Chapter 7 Case Study – Sydney’s Water System

Chapter 7 – Case Study : Sydney’s Water System…

Chapter 7 : Case Study – Sydney’s Water System

7.1 Introduction The purpose of the case study is to consider and test three key propositions of this thesis

in the context of a real problem situation. First is to demonstrate that the problem

typology described in Chapter 3, regarding the Type 3 problem, can be identified and,

importantly, that there is value in recognising this type of problem. Second is to

demonstrate the benefit of using the problem-structuring approach developed in Chapter

6, through its practical application to a real Type 3 problem. In this case the problem is

consideration of the planning process for the development of the water supply system in

a large metropolis (the metropolis being Sydney, Australia). And third is to compare this

novel approach with established methodologies used in major planning initiatives to

determine whether the problem-structuring approach developed here provides any

clearly identifiable advantages over existing approaches. If so, the aim is then to propose

a more comprehensive, effective approach to the process of major infrastructure

planning.

In order to achieve these three aims, the case study is presented in two distinct parts:

first, is the application of the problem-structuring approach prospectively in order to guide

the planning process; and second, is to use the problem-structuring approach retrospectively

to critique alternative approaches.

7.2 Case Study structure Part A is a prospective application of the problem-structuring approach in its entirety.

This part of the case study was based on a project managed by the Warren Centre for

Advanced Engineering at the University of Sydney. The project focuses on options for

developing the water system for the metropolis of Sydney, Australia. Both the system

(the greater metropolis of Sydney) and the relevant subsystem (the metropolitan water

system) were defined. The boundaries of the system were examined and tested using a

boundary critique process. Once the system definition was completed, a comprehensive

(but preliminary) narrative was prepared to give the reader the background to the

problem situation and, importantly, to develop the argument that the problem in

question is, indeed, a Type 3 problem. A qualitative, multidimensional system model was

prepared, using the trilemma systems mapping approach developed in Chapter 6. Then,

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the response of the model to a plausible, hypothetical disturbance was explored. Critique

of the system model was carried out by a large group of participants, representative of

the entire domain of interests. A number of narratives was prepared, reflecting different

perspectives and worldviews of the domain interests.

Part A is intended to address the first two propositions noted above: namely, to establish

that the Type 3 problem typology exists and to demonstrate practical application of the

problem-structuring approach by developing a system model for the Type 3 problem as a

starting point for formalised (and accepted) decision analysis techniques.

Part B achieves the third aim of the case study in comparing this approach with

established methodologies. In addition, it demonstrates a further important application

of the approach. Having developed a robust system model of the problem, this was used

retrospectively to critique other established approaches to strategic planning. In this case,

the system model developed in Part A was used to critically examine a major planning

exercise, which was undertaken by the New South Wales (NSW) State Government to

plan urban and major infrastructure development. The outcome of this examination

confirmed the extensive criticism in the media, in Parliamentary debate, and by the NSW

Ombudsman of the approach taken by the government.

7.3 Case Study: Part A – The Sydney Metropolitan Water System Analysis 7.3.1 The Warren Centre “Metropolitan Water Options” project 7.3.1.1 Project Background In September 2004, a panel discussion was presented at the Engineering Leadership 2004

conference in Sydney, in which the author participated. The subject of this discussion

was the leadership role of engineers in identifying good solutions to the very complex

socio-economic-technical problems which confront modern society. The challenges

relating to a sustainable water supply for metropolitan Sydney was used as an example.

One conclusion reached from the case study and panel discussion was that it is no longer

enough for engineers simply to practise their discipline; rather they need to engage with

the problem in a broader sense: as citizens. This conclusion led the author to reflect

upon whether a new set of philosophical principles for engineering practice would be

required to enable such a change to be affected.

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After the conference, the author convened a meeting of representatives of three

institutions, the Warren Centre for Advanced Engineering at the University of Sydney,

Engineers Australia (EA), and the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and

Engineering (ATSE). The purpose of this meeting was to determine whether there was

interest in establishing a project with two aims: first, to engage the broader community

on the complexities of Sydney’s water system; and, second, to provide a white paper

which might be used by various groups as a reference for policy-making. After several

meetings, the Warren Centre agreed to manage the project within its portfolio, and EA,

and ATSE agreed to provide in-kind support for the project. Later, the Nature

Conservation Council of NSW also formally became a supporter of the project.

7.3.1.2 Project Vision The vision for the project was to engage a diverse, representative group of citizens from

the Sydney community, with both interest and expertise in issues relating to Sydney’s

water system, and a desire to communicate with a broader Sydney community. The main

focus of the project would be to develop a methodology which would facilitate

engagement of a very diverse group of interests and to prepare a comprehensive set of

documents as a means of informing the broader community. It was envisioned that this

would culminate in a forum, open to the general public, at which this material would be

criticised and debated. More precisely, the project had three aims:

1. Using metropolitan Sydney as a detailed case study, make specific but wide-

ranging recommendations to resolve the current problems with the water system;

2. Develop a methodology that can be applied to any metropolitan water system;

and

3. Explore ways in which highly complex, infrastructure problems, such as water,

energy, resource development, etc might be approached generally.

The outcome of the entire process would be summarised in a report which would be

submitted the NSW State government, with the expectation that this would influence

policy development.

The steering committee, co-chaired by a director of the Warren Centre and by the

author, agreed that the project would be approached in two stages. The first stage would

be to assemble a group of volunteers to work on the project and, concurrently, to seek

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funding from the Federal and State governments, corporations, industry associations, and

not-for-profit organisations. This group would structure the problem in order to define

the major issues, to engage with a wide representation from the domain of interests, and

to prepare an initial system model to be used in wider community engagement. The

second stage would be widespread community consultation, culminating in the public

conference. The case study presented here covers the initial, problem-structuring stage

of the project; that is up to the conclusion of Stage 1.

7.3.2 Using the problem-structuring approach as the basis for project engagement

In this part of the case study, the problem-structuring approach will be demonstrated in

its application as the basis for the Warren Centre project methodology. As noted above,

this project tackled the challenge facing the metropolis of Sydney, Australia, in

developing a sustainable water system. Considered here are the catchment (including

technologies such as desalination), storage, distribution, demand management, sewerage,

stormwater drainage, effluent management, recycling and water-borne waste disposal.

The general problem-structuring approach is represented diagrammatically in Figure 7.1

and a step-by-step description of the process appears in Appendix 7.1.

7.3.3 Initial problem statement The problem is stated as follows:

“The challenge of providing a sustainable water system for the

metropolis of Sydney”.

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Figure 7.1 – The problem-structuring approach

Problem-Structuring Approach

Background narrative to establish/confirm problem typology

Proposition of problem system

System/sub-system definition and boundary critique

Trilemma analysis and multidimensional cognitive mapping of the “As Is” system

"As-Is“ dimensional/system critique

Disturbance

Dimensional/system critique of”Most Likely” system response

Dimensional/system critique of“Desirable Future” system response

Worldview narratives

Broad engagement with constituency of interests

Qualitative evaluation system response

Scope of Case Study

Figure 7.1 – The problem-structuring approach







Disturbance






Scope of Case Study







Disturbance












Disturbance






Scope of Case Study

7.3.4 Proposition of problem system 7.3.4.1 System/subsystem definition The system is defined as being the metropolitan area of Sydney, including its current and

future water sources. In geographic terms, the system is the metropolitan area, plus

existing and proposed catchments. As will be shown in the next section, definition of

the system boundary is an important step to identify and to consider a broad range of

social, economic, and technological issues embodied in the problem definition.

Within the Sydney metropolitan system, the water subsystem is defined as being the

infrastructure and institutional arrangements necessary to capture, store and distribute

water (including demand management), to remove and treat effluent and stormwater

(including recycling), and to dispose of water-borne waste. Definition of the physical

system is straightforward and requires little more description than noted above.

However, determining the boundaries of the greater, non-physical system, that is, to

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identify what other aspects should be included in the system model, such as, for example,

societal, moral, and environmental issues requires further consideration. The process of

boundary critique is used to facilitate this and is described in the next section. The system

concept map is shown in Figure 7.2:

Figure 7.2 – Concept map of metropolitan system and water subsystem

SystemSystemMetropolitan SystemMetropolitan System

Outer boundary

Inner boundary

Area for system boundary critique

SystemElement

SystemElement

SystemElement

SystemElement

SystemElement

SystemElementSystem

Element

Water Sub-System

Water Sub-System

Sub-system outer boundary

Sub-system inner boundary Area for sub-system

boundary critique

Figure 7.2 – Concept map of metropolitan system and water subsystem


Outer boundary

Inner boundary


SystemElement

SystemElement

SystemElement

SystemElement

SystemElement

SystemElementSystem

Element

Water Sub-System

Water Sub-System



boundary critique


Outer boundary

Inner boundary


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boundary critique

7.3.5 Boundary critique The boundary critique approach used here follows the thinking of Ulrich (1987).

Generally, the concepts developed here of “As-Is” and “Desirable Future” system states

align well with Ulrich’s critical approach. However, Ulrich’s Habermasian emancipatory

stance was anthropocentric (presumably largely deriving from his interest in social

systems). This is appropriate if one’s worldview leads to a sustainable development

approach but, as discussed extensively in Chapter 2, in the sustainability discourse, the

monist “sustainability” worldview must also be acknowledged. Consequently, Ulrich’s

boundary critique methodology has been modified somewhat to accommodate this

perspective.

The boundary critique process complements the definition of the boundaries of the

metropolitan system and water subsystem, both in their physical and non-physical senses.

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The process transparently identifies what is to be included within the domain of interests

and represented in the system model. The critique is undertaken twice: first, to

determine the boundary of the metropolitan system; and second, to identify the

boundary of the water subsystem. In both cases, the process is the same: the “As-Is”

and “Desirable Future” system states are considered in the context of 12 questions

(developed from Ulrich’s process). These questions are:

1. Who is the beneficiary of the system (S)?

2. What is the purpose of S, i.e., what goal states is S able to achieve so as to serve

the beneficiary?

3. What is S’s measure of success (or improvement)?

4. Who is the decision-maker, i.e., has the power to change S’s measure of

improvement?

5. What components (resources and constraints) of S are controlled by the decision-

maker?

6. What aspects of the problem are part of S’s environment, i.e., are controlled by S’s

decision-maker?

7. Who is involved as designer of S?

8. What kind of expertise does flow into the design of S, i.e., who is considered an

expert and what is his/her role?

9. Who is the guarantor of S, i.e., where does the designer seek the guarantee that

his/her design will be implemented and will prove successful, judged by S’s

measure of success (or improvement)?

10. Who is the witness representing the moral interests that will or might be affected

by the design of S? That is, who among the affected does get involved?

11. To what degree and in what way are those affected given the chance of

emancipation from the premises and promises of those involved?

12. Upon what worldviews of either those involved or those affected is S’s design

based?

These questions seek to understand sources of motivation, sources of control, sources of

expertise, and sources of legitimation. As each question is considered twice, first in the

context of the “As-Is” system state (denoted by italicised verbs in the questions above)

and then considering the “Desirable Future” (denoted by changing the italicised verbs in

the questions above express the notion of “ought”). The responses which emerge may be

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examined critically to determine what should be included and excluded, and what should

be identified for consideration at the margins of the system and subsystem boundaries.

A concise statement of the boundary critique appears in the next two sections and the

full detail appears in Appendix 7.2.

7.3.5.1 The metropolitan system boundary critique The physical metropolitan system boundary is defined as being the greater Sydney

metropolitan area, plus current and future water catchments and resources89.

The boundary critique arrives at a consideration of the metropolitan system as being a

human social system, which exists for the benefit of its constituents. The aim is for a

sustainable metropolis having long-term prosperity, without compromising other moral

interests. It is recognised that there is a substantial difficulty in identifying appropriate

indicators that represent both the prosperity of the metropolis and the interests of other

non-human constituents. This suggests that a range of both quantitative and qualitative

indicators is required (for example, Palme and Tillman (2007)). Sydney is both socially

stable and prosperous, but there is ongoing dissatisfaction with the way in which the

growth of the metropolitan area and its impact on the environment are being handled

both by NSW and Federal government authorities. Many members of the domain of

interests are excluded from the decision-making process and lack influence in policy

outcomes, particularly those relating to the development of social and service

infrastructure. Thus, a substantial challenge for policymakers is to take into account the

important perspectives representative of all interests in the problem, in order to arrive at

an informed, responsible path to metropolitan development. There is a pervasive

societal cynicism that political processes are unnecessarily secretive and exclusive, and

that broader consultation with the community is desirable. This process of consultation

should include a broad range of institutions and other representatives, bringing an

informed position on the sustainability discourse, so that when policy is finally

determined, it properly reflects the interests of the entire domain of interests. The

current NSW government position is one of “sustainable development”, where human

interests are placed above those of the others with moral status within the domain.

89 Note that this extends beyond the ocean shoreline to include discharge points for sewage and the areas

affected by it, together with environmental impact of potential desalination options.

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7.3.5.2 The water subsystem boundary critique The physical water subsystem is bounded by the catchment, storage, distribution and

logistics, demand management, recycling, sewage and stormwater removal and treatment,

and waterborne disease disposal infrastructure, together with the resources and

institutions required to construct, operate, and maintain them. The water subsystem

exists to support the development of the metropolis of Sydney. However, there is a

widely-held view that the subsystem should be developed in such a way that it does not

compromise the interests or well being of other species or ecosystems. A range of both

qualitative and quantitative indicators needs to be developed to fully represent the

integral nature of both the metropolitan system and the water subsystem. This should

take into account of the full spectrum of interests within the domain. Current

governance arrangements regarding the water subsystem are heavily politicised and

would benefit from greater independence. The politicisation of the water issue has

constrained the planning and design process, and has largely excluded the involvement of

the community and broader moral interests. There should be more rigorous consultation

and engagement early in the planning process, in order to identify and engage the full

domain of interests, which must be acknowledged and responded to within the water

subsystem.

For the last 150 years, the predominant influence on design of the water subsystem has

been the various disciplines of engineering. Reliance on the purely engineering approach

has constrained the introduction of innovative solutions which could be more beneficial

to the broad domain of interests. This suggests that the purely technical engineering

paradigm should be modified to include non-engineering input. Responsibility for the

water subsystem is with the State government of NSW, which should employ greater use

of consultative processes to extend democratic participation and government

accountability. This should include representation of all moral interests, including non-

human interests, affected by the development and design of the water subsystem.

7.3.5.3 Integrating the boundary critique into project management structure The steering committee (under the co-leadership of the author) identified eight

dimensions of similarity to be used to group interests and areas of information identified

in the boundary critique. These were: Political; Regulatory; Institutional; Economic;

Health; Environmental; Social/Community; and Technological. Six of these (the

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exception being “Health”) were drawn from well-established business strategic planning

processes, familiar to a number of the steering committee members.

It was agreed that because the main focus of the project was on the water subsystem, the

Technological aspects would be considered by developing a model of a water subsystem

with four dimensions of its own: Sources; Demand/Usage; Reuse; and Disposal, as these

covered the complete water cycle. Issues identified in the water subsystem would be

mapped against the seven metropolitan systems dimensions, with this analysis being done

by a total of eleven teams, each working on one of the system or subsystem dimensions,

as shown in Figure 7.3.

Political

Regulatory

Institutional

Economic

Health

Environmental

Social/Community

Technological

Steering Committee

Met

ropo

litan

Sys

tem

Dim

ensi

ons

Water Sub-System Elements

Management Team

Sources Storage/Distribution

Demand/Re-Use

Treatment/Disposal

Figure 7.3 - Metropolitan Water Options Project Structure

Political

Regulatory

Institutional

Economic

Health

Environmental

Social/Community

Technological

Steering Committee

Met

ropo

litan

Sys

tem

Dim

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Management Team


Demand/Re-Use

Treatment/Disposal

Political

Regulatory

Institutional

Economic

Health

Environmental

Social/Community

Technological

Steering Committee

Met

ropo

litan

Sys

tem

Dim

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Management Team


Demand/Re-Use

Treatment/Disposal

Figure 7.3 - Metropolitan Water Options Project Structure

Ten teams (Regulatory and Institutional issues being considered by one team) were

constituted, with diverse membership from local government, community groups, law,

politics, economics, health services, environmental groups etc. Project participants were

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identified by steering committee members as having particular expertise in one or more

of the problem dimensions, either due to their professional expertise or personal

involvement in the issues. See Tables 7.1 (below) and 7.2 (overleaf).

TEAM LEADER

TYPICAL EXPERIENCE OF TEAM MEMBERS

POLITICS TEAM Consultant (water industry)

Politician; engineer/businessman

REGULATORY/INSTITUTIONAL TEAM Lawyer

Academic; municipal council professional officer

ECONOMIC TEAM Economist (public sector) Commercial property management professional;

economist; academic.

ENVIRONMENT TEAM Academic/professional environmentalist

Soil conservationist; academic/conservationist; conservation NGO professional officer; catchment management authority board member; municipal council water management officer; academic environmentalist; community environmental representative; professional officer, water supply authority.

COMMUNITY TEAM Academic Environmental educationalist; municipal council; nature

conservationist; catchment education official; municipal council environmental officer; academic; science teacher; social services professionals; and environmentalists; ecological engineer; public servant (public works department); public servant (energy and sustainability; environmental NGO professional officer.

HEALTH TEAM Public health medical officer

Table 7.1 – Metropolitan System Teams

The project teams met over a period of several months from December 2005 to May

2006. Each project team leader was a member of the steering committee and involved in

developing the project methodology and facilitating use of the problem-structuring

approach to guide the team’s consideration of the problem.

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TEAM LEADER

TYPICAL EXPERIENCE OF TEAM MEMBERS

SOURCES TEAM Academic (water industry expertise)

Professional engineer (energy/water expertise); senior public servant (engineer/dam management expertise); municipal council officer.

LOGISTICS TEAM Environmental engineer Professional engineers (3) from firms consulting to the

water industry. USES AND DEMAND TEAM Professional engineer (water expertise)

Water industry association executive; consultant engineers (4); senior public servant (engineer/water background).

TREATMENT AND DISPOSAL TEAM Environmental engineer Environmental engineer; academic (water system

expertise); consultant engineer. Table 7.2 – Water Subsystem Teams

7.3.6 Confirmation of problem typology In order to establish the problem typology and to provide the participants in the project

with a comprehensive background of the way in which Sydney’s water supply developed

since European settlement in 1788, a historical narrative was developed by the author.

The narrative describes the development of the institutions responsible for the water

supply, sewerage, and drainage of metropolitan Sydney from the first days of white

settlement in the late 18th century through to the present day. From about 1875 until

the 1980s, engineering practice was the predominant influence over the evolution and

operation of these institutions. It is argued that the development of Sydney’s water

system was largely successful and acceptable to society as long as the underlying

philosophical principles of engineering practice, which formed in the second half of the

19th century, were broadly consistent with the worldview predominant in the

community. Starting in the 1960s, these began to diverge: engineering continued to be

based on an instrumentalist, positivist philosophy, whereas the influence of late

modernist thinking, critical theory, and postmodernism became more pervasive in the

general community90. At this time, reflective of this change in community values, there

was a collapse in confidence in many of the technologically-focused disciplines.

90 This is not a phenomenon exclusive to the practice of engineering and its relationship with society as a

whole. Indeed, as argued in Chapter 3, the area of operational research was one of the first to identify the sea-change in community worldviews.

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Concerns emerged regarding the long-term sustainability of the modern phenomenon,

with particular emphasis on ecological impact and the social issues regarding the long-

term consequences of technology, industry, and urbanisation. The narrative concludes

that in the last 20 years or so, the situation has now come to be manifested as a Type 3

problem. There are widely differing stakeholder views and values, increasing political

secrecy and coerciveness, ineffectual governance arrangements, and shifts in institutional

power. In addition, the lack of community involvement, and the broadening of the

domain of interests to include non-human species, riparian health and ecological impact

have emerged as major concerns. (The complete narrative appears in Appendix 7.3.)

7.3.7 Development of the qualitative system model The model which was developed for the project was to consider the metropolis as being

an open, dynamic, complex social system, with a water subsystem, which gathers, stores,

distributes, recycles, and disposes of water and effluent.

The metropolitan system was described as a set of interacting system elements in which

the water subsystem sits, both influencing and being influenced by interaction with other

system elements, as shown in Figure 7.4 (overleaf).

The system elements were represented by seven trilemmas. Each of these trilemmas

(and the relationships which exist between them) could be investigated over the eight

system dimensions and the four subsystem dimensions identified in section 7.3.5.3.

A first draft of the trilemma analysis was developed by the author and reviewed and

discussed by the project management team to arrive at a more comprehensive document

for critique by the steering committee. The elapsed time for conducting the analysis was

about three months, with four, informal three-hour working sessions by members of the

project management team. In addition there were two three-hour workshops in which

the entire steering committee participated. Six months after the formal commencement

of the project, a forum was held at which representatives from each of the teams

presented the results of their consideration91. A “straw proposal” narrative was prepared

by the project management team as a starting point for the forum discussions. The

91 The elapsed time for this stage of the project could have been shortened if professional facilitation had

been used. Progress was slower than might have been the case because project team members contributed voluntarily from their own personal time.

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results of this forum concluded Stage 1 of the project and formed the basis of the interim

report back to the project sponsors.

Metropolitan SystemMetropolitan System

Water Sub-System

Water Sub-System

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Figure 7.4 – The Sydney metropolitan system and water sub-system

7.3.7.1 Trilemma System Mapping The process of identifying and developing the trilemmas was as follows:

1. Issue Identification and Brainstorming – A brainstorming session was held with

members of the project management team to identify as many of the influential issues as

possible. This commenced with the consideration of the high-level situational issues

influencing Sydney’s water system. These are the major issues of the problem

environment or context (see Figure 7.5). Following this, significant forces at play in the

system were identified (for an extract of these, see Figure 7.6). This process took place in

a three-hour workshop. The author then analysed the output from the brainstorming

session and constructed the seven trilemmas.

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Figure 7.5 – Starting-point issues for trilemma analysis

Climate change and weather

variability

"Triple Bottom-Line" –economic/environmental/social (is this a trilemma

in itself?)

Single, simple, central system vs.

decentralised, local, small,

complex system

Government and NGOs vs. technology

Business models for water supply

Health risk trade-off vs.

recycling

Retrofit vs. greenfield

Enabling technologies to permit reform of

integration and energy and water systems

Free Market vs. monopoly –

market participation

Science vs. pseudo-science

Belief vs. Science Science vs.

Uncertainty

Acceptance of change vs.

Resistance to change

Sydney’s water – situational issues – a starting point…

Figure 7.5 – Starting-point issues for trilemma analysis


variability


in itself?)



complex system




recycling








Uncertainty





variability


in itself?)



complex system




recycling








Uncertainty




Figure 7.6 – Summary a brainstorming session output

Health Risk ↔ Recycling

Change Acceptance ↔ Change Aversion

High Rainfall ↔ Low Rainfall Enabling Technology ↔ Politics

Public Ownership ↔ Private Ownership

Community Concern ↔ Technological Influence

Greenfield ↔ BrownfieldFree Market ↔ Monopoly

Political Self-Interest ↔ Community Concern

Centralised ↔ Decentralised

Regulation ↔ Monopoly

Media Influence ↔ Politics

Vested Interests ↔ Community Engagement

Opinion Leaders ↔ Community EngagementOpinion Leaders ↔ Politics

Free-market Capitalism ↔ Big Government

Vested Interests ↔ Community Interests

Economics ↔ Environmental Concern

Legal Activism ↔ Politics

Legal Activism ↔ Corporate Governance

Population Growth ↔ Population DeclineHigh Energy Cost ↔ Low Energy Cost

Identify the dichotomies…

Political Self-Interest ↔Technological Influence

Figure 7.6 – Summary a brainstorming session output

Health Risk ↔ Recycling



















Political Self-Interest ↔Technological InfluenceHealth Risk ↔ Recycling



















Political Self-Interest ↔Technological Influence

265


Trilemma Development – From the list of dichotomies which emerge from the

brainstorming session (see Figure 7.6), the underlying forces responsible for the

dichotomies were identified.

From these, seven trilemmas were identified by the author and later subjected to critique

by the steering committee. An example of the development of one of the trilemmas is

presented here. The other six trilemmas are shown completely in Appendix 7.4.To

construct the Vested Interests trilemma, three forces were identified from critical

consideration of the brainstorming output. To identify these, it is important to recognise

forces that are naturally in tension. In this case, vested interests (particularly business and

community interests) were identified to be in tension both with established political

processes and with media (particularly newspapers) seeking to influence political

processes and exploit public concerns, regarding security of water supplies. The three

forces were then represented as a triad and consideration was given to the response of the

triad under the influence of dominant forces. Once the three forces constituting the

trilemma have been identified, potential states of the system element are considered, with

each force, taken in turn, being assumed to be dominant. For example, referring to

Figure 7.7, when Politics is dominant over Vested Interests and Media Influence, the

result (represented at the bottom left vertex of the triad) is Strong Government. But

strong governments can be either utopic or dystopic. In liberal, Western, democratic

societies, the utopic image of strong government is typically considered to be one where

the government is motivated by public good. That is, it is free from the influence of

vested interests, takes a bipartisan (or multi-partisan) approach to long-term strategic

issues, and encourages a competent, largely independent bureaucracy, which both advises

on and implements public policy. On the other hand, a dystopic image of strong

government is one where sectional and vested interests remove objectivity from decision-

making. “Pork-barrelling” becomes a major influence on policy determination,

government is largely dismissive and insensitive towards community opinion and may be

unduly influenced by an interfering media. (Both the utopic and dystopic

characterisations are represented at the vertex labelled “Strong Government” in Figure

7.7.) The process is repeated to identify utopic and dystopic positions at the other two

vertices.

