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CHAPTER 2
History of Afghanistan
Intertwined in the historical expression of Afghanistan is the ethnic mosaic of
the nation that validates the understanding of the society and also the work from literary
perspective. To study the evolution of ethnicity, its nuances, both pragmatic and forced
in Afghanistan, it becomes essential to typify the historical events that are spooled in the
knowledge of the nation. The story of Afghanistan is in many ways a tragic one as it
features a few of the goriest events that can occur to mankind. Its war-torn, most
ravaged and most beleaguered status is a witness to the invasions, internal ethnic
upheaval and a variety of conflicts that has left the nation in such a devastated state.
Afghanistan was once a cradle of civilizations and now its people are being projected as
backward and tribal. Its people have been subjected to not just physical trauma that
occurred due to internal upheaval and external pressures but also to the labyrinth of
ideologies pertaining to Islam--a constant and conflicting feature. For the people,
nothing has changed in the last one thousand years; the leadership had only one
objective--to rule and manifest power. First of all, when we study who the Afghans are,
we get to see a multitude of traditions and cultures that have merged into this nation and
this substantiates our study on the ethnicity of Afghanistan.
This nation has been aptly described as one on the crossroads of Asia and this
makes it evident to understand how the future of this country will have an effect on the
entire Asian continent. And modern Afghanistan is said to be an accidental
49
geographical unit carved out of the heart of Central Asia by the sword of its
conquerors. Afghanistan has historically been the link between Central Asia, the
Middle East and the Indian sub-continent--a nation made up of many different
nationalities, the result of innumerable invasions and migrations. In earlier centuries,
its geopolitical position let to alternate enrichment and devastation, as armies marched
in through on their way to other lands. Its commercial crossroads became vulnerable
for its inhabitants, despite the opening of the sea lanes in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Within its current borders there are at least a dozen major ethnic groups –
Pashtuns, Baluch, Chahar Aimak, Turkmen, Hazara, Tajik, Uzbek, Nuristani, Arab,
Kirghiz, Pashai and Persian. Historically and technically, the Pashtun ethnic group has
been the most dominant. Therefore the term Afghan is synonymous with the Pashtuns
and is generally viewed by other people in the country and across the globe to refer to
the powerful, heroic and the dominant group. The royal families of the country have
been Pashtuns, and today represent about 50% of the total population. Tajiks come in
second with 25%, and the rest make up considerably smaller percentages. Although
there are tiny Hindu, Sikh and Jewish communities, the vast majority of the people are
Muslims, and in fact many ethnic groups consider Islam to be one of the defining
aspects of their ethnic identity. However, as the work progresses further, it becomes
mandatory to study the origin and evolution of the different ethnic groups in
Afghanistan. History reveals that Islam was brought to Afghanistan during the eighth
and ninth century by the Arabs; and prior to that, the nation was ruled by various
Persians, Greeks, Sassasians and Central Asian empires. Following a subsequent break
down in Arab rule, semi-independent states began to form and later these local
50
dynasties and states however were overwhelmed and crushed during the Mongolian
invasions of the 1200s that were to remain and rule the country until the 1500s, despite
much resistance and internal strife.
After the collapse of the Mongol rule, Afghanistan was caught between the vice
of two great powers. During this time it was the Mughals of northern India and the
Safavids of Iran that fought over the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan to lay siege
in the nation. Armies marched devastating the land and murdering the people
conquering city after city, and destroying whatever had been left by the invading army.
Afghanistan was subject to anarchy and it was not until 1747 that Afghanistan was able
to free itself when Nadir Shah an empire builder from Iran, died and left a vacuum in
central Asia. It was Ahmed Shah Durrani, a former Afghan bodyguard who was able to
fill the vacuum. Ahmad was a Pashtun, and his Pashtunwali- the honour code of the
ethnic group, allowed the Pashtuns to rule Afghanistan in one form or another for the
next 200 years. Ahmad Shah displayed himself as an ardent follower of the tenets of
the Pashtun ethnicity, and was able to unify the different Afghan tribes and went on to
conquer considerable parts of what are today eastern Iran, Pakistan, northern India and
Uzbekistan. Although, his successors proved unable to hold his vast empire together
and within 50 years, much of it had been seized by rival regional powers. Within the
country there were numerous bloody civil wars; each ethnic group tried to substantiate
its stance in the nation. Several wars for the throne took place, and for many Afghans,
it meant little that their lives were being uprooted and destroyed by ethnic kin as
opposed to foreign invaders. Diverse ideologies of each ethnic group led to the
mayhem leaving the life of common man in a devastated state. These ethnic and
51
internal conflicts paved way for the two imperialist powers- the British Empire and
Czarist Russia to intervene in the 1800s thereby aggravating the internal conflicts
dramatically.
The British with a view to expand and consolidate their colonial holdings on the
Indian sub-continent were looking at the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan as a
natural barrier to prevent invasion by rival imperialists. The Russians were expanding
south and east swallowing up several formerly independent sultanates and emirates in
Central Asia. The two great powers essentially engaged in a race for Afghanistan and
their trials for seizures of land and the intention to overthrow the indigenous nations
and interference into the affairs of the remaining independent states in the region
became known as ‘the Great Game.’ The arrival of European imperialism simply
accelerated and made living more difficult; the wars, poverty and material destruction
had already wrecked not just the region but also their interest in life.
In 1900 Abdur Rehman Khan, the ‘Iron Amir’, ruled Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901
described his country’s vulnerable position: “How can a small power like Afghanistan
which is like a goat between two lions or a grain of wheat between two strong
millstones of the grinding mill, stand in the way of the two stones without being
ground to dust?” (2) It was to keep Afghanistan away from the imperial lions and to
attain an internal toughness and integrity so that it would deter any foreign intrusion in
the Afghan soil he struggled. But the two powers Russia and Britain came to
understand the advantages each would bag, each perceiving the intention of the other.
Afghanistan in short became a buffer state and the nation’s limitations viz-a-viz its
economic backwardness, subservient military divided ethnic tribes acted as deterrents
52
to have common national goals and national independence. Not just this, but the
subsequent rulers of the nation acted as coadjutors for the imperial lions to take
position in the country with a view to build modern military and improve its economy
with the aid of foreign investors.
On two separate occasions, British armies from India out rightly invaded
Afghanistan in attempts to install puppet governments amenable to British economic
interests, and to oppose the economic interests of Czarish Russia. The first came to be
known as the First Anglo-Afghan War that took place in 1838. Outraged by the
presence of a single Russian diplomat in Kabul, the British demanded a deal that
Afghanistan avoids any contact with Russia or Iran, and that it hand over vast tracts of
Pashtun inhabited land to British India. Dost Mohammad the Afghan ruler agreed to
these humiliating demands, but the British did not stop invading the country. The
British however seized most of the major cities in Afghanistan with little resistance,
but their tyranny soon resulted in a popular uprising by the people which resulted in the
massacre of the entire British army of 15,000. Still the British outrage over the
uninvited arrival of a Russian diplomatic envoy in Kabul, in 1878, resulted in the
Second Anglo-Afghan War. Subsequently the British withdrew but not before they set
up a puppet ruler and forced the country to hand over control of its foreign affairs to
Britain. It was demanded that Afghanistan would remain a British protectorate until
1919. Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the wave of popular rebellions
that rippled through Asia subsequently, Amanullah the then king of Afghanistan,
declared his country’s independence by signing a treaty of aid and friendship with
Lenin, and declaring war on Britain. After a period of border skirmishes, and the
53
bombing of Kabul by the Royal Air Force, Afghanistan’s Independence was conceded
by the British. Notwithstanding its defeat, Britain conspired with the conservative
religious and land owning elements of the country that were unhappy with
Amanullah’s attempts to secularize and reform the country. This makes it evident that
more than the foreign outbreaks it is the internal differences between the ethnic groups
that created the differences time and again. The outbreak of an uprising and civil war
forced Amanullah to abdicate in 1929. Different warlords contested for power until a
new king, Muhammad Nadir Shah took power and was assassinated four years later.
