Chapter 5Shelter, the Greatest Need

ADEQUATE SHELTER

To improve your chances of surviving a nuclearattack, your primary need would be an adequateshelter equipped for many days of occupancy. Ashelter that affords good protection against falloutradiation and weather would be adequate in morethan 95% of the area of the United States. However,even in almost all areas not endangered by blast andfire during a massive nuclear attack, the falloutprotection provided by most existing buildings wouldnot be adequate if the winds blew from the wrongdirection during the time of fallout deposition.

To remain in or near cities or other probabletarget areas, one would need better protection againstblast, fire, and fallout than is provided by mostshelters in buildings. Blast tests have proved that theearth-covered expedient fallout shelters described inthis book can survive blast effects severe enough todemolish most homes.'

This chapter is concerned primarily withexpedient shelters that give excellent protectionagainst fallout radiation. These earth-covered falloutshelters could be built in 48 hours or less by tens ofmillions of Americans following field-tested, writteninstructions." Expedient blast shelters are discussedin Appendix D. The special blast doors and otherdesign features needed for effective blast protectionrequire more work, materials, and skill than areneeded for expedient fallout shelters.

If average Americans are to do their best whenbuilding expedient shelters and life-support equip­ment for themselves, they need detailed informationabout what to do and about why it is to theiradvantage to do it. We are not a people accustomed

to blindly following orders. Unfortunately, during acrisis threatening nuclear war, it would take too longto read instructions explaining why each importantfeature was designed as specified. Therefore, only afew reasons are included in the step-by-step,illustrated instructions given in Appendix A forbuilding 6 types of earth-covered expedient sheltersduring a crisis.

In this chapter, reasons will be given for design­ing a Pole-Covered Trench Shelter as specified in theOak Ridge National Laboratory instructions givenin Appendix A.2. The two pages of drawings andplans given at the end of Appendix A.2 show the partsof this' shelter, except for the essential shelter­ventilating pump installed in its entrance trench. Thefollowing account of how an urban family, afterevacuating, used these instructions to build such ashelter in less than 36 hours also includesexplanations of various radiation dangers and ofsimple means to build protection against thesedangers.

This family, like scores of other familiesrecruited to build shelters or life-support equipment,was offered a sum about equivalent to laborers' wagesif its members completed the experiment within aspecified time. The test period began the moment thefamily received the written, illustrated instructionspreparatory to evacuating by car, as mentioned in thepreceding chapter. Like the other test families, thisfamily was paid for all of its materials used. Ifa familyworked hard and completed the project in half thespecified time, it was paid a cash bonus. Throughoutsuch tests workers were guided only by the writteninstructions, which were improved after eachsuccessive test.

The successful outcome of almost all the shelter­building experiments indicates that tens of millions ofAmericans in a nuclear war crisis would work hardand successfully to build earth-covered expedientshelters that would give them better protectionagainst fallout, blast, and fire than would all but avery small fraction of existing buildings. However,this belief is dependent on two conditions: (I) that in adesperate, worsening crisis our country's highestofficials would supply strong, motivating leadership;and (2) that Americans would have received-well inadvance-shelter-building and other practical, testedsurvival instructions.

SHELTER AGAINST RADIAnON

The family previously pictured evacuating by car(Fig. 4.3) drove 64 miles to build a shelter at the siteshown in Fig. 5.1. Although the August sun was veryhot in this irrigated Utah valley, the family membersdid not build in the shade of nearby trees. To avoiddigging through roots, they carried the poles about150 feet and dug their trench near the edge of thecornfield.

The father and the oldest son did most of thework of making the shelter. The mother and second

son had health problems; the two youngest childrenwere not accustomed to work.

The family followed an earlier version of theplans and instructions given in Appendix A forbuilding a Pole-Covered Trench Shelter. Because theearth was firm and stable, the trenches were dug withvertical walls. If the earth had been less stable, itwould have been necessary to slope the walls­increasing the width at the top of the main trenchfrom 3\/2 to 5 feet.

Before placing the roof poles, the workersassured themselves a more comfortable shelter bycovering the trench walls. They had brought a largenumber of the plastic garbage bags required in theirhome community and split some bags open to makewall coverings. Bed sheets or other cloth could havebeen used.

The room of this 6-person shelter was 31/2 feetwide, 4 1/2 feet high, and 161/2 feet long. A small stand­up hole was dug at one end, so each tall occupantcould stand up and stretch several times a day.

The trenches for entry and emergency exit weredug only 22 inches wide, to minimize radiationentering the shelter through these openings. One wallof these two narrow trenches was an extension of the

Fig. 5.1. Placing 9-foot poles for the roof of a Pole-Covered Trench Shelter.

room wall shown on the right in Fig. 5.1. The familysat and slept along the left wall, to be better shieldedfrom radiation coming through the openings.

This shelter was designed so that its main trenchcould be enlarged to make a much more livable roomwithout disturbing its completed roof. For thisreason, the 9-foot roofing poles were placed off­center, with the two extra feet resting on the groundto the right of the main room.

