Rail-East's annual profit.

Japan Rail-East has successfullyestablished itself in station restaurants,convenience stores mostly at stations (108outlets by 1996), rental of surplus land andbuildings, developing housing projectsalong its lines, a hotel chain at or nearstations (the eleventh opened at Nagano intime for the Winter Olympics), bed-and-breakfast facilities in stations (eight bySpring 1997), redevelopment at or nearstations with hotels, office buildings, andshopping centers, and management ofshopping centers, hotels, advertisingagencies, and information services. InFebruary 1993, Japan Rail-East introducedits own credit card – VIEW – which ishonored at station businesses and for ticketand tour purchases. (An interesting sideeconomy is the recycling of used ticketstock as toilet paper for the company'sstations and trains.)

A focal point for income production hasbeen the space below, above, and alongsideJapan Rail-East tracks. Adding to a similararray, Japan Rail Central has concentratedon mammoth building complexes at, on,and around principal stations (Nagoya andToyohashi so far), a major resort hotel (atTakayama) with more to follow, a tourcompany, investment services, and aJapanese restaurant in London. TheAffiliated Business department has beenthe income-growth leader among JapanRail-East departments. Japan Rail-Westadds world-wide travel bureau; the Tennojistation building in Osaka, which is claimedto be Japan's largest commercial complex;the largest shopping mall in Japan; and 110miscellaneous profit-making subsidiariesand affiliates, including a railway, two buscompanies, and taxicab companies.

Summary Evaluation of Rail Systems inJapan and Application of Experience

A summary observation concludes that thebreak-up of JNR into the regional railwaycompanies has been successful, and thatthe keys to success of the action have been(1) not requiring the new companies to


carry the full burden of past debts, (2)granting to the new companies theprivileges that the private railways (indeed,any private corporations) have – coupledwith the lack of stern regulation or anti-trust prohibitions, (3) adopting public-interest benevolent goals and objectives,and (4) a prevailing positive attitude ofcooperation and coordination. This latterweighs heavily in the successful venturesinto joint-use of track.

A summary of significant points withrespect to transferring Japan's success withjoint-use of track to North Americainclude: Freight service has beencorporately separated from passengerservice – as in the U.S. – but Japan-Freightis a tenant on the regional Japan Railcompanies' tracks. In a reverse of the rolesof Amtrak and the nation's freightrailroads, Japan Rail-Freight supplies andoperates its own motive power and rollingstock. The railways have long voluntarilyadhered to identical standards of trackgauge (although several), traction power(again, several), and clearance envelope. InJapan, anomalies are addressed rather thanused as reasons to not accomplish things togain benefits (e.g., one of Tokyo's rapidtransit lines adopted the Tokyo streetcargauge of 4'6" rather than require anextensive interurban company to convert tostandard gauge.) This also reveals how oneaction to achieve a standard for joint usecan cascade through the system to compelother changes in standard which areotherwise unjustified. The surge in Third-Sector railway projects created a suddenmarket for economical, efficient, easy-to-maintain railbuses (and the willingness ofthe railcar manufacturers to take orders ofonly a few at a time).

8.2.3 Japanese Private Interurban Railways

The American interurban industry was anatural outgrowth of the early electricstreet railway and urban rapid transit.Typically, but not always, the interurbantrains ran into and out of cities on streetcar

tracks, but between cities on railroad-likeprivate rights-of-way. Rather quickly, theinterurban railway developed into a uniquerail form with its own kind of rolling stockcapable of running slowly in mixed trafficamong the streetcars and fast on the openrailroad-type track. In time, numerousinstances of joint use of track emerged,although the practice was not at that timeheralded as anything unusual.

It is more the interurban than the streetcarthat was reborn as light-rail transit, with allthe versatility introduced by the interurbanrailway. The historical timing was suchthat the defining interurban features ofeither running cross-country to link urbancenters or radiating from urban cores wereapplicable to Japan as it underwent itsrapid Meiji-Era transition from a feudalstate to a modern industrial nation. InEurope, the emergence of regional railwaysand independent Stadtbahn reflect a returnto the interurban, but in a contemporaryform.

Although some historians erroneouslycredit the automobile with the rapidoutward growth of Los Angeles, it wasactually a well-planned interurban networkthat set the pattern for metropolitangrowth. The automobile merely tookadvantage of it. Similarly, it was theinterurban railway that defined the low-profile but extensive pattern of growthexperienced at the same time by Tokyo,Osaka, and Nagoya.

The interurban railway has become adominant practitioner of jointuse/reciprocal running in Japan. TheJapanese interurban railways – both privateand third Sector – practice jointuse/reciprocal running to a greater extentthan the other rail modes. Nevertheless,among the interurban systems' partners inthe practice, the urban rapid transitsystems, though numerically fewer, have alarger percentage of participants in jointuse/reciprocal running.


When interurbans were introduced inJapan, the Japanese had progressedsufficiently to carry on their ownentrepreneurship. They followed U.S.practice closely and created American-style electric interurban railways. Acentury later, the interurban has evolvedinto the dominant mode for travel inJapan's major conurbations. Thetechnology and operating practices haveadvanced to the state of the art. The naturalcourse of continued development in Japanshows how the interurban might haveevolved in the U.S. and Canada had notother forces intervened.

Interurbans shoulder most of thecommuting burden in the major Japaneseurban areas. Their role is vital. In the vastKanto region (i.e., the Tokyo-Yokohamacommutershed), the large Kansai region(Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe commutershed), andthe Nagoya region, the sharing of averageweekday passengers among urbantransportation modes was as shown inTable 8-2 in 1980.

The interurban companies carry thegreatest share of passengers each day. Inthe Kanto region, they carry 41.62% of allrail passengers in a network having theworld's most extensive electrifiedsuburban/commuter-rail network (JapanRail-East's) and the world's most extensiveheavy rapid transit ("subway") network. Inthe Kansai region, the interurbans carry54.61% of the rail passengers, and inNagoya, 51.56%.

