CHAPTER - I

INDIAN OCEAN THHOUGH THE PASSAGE OF THIE ~PACE RELI\TIONSHIP_li.ND_~EOJ?_Q]:,ITIC}\i-}:;RAf!E 1:JO:~K

The Indian Ocean~ like the Antarctic Ocean, is not

bounded by any major global power, although the potential

regional powers do border it. No regional power has been able

to exercise exclusive domain over its waters in the so far

knmvn-records. The vast majority of the Indian Ocean littoral

countries attained their independence from the colonial European

empires only after the end of the Second World War. .fv'Tost of

these countries were either colonies, trust territories or

protectorates under the British Empire, v.'hich controlled the

political, military and economic activities in this region till

recently. Soon after the war Indonesia declared their indepen-

dence which was crushed and delayed by the Dutch with the help

of the dominant maritime power, Great Britain, but it was finally

and formally granted in 1949o The Indian Sub-continent was

divided into India and Pakistan and given independence by Great

Britain in August 1947. So were Burma and Sri Lanka in 1948.

On the African littoral independence dawned with Sudan

in 1955, followed by Somalia in 1960, Tanganyika in 1961 and

Uganda in 1~62 and Kenya and Zanzibar in 1963, Zambia in 1964;

Lesotha and Botswana in 1966, and Swaziland in 1968. The French

colony of Madagascar "Vras granted independence in 1960o Hauri tius

Singapore, Malaysia, Aden also got their independence from Great

Britain in 1960s. Portugal granted independence to its colonies

in early sixties and seventies. Thailand, Ethiopia were annexed

by the Axis powers but regained control soon after the war.

Among other traditionally independent states were Yemen, Kuwait,

Muscat and Oman, but only in nameQ

The ovenihelrning majority of the littoral countries are

having republican and parliamentary system and there are few

constitutional monarchies, theocracies and self-proclaimed

scientific socialist countries also.

Even this day there are quite a few colonial vestiges

waiting and aspiring for independence but pitted against stra_

tegic moves of big powers. Their relative strategic and scatterec

locations and sparse populations are the heavy odds.

The economic, political and geopolitical anolysis of

the Indian Ocean region reveals an unparalleled and hetero-

genous nature of a community faced with various problems in

intra-regional and international politics. The relative depen­

denceof these countries on the non-littoral big powers for

capital~ technological know-how and technology transfer and

manufactured (soft as well as hard-ware) goods is a very

important factor influencing their external behaviour and

retarding their economic and political well-beingo

The spatial relationship of the Indian Ocean is well

demarcated by the three continents of Asia, Africa and Australia

and a chain of islands and archipelagos and the straits and

approaches connecting this smallest of the three big Oceans

to other water bodies. The relative location of the Indian

Ocean in the geopolitical thinking has great significance in

any spatial calculation. In the Heartland Theory of Mackinder,

the Indian Ocean occupies a significant place in the outer or

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Insular Crescent just do~m south of the Inner or Marginal

Crescent surrounding the Pivot Area. 1 The fortress of Heart:_and

is located on the solid base of the Eurasian landmass. Here

the Indian Ocean occupies a very important place in the debate

over the controversial superiority of land power or that of

maritime power as it directly downward south of the Rimland

surrounding Heartland concept of Spykman in contrast to the

ideas of Mackinder. 2 In this age of technological advancement

both the concepts of Heartland and Rimland have undergone

overwhelming chan~e with the blue waters and the blue skies

gaining ever increasing importance in strategic focus, and there

are few indeed who will dare to survey the \vorld scene with

the majestic sweep of a Mackinder or the holistic view of a

Herbertson., 3

The earliest sea voyages of the Polynesians, for example,

or of the Indians, are shrouded by the veil of prehistoric

events. Only occasionally do archaeological discoveries or

place names establish an earlier connection between civili-

zations which could only have been made by crossing over the

blue waters. For instance, the name of the island of Socotra

in the Gulf of Aden, still bears the roots of its original

Sanskrit name, Dvipa SukhataTa. Socotra was established as an

Indian colony around 3000 B.Co and lasted until the late Roman

1. See Mackinder, H.J., Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Constable & Co.), 1919.

2. See Spykman, H.J., The Geo~raphy of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 194 ).

3. House, John w., The GeograEher in a Turbulent Age(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 12.

5 . d 4 perlo •

Although in the writings of Mackinder greatest importance '!'*

was attached to the Heartland but after the Vlorld War II it is

the United States which has become the most powerful giant on

the globe.. The dynamics of spatial relationship has seen the

factors of accessibility , mobility and strategic distance

transforming with the passage of time marked with the technology

impact on logistics, accoustics and weapons systems. Mahan,

who devoted attention to offshoot campaigns in the Indian

Ocean also described Russia as a 11 vast uninterrupted mass" '