Whenever practical, expedient shelters shouldbe built so that they can be readily enlarged to makesemi-permanent living quarters. After it becomes safeto emerge for limited periods, occupants could sleepand spend much of their waking time in such arainproof dugout that affords excellent protectionagainst continuing radiation. In cold weather, livingin a dugout like this is more comfortable than livingin a tent or shack. After the fallout radiation dose rateoutdoors has decayed to less than about 2 R per hour,the small vertical entry could be enlarged aridconverted to a steeply inclined stairway.

The importance of giving inexperienced shelterbuilders detailed instructions is illustrated by theunnecessary work done by the young women shownin Fig. 5.2. They had agreed to try to build a Pole­Covered Trench. Shelter, working unassisted andusing only hand tools. Because the summer sun inUtah was hot, they selected a shady site under a largetree. The brief instructions they received included noadvice on the selection of a building site. Cutting anddigging out the numerous roots was very difficult forthem and required several of the 22 hours they spentactually working.

Another disadvantage of making a shelter undertrees is that more of the gamma rays from falloutparticles on the leaves and branches would reach andpenetrate the shelter than if these same particles wereon the ground. Many gamma rays from falloutparticles on the ground would be scattered orabsorbed by striking rocks, clods of earth, treetrunks, or houses before reaching a belowgroundshelter.

Fig. 5.2. Two non-athletic college girls who completed a 4-person Pole-Covered Trench Shelter in 351/2

hours, despite tree roots.

TYPES OF SHIELDING

Shelters provide protection against radiation byutilizing two types of shielding: barrier shielding andgeometry shielding.

• Barrier shielding is shown by Fig. 5.3, asimplified illustration. (In a real fallout area, a man inan open trench would have fallout particles all overand around him.) The 3-foot thickness of earthshown (or a 2-foot thickness of concrete) will providean effective barrier, attenuating (absorbing) about99.9% of all gamma rays from fallout. (In theillustration, only a single fallout particle 3 feet fromthe edge of the trench is considered.) Only onegamma ray oui of 1000 could penetrate the 3 feet ofearth shown and strike the person in the trench. Raysfrom particles farther away than 3 feet would benegligible; rays from particles closer than 3 feet wouldbe attenuated according to the thickness of earthbetween the fallout particle and the man in.the trench.

However, the man in the trench would not beprotected from "skyshine," which is caused bygamma rays scattering after striking the nitrogen,oxygen, and other atoms of the air. The man'sexposed head, which is just below ground level,would be hit by about one-tenth as many gamma rays

as if it were 3 feet above ground (Fig. 5.3). Even if allfallout could be kept out of the trench and off the manand every part of the ground within 3 feet of the edgesof the trench, skyshine from heavy fallout on thesurrounding ground could deliver a fatal radiationdose to the man in the open trench.

Skyshine reaches the ground from all directions.If the man were sitting in a deeper trench, he wouldescape more of this scattered radiation, but not all ofit. For good protection he must be protectedoverhead and on all sides by barrier shielding.

The barrier shielding of the Pole-CoveredTrench Shelter shown in Fig. 5.4 was increased byshoveling additional earth onto its "buried roof."After father and son had mounded earth about 18inches deep over the centerline of the roof poles, alarge piece of 4-mil-thick polyethylene was placedover the mound. This waterproof material served as a"buried roof" after it was covered with more earth.Any rainwater trickling through the earth above theplastic would have run off the sloping sides of the"buried roof" and away from the shelter.

• Geometry shielding reduces the radiation dosereceived by shelter occupants by increasing thedistances between them and fallout particles, and by

ORNL-DWG 78·7205

Fig. 5.3. Simplified illustration of barrier shielding and skyshine (scattered gamma radiation). An opentrench provides poor protection.

Fig. 5.4. Increasing the barrier shielding over a Pole-Covered Trench Shelter.

providing turns in the openings leading into theshelter. Figure 5.5 is a sectional drawing of the shelterentry built by the Utah family.

The farther you can keep away from a sourceeither of light or of harmful radiation, the less light orother radiation will reach you. If fallout particles areon the roof of a tall building and you are in thebasement, you will receivea much smaller radiationdose from those particles than if they were on thefloor just above you. Likewise, if either visible light orgamma rays are coming through an opening at the farend of a passageway, less will reach you at the otherend if the passageway is long than if it is short.

Turns in passageways are very effective inreducing the amount of radiation entering a shelterthrough them. A right-angle turn, either from avertical or horizontal entry, causes a reduction ofabout 90%.

Note: Fallout shelters need not provide additionalshielding to protect occupants against initial nuclearradiation that is emitted from the fireballs of nuclearexplosions. (See Figs. 1.I and 1.4.) Large nuclearweapons would be employed in an attack on the UnitedStates. The initial nuclear radiation from thesizes of explosions that may endanger Amer-

icans would be greatly reduced in passingthrough the miles of air between the fireballsand those fallout shelters far enough away tosurvive the blast effects. The smaller an explo­sion, the larger the dose of initial nuclearradiation it delivers at a given blast overpres­sure distance from ground zero. (For a discussionof the more difficult shielding requirements of blastshelters that would enable occupants to survive blasteffects much closer to explosions and therefore wouldbe subjected to much larger exposures of initial nuclearradiation, see Appendix D, Expedient Blast Shelters.)