266


Dystopia• Weak government does not

adequately constrain interests• Solution is expensive and inefficient• Ineffective regulatory environment

Utopia• Vested interests with strong

sense of civic responsibility• Guided and constrained by

intelligent regulation• Community concerns and

perspectives sought and included in solution

Utopia• Motivated by public good, not vested

interests• Bipartisan approach to long-term

strategic issues• Competent, largely independent

bureaucracy

Dystopia• Sectional and vested interests remove

objectivity from decision-making• “Pork-barrelling” a major influence in

policy determination• Insensitive to community opinion• Public agenda driven by media

Utopia• Responsible media coverage• Well-informed, balanced

discussion• Responds to the public interest

Dystopia• Influenced by sectional interests• Politically biased• Limited public debate

Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politics Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politics

VestedInterests

Free MarketFree Market

InformedPublic

InformedPublicStrong

GovernmentStrong

Government

The Vested Interests trilemma…

Figure 7.7 – Example of trilemma – first stage of development










bureaucracy







Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politics Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politics

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government











bureaucracy







Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politics Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politics

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politics Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politics

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government


Figure 7.7 – Example of trilemma – first stage of development

The next step is to further develop the content of the trilemma by subjecting it to

critique in order to determine the “As-Is” system state. This is done by holding each

force constant in turn and exploring the influence on the system states represented at the

vertices by varying the tension between the remaining two forces. For example, in Figure

7.7, assuming the vested interests force is constant and considering the effect of varying

the influence of political processes in tension with media influence. The utopic and

dystopic positions at the “Strong Government” and “Informed Public” vertices are

thereby criticised and further developed.

In this case, critical examination of the trilemma by project team members enabled the

“As-Is” position to be identified within the triangle boundary (see Figure 7.8 overleaf).

The location of the “As-Is” symbol on the diagram simply indicates the approximate

equilibrium point of the three forces.

267


Figure 7.8 – Example of trilemma – second stage of development – “As-Is” system element state










bureaucracy







Media

Ves

ted

Inte

rest

s

Politics

Media

Ves

ted

Inte

rest

s

Politics

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

“As I

s”


Figure 7.8 – Example of trilemma – second stage of development – “As-Is” system element state










bureaucracy







Media

Ves

ted

Inte

rest

s

Politics

Media

Ves

ted

Inte

rest

s

Politics

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

“As I

s”











bureaucracy







Media

Ves

ted

Inte

rest

s

Politics

Media

Ves

ted

Inte

rest

s

Politics

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

“As I

s”


A simplified diagram can then be prepared which summarises the characteristics of the

“As-Is” state of the system element (see Figure 7.9).

Figure 7.9 – Example of trilemma – concise “As Is” system element characteristics

Characteristics of the “As Is” situation• Insensitive to public opinion.• Public agenda heavily influenced by media.• Weak government struggling to constrain private interests.

• Public suspicion of political processes.• Little well-informed, balanced discussion.• Media coverage superficial.• No bipartisan approach to long-term strategic infrastructure issues.

• Intimidated bureaucracy.• Secretive government decision-making.

Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politic

s Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politic

s

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

“As I

s”


Figure 7.9 – Example of trilemma – concise “As Is” system element characteristics




Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politic

s Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politic

s

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

“As I

s”





Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politic

s Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politic

s

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

“As I

s”


A simplified map of the seven trilemmas, which characterise the metropolitan system and

within which the water subsystem must be developed, is shown in Figure 7.10. Note that

268


the lines on the diagram indicate relationships between trilemma vertices and other

aspects of the problem system. The intention is to represent the interrelationships

between system elements, indicating the holistic nature of the system, rather than just

considering each system element in isolation.

TechnocraticTechnocratic

Engaged CommunityEngaged

CommunityCoercive Politics

Coercive Politics

CommunityConcern

Tech

nolo

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lIn

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Political

Establi

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ModernIndustrial

CommunityConcern

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ModernIndustrial“A

s Is

”TechnocraticTechnocratic



Coercive Politics

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ModernIndustrial




Coercive Politics

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s Is

”

InformedPrecautionInformed

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RationalUnderstanding


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Quality ofLife

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Healthy EcologyHealthy EcologyEfficient

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concern

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“As Is”

MonopolyMonopoly

PrivateOwnershipPrivate

OwnershipPublic Ownership

Public Ownership

Free Market

Capitalism

Cap

ital

Effic

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y

Big

Govern

ment

BusinessModel

Free Market

Capitalism

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Govern

ment

Free Market

Capitalism

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BusinessModel“A

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MonopolyMonopoly



Public Ownership

Free Market

Capitalism

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ital

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Govern

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BusinessModel

Free Market

Capitalism

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ital

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Govern

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Free Market

Capitalism

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BusinessModel

MonopolyMonopoly



Public Ownership

Free Market

Capitalism

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Free Market

Capitalism

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Capitalism

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edia

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s

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sCommunity

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edia

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s

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StrongGovernment

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Media

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Politics

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VestedInterests


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GovernmentStrong

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Media

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edIn

tere

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Politics

Media

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Politics

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

Media

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edIn

tere

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Politics

Media

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Politics

VestedInterests


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GovernmentStrong

Government

“As I

s”

Good Government

Good Government

Corporate CitizenshipCorporate CitizenshipLegal

DominanceLegal

Dominance

Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

l

Activis

m

Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

l

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SocialContract“As Is”

Good Government

Good Government


DominanceLegal

Dominance

Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

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Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

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SocialContract

Good Government

Good Government


DominanceLegal

Dominance

Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

l

Activis

m

Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

l

Activis

m


Figure 7.10 – a concise map of the seven trilemmas facing Sydney.




Coercive Politics

CommunityConcern

Tech

nolo

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lIn

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ce

Political

Establi

shmen

t

ModernIndustrial

CommunityConcern

Tech

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Political

Establi

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Tech

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Political

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s Is




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ModernIndustrial

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Political

Establi

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Political

Establi

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ModernIndustrial




Coercive Politics

CommunityConcern

Tech

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Political

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ModernIndustrial

CommunityConcern

Tech

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Political

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Tech

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s Is

”


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Responsible Science

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Quality ofLife

Quality ofLife


EconomyEfficient

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Quality ofLife

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EconomyEfficient

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Econom

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“As Is”

MonopolyMonopoly



Public Ownership

Free Market

Capitalism

Cap

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Effic

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Govern

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BusinessModel

Free Market

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Free Market

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BusinessModel“A

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MonopolyMonopoly



Public Ownership

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BusinessModel

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Free Market

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BusinessModel

MonopolyMonopoly



Public Ownership

Free Market

Capitalism

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BusinessModel

Free Market

Capitalism

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Free Market

Capitalism

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Community

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StrongGovernment

StrongGovernment

Community

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GovernmentStrong

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Good Government

Good Government


DominanceLegal

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Governance

Expectations

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Good Government

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DominanceLegal

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SocialContract

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Governance

Expectations

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Coercive Politics

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Coercive Politics

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“As Is”

MonopolyMonopoly



Public Ownership

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Capitalism

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BusinessModel

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BusinessModel“A

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MonopolyMonopoly



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Figure 7.10 – a concise map of the seven trilemmas facing Sydney. The initial trilemma system maps developed by the author were circulated to the steering

committee for comments and criticism. Two four-hour working sessions, involving

steering committee members and some project team members, were held to further

review and criticise the trilemma system maps. In addition, there were a number of

sessions, as part of the regular project management team meetings, in which the

underlying assumptions and material represented in the trilemmas was discussed and

refined. This process resulted in the diagrams which appear in Appendix 7.4.

There are several important observations to note relating to this process of developing

the trilemma system map. The process is one of critical discourse. The intention is to identify

issues of both intrinsic and extrinsic value in the problem structure and to examine critically

preferences in relation to these values. (It should be noted that preferences can only be

represented quantitatively relative to value scores. That is, how strongly one feels about

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some issue is mediated by how it scores in relation to the performance scores of other

issues.) Because many of the issues derive from the beliefs and value positions of the

participants, it is important to have a diverse group, which is representative of the

domain of interests. For this reason, considerable effort was put into identifying people

who would be interested in working on this project and who were not engineers and,

importantly, who were not products of the institutions historically responsible for development of

Sydney’s water system. That is not to say that engineers ought to be excluded from the

process, but rather, that others should be included. Because of the diverse interests of

the participants, there will be different viewpoints in relation to intrinsic value and

preference – the aim is to identify these and to incorporate them in the problem

structure. This is a fundamental difference to the traditional, reductionist, positivist engineering

approach. The engineering approach typically seeks to focus on the technological problem

and, because of the embedded reductionist methodology, often deliberately discards matters

of intrinsic value and preference. These matters are seen as subjective influences on the

problem which ought to be eliminated. In the approach utilised here, these issues are

identified such that typically they can be grouped according to the problem dimensions

(Political, Regulatory, Institutional, Environmental, Health, Economic, Social/

Community, and Technological) established at the outset. This process results in the

multidimensional representation of the problem emerging, as a critique of the trilemmas

proceeds.

7.3.7.2 Multi-Dimensional Mapping and “As Is” critique On completion of the trilemma maps, a small working group, consisting of members

from the steering committee and some of the project teams, conducted a critique of the

“As-Is” system. This used the multidimensional cognitive mapping technique, outlined

in Appendix 6.6, to identify relationships both within and between system dimensions.

An example of one of these maps is shown in Figure 7.11 and further examples are

presented in Appendix 7.5.

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Media & public policy

Values & prosperity

Value of science & engineering

Corporate governance is prudential and

fiduciary, not moral

Government insensitive to public opinion

Disconnect between the government and

community – empowers media manipulation

Erosion of the instruments for public

opinion influencing government

Media plays the wrong role; it mis-shapes the

debate, is counter-productive

Media manipulated

Where risk lies and how to manage it

Gaps in knowledge of how life-style affects

environment

Shift in values and perceptions of “the good

life” – what are the characteristics of “the

good life”

We do not use right tools and indicators

Constrain “prosperity”rather than “economic

growth”

Influence of media in “filtering” information

Decline in science and engineering

Over-estimation of the capabilities of science

Public retreat from long-term perspective

Competing interests –no public meeting; no

“Domain” anymore

“Token gesture” to community involvement

Malconnect between public policy and public

opinion

“As Is” – Social map

Figure 7.11 – A conjugate cognitive mapping representing the “As-Is” system state for the “Social” dimension of the metropolitan system


Values & prosperity











Media manipulated



environment



good life”



growth”









opinion



Values & prosperity











Media manipulated



environment



good life”



growth”









opinion


Figure 7.11 – A conjugate cognitive mapping representing the “As-Is” system state for the “Social” dimension of the metropolitan system

The way in which this map was prepared was to use “visible thinking” techniques (for

example, Bryson and Ackermann (2004)) to examine all problem information (from the

brainstorm list and the trilemma system maps) in small group discussion. In this case, a

4-hour working session was held, involving the project management team members and

other project participants. The tools used were a combination of overhead displays,

whiteboard, flip-chart, and “Post-It” notes to consider and arrange information on each

of the problem dimensions. In addition, notes of the discussion were kept for future

reference. The benefit of this approach is that it visually represents the information,

allowing it to be related to each dimension of the problem, highlighting relationships and

major “conjugation points” (the yellow symbols in Figure 7.11). As participants consider

the interrelationships, both within and between problem dimensions, indicators of both

value and preference emerge.

Disturbance Also using the trilemma approach, a plausible, hypothetical, qualitatively described

disturbance was framed. Group discussion identified three “meta-issues” or forces

which, potentially, could have serious impact on the development of Sydney’s water

system. These were:

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• Demographic shift;

• Climate/rainfall change; and

• Energy/greenhouse gas issues.

Demographic Shift – Sydney’s population includes a large, post-World War II “baby

boom” generation. The city is also the entry point for a large proportion of

Australia’s immigrants. In the last 50 years, there has been significant urban sprawl,

due to population preference for living in freestanding, residential accommodation.

Demographers anticipate a significant shift as the baby boom population ages and the

demographic mix changes. Although there are significant urban developments

anticipated, it is also expected that there will be a tendency for the ageing population

to move to medium-density housing. The demographic issues are highly complex and

it would be a mistake to attempt to capture them in a couple of paragraphs. The

point is that major demographic shifts, which could significantly affect the water

subsystem requirements, are plausible potential developments over the next 50 years.

It is possible to consider a number of scenarios as potential consequences to these

demographic forces.

Climate/Rainfall Change – the period from 1999 to 2006 was unusually dry, being

the second longest drought, since records began in the 1860s. There is considerable

debate as to whether this is part of a regular long-term rainfall cycle or whether global

warming is having a permanent impact on Sydney’s rainfall patterns. Once again, the

issues are highly complex and there is simply not enough information to accurately

predict how Sydney’s climate and rainfall patterns will behave in the next 50 years.

However, a range of climate scenarios can be considered as potential disturbances to

the system.

Energy – recent trends in global energy costs have been steeply upwards. Sydney is

reliant largely on coal-fired power generation for its energy needs. Coal prices tend to

be cyclical but economic cost is becoming secondary to consideration of greenhouse

gas emissions. Renewable energy sources, such as wind generation, potential options

to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions (through methods such as carbon capture and

storage, as well as demand management), and nuclear energy have been included

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recently on the political agenda. Once again, a range of scenarios can be considered in

relation to energy outcomes over the next 50 years.

These three meta-issues can also be arranged as a trilemma and the interrelationships

between them explored. For example, a potential solution to a shortfall in rainwater

supply is seawater desalination. However current desalination technology is relatively

energy intensive and the lowest cost source of energy is electricity derived from coal.

Hence, there is a natural tension between potential solutions for the water problem and

others in relation to energy and greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Similarly,

the demographic shifts, considered above, also have potential impact upon, or are

impacted by, energy use and climate. A “Scenario Triangle”, as shown in Figure 7.12

represents three potential scenario sets which can be used as a starting point to develop

images of plausible, hypothetical disturbances with which to investigate system response.

Figure 7.12 – Using the trilemma approach to develop a base system “Disturbance Triangle”

Demographic Disturbance 2• Sydney's infrastructure continues to

deteriorate• Steadily increasing land and housing

costs forced many people to leave Sydney, moving to other regional and capital cities

• Population gradually declines, worsening infrastructure deterioration

Demographic Disturbance 1• Economic growth remains strong• Population continues to grow strongly• Sydney is the most popular home for new

migrants• North-Western and South-Western Growth

Centres are developed• Ageing population continues

redevelopment of medium density housing

Climate Disturbance 1• Global warming continues• Tropical cyclonic weather patterns moved further

south• Water-born and insect-borne diseases emerge• Sydney experiences an increase in rainfall

caused largely by major storms• Flooding becomes a serious issue, particularly in

low-lying areas of Western Sydney

Climate Disturbance 2• Global warming continues• Sydney's weather is less

influenced by cyclonic weather patterns

• Climate becomes hotter and drier, with rainfall about half the long-term average

• Summer becomes longer, with higher average maximum temperatures

Energy/Resource Disturbance 2• Softening of global slows the increase in energy

costs• Improved conventional technologies substantially

increases power generating efficiencies• Development of renewable technologies moves

faster than expected

Energy/Resource Disturbance 1• Increasing global demand for energy,

particularly China and India causes oil, gas prices to jump dramatically

• Global demand for steel and energy sharply increases coal prices

• Development of renewable energy technologies is slower than expected

Global Energy/

Resource Demand

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Disturbance triangle…

Demographic Disturbance 2• Sydney's infrastructure continues to

deteriorate• Steadily increasing land and housing

costs forced many people to leave Sydney, moving to other regional and capital cities

• Population gradually declines, worsening infrastructure deterioration

Demographic Disturbance 1• Economic growth remains strong• Population continues to grow strongly• Sydney is the most popular home for new

migrants• North-Western and South-Western Growth

Centres are developed• Ageing population continues

redevelopment of medium density housing

Climate Disturbance 1• Global warming continues• Tropical cyclonic weather patterns moved further

south• Water-born and insect-borne diseases emerge• Sydney experiences an increase in rainfall

caused largely by major storms• Flooding becomes a serious issue, particularly in

low-lying areas of Western Sydney

Climate Disturbance 2• Global warming continues• Sydney's weather is less

influenced by cyclonic weather patterns

• Climate becomes hotter and drier, with rainfall about half the long-term average

• Summer becomes longer, with higher average maximum temperatures

Energy/Resource Disturbance 2• Softening of global slows the increase in energy

costs• Improved conventional technologies substantially

increases power generating efficiencies• Development of renewable technologies moves

faster than expected

Energy/Resource Disturbance 1• Increasing global demand for energy,

particularly China and India causes oil, gas prices to jump dramatically

• Global demand for steel and energy sharply increases coal prices

• Development of renewable energy technologies is slower than expected

Global Energy/

Resource Demand

Dem

ogra

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Cha

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Climate

Change


Global Energy/

Resource Demand

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Disturbance triangle…

Due to time and resource constraints, only one of these was developed for consideration

in the case study and this is shown in Figure 7.13 (overleaf). More generally though,

exploration of the disturbances represented in the disturbance trilemma (or trilemmas)

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can give substantial insight into the span of structural uncertainty in the problem. This

can be explored through subsequent scenario analysis.

Figure 7.13 – Description of a plausible, hypothetical disturbance derived from the “Disturbance Triangle”

Disturbance: Hot, Dry, Ageing Sydney

• The global warming phenomenon continues unabated. Sydney's climate has very hot, dry periods and rainfall well below the long-term average. Year-round average temperatures increase, with particularly hot summers, with substantially more very hot days.

• Sydney remains the major metropolis of Australia, and continues to be the destination for many of Australia's immigrants. Population growth continues along the projected, long-term trend. The ageing populationcauses a significant change in domestic dwelling habits, with increasing numbers of home units and medium-density housing. The South-West and North-West Growth Centres are developed.

• Global demand for energy and resources continues to increase, driven by the rapidly industrialising economies of China and India. Energy prices increase steadily. Renewable energy technologies continue to be expensive both in capital and operating costs.

7.3.7.3 System response The next step in the problem-structuring process is to consider the system response to

the hypothetical disturbance. The response of the “As-Is” system can follow two

pathways as shown in Figure 7.14. If there is no change to the “As-Is” system, analysis

of the impact of the disturbance on the system will lead to a “Likely Future” system state.

However, it is likely that a more attractive “Desirable Future” can be imagined. By

developing an image of a “Desirable Future” system state and reconsidering the structure

of the “As-Is” system, the characteristics of the “As-Is” system which must be changed

can be investigated. Thus, necessary changes can be developed regarding the structure of

the “As-Is” system, so that it is capable of responding to the disturbance in such a way

that it can deliver the “Desirable Future” system state.

The process by which this was undertaken was by having each group critically examine

the likely response to the hypothetical disturbance of each trilemma in turn. (See Figure

7.15 overleaf.) Further consideration was then given to the issues which were identified

in the “As-Is” system analysis and these were recorded in the multidimensional cognitive

maps.

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Figure 7.14 – Plausible system responses to the hypothetical disturbance identified in the “Disturbance Triangle”

These two system states might be thought of as the “Trajectory Images” of the system

Key question: What changes can be made to the system elements which would be likely to provide a pathway to the Desirable Future system state – the “Strategic Image”?

“Likely Future”

“Desirable Future”

The “As Is” system…• Determined by history

and “Values”

Disturbance If there is no change to the “As Is” system…

System response: two possible pathways…

Is there a more desirable outcome?

Figure 7.14 – Plausible system responses to the hypothetical disturbance identified in the “Disturbance Triangle”



“Likely Future”



and “Values”






“Likely Future”



and “Values”




As a starting point to imagine the “Likely Future” and “Desirable Future” system states,

each group was asked to imagine how the “As Is” system would be likely to respond to

the disturbance, considering questions such as:

• How will each “As Is” element respond to the disturbance?

• What will work well and what will not?

• How might the system elements interact to create the overall system response?

• How might the interrelationships between elements and subsystems interact to

determine the total system response?

• Specifically, how might the water subsystem respond?

Consider the interrelationships between elements and subsystems to imagine the overall

“Desirable Future” system response:

• What might “Desirable Future” system elements look like?

• What aspects of the “As Is” system could be changed to make the system better

able to respond?

• How might relationships between system elements be influenced to improve the

overall system response?

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• How might relationships between system elements be changed to improve the

total system response?

• How might subsystems be changed to give a more desirable response?

“Likely Future”





3. What Strategies do we need to change the Trajectory?

• Describe in terms of the 8 problem dimensions

1. Characterise the “As Is”system…

• Describe the history and Values which shaped the system

• Identify the forces at work• Formulate and critique the

Trilemmas• Characterise the sub-system

2A. Describe the two scenarios:

• Words, diagrams, pictures etc

2B. Interpret the effect in terms of the Trilemmas

Figure 7.15 – Problem structuring process steps in imagining plausible system responses

“Likely Future”














“Likely Future”














Figure 7.15 – Problem structuring process steps in imagining plausible system responses To assist the project groups, a “straw proposal” narrative was prepared by the author,

characterising the “As-Is” system state, the nature of the hypothetical disturbance, and

the likely response of the “As-Is” system. The “Desirable Future” system state was also

imagined and included in the narrative (see next section). This narrative was based on a

three-hour working session by the project management team and some of the project

team leaders.

7.3.7.4 “Straw proposal” narrative To provide background and contextualise the problem in preparation for the project

forum, a brief “straw proposal” narrative was prepared and circulated prior to the forum.

The intention was that this would be a starting point for further narratives to be

developed which would reflecting different worldviews of project participants. This

would then facilitate engagement of a broad representation in the domain of interests.

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The narrative was prepared by directly interrogating the trilemma system maps and the

conjugate cognitive maps of each of the problem dimensions. That is, the various

cognitive maps were simply “read”, taking various points and working them into

appropriate parts of the narrative. The narrative was structured according to the

problem dimensions, first identifying the major issues within each dimension (generally

issues which have the most relationship lines or major conjugation points – refer to

Figure 7.11 above). As each problem dimension was considered, reference was made to

the trilemma system maps to identify important issues highlighted across trilemma

representations. Because of the richness of information captured in the cognitive

mapping processes (both the trilemma system maps and the conjugate cognitive maps)

and their subsequent critique by a diverse representation from the domain of interests, it

is a relatively simple task to develop a concise narrative which comprehensively

represents the richness of the problem information across all dimensions. Using this

approach to prepare the straw proposal narrative is not unlike a (cartographic) map-

reading exercise – there is an immense amount of information which can be extracted

from the cartographic depiction by a skilled reader, particularly one who is familiar with

the terrain.

However, it is important to note that this narrative will always reflect the beliefs and

worldviews of the narrative writer, no matter how much effort is put into remaining

objective. This should be pointed out at the outset, when it is being used to stimulate

subsequent consideration of the problem. Unless this is handled carefully by the

facilitator, the risk is that it will be seen as an attempt by the narrative writer to influence

the project outcome. Nonetheless, this should not be seen as a deficiency of the

approach, rather it is a reflection of the new engineering paradigm proposed here, where the

engineer is engaged fully within the problem, rather than simply attempting to be

considered to be attached, independent observer.

The straw proposal narrative appears in Appendix 7.6.

7.3.7.5 Project forum A half-day forum was held to conclude Stage 1 of the project. In the first part of the

forum, reports were received by each of the eight metropolitan system teams and the

four water subsystem teams. Some teams had progressed further than others, with two

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in particular presenting very comprehensive analyses of the system response. In the

second part of the forum, participants formed several small groups to critique the straw

proposal narrative across each of the problem dimensions. These group critiques were

facilitated by steering committee members. Also, teams were requested to critique the

problem-structuring approach, comparing it with other approaches they had experienced.

7.3.8 Warren Centre project and outcomes 7.3.8.1 Project outcomes Stage 1 of the project was successful in formulating a model representing the

metropolitan system and the water subsystem and engaging about 60 volunteers from a

diverse cross-section of the community to participate in the project. A number of

project participants observed that the problem-structuring methodology used in the

project gave unexpected insights into the nature of the problem. They also suggested

opportunities for its application in other areas where Type 3 problems have been

identified. A comprehensive interim report was prepared for the project sponsors.

However, funding commitments fell well short of the minimum target of $250,000 and

the project steering committee could not endorse continuing the project into its second

stage. The main impediment was that the project was not able to obtain full engagement

of the water-related instrumentalities of either the State government of NSW or the

Australian Federal government. Consequently, several large, commercial organizations

which had given undertakings to support the project declined to become involved either

financially or through commitment of other resource. The steering committee reviewed

the situation as concerning: three very significant professional institutions that were able

to engage 60 volunteers to work on potentially the most critical issue that faces the

Australian community in the foreseeable future were not supported by either level of

government. This had a significant impact on the progress that some teams could make.

There were some instances where team members who were either employees or

contracted by the NSW state government felt they should withdraw from the project.

The consequence of this was that a number of the teams were unable to make the

progress that they had intended by the time of the forum. Although this was an

impediment for the progressing the Metropolitan Water Options project it provided

fertile ground for conduct of this case study. The situation itself represents one of the

challenges typically encountered in Type 3 problems: the effect of power imbalances and

coercive use of power.

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Two teams made particular progress: the Environmental Team, and the Community

Team. The Environmental team focused on three trilemmas (Lifestyle, Modern

Industrial, and Public Interest) and were able to prepare and present scenarios which

explored the response of a number of natural system elements in terms of their current

state, impacting pressures and likely response. The Community Team did an excellent

job of identifying the sorts of issues that the community needs to engage in for a

metropolis the size of Sydney, with its enormous environmental footprint, to have a

sustainable, long-term future.

In addition, the author made a formal submission to and testified before the General

Purpose Standing Committee No. 5, of the Legislative Council of the Parliament of New

South Wales in its Inquiry into a Sustainable Water Supply for Sydney.

7.3.9 Worldview narratives As noted in Chapter 6 (sections 6.3.5.4 and 6.3.5.5), the purpose of preparing a set of

worldview narratives is to establish a range of interpretations, reflecting worldviews of

the participants’ perspectives of the agreed problem information. This set of narratives is

used in widespread community engagement, making reference to the differences in

perspective in order to elicit the range of values and preferences within the domain

interests. This helps to formulate values hierarchies in the established, formalised

decision-making methodologies such as MCDM.

The aim of this part of the case study was to establish the framework for ensuring that

narratives to be used in engagement with the domain of interests contained the agreed

problem information, identified in the trilemma analysis and subsequent critique. One

proposition, motivated by the author, which was tested, was whether narrative writers

would be drawn naturally to constructing a narrative which contained all the agreed

problem information. Or, alternatively, to determine whether they would be selective in

order to emphasise those aspects reflective of their own worldview. It is important to

note that such narratives can generally treat problem information in two ways. First, the

problem information simply can be presented neutrally, without any deliberate

interpretation, that is, merely presenting the information for the reader to interpret. Or

second, the narrative writer can discuss problem information and bring their own

perspective, which reflects their worldview. In the second instance, the narrative writer

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can present problem information, constructing a supportive argument for various

interpretations of it. In this case, where the narrative writer sees problem information as

contentious or wishes to place a negative construal on it, it is important that such an

interpretation is made clear.