There are 38 private companies and 15Third-Sector companies operating electricinterurban railways in Japan. In addition,three of the Japan Rail Group companiesoperate a total of 16 interurban lines in 11localities; predecessor JNR acquired theseover the years and added them to thenational railway network. No matter howyou count them, there is a greaterconcentration of electric interurbansystems in Japan than in any other nationof the world.

There are other private companies andThird-Sector companies operating electricrailways in other forms, such as heavyrapid transit, light-rail transit, streetrailways, and more operating dieselrailways.

Interurban versatility is underscored by avariety of track gages: 1435mm (the NorthAmerican standard gauge of 4'8½"),1372mm (4'6"), 1067mm (Japanese"standard" gage of 3'6"), and 762mm(2'6"). Versatility continues with a varietyof electrification systems: 600vDC trolleywire or catenary, 750vDC third rail,1,500vDC catenary, and 20,000vACcatenary, as well as some diesel railcarsand railbuses oper ating under catenary.This diversity may have suppressed somejoint-use track ventures, but where gaugecompatibility exists, joint use byinterurbans and other carriers flourishes.Even where track gauges are different, theproblem has been overcome by joint use ofrights-of-way, or three-rail track. Newinterurban lines continue to be built. Allfeature some degrees of joint venture, jointuse of track, or reciprocal running. Sincethe institution of the Third Sectorarrangement, the following eleven electricinterurban lines have been opened: (Notethose that participate in reciprocalrunning/joint use of track with Japan Railgroup railway companies are indicated by"*", and those that participate in reciprocalrunning/joint use of track with otherprivate railways are indicated by "#".)

! Abukuma Railway – 1067mm (3'6"),20,000vAC catenary – 54.9 km(34.11 miles).*#

! Aichi Loop-Line Railway – 1067mm(3'6"), 1,500vDC catenary – 43.5 km(27.03 miles).*

! Chiba Express Electric Railway –1435mm (4'8½"), 1,500vDC catenary– 10.9 km (6.77 miles).#


Table 8-2Interurban Market Share


! Hokuetsu Express – 1067mm (3'6"),1,500vDC catenary – 59.5 km (37.00miles).*

! Hokushin Express Electric Railway –1435mm (4'8½"), 750vDC catenary –7.5 km (4.66 miles).#

! Kamogawa Railway – 1435mm(4'8½"), 1,500vDC catenary – 2.5 km(1.55 miles).#

! Kansai Airport Access Line —1067mm (3'6"), 1,500vDC catenary –6.9 km (4.29 miles).*#

! Narita Airport Rapid Railway –1067mm (3'6") 1435mm (4'8½"),1,500vDC catenary – 8.7 km (5.41miles).*#

! Shinano Railway – 60.4 km (37.53miles).*

! Toyo Rapid Railway – 1067mm(3'6"), 1,500vDC catenary – 16.2 km(10.07 miles).*#

! Yagan Railway – 1067mm (3'6"),1,500vDC catenary – 43.5 km (27.03miles).#

In addition, the following were developedas non-electrified railways using diesel-propelled rolling stock as a vanguard forfuture electrification:

! Ise Railway – 1067mm (3'6"),railbuses – 22.3 km (13.86 miles).*

! Kita Kinki Tango Railway –1067mm (3'6"), railbuses – 30.4 km(18.89 miles).*

! Tokai Transport DevelopmentAgency – 1067mm (3'6"), DMUs –11.2 km (6.96 miles).

Many interurbans operate networks of busroutes, and often extend their influence intoresort areas with funiculars and aerialcableways. Several operate fleets oftaxicabs. Some operate ferries or excursionboats. Such diversification, of course,expands their transportation sphere, puttingmore passengers into their electric railway

cars and trains. They extend their travelinfluence by encouraging hiking in regionsthat they serve, and even maintain hikingtrails. They have expanded into travelbureaus and publishing travel-orientedperiodicals.

Copying their U.S. counterparts of earlierdecades, Japanese interurbans developedfamily amusement parks to generate off-peakriding on their lines. Some of the amusementparks have graduated to theme parks. Thesponsor and local partner for Walt DisneyEnterprises' Disneyland near Tokyo is theKeisei Railway interurban company. Theinterurban companies have built sportsstadiums strategically located so sports fansmust ride their trains to reach the games, andthey own their own baseball teams. Of thetwelve major league Japanese baseballteams, five are owned by interurbancompanies: Seibu [Railway] Lions, Hankyu[Railway] Braves, Kintetsu [Kinki NipponRailway] Buffaloes, and Nankai [Railway]Hawks in the Pacific League, and Hanshin[Railway] Tigers in the Central League.

In retailing, they have ventured into non-traditional transport businesses such assmall stores (like florists), at one extreme,and into shopping malls at the otherextreme. Many of the nation's majordepartment store chains are owned by theinterurbans, and their principal stores oftenserve also as the main railway terminal.Takamatsu-Kotohira Electric RailwayCompany on the island of Shikokuoperates a major chain of supermarkets,with the stores alongside stations. Noticethat in addition to making a profitthemselves, all of these non-transitventures are expected to generate travel onthe interurbans. The interurbans haveexpanded their activity to hotels, includingmajor chains and overseas locations. Theinterurban companies are also involved inplanned communities and new-towndevelopment. Some build their ownrolling stock, and a several sell theirproducts to other railways in Japan and


abroad. Hence, there is no need for publicsubsidy of these private railways.

These joint business arrangements amongthe interurbans and other Japanese railwaysare uncommon in North America where,for anti-trust reasons or profit motives,real-estate/land development and publictransportation were separated over the pastsix decades. Attempting to preservethemselves, and in the face of real-estatetaxes, U.S. railroads divested themselves ofreal estate at the very time Japaneserailways were continuing theseinvestments. In separating transport fromnon-transport, freight from passenger, andrailroad from rail transit, the climate forjoint ventures, much less joint use of trackand facilities, diminished.

