Upload
others
View
15
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
169
CHAPTER – 4
INDIA & PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
India and Pakistan were the only states outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty to declare, openly, their nuclear weapons capability. In 1998, they tested
nuclear weapons and since then, deployed ballistic missiles, enunciated nuclear
doctrine and made organizational changes to their nuclear establishments. In 2002,
they teetered on the brink of war in Kasmir. This chapter summarizes Indian and
Pakistani nuclear weapon capabilities and Foreign assistance.
Almost 50 years of nuclear ambiguity were sweptaway by the May 1998
nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. Optimists hoped that overt nuclear weapons
capabilities could help provide more conventional stability and that limited nuclear
arsenals might dampen competition in missile development.1 The 1999 conflict in
Kargil and 2002 crisis in Kashmir challenged this view point.2 South Asia remains a
nuclear flashpoint, and potentially, a source for terrorists of access to weapons of
mass destruction.
Indian Nuclear Programme
As early as June 26, 1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be India‟s first
Prime Minister, announced :
“As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise
and use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her
scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for
constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend
herself by all means at her disposal.”3
1 See Joeck, Neil, Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia, Adelphi Paper 312, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997. 2 Riedel Bruce O., “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, “Policy Paper
Series, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.
[http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi]. 3 B.H. Udgaonkar, India‟s Nuclear Capability, her security concerns and the recent tests, Indian
Academy of Sciences, January 1999.
170
India‟s nuclear weapons program was started at the Bhabha Atomic Research
Center in Trombay. In the mid 1950s India acquired dual use technologies under the
“Atoms for Peace” non-proliferation program, which aimed to encourage the civil
use of nuclear technologies in exchange for assurances that would not be used for
military purposes. But in 18 May 1974 India‟s occurred his first nuclear test. And
this first nuclear test described by the Indian government as a “peaceful nuclear
explosion.”
Since then India has conducted another series of test at the Pokhran test range
in the state of Rajasthan in 1998. India has an extensive civil and military nuclear
program, which includes at least 10 nuclear reactors, uranium miving and milling
sites, heavy water production facilities, a uranium enrichment plant, fuel fabrication
facilities, and extensive nuclear, research capabilities.
Nuclear Tests
India carried out its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974. Billed as a “peaceful
nuclear explosion”, the test had 15 kiloton yield.4 Subsequently, Defense Minister
Jagjivan Ram argued that the test had few or no military implications and was simply
part of India‟s ongoing attempts to harness the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.5 The
two scientists closely associated with the nuclear test, R. Chidambaram and R.
Ramana, maintained the same public postures.6 India‟s explanation of the test found
few adherents abroad, however. Of the great powers, only France congratulated the
Indians or their success.7 The Chinese and Soviet reactions were muted, but critical.
The United States and Canada cut off all nuclear cooperation with India. Canada
accused India of having diverted nuclear materials from a Canadian supplied reactor
4 The slightest doubt of the military significance of the test was effectively ruled out in October 1997
when Raja Ramanna, one of the key scientists involved in conducting the test, explicitly stated that
the 1974 test was that of a nuclear weapon. See Adirupa Sengupta, “Scientist says Bomb was tested in
„74‟, India Abroad, October 17, 1997. p. 140 5 On this point, see “Indian Rules out Atomic Arms”. Use New York Times, May 23, 1974, p. 5
6 R.Chidambaram and R. Ramanna, “Some studies on India‟s Peaceful Nuclear Experiment”,
“Peaceful Nuclear Experiment”, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions IV (Vienna : International Atomic
Energy Agency, 1975. 7 “New Delhi Assailed at Parley in Geneva for Atom Explosion,” New York Times, May 22, 1974, p.
3
171
to make the bomb.8 The U.S. reaction however, was the most severe in 1976
Congress introduced the symington amendment to the foreign aid bill, thereby
cutting off certain forms of economic and military assistance to countries that
received enrichment or reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology without
full-sope international atomic energy agency safegurds.9
After 24 years without testing India resumed nuclear testing with a series of
nuclear explosions known as “Operation Shakti” Prime Minister Vajpayee
authorized the tests on April 8, 1998, two days after the Ghauri missile test-firing in
Pakistan. On May 11, 1998, India tested three devices at the Pokhran underground
testing site, followed by two more tests on May 13, 1998. After some time the U.S.
Congress passed after the Indian nuclear test significantly hobbled India‟s ability to
further its nuclear weapons program. The sharpness of international reaction and the
variety of nuclear export restrictions that the major industrial powers placed on India
came as a surprise to the Indian political elite. This body of restrictive legislation
also had a perverse and unintended consequence, however, it made the Indian
program increasingly indigenous.
Despite the inital wave of domestic support following the test, pressing
internal concerns diverted the public‟s attention from the pursuit of a nuclear
weapons option. Infact, with in the year 1984 of the test Indira Gandhi had declared a
“state of emergency” to avoid prosecution for a number of minor electoral violations.
With her personal political survival at stake, she could ill afford to devote significant
time and resources to the nuclear question.
The next stage in India‟s nuclear program was marked by little progress in
attaining nuclear weapons status, even though there was increasing public and
military and even some political support for acquiring nuclear weapons.
However, there is some other controversy also about based on seismic data,
U.S. government sources and independent experts estimated the yield of the so-
8 Robert Trumbull, “Canada Says India‟s Blast Violated use of Atom Aid,” New York Times, May
21, 1974, p. 4 9 Brahma Chellaney, Nuclear Proliferation : The U.S. Indian Conflict (New Delhi : Orient Longman,
1993), pp. 74-75.
172
called thrmonuclear test. Observers initially suggested that the test could have been a
boosted fission device, rather than a true multi-stage thermonuclear device. But after
these nuclear tests India called a nuclear state.
Nuclear Arsenal
Though India has not made any official statements about the size of it nuclear
arsenal, the NRDC estimates that India has a stockpile of approximately 30-35
nuclear war heads and claims that India is producing additional nuclear materials.
Joseph Cirincione at carnegie endowment for international peace estimates that India
has produced enough weapon grade uranium. Weapons grade plutonium production
takes place at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, which is home to the Cirus
reactor acquired from Canada, to the indigenous Dhruva reactor, and to a plutonium
separation facility.
According to a January 2001 Department of Defense Report “India probably
has a small stockpile of nuclear weapon components and could assemble and deploy
a few nuclear weapons with in a few days to a week.” A 2001 RAND study by
Ashley Tellis asserts that India does not have or seek to deploy a ready nuclear
arsenal. In Jane‟s Intelligence Review10
report, India‟s objective is to have a nuclear
arsenal that is “strategically active but operationally dormat”, which would allow
India to maintain its retaliator capability “within a matter of hours to weeks, while
simultaneously exhibiting restraint”. However, the report also maintains that, in the
future, India may face increasing institutional pressure to shift its nuclear arsenal to
fully deployed status. In reality India‟s nuclear arsnel is the third largest in the world
after Russia and the U.S.