whose "centre cannot be broken 11 5 and regarded the Indicm Ocean

as the Ocean of the 21st century. But it is, in any event,

probably safe to say th::lt no over-simplified theory of the

historical process can be a trustworthy basis for predicting

the unpredictable. 6 In the strict terms of the dynamics of

spatial relationship the Atlantic, Indian and Arctic Oceans

are surrounded by trailing edges of continents movine; away

from them. 7

The existing information on the early and ancient phase

of the history of the Indian Ocean is most unreliable due to the

4.

5.

6.

7.

Neumann, Gerbard & Pierson, W.J. Jr., Principles of Physical Oceanography (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1968 ), p. 2.

Mahan, A.T., The Problem of Asia (Boston, M.A., Little Brown Co., 1900), pp 24 & 26.

Potter, E~B., Sea Power: A Naval Histocr} (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 196~, p. 490.

Harry Hess of the Princeton University quoted by Behrman, Daniel, The New World of the Oceans (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1969), p. 209.

. 6

lack of evidence and proof pertaining to maritime explorations

apd adventures. According to Panikkar, partly perhaps as a

result of the monsoons, and partly as a result of the earlier

growth of civilization, the Indian Ocean was undoubtedly the

first centre of oceanic activity. The first naval and oceanic

tradition in fact grew up in the lands washed by the Arabian

sea. 8 According-to the Palermo Stone records, the Egyptian

Pharaoh Sahure of the Fifth Dynasty sent an expedition to Punt

(Somalia) which brought back 8,000 measures of myrrh, 6,000 •

units of gold and 2,600 staves of ebony.9

Pharaoh Pepi I of the Sixth Dynasty wa3 probably th~

first Egyptian King to send troops in nearby littoral countries

of the Indian Ocean to suppress the Bedouins. But the ancient

Egyptian, Sumerian and the Indus Valley civilizations were

continental in character and at the most they could think of

was the river navigation. It were the Egyptians who first

thought of joining the waters of the Red and Mediterranean Seas

through a canal; although the first non-littoral people to sail 1 into the Indian Ocean were the Phoenicians who covered the

shores of Europe , Asia and Africa for trade and cor.nnercial

purposes for more than two millenia, and assisted the Jews and

Assyrians in building and manning their war-fleets in the

northern India Ocean. 10 The Assyrian Kings Sennacherib (704-631-

B.C.) and Ashurbanipal (688-626 B.C.) ruled their far-flQ~g

----·-----8.

9.

}1 o.

Panikkar, K.M., India and the Indian_Ocean (Bombay:Geor~e Allen&Unwin,19?1), p. 2~. Iskandar, Zaky and Badawy, Alexander, Brief History of Ancient EgJEt (Cairo: . 19t>5),p.44. See Toussaint, Anguste, L'Histoire de 1' Ocean (Paris:Presses Univ. de France,l~J,

empire which was later overrun by the Persians, who took a

great interest both in land and maritime campaiens. They ~"

fought against the Hellenist world in the latter's islands and

the defeat of the Persians and Salamis revealed the Persian

warfare tActics. The Greeks probably learnt first tactical

lessons from the Orient. 11 The Hellenist period in this

region began with the defeat of the Persians at the hands o~

Alexander the Great in 331 B.c. 12 The maritime achievements

of Indians were very remarkable at this juncture of time as

India seems to have been the first Indian Ocean littoral country

to possess real battlefleets. The Iviaurya Emperor Chandragupta

(321-297 B.C.) had even during that period an actual Board

of Admiralty, with a Superintendent of ships at its head. 13

Egypt was at the vE'ry height of its power ·when Philopator came

to the throne. He found himself master of Ethiopia, Cyrene,

Phoenicia, Coele-Syria, part of upper Syria, Cyprus, Rhodes,

and the cities along the coast of Asia minor from Pamphilia to

Lysimachia, and the cities of Aenos and TvJaroned in Thrace. So

Egypt was the greatest naval power in the world, having the

command of the sea and the whole of the coast at the eastern

14 end of the Iviediterranean.

11 •

12.

13.

14.

11 Grand Larousse Encyclopedique"t Vol. 10, Tactique (Paris: Larousse, 1964).

McDowell, Carl E.~ and Gibbs, Helen M., Ocean Trans­portation(New York, 1954).

Toussaint, Auguste, Histor~ of t0e Indian Ocean (Tr. by June Guicharnand), (Lon on: Routledge & Kegar. Paul, (1966), p .. 72.

