CHAPTER 7: ADDITIONAL STUDIES (HIRA, OCCUPATIONAL …environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/Risk... · 2016. 3. 8. · Project: QRA for Integrated Fertiliser Plant Client:

EIA for the Proposed Integrated Fertilizer Plant [Ammonia Plant (2x2200MTPD),Urea Plant

(2x3850MTPD), Nitric Acid Plant (2x400MTPD), Ammonia Nitrate Plant (2x500 MTPD),

Power Plant (2x67.5MW)] of VBC Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd at Jayanthipuram Village ,

Jaggayyapet Mandal Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh

Bhagavathi Ana Labs Pvt Ltd (a Bureau Veritas Group Company) Ref BV Bhagavathi: BALEN2013/069 Rev. 00, Final

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CHAPTER 7: ADDITIONAL STUDIES (HIRA, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, SAFETY & DISASTER

MANAGEMENT PLAN and PUBLIC HEARING)

7.1 Introduction The word 'disaster' is synonymous with 'emergency' as defined by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). An emergency occurring in the proposed Integrated Feritiliser plant [Ammonia Plant (2*2200MTPD), Urea Plant (2*3850MTPD), Nitric Acid Plant (800MTPD), Ammonia Nitrate Plant (1000MTPD), Power Plant (2*67.5MW)] (hereinafter referred to as "Plant") is one that may affect several sections within it and/ or may cause serious injuries, loss of lives, extensive damage to environment or property or serious disruption outside the plant. It will require the best use of internal resources and the use of outside resources to handle it effectively. It may happen usually as the result of a malfunction of the normal operating procedures. It may also be precipitated by the intervention of an outside force such as a cyclone, flood, earthquake or deliberate acts of arson or sabotage. This chapter deals with the risks associated with the Integrate Fertiliser Plant, its mitigation and the Disaster Management Plan. 7.2 Scope of Work The scope of the study is to model and appraise the risks associated with all toxic and flammable hazards resulting from potential loss of containment accident scenarios from VBC Operations and developing a Disaster Management Plan. 7.3 Objectives The specific objectives of the study are to identify:

The risk associated with the Nitric Acid and Ammonia facility

Potential consequences of identified threats

Recommend risk prevention and reduction measures to ensure that all risks are within ALARP.

Defines the actions to be taken in case of emergencies. 7.4 Methodology of HIRA Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 7.4.1 Identification of Hazards The materials, which will are considered for the proposed plant are Ammonia & Nitric Acid which will be stored in isolation The main hazard potentials in the proposed Integrated Fertiliser, Plant are categorized as below:

Material hazards; Ammonia & Nitric Acid Storage Facilities.

Process hazards due to loss of containment during handling of hazardous materials or processes resulting in fire, explosion, etc

Mechanical hazards due to "mechanical" operations such as welding, maintenance, falling objects etc. - basically those NOT connected to hazardous materials.

Electrical hazards: electrocution, high voltage levels, short circuit, etc.






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Out of these, the material and process hazards are the one with a much wider damage potential as compared to the mechanical and electrical hazards, which are by and large limited to very small local pockets. 7.4.2 Risk Modelling with Phast 6.7

Phast is a consequence modelling package that can be used to assess situations which present potential hazards to life, property and the environment and to quantify their severity. Phast examines the progress of a potential incident from the initial release to far-field dispersion including modelling of pool spreading and evaporation, and flammable and toxic effects. The results from the analysis can be displayed in tabular & graphical form, so the extent of the impact can be seen, and the effect of the release on the population and/or workforce and environment can be assessed. Validation of software is important to obtain reliable results, and Phast is amongst the world’s most validated consequence modelling software packages, using comparisons with observations during both experiments and real life incidents. * PHAST: Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools 7.4.2.1 Detailed QRA Approach Rule Sets and Assumptions

As part of the risk modelling, rule sets and assumptions have been agreed prior to the execution of the risk calculations. These assumptions and rule sets are given below. Assumption No: 1

Project: QRA for Integrated Fertiliser Plant

Client: VBC Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited

Subject Area: Hole Size Selection

Rev: 0 Reference: Common Practice Date:8 April 2015

Assumption / Rule Set: The following representative leak sizes have been applied. Pipeline Release Sizes:

Small release through 5 mm equivalent hole, representative of hole sizes up to 20mm.

Medium release through 25 mm hole, representative of 20 to 80 mm hole sizes.

Large release through 100 mm hole, representative of 80 to 200 mm hole sizes.

Full bore release equivalent to pipeline diameter

Catastrophic rupture in case of storages

Tank on Fire leading to roof failure






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Assumption No: 2



Subject Area: Isolation and Detection Time

Rev: 0 Reference: ESDV Philosophy Date:8 April 2015

Assumption/Rule Set:

1. For release, maximum event duration is a combination of detection and isolation time. As ESDV’s are placed in each areas, 300 secs is assumed considering control procedure taken in such event in all areas i.e. process area, unloading area and storage tanks.

Assumption No: 3





Assumption / Rule Set: For an individual ignition source, the probability of delayed ignition in time period t is given by:

Where Pi, t is the probability of ignition over the time interval, fi is the presence factor for the source (the proportion of time the source is present and active), and wi is the ignition effectiveness factor for the source. The program obtains an ignition function for each grid cell, combining all of the sources inside that cell. It calculates the total probability at 100s and at 1000s, and then calculates an equivalent presence factor and an equivalent effectiveness factor, where the equivalent effectiveness factor is a function of time:

If the values calculated for wx, y, t1 and wx, y, t2 are very similar (within 5% of each other), then wx, y is assumed not to be a function of time; the factor a will be set to zero, and the factor b will be set to the arithmetic average of wx, y, t1 and wx, y, t2. The probability of delayed ignition in time period t from the ignition sources in a grid square centered at x,y is then given by:

Where Px, y, t is the probability of ignition over the time interval, fx, y is the equivalent presence factor for the grid cell, and wx, y, t is the equivalent ignition effectiveness factor for the grid cell. Immediate ignition of pressurised flammable material may lead to jet fire and If an






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instantaneous release is immediately ignited, the flammable vapour formed may result either in a fireball, flash fire or explosion. However in this study, it is assumed that the event will always lead to a flash fire and jet fire. Delayed ignition of flammable vapour may result in either a flash fire or a Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE), depending on the cloud size and level of confinement. For unconfined areas, ignited vapour clouds tend to develop into a flash fire. Considering the very low level of confinement of the pipeline route vicinity and fixed facilities in the pipelines network, the probability of a flash fire is set to 95%, and the probability of an explosion is 5%.

Assumption No: 4

Project: QRA for Integrated Fertiliser , Plant


Subject Area: Human Impact Criteria

Rev: 0 Reference: Purple Book Date:8 April 2015

Assumption / Rule Set: The following impact criteria are used: 1. Jet fire/Pool Fire

Two sets of criteria are used to determine impact from combination of these events. Areas exposed to radiation levels of 37.5 kw/m2 are assumed to give 100% fatality level. The fatality levels in areas exposed to lower radiation levels are determined using the following probit function (Ref./3/): Pr = -36.38 + 2.56 ln(I1.333 . t) Where:

Pr : probit I : thermal radiation level in W/m2 t : exposure duration in second

The maximum exposure duration for these events is set to 20 seconds. This is assumed as the time that someone will remain within the radiation envelope before attempting to escape.

2. Flash fire The area within the LFL envelope of flammable vapour cloud is used as single value criteria and it is assumed that this area gives 100% fatality level.

The table below summarises the vulnerability factors for outdoor exposure, which is applied in the study.

Type of Consequence Vulnerability

Flash fire 1






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Rev: 0 Reference: Purple Book Date:8 April 2015

Jet Flame 1

Pool Fire 1

Assumption No: 5




Rev: 0 Reference: ERPG Date:8 April 2015

Assumption / Rule Set: The most carefully assessed acute toxic criteria for process chemicals are contained in the ERPG (Emergency Response Planning Guidelines) developed by ACGIH and AIHA. These provide three levels of toxic injury for a 60 minute exposure for around 120 industrial toxic gases. ERPG-3: Maximum airborne concentration below which, it is believed, nearly all individuals can be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing life threatening health effects. ERPG-2: Maximum airborne concentration below which, it is believed, nearly all individuals can be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing irreversible adverse health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual ability to take protective action. ERPG 1: Maximum airborne concentration to which, nearly all individuals can be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing health effects more severe than mild odour perception or irritation, if relevant. ERPG 2: The most commonly used end-point in consequence calculations and same will be considered for modelling purpose. Also other toxic exposure guideline from NIOSH is called IDLH – Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health and this represents an exposure of 30 minutes. This is the concentration which can generally be tolerated for 30 minutes without any escape-impairing or irreversible health effects being experienced.