There are no official figures for weapon stockpiles at an stage of
development of India‟s arsenal. The only figures that can be offered are either
explicit estimates made from considerations of India‟s probable ability to produce
critical raw materials and considerations of likely production plans; or are unofficial
10
T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, “Nuclear diplomacy returns to South Asian security agenda,” Jane‟s
Intelligence Review, May 2002, pp. 40-43. A concise overview of India and Pakistan‟s nuclear
arsenals, nuclear doctrines and ballistic missile capabilities accompanied by an assessment of the
relationships between Pakistan, India and China.
173
statements of uncertain provenance and authenticity. To show the problems with
figures of the latter sort we have only to look at the statement by K. Subrahmanyam,
A leading strategic theorist, that by 1990 India had stockpiled at least two dozen
unassembled weapons, versus the May 1998 estimate by G. Balachandran, and
Indian nuclear researcher, that India had fewer than 10 weapons ready to be
assembled and mounted on warplanes or missiles.
The types of weapons India is believed to have available for its arsenal
include :
A pure fission plutonium bomb with a yield of 12 kt;
A fusion boosted fission bomb with a yield of 15-20 kt, made with weapon-
grade plutonium;
A fusion boosted fission bomb design, made with reactor-grade plutonium;
Low yield pure fission plutonium bomb designs with yields from 0.1 kt to 1
kt;
A thermonuclear bomb design with a yield of 200-300 kt.
All of these types should be available based on the tests conducted during
Operation Shakti (Pokhran-II). It may be possible to extrapolate significantly from
these device classes however without further testing. There is reasonable doubt about
whether the thermonuclear device actually performed as designed. Even if this so, it
does not rule out the possibility that sufficient test data was collected to field a
successful design with reasonable confidence of good performance. Interest has been
expressed in the development of a neutron bomb (a very low yield tactical
thermonuclear device), but this would probably require additional testing to perfect.
The most widely accepted estimates of India‟s plutonium production have
been made by David Albriht ([Albrigt et al 1997], [Albright 2000]). His most recent
estimate (October 2000) was that by the end of 1999 India had available between
240 and 395 kg of weapon grade plutonium for weapons production, with a median
value of 310 kg. He suggests that this is sufficient for 45-95 weapons (median
estimate 65). The production of weapon grade plutonium has actually been greater,
174
but about 130 kg of plutonium has been consumed – principally in fueling two
plutonium reactors, but also in weapons tests. His estimate for India‟s holdings of
less-than-weapons-grade plutonium (reactor or fuel grade plutonium) are 4200 kg of
unsafeguarded plutonium (800 kg of this already separated) and 4100 kg of IAEA
safeguarded plutonium (25 kg of this separated). This unsafeguarded quantity could
be used to manufacture roughly 1000 nuclear weapons, if India so chose (which
would give it the third largest arsenal in the world, behind only the U.S. and Russia.
Indian Nuclear Doctrine
The nuclear testing by India and Pakistan raises the stakes in what has
become a dangerous three cornered regional armsrace. China is a declared nuclear
power with a significant arsenal of weapons and various means to deliver them. Both
India and Pakistan are thought to be capable of putting together nuclear, weapons in
a reasonably short space of time. Neither claims to have deployed nuclear weapons.
But the latest test underline their growing nuclear capability.
The nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan has spawned a parallel
missile race as each country seeks to develop medium and long-range missiles which
might carry a nuclear warhead.
But India has declared no first use policy and is in the process of developing
a nuclear doctrine based on credible minimum deterrence.” In August 1999, the
Indian government released a draft of the doctrine which asserts that nuclear
weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of “retaliation
only”. The document also maintains that India “will not be the first to initiate a
nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation if deterrence fail” and that
decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be made by Prime Minister
or his designated successor.
According to NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and
Pakistan in 2001-2002, India remains committed to its nuclear no first use policy.
But in Indian foreign ministry official told Defense News in 2000 that a “no first
strike” policy does not mean India will not have a first strike capability. India has not
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and
four of its 13 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.
175
Despite promoting a test ban treaty for decades, India voted against the UN
General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted on September
10, 1996. India objected to the lack of provision for universal nuclear disarmament.
“With in a time bound framework”. India also demanded that he should also treaty
ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV
of the CTBT that requires India‟s ratification for the treaty to enter in to force, which
India argued was a violation of its sovereign right to choose Lohether it would sign
the treaty. In February 1997, Foreign Minister Gujral reiterated India‟s opposition to
the treaty saying that, “India favors any step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons,
but considers that the treaty in its current from is not comprehensive and bans only
certain types of tests.
Indian Nuclear Weapon Capabilities and Thinking
India began its nuclear program shortly after independence in 1947. After a
humiliating defeat in a border war with China in 1962, followed by China‟s first
nuclear test in 1964, the drive for nuclear weapons intensified. The 1974 test of a
“peaceful nuclear device” was an important milestone, but it took several more years
to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Simultaneously, India developed a nuclear
infrastructure that supported both civilian and military purposes. For example,
India‟s development of reprocessing capabilities supported both its use of mixed
oxide fuel (plutonium and uranium) for its nuclear power plants and its plutonium-
based weapons.
The size of India‟s nuclear stockpile has been a topic of considerable debate
within scientific and defense communities. Estimates vary from a few to 100, but
several converge on around 30-35 weapons, probably stored in component form. The
U.S. Department of Defense believes that India is capable of manufacture complete
sets of components for plutonium-based weapons and has a small stockpile of such
components. India “probably can deploy a few nuclear weapons within a few days to
a week... and can deliver these weapons with fighter aircraft.”11
Most agree that India
is expanding its stockpile, and that if India uses unsafeguarded reactor-grade
plutonium, the potential to expand its stockpile is very significant.
11
U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation : Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 24.
176
India‟s delivery capability has long reflected two very different contingencies
China and Pakistan. Because of the distances involved and India‟s lack of long-range
bombers, capability against China inevitably required ballistic missiles. Against
Pakistan, however, Indian officials recognized early on that aircraft would be more
valuable, particularly in a retaliatory strike; the Indian air force is significantly more
sophisticated and capable than Pakistan‟s.12
India has some 35 Mirage 2000 fighters
that are nuclear-capable, although other aircraft cold also be used.
Ballistic missiles add considerable instability into the security equation
because they are high priority targets; the pressure to use them quickly and, for the
other side, to strike them preemptively, is great. Indian officials have said short-
range Prithvi ballistic missiles (150 km and 250 km ranges) are conventionally
armed. While nuclear-capable and able to reach almost all of Pakistan, the use of
nuclear-armed Prithvis could pose major risks of fallout to India.13
India has
deployed Agni-II missiles with a 1500 km range and tested an 5000 km range version
of the Agni-III in 2012. These solid-fueled missiles, which reportedly can be
launched within minutes, considerably enhance India‟s ability to respond rapidly in a
crisis situation.