Figure 5.6 shows the completed shelter after itwas occupied by the family of six just 32 112 hours afterreceiving the shelter-building instructions andbeginning preparations to evacuate. (This family wona bonus for completion within 36 hours and also alarger bonus given if all members then stayed insidecontinuously for at least 72 hours.) To get a betteridea of how six people can live in such a small shelter,look at the drawings at the end of Appendix A.2.In warm or hot weather, shelters, especiallycrowded ones, must be well ventilated and cooled byan adequate volume of outdoor air pumped throughthem. This family had built an efficient homemade airpump (a KAP) and used it as described in Chapter 6and Appendix R.

ORNL-DWG 78-7204

SHELTER ROOM

THRESHOLD 80ARD

Fig. 5.5. Skyshine coming into a shelter through a vertical entry would be mostly absorbed while turninginto and traveling down the entryway trench.

Fig. 5.6. Earth mounded over a 31h-foot-wide Pole-Covered Trench Shelter. The canvas canopy wouldprotect the vertical entry against both fallout and rain. (A smaller canopy over the air duct-emergency exit at theother end is obscured by the mounded earth.)

All of the earth excavated in digging the trencheswas mounded over the roof poles, making a covering30 inches deep. This shelter had a protection factor(PF) of over 300; that is, persons inside would receiveless than 1/ 300th of the gamma-ray dose of falloutradiation that they would receive if they werestanding outside in the open.

To have made the roof covering more than 36inches thick would not have increased the protectionagainst radiation very much, unless the entry trenchand the air duct-emergency exit trench had been dugconsiderably longer. Field tests have shown thatsome families, given only 48 hours, cannot dig thelonger trenches, cut the additional poles, and shovelon the additional earth necessary for a shelter thatwould offer significantly betterprotection than theshelter shown here. The Pole-Covered Trench Shelterand the other shelters described in Appendix A allhave been built by untrained families within 48 hours,the minimum time assumed to be available toAmericans before a possible attack if the Russians'should begin tq evacuate their cities.

EARTH ARCHING USED TOSTRENGTHEN SHELTERS

Several types of expedient shelters can be madeto withstand greater pressures if their roofs are builtof yielding materials and covered with enough earth

to attain "earth arching." This arching results whenthe yielding of the roof causes part of the load carriedby the roof to be shifted to the overlying earthparticles, which become rearranged in such a waythat an arch is formed. This arch carries the load tosurrounding supports that are less yielding. Thesesupports often include adjacent earth that has notbeen disturbed.

To attain earth arching, the earth covering theyielding roof must be at least as deep as half the widthof the roof between its supports. Then the resultantearth arch above the roof carries most of the load.

(A familiar example of effective earth arching isits use with sheet metal culverts under roads. Thearching in a few feet of earth over a thin-walledculvert prevents it from being crushed by the weightof heavy vehicles.)

Figure 5.7 shows how a flexible roof yields underthe weight of 30 inches of earth mounded over it andhow earth arching develops. After the arch is formed,the only weight that the yielding roof supports is theweight of the small thickness of earth between theroof and the bottom of the arch.

Protective earth arching also results if a shelter iscovered with a material that compresses whenloaded, or if the whole roof or the whole shelter canbe pushed down a little without being broken.

ORNl·DWG 78·7441

1 It

Fig. 5.7. Earth arching over a yielding roof enables a shelter to withstand much greater pressures.

SHELTER AGAINST BETA ANDALPHA PARTICLES

In addition to the invisible, light-like gammarays, fallout particles radiate two types of hazardousinvisible particles: beta and alpha particles. Theseradiations would be minor dangers to informedpeople in fallout areas, especially to those who hadentered almost any kind of shelter before the falloutbegan to be deposited in their area.

• Beta particles are high-speed electrons given offby some of the radioactive atoms in fallout. Only thehighest-energy beta particles can penetrate more thanabout 10feet of air or about I/Xinch of water, wood, orhuman body tissue. Any building that keeps outfallout particles will prevent injury from beta radia­tion.

The only frequently serious dangers are from (I)internal beta-radiation doses from fallout­contaminated food or drink, and (2) beta burns fromfresh fallout particles. Fresh fallout particles are nomore than a few days old and therefore veryradioactive. If fresh particles remain: for at leastseveral tens of minutes in contact with the skin, betaburns are likely to result. If only thin clothingseparates fresh fallout particles from the skin, aconsiderably longer time will elapse before theirradiation causes beta burns.

In dry, windy weather, fresh fallout particlesmight get inside one's nose and ears, along with dustand sand, and could cause beta burns if not promptlywashed off or otherwise removed.

Prompt washing will prevent beta burns. Ifwater .is not available, brushing and rubbing thefallout particles off the skin will help.