Rappoport, s., Risto~ of E~1 Vol. I, (London: Th~ Grolier Society PubllshGrs,~4), p. 178.

8

Again, except Ptolemy Philadelphes' futile effort to

reopen the canal linking the Mile to the R.ed Sea near the

tovm of Arsinoe, no great Egyptian maritime activities were

heard ofp About the maritim~ activittes of the Arabs, the

noted historian Hourani writes that in view of the flourishi:'1g

condition of the Minaeans and Sabaeans in the first milleniwn,

and in the light of what can be learnt of their nautical

activity in Hellenistic times, it is a sound conjecture that

Arabs were playing some parts in the sea-faring life of their

times for many centuries before Alexander the Great. 15 '

The Roman conquest of Dgypt (30 B.C.) only gave a new

stimulus to direct maritime relations with India, and it is

really at this point that we enter into the era of the great

. l d"t• 16 c ommerc la_. expe l l ons. The Roman striving for military

ascendancy and political hegemony was to encourage and develop

their ovm maritime trade by weakening the seafarinp, people

of Southern Arabia and help their rivals to establish the

Axumite kingdom in Ethiopia Rome's trade with India and the

states of sou·theast Asia ended with the ascendancy of Byzantine

in Egypt in 395 A.D., This was also the renaissance of the

Persian power under the Sassanids, who drove out the Axumites

from Arabia in 570 A.D. With the decline of the Byzantine and

the advent of Islam the militant Arab mobility increased like

lightening and the enterprising Arab traders penetrated lnto tt.e

coastal areas of East Africa and other islands in the Indian Ocean.

15.

16.

Hourani, G.T., Arab Seafari~g ip the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Time (Princeton: 1951),p.II.

Toussaint, op.cit., p. 34.

9

In the eastern region of the Indian Ocean the maritime

affairs and activity flourished durinz; the ~~Iauryan era. As '~'.

Coedes has remarked that after hnving been, at about the

bcginninr of the Christian era, the country of gold to'.vard

which the Hindu navigators steered th~ir course, Into-China

and more especially the Malay Archipelago became for the Arabs

and the Europeans, a few centuries later, the country of

spices, camphor, and aromatic woods, before establishing itself,

as it has recently done, as one of the most import8nt producer

of rubber, tin and oil. Furthermore, the position of the

Peninsula and Sunda Islands makes them an obligatory point of

call for navigators making their way from the ~est m1d fro~

IncHa, to China, and vice-versa; whence thr~ir importance for

maritime trade. 17

In the Medieval Ages the Arab dominance was over the

Arabian Peninsula, the East Africa and the islands and

archipelagos of the Indian Ocean, but the concept of thalasso­

cracy was non-existent in this part of the world until the

European ascendancy by 16th century. The Arab dominance under

the Caliphate was at the peak of its glory during the 13th

century, spread over a vast expanse conquered by the Arab

rulers. Under its influence and control were the courtries

on the East African littoral and the islands of the Indian

Ocean including the Majapahit Empire in the East Indies. During

the Ming rule China became very active in maritime spt~e:::-·e and

sent important naval expeditions to the Indian Ocean. According

•. - - -·- ------------------17. Coedes, G., Les E 1 tats hindouise's d' Indo-Chine et d'

Indonesie (Paris---····------ 191~8),

DD. 1-2.

10

to Toussaint, the military conquest of India, begun early ~n

the eighth century and not brougnt to a close until the enc of

the sixteenth, was a long series of land operations on a limited

scale, in which the sea played no part. The conquest had no

influence on the organization of Indian trade, in which the

18 Noslem conquerors never had any part.

In the naval battles fought in and around the Indian

Ocean the Arabs were defeated and subjugated by the Soljuk Turks

and the Ottoman Turkey assumed the political and spiritual leader­

ship of the Islamic world, and played a very important role

and restructured the geopolitical pattern of th:i s region.

The Turkish Empire indeed belonged to the transition :pe':"iod,

in which i~ developed alongwith the other so-c~lled European

Great Powers. 19 In the medieval ages the trade between the

Orient and the \'lest suffered heavy set-backs on accour.t of

the intermixture of religious factors in the East-West relations,

and the heinous activity of slave-trading had its day. Of

course, the slave trade, like piracy, had existed in the Indian

Ocean, but it was the Arabs who gave it its fir.al forn, and

became, as it were, specialists in it. 20 Ironically, just as

the only major oriental attempt to take to the seas dissipated,

WestE)rn Europe vms beginning its Oceanic age thn.t would dctcrrr.ine

overseas thrusts of the Portuguese, Dutch Spanish, English , and French. 21

18. Op.cit., p. 48. 19. fiJaull, Otto, Poli tische Geographie (Berlin:

1956).