In order to investigate this, three project participants were requested to prepare relatively

concise narratives (five to eight typewritten pages), using an extensive compilation of

material developed during Stage 1 of the project. The narratives were examined to

determine the extent to which narrative writers presented problem information covering

the “As-Is” system characterisation and the “Most Likely” and “Desirable Future”

system responses to the hypothetical disturbance. Two of the participants were team

leaders and one was a team member. The three participants had fundamentally dissimilar

backgrounds: one was a technical expert in one of the eight major problem dimensions;

another was a professional officer working in the public sector; and the third was an

academic whose area of expertise is in the humanities. Each of the narrative writers was

given the same set of comprehensive background material prepared by the author,

regarding the proposition. This included a set of the trilemma system maps, the

multidimensional conjugate cognitive maps, and some further analysis and grouping of

information which had been used to prepare the straw proposal narrative. Altogether,

there were over 200 points of problem information the narrative writers were asked to

consider, of which about 130 were considered to be essential for a comprehensive

description of the problem. (In this instance, the set of agreed information was prepared

by the author; however it is envisaged that, as the problem-structuring approach is

refined, this agreed problem information would be arrived at by the project participants.)

The three narrative writers were selected because of their enthusiasm shown in the

Metropolitan Water Options project and their interest in seeking to identify a sustainable

solution to the long-term development of Sydney’s water system.

When the narratives92 were received from the three writers, they were analysed by the

author to determine how many of the 130 or so essential points of information could be

identified clearly in the narrative text.

92 These three narratives are available for review upon request.

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Only one of the narratives contained virtually all of the objective problem information.

The other two focused on specific aspects of the problem which were within the

particular field of interest of the narrative writer. This refutes the proposition that

carefully constructed narratives will naturally reflect all agreed problem information. It

suggests that there needs to be an iterative process whereby narratives are revised until

the agreed problem information is completely represented in the narrative text. This is

an important issue because the problem-structuring approach utilises narratives as a key

means of subsequent community engagement.

The conclusion from this work was that there needs to be a carefully defined process for

ensuring that narratives completely represent the agreed problem information, before

such narratives can be used to inform the domain of interests about the problem

situation. Interpretation of problem information is to be encouraged, as the process

recognises the importance of reflecting different worldviews and perspectives in

description of the problem.

7.3.10 Critique of Part A of the Case Study In this section, the approaches taken by two of the participant teams will be compared.

The background of these two teams differed: one team (the “Community” team) had

some members with technical expertise relating to the water system but the majority were

well-informed community members interested in engaging in the project. The other (the

“Environment” team) consisted entirely of people with formal environmental expertise

and experience in water system issues. It is informative to contrast the differing

approaches of these two teams. This is followed by general observations made from

feedback from the project team members, who participated at the forum, and subsequent

interviews with selected members of the both teams.

7.3.10.1 Contrasting two approaches Both teams engaged deeply in the problem and recognised the broad, systemic impact of

potential solutions. The implications which the Community team drew from this were

that solutions which are applied generally to the system should preserve some form of

local flexibility. In addition, the team observed that ideal specific solutions may not be

able to be generalised across the entire system. This confirms that the systems theory

upon which the problem-structuring approach is based was well understood and

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incorporated into the team’s analysis. The team was concerned that social justice and

equity are important issues to consider, and that indicators generally do not take such

issues adequately into account. The team also noted the importance of recognising

different perspectives and approaches, learning from various successes in other areas and

utilising education, surveys, and media to more comprehensively inform the public.

Notably, the team recognised the importance of integrating the technological, economic,

and ecological aspects of the problem. The team also noted the importance of taking

into account the complexity of the technological issues and the need to have sound

technical solutions identified to these aspects of the problem. From discussion with

team members, the team adopted a “values-driven” approach to the problem. That is to

say, the team was particularly concerned about the intrinsic value issues of the problem

and to provide an intrinsic value framework within which the technological and economic

solutions can be considered. Insights such as this would be expected to be most useful

in developing values and objectives hierarchies in formalised decision-making techniques,

such as MCDA.

The Environment team decided to focus on three trilemmas (Modernist, Lifestyle, and

Public Interest), which they felt had most impact on the Environment dimension. They

gave consideration to each of these, with particular emphasis on formulating the utopian

state of each trilemma. This suggests that the approach of this team also recognised the

intrinsic values represented in the system elements. The team also recognised the

systemic nature of the problem and that the “natural environment” itself needs to be

considered as a subsystem, within which the water subsystem exists. That is, consistent

with systems theory, a hierarchy of subsystems exists within the main system. The team

emphasised the importance of interpreting trilemma information. In some cases, they

reworked the trilemmas to be more reflective of the values of the team. They also

recognised the importance of defining a utopian state. The team gave particular

emphasis to the dynamic nature of the system, again confirming the value of systems

theory and the problem-structuring approach. They also considered the way in which

both the natural (ecological) elements and the elements of the built environment impact

upon both the water subsystem and the natural elements of the greater environmental

subsystem. The team took a structured approach (organising information in a matrix),

considering the natural environment system to be represented by a set of major elements,

which respond to pressures, as a result of the disturbance. The team then identified a

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framework representing important intrinsic values of the system and developed this into

a matrix of outcomes reflecting the response of the dynamic system to the disturbance.

They then proposed a set of indicators to either directly or indirectly represent system

response.

In comparing the approaches of the two teams, an important point that emerges is that

they appear to focus on different levels of values and objectives. The Community team

was more concerned with establishing a set of intrinsic values, that is, a set of high-level

problem values. On the other hand, the Environment team considered intrinsic

valuation initially and then moved down the hierarchy to concentrate on measurable

indicators. A point which will be developed further in the next chapter is that the

problem-structuring approach is useful both in distinguishing between intrinsic and

extrinsic values and the qualitative elicitation of participants’ preferences. Not

surprisingly, groups consisting of members with different backgrounds focused their

attention on different levels of the hierarchy. This suggests that there is intrinsic merit in

having greater diversity represented in group membership because of the greater richness

of perspective and worldview that ultimately is included in the problem structure.

7.3.10.2 Critique by project participants The points noted below consolidate the observations of participants during the second

half of the project forum, a debriefing session held with representatives from the two

teams, which had made particular progress in the project, and observations by the author.

• There was a general consensus that the problem-structuring approach presented a

good way to attack this type of complex problem;

• The approach should be iterative, with output from group meetings being

circulated to the entire membership of the project;

• A common question was how can issues around beliefs and values be represented

without being judgemental;

• Participants suggested that a useful development of the process would be for

there to be a collective description of what the ultimate outcome should look like

and that this should be reflected in the content of narratives. This should be

considered by the entire project membership;

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• A concise manual, explaining the methodology, would be useful for team

members to refer to, rather than having to rely entirely on team leaders for

guidance;

• Although the trilemma process is intended to simplify a highly complex issue,

there was a perception among some team members that the approach is too

complex and might distract the members from the task. However, they

acknowledged that this was the first time that the problem-structuring approach

had been utilised. They noted that if the issues identified in the critique were

addressed adequately, that this should not present an ongoing difficulty;

• Teams generally felt that to consider all trilemmas would be too complex and

focused on two or three, which they considered to be most relevant for their

analysis;

• One difficulty faced was that the steering committee initially had quite diverse

views as to the best way to approach the project. After the trilemma system

mapping approach had been discussed during several planning sessions, a

consensus emerged that a new approach was worth trying;

• The project teams started at different times. Had all teams started at about the

same time, there may have been an opportunity to use the trilemma system

mapping approach to engage team leaders and to create a set of common

concepts and a common language for the project. (Towards the final stages of

the project, there were clear signs of such a common language emerging.)

• The approach of structuring a problem around a number of different dimensions,

representing similarities, appears to have been successful and gave clarity to the

issues to be focused on by the individual teams;

• Progress in the project appears to be largely a function of the commitment of

volunteers, which in turn appears to be related to the passion individuals have for

the issue. This suggests that beliefs and values strongly influence initial

engagement in the problem;

• Consideration needs to be given to the way in which teams are constituted. In

this project, team leaders were given freedom to invite team members whom they

thought would be a strong contributors. This appears to have added bias. (For

example, the Community team largely consisted of interested lay-people, who

were well-informed on the issue but had limited formal technical knowledge.

They became engaged in the project because of their interest and passion about

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wanting to contribute to a solution. On the other hand, the Environment team

members were selected due to their experience and technical knowledge

regarding environmental issues, albeit with considerable diversity in their

backgrounds. The Community team focused its activities on understanding

community attitudes and the way in which behaviours might be influenced;

whereas the Environment team sought to understand and identify values and

how these influence outcomes.)

These observations might be consolidated into specific conclusions regarding the case

study as follows:

• The trilemma system mapping approach provided a useful framework to

represent the system. It provided the means to synthesise contributions from

individual groups and to elicit values and preferences regarding problem

information;

• The systems approach, in particular the dynamic response to the hypothetical

disturbance, was recognised as an effective device for considering future system

responses;

• A useful precursor to team deliberations would be some form of “visioning” to

identify and distinguish between intrinsic values, extrinsic values and preferences,

rather than attempting to elicit these purely from team discussion. This would

ensure that consideration of the problem would extend beyond the purely

technical from the outset. An area of future work proposed is to consider

whether the process could be used in constructing values or objectives

hierarchies, during the MCDM process. That is, to determine whether there

would be benefit in specifically distinguishing between intrinsic value (perhaps

further differentiating between object intrinsic value and moral intrinsic value, as

noted in Chapter 2 (section 2.4.2.2), and Chapter 6 (section 6.2) and extrinsic

value in constructing the values hierarchy. And further, investigating whether

this would assist in the elicitation and representation of preference and valuation

information, through the construction of value functions or similar intra-criterion

preference relationships;

• The trilemmas established a common language to use across project teams;

• The trilemmas satisfactorily represented the breadth of the problem. The water

subsystem was considered to be of such complexity that it needed to be

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represented by a further set of trilemmas and, in the case of the Environment

team’s consideration, a further subsystem was identified within the metropolitan

system (of which the water subsystem was itself a subsystem). This enabled clear

project boundaries to be established, thus giving greater focus to project teams,

regarding the issues they were requested to examine;

• The approach enabled the steering committee and project management team to

determine those areas which needed greatest resource;

• It informed the steering committee and project management team as to the most

likely barriers to project progress;

• In preparation for, and following, the first forum of project teams, the approach

enabled construction of a rich, comprehensive narrative of the problem and the

way in which the problem system evolved in response to the hypothetical

disturbances;

• The approach requires further development to make it more robust. In

particular, it needs to be adopted at the outset as a means to structure problem

information, so that key organisational requirements are considered. Also, the

project steering committee (which must include team leaders for each problem

dimension) must have a clear understanding of the approach and its underlying

basis. This would enable team leaders to identify issues of values and preference,

which emerge from team discussions;

• One of the most valuable outcomes of the case study was the emergence of the

set of rich, comprehensive narratives of the metropolitan social system and the

water subsystem. Reflecting on the value of these narratives, it became clear that

they can be the thread, which links various stages of problem resolution. This

can be achieved in two ways: first, the narratives can provide a chronological

contextualisation of how the problem arises, and how various parts of the

solution can be developed and placed into the problem context. Second, they

can indicate opportunities where potential solutions might lie, by identifying gaps

in knowledge, by complementing areas where information is incomplete, or by

identifying where inconsistencies exist and how these might be resolved.

Furthermore, experience in the case study suggests that if ownership of the

narratives is vested in the participants, the narratives can become a useful means

for ongoing engagement and for the development of a deeper understanding of

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the problem. This appears to be due to the narratives drawing upon a common

language which develops within the project team to describe issues under

consideration. Perhaps, even a “culture” develops within the group of people

working on the problem and the narratives assume their widely acknowledged

cultural role in communicating between community members.

There are some further aspects of the problem-structuring approach which this part of

the case study confirms (or rather, does not refute):

• This approach is unlike other qualitative systems approaches (for example, total

systems intervention, critical systems heuristics, soft systems methodology),

which generally only identify and consider relationships between system

elements. The trilemma systems mapping approach examines dynamic system

responses to a hypothetical disturbance;

• The three issues which form each trilemma are effectively “self-bounded” and

facilitate the determination and critique of the inner boundary (viz. Midgley

(1992) boundary critique model). This is because the description of any situation

in relation to the three trilemma forces will be contained within the triangle;

• The response of the system to disturbances can be linked back to the stakeholder

belief system used to define the trilemmas, because of their “self-bounding”

nature. Hence, scenario outcomes directly reflect stakeholder belief systems;

• The approach allows representation of a large amount of information using

relatively simple schema – this meets the challenge of having only five to eight

units of concentration, so the mind can keep focused. Representing problem

information across a range of dimensions allows information to be stored and

quickly recalled, so that richness of problem information is not lost;

• The use of the trilemma device forces the formation of mental representations

(that is, personal constructs) of the problem. It uses a device which, deliberately,

is analogous with the theoretical cognitive processes described in established

psychological theory. This does not necessarily happen with other cognitive

mapping approaches – success is largely determined by the skill, knowledge, and

experience of the facilitator;

• It is relatively straightforward to identify utopia/dystopia positions, by holding

one force constant and exploring the effect of varying the other two;

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• By engaging a wide range of stakeholder perspectives in identifying the forces

and creating the trilemmas, there is both engagement of stakeholders and the

creation of a common language to describe the problem;

• Rigorous use of the approach results in an extremely rich representation of the

problem which can readily form the basis of a comprehensive problem narrative.

A set of such narratives created by different authors representative of the entire

domain interests can be developed, so that ultimately they contain all agreed

problem information. These also reflect the perspectives and worldviews of the

individual narrative writers thereby retaining the richness of problem information

relating to values, interests, beliefs, and preferences.

One question, which might be developed into a criticism of the approach, is how can the

practitioner be confident that some key force (which potentially might destabilise the

system) is not overlooked in developing the trilemmas. The solution to this lies in

critique of the system once the initial trilemma mapping has been done; and again, later,

during the critique of the scenarios. This emphasises the importance of critique in the

process – its function is not merely to explore values-laden aspects of the problem and

other areas of uncertainty, but is also to provide rigorous testing of the model as it is

developed.

It might appear that the problem-structuring approach by its nature is reductionist and

hence is inconsistent with its own philosophical principles. First, it is not “structurally”

reductionist. Two groups working independently (perhaps with different belief systems)

using the approach to consider an issue would almost certainly not arrive at the same set

of force-pairs or the same sets of trilemmas to characterise the system. And second, the

critical reviews of both the initial problem structure (prior to consideration of the

disturbance), and the critique of the scenario analysis are intended to examine critically

the extent to which the assumptions made might compromise representation of the

uncertainty and complexity of the problem.

The second application of the problem-structuring approach is to use the objective

information identified in characterisation and critique of the problem system, as a

framework for critically examining planning approaches derived by other means. In Part

B of the case study, the material developed in Part A forms the framework for such a

critique. The metropolitan water planning approach developed by the NSW State

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government in the period 2004 to 2006 for the Sydney metropolitan area is considered.

This was developed at much the same time as a 25-year urban plan was prepared for the

Sydney metropolitan area. The Metropolitan Strategy and the Metropolitan Water Plan,

developed by the NSW government, effectively provide an alternative approach to

considering the metropolitan system and the water subsystem and these are critically

examined, using the problem-structuring methodology developed here.

7.4 Case Study: Part B – Critique of the Metropolitan Strategy and Metropolitan Water Plan

The second application of the problem-structuring methodology is to provide a

framework by which various problem-solving approaches can be examined to assess their

comprehensiveness. Here, a framework containing a large amount of relevant problem

information has been developed. This was then used to critique three pieces of work

published in the period from 2004 to 2006, by the NSW State government. These three

documents form the basis upon which the NSW State government planned the water

infrastructure development for Sydney, in the context of its major planning, both for

metropolitan Sydney and for the whole State looking out to 2031.

The first of these is the “Metropolitan Strategy”, a long-term urban plan, which was

prepared as a result of a Ministerial Directions Paper, published in 2004. This drew

together planning material for the development of the greater Sydney metropolitan area,

and outlined strategies across a broad range of economic, social, environmental areas. It

was published in December 2005. The second was the development of the

“Metropolitan Water Plan”, the strategic plan for the development of Sydney’s water

infrastructure. The initial draft of this was released in 2004, subsequently was subjected

to expert review, was revised, and was republished in May 2006. The third document,

published in June 2006, is the “State Infrastructure Strategy”, which outlines

infrastructure development and associated capital requirements, with most emphasis

being on the next 10 years.

7.4.1 Introduction The way in which this critique will be undertaken is to first briefly describe the current

state of affairs regarding metropolitan planning in NSW, in order to place planning for

the water system in the context of state and urban planning. Although some

consideration will be given to the NSW Plan and the State Infrastructure Strategy, the

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main focus will be on the 25-year Metropolitan Strategy, “City of Cities: a Plan to

Sydney’s Future”, (NSW Department of Planning (2005)), and the way in which the

Metropolitan Water Plan (NSW Government (2006)) was developed and how it was

integrated into the Metropolitan Strategy.

7.4.2 Planning in New South Wales 7.4.2.1 NSW State planning The three major documents in the public domain relating to state and metropolitan

planning in NSW, noted above, are the NSW State Plan (NSW Premier's Department

(2006)), the State Infrastructure Strategy (NSW Treasury (2006)), and the Metropolitan

Strategy (NSW Dept. of Planning (2005)). The NSW State Plan comprises a number of

other relevant documents, such as the Metropolitan Water Plan (NSW Government

(2006)), the Urban Transport Statement, the State Health Plan, the NSW Greenhouse

Plan, the Aboriginal Affairs Plan, and several others. Generally, these documents were

prepared within the last five years or so and were integrated to form the NSW State Plan.

This was published several months prior to the state elections in March 2007. This came

after a series of articles in the media, which criticised the State government for a lack of

infrastructure planning around a number of important activities. These were transport,

health, crime, education, the economy, and water (SMH (2006b), SMH (2006d)). Two of

the documents referred to above, the Metropolitan Strategy and Metropolitan Water

Plan, are of particular relevance to this case study. The State Infrastructure Strategy also

contains information relevant to capital expenditure on water-related infrastructure.

7.4.2.2 Metropolitan planning Work on the Metropolitan Strategy commenced in 2004. It was the first total urban

planning exercise done for over 15 years and only the fourth in Sydney’s history. Formal

urban planning did not start in NSW until the late 1940s and two plans, the “County of

Cumberland Planning Scheme” (1947), and the Sydney Region Outline Plan (1968), were

particularly influential (Spearritt (2000)). A further metropolitan strategy was prepared in

1988 and revised in 199393. Of course, in the intervening period, there were many plans

prepared for specific issues and regions within the metropolitan area, but there was

nothing which considered the Sydney metropolitan area holistically. In 2004, the NSW

93 The 1947 and 1968 plans are regarded to have been to be substantially more influential on the way in

which Sydney has developed than the 1988 plan, “Sydney Into Its Third Century”. This document is not regarded as having been particularly influential in metropolitan planning (Spearritt (2000).

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Minister for Planning initiated a process to develop a strategic plan for metropolitan

Sydney out to 2031. This was to include a community consultation process. This plan,

the Metropolitan Strategy (NSW Dept. of Planning (2005)), was published in December

2005, at much the same time as other infrastructure planning was also undertaken for the

entire state of NSW.

The planning documents themselves suggest that there was a formal, high-level, process

which planned, coordinated, and collated input from various government departments

and agencies and which also undertook widespread community consultation. However,

as discussed further below, when publication dates of the various documents referred to

in the plan, media reports, parliamentary discussion, and other discussion in the public

domain are examined, it seems more likely that much of the planning material was

developed by government departments and agencies, in isolation, as part of their normal

long-term planning, with the Cabinet Office and Treasury collating information into the

final metropolitan strategy.

Consideration will now be given to two plans in particular, “City of Cities: a Plan for

Sydney’s Future – Metropolitan Strategy” (that is, the Metropolitan Strategy) and the

Metropolitan Water Plan.

7.4.3 The current metropolitan plans and their development 7.4.3.1 “City of Cities: a Plan for Sydney’s Future – Metropolitan Strategy” This plan is developed around a concept which sees metropolitan Sydney continue to

develop as the major “global city” and economic centre in Australia, with strong

economic and employment growth. Emphasis is on development of “city centres”

within the metropolitan area. These are to become employment, services (retailing,

health, and education) and residential hubs, linked by a well-developed transportation

system. Emphasis is also placed on protecting local character, access to parks and

spaces, and containing the environmental footprint of the metropolis.

The plan takes a sustainable development approach, identifying the triple bottom-line

objectives of economic growth, while balancing social and environmental impact. The

stated aims of the plan are to improve liveability, strengthen economic competitiveness,

ensure fairness, protect the environment, and to improve governance. To achieve this,

the plan identifies seven so-called “strategies”: Economy and Employment; Centres and

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Corridors; Housing; Transport; Environment and Resources; Parks and Public Places;

and Governance and Implementation.

Within the Metropolitan Strategy (which runs to over 200 pages) there is limited

reference to the water subsystem, briefly discussing the challenges regarding water

supply, the need for recycling, and the importance of maintaining environmental flows,

particularly within the Hawkesbury-Nepean system. Reference is made to the 2004

Metropolitan Water Plan, suggesting that this document contains the substance of

dealing with water issues for the metropolis within the 25-year planning horizon. The

development of the Metropolitan Water Plan itself will now be considered.

7.4.3.2 Metropolitan Water Plan Before looking at the current Metropolitan Water Plan in detail, is important to

understand some background. In 1998, Sydney’s water catchments were full (Cohen

(2006) 23 March 2006, p2) and, despite somewhat erratic rainfall in the decade of the

1990s, there had been no stress placed on water infrastructure since the completion of

Warragamba Dam in 1960. This was as a result of two factors: first, the capacity of the

dam itself (Warragamba Dam is one of the biggest metropolitan water reservoirs in the

world); and second, the Sydney catchments experienced an unusually wet period in the

forty years or so up to the mid-1990s. This led to complacency in infrastructure

planning, there effectively being a 25-year gap in water infrastructure planning, which had

not accommodated significant changes in population of the Sydney metropolitan area

and the emergence of a water intensive lifestyle (Australian (2004)). But 1998 was the

start of the second longest dry period since records began. By 2002, storage levels in the

Sydney catchments were less than 60% and dropping at alarming rates. The summers of

2002, 2003, and 2004 were all unusually dry and hot and by the end of the 2004 summer,

storage levels of the Sydney system had dropped below 40%. Comparisons were drawn

between the longest drought on record, which lasted nine years – if the current drought

were to be of similar length, Sydney faced the real possibility of running out of water.

The government response to increasing public concern was the publication of the

Metropolitan Water Plan in October 2004 (DIPNR (2004)). The plan is brief and was

widely regarded as being more of a public relations exercise to convince the community

that work was underway, rather than being a substantive strategic plan (SMH (2004)). In

the plan, few commitments are made for infrastructure development, and associated

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capital expenditure. Most of what the plan commits to is to investigate options for

developing new supply alternatives, reducing demand, investigating recycling, and

resource allocation between environmental, residential, farming and commercial

requirements.

After the Plan was published in 2004, an expert panel was appointed by the Cabinet

Office to review it. The panel made two reports back to the government, an interim

report in February 2006 (White (2006b)) and its final report in April 2006 (White

(2006a)). The specific Terms of Reference given to the expert review panel have not

been made public94. The panel makes only brief reference to the 2004 plan, focussing on

a quantitative analysis of the supply-demand balance and developing a set of

recommendations as to how this balance could be maintained in the medium term (2006-

2015), and in the longer term (2015-2030). In May 2006, a new Metropolitan Water Plan

was published, only based loosely on the 2004 document but making extensive reference

to the recommendations of the expert panel’s review.

A reasonable way of considering the 2004 plan, the expert review, and the 2006 plan is to

see them as one piece of work. The 2004 plan was an outline of the problem and

identification of a range of options to be examined; the expert review was the means of

giving substance to these while giving impression of independent, impartial ratification of

government policy; and the 2006 plan provided the means to draw together material

from the expert review, together with a substantive body of work undoubtedly

completed by various government agencies and departments such as Sydney Water

Corporation, the Sydney Catchment Authority, the Department of Energy, Utilities and

Sustainability, the Department of Planning, the Department of Environment and

Conservation, and the Department of Natural Resources. This work appears to have

been coordinated by the Cabinet Office.

7.4.3.3 The State Infrastructure Strategy The State Infrastructure Strategy was published in June 2006 by the NSW Treasury, and

was tabled in Parliament just prior to the State budget. It is primarily a capital planning

document. The strategy covers five main areas of infrastructure: human services

94 The author made an unsuccessful attempt was made to access the Terms of Reference.

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(particularly health and education); justice (particularly correctional services and police);

transport; electricity; and water.

Total capital expenditure planned for the metropolitan water system for the period 2007-

2016 is about $7.5 billion95. Despite the emphasis on water supply and recycling in both

the Metropolitan Strategy and the Metropolitan Water Plan, the State Infrastructure

Strategy only identifies about 21% of total planned capital expenditure on water supply,

whereas sewerage (41%), and distribution infrastructure (37%) spending account for

nearly 80% of the total. Less than 1% of expenditure is identified for environmental

flows in the Hawkesbury-Nepean system (NSW Treasury (2006), pp46-47).

7.4.4 Critique of the water planning approach The intention of this critique is not to criticise the detail or specific commitments made

as the planning process took place in the period from 2004 to 2006. Rather, the aim is to

identify the planning paradigm underlying the development of the “City of Cities”

Metropolitan Strategy and its relationship with Metropolitan Water Plan. This will then

be contrasted against the problem-structuring approach developed in this dissertation, in

order to determine whether it might offer any advantage over current practice.

7.4.4.1 Metropolitan Water Plan (2004) As noted above, this document is not really a plan at all – rather it outlines a number of

major challenges regarding water supply and the need to investigate options, such as

groundwater utilisation, recycling, desalination, demand reduction, and environmental

protection. Virtually all commitments in this plan are to undertake investigation or state

intentions to undertake detailed planning into previously identified options. The only

firm capital commitments are $106 million for deep water access at two of Sydney’s

dams, and $31 million to allow environmental releases to be made at four dams and two

weirs on Hawkesbury-Nepean system. The work of the Hawkesbury-Nepean River

Management Forum, in relation to management of the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment,

appears to have been largely ignored96. There are a several preliminary capital estimates

95 The amount planned for recycling was not released as it was identified by the government as

commercially sensitive. The government stated that this is due to the project being identified as a potential public-private participation project.