He was succeeded by Muhammad Zahir Shah, who was to be Afghanistan’s last king,
and who would rule for the next 40 years. Zahir Shah’s rule was highly autocratic; the
word of the king was the word of law. Official bodies i.e. the advisory councils and
assemblies were sometimes called to advise the king; they had no power, and in no
way represented the people of Afghanistan. These bodies consisted of the country’s
tribal elders – a nice sounding term, but in reality referred to the brutal land owners and
patriarchs. It is said that this time of Afghanistan’s history was one where attempts
were made to modernize the country – all this really meant was newer rifles for the
army, the purchase a few airplanes, the creation of a tiny airline to shuttle the ruling
elite around, and some telegraph wires to allow the king to collect this taxes more
promptly. Under his rule political parties were outlawed, and unhappy students were
shot and killed when they protested.
In 1973, the king was overthrown by a prominent member of his own family
Daoud, and a Republic was declared. Daoud, decided to title himself president instead
of king and he did bring about some changes as the most draconian realities of
54
monarchy were rolled back. Dissatisfaction amongst people started as little was done to
satisfy them. Daoud seized power with an underground party namely the PDPA--
People’s Democratic Party, a pro-Moscow communist party. Once he had consolidated
power he felt no longer needed these controversial allies, and ordered a crackdown
upon the party. The PDPA seized power from Daoud in 1978 in a military coup. After
seizing power they began a series of limited reforms, trying to unite the diverse ethnic
groups, declaring a secular state, and that women deserved equal treatment in the
society. They sought to curtail the practice of purchasing brides, and tried to implement
a land reform program. They quickly met with fierce opposition from many sections of
the deeply religious population though and soon several rural areas rose in open armed
rebellion against the new government. Immediately following the PDPA coup, the
soviets took an active interest in the so-called socialist revolution unfolding in its
backyard. Utterly dismayed by the clumsiness of the radical faction of the PDPA, the
Soviet Union invaded in 1979 and handed power over a man named Karmal, who was
the leader of the more moderate faction of the PDPA. Though, perhaps this was not the
Soviets original intention, they found themselves forced to commit more and more
troops and material to prop up the unpopular PDPA government. Several Islamic
fundamentalist groups sprang up and began waging guerilla warfare. Many of them
operated from camps set up by the CIA and Pakistani Intelligence within Pakistan,
from which they could strike into Afghanistan, and then beat a hasty retreat over a
guarded border. The United States government initially paid little attention to the
PDPA coup in Afghanistan; its attention was instead focused on to the west, where a
popular revolution has overthrown their most valuable Middle East ally, the brutal and
55
autocratic Shah of Iran. However, at that point the United States took an active interest
in the Islamic fundamentalists waging war on the PDPA and the Soviets. Mujahadeen--
the name of the Islamic guerillas was provided with military training by the CIA. After
offensive after offensive, gradually the Soviet military became discouraged. They were
actually able to occupy and hold all of the major cities, just at the British imperialists
had been able to, the century before, but they were unable to subjugate the countryside.
Soviet causalities began to mount dramatically; even their control of the air was
becoming an expensive affair.
Mujahideen’s call for ‘Jihad’, or the holy war against the the secular Soviets
won favours from thousands of Arabs across. In 1989 the Soviets withdrew, and the
CIA soon lost interest in its mercenary forces now that they had accomplished their
mission of bleeding the Soviets white. The Mujahideen factions began fighting as
much with themselves as with the PDPA forces, resulting in increased suffering and
bloodshed. It wasn’t until 1992 that Mujahideen fighters were able to topple the
remnants of the PDPA government, ending the Stalinists attempts to bring revolution to
the people of Afghanistan. Different Mujahideen warlords occupied different cities and
regions of the country. The collapse of the PDPA government did not mark the end of
Afghanistan’s civil war. The Mujahideen warlords continued to bring death and
destruction upon the country and sought to enlarge their new fiefdoms at the expense
of their neighboring rivals. Pakistani Intelligence aided in the creation of a new Islamic
fundamentalist movement-- the Taliban which was born in the Islamic schools that had
sprung up inside the Afghan refugee camps inside Pakistan. Its leadership and the bulk
of its initial ranks were made up of young religious Pashtun students, motivated by the
56
zeal of religion and the belief that they were ordained to bring stability and the ways of
Allah back to their war torn land.
They railed against corruption and greed of the contending Mujahideen factions
inside Afghanistan, and initiated a military push to conquer the country. They were
initially well received by certain sections of the weary population. In 1996, they
captured the capital city of Kabul, and had forced most of the remaining warlords into a
small pocket in the far north of the country. Once in power, the Taliban sought to
create a theocratic state based on their interpretations of the Koran making it adapt to
their needs. Already severely suppressed by the various Mujahideen warlords, the
plight of Afghanistan’s women was made even worse under the new regime. The veil
became the law of the land, and women were forbidden from attending school or
holding employment outside of the home. Television was banned and an effort was
made to purge the country of any signs or remnants of secular or Western influence.
The country became politically and diplomatically isolated.
The work tends to focus on the mayhem and anarchy that haunted Afghanistan
in the face of ethnic conflicts for thousands of years. Invasions and foreign rule is a
common feature in the history books, but what needs to be understood is how a
particular society reacts to such intrusions and when societal living and communal
harmony is lagging, anarchy becomes the order of the nation. It’s hard to say how
much longer the Taliban will continue to fight, or when the U.S. will end its war.
Afghanistan’s future like its past seems to be very dark indeed.
Ethnic Groups Prevailing in the Nation
57
The Pashtun Community: The word Afghan is originally a synonym for Pashtun, and
is symbolic of the physical might and fervor of the people of Afghanistan. Because of
this etymology, the Pashtuns are often referred to as ‘ethnic Afghans.’ Just as Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and other countries have been named for their
historical majority ethnic group, so was Afghanistan by the predominance of the
Pashtuns. Throughout the Pashtun history, the warrior has been the most revered
member of society. It is said that the term 'Pakhto' or 'Pashto' is merely the not name of
the language, but the name of an honour code and religion. These people are highly
conventional and hold strong belief in the main tenets of 'Pakhto' or formally known as
Pashtunwali-
1. Hospitality and asylum to all guests seeking help and justice being very firm
and rigid
2. Eye for an eye or Tooth for a Tooth,
3. Thirdly defense of 'Zan, Zar and Zameen' i.e women/family, treasury and
property.