Reagent Hazard Ratings

Flammability Reactivity Health

Nitric Acid 0 0 3

Ammonia 1 0 3

4 = Extreme, 3 = Severe, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Slight,






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Rev: 0 Reference: ERPG Date:8 April 2015

Material IDLH(ppm) ERPG-2 (ppm)

Ammonia 300 150

Nitric Acid 25 10

Assumption No: 6


Client:VBC Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited

Subject Area: Weather Data

Rev: 0 Reference: CPQRA Date:8 April 2015

Assumption / Rule Set: 1. The following describes the assumptions and the data to be used for the weather classes. 2. Wind Speed and Pasquill stability classes: Bhagavathi Ana Labs will finalize stability class as per the Pasquill-Gifford stability classes as mentioned in CPQRA. Wind Speed and Pasquill Stability Class

Surface Wind

Speed, m/s

Day Time Isolation Night Time Isolation

Any Time Heavy

Overcast Strong Moderate Slight

Thin Overcast or

>4/8 > 3/8

Cloudiness Low Cloud

<2 A A-B B F F D

2-3 A-B B C E F D

4-5 B B-C C D E D

5-6 C C-D D D D D

>6 C D D D D D

The day and night processed weather class / wind speed, wind directional probability data for the site will be taken from the Indian Meteorological Data (IMD). The wind speed will be in metres per second following the atmospheric stability class (e.g. A, B, C, D, E and F).






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Assumption No: 7



Subject Area: Weather Condition for Jayanthipuram

Rev: 0 Reference: IMD Book Date:8 April 2015

Assumption / Rule Set: There are two weather classes which have been considered for the Gannavaram in place of Jayanthipuram which is the nearest IMD Station. They are listed below: Day Weather

2AB:Moderate and 2m/s wind speed Day time Temperature considered is 400C

Night Weather

5D: D stability (neutral) and 5 m/s wind speed. Night time Temperature considered is 280C

Wind Direction

Weather Class Probability (%)

Day Weather Night Weather

2AB 5D 2AB 5D

N 0.052 0.010 0.038 0.009

NE 0.097 0.018 0.030 0.007

E 0.127 0.023 0.098 0.023

SE 0.052 0.010 0.189 0.045

S 0.082 0.015 0.159 0.037

SW 0.075 0.014 0.045 0.011

W 0.242 0.026 0.184 0.021

NW 0.052 0.010 0.060 0.014

Calm 0.067 0.012 0.045 0.011

TOTAL 0.778 0.125 0.849 0.178






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Assumption No: 8


Client:VBC Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited

Subject Area: Battery Limit

Rev: 0 Reference: As per SOW Date:8 April 2015

Assumption / Rule Set:

The following sections will be considered for the QRA Study:

S.No Chemical Quantity Operating

Temperature Operating Pressure

1 Ammonia 2*10000MT -330C 1 bar

2 Nitric Acid 4*200MT 340C 1 bar






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Assumption No: 9


Client: VBC Fertiliser & Chemical Limited

Subject Area: Battery Limit

Rev: 0 Reference: As per SOW Date:8 April 2015

Assumption / Rule Set: 1. The Plant layout considered is






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Nitric Acid Storage Facility considered for Risk Assessment Ammonia Storage Facility considered for Risk Assessment






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7.4.3 System Definition, Hazard Identification & Failure Scenarios This stage of the study involves a review of the facilities in order to define the failure cases. The failure cases in the facilities are defined in terms of LoC scenarios, i.e. accidental releases of process fluids into the atmosphere. This may include various sizes of process leaks, full bore rupture of process piping and catastrophic rupture of storages. Range of release sizes and the representative sizes applied for this study are outlined in assumption register. The failure cases are defined by sectionalising equipment in the process units. The following steps apply:

Identify isolatable segments, based on isolation facilities and physical location.

Identify sections with different physical nature of the hazardous materials being handled (i.e. fluid phase, pressure and temperature) within each isolatable segment.

Identify generic failure cases in term of release sizes in each section.

All facilities which normally containing hazardous material has been considered in defining the failure cases. Details of failure cases identified and consequence effects for proposed facilities are summarised in consequence tables. For each failure case, the release rate and the release duration of release is then defined. This will determine the amount of material being released to the atmosphere, and hence the potential impact of the failure scenario. The duration of a release is dependent on the time to detect the released fluids, time to isolate the leaking segment and the time to discharge remaining inventory in the segment. The total release duration is the sum of these three periods. Further it can be argued that the time to detect depends on:

Monitoring of process conditions, which may indicate any leak in process and/or pipeline sections.

Availability of a fire and gas detection system and/or leak detection system in a pipeline.

Surveillance of the Receiving and Loading area, either by operator routine patrol or by a remote surveillance system.

While the time to isolate is determined by the availability of ESD system, which includes:

ESD activation logic (i.e. manual or automatic),

Remote or local activation (push button location) for manual intervention, and

Location of the isolatable segment. Release durations applied in this study are outlined in Assumptions (Release Characteristics).






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7.4.4 Consequence Modelling / Phast Software

Phast calculates wide range of possible consequences from the LoC events, including:

Pool Fire, causing thermal radiation impact.

Flash Fire, causing thermal radiation impact within the flammable cloud envelope. Various factors affecting the extent of consequence are also considered within the Phast model (applied values of these factors are discussed in Assumption Register), which include:

Atmospheric conditions, including solar radiation flux, ambient temperature, humidity and wind speed/direction as well as weather stability.

Release location.

Release orientation.

Bund / dike existence.

Detailed findings of the consequence analysis for selected failure cases are presented in Consequence tables. The qualitative levels of explosion and heat radiation effects are described in the below tables respectively are used to assess the likelihood of harm to people or the likelihood of further loss of containment and escalation.

Table 7.1: Explosion Overpressure Effects

Overpressure (bar) Effects Within Zone

0.02 10% window glass broken 0.05 Window glass damage causing injury

0.1 Repairable damage to buildings and house facades

0.2 Structural damage to buildings

0.35 Heavy damage to buildings and process equipment

Table 7.2: Effects of Thermal Radiation

Radiation Intensity (kW/m2)

Observed Effect

37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment 12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing

4 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 s, however blistering of the skin (second degree burns) is likely; 0% lethality

Various probability factors which will determine the route of event within the event trees are also determined in the Phast model. These include: 1. Immediate ignition; This is directly specified and will be different depending on the size of the release. 2. Fireball / flash fire / explosion probability in the event of immediate ignition of instantaneous release. This is directly specified.






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3. Flash fire / explosion probability in the event of delayed ignition. This is also directly specified in Phast. 4. Toxic Hazards: The release of toxic chemicals into the atmospheric results in dispersion of a toxic cloud in downwind direction. The variation in time of the concentration will depend on both the release characteristics (continuous, finite-duration, instantaneous or time-varying release) and the effects of wind meander. The selection of the average time should be appropriate for the calculation of the toxic effect for an average human, who is located at a fixed location and observes a concentration C (ppm) as function of time. 7.5 Consequence Analysis Since the material involved in this study is toxic as well as flammable, the possible scenarios are toxic impacts, pool fire, flash fire, dispersion and Jet fire. Orange colour in the pictures shows predominant effect due to wind direction. All the pictures provide cumulative effect due to the proposed storage tanks. 7.5.1 Toxicity The extent of the consequence of toxicity is represented by the toxicity envelope, i.e. the maximum dispersion distance of the toxic cloud at IDLH concentration. Table 7.3 below summarises representative failure cases together with their toxicity consequence results.