The interurban railways range from vastand modern (e.g., the Tobu Railway with293 miles of line and 1,951 units of motivepower and rolling stock) to small andquaint (e.g., the 2.6-mile Kambara Railwaywith only a few cars).

8.2.4 Japanese Third-Sector Railways

The Third-Sector railway, a relatively-newform of railway corporate entity is notexclusive to any one rail mode, ortransportation or economic developmententerprise. There are over 5,400 thirdsector (Daisan) ventures of all types inJapan, representing over $10 billion ininvestment. It is explained to helpunderstand the nature of this increasinglypopular railway organization.Understanding Third-Sector railways isvital because these type railways areprincipal participants in joint use oftrack/reciprocal running in Japan. Thereare no examples of such entities in theU.S., although their formation has beenpromoted indirectly by encouragingprivate-sector participation and jointpublic/ private ventures. Various state andlocal legislative bodies are making orconsidering legislation that will enabletransportation entities to employ joint

ventures as a means to bring about newfacilities or services. In some ways, super-turnkey projects embrace some Third-Sector characteristics. The third sectorrailway's closest equivalents are the newLRT DBOM ventures in the U.S. Themanner and extent to which they have beenused in Japan to affordably restore failingor discontinued passenger railroad servicesand to establish new rail lines has potentialapplication on such entities in NorthAmerica. It is no coincidence that Third-Sector railways, joint ventures, and sharedtrack appear to be related.

Accompanying the breakup of the JapaneseNational Railways (JNR) into the JapanRail Group was the selective screening outof "unproductive" branch lines and thediscontinuance of construction (most ofwhich had long been dormant anyway) ofnew lines. Arrangements were promulgatedto make these facilities available to otherexisting or new operators. Because muchof the service on these low-densitycandidates for discontinuance was regardedas vital to regions or municipalities,various levels of local government steppedforward to rescue lines, usually in jointventures with private investors. Facilitiesor services that did not suit national orlarge-scale priorities were often importantto the locales they served.

The disposition of branch lines by Class 1railroads to local county economicdevelopment agencies, councils ofgovernment, and their contracting withprivate short-line railroad operators is aprocess paralleling Third-Sector formationin Japan. A major difference is that thebranch lines in the U.S. provided freightservice while the Japanese lines werepredominantly for passengers.Technically, there already were third-sector railways in Japan, but they were notseparately categorized. They weregrouped with the private railways. Thecasting off of certain lines as part of thecreation of the new Japan Rail group of


railways, however, was an inducement tothe quick formation of a multitude of suchrailway ventures and the "Third Sector"term was introduced.

Previously, Japanese railways wereseparated into two general groups:Kokutetsu or JNR (i.e., the "first-sector")and shitetsu or "private railway" (hence,the "second-sector"). In Japanese railwaylexicon, "private" does not necessarilydenote exclusive private sector ownership.The term encompasses all railways otherthan JNR, including municipally ownedand operated rapid transit and streetrailway systems. For this new wave of jointmunicipal/private-enterprise railwayventures the term Daisan Sekuta (i.e.,"Third Sector") was introduced. The Third-Sector pattern followed by Japan is verysimilar to many of the smaller railways ofSwitzerland which are owned jointly bycorporations and cantons or municipalities.Absent prohibitions, this process initiatesand happens from the bottom up ratherthan being prescribed by the nationalgovernment.

The municipal investors in these thirdsector railways include villages, towns,cities, counties, and prefectures. Theprivate investors range widely frominterested individuals to corporationsformed expressly for the purpose. Somealso include shippers and existing privaterailway companies.

Some are bold ventures of heavy publicfinancing with goals of opening newterritory for development – both on a cityscale, such as the tunneled HokushinExpress Railway in Kobe, and on aregional scale, such as the Yagan Railwayinto the isolated interior of Honshu Islandnorth of Tokyo. Typically, the Third-Sector railways are single lines. Mostoften, they are on the fringe ofurbanization or in rural areas. This stemsfrom their heritage as cast-off JapaneseNational Railways branch lines.

Japanese branch line railways arecommonly picturesque and endowed withunique local character. How are Third-Sector railways financially self-sufficient?The basis for assuming operation of a JNRfinancial loser and making it financiallyviable local operation required lower thanJNR wage rates, part-time employees, andvolunteer marketing efforts. The railwaysemploy retired JNR employees asdispatchers and train operators, housewivesas ticket collectors at stations, and teenagestudents for station maintenance work. Theservice areas are saturated withpromotional literature aimed at gainingmore use of the railway.

Other Third-Sector projects whichcomplete unfinished JNR lines or buildanew are high-quality facilities with first-class rolling stock and modern operatingpractices. These usually have theprefecture within which they occur as aparticipant, and are pursued for the purposeof opening new territory for economicdevelopment. Without exception, thesehave become significant partners inreciprocal running arrangements.

While the foregoing characteristics typifythe Third-Sector Railways, there is morevariety than can be portrayed here. Theirscope and variety could justify a separateresearch effort. Some of these newrailways are profitable even at prevailingJapan Rail or transit authority wage rates.Some are not at all modestly capitalized,but have made enormous capitalinvestments which must be repaidessentially through the farebox.

Third-Sector railway practices that areperforming financially superior to theformer JNR operation include thewidespread use of diesel railbuses, whichcost little more to purchase and no more torun than highway buses, wan-man ("one-man") operation – dispensing withconductors and placing fare-collectionapparatus within view of the engineer/motorperson, and elimination of staff at


stations other than at crew operatingpoints. The national government and theJNR holding companies have been helpful,too. Many of the rights-of-way andphysical plant remain in national-government/JNR ownership and are madeavailable at little or no charge, therebyreducing the debt incurred locally to takeover a railway. Surplus JNR rolling stock –usually diesel multiple-unit (DMU)railroad cars (comparable to TCRP A-17Category 1 DMUs) – have been madeavailable for rebuilding (or at leastrepainting) to provide initial service whilereplacement railbuses are beingmanufactured. Because the service islocally, or regionally regarded as essentialthough not profitable, local subsidies keepthe trains running. Because the localgovernments are part-owners, there is notthe American-style concern for puttingpublic tax money into the hands of privateoperators. Early results in convertingformer JNR lines to Third Sector Railwaysshow an increase in farebox recovery ratesfrom 10-or-20% to 70-to-more-than-100%,thus demonstrating that railways can bebasically economical, with ingenuity andenthusiasm packaged in locally/regionally-fashioned institutions.