In January 2003, the Ministry of External Affairs released to the public a
short document on India‟s nuclear doctrine. The doctrine reiterated some of the
points in the 1999 draft document on nuclear doctrine produced by the National
Security Advisory Board and refined others. In summary, the document committed
India to a credible minimum deterrent, defined as : 1. a posture of “No First Use”
and no use against non-nuclear weapon states, with the exception of the right to
retaliate with nuclear weapons against a “major attack against India, or Indian forces
anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons;” 2. Civil control in the form of the
Prime Minister as head of the Nuclear Command Authority; 3. Nuclear retaliation
against a first strike as massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. The
document described the Nuclear Command Authority as being composed of a
Political Council (chaired by the Prime Minister and authorize the use of nuclear
weapons) and an Executive Council (chaired by the National Security Advisor).
12
Perkovich, George, India’s Nuclear Bomb : The Impact on Global Proliferation, (University of
California Press, CA, 1999), p. 248-249. 13
Perkovich, op cit., p. 248
177
Map 4.1 : Pakistani Nuclear Programme
Pakistan‟s nuclear program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto,
who founded the program while he was Minister for fuel, power and natural
resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of
East Pakistan in the 1971 was with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a
meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972.
India‟s 1974 testing of a nuclear “device” gave Pakistan‟s nuclear program
new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan‟s program acquired sensitive
uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer
Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German trained metallurgist
178
who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired
through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the
Netherland. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment
technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and
operating Pakistan‟s Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan‟s
direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the
necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment
capabilities.
In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons grade uranium
production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a
nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and
according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear
explosion in 1987.
Pakistan‟s nuclear progam is based primarily on highly enriched uranium
(HEU), which is produced at the A.Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas
centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta had an estimated 3000
centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued is pursuit of expanded uranium
enrichment capabilities.
In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities.
With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt) Khusab research
reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was
operational. According to Public statements made up US officials, this
unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates on estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons
grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The
reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium – 6. According to J.
Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab‟s plutonium production capacity could allow
Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a
ballistic missile.
Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing
plant next to Pakistan‟s Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in
179
Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are
subject to IAEA inspection.
Nuclear Tests
On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced it had successfully conducted five
nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five
nuclear tests conducted on May 28. Generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter
scale, with a total yield of up to 40 kT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that
one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton
nuclear devices.
On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear war head with a reported
yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total
number of claimed tested to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at
least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May, 1998
remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.
Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests
cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as
the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those
claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons
were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by
Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much
smaller, test in the initial round to tests at the Raskoh range. The single test on 30
May provided a clear seismic signal. According to a preliminary analysis conducted
at Los Atamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an
underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons
grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had
either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence
community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later
contested the accuracy of this finding.
These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five
nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani
180
officials that they would respond to India. Pakistan‟s nuclear tests were followed by
the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and
Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance
notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on
nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by
Pakistan‟s incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister
Sharif with drew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in
which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.
Nuclear Arsenal
The natural resources defense council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has
built 24-48 HEU based nuclear war heads, and NRDC reports that they have
produced 585 – 800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan‟s nuclear war
heads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched
uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per war head. According to
NRDC, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade
plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.
Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled.
They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the delivery systems.
In 2001 report, the Defence Department contents that “Isalamabad‟s nuclear
weapons are probably stored in component form” and that “Pakistan probably could
assemble the weapons fairly quickly”. However, no one has been able to ascertain
the validity of Pakistan‟s assurances about their nuclear weapons security.
Pakistan‟s reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly
vulnerable to diversion. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) can be used in relatively
simple gun – barrel – type design, which could be with in the means of non-state
actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.
The terrorist attacks on September 11th
raised concerns about the security of
Pakistan‟s nuclear arsnal. According to press reports, with in two days of the attacks,
Pakistan‟s military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret
locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence Chief and
181
other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an
attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan‟s
nuclear arsenal concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of
nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea
admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that
Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment
program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.
Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine
Several sources such as Jane‟s Intelligence Review and Defense Department
reports maintain that Pakistan‟s motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to
counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional
forces and nuclear weapons.
Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department
report cited above, “Pakistan remains stead fast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating
it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan‟s
nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that
signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan‟s best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only
after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any
connection with India‟s decision.”
Pakistan does not abide by a no first use doctrine, as evidenced by President
Pervez Musharraf‟s statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not
want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals,
he would “respond with full might.” These statements were interpreted to mean that
if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior
conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.
Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Capabilities and Thinking
Pakistan‟s nuclear program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the
humiliating loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that reportedly triggered a
182
political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a crash nuclear
weapons program. Unlike India, Pakistan focused on the uranium route to weapons.
Pakistan sought technology from many sources, including China and North Korea.14
This extensive assistance is reported to have included, among other things, uranium
enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from
China and missile technology from China.
Most observers estimate that Pakistan has enough nuclear material (highly
enriched uranium and a small amount of plutonium) for 30 to 50 nuclear weapons.15
Like India, Pakistan is thought to have “a small stockpile of nuclear weapons
components and can probably assemble some weapons fairly quickly.”16
Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s it purchased from the
United States (28 F-16 and 12 trainer aircraft; 8 are no longer in service), provided
the appropriate “wiring” has been added to make them nuclear-capable. In the 1980s,
Pakistan moved assiduously to acquire ballistic missile capabilities and now deploys
short-range ballistic missiles and a small number of medium-range missiles. AQ
Khan, former head of Khan Research Laboratories, maintained that only the
medium-range Ghauri missiles would be usable in a nuclear exchange (given fall-out
effects for Pakistan of shorter-range missiles). Other observers view the 30 to 50
Hatf2 short-range (300km) missiles (modified Chinese M-11s) as potential delivery
vehicles for nuclear weapons. Ghauri missiles (1350 and 2300km), which reportedly
are based on the North Korean No-Dong and Taepo-Dong-1, are capable of reaching
New Delhi with large payloads.17
14
A 1976 cooperation agreement with China greatly aided the program but Pakistan also
acquired significant technology from the West in the 1980s through the present, triggering a
rash of sanctions. See CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic
Sanctions. 15
SIPRI Yearbook 1995: 5-10 warheads; SIPRI Yearbook 2000: 15-20 warheads. Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, 1998: 12 warheads. January 2002: 30 to 50. Carnegie Endowment 2002:
50-55 (Joseph Cirincione, with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals:
Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, DC, 2002). 16
U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 28. 17
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002, pp. 70-71.