Table 7.3: Impact Area in Terms of Toxicity

Failure Scenario ID

Hole Size Maximum Dispersion Distance to equivalent toxic

dose for Various Weather Cases (m) 2AB 5D

Ammonia Tank

Small 111.46 223.73 Medium 269.29 574.71

Large 481.35 1171.96 Catastrophic Rupture 5538.67 6192.7

Nitric Acid Tank

Small 2.19 1.79 Medium 2.27 2.16







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Figure 7.1: Toxic Impact for Medium Leak- Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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Figure 7.2: Toxic Impact for Catastrophic Rupture – Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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Figure 7.3: Toxic Impact for Catastrophic Rupture – Nitric Acid Tank (Weather 5D)






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7.5.2 Pool Fire When a non-boiling liquid spills, it spreads into a pool. The size of the pool depends on the availability of the bund and obstacles. If there are no obstacles or bund, it can spread into a thin film on flat land/floor. In general, a cylindrical flame approximates the flame geometry. Radiation levels at various distances are calculated taking into account atmospheric transmission coefficient, geometric view factor and the radiation intensity in terms of surface heat flux of the flame. Depending upon the conditions, there are several ways in which these can occur, ultimately causing damage due to heat radiation. 7.5.2.1 Effects of Pool Fire Pool fire may result when bulk storage tanks of fuel will leak/burst, and the material released is ignited. If the tanks are provided with dike walls to contain the leak and avoid spreading of flammable material, the pool fire will be confined to the dike area only. However, the effects of radiation may be felt to larger area depending upon the size of the pool and quantity of material involved. Thermal radiation due to pool fire may cause various degrees of burns on human bodies. Moreover, their effects on objects like piping, equipment are severe depending upon the radiant heat intensity. The extent of the consequence of a Pool fire is represented by the thermal radiation envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.:

4 kW/m2; this level is sufficient to cause personnel if unable to reach cover within 20s; however blistering of the skin (second degree burn) is likely; 0: lethality

12.5 kW/m2; this level will cause extreme pain within 20 seconds and movement to a safer place is instinctive. This level indicates around 6% fatality for 20 seconds exposure

37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality Table 7.4 below summarises representative failure cases with the associated pool fire consequence results.

Table 7.4: Impact Area in Terms of Heat Radiation from Pool Fires

Failure Scenario

ID Hole Size

Thermal Radiation Distances for various Weather Cases (m)

4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 2AB 5D 2AB 5D 2AB 5D

Ammonia Tank

Small 8.4 8.59 5.46 5.54 Not

Reachable Not

Reachable

Medium 19.39 19.71 10.79 11.57 Not

Reachable Not

Reachable

Large 19.39 19.71 10.79 11.58 Not

Reachable Not

Reachable

Catastrophic Rupture 711.02 725.98 519.45 540.31 414.72 424.68






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Figure 7.4: Pool Fire for Medium leak- Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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Figure 7.5: Pool Fire for Catastrophic Rupture- Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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7.5.3 Flash Fire

The extent of the consequence of a flash fire is represented by the flash fire envelope, i.e. the maximum dispersion distance of the flammable cloud at LFL concentration.

Table 7.5 below summarises representative failure cases together with their flash fire consequence results.

Table 7.5: Impact Area in Terms of Heat Radiation from Flash Fires

Failure Scenario ID

Hole Size

Maximum Dispersion Distance of Flammable Cloud @ LFL Concentration for Various Weather

Cases (m)

2AB 5D

Ammonia Tank

Small 15.08 9.43

Medium 31.5 35.24


Figure 7.6: Flash Fire for Medium leak - Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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Figure 7.7: Flash Fire for Catastrophic Rupture - Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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7.5.4 Jet Fire The extent of the consequence of a Jet fire is represented by the thermal radiation envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.:

4 kW/m2; this level is sufficient to cause personnel if unable to reach cover within 20s; however blistering of the skin (second degree burn) is likely; 0: lethality, as outlined in Assumptions.

12.5 kW/m2; this level will cause extreme pain within 20 seconds and movement to a safer place is instinctive. This level indicates around 6% fatality for 20 seconds exposure, as outlined in Assumptions.

37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality as outlined in the same section above.

Table 7.6 below summarises representative failure cases with the associated jet fire consequence results.

Table 7.6: Impact Area in Terms of Heat Radiation from Jet Fires

Failure Scenario ID Hole Size


4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

2AB 5D 2AB 5D 2AB 5D

Ammonia Tank

Small 5.56 5.65 NR NR NR NR Medium 20.33 19.77 NR NR NR NR

Large 47.19 45.01 NR 35.40 NR NR






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Figure 7.8: Radiation for Jet Fire Medium leak – Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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7.5.5 Explosion Explosion is the scenario occurs when an ignition source catches the pool radius of the flammable liquid or gas reaching boiling point of the material. This is provided in the form of thermal radiation at different bar pressure in Table 7.7.

Table 7.7: Impact Area in Terms of Explosion Effects from Late Ignition

Failure Scenario ID

Hole Size Over Pressure Radius for various Weather Cases (m)

0.02 bar 0.13 bar 0.20 bar 2AB 5D 2AB 5D 2AB 5D

Ammonia Tank

Small 16.95 NR 11.79 NR 11.39 NR Medium 65.87 55.41 46.69 36.58 45.18 35.09

Large 74.26 76.07 41.46 41.93 38.86 39.23 Catastrophic Rupture

1198.58 1256.94 554.89 592.24 504.02 539.07

Figure 7.9: Explosion Radius for Medium leak - Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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Figure 7.10: Explosion Radius for Catastrophic Rupture - Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)

7.5.6 Fireball The extent of the consequence of a Fireball is represented by the thermal radiation envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.:

4 kW/m2; this level is sufficient to cause personnel if unable to reach cover within 20s; however blistering of the skin (second degree burn) is likely; 0: lethality, as outlined in Assumptions.






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12.5 kW/m2; this level will cause extreme pain within 20 seconds and movement to a safer place is instinctive. This level indicates around 6% fatality for 20 seconds exposure, as outlined in Assumptions.

37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality as outlined in the same section above.

Table 7.8 below summarises representative failure cases with the associated Fireball consequence results.

Table 7.8: Impact Area in Terms of Heat Radiation from Fireball

Failure Scenario

ID Hole Size


4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

2AB 5D 2AB 5D 2AB 5D

Ammonia Tank

Small NR NR NR NR NR NR

Medium NR NR NR NR NR NR Large NR NR NR NR NR NR

Catastrophic Rupture 154.82 154.82 NR NR NR NR






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Figure 7.11: Fireball for Catastrophic Rupture - Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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Table 7.9: Impact Area in Distance to Concentration Results

Failure Scenario ID

Hole Size Maximum Dispersion Distance @ Different

Concentration for Various Weather Cases (m)

2AB 5D

Ammonia Tank (IDLH 300 PPM)

Small 89.24 169.84

Medium 223.85 506.44

Large 350.58 830.99

Catastrophic Rupture 5975.31 8731.8

Figure 7.12: Dispersion Radius for Medium leak-Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)

. Figure 7.13: Dispersion Radius for Catastrophic Rupture -Ammonia Tank (Weather 5D)






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7.6 Conclusions and Recommendations Risk Assessment is carried out with the objective to identify the potential hazards from pipeline, and storage facilities. Important conclusions and recommendations arising out of the Risk Analysis for Proposed Plant are listed below.

Heat radiation from pool fires are well within the boundary except for catastrophic rupture of Ammonia Tank.

A 100M safe distance is to be provided as per Best Management Practices to avoid fire & explosion scenarios for the proposed Ammonia Tank.

It is recommended that the adjacent tanks shall be thermally protected by firewater.

The ammonia storage tanks will be of double wall, double integrity construction with complete automatic safety protection control systems as per the best world wide






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practice. Onsite and offsite emergency management systems will be scrupulously practiced including mock drills to ensure safety of personnel inside and outside the factory premises to tackle emergencies in case of catastrophic damages to the ammonia storage tanks and pipelines.

The threat zones due to the storage of Nitric Acid are confined within the plant premises, proper bund is to be provided to avoid spillage of complete inventory in case of catastrophic rupture.

Natural Gas is used as fuel for the proposed plant and a pipeline is laid from the existing Gail transportation pipeline which is 2km’s away from the proposed pipeline. So the consequence distances for the proposed pipeline will be less as the MSDV/ESDV will be provided.