The emergence of this new category ofrailway in Japan has caused a renaissance forthe manufacture of railbuses. Thecharacteristics of these new Third-Sectorrailways has placed new expectations onrailbus design, construction, andperformance. Third-Sector railways aredistributed throughout the nation. They areoften operated and maintained by relativenovices, who have neither spacious shopsnor sophisticated tools. Their operatingrequirements are seldom for more than twoto five vehicles. The challenge tomanufacturers of these versatile, economical,reliable vehicles is to fill very small ordersand to maintain parts inventories.

By January 1, 1998, there were 54 Third-Sector companies operating intercity,

commuter/suburban, interurban, heavyrapid transit, or light-rail transit railservices. Nine others operate monorail-ways, people-movers, or funiculars.

8.2.5 Japanese Diesel Railbuses

If the Third-Sector is a prime practitionerof joint track use, then the diesel railbus isa major tool in implementing joint trackuse on a local scale.

A principal item of motive power/rollingstock employed throughout Japan ininstances of joint-use of track/reciprocalrunning is the railbus. Railbuses were usedin Japan as early as they were found acrossthe United States. They disappeared here,and they nearly disappeared in Japan.There was a momentary resurgencefollowing World War II in light-weightrailcars, including railbuses, even in theU.S. The vehicle, however, did not reallycome into broader use until the advent ofthe Third Sector railway. This parallels thepopularity of these vehicles, calledSchienenbusse, in Germany. Suddenly,Third-Sector railways needed affordablerail vehicles that could be operated andmaintained by semi-skilled neo-railroadersand would be dependable, economical, andefficient. Their rapid deployment results intheir use now by all six of the regionalJapan Rail Group corporations, 18 privaterailway companies (including someinterurbans), and 34 of the Third-Sectorrailways. This represents 37½% of allrailroad ventures in Japan.

Japanese, like Europeans, tend not tocategorize and separate their rail modes,such as high-speed rail, intercity rail,commuter rail, heavy rapid transit, lightrail transit, and street railway. These are alljust "rail," the only distinction being if theyare electrically propelled. The one worddensha ("electric car") applies toeverything from streetcars to the high-speed 16-car Shinkansen trains. While theterm "DMU" (diesel multiple-unit) isinternationally recognized, including in


Japan, the general reference to the topicalvehicles is rerubasu (railbus), althoughdeizeruka (diesel car) is common. They arenot called DMUs or diesel LRVs in Japan.Distinction between railroad DMU(Category 1) and rail transit railbuses(Category 2) is blurred in Japan.

It is, however, their combination of lightweight and short length that distinguishesthe Japanese railbuses as the smallestamong other self-propelled rail-boundconveyances. The conventional dieselmultiple-unit (DMU), of which there arethousands in Japan, are typically of 21,500mm (70'7") length and are powered byunderfloor pancake or side-mountedengines – somewhat comparable to thevenerable Budd Rail Diesel Car (RDC).Railbuses are shorter than DMUs andemploy smaller engines, all evolved frombus and coach technology. They would beconsidered FRA non-compliant in the U.S.

The first of the new generation of railbusesused conventional bus bodies. Then,reacting to customer comment,manufacturers made the bodies wider andlonger than would be suitable for ahighway vehicle, and evolved the vehicleinto a better-riding double-truck versionrather than the two-axle version.

In the rapid but intermittent evolution frombuses on rails to small railroad coaches, asignificant feature was the introduction oftrain doors to enable crew (and sometimespassengers) to move from car to car whenthey are coupled into trains. This featuredeprives Japanese rail-buses of theirmotor-bus appearance (see Figure 8-4a).Another significant step, less obvious, wasequipping the railbuses to operate multiple-unit with each other and with their largerDMU counterparts. This requiredupgrading the control, performance,coupler, and other mating surfaces torailroad standards. The shell and structureremained bus derivative, however. In trainwith larger DMUs, the railbuses do not

serve merely as extracapacity units at theends of trains, but in the opposite direction,they take on the important role of controlcab. The railbuses have been built inadditional variations such as married pairsand three-car train sets. Some havestreamlined ends. Some have been styledto appear as vintage trolley cars. Thoseassigned to long-distance trips areequipped with lavatories. They would notbe considered FRA-compliant in America.The Japanese railbus has become a veryversatile passenger-rail vehicle. Hence,their numbers have grown rapidly. By theend of 1997, there were more than 780 ofthese "non-compliant" railbuses operatingthroughout Japan.

The types of service in which railbuseshave found their niches are many:

! rural branch lines, including ThirdSector railways, that otherwise wouldhave been abandoned

! as means to open new rural or urbanrailway lines and serve until largercars become necessary

! urban shuttles – more effective thanshort bus trips on congested streets

! school trippers on commuter/suburban rail lines

! means of reaching parks, naturalfeatures, shrines and temples, andplaces where automobiles and othervehicular traffic might be unwelcome

! vanguard for future electrification, todevelop a ridership constituencybefore the catenary is erected

! temporary services during specialevents, world's fairs, expositions, etc.

! replacement of older DMU stock, thelarge capacity of which is not needed


Very early in the new era of railbuses inJapan, with the impetus being the smallerrailways and the third-sector movement,the Japan Rail Group found it useful andeconomical to buy their own railbuses.This is a similar circumstance to theGerman Federal Railways who, afterpermitting Karlsruhe urban light-railvehicles to venture onto its mainline/branch line rails, observed theresulting economy and bought and operatesits own LRVs to replace oldercommuter/suburban trains.