20. Toussaint, op.cit., p. 58.

21. Reynolds, Clark G., Command of the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: William Forrow & Co., 1 97 4 ) ' p • + 1 04 •

The Arab and Turkish control and refusal of the land

routes to Orient took the then active European powers to

discover and try alternative route to the East. The subsequent

discovery of the Cape Route and the arrival of the Europem1

power into the Indian Ocean region did not make them the ma.sters

of this region~ It was only after the second seize of Vienna

in 1683 that they could seek the control and attempt the over-

land conquest of the Indian Subcontinent, Cathay, and the Far

East after the defeat of the Turkish might, and could the

thalassocracies hammer out international law upon the sea, and

the combined overseas thrust of all the maritime peoples acted 22 as a major force in the advance of the Western values.

According to Panikkar, it was an age of maritime power and of 2-

authority based on the control of the seas. )

Although the Dutch had established themselves here

firmly by the end of the seventeenth century, but the British

explorations, diplomatic marriages and the Anglo-Dutch commercial

treaties, the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the Anglo-Dutch

wars, and the Spanish war of succession, all resulted in the

British consolidation of power in this region. During the

eighteenth century the events in the Atlantic had far-reaching

repercussions on the European fortunes in other overseas

regions. The Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 went in favour of the

British. According to Godechot, in that century Atlantic was

22. Reynolds, op.cit., p. 110.

23. Panikkar, op.ci t., p. 13.

tz virtually an EneJ.ish lake. Of co ;,lrse, Enelish dominion had

its fluctuations. It was at its height between 1763 and 1775,

but at the beginning at the end of the century, the British

hold on the Ocean remained powerful, extensive and over_

h l . 24 w e m1ng.,

Britain's supremacy in India began with her victory at

Plassey in 1757 and it was assured of the domination of Indian

Ocean after thedefeat of the French at Trafalg~Jr. French took

possession of the Ile de France Ollauri tius) in 1775 and

established a strategic post at Saint-Marie on Madagascar in .

1750; discovered the Southern Indien Ocean islaDds of Kern;uelen

in 1734, Marion Dufresne in 1772, 3nd occupied the Seychelles

in 1744 and organized it for naval warfare operations in 1770.

The British got Penang from Kedah in 1786 and occupied the

strategic Malacca in 1795, Sri Lanka and 'f\~aldi ves in 1796; and

concluded a defence treaty against Napoleon with Muscat and

Oman in 1797, which was followed by a Peace Treaty with Turkey

at Dardanelles in 1809. 25 The British took rl!auri tius from

France in 1814 and took the Reunion island from France in 1810

only to return it back to France in 18 '15. v.Jit h the occupation

of South Africa in 1795, and the purchase of Cape Tovm in 1814,

and the founding of Sydney in 1788 and the colonization of

Tasmania in 1803, the British became the virtual masters of

24. Godechot, J., Histoire de 1' Atlantique, (Paris:Presses Univ. de France ,1947), p. 163.

25. Hertslet,Comrn.Treaties Series Treaties,(Amsterdam, 1971.

, Com:-'1ercial ) ' 2: 371 •

the Indian Ocean region. Britain was in possession of the

strategic post of Singapore while Jvlalacca and Java were under

the Dutch domination.

The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century gave

further impetus to the European colonial pov:ers to exploit the

natural resources and raw materials of this region ·which in

turn becar.Je an easy market for their finished goods. The

nineteenth century witnessed the arrival of steam ship and the

abolition of slavery and migration of populations worldwide.

The opening of the Suez Canal sank the distances greatly

and opened a new chapter in the geopolitical and oceanic

strategic relations of the region. Vli th the thwarting of the

Italian adventures in Northeast Africa, the British began the . 2r

acquisition of Aden, Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia Kenya, Uganda, J

' Zanzibar, Burma, the Cocos and Keeling and Christmas Islands.

Important technological advancement and inventions durine; the

late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries helped the

dominant Britain to consolidate its political, military power

and make safe and secure her sea-lanes of communications. The

discovery of petroleum in the .f\Uddle East, Burma and Indonesia

suddenly further enhanced the stratesic significance of the

Indian Ocean.

The early twentieth century witnessed the growing

nationalism questioning Britain's imperial role and colonial

26. "Great Britain and France: Declaration Frontier, Togoland (10.7.1919), State Papers, Vol. 11~. 828; Vol. 118, pp. 893, 1088.