96 The Hawkesbury-Nepean River Management Forum was an extensive community engagement project, which sought to include and take into account the needs and views of a wide range of stakeholders directly involved with the Hawkesbury-Nepean river system. The health of this river has been

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in relation to further work (for example, a desalination feasibility study, and facilities to

make water transfers from the Shoalhaven River system to the Hawkesbury-Nepean

system). There is virtually no reference to sewerage or stormwater drainage, other than

further evaluation of a recycled water programme for western Sydney. A commitment

was made to develop the “Sydney Metropolitan Water Sharing Plan” under the Water

Management Act (2000), to identify and allocate water resources for environmental

flows, residential and commercial consumption, and irrigators, however a literature

search suggests that this plan was not prepared.

7.4.4.2 Expert Review of the Metropolitan Water Plan (2004) Although commissioned as a review of the 2004 plan, the two reports done by the

independent experts made little reference to the 2004 document. Rather the panel

developed a number of strategic alternatives which would allow maintenance of the

supply-demand balance until 2015, using rain-fed water supply, with additional

contingency planning required to guard against the risk of severe drought97. The panel

recommended adoption of three strategic themes98.

First was large-scale implementation of demand management and recycling measures,

with attention given to modelling baseline demand and potential savings available

through demand management and recycling programs. Second, was to understand

constraints, such as environmental flow requirements for catchment rivers, system

reliability criteria, and trigger points for investment decisions during extended periods of

drought. This would include decision points to commence the tapping of groundwater

and the construction of seawater desalination capacity99. And third was the adoption of

an “adaptive management” approach, which would include scarcity-based pricing

considerations, modifying reliability criteria, and substantive institutional reform, with a

high level coordinating body responsible for implementation of the plan. The panel

deteriorating for many years and the forum was welcomed as a means by which community views could be considered.

97 At the time this review was commissioned at the end of 2004 the total catchment was that its low point of 38% but by the publication date (April 2006), the drought was beginning to break and the total catchment level had risen to 45%, with a panel noting that there was a 80% likelihood that the catchment level would continue to increase.

98 It is not possible to determine the origin of these themes. It was not made clear whether they were part of the terms of reference given to the panel, all whether they were derived as a result of the panel’s deliberations.

99 The conclusion was that groundwater supplies could be utilised for periods of up to three years during deep drought, and, should the total storage capacity drop below 30%, construction of a desalination plant would commence, on the basis that the lead-time for plant construction would be covered by remaining water supplies.

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noted that estimates from 2015 to 2030 were less certain and would depend on a number

of issues, such as demographic trends, environmental flow requirements, and the extent

to which additional supply capacity might be constructed.

It is interesting to note that the expert panel review of the 2004 Metropolitan Water Plan

(with the exception of some reference to water recycling programs in western Sydney)

focuses almost exclusively on water supply. There is no extensive deliberation given to

stormwater management or sewerage management. Nor is there consideration given to

the interrelationships between these and the current water supply paradigm (much of the

water requirement is for the wet carriage of sewage), even though sewage and stormwater

management are expected to be the biggest capital expenditure items undertaken by the

government in the near to medium future.

7.4.4.3 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan This plan is far more comprehensive than the 2004 document and makes a number of

capital commitments to infrastructure development. In the plan, it is noted that the

recommendations of the expert review panel have been influential in preparation of the

revised version of the plan. (This supports the view noted earlier that the expert review

was, in fact, part of the planning process, rather than a true review.)

The 2006 plan again focuses on Sydney’s water supply, largely accepting the

recommendations of the expert panel review. The plan adopts a supply-demand balance

approach and recognises the potential and impact of both long-term drought and of

climate change. It places significant emphasis on grey water recycling (particularly for

western Sydney) and makes mention of the potential for stormwater recycling. A

number of government initiatives introduced in the previous two years, relating to water

saving and demand management schemes for residential, agricultural, commercial, and

government enterprises, are outlined. Commitments are made to increase water transfers

from the Shoalhaven system and developing groundwater access when storage capacity

drops below 40%. There is a commitment to the design of a desalination plant with an

ultimate capacity of 500 megalitres per day100. Also, there is discussion of improving

catchment and river health but no commitment to increasing environmental flows,

during times of low rainfall. Commitments are made regarding environmental flows in

100 500 megalitres per day would meet about 40% of the 2015 projected demand.

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the Shoalhaven River. But no pledge is made to increased environmental flows in the

lower Hawkesbury-Nepean system – these would improve the environmental condition

of the river. The adaptive management approach recommended by the expert panel is

adopted and commitments are made to regulatory reform to allow private enterprise

access to some parts of the water system. Commitments are also made to greater

community engagement and the involvement of experts to advise on determining water

policy.

There are a number of observations regarding the strategy for development of the

metropolitan water system over the period from 2004 to 2006, concurrent with

development of the Metropolitan Strategy and the State Infrastructure Strategy. These

are:

• The date of publication of each of the documents suggests that integration of the

strategic plans relating to water, infrastructure, urban planning, and state planning

was done after the planning process, rather than before it;

• The structure of the plans and a lack of relationships identified between issues

both within and between the various planning documents suggest a “jigsaw

puzzle” planning approach – various government departments appear to have

undertaken much of the analysis more or less in isolation, with the government

selectively releasing material into the public domain as independent pieces of

work, rather than as an integrated plan. It appears that the NSW Cabinet Office

undertook some form of oversight, rather than the Department of Planning, as

might be expected;

• Individual planning documents do not contain explicit references and linkages to

other documents, again suggesting little integration in the planning process. For

example, the State Infrastructure Strategy, published in June 2007, makes

reference to capital amounts identified in the 2004 Metropolitan Water Plan

(DIPNR (2004)), even though no such amounts were ever quantified –

presumably these were estimated after publication of initial version of the plan.

On the other hand, the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (NSW Government

(2006)), published about one month prior to the State Infrastructure Strategy,

makes no reference at all to the infrastructure strategy document. The

infrastructure strategy refers to nearly $3 billion – 48% of Sydney Water

Corporation’s 2006-7 to 2009-10 capital budget – in investment for sewerage and

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stormwater infrastructure development (NSW Treasury (2006), p 46), yet no

mention is made of this in the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (NSW Government

(2006));

• The 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan (NSW Government (2006)) focuses almost

entirely on supply of water and recycling, using the well-established wet carriage

model of sewage treatment and disposal. As Beder (1989a) points out, very

significant amounts of potable water are used for the wet carriage of sewage,

without consideration of alternative technologies, which might be investigated.

This reflects the established, conservative, instrumentalist engineering paradigm,

which has dominated the design of water system infrastructure in Sydney over

the last 140 years. As Beder also points out, preference is given to pre-existing

technologies and investment, rather than investigating the potential of new

technologies to resolve some of the challenges of sustainability;

• Despite the original Ministerial Directions Paper placing considerable emphasis

on water, sewerage, and drainage, there is scant reference to the water system in

the final 25-year urban development plan;

• The impact on water-borne disease and poor sanitation received only passing

attention in the planning process. Although major water-borne disease

outbreaks, such as typhoid, cholera, and dysentery are considered to be unlikely,

climate change is expected to increase the threat of insect-borne disease, due to

habitat extensions for insects such as mosquitoes. Options identified and

discussed in the Metropolitan Water Plan regarding rainwater reuse, grey-water

use, and neighbourhood stormwater detention do not appear to have been

evaluated for potential health impacts;

• Despite government publicity stating that the various plans were developed with

widespread community consultation, much of the planning was done under a

cloak of secrecy. The opposition parties, the NSW Ombudsman, and the media

criticised the government for its “obsessive secrecy” in refusing freedom of

information applications and requiring consulting experts to enter into “cabinet-

in-confidence” secrecy agreements Australian (2005), Telegraph (2005), SMH

(2006a), Telegraph (2007));

• Despite the advice of the expert review panel, the commitment in the 2006

Metropolitan Water Plan (NSW Government (2006)) that construction of a

desalination plant would not commence unless levels in Sydney’s catchments

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drop below 30%, the government announced commencement of the plant (at a

cost of $1.9 billion) in February 2007. This was despite the catchment water

levels were still above 35%, and that there was no capital amount included in the

State Infrastructure Strategy. This decision attracted widespread criticism, being

interpreted as a political move to avoid increased water restrictions immediately

prior to the State election, held in March 2007 (SMH (2006c), SMH (2007c),

SMH (2007d), SMH (2007a), SMH (2007b)).

All of this suggests that the approach taken by those who prepared the Metropolitan

Strategy and the 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan appears to have attempted to combine a

reductionist, analytical approach to come to terms with the technical (the economic,

technological, ecological) aspects of the problem, combined with a “soft” methodology

to engage in an extensive but not particularly effective community consultation program.

This indicates that the planning authorities are taking an approach which may be

appropriate for a “Type 2” problem (as described in Chapter 3) but not for one of Type

3. Although there is a shared commitment to seeing a sustainable water system

developed to meet Sydney’s needs, there are substantial differences between parties, both

within the decision-making group (in this instance, the various government departments

and agencies) and the broader community. Progress is made coercively through secretive

decision-making processes and by the government driving through decisions which

appear to be solutions to one part of the problem but instead merely manifest themselves

as symptoms of another.

This approach does not recognise sharp differences in beliefs and values amongst the

domain of interests and does not recognise the complex, systemic characteristics of the

problem. As demonstrated in the first part of this case study, the problem is not a Type

2 problem, rather it has a uniqueness and a holistic complexity, which clearly

characterises it as being of Type 3. Because the problem is not clearly identified as a

Type 3 problem, the problem-solving approach is at best only partially effective.

Precisely the same approach flaw exists in the Expert Panel review of the 2004

Metropolitan Water Plan (DIPNR (2004)). Rather than recognising the holistic,

interconnected nature of all the elements of the water subsystem, the expert panel

focused on balancing supply and demand, without giving anything more than a mention

to important water subsystem elements, such as the sewerage, stormwater,

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environmental, and social aspects of the problem. The 2006 Metropolitan Water Plan,

although far more substantive than the initial 2004 document, misses both the systemic

nature of the water subsystem and the interrelationships which need to be identified

between the water subsystem and the greater metropolitan system. These would be

expected to be included in the Metropolitan Strategy. Because the impact of differing

beliefs and values of the domain of interests are seen as being outside the problem – this

probably gives rise to the secrecy surrounding planning of the water system – rather than

within it, large parts of the community see themselves as marginalised or entirely excluded

from the process. This is seized upon by the media as yet another reason for criticising

the government’s management of the situation in the face of a looming crisis.

Because of this disengagement or marginalisation of a significant part of the domain of

interests, due to their only partly sharing values represented in the problem definition, the

political processes tend to be poll-driven. Sectional interests dominate the decision-

making and the bureaucracy appears to be incapable of having political influence,

because it is unable to come to terms with the complexity of the problem.

Similarly, technologists – particularly engineers, in this instance – are limited by their

positivist, instrumentalist paradigm and unable to engage adequately with the breadth and

complexity of the problem. The consequence is that their influence in the decision-

making process, rather than being respected is seen more as a liability. The fragmented

approach to analysing the system results in suboptimal solutions being selected. This

further undermines the credibility of the technologists, which is tested both in terms of

their ability to identify rigorous solutions to the problem and their influence in the

political processes. Because technologists are seen to be ineffectual, an increased

scepticism emerges around the effectiveness of science and technology. This often has

the consequence that misinformation, even pseudoscience, receives significant

community and media attention.

Although lifestyle and quality of life are important to most residents of Sydney, most do

not believe in causing irreparable damage to the ecology. The Metropolitan Water Plan

does not seem to have given particular weight to a large body of work done on

catchment health and riparian well-being, in particular, in relation to the Hawkesbury-

Nepean river system. The underlying philosophical approach of both the Metropolitan

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Strategy and the Metropolitan Water Plan is one of “sustainable development” –

reference is implicitly made to a triple bottom-line approach. This paradigm is reflected

in a strategy which only allows for environmental flows in times of normal to high

rainfall. Although the alternative philosophical “sustainability” belief system is well

represented within the community and has had considerable influence in preventing

infrastructure development in the Shoalhaven Valley, this approach is seen by

government as being an impediment to progress. But both positions are represented in

the community, and, in a democratic society, the two should be acknowledged and

represented in the eventual outcome. The current planning approach appears to see this

issue as being outside the problem: an unfortunate, unwanted complication which needs

to be dealt with.

One of the major initiatives proposed in both Metropolitan Strategy and the

Metropolitan Water Plan is the development of a significant recycling capability in

western Sydney. The capital cost of developing this infrastructure has been kept

confidential and does not appear in the State Infrastructure Strategy. As noted above,

the government has been harshly criticised for undue secrecy in its decision-making. In

particular, this is the case where there is public suspicion regarding the efficient use of

government resources or that public/private participation (PPP) projects are being

utilised at substantially higher cost of capital than if the infrastructure investment was

carried out by government enterprise. Once again, this is reflective of a Type 2 problem-

structuring approach, rather than recognition that a satisfactory resolution of these sorts

of issues ought to be included within the system boundaries. Concern regarding the

business model proposed is not confined to PPP projects. As discussed earlier, there is

considerable unease regarding government enterprises, such as Sydney Water

Corporation, being required to contribute significant dividends to the State Treasury,

rather than limiting the operating surplus to providing for future capital expenditure

requirements.

As noted above, the media and the NSW Ombudsman expressed concern regarding

undue government secrecy in decision-making. The public is cynical about government

manipulation of the media and the media is critical of the government for denying it

access to information. This combines to produce an ill-informed discussion of the major

issues and limits public debate. The government becomes less sensitive to popular

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opinion, with undue attention given to opinion polls, while a countervailing force

develops, which makes the public agenda heavily influenced by the media.

A further deficiency of this planning approach is that there does not appear to be any

consideration given to how the metropolis and its various subsystems might respond to

plausible, hypothetical events. In the case of the Metropolitan Water Plan, the strategy is

framed almost entirely around a climate change scenario which would cause Sydney’s

climate to remain hot, with the city being able to cope with extended drought. No

consideration appears to have been given to alternative futures such as Sydney’s climate

remaining hot but with a much higher annual rainfall101. For a strategic plan to be

effective, it needs to be able to respond to many plausible disturbances.

This brief critique of the Metropolitan Strategy and the Metropolitan Water Plan invites

the question as to whether the problem-structuring approach developed in this

dissertation might contribute to a more satisfactory outcome. That is, whether, first of

all, employing a problem-structuring approach, which recognises the holistic complexity

of the problem, would add significant value. This would require development of a model

to represent the metropolitan system and the water subsystem of the type developed in

Part A of the case study. And second, whether such an approach could be usefully

employed in informing established decision-making techniques (such as MCDM) to

guide policy determination and the final decision-making processes. This question will

now be explored.

7.4.5 An Alternative Approach The problem-structuring methodology developed in this dissertation suggests that there

is an opportunity to take an alternative approach to problems, such as urban planning for

large metropolitan areas and associated major infrastructure investment. In recognising

the Type 3 nature of the problem and taking a holistic planning approach, many of the

issues identified above become incorporated into the problem structure itself, rather than

being seen as peripheral to it. An important first step is to recognise the Type 3 nature

of the problem prior to commencement of the formal planning process (although

101 When Sydney experiences unusually high rainfall (which seems to occur with much the same frequency

or perhaps more often than unusually low rainfall), the cause is normally due to the influence of rain depressions resulting from cyclonic activity in tropical waters hundreds of kilometres north of Sydney. It is not out of the question that climate change could increase the frequency of cyclonic activity and cause resultant rain depressions to move further south.

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acknowledging that in complex systems, such as these, the characteristics of the system

continue to evolve and must be accommodated).

For a systems approach to work effectively, particularly in social systems such as

metropolitan areas, boundary critique is especially important. This must include

identification of the domain of interests, which are represented both directly and

indirectly in the problem. It may be that different aspects of the problem might require

different boundary conditions to be considered. (For example, in the case of the Sydney

water subsystem, water catchments and riparian systems extend over 200 km south-west

of the city centre but less than 100 km to the north. In the case of the energy subsystem,

the coal-fired electrical generating capacity, which supplies most of the needs of the

metropolitan area, is up 150 km to the north and north-west of the city centre, with none

being to the south.) Boundary critique also drives consideration of the various

dimensions, which can be used to represent problem information. For example, many of

political and social aspects of the problem, which are otherwise viewed as impediments

to progress, are now included in the problem definition. The result is that the political

and social discourse occurs as part of the problem-structuring and ultimate problem

resolution. These issues are “swept in” to the problem boundaries.

Historically, consideration of the water subsystem has been primarily technologically

driven. The obvious reason for this is that there are significant technological challenges

to construct and manage water system infrastructure. However, there is another

pressure, which influences development of the water subsystem. As noted in the initial

narrative, this is due to the institutions responsible for this infrastructure having been

dominated by technologists, primarily engineers. Consequently, particular technological

approaches have been favoured over others (for example, water carriage, rather than dry

conservancy).

But the holistic, systemic nature of the subsystem and the interrelationships which exist

across the subsystem boundaries into the metropolitan system itself must be recognised.

This provides important insights as to how holistic approaches can be taken to evaluate

potential solutions and how these may be integrated into the final outcome. Such an

approach achieves two things. First, it avoids over-emphasis of one subsystem element

(in the case considered here, the water supply), without adequate consideration being

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given to other important subsystem elements (in this case, the consideration of various

options in relation to sewerage, stormwater treatment, riparian flows, health implications,

economic implications and other factors identified in the dimensional analysis of the

problem subsystem). And second, it allows the identification of potential opportunities

to employ alternatives beyond those which are represented in the established

technological paradigm.

Furthermore, the qualitative system model allows the exploration of a range of scenarios

representing ways in which the system might respond to a variety of hypothetical but

plausible disturbances. This allows an assortment of strategic responses to be considered

and their potential impact on the entire domain of interests to be evaluated, across all

problem dimensions.

Thus, the broad process steps of an alternative approach proposed are these:

1. Establish a working group which is broadly representative of the domain of

interests;

2. Undertake the problem-structuring approach (as developed in Chapter 6 and

demonstrated in this chapter), with two fundamental aims in mind:

a. to develop a rich, qualitative model of the problem system, which

structures rather than discards problem information; and second

b. to explore critically the response of this system model to the hypothetical

disturbances. Thus, the decision-making domain becomes informed

regarding the:

i. intrinsic values (both of object and moral kind);

ii. extrinsic values; and

iii. preferences, which might be attributed to various members of the

domain of interests;

As noted earlier, these might be used to inform the development of a values

hierarchy (see Step 4 below);

3. Develop a set of narratives to be used in community engagement to confirm and

enrich the understanding of the problems system;

4. Construct a values hierarchy, based on the information developed in the first

three steps. This would use the insights gained from the critique of the cognitive

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maps, the exploration of the system response to the hypothetical disturbances,

and the interrogation of the narratives;

5. Utilise multi-criteria decision analysis techniques to understand objectively the

impact of options from which a solution to the problems system can be selected.

That is, develop a practical solution, which satisfactorily acknowledges and takes

into account the needs of the entire domain of interests.

The critical approach underpinning the technique developed here, in particular,

evaluating the trilemmas and a set of narratives, can give significant insight into several

steps in the process above. The contribution in relation to Step 2 has been discussed

earlier and will not be elaborated upon further here. However, little has been said so far

regarding Step 4, the construction of the values hierarchy, and Step 5, identification of

potential options for evaluation during the decision-making process.

The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values and the importance of this in coming

to terms with Type 3 problems has been emphasised in a number of places in this

dissertation. The critical discussion and evaluation, which takes place as the trilemmas

are constructed, and when the “As-Is” system model is characterised and described,

would be expected to be of use in identifying issues of extrinsic value and both types of

intrinsic value (those of the object kind and those of the moral kind). The way in which

this is achieved is through the critique of the trilemmas by considering the interactions

between the forces represented in the triangle. The trilemma device can be considered to

be a means by which intrinsic and extrinsic values can be identified and distinguished (see

Chapter 6, section 6.3.5.1.3). The reason this is important is because the different types

of values (that is, “object” intrinsic values, “moral” intrinsic values, and extrinsic values)

would be expected to require quite different types of criteria or indicators at the lower levels in

the values hierarchy. Although a process for achieving this was not developed here, it is

thought that this would be a fruitful area for further investigation.

The other application where the approach developed in this dissertation would be

expected to be useful is in the identification of options for evaluation in the decision-

making process itself (that is, in Step 5). In this case, the trilemma device can be used as

an end in the problem-structuring process. As the utopic, dystopic, and plausible future

states of each system element are considered during the critique, it requires consideration

of likely responses of the trilemma system element. Thus, it sheds light on possible paths

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forward in order to resolve the problem. These can be considered as candidate strategies

for evaluation in the multi-criteria decision-making process.

The conclusion drawn from this brief critique suggests that the problem-structuring

approach developed in this dissertation provides a powerful means by which to critique

established urban planning and infrastructure planning approaches. It also suggests an

alternative means to undertake this planning, which would appear to have substantial

advantages over existing methodologies.

7.4.6 Concluding Remarks This case study set out to test three key propositions of the thesis in the context of a real

problem situation. The first of these was to confirm that the problem under

consideration – the development of the Sydney metropolitan water system – was indeed

a Type 3 problem. That is, it was to demonstrate that the Type 3 problem actually exists.

The two other propositions relate to application of the problem-structuring approach

developed in Chapter 6. The first application is prospective in its nature: it seeks to use

general systems theory as the paradigm for modelling the system, and to develop a

problem representation which uses established behavioural and cognitive psychology

theory. This is framework is used to structure the information in such a way that it aligns

with human behaviour and cognitive function. In this case, a robust, qualitative model of

the metropolitan system and the water subsystem was conceived.

The second application is retrospective. Having developed a system model and subjected it

to a robust critique from a wide representation of the domain of interests, a framework

was thereby created against which other approaches can be tested and evaluated. In this

case, the planning approach developed by the NSW State government was evaluated. In

addition, it was anticipated that examples relating to the other important issues identified

in the dissertation might be identified. For example, the distinction between

sustainability and sustainable development, and engineering practice might be expected

to be topics of interest in consideration of metropolitan water systems. The approach

was successful in this application, identifying a clear position of sustainable development

in government planning process. In addition, a dated paradigm underlying the

government planning process was identified. This appears to be ineffectual in dealing

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with Type 3 problems of the complexity of the metropolitan water system. This

application also enabled an alternative paradigm to planning to be outlined.

7.4.6.1 Characterisation of the Type 3 problem The historical narrative describing the evolution of Sydney’s water system and the

institutional arrangements which evolved to develop and manage it points out that the

metropolitan water system increased in complexity over the two centuries or so of

Sydney’s history, evolving through all three stages of problem complexity. It is only in

the last 30 years that the system evolved into a Type 3 problem. Interestingly, this

coincides with the divergence between the predominant worldview of the Sydney

community from the established, instrumentalist, positivist worldview to which

engineering practice has largely adhered for the last 70 years or so. This suggests that

there are opportunities for engineers to reconsider the underlying approach to 21st-

century practice, in the context of the philosophical principles developed in Chapter 4.

An important consideration of the Type 3 problem (which was the focus of the first part

of the case study), was the moral position taken by the participants in the Warren Centre

project regarding sustainability. In section 2.5.1, two distinct moral positions were

identified: a “conservationist” approach (as represented in the “sustainable development”

position) and “deep ecology” approach (as found in the “sustainability” position). The

full spectrum of beliefs and values appeared to be represented among participants. There

was no explicit discussion of these two philosophical positions as part of the formal

project activity, however there was informal discussion, in particular in relation to issues

such as the health of the Hawkesbury-Nepean and the Shoalhaven river systems. It is

perhaps a deficiency of the case study that these issues were not explored more

thoroughly, so as to make them unequivocal. In the second part of the case study, the

prevailing paradigm was one of sustainable development – the “triple bottom-line”

approach was explicitly stated in the State government planning documents.

7.4.6.2 Demonstration of the problem-structuring approach Part A of the case study provided a full demonstration of the way in which the problem-

structuring approach is used in a real application. The process was established to engage

representatives of the full domain of interests, resulting in a rich, robust system model.

The response of this model was tested using scenario analysis and the outcome subjected

to critique by members of the project team. An important outcome of this work was a

body of information, accepted by participants as descriptive of the range of worldviews

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represented in the domain of interests. To call this “objective” information, or even

“rationally determined” information, would not be entirely accurate, because of the range

of beliefs and values influencing both identification and interpretation of this information

– in such a situation, true objectivity is neither achievable nor desirable. The important

point is that the information derived from this approach is an agreed representation of the

problem, which incorporates all the important issues, irrespective of interpretation. This

recognises that there will be different, even opposing interpretations of the agreed

problem information, according to the worldview and belief system of the reader.

This body of information is useful in two ways. It can be the first step in developing a

solution to the problem, providing useful background for objective investigation of the

problem in order to identify a range of potential solutions for evaluation. This was

confirmed in Part A of the case study. Alternatively, the approach can be used to inform

critical examination of other approaches which might be used to identify solutions to the

problem. Part B of the case study demonstrated such a critique.

7.4.6.3 Critique of Alternative Methodologies The NSW State government appears to have undertaken a significant amount of work,

through its agencies and departments, to prepare a set of integrated, long-term strategic

planning documents at state, metropolis, and agency level. However, critical examination

of this process identified significant deficiencies. These can be thought of as being a

consequence of two broad defects in the governments planning process. The first of

these is that this systemic nature of the metropolis and the water system is not

recognised. This creates a number of issues:

• Too much emphasis is given to one system element (the supply of water),

appearing not to recognise the relationships between water supply and other

system elements;

• System boundaries are not established and, hence, there is no clear delineation as

to what interests should be included or excluded from consideration in the

problem;

• The multidimensional nature of the problem is not recognised, with a

consequence that important issues are seen to be external to the problem rather

than part of it. (Surprisingly, the political dimension, as an election approached,

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appears to have been assumed to be outside the system boundary, rather than

within it),

• The plan appears to have been developed in pieces, following a mechanistic

model, rather than having been developed using a holistically defined planning

process.