Pashtuns are fiercely independent and there is a lot of internal competition. The
Pashtun people are extremely protective of their womenfolk, at home they are
undeniably in-charge of all the family affairs. All Pashtun men are extremely close to
their mothers and are encouraged to espouse the virtues of a chivalrous warrior by their
mothers. To uphold the sanctity of Pashtunwali becomes their primary objective and
the tenets of Pashtunwali are transmitted from generation to generation in the form of a
number of verbal stories or anecdotes that every child becomes acquainted with,
through the elders in the family. Mothers are generally very tough on their male
58
children when it comes to being well-mannered. It is seen that women have the
responsibility of guarding and protecting the status of men and the family, within the
Pasthun community. For this reason, women are guarded closely and protected. A
man enquiring about the wife of another man is considered heretic and it would have
serious consequences. The Pashtuns are a private people and the men also make efforts
to safeguard themselves, their extended families, their communities; sustaining their
honour and social status becomes pivotal. Although it is an Islamic duty to observe
burqa, Pashtun women do so because it forms a part of their cultural tradition and not
primarily for Islamic purposes. It is said that ‘Pashtunwali’ has been in existence since
before the advent of Islam and is still practiced today. The Pashtuns are predominantly
a tribal people, although an increasing number of them now dwell in cities and urban
settlements. Many still identify themselves with various clans. Most decisions in tribal
life are made by a 'Jirga' or 'Senate' of elected elders and wise men.
Origin of the Pashtun Community: A number of ancient groups with eponyms to
‘Pukhtun’ have been referred to as possible ancestors of modern Pashtuns. The
Rigveda seems to (1700–1100 BC) mention a tribe called Paktha and their connection
with today's Pashtun people inhabiting eastern Afghanistan. The Greek historian
Herodotus mentioned a people called ‘Pactyans’ living in the same area (Achaemenid's
empire) as the 1st millennium BCE. However, these were often referred to as ethnic
Afghans in the middle ages until the advent of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century.
The earliest mention of the name Afghan (Abgân) is by Shapur I of the Sassanid
Empire during the 3rd century which is later recorded in the 6th century in the form of
59
‘Avagana’ by the Indian astronomer Varāha Mihira in his Brihat-Samhita. It was used
to refer to a common legendary ancestor known as ‘Afghana’, propagated to be
grandson of King Saul of Israel. George Moore published his famous work The Lost
Tribes in 1861 where he referred to the origin of the Pashtun tribes. He gave numerous
facts to prove that these tribes are traceable to India. He gave details of the character of
the wandering Israelites, and said:
And we find that the very natural character of Israel reappear in all its life and
reality in countries where people call themselves Bani Israel and universally
claim to be the descendants of the Lost Tribes. The nomenclature of their tribes
and districts, both in ancient Geography, and at the present day, confirms this
universal natural tradition. Lastly, we have the route of the Israelites from
Media to Afghanistan and India marked by a series of intermediate stations
bearing the names of several of the tribes and clearly indicating the stages of
their long and arduous journey. (Moore, 3)
The Exiled and the Redeemed by Itzhak Ben-Zvi, second President of Israel, writes that
Hebrew migrations into Afghanistan began, ‘with a sprinkling of exiles from Samaria
who had been transplanted there by Shalmaneser, King of Assyria (719 BC). He writes:
The Afghan tribes, among whom the Jews have lived for generations, are
Moslems who retain to this day their amazing tradition about their descent from
the Ten Tribes. It is an ancient tradition, and one not without some historical
plausibility... if the Afghan tribes persistently adhere to the tradition that they
60
were once Hebrews and in course of time embraced Islam, and there is not an
alternative tradition also existent among them, they are certainly Jewish. (Ben,
Itzhak. 5)
Shalva Weil, anthropologist and senior researcher at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem said "Of all the groups, there is more convincing evidence about the Pathans
than anybody else, but the Pathans are the ones who would reject Israel most
ferociously. That is the sweet irony" (6).
From the anthropologists’ perspective, they lend credence to the oral traditions
of the Pashtun tribes themselves. Another book that corresponds with Pashtun
historical records-- Taaqati-Nasiri, states that in the 7th century BC a people called the
Bani Israel settled in the Ghor region of Afghanistan and from there began migrating
southeast. These references to Bani Israel agree with the commonly held view by
Pashtuns that when the twelve tribes of Israel who were dispersed, the tribe of Joseph,
among other Hebrew tribes, settled in the Afghanistan region. This oral tradition is
widespread among the Pashtun tribes. There have been many legends over the
centuries of descent from the Ten Lost Tribes after groups converted to Christianity
and Islam. However their modern past stretches back to the Hotaki dynasty and the
Durrani Empire.
The Tajiks: ‘Tājik’ is a word of Turko-Mongol origin and literally means Non-Turk.
Tajik in Central Asia is used to refer to people that still speak an Iranian language,
including both Tajiki-speaking Tajiks, and the Pamiri peoples, also known as the
61
Mountain Tajiks. The origin of the name Tajik has been disputable in twentieth-century
political disputes about whether Turkic or Iranian peoples were the original inhabitants
of Central Asia. The Tajiks form the next major ethnic group in Afghanistan and trace
their ancestry to the Eastern Iranian speaking Bactrians, Sogdians, and Parthians. But
the Tajiks adoption of the now dominant Persian language--a Western Iranian language
is believed to be due to the dominance of the Persian empire in the region during the
Achaemenid and Sassanid dynasties. However, the Persian language, particularly the
Tajiki, contain numerous words from Sogdian, Parthian and other Iranian languages of
ancient Central Asia. Following the Arab conquest of Persia, many Persians after
conversion to Islam, entered Central Asia as military forces and settled in the
conquered lands. As a result of these regular Persian migrations (Zoroastrian and
Muslim) over the course of more than 200 years, it is seen that the Tajiks have also
ethnic Persian ancestry in addition to their East-Iranian ancestry. The rich cultural
dissemination through Persian literature also helped to establish the new language,
besides having an intermittent military dominance. According to a leading historian of
Iranian and Central Asian history, Richard Nelson Frye, the Persian migration to
Central Asia may be considered the beginning of the modern Tajik nation. In his later
works, Frye expands on the complexity of the historical origins of the Tajiks. Moreover
in a 1996 publication Frye explains that "the peoples of Central Asia, whether Iranian
or Turkic speaking, have one culture, one religion, one set of social values and
traditions with only language separating them"(48). They predominate four of the
largest cities in Afghanistan--Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Ghazni. In Afghanistan,
62
the Tajiks do not organize themselves by tribes and refer to themselves by the region
they are from, such as Badakhshi, Baghlani, Herati, Kohistani etc.
Hazara: The Hazara are a people set apart from fellow Afghans by religion, mixed
ethnicity and an independent nature. Persecution has shaped and defined the Hazara
especially by the Pashtun community, particularly over the last 200 years. They face
discrimination as they are the Shi'ite Muslims, a minority among Afghanistan's
dominant Sunni Muslims and also for their ethnic bias. Their traditional homeland lies
in central Afghanistan amid rugged mountains, where living is not smooth, nearly
inaccessible region of craggy peaks and rushing rivers called the Hazarajat. Hazara
origins are much debated as their name is from a Persian word meaning ‘thousand’.
However current theory suggest that they have obvious Asian features, and are
descents from Mongol soldiers left behind by Genghis Khan in the 13th century, with
considerable Turkish admixture. Their unwritten dialect--- ‘Hazaragi’ is a blend of
regional languages - Arabic, Urdu, Mongol, Turkish and Dari/Farsi, which is now
Afghanistan's primary language. Although they are the third major ethnic group in
Afghanistan they constitute only close to 10% of the population now; they are the
discriminated group and subjected to inhuman treatment by the dominant groups.
History reveals that prior to the 19th century, Hazaras were 67% of the total
population, the largest Afghan ethnic group. As part of ‘ethnic cleansing’ more than
half were massacred in 1893 when their autonomy was lost as a result of political
action. Later fundamentalist governments, including the Taliban—Pashtun dominated,
attempted to dismiss them historically, politically and culturally by labeling them a
63
mere religious entity and continued to attack them until they were driven from power.