If a person is exposed outdoors where there isheavy, fresh fallout for a long enough time to receive'a large dose of gamma radiation, the highest-energybeta radiation given off by fresh fallout particles onthe ground may be a relatively minor danger to hiseyes and skin. Even ordinary glasses give goodprotection to the eyes against such beta radiation,and ordinary clothing gives good protection to theskin.

Ordinary clothing will shield and protect thebody quite well from all but the highest-energy betaparticles given off by fresh fallout deposited on theclothing. Fallout-contaminated clothing should beremoved as soon as practical, or at least brushed andbeaten before entering a shelter room, to rid it of asmany fallout particles as possible. (Fallout particlesthat are many days old will not cause beta burnsunless large quantities are on the body for hours.)

Most of the knowledge about beta burns onhuman skin was gathered as a result of an accidentduring the largest U.S. H-bomb test in the tropicalPacific." Winds blew the fallout in a direction notanticipated by the meteorologists. Five hours afterthe multimegaton surface burst, some natives of theMarshall Islands noticed a white powder beginningto be deposited on everything exposed, includingtheir bare, moist skin. Unknown to them, the verysmall particles were fresh fallout. (Most fallout issand-like, but fallout from bursts that have crateredcalcareous rock, such as coral reefs and limestone, ispowdery or flakey, and white.) Since the natives knewnothing about fallout, they thought the white dustwas ashes from a distant volcanic eruption. For twodays, until they were removed from their islandhomes and cared for by doctors, they paid practicallyno attention to the white dust. Living in the open andin lightly constructed homes, they received from thefallout all around them a calculated gamma-ray doseof about 175 R in the two days they were exposed.

The children played in the fallout-contaminatedsand. The fallout on these islanders' scalps, barenecks, and the tops of their bare feet caused itchingand burning sensations after a time. Days later, betaburns resulted, along with extreme discoloration ofthe skin. Beta burns are not deep burns; however, ittook weeks to heal them. Some, in spite of propermedical attention, developed into ulcers. (No seriouspermanent skin injury resulted, however.)

For survivors confined inside crowded,unsanitary shelters by heavy fallout, and withoutmedicines, beta burns could be a worse problem thanwere similar burns to the Marshall Islanders.

All of the Marshall Islanders unknowingly atefallout-contaminated food and drank fallout­contaminated water for two days. Mainly as a resultof this, radioactive iodine was concentrated in theirthyroid glands, and thyroid abnormalities developedyears later. (There is a simple, very low-cost means ofattaining almost complete protection against thisdelayed hazard: taking minute prophylactic doses ofa salt, potassium iodide. This will be discussed inChapter 13.)

In dry, dusty, windy areas the human nasalpassages usually filter out much dust. A large part ofit is swallowed and may be hazardous if the dust iscontaminated with fallout. Under such dry, windyconditions, beta burns also could be caused by largeamounts of dust lodged inside the nasal passages.Breathing through a dust mask, towel, or other cloth

would give good protection against this localizedhazard. In conclusion: persons under nuclear attackshould make considerable effort to protect them­selves from beta radiation.

• Alpha particles, identical to the nuclei of heliumatoms, are given off by some of the radioactive atomsin fallout. These particles have very little penetratingpower: 1 to 3 inches of air will stop them. It isdoubtful that alpha particles can get throughunbroken skin; they cannot penetrate even a thinfabric.' Alpha particles are hazardous only ifmaterials that emit them (such as the radioactiveelement plutonium) enter the body and are retainedin bone, lung tissue, or other parts of the body. Anyshelter that excludes fallout .particles affordsexcellent protection against this radiation danger.Unless survivors eat or drink fallout-contaminatedfood or water in considerably larger quantities thandid the completely uninformed natives of theMarshall Islands, danger from alpha particles wouldbe minor.

PROTECTION AGAINST OTHER NUCLEARWEAPONS EFFECTS

• Flash burns are caused by the intense rays ofheat emitted from the fireball within the first minutefollowing an explosion." This thermal radiationtravels at the speed of light and starts to heat or burnexposed people and materials before the arrival of theblast wave. Thermal radiation is reduced-but noteliminated-if it passes through rain, dense clouds, orthick smoke. On a clear day, serious flash burns on aperson's exposed skin can be caused by a 20-megatonexplosion that is 25 miles away.

A covering of clothing-preferably of whitecloth that reflects light-can reduce or prevent flashburns on those who are in a large part of an area inwhich thermal radiation is a hazard. However, inareas close enough to ground zero for severe blastdamage, the clothing of exposed people could be seton fire and their bodies badly burned.

• Fires ignited by thermal radiation and thoseresulting from blast and other causes especiallywould endanger people pinned down by fallout whilein or near flammable buildings. Protective measuresagainst the multiple dangers from fire, carbon mon­oxide, and toxic smokes are discussed in Chapter 7.