14

policies, and the Empire's role in the First World War; which

was followed by signing of London and vJashington Naval parleys <r"'

and treaties, 27 that showed the growinp: competition in naval

matters. The policy of appeasement and Nazi quest for the

Lebensraum indicated to the formation of war clouds. The

British consolidation in the Middle East could check the Nazi

aspiration of entering the Indian Ocean littoral via the planned

Baghdad Railway Line. The British fleet and air force comple~ely

dominated the situation and any local chief who tended to

subordination could expect nothing but repression from the

British armed forces. 28

During the Second World War the dominant British sea­

power aided by the army and air force commanded the destinies

of this region. The strategic naval and air bases of the

region were put to the best and urgent use denying access to t~e

Axis fleet and bombers to this region and expelling them

back. 29 The British diplomatic and military manoueuverings

succeeded in repelling the Axis aggression and culminated in

the signing of scores of treaties of war, peace and orders in

the council which all led to the ultimate defeat of the Axis

powers and the restauration of status quo anteo It is, therefore,

27. "Great Britain and France and Others. Treaty on Naval Armament Limitation, 6.2.1922, in State Paper~, vol. 117, p• 453.

28. Hirszowicz, Lukasz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London: Longmans, 1966),p.9.

29. Great Britain Order in Council: Persian GulfStates: Emergency, in: State Papers, Vol. 143, p. 177.

15

obvious that since the defeat of the Fench squadron under ·

Admiral de Suffren in 1783, the Indian Ocean had been a purely ... (11

British lake where British control only being challenged once

by Japanese air attacks on Sri Lanka in 1942.3°

SEA-BORNE TRADE AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES

J Indian Ocean, one of the great oceans is surrounded by

the continents of Asia, Africa, Australia and is separated from

the Anarctic continent by the Antarctic Circle. It is t~e

smallest of the three big Oceans, covering an Oceanic area of

nearly 75 million square kilometres. Unlike the Atlantic and

Pacific Oceans it does not cover the temperate zone of the

northern hemisphere. The greatest depth of the Indian Ocean

is over 24,000 feet in the Java Trench, and the averar,e depth

of 13,000 far exceeds that of the Atlantic Ocean. The Indus,

Ganges, Irrawaddy, Tigris-Euphrates, Zambezi and Limpopo are

the large rivers emptying into the Indian Ocean. The Arabian

Sea and the Bay of Bengal are its two major arms. 31

Given its geographical location ru~d coastal configu­

rations, historically the northern expanse of the Indian Ocean

has always, since the known antiguity, been the theater of

human activity, as it is easily and comfortably accessible

from both.the west and east through the bottlenecks or choke

30.

31.

Watt, D.C., Britain and Indian Ocean: Diplomacy Before Defence, in: The Political Quarterl~ (London), Vol. 42, No. 3, Jul-Sept. 1971, p. 08.

Cowles Encyclopedia of Nations (New York: Cowles Efaucation ~orp8ration) 1968, p. 246.

16

points of the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Strait of Malacca and

the Timor and Arafura Seas. In the northern region the

waters are warm and comparatively calm and predictable wind

motions, which make the navigation easy by sailing v1i th the

prevalent wind and oceanic currents systems. Therefore, the

coastal trade here was always sea-borne and flourished between

the nations of Asia and Africa 1ong before the advent of the

non-littoral Europeans here during the 15th century A.D.

Partly due to reasons of safety and economy the sea-

borne trade prevailed in the mediterranean, where the Phoeni-

cians, Carthagians, and Greeks carried it on from the main

trading centrP.s like Tyre as early as the 9th century B.C.

It was in the 4th century B.C. that the sea-borne trade began

expanding from Greece, Rome and Cathay (China) via lVJalaya, Java,

Sri Lanka, India, 32 and the trade routes across the Mediterranean

were only tributaries of the broad stream of commerce that

flowed in many channels between Africa, Asia and converged in

the Red Sea, the centre of world trade at thRt time. The

Mediterranean Sea lost its importance as the bastion of Europe's

overseas trade with the outside world with the spread of

Moslem dominance in the Red Sea and IVIediterranean region from

the 7th century A.D. onwards. This was tbe most important

turning point in European history ar.d Greece and Italy·never

recovered from the blow. The centre of European trade shifted

32. Wyetinsky, W.S., and E.S., World Commerce and Go,rernments: Trends and Outlook (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1955, P• 5.

17

northward from the Mediterranean to the areas along the

Atlantic coast. The Crusades and the great voyages of the

15th and 16th centuries which culminated in the discovery of

America and of routes to India, were Europe's response to the

challenge of the Moslem Kingdoms. 33 The foreign trade of that

time was somewhat like that of the ancient world - long

distance commerce in rare and valuable luxuries - like gold

from Ethiopia, silk from China and spices from the Indies.