Furthermore, it is recommended that additional measures for safety be taken. These measures include inspecting all other piping and appurtenances for damage and corrosion to prevent unexpected leakage establishing an Emergency Plan, Employee Emergency Plans and Fire Prevention Plans."

Workers handling and operating Ammonia tanks, cylinders, and tank wagons should receive special training in standard safety procedures for handling compressed corrosive gases. All pipes and containment used for this service should be regularly inspected and tested.

Use corrosion-resistant structural materials and lighting and ventilation systems in the storage area.

Wood and other organic/combustible materials should not be used on floors, structural materials and ventilation systems in the storage area for ammonium nitrate.

Storage tanks should be above ground and surrounded with dikes capable of holding entire contents.

Limit quantity of material in storage upto 80 %.

Restrict access to storage area.

Post warning signs when appropriate.

Keep storage area separate from populated work areas.

Inspect periodically for deficiencies such as damage or leaks.

Have appropriate fire extinguishers available in and near the storage area. The following measures are suggested for reducing the risk involved in pipeline systems.

Preventive Maintenance

Routinely inspect and conduct preventive maintenance of equipment / facilities at the unit. Instruments: All the instruments like pressure, temperature transmitters/gauges and alarms switches and safety interlocks should be tested for their intended application as per the preventive maintenance schedule. Similarly, the emergency shutdown system should be tested as per the preventive maintenance schedule.






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7.7 Occupational Health and Safety Safety in the workplace is critical to the success of running a business, no matter what size it is. As a small business owner one has certain rights and responsibilities regarding health and safety in the workplace. Even without any employees, one must ensure that the business doesn’t create health and safety problems for the customers and the general public. All safety gears will be provided to workers and care will be taken by EMC that these are used properly by them. All safety norms will be followed.

Preventing Fires & Explosions

Fires & explosions in boiler can also result from the ignition of volatile materials and fuels. The most hazardous procedures are during the firing- up and shutting-down procedures. Coal-fired boiler should have safeguards to ensure that unspent fuel does not accumulate and ignite. The fuel supply to boiler should be fitted with an automatic shut-off mechanism.

Operators should be trained in safe systems of work. The building should be designed to be non-combustible, with automatic fire suppression engineered or designed into the process where appropriate.

Risk assessments should be carried out to consider the potential dispersal of toxic chemicals from non-furnace processes & combustion products, and the potential impact of an explosion on the surrounding areas.

Regular safety audits should be undertaken to ensure that hazards are clearly identified and risk-control measures maintained at an optimum level.

Boiler should not be operated beyond their safe lives. Toxic Vapours, Dusts & Fibres






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Ammonia will lead to the release of toxic fumes either during operation or accidentally. When a boiler is stripped for maintenance purposes, particular care should be taken to avoid inhaling dusts or fibres from the insulating material. Dust and fume collectors should be incorporated into the boiler design. Handling o Heavy Bags Handling of heavy bags of the final products may lead to occupational injuries like strains, sprains and cramps. This can be avoided by going for mechanical handling of the product or minimising the weight for manual handling. 7.8 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) General Provisions As a supplementary protection against exposure to hazardous conditions in the production of ammonia where the safety of workers cannot be ensured by other means, such as eliminating the hazard, controlling the risk at source or minimizing the risk, suitable and sufficient PPE, having regard to the type of work and risks, and in consultation with workers and their representatives, should be used by the worker and provided and maintained by the employer, without cost to the workers.

Items of PPE provided should comply with the relevant national standards and criteria approved or recognized by the competent authority.

Those responsible for the management and operation of the personal protection programme should be trained in the selection of the proper equipment, in assuring that it is correctly fitted to the people who use it, in the nature of the hazards the equipment is intended to protect against, and provide adequate comfort, and in the consequences of poor performance or equipment failure.

PPE should be selected considering the characteristics of the wearer and additional physiological load or other harmful effects caused by the PPE. It should be used, maintained, stored and replaced in accordance with the standards or guidance for each hazard identified at the facility and according to the information given by the manufacturer.

PPE should be examined periodically to ensure that it is in good condition.

Different PPE & their components should be compatible with each other when worn together.

PPE should be ergonomically designed and, to the extent practicable, should not restrict the user’s mobility or field of vision, hearing or other sensory functions.

Employers should ensure that the workers who are required to wear PPE are fully informed of the requirements and of the reasons for them, and are given adequate training in the selection, wearing, maintenance and storage of this equipment.

When workers have been informed accordingly, they should use the equipment provided throughout the time they may be exposed to the risk that requires the use of PPE for protection.

The PPE should not be used for longer than the time indicated by the manufacturer.

Workers should make proper use of the PPE provided, and maintain it in good condition, consistent with their training and be provided with the proper means for doing so.






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Head Protection

Any helmet that has been submitted to a heavy blow, even if there are no evident signs of damage, should be discarded.

If splits or cracks appear, or if a helmet shows signs of ageing or deterioration of the harness, the helmet should be discarded.

Where there is a hazard of contact with exposed conductive parts, only helmets made of non-conducting material should be used.

Helmets for persons working overhead should be provided with chin straps.

In addition to safety, consideration should also be given to the physiological aspects of comfort for the wearer.

The helmet should be as light as possible, the harness should be flexible and should not irritate or injure the wearer and a sweatband should be incorporated.

All protective headgear should be cleaned and checked regularly.

Face & Eye Protection

Face shields or eye protectors should be used to protect against flying particles, fumes, dust and chemical hazards.

Face shields should be used in boiler operations and other hot work involving exposure to high-temperature radiation sources. Protection is also necessary against sparks or flying hot objects. Face protectors of the helmet type and the face-shield type are preferred.

With the use of face and eye protectors, due attention should be paid to greater comfort and efficiency.

The protectors should be fitted and adjusted by a person who has received training in this task.

Comfort is particularly important in helmet and hood type protectors as they may become almost intolerably hot during use. Air lines can be fitted to prevent this.

Face and eye protectors should give adequate protection at all times even with the use of corrective vision devices.

Eye protectors, including corrective lenses, should be made of appropriate high-impact material.

Respiratory Protective Equipment

When effective engineering controls are not feasible, or while they are being implemented or evaluated, respirators, appropriate to the hazard and risk in question, should be used to protect the health of the worker.

When the hazard and risk cannot be assessed with sufficient accuracy to define the appropriate level of respiratory protection, employers should make positive pressure air-supplied respiratory protective devices available.

When selecting respirators, an appropriate number of sizes and models should be available from which a satisfactory respirator can be selected. Different sizes and models should be available to accommodate a broad range of facial types. Workers should be fit-tested for respirators.

Respirators should be cleaned and sanitized periodically. Respirators intended for emergency use should be cleaned and sanitized after each use.






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The user should be sufficiently trained and familiar with the respirator in order to be able to inspect the respirator immediately prior to each use to ensure that it is in proper working condition. Inspection may include the following :

tightness of connections;

the condition of the respiratory inlet and outlet covering;

head harness;

valves;

connecting tubes;

harness assemblies;

hoses;

filters;

cartridges;

end of service life indicator;

electrical components;

shelf life date;

The proper function of regulators, alarms and other warning systems.

Respirators should be properly stored. Damage may occur if they are not protected from physical and chemical agents such as vibration, sunlight, heat, extreme cold, excessive moisture or damaging chemicals.

Each respirator should be used with an understanding of its limitations, based on a number of factors such as the level and duration of exposure, the characteristics of the chemical and the service life of a respirator.

Workers should be medically evaluated for their ability to wear a respirator safely before they are required to do so.

Hearing Protection

When effective engineering controls are not feasible or while they are being implemented or evaluated, hearing protection should be used to protect the health of workers.

Hearing loss of speech frequencies may occur with elevated long-term exposure to noise. The use of hearing protectors gives the best results to users who are well informed of the risks and trained in their use. If earplugs are used, special attention should be paid to the proper fitting technique.

Hearing protectors should be comfortable, and the users should be trained to use them properly. Special attention should be paid to possible increased risk of accidents due to the use of hearing protectors. Earmuffs reduce the capacity to locate sound sources and prevent warning signals from being heard. This is especially true for workers with considerable hearing loss.