• Flash blindness can be caused by the intenselight from an explosion tens of miles away in clearweather. Although very disturbing, the blindness isnot permanent; most victims recover within seconds

to minutes. Among the Hiroshima and Nagasakisurvivors (people who had been in the open morethan persons expecting a nuclear attack would be),there were a number of instances of temporaryblindness that lasted as long as 2 or 3 hours, but onlyone case of permanent retinal injury was reported."

Flash blindness may be produced by scatteredlight; the victim of this temporary affliction usuallyhas not looked directly at the fireball. Flash blindnesswould be more severe at night, when the pupils arelarger. Retinal burns, a permanent injury, can resultat great distances if the eye is focused on the fireball.

People inside any shelter with no openingsthrough which light can shine directly would beprotected from flash burns and eye damage. Personsin the open with adequate warning of a nuclearexplosion can protect themselves from both flashblindness and retinal burns by closing or shieldingtheir eyes. They should get behind anything casting ashadow- quickly.

SKIN BURNS FROM HEATED DUST(THE POPCORNING EFFECT)

When exposed grains of sand and particles ofearth are heated very rapidly by intense thermalradiation, they explode like popcorn and pop up intothe air." While this dust is airborne, the continuingthermal radiation heats it to temperatures that maybe as high as several thousand degrees Fahrenheit ona clear day in areas of severe blast. Then the shockwave and blast winds arrive and can carry theburning-hot air and dust into an open shelter. 6.9

Animals inside open shelters have been singed andseriously burned in some of the nuclear air-burst testsin Nevada."

Thus Japanese working inside an open tunnel­shelter at Nagasaki within about 100 yards ofgroundzero were burned on the portion of their skin that wasexposed to the entering blast wind, even though theywere protected by one or two turns in the tunnel. 4

(None of these Japanese workers who survived theblast-wave effects had fatal burns or suffered seriousradiation injuries, which they certainly would havesuffered had they been outside and subjected to thethermal pulse and the intense initial nuclear radiationfrom the fireball.)

Experiments conducted during several nucleartest explosions have established the amount ofthermal radiation that must be delivered to exposedearth to produce the popcorning effect." Large airbursts may result in exposed skin being burned by hot

dust and heated air produced at overpressure rangesas low as 3 or 4 psi. However, calculations indicatethat the large surface bursts most likely to endangerAmericans would not result in the occupants of small,open shelters being burned by these effects-i-exceptat somewhat higher overpressures.

Protection is simple against the heated dust andvery hot air that may be blown into an open shelter bythe blast. When expecting an attack, occupants of anopen shelter should keep towels or other cloths inhand. When they see the bright light from an explo­sion, they should cover their heads and exposed skin.If time and materials are available, much betterprotection is given by making expedient blast doors,as described in Appendix D. When occupants see thevery bright light from a large explosion miles away,they can close and secure such doors before thearrival of the blast wave several seconds later.

ESSENTIAL LIFE-SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

Shelters can be built to give excellent protectionagainst all nuclear weapon effects, except in placeswithin or very close to cratered areas. But mostshelters would be of little use in areas of heavy falloutunless supplied with enough life-support equipmentto enable occupants to stay in the shelters until condi­tions outside become endurable. In heavy falloutareas most high-protection-factor shelters would becrowded; except in cold weather, most would need aventilating pump to remove warmed air and bring inenough cooler outdoor air to maintain survivabletemperature-humidity conditions. Means for storingadequate water is another essential life-supportrequirement. These and other essential or highlydesirable life-support needs are covered in followingchapters.

BASEMENT SHELTERSThe blast and fire effects of a massive, all-out

attack of the magnitude possible in 1987 woulddestroy or damage most American homes andother buildings and endanger the occupants ofshelters inside them. Outside the blast and/ orfire areas, the use of shelters inside buildingswould not be nearly as hazardous. However, anenemy might also target some areas into whichlarge numbers of urban Americans had evacua­ted before the attack, although such targettingis not believed to be included in Soviet strategy.

Earth-covered expedient shelters in a blast areagive better protection against injury from blast, fire,or fallout than do almost all basements. But duringthe more likely kinds of crises threatening nuclearwar most urban Americans, including those who

would evacuate into areas outside probable blastareas, probably would lack the tools, materials,space, determination, physical strength, or timerequired to build good expedient shelters that areseparate from buildings and covered with earth. As aresult, most unprepared urban citizens would have touse basements and other shelters in existingstructures, for want of better protection.

Shelters in buildings, including basement shelters,have essentially the same requirements as expedientshelters: adequate shielding against fallout radiation,strength, adequate ventilation-cooling, water, falloutradiation meters, food, hygiene, etc. Sketches and shortdescriptions of ways to improve the fallout protectionafforded by home basements are to be found in widelydistributed civil defense pamphlets, including twoentitled "In Time of Emergency," and "Protection inthe Nulear Age." In 1987, millions of copies ofthese pamphlets are stockpiled for possibledistribution during a crisis. Unfortunately, mostof such official instructions were written yearsago, when the deliverable megatonnage and thenumber of Soviet warheads were small fractionsof what they are today. Official civil defenseinstructions now available to average Ameri­cans do not inform the reader as to what degree ofprotection against fallout radiation (what protectionfactor) is given by the different types of do-it-yourselfshelters pictured. There is no mention of dependableways to provide adequate cooling-ventilation, anessential requirement if even a home basement is to beoccupied by several families in warm or hot weather.Outdated or inadequate information is given aboutwater, food, the improvement of shelter in one'shome, and other survival essentials.