The second defect is that the approach used by the government fails to acknowledge the

existence of diverse worldviews within the domain of interests. The approach taken by

the government is one of sustainable development. This would be less of a problem if

the structure of the approach at least acknowledged that there is a significant worldview

represented in the community which takes a sustainability approach. In many aspects,

catchment and riparian management are at odds with sustainable development.

Acknowledging this difference and seeking solutions which might satisfy the aspirations

of both groups would be one way to avoid conflict. The conclusion drawn here is that

the current paradigm underlying the planning approach, despite very significant resources

being committed to it, has substantial deficiencies. Utilising a planning framework

integrating the problem-structuring approach developed in this dissertation, together

with established multi-criteria decision analysis techniques as broadly outlined in section

7.4.5 of this chapter, would provide an opportunity for major reform of the planning

process.

7.4.6.4 Reflexive Critique and Lessons Learned from the Case Study An as noted in Chapter 1, qualitative research is influenced by the beliefs, values and

worldview of the researcher, in relation to the problem being investigated. In evaluating

the case study, it is important to recognize the influence of these on the case study

outcome. The most significant of these was the influence applied by the researcher in

adopting the systems methodology which was developed in Chapter 6 as the framework

for undertaking the Warren Centre project. The methodology which was considered by

the project steering committee in contrast to the approach used here was the traditional

business strategic planning approach. Proponents of this approach argued that such an

approach was tried and tested and, were it to be applied in such a way as to ensure

widespread community consultation, it would be expected to deliver a reasonable

outcome. The opposing view (argued by the author and which ultimately prevailed), was

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that several attempts, using this type of approach, had been made previously to resolve

the Sydney metropolitan water problem but these have not been successful.

Because this problem-structuring approach was new (the case study was its first

application), it was subject to considerable modification as the engagement of project

team members took place. Although a framework for conducting the case study had

been prepared in advance, changes were made as suggestions for improvement were

contributed. The author attempted to be open-minded and encouraging of suggestions

to improve the process, however not all either could or should have been accepted. As

noted earlier, this resulted in some criticism that some outcomes were unduly reflective

of the researchers values (the most notable example being the preparation of the

strawman narrative). It is important to note however, that this should not be seen as a

particular defect of the process, unless the fundamental philosophical principle of the

practitioner being engaged as part of the system (rather than independent and detached

from it) is rejected. For subsequent cases, one means to avoid this issue would be to

have more than one process facilitator, so that multiple perspectives and worldviews can

be brought to the process, thereby widening the attractiveness to the participants.

A related point is that the meaning of language used in the problem evolved as people’s

understanding of the problem increased. As familiarity with the approach grew, the

process was accepted by most participants as being a powerful means by which to frame

complex issues and to understand the relationships that exist between various parts of

the system. It is important that the tendency towards creating jargon is resisted and that

the language used to describe features of the problem system is widely accessible to

people who may not be familiar with the problem itself. In terms of facilitating the

modelling process, a glossary of terms and a process manual could be prepared. Such a

manual should not be prescriptive but rather should provide general guidance. However,

this does not address the use of jargon in the resultant narratives. The critique of the

narratives needs to identify the use of jargon, either ensuring that it is fully explained or

contextualised before the narratives are finally disseminated to the their intended

audiences.

In conclusion, the three stated aims of the case study were satisfied: the existence of the

Type 3 problem was established through the example of the metropolitan water system

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in Sydney. The problem-structuring approach was demonstrated. And a number of clear

benefits of using this approach in comparison to establish planning practices were

identified.

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Appendix 7.1 – Outline of Problem-Structuring Approach

Problem Statement

The question or issue to be addressed is stated concisely.

Problem System and Sub-System Boundary Definition and Critique

The system boundary is defined and subjected to group critique in order to establish those

aspects of problem which are to be included and those which are to be excluded. It is

important to note that consideration of the system boundary needs to take into account

all dimensions of the problem (the three spatial dimensions and the temporal dimension).

Aspects of the problem which require detailed examination or which are thought to be

major influences on system behaviour are represented as sub-systems. Sub-systems are

also subjected to boundary critique.

As part of this process, problem dimensions are determined in order to add richness and

depth to the system under consideration.

Preparation of Background Narrative

Depending on the particular problem under consideration, a background narrative may

be required, both to establish problem typology (that is, to confirm the existence of a

Type 3 problem) and as a means to introduce participants to the richness of the problem

system. Not all problems require the preparation of a background narrative. Typical

problems where narrative preparation might be considered useful would be those

situations where there has been an awareness of the issue for a considerable time, but

with little progress being made because of conflicting perspectives on the problem and

how it should be resolved. Major infrastructure problems (water, power generation, and

intractable waste disposal are typical of such problems). Whether or not a background

narrative is prepared will largely depend on project participants and their knowledge of

the problem itself. In some cases, it may be more valuable to prepare the background

narrative (at least in draft form) prior to undertaking the problem system and sub-system

boundary definition and critique. In this case, a further revision of the narrative is be

required to incorporate information resulting from the boundary definition and critique.

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Identification of Problem Dichotomies and Forces at Work within the

System

Problem dichotomies represent conflicts, choices, opposites, and forces in tension which,

taken together, are representative or symptomatic of system behaviour. Underlying each

dichotomy is one or more forces within the system, which resolve to determine the system

state at any point in time. Through identifying problem dichotomies, force-pairs can be

discovered. In some cases dichotomies will be directly representative of force-pairs,

while in others they will be symptomatic of underlying force-pairs, which then need to be

identified. Identification of force-pairs is used to inform the later construction of

trilemmas, which, in turn, are used to represent system elements.

The way in which problem dichotomies are identified is through a well-established,

facilitated technique known as “brainstorming”. In this process, participants engage in a

free-ranging discussion of the issue, followed by the rapid proposition of dichotomy

candidates. No criticism is allowed during a brainstorming session, so as not to stem the

flow of ideas. Once all the dichotomies have been identified, each is analysed critically to

determine the nature of the force-pair underlying it. In some cases, dichotomies may

have no underlying force-pair, in which case they are discarded. There is considerable

skill required from a facilitator in conducting this process to ensure that all participants

have an equal voice and that the brainstorm list is elicited creatively and freely.

Representation of System Elements (Trilemmas)

Trilemmas are triadic constructs of three system forces in tension, which result in system

states at any point in time. The system forces are represented by the arrows within the

triad and the system states are described at vertices of the triad (see Figure 6.5).

Although the system forces need not be independent, they form true trilemmas only when

the forces would be expected to act in tension when the system is subject to a substantial

shock or disturbance. The system state represented at the vertex, when its associated

force is dominant, can either be highly desirable, that is, utopic, or highly undesirable, that

is, dystopic. Practically, the actual system state is a plausible combination located

somewhere between the two.

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Characterisation of the “As-Is” System State

The “As-Is” system state is a word-rich description of each system element, describing its

current state. In turn, each force in the triad is set aside and the relationship between the

remaining two forces is explored and the consequent effect upon the system states

represented at each vertex. This illuminates the balance between the utopic and dystopic

system states, which were identified in the previous step, by assuming each force in turn

to be dominant over the other two. The “As-Is” system states can be represented at the

vertices of the triad by describing a plausible future in words, sitting between the utopic

and dystopic positions. Alternatively, a summary “As-Is” system state can be described.

In this instance, the plausible system states represented at each vertex are synthesised

into a paragraph describing the state of the system element as a whole. In both cases, a

symbol is placed within the triad indicating the approximate place where the three forces

resolve.

Investigation of the system response to a Plausible, Hypothetical

Disturbance

A plausible, hypothetical disturbance is introduced to the system and the likely system

response is considered. Analysis of the system response is intuitive, so that many different

perspectives and worldviews, representing those of the entire domain of interests, can be

incorporated into the qualitative system model. Different types of disturbances can be

imagined (for example, sudden step-changes, more gradual ramp-changes, and so on).

Scenarios can then be envisioned to represent how the system might ultimately respond,

together with insight as to how it might achieve the new system state. An important

consideration in conceiving the hypothetical disturbance is that it is selected with a view

to ensuring that it impacts widely over the whole system. Plausible, hypothetical

disturbances can be simple (for example, a 100% increase in the price of water) or can

represent more complex interactions of parameters. It is suggested here that to consider

more than three parameters in the disturbance becomes unmanageable. Furthermore, a

disturbance with three parameters can be characterised comprehensively by representing

it as a triad or “disturbance triangle”. This can be a useful approach when there are

several “meta-issues” to be considered.

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Two scenarios are considered in response to the introduction of the disturbance:

“Likely Future” Response of the “As-Is” System

The “Likely Future” system response of each trilemma is visualised.

“Desired Future” Response of the “As-Is” System

The “Desired Future” response of each trilemma is visualised.

In both cases, depending on the size of the participant group, exploration of both “As-

Is” and “Desired Future” system responses can either be carried out in a single plenary

session or, desirably, in small groups. This type of discussion is often most productive in

groups of five to seven people, with a facilitator ensuring that no one position is

dominant and that all group members have the opportunity to contribute. For example,

if there were about 20 participants, three small, facilitated groups could be asked to

consider the responses of the system. Each group prepares a brief report and presents

this to a plenary session of all participants. Plenary discussion contrasting the three

approaches yields further insights into the response of the problem-system.

Once these two cases have been investigated, consideration is given to what changes

would be required to the “As-Is” System model for it to be able to achieve the “Desired

Future” response.

Changes Required to the “As-Is” System Model to Achieve the “Desired

Future” System State

The necessary changes to each trilemma are visualised for the total system to be able

to deliver the “Desired Future”.

The process used to determine changes required to the “As-Is” system model is much the

same as that used to determine the “As-Is” and “Desired Future” system responses

noted above. Each trilemma, in turn, is considered in facilitated, small-group discussion,

followed by a plenary discussion of the output of the groups.

Up to this point, focus has been on the way in which system elements are likely to

respond to the disturbance. Consideration is now given to the way in which the whole

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system would respond, taking into account relationships which would be expected to

exist between system elements. Particular attention is given to the system states which

are represented at the vertex of each system element.

Integrated System Model Development

Once the trilemma analysis is complete, relationships are identified between system

states, trilemmas, and forces in order to produce a depiction of the integrated problem

system. This system model is then utilised to inform thinking about the holistic nature of

the system in its response to disturbances.

Again, this is achieved through facilitated, plenary discussion. Consensus representations

of each trilemma are placed on posters (for example, on flip-chart paper, and fixed to a

large wall) and relationships drawn in between trilemmas, vertices, pairs of vertices, or

system forces. The aim of this step is to identify where the major influences exist

between system elements and to gain some insight as to how the system might respond

as a whole. There should be no constraints on the extent to which the system is

represented: the trilemma system map should be embellished by notes, comments,

depictions, and text. These should all be recorded for future reference (a small digital

camera is useful for this task).

Narrative Development

The next step in the process is to develop a set of “agreed” or “uncontested” problem

information. It is important to note that agreement and contestability of information only

relate to whether or not the issues identified are significant in determining system

response. Interpretations of influence of these issues may differ significantly between

individual participants, depending on the worldviews or perspectives of various members

of the domain of interests and these interpretations may be in conflict. This information

is identified through plenary discussion and critique.

In order to represent the set of information and to arrive at some understanding of how

this information affects system response, various interpretations are captured in a set of

narratives. The narratives have two functions: one is to produce a rich, comprehensive

description of the problem itself, including interpretations of how the problem system

might respond to the hypothetical disturbances; and the other is to use this information

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to engage with the domain of interests by presenting an array of different interpretations

and representations to choose from. That is to say, taken as a whole, the set of narratives

represents the accumulated knowledge and understanding of how the system is currently

and how it might respond to a disturbance.

Once the narratives have been prepared, they are subject to critique, not only to ensure

that the agreed problem information is represented within the narrative, but so that they

are as free as possible of the jargon which may have emerged during the problem-

structuring analysis. These narratives are then used to engage as wide a representation of

the domain of interests is possible.


Appendix 7.2 – System and water subsystem boundary critique

This boundary critique follows the twelve questions identified by Ulrich with minor modification (Ulrich’s system was originally conceived of for

planning delivery of social services) Ulrich (1987)). Ulrich’s twelve “boundary questions” are intended to provide a means by which the normative

and objective content of the system design may be challenged or disputed, either by the designer or by those affected by it.

Metropolitan system boundary critique The metropolitan system is defined as being bounded by the greater Sydney metropolitan area, plus current and future water catchments

and resources. The metropolitan system considered here are those aspects of the metropolis which relate either directly or indirectly to the water

subsystem.

“AS IS” “DESIRABLE FUTURE”

SOURCES OF MOTIVATION SOURCES OF MOTIVATION CRITIQUE

1. Who is the beneficiary of the system (S)?

The inhabitants of the metropolis of Sydney.

1. Who ought to be the beneficiary of the system, S?


The metropolis is a human social system which exists for the benefit of its constituents.

2. What is the purpose of S, that is, what goal states is S able to achieve so as to serve the beneficiary?

Economic, social, and environmental prosperity.

2. What ought to the purpose of S, that is, what goal states ought S be able to achieve so as to serve the beneficiary?

Economic, social, and environmental prosperity.

The aim for a sustainable metropolis is long-term prosperity without compromising other moral interests.

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“AS IS” “DESIRABLE FUTURE” SOURCES OF MOTIVATION SOURCES OF MOTIVATION CRITIQUE

3. What is S’s measure of success (or improvement)?

A broad range of economic, social, and environmental indicators.

3. What ought to be S’s measure of success (or improvement)?

A broad range of economic, social, and environmental indicators.

There is considerable difficulty in identifying appropriate indicators which fully represent both the prosperity of the metropolis and the interests of non-human constituents. A range of both quantitative and qualitative indicators is needed.

4. Who is the decision-maker, that is, has the power to change S’s measure of improvement?

The State government of New South Wales (NSW). The Federal government of Australia.

4. Who ought to be the decision-maker, that is, have the power to change S’s measure of improvement?

The State government of NSW and the Federal government of Australia in consultation with representatives of the domain of interests.

Although socially stable and prosperous, there is ongoing dissatisfaction in the way in which the challenges of growth of the metropolitan system are handled by the State government in particular and, in some instances, the relevant Federal instrumentalities.

5. What components (resources and constraints) of S are controlled by the decision-maker?

All fiscal, social, and environmental policy parameters within the constraints and influences of a liberal democracy.

5. What components (resources and constraints) of S ought to be controlled by the decision-maker?

All fiscal, social, and environmental policy parameters within the constraints and influences of a liberal democracy.

Many members of the domain of interests feel excluded from the decision-making process and lacking in influence in planning outcomes, particularly those relating to the development of social and service infrastructure.

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6. What aspects of the problem are part of S’s environment, that is, should not be controlled by S’s decision-maker?

Municipal/community and national resources which are independent of the greater system.

6. What aspects of the problem ought to be part of S’s environment, that is, should not be controlled by S’s decision-maker?

Municipal/community and national resources which are independent of the greater system.

The challenge for policy-makers is to engage the domain of interests, taking important perspectives into account to arrive at an informed, responsible path to development of the metropolis which takes into account all moral interests of the constituency.

7. Who is involved as designer of S?

The State government of NSW, under the administrative advice of the NSW Public Service, with some portfolio responsibility being with the Federal government.

7. Who ought to be involved as designer of S?

The State government of NSW, under the administrative advice of the NSW Public Service, with some portfolio responsibility being with the Federal government.

There is a pervasive societal view within the metropolis that political processes are unnecessarily secretive and exclusive and that broader consultation with the domain of interests is desirable.

8. What kind of expertise does flow into the design of S, that is, who is considered an expert and what is his/her role?

Restricted professional expertise largely identified and selected by the NSW Public Service.

8. What kind of expertise ought to flow into the design of S, that is, who ought to be considered an expert and what should be his/her role?

A richer cross-section of expertise representing an appropriate balance of technical competence and community representation.

The NSW government uses a select group of consultants and advisers which is generally constrained by legally binding confidentiality arrangements. A broader utilisation of expertise representing the entire domain of interests is desirable.

9. Who is the guarantor of S, that is, where does the designer seek the guarantee that his/her design will be implemented and will prove successful, judged by S’s measure of success (or improvement)?

The State government of NSW (with the Federal government having responsibility in specific areas).

9. Who ought to be the guarantor of S, that is, where ought the designer seek the guarantee that his/her design will be implemented and will prove successful, judged by S’s measure of success (or improvement)?

The State government of NSW (with the Federal government having responsibility in specific areas) with additional community consultation through the democratic process.

Greater utilisation of the various instruments of the democratic process is desirable.

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10. Who is the witness representing the moral interests that will or might be affected by the design of S? That is to say, who among the affected does get involved?

Political parties, media, government bureaucrats, consulting firms.

10. Who ought to belong to the witnesses representing the moral interests that will or might be affected by the design of S? That is to say, who among the affected ought to get involved or represent those involved?

Political parties, media, government bureaucrats, consulting firms, community groups, non-government organisations, environmental groups, professional institutions.

A broad range of institutions and other representatives should be involved in major policy decisions affecting the long-term sustainability of the metropolis. These should be actively engaged by local, state, and Federal government from policy development right the way through to implementation and legitimation.

11. To what degree and in what way are those affected given the chance of emancipation from the premises and promises of those involved?

Current institutional arrangements only partially recognise the moral interests of those other than the human inhabitants of the metropolis.

11. To what degree and in what way ought those affected be given the chance of emancipation from the premises and promises of those involved?

The sustainability/sustainable development discourse should be broadened to include all moral interests in the constituency.

The domain of interests should be engaged in the sustainability/sustainable development discourse so that the worldview to be adopted when policy determination has matured properly reflects the interests of the entire constituency.

12. Upon what worldviews of either those involved or those affected is S’s design based?

The anthropocentric worldviews largely prevails, with human interests being placed above those of other species and ecosystems. Late-modern capitalism is the predominant influence on most aspects of government.

12. Upon what worldviews of either those involved or those affected ought S’s design be based?

In this critique, the sustainability worldview is preferred over and above the sustainable development position for long-term viability of the complete domain of interests.

To the extent that long-term sustainability of the metropolis currently enters policy considerations, the paradigm is one of sustainable development. Hence, human interests are placed above those of other interests within the constituency.

er 7 – Case Study : Sydney’s Water System…

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1. Who is the beneficiary of the water subsystem (Sub-S)?


1. Who ought to be the beneficiary of the Sub-S?


The water system itself exists to support development of the metropolis of Sydney. The important point to consider is that in developing such a system, it ought to be done without compromising the interests or well being of other species or ecosystems.

2. What is the purpose of Sub-S, that is, what goal states is able to achieve so as to serve the beneficiary?

To provide water, sewerage, sanitation, drainage, and waste treatment facilities and services for the metropolitan system.

2. What ought to the purpose of Sub-S, that is, what goal states ought Sub-S be able to achieve so as to serve the beneficiary?

To provide a sustainable subsystem of water, sewerage, sanitation, drainage and waste treatment facilities and services for the metropolitan system.

The purpose of the water system ought to be to provide facilities and services for the metropolitan system but without compromising downstream riparian health, the ecological integrity of catchments, or otherwise compromise the interests of the constituency.

The physical water subsystem is defined as being bounded by the catchment, storage, distribution and logistics, recycling, sewage and

stormwater removal and treatment, and waterborne waste disposal infrastructure, together with the resources required to construct,

operate, and maintain them.

Water subsystem boundary critique

Chapt


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3. What is Sub-S’s measure of success (or improvement)?

Provision of adequate water and satisfactory sanitation and stormwater drainage for the metropolitan system, without the need for constraints due to an inadequate supply of water or deficiencies in sanitation and stormwater requirements.

3. What ought to be Sub-S’s measure of success (or improvement)?

Provision of a sustainable water, sanitation, and stormwater drainage system which does not compromise the economic well-being of the metropolitan system and also takes into account the requirements for environmental, ecological, and social prosperity.

A range of both qualitative and quantitative indicators needs to be developed which fully represents the integral nature of both the water system and metropolitan system, and which takes into account the interests of all stakeholders.

4. Who is the decision-maker, that is, has the power to change Sub-S’s measure of improvement?

Ultimate decision-making authority sits with the NSW State government, with most responsibility delegated to Sydney Water Corporation and Sydney Catchment Management Authority. Federal government has some portfolio responsibility, for example, environmental regulation.

4. Who ought to be the decision-maker, that is, have the power to change Sub-S’s measure of improvement?

An independent statutory authority (or authorities) accountable to the domain of interests.

As often happens with Type 3 problems, the issues of the water subsystem have become heavily politicised. Bringing a greater independence to the issue so that special interests do not have an undue influence on policy would be better achieved with a fully independent governance model.

5. What components (resources and constraints) of Sub-S is controlled by the decision-maker?

Virtually all resources are controlled by the decision-maker.

5. What components (resources and constraints) of Sub-S ought to be controlled by the decision-maker?

All decisions ought to be controlled by the decision-maker but should be made on a fully informed basis after wide consultation with representatives of the domain of interests.

The politicisation of Sub-S has resulted in a constrained and secretive planning and design process which largely excludes community and broader moral interests.


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6. What aspects of the problem are part of Sub-S’s environment, that is, should not be controlled by Sub-S’s decision-maker?

The technically-determined parameters which define the requirements of the water subsystem

6. What aspects of the problem ought to be part of Sub-S’s environment, that is, should not be controlled by Sub-S’s decision-maker?

The range of socially- and technically-determined parameters which define the requirements of the water subsystem

There should be a clearly defined consultative process established early in problem identification and planning which identifies the full range of parameters which are important to the entire constituency of the metropolitan system (S) to which Sub-S must respond.

7. Who is involved as designer of Sub-S?

Sydney Water Corporation in consultation with Sydney Catchment Authority has ultimate authority for the design. Much of this is outsourced to preferred private sector engineering companies.

7. Who ought to be involved as designer of Sub-S?

Sydney Water Corporation, in consultation with Sydney Catchment Authority and other relevant agencies, should have ultimate authority for the design. Sub-contracting design to the private sector is effective provided all areas of expertise required are readily available and that contextual history of the subsystem is properly maintained.

When the Water Board was disbanded and corporatised, the engineering resources were largely dismantled, with the technical design responsibility being sub contract to the private sector. The result was a considerable loss of “corporate memory” and experience. Privatisation of design may well be the optimal solution provided there is a means to preserve important historical context.


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8. What kind of expertise does flow into the design of S, that is, who is considered an expert and what is his/her role?

The main design expertise sits largely within the various disciplines of engineering.

8. What kind of expertise ought to flow into the design of Sub-S, that is, who ought to be considered an expert and what should be his/her role?

There ought to be an extension beyond the purely technical domain of engineering to ensure that the subsystem as optimal interaction with the metropolitan system as a whole.

For the last 150 years, the predominant influence on design of Sub-S has been the various disciplines of engineering. The reliance on the purely engineering solution has potentially constrained the introduction of innovative solutions which may be more beneficial to the broad domain of interests in the long-term. The purely technical engineering paradigm should be extended to include non-engineering input.

9. Who is the guarantor of Sub-S, that is, where does the designer seek the guarantee that his/her design will be implemented and will prove successful, judged by Sub-S’s measure of success (or improvement)?

The guarantor of the Sub-S design sits with the State government of NSW, which is democratically accountable to the people of the metropolis.

9. Who ought to be the guarantor of Sub-S, that is, where ought the designer seek the guarantee that his/her design will be implemented and will prove successful, judged by Sub-S’s measure of success (or improvement)?

The guarantor of the Sub-S design should with the State government of NSW, which is democratically accountable to the people of the metropolis.

Ultimate responsibility sits with the State government of NSW through two acts of Parliament. The use of democratic processes to inform design of systems and subsystems within the community represented by the State of NSW is largely limited to four yearly state elections. Greater use of referendum or other consultative processes could increased both democratic participation and accountability of the State government.


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10. Who is the witness representing the moral interests that will or might be affected by the design of Sub-S? That is to say, who among those affected does to get involved?

There is no formal representation of all moral interests which it within the boundaries of Sub-S. Some special interest groups such as environmental and conservation organisations speak for non human species. Community groups representing those of affected communities often have significant voice.

10. Who ought to belong to the witnesses representing the moral interests that will or might be affected by the design of Sub-S? That is to say, who among those affected ought to get involved or represent those involved?

A more formal process to recognise moral interests and take them into account so that the purely technical is not overly influential in design of Sub-S.

Representation of all moral interests is limited to environmental and ecological legislation and the extent to which special interest groups influence design of Sub-S.

11. To what degree and in what way are those affected given the chance of emancipation from the premises and promises of those involved?

Processes are largely informal, with the loudest voice being given most weight.

11. To what degree and in what way ought those affected be given the chance of emancipation from the premises and promises of those involved?

There ought to be a process by which the complete range of moral interests in Sub-S identified and formally represented.

A formally constituted process to identify the full range of moral interests should be considered.

12. Upon what worldviews of either the involved or those affected is Sub-S’s design based?

The predominant worldview on design and operation of Sub-S. is the instrumentalist engineering paradigm.

12. Upon what worldviews of either the involved or those affected ought Sub-S’s design be based?

The worldview ought to represent both the technological and broader non-technological issues relating to the design of sub-S.

The worldview which has influenced the development and design of sub-S. has been predominantly the instrumentalist, positivist engineering paradigm, which is now somewhat out of step with broader community expectations. Furthermore it does not fully acknowledge or non-human interests, generally placing the means of humanity above those of other species and ecosystems.


Appendix 7.3 – Background Narrative : Sydney’s Water System

Note: three official histories of the Sydney Water Board have been cited extensively here, in most instances referring to author name and page number only: Henry, F.J. (1939), The Water Supply and Sewerage of Sydney, Halstead Press Pty Ltd, Sydney, Aird, A.W., (1961) The water supply, sewerage, and drainage of Sydney, 1788-1960, Hallstead

Press Pty Ltd, Sydney, and Beazley, M. (1988), The Sweat of Their Brows: 100 Years of the Sydney Water Board, 1888-1988, Water

Board, Sydney, Illawarra, Blue Mountains, Sydney, Australia

Introduction This narrative is to briefly trace both the development of the metropolitan water,

sewerage, drainage system and to consider the underlying arrangements for the

institutions responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the system.