No model is suitable for all persons. Those wearing hearing protectors should be able to choose from alternative products that meet the attenuation criteria. Earplugs should not be the only solution as not all people can wear them.

Hearing protectors should be made available at the entrance to the noisy area and they should be put on before entering the noisy area. Noisy areas should be indicated by appropriate signs.






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The attenuation of hearing protector’s works well only if they are well maintained. Good maintenance consists of cleaning, changing replaceable parts such as cushions, and overall monitoring of the state of the hearing protector.

Hearing protectors should be evaluated through an audiometric test programme for exposed workers.

Protection from fall

When other measures do not eliminate the risk of falling, workers should be provided with and trained in the use of appropriate fall protection equipment, such as harnesses and lifelines. Workplaces and traffic lanes in which there are fall hazards or which border on a danger zone should be equipped with devices which prevent workers from falling into or entering the danger zone.

Devices should be provided to prevent workers from falling through floors and openings.

Safety harnesses should be worn where required and the lifeline should be attached to an adequate anchor point.

Harnesses should be chosen that are safely used with other PPE that may be worn simultaneously.

Appropriate and timely rescue should be provided when using fall-arrest equipment to prevent suspension trauma.

Protection while handling Ammonia

Adequate number of SCABA apparatus to be provided while handling ammonia manually or during repairs to ammonia handling equipment.

Fully covered body suit should be worn while handling ammonia.

Adequate number of PPE is to be made available in the plant premises.

Body suits with PVC make is to be provided. Protection while handling Nitric Acid

Fully covered body suit should be worn while handling Nitric Acid

Adequate number of PPE is to be made available in the plant premises for handling Nitric acid during unloading activities.

7.9 Occupational Health – Proposal for Surveillance The choice and the implementation of specific measures for preventing workplace injury and ill health in the work-force of the ammonia plant depend on the recognition of the principal hazards, and the anticipated injuries and diseases, ill health and incidents. Below are the most common causes of injury and illness:

Slips, trips and falls on the same level; falls from height; unguarded machinery; falling objects;

Engulfment; working in confined spaces; moving machinery, on-site transport, forklifts and cranes;

Exposure to controlled and uncontrolled energy sources; exposure to mineral wools and fibers; inhalable agents (gases, vapors, dusts and fumes);

Skin contact with chemicals (irritants acids, alkalis), solvents and sensitizers); contact with hot objects;






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Fire and explosion; extreme temperatures; radiation (non-ionizing, ionizing);

Noise and vibration; electrical burns and electric shock;

Manual handling and repetitive work; failures due to automation; ergonomics;

Lack of OSH training; poor work organization;

Inadequate accident prevention and inspection; inadequate emergency first-aid and rescue facilities; lack of medical facilities and social protection

Ammonia plant generates dust during its operation and transportation thus causing lung disease, pneumoconiosis, silicosis etc. in the long run.

Dust may enter into the systemic circulation and thereby reach the essentially all the organs of body and affects the different tissues.

Working near heavy noise generating equipments may cause hearing and blood pressure related diseases

Continuous working and improper working position leading to pain & exhaustion.

Plan of evaluation of health of workers

By pre designed format during pre placement and periodical examinations.

Proper schedule will be devised and followed with help of occupational health experts and doctors.

Health effects of metals used and health hazard plans based on monthly correlation of these metal related diseases and people affected.

Schedule of medical check-up during operational phase

Comprehensive Pre-employment medical checkup for all employees

General check up of all employees once every year.

Medical examination will be done for all the employees after retirement and all those employees with more than 5 years of service leaving the company. After retirement, medical examination facility will be provided for a period of 5 years.

Local hospitals and Govt. health monitoring system will be engaged.

Dispensary and ESI facility will be provided to all workers as applicable

All safety gears will be provided to workers and care will be taken by EMC that these are used properly by them. All safety norms will be followed






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ENTRY MEDICAL EXAMINATION FORM






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PERIODIC MEDICAL EXAMINATION FORM






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7.10 Disaster Management Plan This DMP has been designed based on the range, scales and effects of "Major Generic Hazards" described in the Risk Assessment and prediction of their typical behavior. The DMP addresses the range of thermal and mechanical impacts of these major hazards so that potential harm to people onsite and off-site, plant and environment can be reduced to a practicable minimum. The scenarios of loss of containment are credible worst cases to which this DMP is linked.

Capabilities of DMP The emergency plan envisaged will be designed to intercept full range of hazards specific 'to Ammonia & Nitric Acid Plant such as fire, explosion, major spill etc. In particular, the DMP will be designed and conducted to mitigate those losses of containment situations, which have potentials to escalate into major perils. Another measure of the DMP's capability will be to combat small and large fires due to ignition, of flammable materials either from storage or from process streams and evacuate people from the affected areas speedily to safe locations to prevent irreversible injury. Emergency medical aids to those who might be affected by incident heat radiation flux, shock wave overpressures and toxic exposure will be inherent in the basic capabilities. The most important capability of this DMP will be the required speed of response to intercept a developing emergency in good time so that disasters such as explosion, major fire etc. are never allowed to happen.

Disaster Control Philosophy

The principal strategy of DMP is "Prevention" of identified major hazards. The "Identification" of the hazards will employ one or more of the techniques [e.g. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), accident consequence analysis etc.]. Since these hazards can occur only in the event of loss of containment, one of the key objectives of technology selection, project engineering, construction, commissioning and operation is "Total and Consistent Quality Assurance". The Project Authority will be committed to this strategy right from the conceptual stage of the plant so that the objective of prevention can have ample opportunities to mature and be realised in practice. The DMP or Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) will consist of:

On-site Emergency Plan

Off-site Emergency Plan Disaster Management Plan preparation under the headlines of On-site Emergency Plan and Off-site Emergency Plan is in consonance with the guidelines laid by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) which states that the "Occupier" of the facility is responsible for the development of the On-site Emergency Plan. The Off-site Emergency Plan should be developed by the Governments district emergency authorities/district collector.






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7.10.1 On-Site Emergency Plan Objectives

The objective of the On-site Emergency Plan should be to make maximum use of the combined resources of the plant and the outside services to

Effect the rescue and treatment of casualties

Safeguard other personnel in the premises

Minimise damage to property and environment

Initially contain and ultimately bring the incident under control

Identify any dead

Provide for the needs of relatives

Provide authoritative information to the news media

Secure the safe rehabilitation of affected areas

Preserve relevant records and equipment for the subsequent enquiry into the cause and circumstances of emergency

EMERGENCY LEVELS Emergencies have been classified into two categories i.e. Nature - I & Nature - II. Nature - I Incidents likely to endanger the human lives, plant and equipments within the factory premises and can be controlled by the internal resources and in certain cases with help of Mutual Aid Scheme. Nature - II Incidents likely to endanger the human lives, plant and equipments within the factory premises and surrounding area but cannot be controlled by local resources and requires help from the Collector’s Office, Police Commissioner, Civil Defence Control Room, State Transport Office, Medical help etc. as laid down in the District Contingency Plan. NATURE - I EMERGENCY Probable Nature I Emergencies can occur due to:

(a) Ammonia gas release from plant installations.

(b) Uncontrollable dry grass fire in the open area.

(c) Huge fire in factory premises

(d) Accidental leakage from road tankers of Nitric Acid. Occurrence of emergencies shall be made known to all through siren codes. The detailed emergency organisation (ON-SITE) chart is provided below.

CRITERIA FOR NATURE - II EMERGENCY Plant Manager and & above shall declare Nature - II emergency in consultation with Main Incident Controller based on their experience and criteria as mentioned below:

(a) Quantity of released liquid/gases either flammable or toxic, depending upon size of vessel and failure mode.

(b) Effectiveness of measures like (i) Isolation of process






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(ii) Fire propagation and probability of subsequent events. (c) Need for Evacuation of neighbouring population and Medical help from the

District Contingency Plan Resources. Nature-II Emergencies may occur due to

(a) Uncontrollable heavy leakage of ammonia from storage tanks. (b) Rupture of ammonia cross-country pipeline by striking of any heavy objects. (c) Severe natural calamities like earthquake & heavy cyclone.