Because of the synergy with bus design,railbus manufacturers are willing to fillsmall orders for a few or only one unit. Inaddition, they are willing to tailor them toeach customer's unique needs. Therailbuses are maintained and repaired bythe individual owning railway companies.While a variety of national and local lawspertain to such matters as safety (e.g.,grade-crossing protection) andenvironmental issues, railbuses per se arenot "regulated."

The history of the modern Japanese railbusis brief. Few changes in design through theJapanese railbus' short evolution haveresulted in a record of reliability. Thenewer vehicles keep pace with advances inbus and railway technology. The use ofoff-the-shelf components contributes tofavorable maintenance experience.

Both the railbus and light DMU arederived from non-railroad vehicles; theDMU from the LRV and the railbus fromthe bus. The railbus and the light DMU(Category 2 and 3) are following separatefunctional and evolutionary courses.

Other than a temporary effort by theSapporo Municipal Transport Bureau withoperation of diesel-electric streetcars, therehas been no effort to make the railbusadopt characteristics of light-rail vehicles,nor to create a low-floor version, nor tooperate them on tracks in paved streetswith automotive traffic. Sapporo's use of

diesel-electric streetcars was a means ofextending street railway service intogrowing urbanization areas in advance oferecting trolley wire (which eventually wasdone). The cars were converted to straightelectric and in that form found their way toother street railway systems when Sappororenewed its fleet. They operated in dieselmode from 1958 to 1968, and continue in1998 running in electric mode. TheseSapporo LRVs were not dual powervehicles but were diesel-electric drive,never running off wire until theirconversion to all-electric power. There hasbeen no repeat or imitation of this specialmode, which, incidentally was neither anexperiment nor a demonstration, just afinancial and operating expedient.

Dual-power exists in the U.S., Japan, andelsewhere. In the U.S., there are severalparallels with the Japanese railbus and itsGerman counterpart, the Schienenbusse.The Mack FCD railbus on the New York,New Haven & Hartford Railroad in the1950s was most common among anotherwise rare vehicle type. Mack mated aconventional transit bus body on stockPCC-car trucks – at least two models wereproduced by Mack. Ten were built byMack's Allentown, Pennsylvania plantduring 1951-19542 and in view of therespective dates may have influenced theSapporo cars, or at least the decision tobuild them.

8.3 JOINT USE RATIONALE, THEJAPANESE EXPERIENCE

Some specific regional transportationpolicies and rationale underlie Japanesejoint-use of track experience. The TokyoTozai Line's implementation providesexamples of the rationale in practice, and issubsequently described. Purposes of joint-use of track arrangements in Japan and thePacific Rim include the followingexamples:


8.3.1 To Eliminate Transfers

! By offering a one-seat ride viacentral-city rapid transit lines insteadof having to transfer fromcommuter/suburban trains orinterurban trains at the periphery.This feature is demonstrated inmultiple instances of reciprocalrunning focused on the rapid transitnetworks of Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto,Kobe, and Fukuoka.

! By offering a one-seat ride via feederlines; Japan Rail reaches populardestinations on tracks other than itsown, such as from Tokyo to the Izupeninsula resorts over Izukyuinterurban tracks beyond Ito, or therural Wakasa Railway's railbusesover a Japan-Rail-West mainline toreach the city of Tottori.

! By running interurban trains overJapan Rail (without having to changetrains) to alternative terminals not onthe interurban system, e.g., Odakyuinterurbans running to Gotemba, theeastern gateway to Mount Fuji, onJapan Rail-East tracks.

! By allowing special train throughservice such as school trippers so thatgroups of students do not have totransfer.

! By running private branch line orsuburban trains over Japan Rail trackto reach a central city; Third-Sectorrailways running direct to the corecity instead of transferringpassengers to Japan Rail mainlinetrains.

8.3.2 To Improve Service

! By reducing travel time throughelimination of transfer and waittimes.

! By reducing terminal congestion ofboth passengers and trains.

! By overlapping passenger-trainservice both to convenientlydistribute passengers and to enablesame-platform transferring from trainto train. One transfer in any ofTokyo's Asakusa Line subwaystations, for example, allowspassengers from Yokosuka on theKeihin interurban to continue on theKeisei interurban to NaritaInternational Airport without twotransfers using an intermediatesubway train.

! By enabling special excursionservice; Nagoya Railway specialtrains from Nagoya to Tateyama onthe opposite coast, using interurbantrackage at both ends and a JapanRail-Tokai mainline between.

8.3.3 To Save Money or Better Use ExistingInfrastructure Investment

! By obviating the huge investmentneeded for duplicative large-volumecapacity.

! By exploiting the large capacity ofcity rapid transit subways (so thatsuburban trains can reach many in-city destinations without buildingredundant infrastructure).

8.3.4 To Extend Existing Services or Introduce New Services

! By extending the service of an urbansubway by using another railway'stracks (such as employed by both ofTokyo's central subway operators toreach well into the suburbs withouthaving to build extensive newinfrastructure).

! By enabling significant shortcuts forlonger-distance trains by operatingover sections of private railway orinterurban companies.


! By bringing coordinated rail servicesto major airports like NaritaInternational, New KansaiInternational, Haneda Domestic,Fukuoka International, and MiyazakiInternational. (Chitose InternationalAirport, serving Sapporo, is directlyserved by Japan Rail-Hokkaidoexpress electric suburban trains.)

8.3.5 To Support Land Use and EconomicDevelopment Initiatives

! By opening new territory fordevelopment, both in metropolitanareas by serving new-town sites, andin a broader sense, to open heretoforeinaccessible interior regions.

! By allowing continuation of localpassenger-train service on trackagetaken into the high-speed Shinkansennetwork (such as on the newerYamagata Shinkansen and AkitaShinkansen).