In commerce with the East, the Europeans (Portuguese,

Spaniards, Dutch, English and the Hanseatic League) paid tribute

to the Arabs, who had a monopoly over the trade with India and

China. The Moslems haild all the main known routes to the

East. Hence, the European merchants and navigators became

convinced that the East could be reached by sea without passing

through waters and lands under I'-1oslem control; and a maritime

route to the Indies was their main objective, followed by

establishing direct trade links with the natives in order to

eliminate the middlemen. In this regard the year 1497-98 mark

the watershed. Thus by the end of the 15th century, Europe

had already broken the blockade and the whole world - Africa,

Asia, America - lay open to European trade and colonization,

although at that time Europe lagged behind Asia in industrial

skill, the superiority of Asian commerce, handicraft and

administration. 34

---·-- ------··-----33. Ibid., p. 7.

34. Ibidof P• 8.

18

The commanding importance of the northern portion of

the Indian Ocean has been well apprecia~ed al initio,due to .,.

its valuable and exotic merchandise and. the ever-increasing

competition among the overseas importers to avail it, be it

the gold and incense of Aksum and Ophir and Punt or the spices

and iron of Indian Subcontinent or the industrial fuel from

the Middle East or the precious metals and critical strategic

minerals from the Indian subcontinent, Southern Africa and

Australia or tbe rubber and tin of I'ilalaya and Indonesia.

The Suez Canal may not be absolutely essential, but

any interruption in its availability creates widespread

difficulties, 35 which was well demonstrated when it was

nationalized in 1956 and again when it was closc?d by Egypt

in 1967 waro

Inspite of north-western, southern and eastern approache:3

to the Indian Ocean the trade of the region has not yet been

diversified except th3.t with Japan othervlise it is still

dominated by the western industrial democracies. So far a

distinct Indian Ocean economic community has not emerged.

Intra-regional trade is very little. The technologic<-il

superiority which gave military supremacy to the Portuguese in

the 16th century today gives economic hegemony to the indus-

trialized countries, therefore, the continuing predominance

35. Cressey, G.B., Crossroads South-West Asia( 1~p. 23.

L&nd and Life in )

19

of trade links with countries beyond the Indian Ocean has

meant that the sea-approaches to the Ocean has retained their '1'"

earlier importance, 36 an opt-repeated plea for the justi-

fication of any political and military action by the non-

littoral industrialized big powers.

The appearance of super tankers necessitated the regular

cleaning and dredging of the approaching canals, especially

those of the eastern approaches and in fact there was a move

to dig a waten1ay in the Kra Isthmus of Thailand. Oil

resources, a major portion of international commerce traverse

the waters of the Indian Ocean more than any other single

trading commodity anywhere on the globe. Are the demographic I

and natural resources dimensions of the Indian Ocean region

simply inadequate to attain development to reach the economic

level of the.Western World? The result is unending frustration

and growing hostility toward the more fortunate countries of

the West. 37 Hence the Indian Ocean is of major and growing

importance to the non-littoral developed economic and milit3ry

powers. ~It is a fact that most of the world's population,

its workable raw materials and its transportation facilities

are found close to the coasts of the various continents, while

their interiors are comparatively empty. 38 This is very valid

in respect of some parts of the Indian Ocean.

36.

37.

38.

Burrell, R.M:, and Cottrell, Alvin J., eds., The Indian Ocean: A ...;onlference Report (\'lashington D.C., 1 J71).

Adie, Vv.A.C., Oil Politics and Sea Power: The Injian Ocean Vortex (Nevt York: ·-- ---- 1975), p. V.

So~ol 9 Ant~ony E.~ Sea Power in Nu~.1~~4Age (':!ashington D.c.: Publlc Affalrs Press, 1961), p. 5 •

20

In trade matters the Cap route aloncwith the coast

of South Africa has not declined in its importnnce. On the

contrary it has grown in importance siDce the Second \'Jorld War

as many strategically critical raw materirJ.ls, i.e. copper,

uranium etc., are routed through this highway for inter-

continental trade.

After the second Vlorld \var the new technological knowhovi

and skills have yielded unforeseen results in the economic

progress and advancement in nation-building. In context of

North-South situation also soma of the countries of this region,

particularly Australia, South Africa India and Israel have

attained the level and potential in terms of industrial and

economic gro-vrti1 and technological advancement. The rapid and

fluctuating economic growth in several littoral countries

resultant to the oil revenues has generated industrial develop-

ment and jobs in several couDtries. The uneven and contrasting

GNP and GDP levels of this region are underdeveloped or

developing ones.