Action Plans The Action Plan should consist of:

Identification of Key Personnel

Defining Responsibilities of Key Personnel

Designating Emergency Control Centers and Assembly Points

Declaration of Emergency

Sending All Clear Signal

Defining actions to be taken by non-key personnel during emergency Key Personnel

The actions necessary in an emergency will clearly depend upon the prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the required actions are initiated and directed by nominated people, each having specified responsibilities as part of co-ordinate plan. Such nominated personnel are known as Key Personnel. The Key Personnel are:

Site Controller (SC)

Incidental Controller (IC)

Liaison and Communication Officer (LCO)

Fire and Security Officer (FSO)

Team Leaders (TL) Site Controller (SC)

In the emergency situation, decisions have to be taken which may affect the whole or a substantial part of the plant and even places outside. Many of these decisions will be taken in collaboration with the other officers at the plant and the staff. It is essential that the authority to make decision be invested in one individual. In this plan, he is referred to as the 'Site Controller'. The Plant Manager (however called) or his nominated deputy will assume responsibility as SC.

Incident Controller (IC)

In the emergency situation, someone has to direct the operations in the plant area and co-ordinate the actions of outside emergency services at the scene of incident. The one who will shoulder this responsibility is known as 'Incident Controller' in this plan. A Senior Operations Officer or an officer of similar rank of the unit may be nominated to act as the IC.

Liaison and Communication Officer (LCO)






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Operations Officer or any other officer of deputy rank will work as LCO and will be stationed at the main entrance during emergency to handle Police, Press and other enquiries. He will maintain communication with the IC

Fire and Safety officer (FSO)

The Fire and Safety Officer will be responsible for fire fighting. On hearing the fire alarm he shall contact the fire station immediately and advise the security staff in the plant and cancel the alarm. He will also announce on PAS (public Address System) or convey through telephones or messengers to the SC, IC and LCO about the incident zone. He will open the gates nearest to the incident and stand by to direct the emergency services. He will also be responsible for isolation of equipment from the affected zone.

Team Leaders (TL) A number of special activities may have to be carried out by specified personnel to control as well as minimize the damage and loss. For this purpose designated teams would be available. Each team will be headed by a Team Leader (TL). Following teams are suggested:

Repair Team

Fire Fighting Team

Communication Team

Security Team

Safety Team

Medical Team Responsibilities of Key Personnel Site Controller (SC)

On getting information about emergency, proceed to Main Control Centre

Call in outside emergency services

Take control of areas outside the plant, which are affected

Maintain continuous communication, review situation and assess possible course of events

Direct evacuation of nearby settlements, if necessary

Ensure that casualties are getting enough help

Arrange for additional medical help and inform relatives

Liaison with Fire and Police Services and Provide advice on possible

effects on outside areas

Arrange for chronological recording of the emergency

Where emergency is prolonged, arrange for relieving personnel, their catering needs etc.

Inform higher officials in head office

Ensure preservation of evidence

Direct rehabilitation work on termination of emergency Incident Controller (IC)






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On getting emergency information, proceed to Main Control Centre

Activate emergency procedure such as calling in various teams

Direct all operations within plant with following priorities: a) Control and contain emergency b) Secure safety of personnel c) Minimise damage to plant, property and the environment d) Minimise loss of material

Direct rescue and repair activities

Guide fire-fighting teams

Arrange to search affected area and rescue trapped persons

Arrange to evacuate non-essential personnel to safe area/assembly point

Set up communications network and establish communication with SC

Arrange for additional help/equipment to key personnel of various teams

Consider need for preserving all records, information for subsequent enquiries Liaison and Communications Officer ()

To ensure that casualties receive adequate attention, arrange additional help if required and inform relatives

To control traffic movements into the plant and ensure that alternative transport is available when need arises

When emergency is prolonged, arrange for the relief of personnel and organize refreshments/catering facility

Advise the Site Controller of the situation, recommending (if necessary) evacuation of staff from assembly points

Recruit suitable staff to act as runners between the Incident Controller and himself if the telephone and other system of communication fail. -Maintain contact with congregation points

Maintain prior agreed inventory in the Control Room

Maintain a log of the incident on tape

In case of a prolonged emergency involving risk to outside areas by windblown materials - contact local meteorological office to receive early notification of changes in weather conditions

Fire and Safety Officer ()

Announce over the PAS in which zone the incident has occurred and on the advice of the Shift Officer informs the staff to evacuate the assembly

Inform the Shift Officer In-charge, if there is any large escape of products

Call out in the following order: a) Incident Controller or his nominated deputy b) Maintenance Officer c) Personnel and Administrative Officer d) Departmental Head in whose area the incident occurred e) Team Leaders (TL)






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Emergency Control Centre The Emergency Control Centre will be the focal point in case of an emergency from where the operations to handle the emergency are directed and coordinated. It will control site activities. Emergency management measures in this case have been proposed to be carried from single control Centre designated as Main Control Centre (MCC) MCC is the place from which messages to outside agencies will be sent and mutual aids and other helps for the management of emergency will be arranged. It will be located in the safe area. It will be equipped with every facility for external and internal communication, with relevant data, personal protective equipments to assist hose manning the centre to enable them to co-ordinate emergency control activities. CC will be attended by SC. Following facilities would be available in the MCC:

P&T phones, mobile phones, intercoms, and wireless

Fax and telex

Emergency manuals

Blown up area maps

Internal telephone directories

District telephone directories

Emergency lights

Wind direction and speed indicator

Requisite sets of personal protective equipment such as gloves, gumboots and aprons

MCC will be furnished with call out list of key persons, fire, safety, first aid, medical, security, police and district administrative authorities.MCC will also contain safety data pertaining to all hazardous materials likely to cause emergency and well-defined procedures of fire fighting, rescue operations, first aid etc.

Assembly Point In an emergency, it will certainly be necessary to evacuate personnel from affected areas and as precautionary measure, to further evacuate non-essential workers, in the first instance, from areas likely to be affected, should the emergency escalate. The evacuation will be effected on getting necessary message from i.e. on evacuation; employees would be directed to a predetermined safe place called Assembly Point. Outdoor assembly points, predetermined and pre-marked, will also be provided to accommodate evacuees from affected plant area(s). Roll call of personnel collected at these assembly points, indoor and outdoor will be carried out by roll call crew of safety team to account for any missing person(s) and to initiate search and rescue operations if necessary.

Declaration of Emergency

An emergency may arise in the plant due to major leakage of oil or major outbreak of fire/explosion. In case of major leak or major outbreak of fire the state of emergency has to be declared by the concerned by sounding Emergency Siren.






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Upon manual or sensor detection of a major loss of containment of volatile hazardous substance, the DMP is activated by raising an audible and visual alarm through a network of geographically dispersed gas/vapor and heat detectors and also "break glass" type fire alarm call points with telephone handsets to inform the Central Control Room. A separate siren audible to a distance of 5 km range will be available for this purpose. The alarm is coded such that the nature of emergency can be distinguished as a leakage or major fire. The Control Centre and Assembly point will be located at an area of the minimum risk or vulnerability in the premises concerned, taking into account the wind direction, areas which might be affected by fire/explosion, leakage etc. After cessation of emergency, FSO will communicate to IC. After verification of status, IC will communicate with SC and then announce the "All Clear" by instructing the Time Office to sound the "All Clear Signal". Alarms would be followed by an announcement over Public Address System (PAS).In case of failure of alarm system, communication would be' by telephone operator who will make announcement in the complex through PAS. Walkie-talkie system is very useful for communication during emergency with predetermined codes of communication. If everything fails, a messenger could be used for sending the information. Two 5.0 km, range variable pitch electric sirens (one in service and the other standby)will generate the main alarm for the entire site as well as for the district fire brigade. The alarm is coded such that the nature of emergency can be distinguished as a leakage or major fire. Fire and Gas alarm matrices are provided at the Central Control room, security gate, on-site fire station and main administrative office corridor to indicate location of the site of emergency and its nature.

Mutual Aid Procedure

All factories may not be equipped with an exhaustive stock of equipment/materials required during an emergency. Further, there may be a need to augment supplies if an emergency is prolonged. It would be ideal to pool all resources available in the and nearby outside agencies especially factories during an emergency, for which a formal Mutual Aid scheme should be made among industries in the region.