183
Pakistan has not yet enunciated a nuclear doctrine, but it is clear that
Pakistan‟s nuclear arsenal is seen as the key to military parity with India. Because of
its fears of being overrun by larger Indian forces, Pakistan has rejected the doctrine
of no-first-use. In May 2002, Pakistan‟s ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, stated
that “We have not said we will use nuclear weapons. We have not said we will not
use nuclear weapons. We possess nuclear weapons. So does India ...We will not
neutralize the deterrence by any doctrine of no first use.”18
On June 4, 2002,
President Musharraf went further: “The possession of nuclear weapons by any state
obviously implies they will be used under some circumstances.”19
In recent years, Pakistan apparently has taken steps toward refining command
and control of nuclear weapons. In April 1999, General Musharraf announced that
the Joint Staff Headquarters would have a command and control arrangement and a
secretariat, and a strategic force command would be established.20
The connection to
civilian leadership was unclear, given a recent account of the 1999 Kargil incursion
which suggested that Prime Minister Sharif was unaware that his own nuclear
missile forces were being prepared for action.21
Pakistan established a National
Command Authority (NCA) in February 2000, but little is publicly known about it.
Pakistani officials have repeatedly said that their nuclear capabilities are safe. The
new NCA is believed to be responsible for nuclear doctrine, as well as nuclear
research and development, wartime command and control, and advice to President
Musharraf about the development and employment of nuclear weapons.22
18
Barbara Crossette,”Pakistan Asks U.N. Council for Action on Kashmir,”New York Times,
May 30, 2002. 19
Laurinda Keys, “Pakistan President Says There are Circumstances For Use of Nuclear
Weapons,” Associated Press Newswire, June 4, 2002. 20
“Pakistan Should Respond, Says COAS,” Dawn, April 13, 1999. 21
Riedel, op. cit., p. 12. Since the military coup, there may be, ironically, less concern about
civil vs. military control, but this may be an issue for future concern. 22
Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 27.
184
Table 4.1 Potential Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Delivery System
185
Role of Kashmir
Kashmir has been a flashpoint since Indian and Pakistani independence in
1947. Many analysts have feared that nuclear weapons could be used if conventional
hostilities over Kashmir were to spiral out of control, especially if, as in 1965 Indo-
Pakistan conflict, India opened a new front on the Punjab plains to break a stalemate
in Pakistan or attempt to settle the issue decisively by confronting Pakistan with a
mortal threat to its territorial integrity.23
Under these circumstances, some have
suggested Pakistan might be tempted to detonate a small nuclear weapon on its own
territory to halt forward Indian movement. Other observers, however, believe such a
strategy would be akin to a state acting as a suicide bomber.24
Some media reports
have suggested that paradoxically, “the fact that both countries have very small
nuclear arsenals increases the pressure on both sides to use their weapons against
high-value targets.”25
Regardless of whether nuclear weapons might be used to stop
war or to gain a military advantage, many observers agree that uncertainty about
intentions could worsen stability.
Since 1998, both India and Pakistan appear to be integrating nuclear weapons
into security strategy and planning. With the ominous logic of nuclear deterrence,
each side‟s desire to make its nuclear forces more credible may make those nuclear
forces more usable. Ballistic missiles offer both sides advantages over using aircraft
as delivery vehicles, but the short ranges create a hair-trigger situation. From launch
to impact, missile flight times may be as short as 5 minutes. In the past, both sides
appeared to use the separation of warhead components as a form of command and
control (in the sense of lowering the risk of unauthorized or accidental use). Some
observers have noted that this approach becomes risky when the other side can
23
The war was preceded by a major tank engagement along the border with Pakistan‟s Sind
Province in the Spring, which went in Pakistan‟s favor, and a subsequent war over Kashmir
in August-September 1965. Pakistani troops only narrowly defeated an Indian counter-attack
in the direction of Lahore, illuminating Pakistan‟s vulnerability. 24
Salman Rushdie, “The Most Dangerous Place in the World,” New York Times, May 30,
2002. 25
“U.S. is Limited in Ways it Can Act To Subdue India-Pakistan Tension,” Wall Street
Journal, June 3, 2002. “High-value targets” could be military installations, key infrastructure
or cities.
186
launch short-range ballistic missiles against which there is no defense. These
observers have called for improving command and control of nuclear forces, while
noting, ironically, that reduced ambiguity could conversely increase the likelihood of
war.26
The Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly has estimated that a nuclear
exchange could kill between 9 and 12 million persons on both sides, with 2 to 6
million injured. These estimates are likely predicated on nuclear exchanges aimed at
cities; e.g., Indian Defense Secretary Yogendra Narain suggested in 2002 that “India
would retaliate against Pakistani aggression and that both sides should be prepared
for mutual destruction.” President Musharraf‟s interview in June 2002 with CNN
offered respite from the nuclear rhetoric when he stated, “I don‟t think either side is
that irresponsible to go to that limit [i.e., nuclear conflict]. ... One shouldn‟t even be
discussing these things, because any sane individual cannot even think of going into
this unconventional mode, whatever the pressures.”27
Confidence-Building Measures
India and Pakistan have a 30-year history of confidence-building measures.
These include hotlines between army commanders and prime ministers, a joint India-
Pakistan Military Commission (created in 1990), and agreements to provide prior
notification of troop movements and ballistic missile tests. In 1991, both sides agreed
not to attack nuclear facilities.28
Implementation, however, has been sporadic.29
In
February 1999, the two parties concluded the Lahore Agreement. That agreement
envisioned a plan for future work, to include measures to reduce the risk of
unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, reviews of confidence-building
measures and communications links, prior notification of ballistic missile tests,
continuation of unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing, and dialogue on nuclear and
26
Jock, op. cit., p. 50, p. 76. 27
[http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/01/musharraf.transcript/index.html] 28
Annual data exchanges on the facilities, according to some, were at first less than
forthcoming. See Hibbs, Mark, “India and Pakistan Fail to Include New SWU Plants on
Exchanged Lists,” Nuclear Fuel, March 30, 1992, p. 6. 29
The hotlines were not used to good effect either in Operation Brass Tacks in 1987 or in
May 1998 around the nuclear tests.
187
security issues. The Lahore process was undermined by the summer 2001 military
incursion by Pakistan in the vicinity of Kargil, but the two sides began a dialogue in
2004. In September 2004, India and Pakistan announced 13 confidence-building
measures. Three security-related ones included:
Experts‟ meetings on conventional and nuclear CBMs, including discussions
on a draft agreement on advance notification of missile tests;
Biannual meeting between Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and Pakistan
Rangers;
Implementation of the agreement reached between the defense secretaries in
their talks in August to discuss “modalities for disengagement and
redeployment” on the Siachen glacier.30
Foreign secretaries reported progress in their discussions on missile
notifications in December 2004.
Self-reliance was from the beginning the keynote of India‟s nuclear
programme. The country has nevertheless entered into mutually beneficial
cooperation and collaboration arrangements with many other countries, some of
these dating back to the early years of its nuclear programme. These have helped
Indian scientists get themselves acquainted with up-to-date developments in this
field in other parts of the world and to share their problems and achievements with
others. India has also taken an active part in the activities of international,
multinational, and regional organisations aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race and
promoting the civilian uses of atomic energy.