The reciprocal-running practice has beenspurred particularly by several recentdevelopments. One is the growing need toprovide more suburban Tokyo and Osakatrain service in order to keep abreast ofgrowing population. Another is to restoresome of the severed links resulting fromthe separation of the former government-owned Japanese National Railway intoregional Japan Rail companies, and theresulting discontinuance of numerousuneconomical (by JNR standards) branchlines. Several of these branch lines havebeen rescued by public-private Third-Sector railway ventures.

This concentration of service resultingfrom overlapping train service in Japan isresponsible in large measure for thepopularity of the individual services.

One lesson derived from Japan'sexperience with joint-use of track/reciprocal running, is that it requires

conventional dual rail technology as a base.Those cities that have chosenunconventional transit guideway systemssuch as proprietary monorailway andpeople-mover systems have, in doing so,forfeited opportunities for joint use. Inspite of two predominant track gauges,extensive reciprocal running and joint useof track prevail in Japan. In spite of a widevariety of rolling stock and traction poweroptions, Japanese transportation providersenter into agreements for joint use andcoordinated services. The attraction ofriders by the one-seat ride provided byreciprocal running/joint use of track issuperior to even the most convenienttransfer facilities.

8.4 PROBLEMS AND ISSUES THAT HADTO BE RESOLVED TO ACCOMMODATEJOINT USE

To accomplish joint-use of track, one railoperator (the tenant) has to conform withanother rail operator's (the host) physicaland operating characteristics. In reciprocalrunning, two railroad entities negotiatemutually-agreeable terms, each yielding tothe best characteristics drawn from bothparties. The initial reciprocal runningoperations in Japan caught the attention ofrailway managements and transportationplanners. As joint use results have beenpositive, risk tolerable, and mutual benefitsapparent, negotiations to form newpartnerships or expand existing ones arenot contentious.

In most instances, individual railways werebuilt and rolling stock acquired without theexpectation of ever running on othertrackage. As shared track practice spreads,it encourages more standardized equipmentamong participating carriers orderingreplacement rolling stock.

To initially implement reciprocal runningin the major-city subways, the participatingoperators agree on common standards suchas:


! rolling stock of compatibledimensions and performancecharacteristics,

! cars with identical signal/train-control apparatus,

! coordinated work and operatingrules,

! an integrated schedule, and

! divisions of responsibilities foroperating and maintenance functions,operating costs, and revenues.

Because the rapid transit configurations aremore demanding and more restrictive thanother rail modes, they tend to prevail.Following are some of the ways foundthroughout Japan to resolve problems andconcerns that were encountered, or toachieve compatibility. The subject of thisreport's first four chapters and related keyissues appears here again, this time in aJapanese context – institutional matters,operating/labor practices, physicalfacilities, motive power and rolling stock,and combined features:

8.4.1 Institutional Matters

! Japanese local government regulationprevails over alignments andoperating rights in the same mannerof local "public rights of convenienceand necessity" in the U.S. Forexample, in order for a railwaycompany incorporated in oneprefecture to extend into an adjoiningprefecture, it must alter its charter.Licensing had to be revised to enableconnecting links to be built and toallow railways to run over eachother's tracks in certain instances.

! In metropolitan Tokyo for the easternend of the Tozai Line, Teito RapidTransit Authority rights (to dobusiness) had to be extended intoadjoining Saitama prefecture.

! Cost-sharing arrangements arenegotiated. In the Tokyo rapidtransit situation, reciprocal-runningoperating entities using the TeitoRapid Transit Authority rapid transitlines lease trains to each other on aset-fee basis, necessitating a complexaccounting method. But the operatingentities using the Tokyo MunicipalTransport Bureau rapid transit lineswork out arrangements of train runsand distances designed to achieve50:50 usage, and necessitate noexchange of money. At joint stationswhere two corporate entities meet,the one with the greater amount ofbusiness operates the station and theother pays a fee. Train crewsroutinely change at these commonpoints and do not run into eachother's territory, as do the trains.Again, details of these arrangementsare set locally.

! The first of the joint-use ventureswas negotiated for reciprocal runningover the Teito Rapid TransitAuthority's Hibiya Line. It prescribedequal running lengths by through-running trains among the threeparticipating entities (Teito RapidTransit Authority, Japan Rail-East,and Tokyo Express Electric Railway,Tokyu) with no running permittedover third-party tracks. This meantthat Japan Rail could run itscommuter/suburban trains throughthe central subway, but not onwardover Tokyu tracks, and Tokyu couldrun its interurban trains through thecentral subway, but not onward overJapan Rail tracks.


This restriction was subsequentlydiscontinued as a requirement andnot applied to subsequent Tokyo areareciprocal-running projects.

! While common standards are agreedto by partners sharing track, everyarrangement is negotiated separately.There are no commonly acceptedmodel agreements. Decisions arenegotiated locally. Any commonterms, however, are carried from oldagreements to new agreementsamong existing partners rather thanrevisiting already-settled matters.

8.4.2 Operating/Labor Practices

Japan Rail had to revise some of itsoperating regulations to permit joint usewith rapid transit, railbus, and interurbanoperators. The following are examples:

! Rolling stock can be outfitted forsome alternative uses toaccommodate differing operations.For example, the Fukuoka rapidtransit is operated wanman ["one-man"]. But, its track-sharing partnerJapan Rail-Kyushu trains employ atwo-man crew (motorman andconductor). Japan Rail conductorswork through the "one-man" territoryinasmuch as the rapid transit lineprovides the only link with the city'smajor Japan Rail railroad station(Hakata) and operating headquarters.The organizations representingrailroad and rapid transit operatingemployees cooperated to reach thisarrangement.