Essential Elements

Essential elements of this scheme are given below:

Mutual aid must be a written document, signed by Location In-charge of all the industries concerned

It should specify available quantity of materials/ equipment that can be spared (not that which is in stock)

Mode of requisition during an emergency.






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It should authorize the shift-in-charge to quickly deploy available material/equipment without waiting for formalities like gate pass etc.

It should spell out mode of payment/replacement of material given during an emergency

It should specify key personnel who are authorized to requisition materials from other industries or who can send materials to other industries

It should state clearly mode of receipt of materials at the affected unit without waiting for quantity/quality verification etc.

Revision number and validity of agreement should be mentioned

This may be updated from time to time based on experience gained Emergency Management Training

The Key Personnel would undergo special courses on disaster management. This may preferably be in-plant training. The Managers, Senior Officers and Staff would undergo a course on the use of personal protective equipment. The Key Personnel belonging to various Teams would undergo special courses as per their expected nature of work at the time of emergency. The plant management should conduct special courses to outside agencies like district fire services to make them familiar with the plant layout and other aspects, which will be helpful to them during an emergency.

Mock Drills

It is imperative that the procedures laid in this Plan are put to the test by conducting Mock Drills. To avoid any lethality, the emergency response time would be clocked below 2 minutes during the mock drill.

1st Step: Test the effectiveness of communication system 2nd Step: Test the speed of mobilisation of the plant emergency teams 3rd Step: Test the effectiveness of search, rescue and treatment of casualties 4th Step: Test emergency isolation and shut down and remedial measures taken on the system 5th Step: Conduct a full rehearsal of all the actions to be taken during an emergency

The Disaster Management Plan would be periodically revised based on experiences gained from the mock drills.

Proposed Communication System

The instrument and control system will take care of the following operating philosophy of the plant:

The project will be provided with a control system located in a central control room.

The shift engineer will operate the plant from his console panel.

All operations will be represented in a graphic panel on the console and every operation will be depicted as operating sequences.

All operating parameters will be displayed in digital format.

Alarms will be provided for all parameters, when they exceed set values.

High-High/Low-Low alarms and trip functions will be provided to trip

Pumps/compressors to bring the entire system to a safe shutdown.






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Proposed Fire Fighting System

Elaborate fire fighting system will be available for fighting fires in any corner of the plant. A comprehensive fire detection and protection system is envisaged for the complete facility.

Fire water storage tanks of adequate capacity.

Fire water pump house containing combination of diesel and electrically driven pumps.

Hydrant system complete with suitable size piping, valves, instrumentation, hoses, nozzles, hose boxes/stations, monitors etc.

Foam injection system for fuel oil/storage tanks consisting of foam concentrate tanks, foam pumps, in-line inductors, valves, piping and instrumentation etc.

Automatic high velocity water spray system consisting of detectors, deluge valves projectors, valves, piping and instrumentation.

Automatic medium velocity water spray system consisting of QB

Detectors/smoke detectors, linear heat sensing cable detectors, deluge valves, isolation valves, nozzles, piping, instrumentation etc.

Suitable "Halon Substitutes" such as INERGEN or FM..: 200 or AGGONITE for protection of control room, equipment room, computer room and other electric and electronic equipment rooms.

Computerized analogue, addressable, early warning type fire detection and alarm system consisting various types of fire detection such as ionisation type smoke detection system, photo electric type smoke detection system, linear heat sensing cable detector, quartzoid bulb (QB) heat detection system, infrared heat detectors and spot type electrical heat detectors.

Portable and mobile extinguishers, such as pressurized water type, carbon dioxide type, foam type, dry chemical powder (DCP) type located at strategic locations throughout the plant.

Fire tenders/engines of water type, DCP type/foam type, trailer pump with fire jeep etc. provided in the fire station.

Complete instrumentation and control system for the entire fire detection and protection system for safe operation of the complete system.

Other safety Measures

Considering that fire and explosion is the most likely hazard in such installations, the plant is being provided with systems to guard against such hazards. Salient among these are:

A proper layout to prevent and minimize the effects of any hazardous situation

Design of storage vessels and all components to codes and standards to withstand the rigorous duty

Provision of operating systems to conduct the process through well established safe operating procedures

A control system, which monitors all, plant parameters and give alarms

Control system, which has trip provisions to prevent hazard conditions escalating

A gas detection system which will provide early warning of any leaks

Provision of a fire protection system to control fire

Provision of flame-proof lighting system in the fire prone areas






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Proposed First Aid and Medical Facilities The First Aid Medical Centre has been proposed. It will be fully equipped with emergency facilities. It will be open round the clock. A Medical attendant will always be available in the centre. Emergency cars will be available in all the shifts. Adequate number of first aid boxes will be kept at strategic locations. Required stock of first aid medicines will be maintained. Trained first aiders will be available in all departments. Facilities to be kept in the Medical Room along with others will include: Oxygen Cylinders, Injection Corarnine, Glucose Saline, LV. Sets, Syringes, Injection Needles, Stretchers and medicines.

Proposed Emergency Power Supply

Strategic areas will be provided with emergency lights fed through stationed battery system. Portable emergency lamps will be also available at required points. A Diesel Driven Generator of adequate capacity will be available to keep the operations running in case of power failure. Diesel Engine operated fire pumps will be available.

7.10.2 Off Site Emergency Plan

Objective

If the effects of the accident or disaster inside the plant are felt outside its premises, it calls for an off-site emergency plan, which should be prepared and documented in advance in consultation with the District Authorities.

Key Personnel

The ultimate responsibility for the management of the off-site emergencies rests on the Collector / District Magistrate / Deputy Commissioner. He will be assisted by representatives from all concerned organisations, departments and services at the District level. This core group of officers would be called the District Crisis Management Group (CMG). The members of the group will include:

1. Collector/District Magistrate Deputy Commissioner 2. Commissioner of Police 3. Municipal Commissioner, if municipalities are involved 4. Deputy Director, Health 5. Pollution Control Board Representative

An Operation Response Group (ORG) will then be constituted to implement the directives of the CMG. The various government departments, some or all of which will be concerned, depending on the nature of the emergency, could include:

Police Health & Family Welfare Medical Revenue Fire Service Transport Electricity






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Animal Husbandry Agriculture Civil Defence PWD Civil Supplies Panchayat

The SC and IC, of the on-site emergency team, will also be responsible for communications with the CMG during the off-site emergency.

Education to Public

People living within the influence zone should be educated on the emergency in a suitable manner. This can be achieved only through the Local and District Authorities. However, the Project Authority can extend necessary information to the Authorities. 7.11 Recommendations

7.11.1 For storage tanks

VBC will have double integrity cup-in storage tanks which are operating at atmospheric pressure at -33°C. Corrosion Prevention

External corrosion of the tank due to atmospheric conditions can be prevented by appropriate paint and/or by the application of insulation containing a vapor membrane that reduces the ingress of atmospheric moisture.

The roof should be regularly inspected as per management policies and where possible, repaired without interruption of service. It is important that the condition and integrity of the insulation and vapor membrane on all areas of the tank are considered as part of the overall inspection assessment.

Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) The common problem that is observed in ammonia storage tanks is Stress Corrosion Cracking. SCC initiation requires the presence of oxygen. Wet florescent magnetic particle inspection (WFMT) is the best method to detect SCC.

It is recommended to have periodic inspection schedule as mentioned below to be practiced for selected areas where a specific phenomenon may occur. Selected areas are those areas where the conditions for initiation of SCC are more favorable than in the rest of the tank or the areas.

Periodic external inspections to be made by an engineer in every 2-5 years

An internal tank inspection to be made in 5-10 years after the tank is placed in service

Vertical shell butt welds should be inspected by the UT method in API 620 Appendix U in place of the normal RT method.

All shell nozzles should be thermally post weld heat treated.






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The consequence of a tank failure can be reduced by providing water curtains. This will reduce the rate of vapour generation from the spilled liquid. The pure anhydrous ammonia will combine with available atmospheric moisture forming aqueous ammonia thus making the ammonia vapour cloud heavy and will remain close to the ground. 7.11.2 Pipeline protection

Vulnerable sections of the pipeline can be monitored by installation of remote television cameras. This will enable the operator in the control centre to take appropriate actions when required.