During the political and religious turmoil, between 1978-2001 war years, numerous
Hazara fled with other Afghans to Pakistan or Iran. While many returning refugees
settled in Kabul to work as laborers, market vendors or in service positions while a
majority returned to their mountain homelands. They comprise half-dozen tribes and
identify themselves by village location rather than by family ties. They lead a semi-
nomadic life, simple and harsh in the arid region where water is scarce and cultivation
a formidable task.
It is sad to note that health issues are serious as they are deprived of basic
necessities; moreover their condition is aggravated due to geographical isolation,
unsanitary conditions and little access to medical care. Hazara women are honored in
legend and folk tales. Many pre-Taliban Hazara women were highly educated and
entered teaching or medical professions; they also served in political roles. And it is
important to note that unlike the other Afghan women; they fought beside their Hazara
men in battles. Their contribution in the country tag Hazaras as brave, hardworking,
trustworthy, friendly and committed. The Hazara are Muslims, otherwise known as
‘Twelvers’, who hold a particular reverence for the son-in-law of the prophet
Mohammed. A number of Hazara who have strong ties with the Tajik people are
Ismaili Shi'ites--also known as ‘Seveners’. Strong feelings prevail between the two
sects, each one often denying they have any ethnic affinity with the other at all.
Uzbeks: The Uzbeks are generally indicated to have formed from waves of ancient
migrations holding the Turkic-Mongoloid ancestry reflected by lighter skin and flat
64
facial features. Uzbeks identify themselves as Sunni Muslims, although this is largely a
cultural identity now than a religious one. As Afghanistan’s fourth largest ethnic group
and nearly one-tenth of her total population, Uzbeks reside primarily in mountainous
northern regions. They live simply in small villages, often with Tajik neighbors but are
averse to the Pashtuns who moved into their homelands in large numbers to render
them a minority by the 1960s in territory they once controlled. Afghan culture has been
undeniably impacted by the Uzbeks, particularly in music, carpet making and sport.
Buzkashi, a violent game played by teams on horseback with a headless goat carcass
and now synonymous with Afghanistan as its national sport, was introduced by
Uzbeks. They are considered to be creative people and are patrons of poetry, music and
playing unique instruments, such as the Uzbek 2-stringed fretted flute. Their ethnic
culture is preserved through folk dances and traditional handicrafts like metal working,
wood carving, leather craft and wall or textile painting. Many urban Uzbeks are
businessmen, others are skilled craftsmen. Women are noted for weaving exquisite
rugs, an area of significant contribution to Afghanistan’s textile heritage. Their lives
are however affected due to their ethnic distinctiveness but however less affected than
some other groups. Medical care is not readily available and economic opportunity is
spare. The name Uzbek is said to mean ‘independent’ or ‘self-ruling’, from ‘uz’,
meaning self and ‘bek, meaning master. The name seems fitting since the Uzbek in
northern Afghanistan have remained a cohesive group, where distance from the capital
city Kabul, has allowed them some autonomy. Political interests are represented by a
single party, even when the 2001 Allied invasion increased political opportunities for
65
them. Uzbeks continue to champion a central government with representation for all
Afghan ethnic groups, but granting broad control over local issues to the provinces.
Baluchs: The Baluchis are one of Asia’s cross-border minorities who have a strong
awareness of their minority status. Several rebellions have been waged in the nation to
claim their stance and maintain their autonomy. The Baluch claim their history to be
more than a millennia old, a consensus by eminent scholars was also reached where it
was believed that the Baluch had some nexus with Aleppo in Syria and their movement
towards the southern coast of the Caspian Sea after which they migrated and settled in
today’s Iranian Baluchistan, Pakistani Baluchistan and Afghanistan. Hence they are
divided across the countries of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan and across the three
nations there has been a strong struggle for self-determination with the view to the
formation of an independent Baluchistan, but the demands have gradually faded
through sustained political repression at the hands of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.
The demand articulation for autonomy by the Baluchs in Afghanistan was not
considered as its territorial concentration was lower. They practice Sunni Islam and
live in the sparse and arid lands of the south-west and south in Hilmand and Faryab
Provinces. Their language is Baluchi, although some speak Brahui. The Baluch
People's Liberation Front (PLF) was the strongest organized Baluch group in search of
independence in the 1970s. Most of PLF guerrillas were based in training camps in
southern Afghanistan and were reportedly given sanctuary by Daoud's regime. The
Baluchis are one of the named ‘national' ethnic minorities in the new Afghan
constitution and accordingly have all the rights bestowed to Afghan citizens. However,
66
a lack of information on the situation of Baluchis in post Taliban Afghanistan makes it
difficult to ascertain the future of the group within Afghanistan and in the process of
re-building the state care needs to be taken to not exclude them.
Mujahideen: Amongst the ethnic groups that impacted the religious and socio-
political conditions in Afghanistan, the world cannot be oblivion to Mujahideen whose
complexity has evoked appreciable response from people across nations. The group
consists of people who took up arms against the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party)
and the Soviet forces, who regarded themselves as engaged in a ‘jihad’ or the holy war.
The Jihad movement legitimized the large-scale exodus of a significant proportion of
population to neighboring Islamic countries as Afghanistan had been transgressed by a
secular force and therefore ceased to be Islamic. People from Afghanistan migrated to
Pakistan, Baluchistan, Punjab and Iran and were given aid by the host countries to fight
against the Soviet forces. According to Peter Marsden in The Taliban:
The definition of Mujahideen thus encompasses all those who moved to
Pakistan and Iran, and engaged in fighting within Afghanistan on the basis of
incursionary movements from these two countries, together with the many
people who opted to remain in Afghanistan throughout the war, often fleeing to
the sanctuary of the mountains with their families and organizing raids from
there. Some of these were affiliated to organized groups. Others acted
spontaneously as part of their village or tribal communities. (Marsden, 27)
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The leaders of the Islamist parties who settled in Pakistan saw an opportunity to claim
leadership over the resistance movement, and declaration of ‘Jihad’ (the Holy war)
proved to be a blessing. Pakistan’s interest to support the movement was geared
towards settling border issues with Afghanistan over Pushtunistan and also to practice
political control and destabilize the existing Daoud’s regime in Afghanistan. Another
motive of Pakistan was to create strategic strength against India through the formation
of Islamic bloc stretching from Pakistan to Central Asia. USA provided aid covertly in
1979 in its attempt to destabilize the Soviet forces and then pronounced its aid on a
massive scale from 1986 onwards using Pakistan as a conduit. This gave the Islamist
movement a fillip where there could gather arms and other resources to the Mujahideen
fighting within Afghanistan. Several groups emanated justifying their holy war but the
government took a stand and recognized only seven parties or ethnic groups and stated
that the smaller groups would affiliate to any of the seven main groups.
Four of these ethnic groups were Islamist and tried to create a political
movement which had an ambit in the reinterpretation of the essential elements of
Islam. They set out to achieve a radical restructuring of society in accordance with
reinterpretation of Islamic principles with a view to incorporate the economic, judicial,
social and political system within the Islamic sphere. These religiously driven ethnic
groups gained importance and popularity across nations, more so with the Arab world
that provided them with monetary and moral support. The so called groups legitimized
under the Islamist movements were 1. Jamiat-i-Islami 2. Hisb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) 3.
