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Chapter 25 Monopoly Behavior

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Chapter 25 Monopoly Behavior. 25.1 Price Discrimination. Price discrimination: selling different units of output at different prices. First-degree price discrimination Different units of output for different prices. Price schedules differ from person to person. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

Chapter 25 Monopoly Behavior

Page 2: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.1 Price Discrimination

Price discrimination: selling different units of output at different prices.

First-degree price discriminationDifferent units of output for different prices.Price schedules differ from person to person.Prices differ across quantities as well as

consumers.

Page 3: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.1 Price Discrimination Second-degree price discrimination

Different units of output for different prices.Same price for the same quantity.Prices differ across quantities, but not across

consumers. Third-degree price discrimination

Different prices for different consumers.Same price for the same consumer.Prices differ across consumers, but not across

quantities.

Page 4: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.2 First-degree Price Discrimination Discrete good Reservation prices

r1=v(1)-v(0)

r2=v(2)-v(1)

r3=v(3)-v(2) Gross Consumer’s

surplus

r1+ r2+ r3=v(3)-v(0)

Page 5: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.2 First-degree Price Discrimination Price of the 1st unit: r1

ΔCS: zero ΔPS: r1-MC

Price of the 2nd unit: r2 ΔCS: zero ΔPS: r2-MC

Price of the 3rd unit: r3 ΔCS: zero ΔPS: r3-MC

Can charge v(3) for the first three units ΔCS: zero ΔPS: v(3)-3*MC

Page 6: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.2 First-degree Price Discrimination

To consumer 1 Sell 8 units Charge v1(8)

To consumer 2 Sell 3 units Charge v2(3)

Page 7: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.2 First-degree Price Discrimination

Each unit of the good is sold at the reservation price.

No consumer’s surplus generated. The output is Pareto efficient.

Page 8: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.2 First-degree Price Discrimination

To consumer 1 Sell x1

0 units Charge v1(x1

0)

To consumer 2 Sell x2

0 units

Charge v2(x20)

Page 9: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.3 Second-degree Price Discrimination Two consumers: high demand and low demand. The firm cannot identify the consumers. Zero marginal cost assumed for simplicity. Screening: price-quantity packages that give the

consumers an incentive to choose the right package meant for them.Two contracts: (xH, pH), (xL, pL).The high demand selects (xH, pH).The low demand selects (xL, pL).

Page 10: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.3 Second-degree Price Discrimination Full information

case Low demand

xL=x10, pL=A

High demandxH=x2

0, pH=A+B+C

Page 11: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.3 Second-degree Price Discrimination Self-selection High demand

will choose (xL, pL) and get B.

xH=x20, pH=A+C

Page 12: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.3 Second-degree Price Discrimination Adjustment Low demand

xL=x1m, pL=A

High demandxH=x2

0, pH=A+C+D+E

New profit: E-D

Page 13: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.3 Second-degree Price Discrimination Optimum Low demand

xL=x1m, pL=A

High demandxH=x2

0, pH=A+C+D

Page 14: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

EXAMPLE: Price Discrimination in Airfares High demand and low demand: business and

non-business travelers. Restricted fare

Advanced purchase, inconvenient hours, but cheap.

Designed for low demand. Unrestricted fare

Fully flexible but expensive.Designed for high demand.

Page 15: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.4 Third-degree Price Discrimination

Two groups of consumers. The firm is able to identify the consumers. Constant unit price for each market. The good cannot be resold. Firm’s problem

1 21 1 1 2 2 2 1 2

,max ( ) ( ) ( )y y

p y y p y y c y y

Page 16: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.4 Third-degree Price Discrimination F.O.C.:

MR1(y1)=MC(y1+y2)

MR2(y2)=MC(y1+y2)

or

1 1 1 21 1

1( ) 1 ( )

( )p y MC y y

y

2 2 1 22 2

1( ) 1 ( )

( )p y MC y y

y

Page 17: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.4 Third-degree Price Discrimination

|2(y2)| > |1(y1)|: p1>p2

The market with the higher price must have the lower elasticity of demand.

Page 18: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.5 Bundling Bundles: packages of related goods offered for sale

together.

Willingness to pay for software components

Type of consumer Word processor Spreadsheet

Type A consumers 120 100Type B consumers 100 120

Page 19: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.5 Bundling Selling software separately

Charge $100 for each software. Total revenue: $400.

Bundling Charge $220 for the software suite. Total revenue: $440.

Diversity in consumers’ willingness to pay lowers the price one can charge.

Bundling reduces this diversity.

Page 20: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.6 Two-Part Tariffs People go to

Disneyland for rides. Two prices

Admission ticket: t Price of rides: p*

Given p*, t=CS Profits from rides:

(p*-MC)x* Optimal price:

p*=MC

Page 21: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.7 Monopolistic Competition

Product differentiationProducts are similar, but not identical.Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola.

Monopolistic competitionEach firm faces a downward-sloping demand

curve for its product.Free entry into the industry.Monopolists with zero profits.

Page 22: Chapter 25  Monopoly Behavior

25.7 Monopolistic Competition

Monopolistic competition The demand curve and

the average cost curve must be tangent with each other.