India has sought and received assistance from abroad for some of its major
nuclear projects, and this has some times been a matter of criticism within the
country. But a close study of India‟s nuclear cooperation arrangements with other
countries would provide us a clear picture of the extent of its dependence on others.
In fact, the setback which India‟s nuclear programme has suffered in the past few
years due to the withdrawal of foreign assistance could have been considerably offset
if a clearcut policy on the part of the Government was forthcoming.
30
See [http://www.southasiamonitor.org/diplomacy/2004/sep/8dip5.shtml]
188
Role of Soviet Union
The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was the world's first
communist state, the world's largest and a military superpower. The Soviet Union
was the only military and political challenge to the global dominance of the United
States in 1947. Although Pakistan could not ignore its giant neighbour to the north
only a 14km corridor separating the Afghan territory between the nation-states.
Pakistanis however initially preferred the idea of an alliance with the west rather than
with the communist powers at the time. In 1949, ignoring the indifference of the
United States, Quaid-e-Millat accepted an offer to visit the USSR. This promptly led
to an invitation from United States also at the same time and he then chose to visit
the Americans instead. This was undoubtedly a serious step as far as relations with
the USSR were concerned. By 1950, the Soviets were shifting from a neutral
poistion on the issue of Kashmir and other India/Pakistan questions to a more pro-
Indian stance. Relations between Pakistan and USSR deteriorated further when
Pakistan began to join American-sponsored military pacts in 1954 and 1955. The
Soviets protested strongly that the pacts were designed against themselves and that
Pakistan was allowing itself to be used as an American military and espionage base.
Pakistan strongly denied these allegations but could not prevent the Soviets from
declaring their open support for the Republic of India on the Kashmir Border dispute
and an Afghan claim on 'Pashtunistan' was a problem for them. In December 1955,
the Soviets leaders visited India and, much to India's satisfaction, not only declared
wholehearted support for the Indian claim on Kashmir and Jammu, but also started a
programme of economic and technical assistance towards India. In spite of this, the
Soviets always declared their intention to develop good relations with the Pakistanis
and stated that it was upto the Government of Pakistan to improve bilateral foreign
relationship by stopping its anti-Soviet policy. In 1956, the Pakistani government
refused an offer of Soviet aid which included the establishment of a steel mill within
new State of Pakistan. One of the most serious incidents in Soviet-Pakistani relations
occurred in May 1960 when an American spy plane, known as the U-2, was shot
down by the Soviets while flying over the Soviet Union. The Americans tried to
189
deny that it was on spying mission, but it transpired that the pilot had been captured
alive. Much to Soviet fury, it was also revealed that the plane had taken off from an
American base in Peshawar. The Pakistan government denied any knowledge of the
plane's purpose but the Soviets threatened that if any future missions were launched
from Pakistan, the Soviets would destroy the base. Pakistan wan not moved by these
protests and replied that although Pakistan had been unaware of the plane's
intentions, the United States, as an ally, could use Pakistan's air bases for routine
missions. By 1961, however, tension between the two nations had considerably
subsided, and the Soviets agreed to undertake oil exploration inside Pakistani
territory. The 1962 Indo-Chinese war helped Pakistan's relations with the Soviet
Union as India's acceptance of western arms antagonized the Soviets. Pakistan's
relations with the United States correspondingly deterioted because the United States
had provided India with military aid. The scene was set for greater Soviet-Pakistan
co-operation. The Soviets were also keen to prevent Pakistan/Chinese friendship
from developing much further and in August 1963, the Soviets agreed to give
Pakistan a £11,000,000 loan. Further, there was a shift in the Soviet poistion on the
disputed territory of Kashmir from outright support for India to a more neutral
stance. In April 1965, Ayub Khan became the first Pakistani leader ever to visit the
Soviet Union since 1947 independence. Although there were no dramatic
breakthroughs, further agreements on oil exploration and trade were signed and a
better understanding between the two sides was reached. During the 1965 war with
India, the Soviet leaders made direct appeals to both sides to stop fighting. The
Soviets criticized India for crossing the international boundary during the war. Once
the war ended, both Pakistanis and Hindustanis accepted the Soviet offer for a peace
conference to be held at Tashkent, in Soviet Central Asia (now Uzbekistan). The
Tashkent conference was held between 4 and 10 January 1966. Both sides praised
the fair and hospitable manner in which the Soviets conducted the conference. The
success in hosting the conference raised Soviet prestige in Asia and led to closer
Pak-Soviet ties. The USSR quietly dropped its support of 'Pashtunistan' and
economic assistance to Pakistan increased. The Soviets even eventually agreed to
supply arms to Pakistan when the American base in Peshawer was closed in 1968.
190
Pakistan was now in the unique poistion of receiving arms from China, United States
and the USSR. Relations with the Soviets took a downturn again in 1971 when it was
announced that the United States and the PRC has established diplomatic relations
with Pakistan's mediation. This implied a Sino-US-Pak understanding which
encouraged the growth of an understanding between the Indian and Russian
governments. Within a month of the Sino-US agreement, India signed a Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and Co-operation with the USSR, which was in effect a military
pact which guaranteed Soviet help if India went to war again with Pakistan. After
signing this pact, the Indians felt secure enough to provoke a war with its rival in
December 1971. By 1972, relations had imporoved with the visit of Quaid-e-Awam
to the USSR. It was as a result of this meeting that work on a Soviet assisted steel
mill inside Pakistan finally began in 1983. The possibility of better and closer
relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union was dealt a serious blow with the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979.
Role of Russia
THE MOST SATISFYING and mutually beneficial outcome of the visit of
the Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin, is the signing of a memorandum of
understanding between the two countries on intensifying bilateral cooperation in the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. If, as it is likely, this positive move by Russia is
going to annoy the western nuclear powers, they should realise that the nuclear
blockade could not have stopped India from going ahead with its nuclear
programmes though it would have had to reckon with the stringent regulations issued
by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which could have hampered its access to
advanced technology and materials for its nuclear power reactors.
The NSG, a highly exclusive cartel of advanced nations, could do with some
soul-searching on the effectiveness of its uncompromising and rigorous control over
the spread of nuclear technology to the rest of the world, especially at a time when
there is almost an unstoppable explosion of information technology (IT) which is
continuously demonstrating its capabilities to prise open everything. The nuclear
weapon states should have in fact realised as early as the mid-1970s, which
191
witnessed India's peaceful nuclear explosion, that this country was only a few steps
away from the making of nuclear weapons and it was only a question of time before
the nuclear monopoly was broken by the other countries. It is, therefore, unfortunate
that the nuclear weapon states instead of coming to terms with such a reality had
sought to protect the world from nuclear ``proliferation''. It will be difficult to think
of another instance of the pick-up of a word with such a highly objectionable
connotation which imputes stealthy moves to the efforts of the rest of the world to
crack the case-hardened nuclear shell.