Hisb-e-Islami (Khalis) 4. Ittihad-i-Islami. Each group had its own mode of operating
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and redirecting the Islamic learning of people inviting young radicals to make the
movement more heard and felt. These groups have however demonstrated strong
opposition to the Shi’a minority and the dominant group i.e the Pushtuns took the lead
in professing these radical movements. The other three parties recognized were 1. The
Afghan National Liberation Front 2. Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-islami 3. Mahaz-i-Milli-i-
islami. These groups were referred to as traditionalist, by virtue of its absence of
ideology and power base in the nation.
These parties from the time they were established as channels for military aid, it
became difficult for the government to determine to what extent the various groups
inside Afghanistan were affiliating themselves to one ethnic group or another because
of the resources on offer and the conviction they had. However, geographically it was
possible to identify an ethnic group’s predominance in a particular area, but the fact
remains that within a given village or family more than one group might be represented
adding complexity to the existing conditions. The seven parties which established
themselves into the Seven party Alliance in May 1985 were all adherents of Sunni
Islam. In addition to the existing parties, two Shi’a parties with the encouragement of
the Iranian government to strengthen and bargain the power of Shi’as in the internal
struggle within Afghanistan were formed. It is very ostensible that the ethnic groups’
motive to form a predominant group was to claim a stand, gain sympathy and practice
power in the nation. The war between the Soviet forces and the Mujahideen went
through several phases and from1987 the Soviet Union showed commitment to the
UN-sponsored peace negotiations that had been going on throughout the war involving
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nations like Pakistan, the USA and the Afghan government barring the Mujahideen
parties. The Afghan Interim Government was however formed with the alliance of the
Seven Party group days before the Soviet withdrawal. The government’s capacity to
stay in power was in large part due to the backing by the Soviet Union; this enabled to
defend the urban population with reasonable level of income. The rural population was
also taken care of, and the nation however witnessed subsequent growing
fragmentation within the ranks of Mujahideen. The unity which the Mujahidin
displayed during the Soviet occupation soon took a toll on the common man and led to
the subsequent departure of Soviet troops. As it is said in the Taliban, Localized
fighting erupted between members of one Mujahidin group and another, pitting village
against village, neighbor against neighbor and brother against brother. (35-36) The
Mujahideen parties actively discouraged refugees from returning from camps until an
Islamist government was established and that it would be in their interest to strengthen
their power base in the country. The fighting for power by the religious leaders of
Mujahideen also led to corrupt practices disrupting the beliefs of the common man.
The Taliban: It is believed that the Taliban began as a small spontaneous group in
Kandahar in the early 1994, consisting of religious students who felt outrage at the
devastating attempts of the religious leaders of the Mujahideen. This group evolved as
a colossal force soon with much backing from Pakistan, the USA and Saudi Arabia.
There is much debate as to whether the movement is a Pashtun one with an intention to
reassert the Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan that existed before the war and was
challenged by the Tajik leadership. The Taliban professed Sunni Islam and was not
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receptive of the Shia’s or the Ismailis. The movement’s dictum is heavily based on the
commitment of its soldiers and strong resistance from liberal, urban and western
values. Initially, the focus was to eradicate corruption and to create a society that
accorded with Islam; their role in strengthening of the administrative structure was
however secondary. They set certain rules or rather code of dress and conduct for men
and women and issued decrees. They substantiated that men wear turbans, have beards,
short hair and wear shalwar kameez; women were forced to wear the burqa, a garment
that covers the entire body including the face. It was also imposed that men pray five
times a day and it was the responsibility of women to involve themselves in house-hold
responsibilities and raise their progeny, hence they were prohibited from working
outside. The education for girls would have to wait until an appropriate Islamic
curriculum was designed by religious scholars. Ban on music, entertainment of any
kind, games, television and tapes was also enforced. Soon the Taliban attained great
prominence having captured almost half of Afghanistan. There was a virtual stalemate
between the forces of the Taliban and those of the government, especially in relation to
the Taliban’s attempt to capture Kabul. Not only this, the Taliban also enforced decrees
using the military because culturally and linguistically the Persian-speaking Heratis
were different from Pushtun and rural Taliban. There was strong resistance from places
like Kabul and Herat where female access to education had been provided as a right.
And later, with the intrusion of the Humanitarian agencies it was possible to secure
authority for women to work in health sectors in places like Kandahar and Herat,
although, they did not make any modifications on ban on girl child education.
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The Taliban’s gruesome dictate led many of the elite professionals and those working
in the government agencies to leave the country. There was obvious slowdown in job
opportunities in the various sectors and people started searching to relocate themselves
in the neighboring countries. The country was also wrought with continuous fights of
the Taliban with the other religious ethnic groups for the sake of establishing power.
Young people were reported to be making their way to Pakistan, Iran or beyond to
escape forced recruitments within Afghanistan by the Taliban. They were also accused
by opposition forces of relying heavily on Pakistani volunteers and from other parts of
the world. Their approach to enforce law and order through adaptation of Islam was
much punitive although they gained popularity in the initial years of their coming to
power.
It is discerned that the Western world has been judgmental in its images of the Islamic
world as ‘Islamic Fundamentalists’. In talking about the Taliban there is a tendency to
make hackneyed statements to emphasize these stereotypes. As Peter Marsden says:
The Western vision of Islam is firmly anchored in the crusades, with images of
holy warriors, fired with the passion of mart yrs, storming the battlements of
some crusade castle. Within the Western psyche there appears to be an almost
paranoid fear of Islam as something wild, mindless and potentially
overwhelming. (Marsden, 57)
Ethnic conflicts that occurred due to clashes in civilizations have been shifted to
clashes occuring due to changes in religious ideologies. It cannot be denied that this
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ethnic group embarked on a journey of holy warriors with an onward march willing to
martyr themselves for the cause. However, their extreme oppressive ways towards
women by enforcing stringent and inhumanistic decrees proved detrimental for their
attempts to coerce all regions of Afghanistan under their terrain. Still, it emerged as a
spectacular movement in response to the dissatisfaction with the status quo of existing
society. A set of principles were identified to guide followers and proclaim their modus
operandi also to the world. Within such a movement, there were adaptations of Islam
and ways of putting the belief system to an imperfect world remained in a state of flux.
While Reformation in Europe was a result of growing corruption and opulence of the
Catholic Church, the puritanical Protestant movement rose as a response to the
unprincipled behavior. When the Soviet-backed government fell in April 1992, there
were great hopes that a broad-based Islamic government would be established and
hence peace be restored after 14 years of struggle and conflict. Hence, the aim of the
Taliban was purification of Afghanistan. This was confirmed by Taliban Liason Office
in Kandahar, which quoted Mullah Omar that his main goal was to rid Afghanistan of
‘corrupt, Western-oriented time-servers’ (61). The major fear of the religious leaders in
the Islamic world has been that societies to which they belonged would soon lose their
religious beliefs and the waves of secularism would overtake them. And ever since the
West started to play havoc on the world stage, both the religious and intellectuals felt
that religion would be in a dubious state and therefore they looked for ways and means
to modify Islam to adapt to new circumstances to justify the revival of religion:
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Some have advocated that Islam should seek to incorporate what was seen to be
best from western society while retaining those aspects of Islam that were felt
to be superior to what the West had to offer. Others have felt that Islam should
be modernized and adapted to the new circumstances in which it found itself, in
order to strengthen it vis-à-vis the West. Yet others have rejected any kind of
accommodation with Western values and have sought to return to the key
elements of Islam, at the same time removing all vestiges of Western influence.