In this predominantly agricultural economy of the~e

countries there are seve~·al drawbacks like the pressure of

overpopulation, non-availability of irrigation water, lack of

the application of rr.odern technological means and techniques of

cultivation. The consequences a1·e low yield and frequent crop

failures. The resultant great imbal::,nce between food production

and population growth is the main Characteristic phenomenon in a

majority of the developing countries of the Indian Ocean.

THESis"

341 . 75660954 04402 In

1111111111111111111111111 TH2082

Zl -' - - - .. __/.

Therefore most of the Indian Ocean countries export

their primary products, i.e. petroleum, agricultural products,

ferrous and non-ferrous ores and indus-'-rial minerals to the

developed market economies to buy technological and induscl.rial

and engineering products. Thus it is well evident thrt the

trade -·patterns in most cases are not in favour of the Indian

Ocean countries.

The most significent and interesting aspect of the whole

situation is t'"lat the export of strategically and industrially

critical minerals and fuels is routed through the shipping

routes and lanes to the industrialized cour.tries who in turn

invariably believe in the sanctity of maintainiY"lg the safety

of the sea-lanes of co:::munication, ~alibi for exertin.G

pressure and intervention in the region. Ovcrsimplific<i:ion

~ of the Japanese problem, because our primary objective lies O• •

elsewhere, is likely to be discour1t the enormous advantages

that will accrue to our enemies through conquest of India, tr.e

domination of the Indian Ocean, the severing of all lines

of British communications to tr.e Near Emd T-1iddle East and the

physical junction of our two principal enemies. 39 However,

in London the chiefs of stc.ff sav: the main strater;ic task of

the British Empire for 1942 as taking of the >:.'eight off Russia

and admitted that in India the British position was extremely

weak.. They agrPed and summed up ':d th the gloomiest warnj ng of

39.

---------------------- -----The chief of the War Plans Division of the US Arr:ry, .- _'; General Staff, General D. Eisenhower, quoted in: .ratJ_off, I·lf. and Sne 11, E .IV!., Strategic Planning for Coali -t {pn tw.-. Warfere 19lj-1-L~2, US Army in 'i.'orld ':I ;->r II \'lash in t<":J- • D .. C • , 1 9 53") , p " 1 52 " -- \ '·~r· _,

~\-\-~a&~ /

zz all: "We are in real danc:er of losing our Indian Empire :­

with incalculable consequence to the future conduct of the

war 11 •40

After World War II durir1g the era of independence several

Indian Ocean littoral and island states have tried to maintain

their own navies instead of the former colonial/imperial naval

fleets in the Indian Ocean. The three-dimensional phenomenon

of the withdrawal of mainly the British naval fleets, the

emergence of the growing super power navies and the efforts

by some littoral and island states to have their own naval

forces has resulted in the simultaneous and spontaneous cry

for the exist of the big power presence in t~is region. The

adamant postures adopted by the non-littoral big pmvers not to

withdraw has further complicated the matter. This region has

witnessed the formation and dissolution of :nany a milit;:Ty

and semi-military pacts like CE:'-JTO and SEATO and the growth of

non-alignr:.1ent, since the early 1950s.

The Western industrialized nations' plea for the safety

of the sea-lanes of communication has become an alibi for a ~

gun-boat diplomacy in this region, which ~ns invariably

exploited by their adversary/adversaries detrimental to the

former's and the region 1 s own interests. UnlH;:e the Norwegian

Sea and the I-1edi terranean, the interests of the super powers

in the Indian Ocean area extend beyond mutual opposition. The

Soviet Union is concerned about its sea communications to the

40. Hauner, Milan, India in Axis Strategy(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), p. 442.

ZJ

Far Eastern front, as well as about the political threat from

China to its southern flank. The US is COiiCerned for the <:'.

security of its oil supplies in peace time. 41

Since most of the terrestrial oil resources are located

in this region, and a pretty good deal of international commerce

criss-crosses the waters of this Ocean and the enormous and

unprecedented wealth of the oil-producing countries in contrast

to the poverty and backwardness of other nations makes this

region a ground for mutual rivalries, conflicts, insurgencies

and intervention of the big powers. The Indian Ocean is, ./

therefore, an area of strategic competition first because it

is there; second because in the north-western corn2r is located

the principal world source of surplus oil; and thiru because

it includes major highways of international comri1erce and the

essential marit:..me route between the eastern and western

_parts of the Soviet Union. 42 The Western plea of safeguarding

the sea lanes of communication is demolished by one of the

ardent supporters of US presence in tie Indian Ocean Althout;h

the British expended much energy and effort on defense of the

route to India, no serious and sustained naval challenee was

ever presented which could have forced London to define, in hard

terms, the stratE·e;ic value of the Indian Ocean as a whole

which persisted even after the granting of independence to India

41.