Mr. Putin's realisation of the futility of the nuclear weapon states persisting
with their blockade of India obviously explains Russia's decision to intensify
bilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. With the nuclear weapon
states having already made the world a potentially dangerous planet with their huge
stock of atomic armoury, there is no question of its becoming more dangerous with
more states gaining entry into the exclusive club, unless there is going to be an
outbreak of a global nuclear madness. The only sensible course for the nuclear
weapon states, if they are serious about nuclear non- proliferation, is to reach an
agreement on global nuclear disarmament aimed at a progressive elimination of
atomic weapons.
The agreement signed between the two countries to establish an inter-ministerial
commission on military technical cooperation as well as their identification of key
areas of cooperation in the IT sector impart a much desired completeness to the task
of bringing India and Russia closer. Neither of them could ever have imagined that
the very close ties which they had already built up during the years when there was
no indication whatsoever of the raging Cold War coming to an end and of the
collapse of the Soviet Union were laying the foundations for further strengthening
their relations in a world which has seen the burying of the hatchet by the
superpowers. With IT racing at a speed which could make everything inclusive of
military technology - whether it relates to MiG and SU 30 aircraft or T 90 tanks - an
open book, there is nothing to which the U.S. in particular could object to the further
forging of the close relationship by New Delhi and Moscow. The gains to all the
participants would be much bigger if India, Russia, the U.S. and other countries get
192
together to explore the possibilities of reorienting their military technology for
wholly peaceful and constructive activity by turning their nuclear swords into
ploughshares.
Role of China
Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial
relationship over several decades. Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and
Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the
1980s. China‟s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the
1960s and included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well
as supplying complete weapons systems. After the 1990 imposition of U.S. sanctions
on Pakistan, the Islamabad-Beijing arms relationship was further strengthened.31
Pakistan continues to view China as an “all-weather friend” and perhaps its most
important strategically.
Islamabad may seek future civil nuclear assistance from Beijing, including
potential provision of complete power reactors, especially in light of Washington‟s
categorical refusal of Pakistan‟s request for civil nuclear cooperation similar to that
planned between the United States and India. The Chinese government has assisted
Pakistan in constructing a major new port at Gwadar, near the border with Iran.
Islamabad and Beijing aspire to make this port, officially opened in March 2007, a
major commercial outlet for Central Asian states. Some Western and Indian analysis
are concerned that the port may be used for military purposes and could bolster
China‟s naval presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Analysis taking a realist, power political perspective view China as an
external balancer in the South Asian subsystem, with Beijing‟s material support for
Islamabad allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a more
powerful India. Many observers, especially those in India, see Chinese support for
Pakistan as a key aspect of Beijing‟s perceived policy of “encirclement” or constraint
of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi‟s ability to challenge
31
See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles :
Policy Issues.
193
Beijing‟s region-wide influence. Indian leaders have called the Islamabad-Beijing
nuclear and missile “proliferation nexus” a cause of serious concern in New Delhi,
and U.S. officials remain seized of this potentially destabilizing dynamic.
In 2005, China‟s Prime Minister visited Islamabad, where Pakistan and China
signed 22 accords meant to boost bilateral cooperation. President Musharraf‟s five-
day visit to Beijing in early 2006 saw bilateral discussions on counterterrorism, trade
and technical assistance. Chinese President Hu‟s late 2006 travel to Islamabad was
the first such visit by a Chinese president in ten years; another 18 new bilateral pacts
were inked, including a bilateral Free Trade Agreement. In mid-2007, Prime
Minister Aziz visited Beijing, where Pakistan and China signed 27 new agreements
and memoranda of understanding to “re-energize” bilateral cooperation in numerous
areas, including defense, space technology, and trade. No public mention was made
regarding civil nuclear cooperation. Preident Musharraf‟s April 2008 travel to
Beijing produced ten new memoranda of understanding and a reiteration of the two
countries “special relations”.
In the month after he took office, President Zardari paid a visit to Beijing.
Speculation on his central motive focused on Pakistan‟s urgent need for aid to
correct its growing balance of payments deficit; China‟s huge foreign-exchange
reserves are a potential source of a major cash infusion. Yet Zardari left Beijing
without having secured any Chinese commitment in this regard, although reports did
suggest that the Chinese had agreed to build two new nuclear power reactors in
Pakistan.32
U.S. congressional opponents of such a development confirmed with the
Bush State Department that China‟s provision of new nuclear reactors to Pakistan
would represent a clear violation of its international obligations as members of the
NSG.33
Late 2008 visits to Beijing by senior Pakistani military officers reviewed
progress on multiple military hardware deals, including Pakistan‟s purchase of four
new Chinese guided-missile frigates and a fleet of co-produced JF-17 fighter aircraft.
32
“Pakistan Secures China‟s Help to Build 2 Nuclear Reactors”, Wall Street Journal, October 20,
2008. 33
See http://markey.house.gov/index.php? option-com_content&task=view&id=3486&Itemid=141
194
In short, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan‟s nuclear
infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western
countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology
elsewhere. According to 2001 Department of Defense report China has supplied
Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in
the construction of Pakistan‟s nuclear facilities.
In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water to Khusab reactor,
which plays a key role in Pakistan‟s production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the
China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan‟s efforts to expand
its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets,
which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high speed rotation of
centrifuges.
According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have
provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively
sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first material
support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium
reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been
initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistani failure to sign the NPT
and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused
France to terminate assistance.
Role of U. S.
As part of the 1950s-era Atoms for Peace program, the United States actively
promoted nuclear energy cooperation with India from the mid-1950s, building
nuclear reactors (Tarapur), providing heavy water for the CIRUS reactor, and
allowing Indian scientists to study at U.S. nuclear laboratories. When other nations
joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, however, India refused to
join the treaty on the basis that it was discriminatory. In 1974, India exploded a
“peaceful” nuclear device, demonstrating that nuclear technology transferred for
peaceful purposes could be used to produce nuclear weapons. As a result, the United
195
States has refused nuclear cooperation with India for twenty-five years and has tried
to convince other states to do the same.
On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced the creation of a global
partnership between the United States and India to promote stability, democracy,
prosperity and peace throughout the world. One area of the partnership is civil
nuclear energy cooperation. Both leaders recognized the “significance of civilian
nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more
efficient manner.” President Bush said he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear
energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to
adjust U.S. laws and policies."
If implemented, this cooperation would dramatically shift U.S.
nonproliferation policy and practice towards India. Such cooperation would also
contravene the multilateral export control guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), which was formed in response to India's proliferation. At a time when the
United States has called for all states to strengthen their domestic export control laws
and implementation and for tighter multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation
with India would require loosening its own nuclear export legislation, as well as
creating an NSG exception. Although some states may agree that it is necessary to
create a new paradigm for India, others may believe that this agreement undercuts
the basic bargain of the NPT – peaceful nuclear cooperation in exchange for
forswearing nuclear weapons. Observers note that U.S.-India cooperation could have
wide-ranging implications for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and
could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify their supplying other non-nuclear
weapon states, like Pakistan.