Corrosion Prevention

Above-ground pipelines to be generally coated/painted on the outside surface to protect against corrosion

Buried pipelines must be coated to control external corrosion. Typical coatings are bituminous materials, (extruded) polyethylene and polyurethane. At the soil to air interface, buried pipelines have corrosion issues similar to those of above-ground carbon steel pipelines. A pipe wrap should be utilized at that interface to prevent external corrosion.

Cathodic protection is essential for the effective corrosion protection of underground pipelines.

Ice formation risk can be also reduced by inspections at regular intervals as decided by the management.

Inspection of underground pipeline can be carried out by a pigging method. It is also recommended to clean the pipeline various times with a traditional pig (first generation pig) and then with an intelligent pig (second generation pig) to measure wall thickness, detect leaks etc

Isolation valves A common practice to install isolation valves on long pipelines is at such intervals that the volume released between two valves is limited to 225 tonnes. 7.11.3 General Recommendations

A detailed HAZOP is to be carried out for the proposed expansion before the starting of Operations. Leak Detection

Ammonia sensors Ammonia sensors to be placed at various locations in ammonia plants (e.g. on the

compressor platform, in the synthesis area and in the refrigeration section). However, they can also be placed in loading and tank areas and around an ammonia pipeline where they can prove a useful tool for the detection of a leak from a pipeline. It is recommended to use an electrochemical type of sensor that can sense concentrations up to 300 ppm.

Mass Balance system






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This system detects spontaneous changes in the mass balance of the liquid ammonia pipeline system. Upon a leak, the mass balance system usually first gives an alarm. Specific instructions are provided for response to the alarm. When no operator action follows in a pre-determined period (e.g. 10 minutes), some systems automatically close the isolation valves in the affected part of the pipeline system or in the entire pipeline system.

Soil Temperature system It is suggested for the installation of an optical fiber system that identifies a change in

soil temperature upon a leak in a buried pipeline. These fiber systems should be positioned alongside and above the pipeline, and be coupled to an appropriate interpretation system. This is applicable to underground pipelines.

Leaks through flanges: Special gaskets including insulating gaskets may be used provided they are suitable for the service conditions like temperature and pressure. The construction of these gaskets makes them less likely to fail resulting in a large leak. It is recommended to use gaskets conforming to ASME B16.20 and ASME B 31-4. 7.11.4 Safety Policies & Procedures Workers should be made aware of the key safety policies and procedures prior to working on the site of the construction or operation of any of the facilities. This can be achieved by regular tool box meetings, monthly safety talks and safety induction trainings to new hires. This should serve to reduce the expected occupational accident rates. Safety brief should be given to all the visitors to the plant. Hydrant system should be at an easily accessible location and should be in proper working condition. SCBA: Adequate number of Self- Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) is to be provided to all the plant personnel and should be readily available for use in case of emergency. Onsite emergency training should be provided to all work forces employed at the facility. Railway sliding activities are to be handled with proper care. Helpers should guide the driver while Loco engine attachment and detachment process. Spillage on railway tracks while loading and unloading activities is to be cleared immediately.






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7.12 Natural Disasters Disasters resulting from natural phenomena like earthquakes volcanic eruptions, storm, surges, cyclones, tropical storms, floods, landslides, forest fires and massive insect infestation, violent draught that will cause a creeping disaster leading to famine, disease and death 7.12.1 Natural Disasters can be classified under three major groups as given below:

Earth related - Earthquake, Landslides It is sudden shifts of the earth’s crust below or at the surface that results in ground vibration and the potential collapse of buildings, structures etc. and possible destruction of life and property if the quake is of sufficient magnitude & time.

Wind related - Storm, Cyclone, Tornado Cyclone It is a tropical storm in which the winds reach speeds of over 120 kmph. The cyclone blows in a large spiral around a relatively calm centre or eye. They are always dangerous, as they can change direction without warning.

Water related - Floods, Heavy rains It can arise from abnormally heavy precipitation, dam failure, rapid snowmelts, and river blockages or even bursting of big water pipelines. 7.12.2 The Preparedness for Natural Disasters The actions for preparedness have to be planned ahead of disaster. It would consist of a plan of actions to be implemented. Emergency Action Plan’ (EAP) containing the mitigation plan identified plant emergencies which may arise either by internal failures and/or external forces. In addition to this, some of the preliminary guidelines to be followed in case of Natural Disasters are enlisted below. Earthquake During earthquake everything based upon the stability of the earth is rudely disturbed. If the tilt displacement of the ground disrupts the equilibrium the structure falls. It may also involve industrial installations. In the wake of their collapse, most damage to life is done to those who are inside the house / complex and in case of toxic leakage / major explosion it may affect the surroundings also. Guidelines for Actions to be taken when Earthquake is sensed

Failure of electricity supply due to disturbance in overhead and underground lines is likely. Hence all actions for emergency power shutdown of plants may be taken.

Another risk during earthquake can be partial or total failure of telephone lines. Hence use of wireless, mobile phones, siren and other alternate communication may be done.

Try to get correct information and do not panic and spread rumours.

Suspend all non emergency work in plants and evacuate non essential persons.

Come out from the buildings & be in open area away from tall structures.






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Guidelines for Actions to be taken after Earthquake

If somebody is trapped inside a quake affected building or is under debris, he should shout loudly for help or give some specific signals.

After earthquake, and subsequent damage, search for casualties should be done on war footing.

The Supervisor must ascertain about the damage caused and likely to be caused even after quake. If so observed, inform about the likely danger.

Survivors can use other modes of communications like wireless, mobile as telephone lines are likely to be disrupted.

In case of any toxic or flammable leakage from plants, emergency actions as per the plan may be taken.

Cyclone Cyclones are one of the most disastrous natural hazards in the tropics and are responsible for deaths and destruction more than any other natural calamities. Cyclone warnings are provided through six cyclone warning centres in our country having district wise responsibilities covering both the east and west coasts of India. Cyclone warnings are issued by the ‘All India Radio (AIR) and the Doordarshan for broadcast / telecast in different languages. Guidelines for Emergency Actions to be taken during Cyclone

Persons working in temporary shed should take shelter in a pucca building.

Working at height during cyclonic storm must be suspended.

If one is caught in a cyclonic storm, it is better to remain in a clear and open area.

While driving two wheeler, the driver must be very careful.

Doors, Windows of buildings should be securely closed.

Chain pulley blocks, EOTs etc. should be secured firmly to prevent swing of their accessories.

During cyclone, the electricity supply can get hampered. Preparation for emergency power shut down must be done.

The telephone services may also get affected. Hence alternate services like wireless sets, mobile phones, and sirens will have to be used for communication.

The booms of crane are to be lowered down when not in use.

PPA like face shield, helmet, goggles to be used to take care of any adversity during cyclone.

Guidelines for Emergency Actions to be taken during Flood

Dyke bund valves if not open, should be kept open.

Flammable gas venting system wherein positive pressure of steam has been provided may be kept so to protect against lightening.

Draining of hydrocarbons in open trenches / area to be avoided as it may get carried away along the flow of water.

All temporary electrical connections & gadgets should be removed or relocated to safe positions to protect against water.

Pits dug up should be kept barricaded with strong supports and visible danger signs.

Excavated pits must be monitored against the land sliding due to wet soil.

Drainage & drain pit covers should be covered properly.






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If the water level rises so as to touch permanent electrical installation like motors, panels etc. the plant shutdown may be taken & power to be isolated.

Any obstruction in storm water channel to be cleared off immediately.

Dewatering pumps to be installed to reduce water level.

One must be careful while driving on the road due to slippery condition and potholes. As the plant site is 127AMSL the flooding scenario is not anticipated ABBREVIATIONS

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

EMC Emergency Management Centre

VBC

VBC Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited

ESD Emergency Shut-Down

F & G Fire and Gas Detection

DNV Det Norske Veritas

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment

JF Jet Fire

Kg/s Kilogram’s per second

kW/m2 Kilo Watt per Square Metre, a measure of heat flux radiant heat

LFL Lower Flammable Limit

ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve

ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guidelines

IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health

SOW Scope of Work

Psi Pounds per square inch, a measure of (over) pressure

QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis

UK HSE UK Health and Safety Executive

UFL Upper Flammable Limit

HSE Health Safety Environment

HIRA Hazard Identification and risk Assessment






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Documents

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