No field-tested instructions at present areavailable to guide householders who may want tostrengthen the floor over a home basement so that itcan safely support 2 feet of shielding earth piled on it.In areas of heavy fallout, such strengthening- oftenwould be needed to safely support adequate overheadshielding, especially if the house were to be jarred by alight shock from a distant explosion. In the followingparagraphs, a way to greatly improve the falloutprotection afforded by a typical home basement isoutlined. If improved in this manner, a basementwould provide excellent fallout protection for severalfamilies.

First, earth should be placed on the floor aboveto a depth of about one foot. Earth can be carriedefficiently by using sacks or pillowcases, using thetechniques described in Chapter 8 for carrying water.If earth is not available because the ground is frozen

or because of the lack of digging tools, other heavymaterials (containers of water, heavy furniture,books, etc.) should be placed on the floor above.These materials should weigh enough to produce aloading of about 90 pounds per square foot-aboutthe same weight as earth one foot thick. This initialloading of the floor joists causes them to carry someof the weight that otherwise would be supported bythe posts that then are to be installed.

Next, a horizontal beam is installed so as tosupport all of the floor joists under their centers.Figure 5.8 shows a beam and one of its supportingposts. Such a supporting beam preferably is made bynailing three 2X6s securely together. (Three 2X4swould serve quite well.)

DRHl-OWG 7g. 18368

NOTCH (IN ENDOF JOISTI THATRESTS ON WALL

BRACE BOARDSPRESSED TIGHTAGAINST THEFOUR WALLS

BASEMENTFLOOR

Fig. 5.8. Supporting beam and one of its postsinstalled to increase the load of shielding materialthat can be carried safely by the floor above ahome basement.

Cut posts to fit exactly under the beam. If trees atleast 4 inches in diameter are not available, makeposts by nailing boards together. Position the twooutermost posts within 2 feet of the ends of the beam.Space the posts at even intervals, with each postunder a floor joist. A post under every third joist isideal; this usually means a spacing between posts ofabout 41

(2 feet. If the basement is 20 feet long, 5 postsare enough. Nail each post to the beam, and securethe bases of each with brace boards laid on thebasement floor, as illustrated.

Finally, place a second l-foot-thick layer ofearth on the floor above. If the basement windows areprotected with boards and if all but a part of onewindow and all the aboveground parts of thebasement walls are covered with earth 2 feet thick, thebasement shelter will have a protection factor ofseveral hundred against fallout radiation.

Adequate ventilation and cooling should beassured by using a homemade air pump (a KAP),made and installed as described in Appendix B.Forced ventilation is especially necessary if morethan one family occupies the basement in warm orhot weather.

More work and materials are. required toimprove a home basement in this manner than areneeded -to build a covered-trench shelter for onefamily. An earth-covered shelter separate frombuildings will provide equally good protectionagainst radiation, better protection against blast, andmuch better protection against fire.

If a family cannot build a separate, earth­covered shelter outdoors, often it would be advisableto make a very small shelter in the most protectedcorner of the basement. Such an indoor sheltershould be of situp height (about 40 inches for tallpeople) and no wider than 3 feet. Its walls can readilybe built of chairs, benches, boxes, and bureaudrawers. Interior doors make an adequately strongroof. Expedient shielding materials, to be placed onthe roof and the two exposed sides, can be ordinarywater containers and bureau drawers, boxes, andpillow cases filled with earth or other heavy materials.Or, if heavy-duty plastic trash bags or 4-milpolyethylene film are available, make expedientwater containers and use them for shielding. To doso, first line bureau drawers, boxes, pillow cases,trash cans, etc. with plastic. Place the lined containersin position to shield your shelter, then fill theseexpedient water containers with drinkable water (seeChapter 8).

As demonstrated by hot-weather occupancytests of such very small indoor shelters, a small KAPor other air pump must be operated to maintain aforced flow of air through such a crowded shelter, toprevent intolerable temperature-humidityconditions. (See Chapter 6 for ventilation-coolingrequirements, including the provision of anadequately large opening in each end of a shelter.) Insome basements a second small KAP would beneeded in hot weather to pump outdoor air throughthe basement. This KAP could be operated by pulling

a cord from within the small shelter, using animprovised "pulley" as described in Appendix B.

PUBLIC SHELTERS

In the event of an unexpected attack, manyunprepared Americans should and would take refugein nearby marked public shelters. Throughout thepopulated areas that would not be subjected to blast,fire. or heavy fallout, the use of public shelters couldsave millions of lives. All persons concerned withsurvival should remember that the large majority ofofficially surveyed and marked shelters give betterprotection against radiation than most unimprovedhome basements..