Under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act (P.L. 95-242; 42 USC 2153 et
seq), Congress must approve an agreement for cooperation. If the Administration
chooses to exempt the agreement from statutory nonproliferation criteria (including a
requirement that the recipient nation have full-scope nuclear safeguards), both
houses of Congress must pass a joint resolution of approval. The Administration
alternatively may seek to amend certain portions of the Atomic Energy Act; in
196
particular, it could seek to amend Sections 128 and 129, both of which include
nonproliferation criteria. However, the exact procedures depend on the details of
cooperation, which are not yet final. This report will be updated as necessary.
The United States actively promoted nuclear energy cooperation with India
from the mid-1950s, building nuclear reactors (Tarapur), providing heavy water for
the CIRUS reactor, and allowing Indian scientists to study at U.S. nuclear
laboratories. Although India was active in negotiations of the 1968 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), India refused to join the NPT on grounds that it was
discriminatory. The “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974 demonstrated that nuclear
technology transferred for peaceful purposes could also be used to produce nuclear
weapons. In the United States, the Congress responded by passing the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA, P.L. 95-242), which imposed tough new
requirements for U.S. nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states – full-scope
safeguards and termination of exports if such a state detonates a nuclear explosive
device or engages in activities related to acquiring or manufacturing nuclear
weapons, among other things.34
Internationally, the United States created the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 to implement nuclear export controls. The NSG
published guidelines in 1978 “to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to
help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel
cycle or nuclear explosive activities.”35
34
The NNPA, in part, amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. See 42 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.
Prior to the 1970 NPT, safeguards (inspections, material protection, control and accounting)
were applied to specific facilities or materials (known as INFCIRC/66-type agreements).
The NPT required safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities for
non-nuclear-weapon-state parties (those states not having detonated a nuclear explosive
device prior to Jan. 1, 1967). 35
IAEA Document INFCIRC/254, Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-related Dual-use
Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology. Part 1 covers “trigger list” items:
those especially designed or prepared for nuclear use: (i) nuclear material; (ii) nuclear
reactors and equipment; (iii) non-nuclear material for reactors; (iv) plant and equipment for
reprocessing, enrichment and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and
heavy water production; and (v) associated technology. Part 2 covers dual-use items.
Additional NSG criteria for dual-use exports include NPT membership and/or full-scope
safeguards agreement; appropriate end-use; whether the technology would be used in a
reprocessing or enrichment facility; the state's support for nonproliferation; and the risk of
potential nuclear terrorism.
197
Conditioning U.S. nuclear exports on non-nuclear-weapon states having
fullscope safeguards created a problem particularly for fuel supplies to India‟s
safeguarded Tarapur reactors. When the NNPA was enacted, the United States was
supplying fuel. The Carter Administration exported two more shipments under
executive order, despite the Nuclear Regulatory Commission‟s (NRC) refusal to
approve an export license (on nonproliferation conditions). Given slim support in
Congress, no more exports were attempted after 1980. France supplied fuel under the
terms of the U.S. agreement with India until France adopted a full-scope safeguards
requirement also (1984 to 1995). After the NSG adopted the full-scope safeguards
condition in 1992, China picked up the slack. Russia supplied fuel from 2001 to
2004.36
Global Partnership
The Bush Administration has been exploring ways of creating a strategic
partnership with India since 2001. Indian officials identified their growing energy
needs as an area for cooperation, particularly in nuclear energy. The U.S.-India 2004
Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative included expanded cooperation
in civil nuclear technology as one of three goals. Phase I of the NSSP, completed in
September 2004, required addressing proliferation concerns and ensuring compliance
with U.S. export controls.37
In September 2004, the Administration published a final
ruling stating there was a presumption of approval of licenses for some items that are
used in the "balance of plant" (non-reactor-related end-uses) activities at safeguarded
nuclear facilities, and that are not multilaterally controlled for nuclear proliferation
reasons.38
"Balance of plant" activities, refers "to the part of a nuclear power plant
used for power generation (e.g., turbines, controllers, or power distribution) to
distinguish it from the nuclear reactor." In practice, this means certain dual-use
equipment (e.g. machine tools), not controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group
36
China was not a member of the NSG until 2004. Russia, an NSG member, exported fuel,
citing a safety exception, but NSG members objected so strongly that Russia suspended
supply in 2004. Russia may be reconsidering. “Russia to Review Tarapur Fuel Decision”
South Asian Media Net, May 10, 2005. 37
See fact sheet on the NSSP at [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290.htm]. 38
Federal Register, 69 FR 56694, Sept. 22, 2004. Only 4 of the 14 nuclear power plants in
India are under safeguards: Rajasthan 1 & 2 and Tarapur 1 & 2.
198
because they do not meet certain performance criteria, could be exported to the
Rajasthan and Tarapur reactors.
On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced creation of a global partnership
with India in a joint statement with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.39
Noting the
“significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands
in a cleaner and more efficient manner,” President Bush said he would "work to
achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek
agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies."
Three paragraphs of the joint statement were devoted to civil nuclear
cooperation. The statement noted that the United States “will work with friends and
allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation
and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel
supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.” The United States committed
to encouraging its partners to consider this request – a reversal in the U.S. position,
which has been to ban fuel to Tarapur – and to consulting with its partners on Indian
participation in ITER (collaboration on fusion research) and in the Generation IV
International Forum for future reactor design.
The leaders agreed to create a working group, which presumably will
negotiate not only the scope of nuclear cooperation, but also Indian commitments to
nonproliferation. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conveyed that India “ would take
on the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and
advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the
United States.”40
India agreed to do the following:
identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs;
declare its civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA);
voluntarily place civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards;
39
Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,
White House Press Release, July 18, 2005, Washington, D.C. 40
July 18 Joint Statement.
199
sign an Additional Protocol for civilian facilities;
continue its unilateral nuclear test moratorium;
work with the United States to conclude a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty
(FMCT);
refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states
that do not have them, as well as support international efforts to limit their
spread;
secure its nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export
control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and NSG guidelines.
These steps are undoubtedly welcome, but some observers believe they are
insufficient. Separating civilian and military facilities, placing civilian facilities
under IAEA safeguards, and applying an additional protocol are all positive steps,
but place India squarely in the company of nuclear weapon states. There are no
measures in this global partnership to restrain India‟s nuclear weapons program.
India has a self-imposed nuclear test moratorium but continues to produce fissile
material for its nuclear weapons program, despite support for FMCT negotiations.
Few observers are sanguine that FMCT negotiations can proceed quickly in the
Conference on Disarmament, even if negotiations do not cover verification, as the
Bush Administration prefers.41
From a technical verification perspective, the existence of India‟s nuclear
weapons program negates potential nonproliferation assurances that nuclear
safeguards on civil facilities might provide. The Administration‟s position that a
fissile material production cutoff is inherently unverifiable because of the existence
of unsafeguarded facilities and materials may be at odds with Under Secretary of
41
In Oct. 2004, Amb. Jackie Sanders explained that finding undeclared fissile material in a
state under [full-scope] safeguards” is sufficient to make a judgment of noncompliance.”