! A significant concern which has notbeen handled in any standard fashionis the assignment of operatingemployees. Generally, the employeesof one entity do not venture onto theproperty of another, unlike the trainconsists which migrate back and

forth. Train crews change at commonstations. Station staff is comprised ofthe employees of the entity that ownsthe station. However, somereciprocal running agreements assignstation staff according to dominantusage of the facility in terms of trainruns or number of passengers.Exceptions abound. For oneexample, Abukuma Railwayinterurban operators bring their trainsinto Fukushima over the tracks ofJapan Rail-East and FukushimaTransport, possibly because of thenuisance factor of changing crewtwice over very short distances; butat the north end of AbukumaRailway, the trains that continuemany miles to Sendai change crewsat the common junction station.

8.4.3 Physical Facilities

! So as to obtain sufficient clearancesin height-restrictive structures;direct-fixation track construction tothe tunnel floor is employed (exceptwhere a subway passes underbuildings or residences). This is inlieu of conventional track needingthe added height of ballast and ties.

! Low subway clearances brought intoextensive use overhead third-rail(called "trolley bar") in lieu ofcatenary, which required too muchspace. (See also "Motive Power andRolling Stock," below.)

! System-wide communications wereinstalled with two-way radio contactbetween train operators anddispatchers and an open public-address system to communicate withpassengers in stations.


! When Ise Railway purchasedrailbuses to run over its own line, toreach the center of the city ofYokkaichi, Japan Rail-Tokairequired the railbuses to be outfittedwith the wireless ATS (automatictrain stop) that it has installed on itsnewly-electrified Kansai Main Line.

! Not formerly seen, but now quiteroutine is the passing of city subwaytrains over suburban at-grade roadcrossings. As a result, some rapidtransit equipment has been retrofittedwith skirts, fenders, or "cowcatchers." Crossing safety experiencein Japan is remarkably good. Onlines with several classes of trains,anticipators are used which providethe same warning time for slowtrains and fast trains. This serves todiscourage "beating the train to thecrossing." Japanese traffic rulesrequire automobiles, trucks, andbuses to stop at grade crossings evenif the gates are up and the lights arenot flashing. Driving in Japan is stillregarded as a privilege. It is a costlyprivilege that can be taken away forinfractions that might be regarded inNorth America as minor. If theJapanese do not obey the laws as amatter of principle, they obey themto keep their licenses.

! For 1067mm- (3'6"-) gauge OdakyuElectric Railway Companyinterurbans from Shinjuku (Tokyo)to run into the mountains over the1435mm- (4'8½"-) gauge HakoneMountain-Climbing RailwayCompany, it was necessary to lay athird running rail from Odawara toHakone-Yumoto. On this dualgaugetrack with half the trains off center,trains draw 1,500Vdc power from acommon catenary contact wire, setwithin lateral tolerances of bothcompany's pantographs.

8.4.4 Motive Power and Rolling Stock

! In the least complex situation, it hasbeen adequate to revise rulebooks toinclude the signal practices of otherrailways over which a crew mayhave to operate. But wheresophisticated systems prevail, it hasbeen necessary for the newcomerpartner to outfit its rolling stock forthe higher-grade system, lest safetybe compromised. Around Tokyo,Osaka, and Nagoya, where theinterurban companies operateespecially large fleets of cars, someeconomy has been achieved by rulingout the use of certain series of carsfrom running through on the citysubway tracks. This restrictionencompasses the fleet extremes: theoldest cars, and the luxury limitedexpress trains, which continue tooperate exclusively on the owningrailway's tracks.

! Achieving compatible electrificationschemes required that the railwaysdesign a double-sprung pantographthat exerts equal pressure on thecontact wire at low height insubways and at high height out fromunderground.

! Compatible couplers were needed inthe event that one train must pushanother in emergency. In the case ofJapan Rail-East running throughTokyo subways, these trains yieldedtheir railroad-type couplers in favorof the rapid transit-type couplers.Japan Rail elsewhere uses knuckle-type couplers with flexible cables fortrainlines and control. Rapid transitsystems use transit-type couplerswith trainlines and control contacts.


! Throughout Japan, high-stationplatforms and level boarding prevailfor all rail passenger modes exceptstreet railways. When reciprocalrunning is introduced, theparticipants have to agree to auniform car-floor level and acommon station platform height.When one of the pair of sharedfacilities is built anew, this matter istaken into account during design. Inother more common instances wheretwo existing facilities are connected,small variances are tolerated. Thereis no ADA-type minimum gaprequirement or height deviation forwheelchairs, although the railwaysvoluntarily do the best they can toaccommodate wheelchairseconomically.

! A common carbody width at silllevel was necessary for joint use.With few exceptions, all stations inJapan have high platforms. Fornarrower cars, this necessitatedwelding a plate at each door to spanthe gap to the platform of the widerrapid transit clearance line. In thecase of Nagoya Railway's light-railtransit lines radiating from Gifu, newLRVs were outfitted with aretractable plate so that they wouldnot be in the way during boardingand alighting at level boardingplatforms.

! Though uncommon, some rollingstock in Japan is capable of loadingpassengers at high (car-floor-level)station platforms and low (curb-level) platforms, as is done withrotating, folding, or retractable stepsin North America at Buffalo,Pittsburgh, and San Francisco.

! In instances of reciprocal runningusing rapid transit lines, it has beennecessary for the non-rapid transitrolling stock to have additionalmultiple side doors to assure that the

suburban trains could abide by therapid transit system's short stationdwell times and maintain jointschedules on the shared trackage.Dwell times at stations are a majorconcern of scheduling trains on shortheadways.

! Cars are equipped with end doors forevacuation in subways and tunnels.Many subway car end doors hingeoutward and down, forming steps.This feature ruled out the throughoperation of interurban streamlinerswith tapered or rounded car ends(although newer models have beendesigned with disguised end doors).(An American example from the pastis instructive: When the LehighValley Transit Company (LVT) putmodern second-hand high-speed carsfrom Ohio and Indiana interurbanlines into use on its Liberty BellLimited run, which used the third-rail-electrified tracks of the Philadelphia& Western Railway (P&W) to reachPhiladelphia, P&W required LVT toinstall end doors in the rear of the carsfor emergency evacuation. Althoughno subway was involved, P&W's longviaduct over the valley of theSchuylkill River had a catwalk ononly one side; passengers exiting aside door on the blind side wouldhave dropped directly into the River.Accordingly, it was necessary tomove the emergency doors on LVT'ssecond-hand interurbans from thesides to the rear ends.)