Persons preparing to go to public shelters shouldbe aware that many lack forced ventilation and thatthe blowers and fans of most forced ventilationsystems would be stopped by loss of electric powerdue to electromagnetic pulse effects or by othereffects of nuclear explosions on electrical systems. Ablast wave at an overpressure range as low as I psi(144 pounds per square foot) would wreck mostshelter-ventilating fans. In 1987, no water or foodnormally is stocked. A person who brought to apublic shelter 10large plastic trash bags and 10pillowslips, to make 10 expedient water bags in which 60gallons of water could be stored (as described inChapter 8), would help both himself and dozens ofother shelter occupants. If he hoped to share thebasement in a strange family's home, his chances ofbeing welcomed would be improved if he brought asmall homemade shelter-ventilating pump and othersurvival items. The same small pump would beimpractical in a large public shelter. An Oak RidgeNational Laboratory study completed in 1978 foundthat if all citizens were to go to National ShelterSurvey (:\'55) shelters within one mile of their homes,69CC of those who found space would be in sheltersrated for 1000 or more occupants.'? The averagenumber of shelter spaces in this largest class of publicshelters was 3179. The prospect of living in anunequipped shelter crowded with this manyunprepared people-each of whom would have only10 square feet of floor space--is a strong motivationto work hard to build and equip a small, earth­covered shelter.

DECIDING WHAT KIND OF SHELTERTO BUILD OR USE

Before deciding what kind of shelter you andyour family should build or use, it is best to read all of

this book. Your final decision should includeconsideration of ways to provide life-supportequipment discussed in following chapters. At thisstage, however, the reader will find it helpful toreview important reasons why different types ofshelters offer the best hope of survival to differentpeople, in different areas, and under differentconditions.

This book is written primarily to improve thesurvival chances of people who cannot or do notbuild permanent shelters. The information whichfollows will help you select the best expedient oravailable shelter for your family.

SHELTER NEAR OR IN YOUR HOME

If your 'home is 10 or more miles from anaverage target such as a major airport with longrunways, or is 20 or more miles from a great city withseveral strategic targets, you are fortunate: you canprudently build or use a shelter close to home. Noone can foretell accurately which way the winds willblow or where weapons will explode, so, if practical,you should build a shelter that gives better protectionagainst fallout, blast, and fire than shelters in build­ings. Most people living outside targeted areas couldbuild such a shelter in two days or less, using one ofthe designs of earth-covered expedient sheltersdetailed in Appendix A.

Even if you plan to evacuate, you should decidewhere you would take shelter nearby in case you wereunable to do so. There is always a chance that anattack may be launched without warning, givinginsufficient time to evacuate. Or the missile aimed atthe area in which you live may miss its target. If yourtargeted home area were not hit, moderately heavyfallout might be the only danger; even an improvedbasement shelter would be adequate in that case.

EARTH-COVERED EXPEDIENTFAMILY SHELTERS

Advantages of earth-covered, expedient familyshelters:

• Better protection against heavy fallout, blast,and fire than afforded by the great majority ofshelters in buildings.

• The possibility of building in favorablelocations, including places far removed from targetareas, and places where it is impractical to build or toimprove large group-shelters giving good protection.

• The opportunity for men, women, andchildren to work together to provide good protectionin minimum time.

• A better chance to benefit from thoughtfulpreparations made in advance than would be the casein public shelters where water, food, etc. must beshared.

• Less risk of personality clashes, hysteria understress, exposure to infectious diseases, and otherproblems that arise when strangers are crowdedtogether for days or weeks.

Disadvantages of earth-covered, expedientshelters:

• It may be difficult to meet the requirement fortime, space, people able to work hard, materials, andtools-and to get all these together at the buildingsite.

• Building is difficult if heavy rain or snow is.falling or if the ground is deeply frozen. (However,untrained Americans have built good fallout shelterswith shielding provided by 5 or more feet of packedsnow, 11 including a winter version of the Crib-WalledPole Shelter described in Appendix A. The practi­cality of several Russian designs of snow-coveredexpedient shelters also has been demonstrated bywinter construction tests in Colorado.")

• The fewer occupants of family shelters couldnot provide as many helpful skills as would be foundin most public shelters, with tens-to-thousands ofoccupants.

• The lack of instruments for measuringchanging radiation dangers. However, the occupantscould make a homemade fallout meter by followingthe instructions in Appendix C, or buy a commercialinstrument before a rapidly worsening crisis arises.

PUBLIC AND OTHER EXISTING SHELTERS

Advantages of the great majority of public andother existing shelters, most of which are in buildings:

• Their immediate availability in manylocalities, without work or the need to supplymaterials and tools.

• The provision of fair-to-excellent falloutprotection-generally much better than citizens haveavailable in their homes.

• The availability in some shelters of falloutmeters and occupants who know how to use them andwho can provide other needed skills.

• The chance for persons who are not able tocarry food or water to a public shelter to share somebrought by the more provident occupants.

Disadvantages of the great majority of publicand other existing shelters available to large numbersof people:

• The location of most of them in targeted areas.