Under an FMCT, where nuclear weapon states would have undeclared material and
activities, “simply finding fissile material...would be insufficient to make a judgment of
noncompliance.” “U.S. Warns Verification Focus Would Delay Fissile Ban Treaty,”
Washington File, Nov. 1, 2004.
200
State Nick Burns‟ statement to reporters on July 19, 2005 that “this agreement can be
verified and will be verified.”42
Further, the negotiation of safeguards agreements
will be conducted between India and the IAEA, over whose outcome the United
States may have little influence. Nonetheless, the United States must have some
assurances that its assistance does not, according to its NPT Article I obligation, “in
any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture
nuclear weapons.” A significant question is how India, in the absence of full-scope
safeguards, can provide adequate confidence that U.S. peaceful nuclear technology
will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes.43
Presumably, when Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns states that India
has an “exceptional” record of nonproliferation, he is referring to India‟s export
control history.44
Unlike Pakistan, there is little evidence to suggest that India has
transferred sensitive nuclear technologies to other non-nuclear-weapon states.
Therefore, India‟s promise to refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to states that do not have them, as well as its promise to adhere to NSG
guidelines, may be formalities. Under UNSCR 1540, India is obligated to strengthen
its export control legislation; it is unclear what further measures it might be taking
pursuant to the global partnership.
Congressional Role
The July 18 joint statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh
noted that the two countries would seek “full civil nuclear energy cooperation.”
Although the details have not been spelled out, it is clear that the export of nuclear
material, reactors, and their major components would require a Section 123
agreement for cooperation. Since India is considered under U.S. law and by the NPT
to be a nonnuclear weapon state and does not have full-scope safeguards, the
42
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, “Briefing on the Signing of
the Global Partnership Agreement Between the United States and India,” July 19, 2005. See
[http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/49831.htm]. 43
Plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor, which the United States supplied with heavy
water, reportedly was used in India‟s “peaceful nuclear explosion.” See Victor Gilinsky and
Paul Leventhal, “India Cheated,” Washington Post, June 15, 1998. 44
Burns, July 19, 2005, briefing.
201
President likely will have to exempt the agreement for cooperation from at least the
full-scope safeguards requirement in Sec. 123 a. (2). The agreement must lie before
Congress for 60 days of continuous session (once a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement is received).45
An exempted agreement could only become effective if
Congress enacts a joint resolution of approval.
If such an agreement is approved by Congress, the NRC would still have to
license nuclear exports under the agreement. Since the U.S.-India agreement would
not contain the full-scope safeguards requirement and since India would continue to
have a nuclear weapons program, the President would still have to waive the Section
128 requirement for full-scope safeguards and Section 129 provision that would
terminate nuclear exports for a non-nuclear-weapon state that, since 1978, has
detonated a nuclear explosive device or is conducting nuclear weapons work and has
not made sufficient progress toward ending that activity.46
In both cases, there are
provisions for waivers and for Congressional disapproval. According to some
observers, waiving the termination of exports because of a nuclear test may be easier
than waiving a termination because of weapons work, since India committed to a
voluntary test moratorium after 1998, but not to ending its nuclear weapons program.
Impact on Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
Some observers have maintained that while the strategic benefits of expanded
cooperation with India may be considerable, the nonproliferation costs may outweigh
the benefits. U.S.-India nuclear cooperation raises several issues for the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime. First and foremost is the basic bargain of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In exchange for peaceful nuclear cooperation,
nonnuclear-weapon states under the NPT gave up the option of developing nuclear
weapons. This bargain was strengthened when nuclear supplier states adopted the
requirement for full-scope safeguards for nuclear exports. The nuclear
nonproliferation regime is at a crossroads now, particularly since revelations about
Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan‟s nuclear black market sales in 2004 prompted the
45
Specific procedures are found in AEA, P.L. 95-242, Sections 123 and 130. 46
The provision in Sec. 129 terminating exports for nuclear weapon tests applies in
situations where nuclear exports have begun.
202
United States, its allies, the IAEA, the G-8, and the NSG to consider further
restrictions on sensitive nuclear technologies (e.g., uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing). Some NPT members believe that these restrictions
contradict the basic bargain of the NPT; other NPT members believe that restricting
technologies even further is necessary.
Nonetheless, at a time when the United States has called for all states to
strengthen their domestic export control laws and implementation and for tighter
multilateral controls, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India would require loosening its
own nuclear export legislation, as well as creating an exception to NSG full-scope
safeguards requirements. The Administration has not revealed publicly how it will
handle NSG guidelines, but consensus among the 44 NSG members is not always
assured. Some states may agree that it is time to create a new paradigm for India,
while other states, particularly those who have benefitted from the right of peaceful
nuclear cooperation under the NPT, may not. Dissent within the NSG could be
counterproductive to achieving other objectives the United States is pursuing in
nuclear nonproliferation, for example, restricting the fuel cycle, disarming North
Korea, and restraining Iran, all of which rely on the considerable support of friends
and allies. U.S.-India cooperation could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify
supplying other non-nuclear-weapon states, like Pakistan.
Other Countries
India has signed agreements for peaceful uses of atomic energy with a
number of other countries. These include Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh,
Brazil, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, German Democratic Republic,
Hungary, Iraq, Iran, Italy, Libya, Indonesia, Malaysia, Poland, Philippines, Romania,
Sweden, Spain, U.K., Yugoslovia etc. Most of the agreements are for exchange of
scientists and information.
India has also assisted a few of the developing countries in their civil nuclear
efforts, often in collaboration with international agencies like the IAEA. For
instance, reactor for Bangladesh, and has offered to set up an atomic power plant in
Malaysia. In Indonesia, the BARC is setting up a „Cobalt-60‟ panoramic batch
203
irradiator, on a turn-key basis, at the Pasar Jamat Research Centre of the National
Atomic Energy Agency. In collaboration with the IAEA, India has set up a neutron
crystal spectrometer in the Philippines. This is meant to be a facility for imparting
training in nuclear physics to scientists of South and Southeast Asian countries.
Taking an overall view of India‟s cooperation agreements with other
countries, it will be seen that the country‟s dependence on foreign sources has been
of a limited nature, confined to certain projects. Assistance was received mainly
from the United States and Canada. Yet the Canadian cut-off of nuclear cooperation
after the 1974 Pokhran test and the delays in the supply of enriched uranium by the
USA have caused a setback to the country‟s nuclear programme. Indian nuclear
planners, however, have only themselves to blame for much that has gone wrong
with the country‟s nuclear programme. Hesitation and lack of clarity have marked
the thinking and actions of the policy-makers. The policy of self-reliance in the
nuclear field as envisaged by Dr. Bhabha in the early 1950s has been put to a severe
test in recent years, and it must be admitted that the policy-planners have not come
off too well.