(Smith, 59)
These movements, diverse as they are, yield intended as well as unintended
consequences which reflect social transformation and change. The enormity of
changes has been staggering, though uneven, affecting the social, economic,
demographic sphere. Political norms get violated and politics of survival becomes an a
priori in the movement.
Ethnic Political Movements and the Plural Society Approach Theory: The growing
fragmentation of multi-ethnic societies all over the globe and that it being
accommodated under the umbrella of modernization led to the assimilation of theories
in the 1970s that offered ideas regarding the different ways in which ethnic groups
could be politically incorporated and assimilated in a multi-ethnic state so as to create a
stable and democratic polity. British economist J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith
proposed the plural society approach theory where they expounded that multi-ethnic
states cannot remain stable and democratic. As the inter-group relations remain
confined to competition, these states fail to develop a sense of common political
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identity and loyalty that could keep astray the cultural and ethnic differences between
them. Furnivall proposes that the only way the plural societies could be held together is
through force, and colonialism truly justifies it. M. G. Smith expanded the plural
society approach and suggests ways in which the different ethnic groups could be
incorporated into multi-ethnic states, although, he expresses his doubt about the
stability and durability of such states. First, he proposes that members of different
ethnic groups could be ‘uniformly’ incorporated as equal citizens with equal civil and
political rights irrespective of their ethnic affiliation; an approach that might lead to the
creation of political nation-state. Smith proposes a second approach where different
ethnic groups could be ‘equivalently’ incorporated with equal or complementary public
rights and status thereby creating a consociational democratic polity. Although, the
model has its shortcomings, the components of consociation are unequal in numbers,
territory, and economic potential. Lastly, his proposal of incorporating the ethnic
groups ‘differentially’ in which the dominant ethnic group exercises power and
maintains its superior position by excluding other groups from power. The theory
however raised doubt on the stance that differential incorporation would lead to
dominant-subordinate relations among ethnic groups.
Arend Lijphart in his seminal works Democracy in Plural Societies: A
Comparitive Exploration and Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus
Government in Twenty-One Countries, provided a consociational mosaic where a
stable and multi-ethnic state is possible. His framework was built on the stance of
creating a consociational polity with elite cooperation in the formation of a coalition
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government where representation for the minority in the upper chamber of the
parliament is made, proportional representation of different ethnic groups in multiple
political parties, non-territorial federalism and decentralization of power, a high degree
of autonomy for each ethnic state and the creation of a written constitution with
elaborate and difficult procedures for amendments. The above model stated by Lijphart
has produced relatively stable multi-ethnic democratic states in places such as
Switzerland and Holland and to a lesser degree in India and Canada and the ethnic
conflict and outbreak is very obvious in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. In
‘Conflict regulation in Divided Societies’ Eric Nordinger sounded skeptical about the
lucrative impact of cross-cutting ties between ethnic groups or geographical isolation
of ethnic groups with the cooperation of the elite. He argues that an individual’s
cultural identity is more predominant than cross-cultural ties. Moreover, geographical
isolation of ethnic groups, instead of promoting elite and group cooperation may lead
to more differences thereby increasing sentiments for autonomy or separation.
Donaatesld Rothchild, an African political specialist and an exponent of the
hegemonic exchange approach found that most African governments could impose a
limited amount of hegemony on ethnic groups within their borders as they lacked the
required coercive capability and political legitimacy. The governments of these states
had to engage in a process of ‘exchange’ with the other ethnic groups with a view to
protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation. This resulted in a system
where the national governments of many African states were holding a hegemonic
coalition of representatives belonging to various ethnic groups. In such a system,
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tradeoffs and bargaining are possible and ethnic violence can be ended by changes in
policies of allocation of power. The role of the state in such a set-up is therefore of a
mediator and facilitator for a viable democracy and stability. However, associational
living and cohesion can still be at stake by the emergence of new counter-elites who
cannot be incorporated into the system or at times by the emergence of new group
demands which cannot be accommodated. Therefore, it can be said that the models of
consociational democracy and the hegemonic-exchange do not ensure political stability
in multi-ethnic states.
Moreover, ethnic groups are likely to engage in political movements when their
expectations are not met by the state i.e. they receive less than they feel they deserve.
This deprivation in which they find themselves that is inequitable and unfair leads to
mass political movement and revolt. Such a relative deprivation helps to explain the
political mobilization of not only economically under-privileged but also of
economically prosperous groups such as the Muslims in India or the Tamils in Sri
Lanka. This resource competition perspective paves way for intense elite interaction
and competition behind politicization of ethnicity. States such as Afghanistan, India,
Ukraine, South Africa, Nigeria have manipulative, power-seeking regional leaders who
exploit their power and take advantage of the communal spirit for their own selfish
ends. As Urmila Phadnis says:
Ethnic politics and nationalist politics are different from each other in one
important aspect; while the objective of nationalist politics is national self-
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determination; ethnic politics is primarily concerned with protecting the rights
of group members within existing state structure (Phadnis, 63).
In Minorities at Risk, Ted Gurr has provided a detailed account of the various types of
ethnic political movements active in the world. According to him, a politically salient
communal group is one which either collectively suffers or benefits from systematic
discrimination of other groups in a state and works towards political mobilization and
action to either defend or promote its self-defined interests. He has subdivided
politicized communal groups into two other groups i.e. national and minority peoples.
Nationalist peoples refer to regionally concentrated groups that have lost their
autonomy to expansionist states but preserve their cultural and linguistic
distinctiveness and want to protect or establish some degree of politically separate
existence. The Indian example proves best in this context where several ethnic groups
within states want autonomy and the struggle with the larger political system continues.
Minority people on the other hand have a better defined socioeconomic status within a
larger society based on their origin, immigration, economic roles and religion. Their
premise is particularly to protect or improve their status demanding or proclaiming
greater access or control of the state. We can say that Afghanistan and its people have
struggled between ethnic and nationalist politics where each had its own obscure
agenda and thereby making it detrimental to reach consensus or profess common
motives for democracy and stability to prevail.
Ethnic conflict according to Gurr can also be distinguished between inter-
groups differentials and outright discrimination. Traits such as cultural, political and
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economic differentials reflect the inter-group differentials. Cultural differentials
include nationality or ethnicity, language, religion, customs, origin, rural or urban
residence. Political differentials are talked in terms of communal groups varying in
access to positions of power, access to civil service, recruitment to military and police
service, political association rights, voting rights and legal rights. Economic
inequalities reflect differentials in income, land and other property, positions in high
office, professions and business. His study further reveals that economic and political
differentials have been deliberately created and reinforced by social practice and public
policy; more by the elites who find it easier to give the disadvantaged groups political
rights and some access to power than to reduce the economic inequalities. History has
shown that contemporary ethnic political movements display a general lack of
congruence between a group’s political and economic status in society and its demand
for separation. Moreover, cultural differences had a greater impact on economic
differentials and discrimination compared to political disadvantages. It is however
logical to understand that if the disadvantaged groups have been victims of deliberate
discrimination and if the groups have mobilized in self-defense but failed to obtain
their legitimate stance in the society, secessionist claims would certainly be made.