! The extensive use of diesel railbuseshas been introduced as a key meansof introducing joint use of trackand/or reciprocal running. In theKarlsruhe, Germany, metropolitanarea, after permitting the operationof urban dual-voltage light-railvehicles on the Deutsche Bahn AG(DBAG) tracks, the host DBAGbought a fleet of its own lower-


operating-cost LRVs to replace someof its locomotive-hauled suburbantrains. Similarly, after the railbusesproved their reliability on newJapanese Third-Sector railways, JapanRail became the owner/operator of thelargest fleet of railbuses on its ownservices. Under these businessescircumstances, issues of rolling stockcompatibility become moot for theoperator as long as their decisions fitwithin a flexible regulatory standard.

! Diesel railcars run beneath catenary,even in one of Nagoya's downtownsubways.

What appears not to have become an issuein Japan is incompatible crashworthinessof rail transit and railroad rolling stock.Over time, as life-expired rolling stock isreplaced, the rolling stock of the partners injoint use becomes similar or identical –thereby reducing or overcoming any safetyor risk concerns. Rather than rolling stockevolving to a crashworthiness or someother national standard, joint use partnersevolve their car designs toward uniformityand compatibility with the uniqueinfrastructure and market that they share.The Japanese reliance on employeediscipline and in sophisticated signal/traincontrol systems is applied to crashavoidance. As an example of Japanesepractitioner attitudes, the use of anti-climbers is not prevalent on newer rollingstock. The impact-vulnerable couplers areexpected to serve an attenuation andoverride function. No other explanation isoffered by the Japanese joint-use carrierssurveyed by this research team.

New Japan Rail railbuses are compatiblewith their larger brethren DMUs and oftenoperate multiple-unit with them, even withtheir different buffing and design strengths.Railbuses on rural lines that run on JapanRail rails to reach major cities are equippedwith conventional railroad-type knucklecouplers. The Abukuma Railwayinterurbans are equipped with the same

multiple-unit coupler as Japan Rail-East'sfleet of EMUs. The railbuses of the Kita-Kinki Tango Railway are equipped withthe same multiple-unit couplers as thehigh-speed diesel trainsets operated non-stop over this Third-Sector railway's tracksby Japan Rail-West. There are placeswhere incompatible rolling stock comesnose-to-nose, such as the end of catenaryon the Aizu Railway, where YaganRailway electric interurbans with multiple-unit couplers meet Aizu's railbuses withknuckle couplers. Ordinarily, the tworailways trade passengers at the rural end-of-wire Aizu-kogen station, by arriving anddeparting from the different sides of anisland platform. However, although theinterurbans cannot venture onto thesanscatenary diesel section, the railbusescan and do run under the catenary in theinterurban's territory.

8.4.5 Combined Features

! To bring Nagoya Railway (NagoyaTetsudo) suburban light-rail vehiclesinto downtown Gifu on one of thecompany's interurban line's privateright-of-way instead of the slowerstreet railway, it was necessary topurchase dual-voltage rolling stockcapable of operating on two catenarycontact voltages: the 600vDC of thesuburban trolley line and the1,500vDC of the interurban railway.It was also necessary to equip thesecars with folding steps so they canload passengers from the trolleyline's low platforms and from theinterurban's high platforms.

! In another through-running instance,Nagoya Railway light-rail vehiclesare equipped with both folding stepsand retractable gap fillers in order torun on an urban street railway lineand a rural interurban line with highplatforms.


Hiroshima Electric Railway solvedthis same problem by rebuilding eachsuburban station with a high sectionand a low section connected bystairs.

8.4.6 Unusual Results

Ordinarily, reciprocal running dependsupon compatible infrastructure and rollingstock. But implementation throughoutJapan has resulted in some unusuallydiverse features. The Tokyo rapid transitnetwork alone contains an unusual varietyof features. Represented are:

! three track gages: 1435mm (4'8½"),1372mm (4"6"), and 1067mm (3'6");

! two electrification contact voltages:600Vdc and 1,500Vdc;

! three means of power distribution totrains: track-level third rail, overheadthird-rail (on Eidan underground),and overhead catenary; and

! four car widths ranging from 2600mm(8'6.4") to 2865mm (9'4.9").

One observed result of widespread jointuse of track/reciprocal running in Japan'slarger urban regions is diminishingnumbers of distinctive designs, sizes, andshapes of commuter/suburban-rail, rapidtransit, and interurban trains. In developingmore common characteristics forcompatible joint operation, the operators ofcommuter trains and interurbans havetended to favor rapid transit rolling stockcharacteristics (though not necessarilystandards). Except for color schemes,logos, and some leeway in styling, thetrains look increasingly similar. Outsidethe city rapid transit territory, however,shared trackage still carries a broad varietyof rolling stock. The interurban companiesstill run unique streamliners side-by-sidewith the rapid-transit-like trains, using theiroriginal terminals instead of runningthrough the subways, where they are

unwelcome without end doors and othersafety modifications. Japan Rail likewiseoperates unique trains of attractive stylingon its own parallel tracks. As might beexpected in any evolution of this sort, thecity rapid transit trains are taking on amore modern appearance inherited fromthe more-style-aggressive interurbancompanies.

While not a commonly regarded attributeof joint running in Japan, selectivestandardization has evolved on Japaneserailways which share facilities and rollingstock.

8.5. CASE STUDY SELECTION

Purpose: "To arrive at the few best andmost applicable (to North America)examples of joint use in Japan, compilematrices identifying such factors as: trackgauge compatible with freight service;national, private/municipal, or join

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