In doing so, there are two underlying intentions. First, is to provide reader with a

comprehensive understanding of the way in which the water system developed as the city

of Sydney grew over the last two centuries or so into a substantial metropolis and to

provide background information for the other parts of the case study – that is, to provide

both a temporal and a spatial representation of the problem. And second, is to establish

that the problem of providing a sustainable water system for Sydney is indeed a Type 3

complex problem. The narrative places particular emphasis on the development of the

institutional arrangements for development of the water system because it is argued here

that this is both reflective of and germane to the nature of this problem.

Broadly speaking, since European settlement in 1788, there have been four eras of

differing institutional arrangements. The first of these was the progressive development

of relatively minor infrastructure to provide water for the newly established township

and, as its population grew over the subsequent fifty years or so, to address issues of

security of water supply and sanitation. This work was done under the direction of the

Governor and, later, with advice from the Governor-appointed Legislative Council. The

second phase began in the 1840s and continued for about 40 years. This was a

transitional period as responsibility for water administration was progressively transferred

from the Governor to a municipal Council for the newly-declared City of Sydney and

subsequently to the Legislative Assembly established in 1856. The third phase

commenced in 1888 with the appointment of a statutory board to oversee and manage

the water supply and sewerage systems and this continued for about a century. The final

era commenced in the 1970s with major reforms to the statutory authority and continues

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to the present day. The general thrust of the argument presented here is that these

institutional arrangements are both reflective of and, in part, responsible for the

emergence of the Type 3 problem, which exists with Sydney’s water system.

The early era – colonial government At the Royal Commission into Sydney’s water supply in 1869, Prof. Smith, the chairman

of the Commission, summarised the history of the city’s water supply up to that time

(Smith (1869a)). The original choice by Governor Phillip of the location for the

settlement was made on the basis of having a clean water supply, so the Sydney Cove

site, with its clear stream, was selected. Unfortunately, plentiful water was not to be

found: Smith quotes an article in the Sydney Gazette (19 October 1811), which refers to a

drought in the second year of settlement, 1789, during which the colony nearly ran out of

water. The Governor ordered that three tanks be cut into the sandstone banks of the

stream, near where Hunter and Pitt Streets now intersect, to hold additional water for dry

times. Although the exact time of construction is not clear, Smith dated the tanks (which

gave the Tank Stream its name) at about 1802. It was not long before these were

becoming polluted and regulations were orders were given by the Governor in 1810 to

protect the water supply. Smith reports a further drought in 1811, in which the tanks

dried up for several weeks. After a period of relatively wet years, there was another

drought in 1820, and a severe drought in 1823/24. The reported rainfall in 1823/4

(about 19 inches (480 mm)), was less than half the normal average.

By the early 1820s, it was becoming apparent that Sydney was subject to a wide variation

in rainfall, and that prolonged dry periods might be common. By then, the population of

Sydney had reached 10,000 and water was becoming to be of critical importance. By

1826, pollution of the Tank Stream became so severe that it was abandoned as a water

supply and water was carted from Lachlan Swamp (now the ponds in Centennial Park) to

a watering point in Hyde Park (Smith (1869a), Aird (1961f)). John Busby who arrived in

Sydney in 1824, having been appointed as Mineral Surveyor to the Government,

proposed cutting a tunnel from the Lachlan Swamp to Hyde Park. Hence, the first piece

of legislation relating to water supply in Sydney was enacted: the Water Tunnel Act (4

William IV No 1) of 1833, which approved the construction and maintenance of Busby’s

Bore, to bring water from Lachlan Swamp to Hyde Park, with the Tank Stream

becoming the de facto sewer and rainwater drain for the city. The tunnel was started in

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1827 but was not completed until 1837, however seepage into the tunnel was able to

supply enough drinkable water for the city from 1830. By the time Busby’s Bore was

completed, the population of Sydney was over 20,000 and the tunnel was capable of

delivering about 350,000 gallons of water per day (1.5 million litres per day), which was

barely adequate. However, in 1838/39 there was another drought and Busby’s Bore was

not able to supply enough water (Aird (1961f)).

Busby’s Bore was in use for many years and, at its peak, was capable of delivering

400,000 gallons (1.8 m litres) per day. There was to have been a reservoir excavated in

Hyde Park to hold 15 million gallons (68 m litres), but it was never built. In 1838/39,

there was a severe drought (referred to in Darwin’s Voyage of the Beagle) and, although

Busby’s Bore did not run dry, there were very serious water shortages, with people paying

6 pence per bucket for water during this period.

At this time, the population of Sydney was growing quickly102. Throughout this period,

the institutional arrangements consisted entirely of direction by the Governor, together

with legislation enacted by the recently formed Legislative Council103. There were two

pressures which led to a change in these arrangements. First, was the Colonial Office in

London seeking ways to reduce cost and to move the administrative responsibility to the

local residents and second, was a growing discontent from within the colony demanding

a greater urgency in responding to problems of water supply and sanitation (Clark (1978)

p55). This led to the declaration of Sydney as a city in 1843 (Richards (1883)) and a

corporate body being established for its administration. A municipal council was

appointed to administer the Sydney Corporation (Clark (1978) p55). The primary

responsibility of this newly established council was to provide water to the rapidly

growing city.

102 In the decade from 1830 to1840 population grew of 11,500 to 29,000. 103 There was a strong emancipist movement in the colony in the 1820s, with an influential group

attempting to persuade the British government to establish trial by jury and the house of assembly. In 1828 an act of Parliament was passed on the recommendation of Governor Darling that between 10 and 15 members were to be appointed to the Legislative Council by the Secretary of State on advice from the Governor. Members of the Council were to be chosen from leading landholders and merchants with the British Parliament having the right to disallow legislation enacted by the Legislative Council within three years of the Governor’s assent (Manning Clark, p 64-65).

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The era of transition – from colonial administration to self-administration Following the 1838/39 dry spell, there was a wet period of about nine years, during

which there was frequent flooding, again followed by a dry year in 1849, in which the

rainfall at South Head was only 21.5 inches (550mm) (compared to an average of about

50 inches (1,270mm)). By the early 1840s, it was clear that Lachlan Swamps and Busby’s

Bore were not capable of delivering adequate water to the city and in 1849, there was a

proposal to build two small dams, holding about 10 million gallons (45 m litres) in the

area of the Lachlan Swamp, but this work was not commenced. In 1850, a Special

Committee was appointed in 1850 by the Municipal Council of Sydney “to inquire into

and report on the best means of procuring a permanent supply of water to the city of

Sydney”. The committee considered areas around Bunnerong, Cook’s River, George’s

River, and the Nepean River, however before the committee could report, a new

Governor, Charles Fitzroy, was commissioned and he appointed a board104 to re-examine

the question. The board made recommendations relating to the development of Botany

Swamps which were implemented. The first step was installing a steam pump in 1854

(Smith (1869a), Aird (1961f)). The board recommended confining activities to the

Lachlan Swamp area, pumping water to a new reservoir to be built at Paddington, with a

capacity of 12 million gallons (55 m litres) (about 40 gallons (180 litres) per head of

population). A small pump was installed in 1854, which transferred water through

Busby’s Bore. In 1858, three 100-horsepower stream-driven pumps were installed, two

of which generally ran 24 hours a day. A 30-inch (750mm) main delivered water from

the pumping station at Lord’s dam to a reservoir at Crown Street holding 3.5 million

gallons (15.9 million litres) and another at Paddington holding 1.5 million gallons (6.8 m

litres). These reservoirs contained only two days’ supply. The major problem with the

system was that capacity was insufficient to accommodate a prolonged dry period, even

with the subsequent construction of six small dams down the course of the stream to

Botany Bay. The quantity of water pumped in 1868 was 956 million gallons (4.34

gigalitres). Reticulated water supply was introduced in 1844, with about 70 houses being

connected. The cost of this was 5 shillings per room per year (Smith (1869b)). The

reticulation network increased significantly in the 1850s and 1860s, requiring night-time

water restrictions to be applied in 1862 and the construction of the six small dams in the

Botany Swamps in 1866-67. By 1874, the system was delivering 4 million gallons (18.2 m

104 The Board consisted of the Commander, Royal Engineers, Lt-Col. Barney, the Colonial Architect, E.T.

Blackett, the Civil Engineer, G.K. Mann and two “gentlemen of the colony”, R.M. Robey and R. Tooth.

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litres) per day. A further dam was built at Bunnerong 1876-77. At the time of

completion of the first stage of this scheme in 1858, the population of Sydney was

estimated to be about 87,000 people. When the Smith Royal Commission (referred to

above) reported in 1869, the population had grown to about 118,000 (Smith (1869a)).

At the Royal Commission hearing on 31March 1868, Thomas Woore read a paper

proposing the construction of a dam on the Warragamba River. The dam wall would be

600 feet (182m) along the top and about 170 feet (52 m) above the floor of the gorge.

The wall would have been masonry, supported downstream with rubble and with

puddling materials in front of the dam wall. Gravity feed of water to Sydney would allow

three years’ supply. The president of the Royal Commission, Professor Smith, reluctantly

rejected the proposal on the basis that the Warragamba dam would have been the largest

dam in the world and he was concerned by experience with smaller dams in England

which had failed and had “spread devastation in their course”. The risk of economic loss

was considered too great, despite that “if successful, the results would be magnificent,

and the work would be a monument of engineering skills and boldness that could not fail

to command a world-wide fame”. Professor Smith added that although he later became

aware of a dam in the Upper Loire in France nearly as great, the risk of flood at the

Warragamba site during construction would also be substantial (Woore (1869)). This

Royal Commission and the subsequent report of an expert engineer from Britain, W.

Clark, appointed to confirm the recommendations of the Royal Commission in 1877, set

the direction for the next eighty years for development of the Upper Nepean to supply

Sydney’s water.

Clark evaluated the Royal Commission report and other submissions received in the

meantime. These were the Upper Nepean scheme, Loddon and Wingecarribee, Port

Hacking, Lower Nepean Scheme, the Warragamba, the Grose, George’s River, Port

Hacking and Woronora, Erskine Valley, Tube Wells, and “Mr Sadler’s Proposal”. He

eliminated all except four, these being the Upper Nepean gravitation scheme, Loddon

and Wingecarribee gravitation scheme, the Lower Nepean pumping scheme and the

George’s River pumping scheme. In his conclusion, Clark discussed costs, the risk of

flooding during construction, operating cost, complexity of construction (including

tunnels, pipework etc), long-term storage capacity, and the opportunity for future

development for irrigation, pastoral and manufacturing. Clark’s recommendation was to

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develop the Upper Nepean scheme (Clark (1877)). The Upper Nepean scheme consisted

of building a small dam, 10 feet (3 m) high, on the Nepean River near Pheasants’ Nest.

A tunnel 4½ miles (7.2 km) long carried water to the confluence of the Cataract, Nepean

and Cordeaux rivers. Another small dam would be built on the Cataract River at

Broughton’s pass and a tunnel 1¼ miles (2 km) long, which would take the water to the

western slope of the George’s River basin. A system of channels and short tunnels

would then deliver the water to a reservoir to be built at Prospect. The reservoir at

Prospect would have a wall height of 80 feet (24 m), and would hold 10,635 million

gallons (48.3 gigalitres), of which 7,110 million gallons (32.3 gigalitres) would be available

for supply by gravitation. From Prospect, the water would be distributed to the existing

reservoirs, and a new distribution reservoir at Petersham (Clark (1877)).

Clark confirmed the Royal Commission’s recommendation of the construction of

Prospect Reservoir, and in addition, recommended construction of further reservoirs

(complementing the Crown Street and Paddington reservoirs) at Petersham, Newtown,

Woollahra and Waverley. He also recommended design principles for reticulation of

water through the suburbs, the use of ball-cocks to connect the mains, the fitting of stop-

cocks and meters, a system of rating which differentiated between properties with gravity

feed and those requiring pumping and further recommendations from his experience

regarding the setting of water rates.

The first water from the Upper Nepean scheme was delivered in 1886 and the Botany

Swamps system was decommissioned and, in 1896, was dismantled. The Botany Swamps

dams remained largely intact until they were badly damaged by heavy rainfall in 1931. At

its peak in 1886, its annual delivery was 1,864 million gallons (8.4 gigalitres) (Aird

(1961e)).

In the early 1850s, there was considerable disquiet on the state of the sanitation of

Sydney. In 1851, the Sydney Morning Herald published a series of ten articles describing

the inadequacy of the water supply and the unsanitary drainage and sewerage conditions

of the city (Clark (1978) p51). The catchment around Sydney, consisting of a number of

small creeks had become open sewers and little had been done by the municipal Council

to solve the problem. In January 1854, the Legislative Council passed an act which

dissolved the municipal Council, appointed three commissioners to administer the

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Council and, in particular to authorise the raising of a ₤200,000 loan to commence

construction of the sewerage scheme. By the end of 1854, the Legislative Council,

impatient with the lack of progress, appointed a select committee to investigate the

matter. The result of this activity was the commencement of five sewers along the creek

lines draining into Sydney Harbour. In addition, minor sewers from a number of city

streets were also planned feeding, either into the five main sewers or discharging directly

into the harbour (Henry pp156-157). By 1877, 33 miles (53 km) of sewers had been

constructed servicing the Woolloomooloo and Fort Macquarie areas, and the area

drained by the Tank Stream.

But by the 1870s, there was a substantial pollution problem in the bays of Sydney

Harbour into which the sewers all discharged. In 1875, there was an outbreak of typhoid

on a ship moored at Fort Macquarie, leading to an outcry regarding public health, with a

petition of 3,800 signatories being presented to Parliament in 1876. The Sewerage and

Health Board was appointed by the government in 1873 and included two engineers,

E.O. Moriarty and W.C. Bennett, both of whom had worked on the Nepean scheme.

In 1887, the board proposed construction of two much larger sewerage schemes, the

northern system which would service what is now central Sydney and the eastern

suburbs, discharging into the ocean at Bondi; and the southern system servicing the area

from Redfern, Waterloo and Mascot, discharging at the mouth of the Cook’s River in

Botany Bay. These designs were approved by W. Clark, an English engineer appointed

by the government in 1877 to review the 1869 Royal Commission findings. Construction

commenced in 1880 and was completed in 1889, with responsibility for its operation

being transferred to the newly-established Board of Water Supply and Sewerage in 1890.

There was a critical water shortage in the early 1880s, with only ten days’ water supply

being stored. The construction of the Upper Nepean scheme had been started and the

Hudson Brothers (the founders Clyde Engineering) were appointed to build a system of

timber-and-iron pipes and viaducts to supplement the Botany Swamps water supply. It

was this system (referred to as the Hudson’s Temporary Scheme) which, in 1886,

delivered the first water from the Upper Nepean scheme to the reticulation system (Aird

(1961d)) and two years later, in 1888, the Water Board held its first meeting (Clark

(1978)).

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Institutional arrangements There are a number of important aspects regarding the transition in institutional

arrangements during this period. The declaration of Sydney to be a corporation and the

appointment of the Sydney City Council, together with the later establishment of the

Legislative Assembly shifted the primary responsibility for administering the affairs of

Sydney from the Colonial Office in London and the Governor to the citizens of NSW.

Furthermore, professional engineers started to become more conspicuous in

management of the issues. These engineers, many of whom had military as well as civil

engineering backgrounds (these being the only truly distinct areas of practice within the

engineering profession at the time105) assumed leadership roles in these activities106. This

transitional period was by no means smooth. The early councillors were accused of self-

aggrandisement, making their first priority the building of a Town Hall, rather than

directing their limited funds toward social improvements. There were allegations of

ineptitude and financial mismanagement and these were substantiated by a committee of

enquiry held in 1849. Further public campaigns, including newspaper articles and

petitions from local merchants and manufacturers led to appointment of a further

committee of enquiry by the Legislative Council in 1852, resulting in the dismissal of the

council and the appointment of a three-man Commission to administer the affairs of the

city. The optimism within the community on the appointment of the three-man

commission was short-lived: efforts to raise capital through a debenture issue were

largely unsuccessful and the engineer in charge of the Botany Swamps project was

replaced due to incompetence. It seems that incompetence was not confined to the

engineer on the project, with three separate select committees recommending dismissal

of the board of Commissioners, resulting in council administration being restored in

1857. Also, there were concerns regarding public health issues, in particular the use of

lead piping for drinking water distribution, the slowness of extending the reticulation

network and the rising rate of water-borne disease in areas which had not yet received

reticulated supplies. Further enquiries were conducted in the early 1860s, culminating in

the Smith Royal Commission of 1868/69.

105 Although it is noted that the British Institute of Mechanical Engineers was established in 1847. 106 The 1852 Board of Enquiry consisted of five members two of whom were engineers, one a civil

engineer and the other the Commander, Royal Engineers. The Smith Royal Commission (1869) also consisted of five members two of whom were civil engineers. The expert report of 1875 was conducted by a civil engineer, W. Clark, who was brought from London to undertake the task. Engineering education did not commence in Australia until late in this period with the establishment of the Engineering Faculty of the University of Sydney in 1883 (Aird (1961) pp10 and 15).

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The Royal Commission noted earlier was one of the most important landmarks in the

history of the institutions responsible for the development Sydney’s water system. Not

only did it consider proposals which influenced develop of the water system for the next

century or more but also, it established a mechanism, which brought about significant

institutional change. The commission was chaired by John Smith, the “Professor of

Physics etc”, at the relatively young University of Sydney and its membership included

three civil engineers and the Surveyor-General. The Commission sought evidence from

a wide range of participants and recommended the commencement of capital works on

the Upper Nepean, a reticulation system using a new reservoir at Prospect, with

reticulation to small reservoirs in the municipalities, and a rating structure which would

cover the interest and maintenance on capital expenditure (Smith commission (1869)

pp33-43). But despite the clarity of the Royal Commission’s recommendations, the

political process delayed commencement. Political parties had not yet become

established and there were frequent changes of ministries. The findings of the Royal

Commission and the alternatives it had investigated were extensively debated. There

were further public debates and enquiries, including an expert report by W. Clark in

1877. The influence of the three engineers on the original Royal Commission was still

significant and the recommendations of the Smith Royal Commission were largely

confirmed and, in addition, it also recommended construction of a sewerage system

diverting outflows from Sydney Harbour to the Pacific ocean. The metering and rating

of water was also supported (Clark (1877)). But the administrative arrangements were

still being debated, some favouring private arrangements with others arguing for a

government-owned or government-guaranteed water company. Finally, it was agreed to

establish a board representing the affected municipalities together with a group of

appointed expert members. This resulted in an act of Parliament in 1880, enabling the

appointment of the Board of Water Supply and Sewerage (later generally known as the

Water Board), but it was not the late 1880s, upon the completion of the upper Nepean

scheme, that the board was formally appointed and held its first meeting (Clark (1978)).

Clark (1978) makes some interesting observations regarding this transitional period in

administration. Until about 1860, there was only a limited mechanism for raising public

finance and this constrained the development of Sydney’s infrastructure. However, the

development of water and sanitation infrastructure seems to have lagged other areas

(such as railways) which enjoyed significant development at that time. It appeared that

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an one hand, the colonial government did not want to take responsibility for developing

and administering the infrastructure but, on the other, it was reluctant to devolve the

authority to local government. It was only when water shortages and the threat of

serious disease reached crisis point that action was taken. But there is a different

interpretation which may be placed on this series of events. The situation in Sydney was

not particularly different from other colonial cities, nor indeed, cities in Britain itself.

Sanitation was not well understood (the miasmic theory of disease had not yet been

replaced by Pasteur’s ground-breaking work, first proposed in the 1870s) and water

supplies were not reliable. To understand this more fully, it is illuminating to first

consider the same period in Britain, because at the time Britain still had full authority for

the administration of the colony of NSW.

By the early 19th century, the industrial revolution in Britain was well underway. There

had been a major migration from the countryside to the growing industrial cities. As the

population of these industrial metropolises grew, sanitation became a major problem and

there were outbreaks of diseases, such as cholera and typhoid with growing frequency

and social impact. At the time, the prevailing miasmic theory was that disease was caused

by the foul smell emanating from open drains and marshes – that is, the smell was

actually the disease itself, rather than a by-product. It was not until 1878 that Pasteur’s

work on the origins of disease was published, and it was not until the end of the century

that Pasteur’s work was widely accepted in the administration of public health.

Nonetheless, notable figures such as Edwin Chadwick, drew a correct conclusion from

an incorrect theory: that the solution to public health required reform of the water supply

and sewerage system107. Chadwick’s work was focused on London and identified the

problem with the sewerage system as being mainly an engineering one but with

substantial administrative defects, whereas water supply was largely an administrative

problem due to a lack of cooperation between the water supply companies. The solution

identified by Chadwick was to consolidate the sewers commissions and water companies

into one organisation and to construct a new design of ovoid, pressurised drains which

would be flushed by water, thus removing the miasma from the streets. One

consequence of Chadwick’s work was an act of Parliament, the Public Health Act (1848),

which established General Boards of Health, to reform the administration of sanitary

systems. But within London, Chadwick’s reforms were largely unsuccessful, being 107 Chadwick’s famous work was the 1842 publication Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring

Population of Great Britain.

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opposed in Parliament and generally not supported in the community. A major outbreak

of cholera in the late 1840s prompted Chadwick to produce another report in 1850 (On

the Supply of Water to the Metropolis). This was influential in the eventual disbanding of the

London Board of Health in 1854 and the creation of the Metropolitan Board of Works108

in 1855. The formation of the Metropolitan Board of Works partly consolidated the

highly fragmented responsibility for water, sewerage, and drainage and to undertake the

major engineering works required for a substantial water, sewerage, and drainage system.

Further consolidation of responsibility took place in 1888, when the Metropolitan Board

of Works was replaced by the London County Council. This organisation remained in

place until 1965 when it was abolished and the responsibility of its successor, the Greater

London Council, was extended considerably to accommodate the growth in London

over the previous 80 years. (Boyne and Cole (1998), Schwartz (1966), Parkin (2000),

Wheeler (2000)).

The point of this comparison is this: Sydney was by no means unique in struggling with

the problems associated with its rapid growth in population. There were two

fundamental problems identified in this era that were associated with relatively rapid

urbanisation. One was the technological challenge in dealing with the provision of a

clean water supply and sanitation issues of densely populated urban areas. The other was

the challenge of moving from directive to participative public administration, in response

not only to social demands for greater representation but also the recognition that the

increasingly complex nature of large urban areas required it. The general solution to this

problem was to establish two bodies: a public works body to develop the capital

infrastructure; and an administrative body, governed by elected representatives of the

municipalities serviced by the infrastructure. In the case of London, the public works

body was set up in 1855 and a joint engineering and administrative authority established

with the creation of the London County Council in 1888. In the case of Sydney, the

administrative authority was established with the appointment of the Water Board in

1888 and the Department of Public Works retained responsibility for major capital

projects until 1924. Although the structural arrangements established in London and 108 It is important to note that in mid-19th-century Britain, elected representation of municipal bodies was

in its relative infancy (having been established in the 1830s) and there was both horizontal and vertical fragmentation of responsibilities assigned to local government. On one hand, across the London parishes were bodies known as Vestries, with various responsibilities, such as paving, lighting, cleansing, “watching”, and so on, while on the other, there were tiers of special-purpose bodies with responsibility functions as baths and wash-houses, schools, police, and burials. The formation of the Metropolitan Board of Works was to address at least part of this fragmentation.

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Sydney were slightly different, the response to the problem was fundamentally the same:

creation of a body with a strong technological capability to carrying out the necessary

civil engineering work and administrative authority representative of the local

government constituencies to provide services to rate-payers.

In both cases, these arrangements remained in place for the best part of a century. Over

this period, both cities saw dramatic improvement in standards of public health, with

diseases such as typhoid, cholera, dysentery, tuberculosis, diphtheria and even, on rare

occasions, bubonic plague being largely eliminated. In the case of Sydney, although there

is no doubt that at times progress was frustratingly slow, the institutional reform which

took place over the period from 1840 to 1890 had a profound and long-lasting beneficial

impact on the development of the city and the well-being of its citizens. At the heart of

these reforms, there emerged a paradigm which recognised the reliance of society on the

engineering profession to create and implement technologically sound solutions, with

oversight and administration by a body representative of the local government

constituencies. But, in the case of Sydney at least, it would be quite misleading to suggest

that these institutional arrangements were particularly efficient. As will be discussed

below, there were continuing criticisms of the effectiveness of the Water Board and its

structure was changed on several occasions, largely as a result of enquiries provoked by

public dissatisfaction.

The Water Board era – 1888 to 1983 In the latter part of the 19th century there had been considerable debate on the merits of

“wet carriage” versus dry conservancy treatment of sewage. Both technologies were

tried. In the period from 1855 to 1875, virtually all of Sydney sewage discharged into

Sydney Harbour by the sewers commenced in the 1850s. Water quality of the harbour

worsened and in 1875, following an outbreak of typhoid on a ship moored in Sydney

Harbour, a petition with 3,800 signatories complaining of the situation was presented to

Parliament. Further agitation over the next two years resulted in the Sewerage and

Health Board committing to the construction of two outfalls, the Northern System,

discharging into the ocean at Bondi, and the Southern System, running to a sewerage

farm at Botany Bay (Beder (1990)). The Northern System was completed and handed

over to the Water Board in 1889 and the Southern System was completed and handed

over in 1890. But by 1890, the Secretary for Public Works, the Hon. Bruce Smith was

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so concerned about deteriorating public health in Sydney due to much of the city’s

sewage continuing to be discharged into open drains, that he proposed a separate

stormwater drainage system to be built as well as the sewerage system. Expansion plans

for the Northern (now called the Bondi system) and Southern sewerage systems had

been developed and were under construction, but the western suburbs were developing

so quickly that construction of the sewers could not keep up with the rate of urban

development. Smith believed that stormwater drainage could be built far more quickly

than sewerage. At the time, the Nepean scheme (with a draft of 50 million gallons (227

megalitres) per day) had been completed and the distribution infrastructure was capable

of delivering 18 million gallons (82 megalitres) per day, nearly double the normal

consumption of about 10 million gallons (45 megalitres) per day. Smith proposed that it

would be possible to quickly build a network of stormwater drains which could be

flushed using the excess water capacity from the Nepean system and which local

municipalities could temporarily use as sewers109. Once the sewerage system was

complete, sewer inlets would be disconnected and the stormwater drains would revert to

their intended purpose. By 1897, nine stormwater major drains had been constructed in

Wentworth Park, Rushcutters’ Bay, Balmain, Erskineville, Long Cove, Iron Cove,

Homebush, and North Sydney. According to the medical adviser to the Board, there was

a dramatic reduction in disease: mortality from diarrhoea dropped from 10.9 to 6.2 per

10,000, diphtheria from 5.2 to 3.1 per 10,000 and phthisis (pulmonary tuberculosis) from

16.8 to 9.5 per 10,000 population. Also, there had been a major problem with typhoid

(which had been exacerbated during the construction of the drainage system due to the

manual excavation of the existing open drains) in the inner-city area, but after the

completion of the stormwater drains, mortality from typhoid in the Erskineville, Redfern

and Waterloo districts had dropped by as much as two-thirds (Aird (1961c)). This

resulted in Sydney ultimately having separate stormwater and sewerage systems which

109 In the latter half of the 19th century, there was a significant debate as to the most appropriate means of

disposing of sewage. There was a strong lobby for “dry conservancy” because of concerns that “water-carriage” could contaminate drinking water. On one hand, were the dry conservancy advocates who proposed collecting excrement and turning it into fertiliser; on the other, was the water carriage group, which was strongly represented in public officialdom. The debate considered economic impact (both capital cost and operating cost), efficacy, and which would be the least offensive to the public. Generally, engineers, doctors and public officials were in favour of water-carriage, while dry conservancy proponents used largely values-based arguments. Neither water carriage nor dry conservancy were well developed technologies at the time and there seemed to be little attempt to develop criteria for comparison. Ultimately, both technologies were used, but because of the planning and capital expenditure required for water-carriage technology, it ultimately prevailed. Dry conservancy did not require the same development of infrastructure and so was more ad hoc in its application – Beder (1990).