Ethnic Political Insurgents: Ethnic insurgency has been in the agenda of human
history for several reasons vis-à-vis seek natural and human resource and power
establishment. The ethnic insurgents undertake international diplomatic activity to
invite external support and sympathizers across nations. As Urmila Phadnis observes:
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Once they emerge, ethnic political movements are prone to get entrenched,
thereby engaging the state in a war of attrition. For an ethnic political
movement to be entrenched, it needs to be durable, visible and audible. The
first aim-maintaining physical durability—refers to the desire of the ethnic
nationalists to exist as a group and as a political movement, especially in the
face of oppression and repression by the state. Durability comes from the
movement’s ability to attract external material support (bases, training,
finances, weapons, soldiers, intelligence, etc.). Additionally, to survive state
oppression and achieve success as a political movement, ethnic insurgents need
to be visible (to be seen) and audible (to be heard) internationally in order to
attract external allies and sympathizers. (Phadnis, 55)
This kind of a political activity mobilized by the ethnic insurgents can be at individual,
group and state levels. At the individual level, it begins with lobbying, mostly
influential foreign politicians, intellectuals, religious figures, prominent leaders and at
times media persons to facilitate their motive and act as spokespersons. At the group
level, it may be the neighboring people who would be able to provide with military,
financial, training facilities and also moral support. Ethnic Diasporas could also be
roped in under this category. Apart from these neighboring kin states who profess
similar struggle or ideologies may also be approached. At the state level, the ethnic
insurgents approach the states that support the central government and request them to
withdraw their support. States which have been in support of similar activities in the
current or past situations are also likely to be approached by the ethnic insurgents.
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Superpowers and former colonial powers also could be another category of states that
may be asked for support either for making it take stance in the global agenda or to
resolve the conflict.
Not just this, IGOs (Inter-governmental organizations) and INGOs (International non-
governmental organizations) are approached by the insurgents with a view to seek
support from a wider audience across nations and attain legitimacy to their movement.
These ethnic insurgents at times make their movement visible and audible by resorting
to terrorist methods to make their cause global and attract media. They resort to
violence when outside states impose solutions on them. And when we consider the case
of Afghanistan, violence began with a resistance movement against the colonial rule
and slowly took shape of strategic politicization of the movement, leaving astray its
agenda.
Theories of Primordialism, Constructivism and Instrumentalism
Having discussed the reasons for ethnic conflicts in terms of the political aims
driven by the leaders, the discourse becomes central to the theories of Primordialism,
Instrumentalism and Constructivism. Instrumentalism is based on the notion that ethnic
conflict is driven by the greed and grievance of the political leaders, or the active
manipulation of claiming ethnic identity. And particularly with Afghanistan this theory
perfectly fits into the subsequent ethnic framework of the society that has nurtured
extremist ethnic identities. The Taliban, the Mujahideen squarely justify their motives to
gain political control for political gains. The theory of Constructivism argues that ethnic
conflict is a product of historical processes over a period of time, resulting in divergent
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ethnic identities and hostility between them. The aggressive motives of the ethnic groups
that have formed as a result of hostility towards the ethnic foreign insurgency and its
ideologies accommodate the constructivist theory. It enables to understand that the
groups have been formed to bring about a social change and ascertain their stand in the
society. Both the above theories accommodate the motives of the extremist ethnic groups
and their agenda of promoting their ideology of restoring the tenets of Islam.
Primordialism argues that ethnic conflict stems from ancient hatreds between ethnic
groups—Pashtuns and Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks and so on—the Sunni sect however
being at the dominant side. The differences can be accounted to religious, racial or
regional connections. The notion of Primordialism and its relation to ethnic conflict
largely originates from the writings of Clifford Geertz. He outlines the concept of
Primordialism in his book The Interpretation of Cultures where he states:
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ – or more
precisely, as a culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed
‘givens’ of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly,
but beyond them the given-ness that stems from being borninto a particular
religious community, speaking a particular language... and following
particular practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on are
seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of
themselves. One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow
believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection,
practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great
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part by virtue of someunaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie
itself. (Geertz, Clifford 259-260)
This theory has been disregarded by most theorists for the reason that Primordialism
has included simplifying complex situations, and its suggestions of ethnic conflict
being natural and to be expected. As Fenton in his critique of Primordialism observes
these divisions as natural, culturally and socially moulded, being grounded in place,
language and shared historic experience. Ethnoconsciousness amongst the different
ethnic groups in Afghanistan prior to the ethnic foreign intervention can be said purely
civilizational and cultural.
South Asian States: Ethnicity at a Glance
South Asian States have been in a constant state of flux, and if we were to look
for common denominators, it is to discern the pattern of the political framework,
conflicting objectives of economic growth and the social status. Several hundred ethnic
groups live in an area stretching from Afghanistan in the west to Bangladesh in the
east. Although the state has relative autonomy with regard to the society, it is very
glaring that it embodies and reflects the values of dominant social strata from which
most of its proactive members function. In view of the common interests of the state
elite and the power elite in South Asia, and also their intention to identify one another
to act in concert, plurality and heterogeneity seems to underlie the dynamics of socio-
economic structure. These varied patterns have also led to the politicization of mass
movements; whatever may be the crux of the conflicts. However, an appraisal of the
similarities and dissimilarities of South Asian states’ ethnicity directs the study in the
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light of 1. The historical context for the formation of South Asian States, 2. Socio-
economic objectives, 3. The constitutional framework, 4. Political structure, 5.
Religious objectives, 6. Policies for coping with the ethnic demands.
The political boundaries of these states have been relatively recent;
commonalities in socio-political and economic spheres can be discerned in the region
prior to the western colonialism. The civil societies in the region prior to colonialism
were characterized by a relatively common pattern of tribal and feudal social
formations. It is to note that all the world’s great religions have substantial followings
in South Asia with Hinduism predominant in India and Nepal; Islam in Afghanistan,
Bangladesh and Pakistan; and Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Bhutan. Ethnicity and
language have consistently proved more powerful a factor than religion in the politics
of South Asia over the past six decades. This was very apparently demonstrated when
the overwhelmingly Muslim Bengali-speaking population of East Pakistan revolted in
1971 against a military dictatorship believed to represent the interests of the equally
Muslim Punjabis, the predominant ethnic group in the western half of the country. And
the Muslim majority state of Bangladesh emerged on the subcontinent in 1971, and its
new constitution specified that the Bengali language is a key element of what it is to be
Bangladeshi.
The impact of colonialism in the South Asian States shall be viewed from the light of
its duration, intensity and scope. Although different schools of thought have allowed
their rhetoric to soar discussing the impact of British colonialism, there is a consensus
on the unevenness of its penetration. Apart from this, the unintended consequences
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should also be considered that contrived a great deal in the social, economic and
political structures of not just the colonies they invaded but also a spill-over effect in
the neighbouring states.
Ethnicity in Pakistan: Pakistan has remained overwhelmingly Muslim, but has
ironically remained diverse in its ethnicity. About 98% of languages spoken in Pakistan
are Indo-Iranian, a branch of Indo-European family of languages. The major ethnic
groups of Pakistan in numerical size include Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Saraikis,
Muhajirs, Balochis, Hindkowans, Chitralis and other smaller groups. Pakistan has five
provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and Gilgit-Baltistan.
Language has been an important variable in ethnic group identification in Pakistan.