• Poor protection against blast, fire and carbonmonoxide.

* Lack of water and means for storing it,and lack of stocked food.

• No reliable air pumps, which are essential inwarm or hot weather for supplying adequate ventilat­ing-cooling air to maintain endurable conditions infully occupied shelters-especially belowground.

• Uncertainties regarding the availability offallout meters and occupants who know how to usethem.

• No dependable lights, sanitary facilities, orother life-support equipment, with few exceptions.

• The crowding together of large numbers ofpeople who are strangers to each other. Underfrightening conditions that might continue for weeks,the greater the number of people, the greater wouldbe the risks of the spread of infectious diseases and ofhysteria, personality clashes, and the development ofother conflicts.

BELOWGROUND EXPEDIENT EARTH­COVERED FALLOUT SHELTERS

(Appendix A details two designs of below­ground shelters, three designs of abovegroundshelters, and one design that affords excellentprotection built either below or aboveground).

Advantages of belowground, earth-coveredexpedient fallout shelters:

• They afford better protection than do above­ground, earth-covered types.

• Less time, work, and materials are required tobuild them than to build equally protective above­ground designs.

* If built sufficiently separated from houses andflammable woods, they provide much better protectionagainst fire hazards than do shelters in buildings.

* If dug in stable earth, even types with unshoredearth walls give quite good blast protection up tooverpressure ranges of at least 5 psi - where mosthomes and buildings would be destroyed by blast orfire.

Disadvantages of belowgroundexpedient falloutshelters:

* They are not practical in areas where the watertable or rock is very near the surface.

* It is impractical to build them in deep-frozenground.

* They are usually more crowded- and uncom­fortable than improved basement shelters.

EXPEDIENT BLAST SHELTERS

Advantages of expedient blast shelters:

* Occupants of expedient blast shelters de­scribed in Appendix D could survive uninjured inextensive blast areas where fallout shelters would notprevent death or injury.

* Blast doors would protect occupants from shockwaves, dangerous overpressures, blast winds, andburns on exposed skin caused by the popcorning effectand heated air.

* The expedient blast shelters described inAppendix D of this book were built and blasttested in Defense Nuclear Agency blast tests.Their air-supply systems were not damaged byblast effects that would have bent over or brokenoff the aboveground, vertical air-supply pipestypical of even expensive imported Swiss andFinnish permanent family blast shelters. (Not­withstanding this weakness, such permanentblast shelters will save many lives.) The hori­zontal blast doors of these tested expedient blastshelters were not damaged because they wereprotected on all sides by spiked-together blast­protector logs surrounded by ramped earth. (Incontrast, the horizontal blast door of the mostexpensive blast shelter described in a widelydistributed Federal Emergency ManagementAgency pamphlet (number H-12-3) is unpro­tected on its sides. This untested blast doorprobably would be torn off and blown away ifstruck by a strong blast wave, following blastwinds, and pieces of houses and trees that wouldbe hurled hundreds of feet.)

* The blast-tested expedient blast valve de­scribed in Appendix D will prevent entry of

blast waves through a shelter's ventilation pipesand resultant destruction of the ventilationpump and possible injury of occupants.

Disadvantages of expedient blast shelters:

* They require more time, materials, tools,skill, and work than are needed for buildingexpedient fallout shelters.

* Especially expedient blast shelters shouldbe well separated from buildings and woodsthat if burned are likely to produce dangerousquantities of carbon monoxide and toxic smoke.

* Their ventilation openings permit the entryof many more fallout particles than do the venti­lation pipes with goosenecks and filters oftypi­cal permanent blast shelters. (However, deadlylocal fallout probably will not be a major dangerin the blast areas where the great majority ofAmericans live, because a rational enemy willemploy air bursts to destroy the mostly "soft"targets found in those areas. Air bursts candestroy most militarily significant "soft" targetsover about twice as many square miles as canthe surface or near-surface bursting of the sameweapons. Fortunately, air bursts produce onlytiny particles, and only a small fraction of these,while they still are very radioactive, are likelyto be promptly brought to earth in scattered "hotspots" by rain-outs and snow-outs. Thus rela­tively few prompt fatalities or delayed cancercases from air-burst fallout are likely to result­even from the air bursting of today's smallerSoviet warheads that would inject most of theirparticles into the troposphere at altitudes fromwhich wet deposition can take place.

WARNING: Permanent home fallout andblast shelters described in widely availableFEMA pamphlets have protection factors inline with the PF 40 minimum standard forpublic shelters in buildings. In heavy falloutareas a sizeable fraction of the occupants of PF40 shelters will receive radiation doses largeenough to incapacitate or kill them later. Per­manent shelters built specifically to protectagainst nuclear weapon effects should havePFs much higher than PF 40.

None of the permanent home or familyshelters described in official OCD, DCPA, orFEMA free shelter-building instruction pam­phlets have been built for evaluation and/ortesting - a finding confirmed to the author in1987 by a retired shelter specialist who for some20 years served in Washington with FEMA andits predecessors.