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continues today and, importantly, it established wet carriage as the technology of choice

for the transport and disposal of sewage.

By the early 20th century, the area around the sewage farm at Botany Bay was becoming

more densely populated and there was growing public concern about the health impact

of the sewage farm, resulting in legal action by local residents. In 1905, a

recommendation was made to cease farming and to treat the sewage. By this time

conversion of the western suburbs drainage system to a main sewer was well under way

and in 1908, following a Parliamentary committee of enquiry, it was decided to construct

a sewer from the farm on the northern side of Botany Bay to divert both the southern

and western systems to an ocean outfall at Malabar, near Long Bay. This work was

completed in 1916 (Aird 137-142).

The northern suburbs of Sydney were also serviced by sewers which drained into Sydney

Harbour. The original work was done between 1891 and 1898 by the Public Works

Department and transferred to the Water Board in 1899. By 1910, the pollution problem

in Sydney Harbour from the northern suburbs was extensive and investigations were

done to determine whether an ocean outfall could be constructed at North Head.

Construction on the North head outfall commenced in 1916 and in the meantime,

primary the treatment works at Willoughby Bay were extended. In 1919, legal

proceedings were taken against the Water Board for negligence and nuisance, resulting in

an activated sludge system being installed together with chlorination of effluent. The

North Head ocean outfall system was started operation in 1926 and was fully

commissioned in 1928 (Henry 202, Aird 154-156).

In 1901-2, there was another major drought which brought Sydney to a most perilous

position and the government appointed a Royal Commission110 to determine a solution.

The Commission presented three reports in April 1902, July 1902, and October 1903.

The first report recommended a major upgrade of the distribution infrastructure, in

110 The membership was: Joseph Davies, MInstCE (Undersecretary for Public Works), Henry Deane,

MInstCE (Engineering Chief, Railway Tramway Construction, Department of Public Works), W. J. Hanna (Commission of the Roads and Principal Engineer for Roads and Bridges, Department of Public Works), Thomas Hughes (Mayor of Sydney), T.W. Keele, MInstCE (Principal Engineer, Harbours and Rivers Branch, Department of Public Works), E.W. Knox, W. L. Vernon (Government Architect) L. A. B. Wade, MInstCE (Principal Engineer, Water Supply and Drainage), with additional appointments being made later that year: Jacob Garrard (President, Metropolitan Board of Water Supply and Sewerage), J. B. Johnston (President, Sydney Chamber of Commerce), J.F. Smith, MP, J.P. Wright (President, NSW Chamber of Manufactures), and J.P. Josephson, AMInstCE (a civil engineer) – Aird (1961).

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particular strengthening Prospect Reservoir, upgrading the canal leading from Prospect

to Guildford, a major upgrade to the Ryde pumping station to increase capacity to

northern suburbs and upgrading mains distributing water to the southern suburbs. The

second report identified sites on the Cataract, Cordeaux, Nepean, and Avon rivers and

recommended that the catchments for these be proclaimed, that no further mining and

forestry leases, the grazing of livestock within the catchment be prohibited. In addition,

the Commission recommended a greater emphasis on conserving water and an

increasingly proportion of water which was metered. As a consequence, Acts of

Parliament were passed to develop new major headworks, the first being a dam on the

Cataract River111. Construction started in 1903 (Aird 25-27).

There was a sustained dry period from 1907 until early 1911, prompting the Water Board

to identify another dam site on the Cordeaux River. This was followed by several years

of good rainfall and the intervention of the First World War, so the problem was not

addressed seriously until 1918, when a Board of Experts was appointed to advise on

development of Sydney’s water supply. It recommended the construction of the

Cordeaux dam and to commence planning the Avon and Nepean dams. Construction of

the Cordeaux dam commenced in 1918 and was completed in 1926. Construction of the

Avon dam commenced in 1921 and was completed in 1928. In 1925, construction

commenced on the Nepean dam near Pheasants’ Nest and was completed in 1935,

following a disruption to construction due to the Depression112.

In 1926, a committee was appointed to continue the work of the Special Board of

Experts which had been appointed in 1918. This committee recommended the

construction of the Warragamba Dam to be commenced after the Nepean dam was

completed, and that the Warragamba be sufficiently advanced that it could contribute to

Sydney’s water supply by 1938. In 1928, the chief engineer, G. Haskins, recommended

that a small dam at Woronora (originally 60 feet (18 m) high) intended as a local supply

for the Sutherland-Cronulla district be increased in height to 200 feet (61 m), giving a

capacity of 15,000 million gallons (68.1 gigalitres). This would enable the deferment of

111 When final survey work was completed there was some debate as what the final height of the dam wall

should be. Finally it was decided that it would be 150 feet (46 m) high enclosing a capacity of 21,411 million gallons (97.2 gigalitres).

112 Although the design capacity of the Nepean dam was 18,000 million gallons (81.7 gigalitres), due to dry weather from its date of completion in 1935 until August 1938, it only stored about 4,000 million gallons (18.2 gigalitres). Heavy rain in late 1938 filled the dam to capacity.

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the Warragamba Dam by four years113. The Woronora dam was commenced in 1930

(construction was suspended for several years during the Depression) and was completed

in 1941 (Aird 88-94, Henry 140).

In the 1934, a severe drought began. Until 1940, the worst dry period on record had

been the drought of 1904-1910 and it was thought that the capacity of Sydney for supply

should be adequate to cover such a period. It became clear the upper Nepean system

was inadequate and, as an emergency measure, a weir, 50 feet (15.2 m) high, was

commenced near the site of the current Warragamba Dam, and was completed in 1940.

The 1934-42 drought (at the time of writing this narrative, the longest on record), has

been used as the basis for water supply calculations since then (Aird (1961b)). Prior to

the completion of the Warragamba dam safe draft114 of the combined Cataract,

Cordeaux, Avon, Nepean, and Woronora dams was 92 million gallons (418 megalitres)

per day. In 1959-60, Sydney’s daily demand was 201.8 million gallons (916 megalitres).

The shortfall had necessitated construction of a large dam, justifying the size of

Warragamba.

The original design of Warragamba Dam was for a wall 370 feet (112 m) high, with a

capacity of 452,500 million gallons (2,054.4 gigalitres). On completion, based on a nine-

year drought, Warragamba had a regulated draft of 274 million gallons (1,244 megalitres)

a day. At the time, the daily draft of the entire Sydney system was 310 million gallons

(1,407 megalitres) a day. Site survey and selection commenced in 1941 and was

completed in 1946. Construction was completed in 1960 (Aird (1961a)).

In 1966, the Water Board appointed the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Authority

(SMEH) to prepare a evaluation of supplying Sydney and the south coast with water

beyond the end of the 20th century. SMEH examined all major catchments feasible for

supplying the region with water, rejecting the Wollondilly and Grose catchments because

of lack of capacity and rejecting development of the Colo River catchment because of

113 Another dam at O’Hare’s Creek was also proposed this time, but much later (in 1938), due to concerns

about its limited capacity, it was decided not to build this dam, rather to proceed directly to the Warragamba project.

114 The quantity of water which can be supplied daily during the longest dry period on record, plus an additional year equivalent to the driest on record, assuming all reservoirs to be full at the start of the drought.

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both the relatively high cost of building a dam, due to the thickness of silt on the river

bed and concerns about interrupting freshwater flow into the Hawkesbury River and the

consequent effect on salinity115. The scheme recommended was the Welcome Reef dam

with a dam wall 200 feet (61 m) high, a capacity of 330,000 million gallons (1,498

gigalitres) and associated developments on the Shoalhaven River. An additional dam,

with about the same capacity as Welcome Reef, could ultimately be built on the

Shoalhaven River, near the junction with Yalwal Creek. Adoption of the scheme was

published in the Sydney Water Board Journal in October 1968116. A number of the

environmental and archaeological studies were done in the 1970s, recommending the

project proceed with consultation with local communities, taking steps to ensure

protection of local ecology. However, for a variety of reasons discussed in the next

section, other than the construction of a small dam in the Shoalhaven Valley at Tallowa

completed in 1976, the project did not proceed.

Meanwhile, there had been extensive development of sewerage and drainage

infrastructure as both the population and the service area grew quickly in the first half of

the 20th century. In the period from 1924 to 1936, extensive work was done to

determine alternatives for dealing with the increasing population in the southern and

western suburbs and in 1936 were commenced on duplicating the sewerage main to

Malabar and the installation of primary treatment works at all ocean outfalls. This work

was completed in 1941 in addition, extensive work was done on sub-mains feeding the

southern and western system. In the period between 1934 and 1960, 878 miles (1,411

km) of sewerage were installed in the southern and western systems (Aird 148-153) and a

further 877 miles (1,413 km) were constructed servicing the northern suburbs (Aird 167).

By the 1980s, there was general concern about the level of pollution on Sydney’s beaches

from the three ocean outfall systems, with beaches regularly being closed to bathers.

This resulted in the decision to extend the ocean outfalls at North Head, Bondi, and

Malabar so that effluent was discharged several kilometres offshore. Construction on

this started in 1984 (Beazley 219). In addition, a number of smaller systems at

Parramatta, Hornsby, Manly, Vaucluse, and Randwick were also constructed in the first

115 Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Authority, (1968), Report on Proposals to Augment the Water Supply to Sydney

in the South Coast (5 volumes), Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board, Sydney, 116 Sydney Water Board, (1968), The Board Adopts the Shoalhaven Scheme, Sydney Water Board Journal, Oct

1968, pp35-58.

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half of the 20th century. These have mostly been integrated into the ocean outfalls

system.

Institutional arrangements The main enabling legislation for the appointment of the Board of Water Supply and

Sewerage (the Water Board) was passed in 1880 and a supplementary act was passed in

1888 just prior to the Board’s appointment and first meeting. The intention of the

appointment of the board was to take over the control and management of the capital

works built by the government, removing responsibility from the Municipal Council of

the City of Sydney. Responsibility for construction of capital works was to remain with

the Minister for Works but, practically, the Water Board was granted ministerial approval

to carry out smaller projects such as reservoirs, pumping stations and mains, with larger

infrastructure being built by the Public Works Department. In 1924, in the wake of

growing public dissatisfaction with the reliability of the water supply and frustration at

the “dual control” system for construction, an act was passed which consolidated

responsibility for construction and operation for all water, sewerage, and drainage works

with the Board117. Also at this time it was granted complete control of its own finances.

(Aird 215-219, Henry 2-3).

The original constitution of the Water Board provided for the Governor to appoint three

“Official Members”, one of whom would be the President, for the Municipal Council the

City of Sydney to elect two “City Members”, and for councillors of a number of

municipalities within the county of Cumberland a further two “Suburban Members”. A

rotation arrangement provided for three members retiring every two years. The original

intention of the structure was to have official members with technical training and for

elected members to represent two constituencies of roughly equal size, the City of

Sydney and the other metropolitan municipalities (Aird page 214-219). The 1924 act,

mentioned above, increased the size of the Board to 18 members (a President appointed

by the Governor for a five-year term and 17 elected members elected from municipal

councils within nine constituencies of metropolitan Sydney, two for each of eight

constituencies and a ninth constituency with one member). This structure was soon

found to be unwieldy, with the need for standing orders to be introduced to control

length of meetings, factionalisation, and conflicting advice regarding policy. At this time

117 At this time the board was renamed the “Metropolitan Water, Sewerage, and Drainage Board”.

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there were problems with construction works and a Royal Commission was appointed to

investigate. It recommended a change to the structure of the board and, after some

parliamentary debate, in 1935, a further act was passed reducing the size of the Board to

seven members: a President and Vice-President appointed by the Governor and five

members elected from five larger constituencies, representing groupings of the

metropolitan municipal councils (Aird 220-222, Henry 9-14).

In 1972, there were concerns that the structure of the Board was ineffectual and the act

was changed to bring the board under the direct control of the Minister. The new Board

consisted of five members appointed by the Minister and a further three selected by the

Minister from a panel nominated by the Local Government Association (Beazley pp 209-

210).

This period, which lasted for the best part of a century, could reasonably be described as

the era of the engineer. Many of the presidents and official members of the Board and a

significant number of the elected aldermen were engineers (Aird 309-321). The Water

Board became known as an engineering organisation118 (Beazley 172-173) and developed

a strong, internal culture. In retrospect, despite public criticism of the performance of

the Water Board and the Department of Public Works (from 1888 to 1925), in the period

from 1888 to 1960, despite the major disruptions of the First World War, the Great

Depression, and the Second World War, the development of Sydney’s water system was

very extensive. Ten major dams were constructed, with a storage capacity of over 400

million gallons (over 1,800 gigalitres)119 – Warragamba dam being one of the largest

metropolitan dams in the world. 129 service reservoirs were built and over 6,400 miles

(10,300 km) of water mains were laid. In addition, over 4,000 miles (6,400 km) of sewers

were constructed and nearly 180 miles (290 km) of stormwater canals were built in areas

subject to flooding (Aird 263, 309, 207). But the 1970s, the water board’s unique culture

(described extensively in Beazley’s history of the Water Board (Beazley general

reference)) was seen to be increasingly out of touch with community expectations.

Practices and work habits which had evolved over a century were either no longer

relevant or reflected complacency, inefficiency and a level of corruption which was

unacceptable. Public dissatisfaction with Water Board culture, politicisation of the issues,

118 The Engineering Club was established in 1935 and from 1951 to 1984 published its own professional

journal, the Sydney Water Board Journal. 119 Minor works done in the last 45 years have increased this to over 2,500 gigalitres.

345


and a change in expectations which took place in Australia across many public

institutions during this period had a profound effect on the Water Board. From the late

1970s to the current day, the Water Board as an engineering institution was gradually and

replaced by a quasi-corporate structure. This major institutional change – which is still

taking place – will be considered in the next section.

The recent era – post-1972 Following approval of the construction of the first two stages of the Welcome Reef dam

in 1968, Stage 1, Tallowa dam and a system of pumping stations, reservoirs and canals to

transfer water from the Shoalhaven Valley to the Nepean system was completed in 1977.

It has relatively small capacity (90 gigalitres) and has been used to transfer water to the

Nepean system in times of low rainfall. A further study was commissioned by the Water

Board in 1974 to study the environmental effects of the second stage of the system, the

construction of the Welcome Reef dam itself. The study was completed by Snowy

Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) and Gutteridge, Haskins and Davey

(GHD), two large consulting engineering firms. The study, completed in 1978 and

explored environmental, social, and ecological impacts of constructing the dam. This

report120 confirmed the findings of the original 1968 study which recommended

construction of two large dams on the Shoalhaven River system and proposed that

construction should commenced in 1986 with completion in 2000 (Seebohm (2000)).

There were further investigations into the dam proposal in the period from 1982 to 1993.

Two studies investigated aboriginal archaeological sites in the inundation area, the second

of these recommending that archaeological sites be excavated and aboriginal artefacts

collected (Seebohm (2000)). In the late 1980s, SMEC and Sinclair Knight & Partners

were commissioned to examine the water supply strategy, tabling their report in 1991

(Snowy Mountains Engineering et al. (1991)). This study undertook a sophisticated

modelling approach to both demand and headworks and concluded that there were three

options to provide Sydney with water. The first of these was either increasing the

capacity of the Warragamba dam (by raising the height of the existing dam wall, or

constructing a flood mitigation dam downstream of the existing dam), or a two-stage

120 The report and several associated studies considered the impact of stream flows, erosion, sedimentation,

water quality, agriculture and land use, terrestrial vertebrates and vegetation, social and recreational aspects, and eutrophication. There were 86 people permanently resident in the dam inundation area, and 37 of these were totally financially dependent on their property. There were 15 people whose homes would be inundated.

346


development of the Shoalhaven. Second was development of reverse osmosis and

desalination technology for effluent reuse. And third, was a “risk management” strategy

in which further capital investment would be postponed until a crisis point was reached

and then additional technology, such as reverse osmosis technology, would be installed

expeditiously. The report recommended not pursuing the third option without further

evaluation. The report concluded that one or other of these schemes would need to be

commissioned by 2011/2012.

In July, 1993 the Welcome Reef development was postponed indefinitely121, the NSW

Government appearing to be following the third “risk management” option, together

with demand management. Other than the relatively small Tallowa dam (mentioned

above), the raising and strengthening the wall of Warragamba dam during the late 1980s,

together with a new spill-way to protect against the possibility of a major flood in the late

1990s, there have been no significant headworks since 1972 (Warragamba fact sheet).

However, there has been significant work done in sewerage and drainage.

In the last 50 years, a number of smaller sewerage systems have been developed,

particularly in western Sydney, there now being about 20 sewage treatment systems in the

Sydney metropolitan area, although about 75% of sewage now is treated by the three

main deepwater outfalls which discharge into the ocean just off the Sydney coast.

(http://www.sydneywater.com.au/OurSystemsandOperations/;

http://www.sydneywater.com.au/OurSystemsandOperations/SystemsOperationsWaste

water_SystemImage.jpg – accessed 12 Nov 2007) In the 1980s there was considerable

public outcry regarding the pollution of Sydney’s ocean beaches and plans were

announced to move the discharge of the discharge sewage from the three ocean outfalls

from a few hundred metres off the cliff-face to between 2.5 and 3.8 km offshore (SMH

11 Sep 89) further works to upgrade ageing sewage infrastructure and extend the system

over a 20-year period was also announced at this time. Although sewerage and drainage

work has been the principal infrastructure development during this period, two

significant events focused public attention on water supply. First was the apparent water

supply contamination by cryptosporidium and giardia in 1998. A Royal Commission122

was appointed, resulting in Sydney Water Corporation (the government-owned

corporation which replaced the Water Board in 1983) being broken into two major parts: 121 No Dam is a Welcome Relief for Braidwood, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 July 1993 122 The Royal Commission was chaired by Peter McClelland QC.

347


Sydney Water which has distribution responsibility and the Sydney Catchment Authority

which is responsible for catchment management (SMH 30 Oct 89, Stein (2000)). The

second event was a prolonged dry period, lasting from 2000 to 2007. By 2005, concern

was growing that should the drought extend much beyond the longest on record,

Sydney’s supply of water could become precariously low. There was considerable public

discussion and dissatisfaction with both government and Sydney Water’s response to the

situation (SMH 15 May 2006). Various solutions have been proposed including tapping

previously unutilised groundwater, sewage and stormwater treatment, and desalination of

sea water. Construction of a desalination plant at Kurnell commenced in 2007.

Institutional arrangements Until the 1970s, much of construction of water reticulation, sewerage, and drainage was

done using manual labour123. The workforce was unionised but there was generally a

harmonious relationship between the unions and management. However, in 1975,

during a period of union militancy and high wage inflation in the broader community, the

relationship between the unionised workforce and management deteriorated, culminating

in a lengthy strike. During the strike, raw sewage fouled Sydney’s ocean beaches, broken

water mains were not repaired, and public dissatisfaction soared. Opinions vary as to the

underlying causes of this breakdown in industrial relations: one viewpoint was that the

harmonious relationship failed to deliver wage increases which were common in other

industries during a period of full employment; another was that it was a generational

change as a younger group came through the workforce who had no experience of the

hardship of the Depression and immediately after the Second World War when work was

scarce; still another was that it was largely a result of a clash between an intransigent

board and a new breed of militant unionist (Beazley 201-205). The board had been

reconstituted in 1972 in response to perceptions that the prevailing structure was

inefficient and bureaucratic. The disruptions of the 1970s led to an enquiry and a further

reconstitution of the board in 1983, reflecting new public expectations regarding

statutory authorities. The new board consisted of six part-time board members, and a

full-time general manager, all of whom were appointed by the government. But the

performance of the Water Board had become a major political issue and the problems

relating to ocean beach pollution in the 1980s, and continued public perceptions of

123 The Water Board was one of the biggest employers in Australia of migrant labour in the 1950s. It was

not until 1970s that boring machinery was routinely used for sewerage excavation (Beazley (1988), pp188-189, 219).

348


inefficiency lead to a further restructuring of the in 1993, establishing it as a state-owned

corporation. The Water Board responded to becoming a target of public dissatisfaction

with advertising and public relations campaigns, an approach which was largely

unsuccessful (Beder (1998)). Subsequently, in 1993, the Board was abolished and

replaced by a state-owned corporation, the Sydney Water Corporation (referred to as

Sydney Water). Since 1983, the Water Board and its successor, Sydney Water, have been

transformed from an engineering organisation to a commercial entity (Beazley 173, 213-

215). The engineering group was dismantled, with most engineering being let out to

private contractors and the large construction group was considerably reduced in size,

with construction work also being subcontracted to the private sector. As a state-owned

corporation, the NSW government now expects hundreds of millions of dollars each year

in dividends from Sydney Water, with the consequence that income which previously had

been directed into capital expenditure is now paid to the State Treasury as a dividend.

In 1998, resulting from findings of the McClelland Royal Commission, responsibility for

catchment management was taken from Sydney Water and given to the Sydney

Catchment Authority (SCA), a newly-established statutory body representing the Crown.

The board of the SCA consists of a managing director and chief executive, and between

four and eight board members appointed by the Minister. Three board members must

be chosen from a nominee of the NSW Farmers’ Federation, a nominee of the Nature

Conservation Council of NSW, and an elected councillor of a local government area

within the catchment area (cite Act). The functions of the authority are to supply water

to Sydney Water Corporation and other prescribed authorities while taking steps to

ensure that catchment areas and infrastructure are managed so as to promote water

quality, to protect public health and safety, and to protect the environment. In 2003, the

NSW State government, in conjunction with the Federal government, established 13

further catchment management authorities covering all catchments in NSW. These

authorities have boards consisting of local residents and landholders and are responsible

for advising the government on catchment health. They also have limited funding to

undertake environmental projects124.

124 Two of these authorities are the Hawkesbury-Nepean catchment management authority and the Sydney

metropolitan catchment management authority. The establishment of these authorities did not replace the Sydney catchment authority which still has the main responsibility for maintaining sustainable catchment health for the Sydney metropolitan area.

349


Discussion Several important matters emerge from this consideration of this narrative. They can be

considered from two perspectives. On one hand, Sydney like most major cities in

developed countries, saw construction of major water infrastructure over the last 150

years or so which made extraordinary improvements to public health and quality of life.

The institutions which were responsible for the construction and management of this

infrastructure was strongly influenced by engineers – initially civil engineers but

subsequently, engineers of all disciplines. Through protection of catchment areas,

treatment of water, distribution systems, effluent management, sanitary drainage,

sewerage, an integrated water management and sanitation system was developed which

effectively eliminated many communicable, water-borne diseases. Water was made

available to service both industrial and domestic use, despite major challenges of climate

and rainfall variability. Today, these well-documented technical achievements are largely

taken for granted.

But there is another interpretation. From the initial days of the formation of formalised

institutional arrangements in the mid-19th-century, engineers were highly influential in

decision-making regarding Sydney’s water system. From the 1840s onwards, engineers

not only took a great interest in development of Sydney’s water system but were very

influential in the institutional arrangements which evolved. Engineers were strongly

represented on the Royal commission of 1869, an engineer from London, W. Clark,

reviewed the Royal Commission’s findings, and engineers were appointed to “official

positions” when the Water Board was established in 1888. As Beazley (1988) points out,

the Water Board became an engineering institution. Beder (1989b), in her extensive

consideration of the development of Sydney’s sewerage system, notes that there is a

strong cultural consideration of the influence of engineers on the development of

Sydney’s water system. The reliance on water as a means not only to supplying both

domestic and industrial requirements for day-to-day living but also as the primary means

of sanitation was established early on. For example, in the late 19th century, in the

spirited debate regarding dry conservancy versus wet carriage for removing and

transporting sewage, wet carriage won the day. Beder argues that this was not simply a

technologically-won argument but that the socially-constructed paradigm used by

engineers, together with their political influence and expertise resulted in the dismissal of

alternative technologies, based on such considerations as cost minimisation (in particular

350


the utilisation of existing assets), institutionalisation of technological education (engineers

were taught only one technology – wet carriage – without consideration of other

technologies). The momentum created by this approach continued to require

development of massive infrastructure without adequately evaluating options which may

have been more cost-effective and, perhaps, more technologically effective.

Beder touches upon but does not develop fully an important point – the instrumentalist

philosophical paradigm which underlies the practice of engineering. It argued here that

the situation arose primarily because of the instrumentalist view which engineers take to

their discipline. The engineering profession is focused on technological and economic

effectiveness. It utilises science and existing technology to develop solutions with

minimal capital expenditure and maximum technological and cost effectiveness. The

paradigm is not confined to the utilisation of science in the development of technology

or the maximisation of capital utilisation but also extends to utilisation of ecological and

human resources. As long as society was willing to sacrifice ecological and individual

well-being for some notion of “greater good”, the instrumentalist engineering paradigm

and the social paradigm of the day were largely aligned. However, in the 1970s the two

paradigms diverged.