Each province consists of more than one language and many dialects. Punjabi is the
largest speaking language of Pakistan with 44.15% of total population speaking the
language, the second mostly spoken language is Sindh. Pashto is spoken in Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa. There are also other languages spoken in this region as different
emperors and rulers stayed here for years. These include, Chitrali, Kohistani, and
Hindko. In Baluchistan province, mostly Baluchi is spoken, however in some parts of
Baluchistan Pashto is also spoken. However, there are other ethnic groups such as the
Marris, Bugtis, Bizenjos and Mengals within the Baluchis and the Yusufzais,
Mohammadans, Khattaks among the Pathans. In a country like Pakistan, where
economical and political instability prevails, ethnic differences augment the disparities
of societal living. History concurs with this notion as economical and military
disparities and language controversy lead to a war in 1971 between East and West
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Pakistan. It resulted in separation of East Pakistan which became Bangladesh. The
military took serious measures at the rapid deterioration of law and order in the nation
occurring due to ethnic differences. The nation came to acquire international acclaim
due to it being a conduit for promoting religious ethnic conflicts across neighbouring
countries.
The Case of Bangladesh: Contrary to Pakistan, Bangladesh is noted for the ethnic
homogeneity of its population. Over 98 percent of the people are Bengalis;
predominantly Bangla-speaking, 86 percent being Bengali Muslim and the rest Bengali
Hindus. People speaking Arabic, Persian, and Turkic languages also have contributed
to the ethnic characteristics of the region. The four largest tribes here are the Chakmas,
Marmas (or Maghs), Tipperas (or Tipras), and Mros (or Moorangs). (internet) The
tribes tend to intermingle and can be distinguished from one another more by
differences in their dialect, dress, and customs than by tribal cohesion. Only the
Chakmas and Marmas display formal tribal organization, although all groups contain
distinct clans. By far the largest tribe, the Chakmas are of mixed origin but reflect more
Bengali influence than any other tribe. Unlike the other tribes, the Chakmas and
Marmas generally live in the highland valleys. Most Chakmas and Marmas are
Buddhists, but some practice Hinduism. The Mros are considered to be the original
inhabitants of the Chittagong hill tracts, while a few have been presumed to be
migrated from India and Burma.
The Case of Maldives: The plethora of migrations stretched over 2000 years from
India, Sri Lanka, Arabia and Africa paved way for the presence of ethnic groups in
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Maldives. Yet, the mass conversion of its population to Islam about eight centuries
ago, its common language called Dhivehi derived from Elu ( an old form of Sinhala
during the medieval period) have given a cultural homogeneity to the people here (75).
However, the contemporary homogeneous mixture of Sinhalese, Dravidian, Arab,
Australasian, and African ethnicity in Maldives results from historical changes in
regional hegemony over marine trade routes. It is said that an early Dravidian-speaking
substratum of population from Kerala in India had settled in the islands leaving its
legacy in the language and place-names. This group was subsequently displaced by
Dhivehi-speakers who arrived from Sri Lanka and whose language became the official
one. Arabs were the last group to arrive beginning in the ninth century. The only
distinct ethnic minority is found in Male among the trading community of Indians, who
settled there in the 1800s. Several hundred in number, they are also a religious
minority, belonging to the Shia branch of Islam.
Bhutan: The geophysical features and the socio-political twists and turns in Bhutan’s
neighbourhood have been the two factors contributing for its multi-ethnic structure.
The society has emerged as a conglomerate of various ethnic groups identifiable
region-wise. The population in the great Himalayan valley in the west, of Tibetan
origin migrated to Bhutan in the ninth century and lately in 1959-60 consequent to the
Mahayana Buddhist influence. They are called the Ngalop group and speak the
Dzonkha language. The Sharchop ( means easterner), the second largest ethnic group,
an Indo-Mongoloid people, thought to have migrated from Assam or possibly Burma
during the past millennium comprise most of the population of eastern Bhutan. The
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Sharchop have been largely assimilated into the Tibetan-Ngalop culture and because of
their proximity to India some speak Assamese or Hindi. The third group consists of
small aboriginal tribal people living in scattered villages throughout Bhutan. Culturally
and linguistically part of the population of West Bengal or Assam embrace the Hindu
system of endogamous groups. They include the Drokpa, Lepcha, and Doya tribes as
well as the descendants of slaves who were brought from similar tribal areas in India.
Together, the Ngalop, Sharchop, and tribal groups were thought to constitute up to 72
percent of the population.
The remaining 28 percent of the population are of Nepalese origin. They were
estimated to constitute a majority in southern Bhutan. These small groups of Nepalese,
emigrated primarily from eastern Nepal under Indian auspices in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Mostly Hindus, the Nepalese settled in the southern
foothills and are sometimes referred to as southern Bhutanese.
Nepal: In Nepal, the discourse on ethnicity has been interpreted on the lines of its
conceptual framework, conflicting views on majority and minority status and
interpretation of caste-ethnic relations. Nepal witnessess great ethnic diversity as
studied by many anthropologists. A few of the anthropologists have made the ethnic
groupings reflective of the tribal groups. And in the census and government
publications, ethnic group figures are provided for linguistic, religious groups, race and
descent population. However, the variables mentioned above can be considered as
broad categories for the enumeration of ethnic groups in Nepal. On the basis of race or
descent, the Nepalese people can be categorized into ‘Mongoloid’ or ‘Tibeto-Burman’,
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‘Indo-Aryan’ and ‘Austro-Asiatic’, barring intermingling of racial groups. When
religion is considered, a confluence of Hindu, Buddhist and non-Hindu religious
practices and beliefs among ethnic groups like Newars, Magars, Tamangs and Gurungs
is evident. To study ethnicity under the broad category of language is also problematic
as most of the ethnic groups do not have their own script and literature, a large number
of them being bilingual. Thus language cannot be considered in total isolation from
other objective attributes in group identification. The non-Tarai Hindus are the largest
comprising almost half the population, the Tarai Hindus accounting for one-fourth. The
ethnic groups categorized are Chhettri, Brahman-Hill, Magar, Tharu, Tamang, Newar,
Muslim, Kami, Yadav and other unspecified groups. It is to note that the Tarai Hindus
speak Hindi or its dialects like the Maithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi. The non-Tarai
Hindus speak Nepali.
India: Divergent variables to be considered in the identification of ethnic groups loom
large in the study of the Indian context. In a vast country like India, the mapping of
ethnic groups and communities has to reckon with two pertinent facts, its long drawn
civilizational thrust underlying unity on the one hand and recognition of diversities on
the other. As regards the former, in the realm of Vedantic philosophy, it is epitomized
by the lofty ideal of the many paths for the realization of ‘self’ being many. The
Brahminical stratum of the society that stands the highest in the hierarchy of the caste
system in India provided a structural framework to maintain and sustain the caste
heterogeneity. The meaning and interpretations of such experiences as put forth to the
society gives an insight of the societal division. Territorialisation of Hinduism
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appeared in the formation of the state systems and proclamation of distinctive cultural
heritage of the core ethnic community seemed another variable. However, if language
has to be considered a factor for ethnic consciousness, the argument seems to be in
dubious shape as there are too many linguistic groups and to regard linguistic states as
minorities would validate the omission by several authors as they are the formal units
of government, and not all members of a particular linguistic group reside there.
Weiner in his joint studies with Katzenstein say that what constitutes an ethnic group in
multi-ethnic societies remains as unclear in India as in other multi-ethnic societies
where ethnicity itself remains in a state of flux. Therefore, considering the various
cultural markers vis-à-vis race, religion, tribe, language we can view ethnic groups as
encompassing many disparities. If the tribes have to be considered, the north-eastern
region has many tribes like the Naga, Mezo or Meiti community. If language is
considered, Tamil, Malyalam, Bengali, Assamese etc fall under the category. If
religious groups are taken for ethnic consciousness then Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and
Parsees can be considered.
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