In the 1960s and 1970s, there was a significant shift in societal values: late modernist

thinking, critical theory, and postmodernism had a notable influence on Western

thought. While the technologically-focused disciplines such as engineering continued to

be based upon an instrumentalist, positivist philosophical perspective, the change in

broad community values led to a collapse in confidence in the technological disciplines,

including engineering. Social expectations changed significantly, with expectations that

labour should be adequately rewarded, occupational health and safety of workers should

be respected, and that ecological responsibility (recognising either its extrinsic or intrinsic

value) was important. Because the Water Board, with its predominantly technologically-

oriented engineering paradigm did not recognise this change in social expectations, it

slipped out of step with the community values. Inability to respond to this mounting

public dissatisfaction and consequent political pressure resulted in the institution being

dismantled and the engineering influence which had dominated the Water Board for a

century was largely eliminated. Over a period of about 20 years, the Water Board, as an

engineering institution, was dismantled and the engineering services moved to the private

351


sector. As a result of public pressure, the Water Board (and its successor organisations,

Sydney Water and the Sydney Catchment Authority) became both corporatised and

politicised, a state of affairs which prevails at the time of writing.

It will be recalled that in Chapter 3, the Type 3 problem was characterised as a problem

which, “due to its uniqueness and complexity, precludes or limits the use of the purely analytical

techniques, and which also requires the engagement of a stakeholder set with conflicting worldviews.

Human stakeholders have what appear to be irreconcilable differences in beliefs and values, and a

willingness to exploit power imbalances coercively to achieve their own ends. Moral status of all

stakeholders and their interests may be difficult to identify and some (for example, non-human species)

may not be formally represented in the decision-making constituency.” An important point that

emerges from this narrative is that the problem of providing a satisfactory water system

for the metropolis of Sydney has evolved into a Type 3 problem. For a 80 years or more,

the problem can be considered to have been predominantly Type 1 – it was seen to be

largely a technological challenge which would respond to the traditional, reductionist

engineering approach. In the 1960s and 1970s, the complexity of the water, sewerage,

and drainage system continued to evolve and the “soft” issues of operational efficiency,

industrial relations, and economic requirements came to be of central concern – the

situation became a Type 2 problem. But in the last thirty years, the complexity of the

situation increased greatly: apparently irreconcilable differences among human

stakeholders, the environmental impact of proposed solutions – particularly in relation to

riparian health, wilderness areas, the significance of archaeologically important

indigenous sites, and the interests of non-human species – have further complicated the

problem situation. Social expectations diverged from those of the traditional engineering

paradigm: politics, differences in social perspective, shifts in power, coercive behaviour

within the problem constituency, differences in stakeholder worldviews, beliefs and

values, and a range of issues with differences of opinion regarding importance became

increasingly dominant in the discourse. In recent years, with the prospect of a serious

drought facing Sydney, the situation was further exacerbated. The result was inadequate

decision-making processes, governance arrangements for the water supply authorities

which have been widely regarded as ineffectual, increasing political secrecy and

coerciveness, and a lack of community engagement. In short, the situation exhibits all

the characteristics of a Type 3 problem.

352


Appendix 7.4 – Trilemma System Maps The following are the trilemma system maps representing the metropolitan system. See

section 7.3.7.1 for the process for preparing trilemma system maps.

The Modern Industrial trilemma…Dystopia• Weak but influential technologists• Strong regulation not underpinned by

capable technologists• Powerful design and build lobby pursuing

its own sectional interests• Strong technological lobby influenced by

interests other than technology

Utopia• Articulate, highly regarded,

influential professional institutions• Strong, intelligent regulatory

framework• Strong capacity to design, build and

operate facilities• Strong local capability with access

to global resources

Utopia• Democratically elected capable

political representation• Incorruptible• Wise, sustainable approach to public

agenda• Strong decisive leadership• Strategic rather than tactical• Capable, politically neutral

bureaucracy

Dystopia• Sectional interests dominate• Corrupt• Intimidated bureaucracy• Short-term poll-driven decision-making• Public relations used to sell decisions

Dystopia• Dominated by sectional and special interests

"NIMBY" attitude prevails• Uninterested• Uninformed

Utopia• Readily available avenues to express

community concern• Strong capable community leaders• Good information flow to citizens (media etc)• Strong participative culture in the community• Knowledgeable citizens• Community involved in consideration of

issues well in advance of decisions being required




Coercive Politics

CommunityConcern

Tech

nolo

gica

lIn

fluen

ce

Political

Establi

shment

ModernIndustrial

CommunityConcern

Tech

nolo

gica

lIn

fluen

ce

Political

Establi

shment

CommunityConcern

Tech

nolo

gica

lIn

fluen

ce

Political

Establi

shment


s Is

”

The Modern Industrial trilemma…

Characteristics of the “As Is” situation• Slow decision-making• Driven by crisis• Fragmented approach to technology• High risk of sub-optimal solutions being selected• Timeframe is too short for optimal outcome

•Missed opportunities to optimise across technologies

•More expensive in capital and operating costs• Risk of social disruption• Negative impact on economic growth• Risks to environmental outcomes




Coercive Politics

CommunityConcern

Tech

nolo

gica

lIn

fluen

ce

Political

Establi

shment

ModernIndustrial

CommunityConcern

Tech

nolo

gica

lIn

fluen

ce

Political

Establi

shment

CommunityConcern

Tech

nolo

gica

lIn

fluen

ce

Political

Establi

shment


s Is

”

353


The Skeptic trilemma…

Dystopia• Decision paralysis• No distinction between belief

and knowledge

Utopia• Clear distinction between the

rational and irrational• Balance between belief and

rationality• Decision to act based on

rational understanding level of risk and knowledge of impact

Utopia• Strong scientific institutions• Robust peer-review process• Recognises uncertainty in framing

conclusions• Recognises the importance and

influence of beliefs and values

Dystopia• Scientific practice not rigorous• Political or sectarian interest influential• Lack of rigour in scientific method

Dystopia• Pseudoscience replaces rational science• Confusion between belief and reality• Theories not subject to the test of falsification

Utopia• Clear distinction between beliefs and

science• Beliefs seen as important social elements


Precaution



Responsible Science

Responsible Science

Belief

Unc

erta

inty

Scienc

e

Skeptic

Belief

Unc

erta

inty

Scienc

e Belief

Unc

erta

inty

Scienc

e

Skeptic

“As Is”

The Skeptic trilemma…

Characteristics of the “As Is” situation• Although science and technology is practised at a high level by international standards, it lacks influence in the political process.

• Pseudoscience is making inroads into some areas of decision-making.

• The precautionary principle is not widely understood or embraced.

• Government decision-making is secretive and reactive.

• Uncertainty and risk is transferred to other parties by government, rather than being managed through soundly crafted policy


Precaution



Responsible Science

Responsible Science

Belief

Unc

erta

inty

Scienc

e

Skeptic

Belief

Unc

erta

inty

Scienc

e Belief

Unc

erta

inty

Scienc

e

Skeptic

“As Is”

354


The Lifestyle trilemma…

Dystopia• Inadequate water for good sanitation• Poor sewerage and drainage

infrastructure• Desirable lifestyle unachievable due to

restricted water supply

Utopia• No water-borne disease• Good sanitation• Plentiful water without wastage• Pleasant, comfortable

surroundings

Utopia• Efficiently functioning market for water,

sewerage, and drainage• Sound balance between satisfying

ecological and human needs• Efficient use of capital• Price reflects social, economic and

environmental costs and benefits

Dystopia• Inefficient, high cost infrastructure• Investment capacity limited• Economic growth constrained by

inadequate water infrastructure• Water and sanitation expensive by

world standards

Dystopia• Irreparably damaged ecology• Human interests overwhelm those of other

species and ecosystems

Utopia• Water infrastructure integrated into

the ecology• Healthy ecosystems both within and

around the metropolis• Ecological interests of both human

and nonhuman species well protected

• Reasonable cost of water infrastructure

Quality ofLife

Quality ofLife


EconomyEfficient

Economy

Ecologicalconcern

Hea

lth/

Qua

lity

of L

ife

Econo

mics

Lifestyle

Ecologicalconcern

Hea

lth/

Qua

lity

of L

ife

Econo

micsEcological

concern

Hea

lth/

Qua

lity

of L

ife

Econo

mics

Lifestyle

“As Is”

The Lifestyle trilemma…Characteristics of the “As Is”situation

• Standards of public health and sanitation are high by world standards, with little or no water-borne disease.

• Generally adequate sewerage and drainage infrastructure, although this is ageing.

• Water usage is relatively high by developed countries standards.

• During periods of low rainfall, some environmental problems exist and water restrictions are required.

Characteristics of the “As Is”situation (cont’d…)

• Sydney lifestyle (e.g. swimming pools, gardening, public spaces, etc) require significant amounts of water.

• Approaching the point where are restrictions on water supply may constrain economic growth.

• Further increases in water supply capacity, a respective of the choice made will probably have significant environmental and economic impact.

Quality ofLife

Quality ofLife


EconomyEfficient

Economy

Ecologicalconcern

Hea

lth/

Qua

lity

of L

ife

Econo

mics

Lifestyle

Ecologicalconcern

Hea

lth/

Qua

lity

of L

ife

Econo

micsEcological

concern

Hea

lth/

Qua

lity

of L

ife

Econo

mics

Lifestyle

“As Is”

355


The Business Model trilemma…

Dystopia• Inefficient, high cost• High capital cost• High operating costs• Insensitive to customer needs

Utopia• Well-run, efficient, low-cost

service provider• Optimum balance between

capital costs andoperating costs

Utopia• Efficient use of low-cost government debt

• Low-cost• Well-allocated resources across a range of competitors

Dystopia• Inefficient operation protected

by government• Potentially viable private operators

excluded from market• Development of infrastructure

falls behind economic growth rate• Decision paralysis on

important new investment

Dystopia• Competitive pressures reduce capacity to

serve customers

Utopia• Efficient access to global capital market

• Low-cost• Well-allocated resources across a range of competitors

MonopolyMonopoly



Public Ownership

Free Market

Capitalism

Cap

ital

Effi

cien

cy

Big

Govern

ment

BusinessModel

Free Market

Capitalism

Cap

ital

Effi

cien

cy

Big

Govern

ment

Free Market

Capitalism

Cap

ital

Effi

cien

cy

Big

Govern

ment

BusinessModel“A

s Is”

The Business Model trilemma…

Characteristics of the “As Is” situation• Government monopoly.• Water assets are inefficiently operated.• Private operators excluded from market.• Decision paralysis on important new investment.

• Dividend being paid to government revenue rather than being invested in infrastructure improvement

MonopolyMonopoly



Public Ownership

Free Market

Capitalism

Cap

ital

Effic

ienc

y

Big

Govern

ment

BusinessModel

Free Market

Capitalism

Cap

ital

Effic

ienc

y

Big

Govern

ment

Free Market

Capitalism

Cap

ital

Effic

ienc

y

Big

Govern

ment

BusinessModel“A

s Is”

356



Community

InformedPublic

InformedPublic

StrongGovernment

StrongGovernment

Community

Engagement

Med

ia

Politics

PublicInterest

Community

Engagement

Med

ia

Politics

Community

Engagement

Med

ia

Politics

PublicInterest

The Public Interest trilemma…







bureaucracy




Utopia• Strong local leadership engages a

wide cross-section of the community• Local communities see themselves

as an integrated part of the metropolis

• Political process used as a major influence on public policymaking

Dystopia• “NIMBY” effect predominates• Shallow, uninformed community discussion• Weak or non-existent community leadership• Self-interested local politics dominates the

process

“As I

s”

The Public Interest trilemma…

Characteristics of the “As Is” situation• Media excluded from information.• Government secretive.• Strong "NIMBY" effect.• Little well-informed public discussion.• Government insensitive to public opinion.• Limited public debate.• Little community leadership.• Gagged bureaucracy.


Community

InformedPublic

InformedPublic

StrongGovernment

StrongGovernment

Community

Engagement

Med

ia

Politics

PublicInterest

Community

Engagement

Med

ia

Politics

Community

Engagement

Med

ia

Politics

PublicInterest

“As I

s”

357












bureaucracy







Media

Ves

ted

Inte

rest

s

Politic

s Media

Ves

ted

Inte

rest

s

Politic

s

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

“As I

s”





Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politic

s Media

Vest

edIn

tere

sts

Politic

s

VestedInterests


InformedPublic


GovernmentStrong

Government

“As I

s”

358


Good Government

Good Government


DominanceLegal

Dominance

Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

l

Activis

m

Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

l

Activis

m

SocialContract

The Social Contract trilemma…

Utopia• Trusted, respected legal processes

resolve genuine differences• Deters and punishes illegal behaviour• Seen as a last resort to resolve

differences• Intelligent interpretation of legal

principles and social context

Dystopia• Politically active judiciary• Distinction blurred between political

and legal processes• Corrupt judiciary• In competent judiciary• Overly influential plaintiffs bar• Overly litigious community

Dystopia• Corrupt or ineffectual directors• Lack of transparency in governance processes• Lack of balance in “triple bottom-line”

Utopia• Responsible corporate governance

practice• Interests of all stakeholders

considered• Open, inclusive governance

processes




bureaucracy




“As Is”

The Social Contract trilemma…Characteristics of the “As Is” situation• Trusted, respected legal processes.• Judicial and political processes remain separate.

• Incorruptible judiciary.• Highly litigious public attitudes.• Tendency towards judicial activism.• Largely responsible corporate governance practices.

• Secretive, exclusive government policy-making.

• Public suspicious of the influence of vested interests in policy determination.

• Bureaucracy largely competent but intimidated by politicians.

• Public agenda strongly influenced by superficial media attention.

Good Government

Good Government


DominanceLegal

Dominance

Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

l

Activis

m

Governance

Expectations

Pol

itics

Lega

l

Activis

m


359


Appendix 7.5 – Multidimensional Conjugate Cognitive Maps

Following are selected examples of the conjugate cognitive maps. In the Warren Centre

project, all dimensions were thoroughly mapped during analysis process.


Values & prosperity


“As Is” – Social










Media manipulated



environment



good life”



growth”









opinion

Quality of life & aesthetics undermined

Process for resolution of social issues

“Likely Future” – Social

Increased social inequity and

therefore social tensions

Increasing impossibility of “As Is” life-style – see

Goulburn for a foretaste

Not learning from history

Can lead to ill-conceived solutions

Social dissent

Greater involvement of community;

local government and communities

take individual actions

Increase in information and

misinformation in the media –

legitimate media information will

increase but may be swamped

Aesthetic issues become

secondary

People taking things into their own

hands – “sporadic”or individually “small scale”

anarchy

Panic over principle; precautionary

principle goes out the window

Technology becomes

marginalised to the point where it is constrained to

solutions in a very limited state

Divisive, uncohesive response

Undermines civil society

Reform will centre around public

debate/discourse around social

expectations of government and

business

Social divide will be exaggerated by

crisis

360


“As Is” – PoliticalErosion of the instruments for public opinion

influencing government

Policy made in isolation – does not

consider the big pictureDisconnect between

the government and community –

empowers media manipulation

Poll-driven

Public retreat from long-term

perspective

Need to understand where risk lies and how to manage it

No free market

Malconnect between public policy and

public opinion

Government insensitive to public

opinion

Market model dominates politics and all levels of

government

County Councils no longer elected

Disconnect between government and private sectors,

thereby precluding possible good

solutions

No independent governance in public instrumentalities and

corporations

“Likely Future” – Political

Can lead to ill-conceived solutions

Government given power to act

Government is more authoritarian

Crisis drives needs change in

government attitude and regulation,

doing potentially detriment to health and environment

Potential to react efficiently by

combination of government and

private investment

Probably will be resolved politically –

state/federal

Greater political unpredictability

361


“As Is” – Institutional

No independent governance in public instrumentalities and

corporations



Current “As Is” does not enable creative

policy and outcomes

Planning – no bipartisan and long-

term approach

Disconnect between government and private sectors,

thereby precluding possible good

solutions

Market model dominates politics and all levels of

government

Career politicians lose touch with the

public – defer to polls as a surrogate

County Councils no longer elected

“Likely Future” – Institutional

Reform will centre around public

debate/discourse around social

expectations of government and

business

Potential to react efficiently by

combination of government and

private investment

Current situation does not lead to

long-term insights into a “good”

solution

Government given power to act

There will be a move away from legal

dominance

Greater involvement of community;

local government and communities

take individual actions

Crisis derives needs change in

government attitude and

regulation, doing potentially

detriment to health and environment

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Appendix 7.6 – Straw Proposal Narrative

Discussion Material for Metropolitan Water Options Project Forum

Thursday 11 May 2006

Australian Technology Park, Sydney

Characterisation of the “As Is” Sydney metropolitan system [The following characterisation of the Sydney metropolitan system has been described by

developing and critiquing seven “trilemmas” representing various forces and tensions

which are thought to be relevant to provision of a long-term, sustainable water system.]

General Narrative Decision-making with regard to water has historically been slow and driven by crisis.

There is a fragmented approach to technology which runs the risk of leading to

suboptimal solutions being selected. Because the timeframe is too short for an ideal

outcome to be achieved, opportunities are missed to optimise across a range of

technologies and may result in high capital and operating costs. This also leads to the

risk of social disruption and can have negative impact on economic growth.

Environmental outcomes are also compromised.

Although science and technology are practice at high level by international standards,

they tend to lack influence in the political process. In some areas bad or incomplete

science has a negative impact on decision-making. The “precautionary principle” is not

widely understood or embraced and government decision-making is secretive and

reactive. There is a tendency to transfer uncertainty and risk to other parties rather than

being managed by the government through soundly crafted policy.

Standards of public health and sanitation are high by world standards, with little or no

waterborne disease. This is due to generally adequate sewerage and drainage

infrastructure although this is now ageing and requires substantial maintenance. Water

usage is relatively high by developed country standards with Sydney’s lifestyle (e.g.

swimming pools, gardening, public spaces etc) requiring significant amounts of water.

During periods of low rainfall, significant environmental problems exist, particularly in

inland waterways, and water restrictions are required. The point is being approached

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where restrictions on water usage may constrain economic growth. Irrespective of the

choice made, further major increases in water supply capacity will almost certainly have

significant social, economic, and environmental impact.

Currently, the government has a monopoly over water assets, with private operators

excluded from the market. Water assets are inefficiently operated, with income being

paid as a dividend the government rather than being reinvested in maintenance and

infrastructure improvement.

Government decision-making tends to be secretive and exclusive, with the bureaucracy

and private contractors involved in the water industry effectively gagged. The media is

excluded from key information, but even relatively superficial media coverage heavily

influences the public agenda. There is a strong “NIMBY” effect, with little balanced,

well-informed public discussion and a government which appears to be poll-driven and

insensitive to public opinion. There is little public debate and little community

leadership, other than in some local special-interest groups. There is a general public

cynicism that vested interests are influential in policy determination.

With the public agenda heavily influenced by the media there is public suspicion of the

political processes and a lack of multi-party approach to long-term strategic infrastructure

issues.

The legal processes are trusted and respected with judicial and political processes

remaining separate. There tends to be less judicial activism at the State level than has

been displayed in recent years at the Federal level. Government and semi-government

instrumentalities although governed by boards of directors this lack independence and

are not free from government influence. These instrumentalities largely lack effective

corporate governance practices.

Critique of the “As Is” Sydney metropolitan system This outline sketch of the Sydney metropolitan system as it stands today, is now

considered in terms of eight problem dimensions (Political, Regulatory, Institutional,

Economic, Health, Environmental, Social, and Technological).

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Political

The current political situation appears to be characterised by a government which is

insensitive to public opinion, due perhaps to apparent disconnect between government

and the community. Government response seems poll driven, giving the opportunity for

manipulation by special interest groups. The media is influential in determining

government response to polls and major issues and is manipulated by special interest

groups and the government itself. There appears to have been an erosion of the

instruments for public opinion influencing government and a general retreat of the public

from consideration of long-term issues. Although there has been a significant adoption

of the free market model at all levels of government, publicly owned instrumentalities

and corporations do not have boards independent of government influence and there is a

disconnect between government and the private sector. The combination of these

factors potentially precludes the delivery of possible good solutions to complex

problems. A further issue in relation to corporate governance is that current governance

practice focuses on prudential and fiduciary responsibilities with little emphasis on moral

obligation. Where water supply is being considered moral issues relating to wilderness

areas, long-term effects of pollution, environmental damage, and energy requirements are

important considerations.

Regulatory

Regulation currently prevents private operators from accessing certain public activities,

water being a notable one. County Councils are no longer elected and have limited

responsibility for provision of utilities.

Institutional

As with many activities in modern society, politics is now largely considered a career

rather than an activity of public service later in life. Career politicians tend to lose touch

with the public, with the consequence of needing to defer to polls as a surrogate.

Government and semi-government instrumentalities, although overseen by boards, lack

true independence and effective corporate governance.

Economic

Although there has been a move to opening government business to the private sector,

private operators are peripheral to the main operators and there is no free market for

private citizens to access. This has led to inefficient operation and maintenance of public

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assets. Economic rationalism is the prevailing government paradigm, with a significant

transfer of risk to the private sector. There is little long-term, low interest government

debt being applied to water infrastructure. It is open to question how well risk is

understood and managed. Although there is a lot of capital available to invest in

infrastructure in NSW, there is a reluctance to place capital in long-term investments.

With the emphasis that economic rationalism places on economic growth there is a

question whether high rates of economic growth are sustainable in the long-term and

that whether a better measure may not be “prosperity”.

Health

Generally, the health and sanitation of Sydney’s water system is considered to be

excellent by world standards. There is essentially no water-borne disease and sanitation

from Sydney’s independent drainage and sewerage systems is to a very high standard.

Environmental

There are gaps in knowledge of how lifestyle affects environment.

Social

There is little opportunity for citizens to influence formulation of public policy. Media

coverage is influential though incomplete, with a perception that the debate is mis-

shaped by government and special interests. Public meetings are unusual and there is no

longer a “Domain” where public concerns are debated. Community engagement is often

seen to be a token gesture. The economic rationalist approach has had strong influence

on Australian society with a shift in values towards economic wealth, rather than in a

more broadly encompassing notion of “prosperity”. There has been a decline in the

influence of science and engineering, together with paradoxical overestimation of the

capability of science to deliver satisfactory outcomes yet a distrust of the “expert”.

Corporate governance is viewed with some scepticism, largely due to the emphasis placed

on prudential responsibility rather than fiduciary and moral accountability. There is a low

public tolerance for risk and little public consideration of long-term perspectives.

Technological

There has been a decline in the interest in science and engineering in recent years. At the

same time as an overestimation of the capacity of science to deliver solutions. There has

also been a focus on economic return on assets, leading to short-term economic return in

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operating operation and maintaining of public assets, leading to poor reliability and

maintenance.

“Most Likely” response of the “As Is” Sydney system Consideration is now given to the way in which the “As Is” system will respond to a

situation where:

there is a very long period of hot dry weather where rainfall is much below the historic

average;

Sydney’s population continues to grow at the today’s rate;

energy becomes increasingly expensive.

The likely response of the Sydney metropolitan system to such a disturbance is outlined

below.

As the sense of crisis increases, the government will probably be given much greater

power to act. The consequence of this is to increase social dissent and runs the risk of

undermining civil society – the response tends to be divisive and incohesive. Technology

becomes marginalised and constrained because of the limited avenues open, due to lack

of response time. As the crisis worsens, there is a risk that the government will become

more authoritarian. Precaution regarding the consequences of policy gives way to panic.

Little regard is given to history and ill-conceived solutions are rushed through the

regulatory and political processes. There is a high risk that long-term insights into a

“good” solution are missed and opportunities no longer exist to integrate the solution of

short-term and long-term problems, due to the urgency of the situation.

Although there will be more rapid deployment of optimal technologies, such as recycling,

as lifestyle suffers, the economic imperative dominates, with quality of life and ecology

suffering. As these issues become secondary the ecology is the big loser. There is

increased risk of people taking things into their own hands, leading to small-scale

anarchy, social tension, and inequity.

Production of water will dominate over economic efficiency with the crisis driving

change in government attitude and regulation, with potential detriment both to health

and environment. The economics of scale is likely to lead to monopolisation and but

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with the current public/private partnership approach there are opportunities to quickly

make public and private investment to implement solutions.

As the situation worsens, greater concern and involvement of the community is likely,

with local government and community groups being encouraged to take individual

action. It is likely that there will be an increase in both information and misinformation

in the media: legitimate media information may well increase but also may be swamped

by vested interest manipulation.

The issue is likely to take on a national character and will probably be resolved politically

at the State/Federal level.

Legal and regulatory reform could be expected as a consequence of public debate and

discourse around the social expectations that the community has of government and

business to resolve the crisis.

“Desirable Future” response Consideration was being given to imagining what a “Desirable Future” might look like

and this is described below.

The community is involved in the early stages as the problem is identified, so there can

be careful consideration of the issues well in advance of decisions being required. There

is a wise, sustainable approach to the public agenda undertaken by all political parties

with strong, decisive leadership. Professional institutions are articulate and highly

regarded and trusted participants in the public debate.

There is a well informed, balanced discussion on the seriousness of the issue and a

consensual approach is followed to consider and resolve long-term strategic issues.

Strong local leadership engages a wide cross-section of the community with local

communities seeing themselves as integral parts of the total metropolis.

Public decision-making and policy determination recognises the importance influence of

a range of beliefs and values in society. Decisions are made based on a rational

understanding of the level of risk and the knowledge of the impact of decisions. There is

368


a clear distinction existing between the influence of beliefs and values, on one hand, and

science and technological solutions, on the other.

Water is plentiful without wastage with healthy ecosystems both within and around the

metropolis. There is good sanitation and water infrastructure is integrated into the

ecology. There is an efficiently operating market for water, sewerage, and drainage, with

the price reflecting social, economic, and environmental costs and benefits.

There is an optimal balance between capital cost and operating cost, with assets being

efficiently constructed and maintained. There is an efficient use of low-cost government

debt, efficient access to global capital markets and an integrated public/private approach

to the construction and operation of water infrastructure.

Vested interests are encouraged to take a consensual approach to long-term strategic

issues and are guided and constrained by intelligent regulation. The strategic nature of

major infrastructure development is recognised and handled by government through

institutions which transcend political boundaries.

The consensual approach to resolution of long-term strategic issues, motivated by the

public good, not vested interests is supported by an open, inclusive governance process.

There is intelligent interpretation of legal principles within the social context of

metropolitan Sydney.

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Documents

Chapter 7 Case Study – Sydney’s Water System