42.

TJiccGwire, Hichael, Soviet-American Naval Arrr:s Control, in: Quester George H., ·Navies and A:rms control (New York~ Praeger, 1980), p. 84.

Millar, T.B., The East-West Strateeic Balance(London: Georce Allen ana Unwin, 1931 ), p. 134.

in 1947. The British decision to withdraw owed more to

domestic political and economic considerations rather than <.

any lessening in real strategic interests.4 3

GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSION AND PHYSIOGtl.APHIC FEATUHES

Indian Ocean, the third largest of the world oceans, is

unique with respect to its shape, size and location. Unlike

the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean; the Indian Ocean waters do

not intermingle with those of the Arctic Ocean. Since the

vast, solid Eurasian landmass lies to its north, blocking its

reach to the Arctic waters. Of course, like the other two

larger Oceans, the Indian Ocean waters mix up with those of

the Antarctic Ocean. Nearly 40 sovereign independent states

of three continents are the littoral and insular entities here

alongwith 12 sovereign nations lying on the hinterland of

the Indian Ocean. Around 20 island are located in the southe~n

Indian Ocean. Of the littoral states three (namely the Republic

of South Africa, Egypt and Israel), have two ocean location.

I'-1eridian 20°E running through the Cape Agulhas, forms

the boundary between the Atlantic and Indian Ocean. The waters

of the Indian and Pacific Oceans are separated by the geometrical

line of 147°E (South-East Cape, Tasmania), the western exist

of the Bass S rai t, and the junctj on betv1een Northwest Austrc:lia L

and the Cape Talbot through Sing2pore, Timor, Sumba, Flores,

43. Burrell, R.M. & Cottrell, Alvin J., eds., op.cit., p. 64.

2.5

the Sunda Islands and Sumatra. Geographers and oceanographers

take the 60° S latitude as the boundary between the Indi::m c:nd

Antarctic Oceans. 44 The mixing up of the Indian Ocean waters

is more in respect to those of South Atlanti.c only after the

Antarctic Ocean, which could be attributed to its opening

towards South and the location of the mid-Oceanic Ridge clea~ly

influencing the course of the waters of the Indian Ocean.

The Arabian Sea, with its Red Sea, Persian Gulf and

the Hormuz and Tirana Straits; the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman

Sea, the Hozambique Channel, etc. make the total oceanic area

of the Indian Ocean is around 2.5 million square kms; which is

roughly equal to the combined area of the Asian and African

continents. The oceanic depth varies from 1793 m in the ncrth

Arabian Sea, and 2400 m in the Kerguelen Platean to 7010 m in

Sunda Trench (The Planet depth is 71~55 m) n('cli'Jy 250 krns. from

the Java Coast. The Indian Ocean islar.ds are irregul~r in

distribution and origin; and the basin formation by the mid-

Oceanic ridge is similar to that of the Atlantic Ocean, but is

shorter and wider.. The mid-Oceanic Ridge actually divides it

into three parts. From the Amsterdam Pateau (40°S) the ridge

runs through Chagos Archipelago, Maldives, Laccadives to the

northern portion of the Arabian Sea. Beyond 20°S, the mid­

Oceanic Ridge runs southeast and its width is 320 kms. Unlike

the mid-Atlantic Ridge, it widens to 1600 kms. in the form of

44. Pell? Senator Claiborne, Challen (:e of the Seven Seas (New York: William Morrow & Co. Inc., 1966}, p. 27.

Z6

Amsterdam St. Paul Plateau, of which the northeastern extension

is actually known as Southeast Indian Ridge.

Beyond 50°S this plateau is divided into separate ridges,

namely the western part is Kergueleu-Gaussberge Ridge, and the

eastern one is the Indo-Antarctic Ridge which finally merges

into the Antarctic continental shelf. Like in south, the mid­

Oceanic Ridge is bifurcated into several small ridges in the

northwestern region, where the Socotra-Chago Ridge runs through

the Gulf of Adan towards the Horn of Africa near Guardafui. L1

the southwest of the Seychelles - Mauritius is the rJlalagasy

Ridge, extending as the Prince Edward-Crozet Ridge. The

peculiar ridge in the Indian Ocean is the geometrical Ninety-

East Ridge running like a meridian from a point just west of

Obtrench projecting towards the Bay of Bengal. 45 The princ ipc:tl

topographical characteristic of the Indian Ocean is that it 1s

divided into two basins, like the Atlantic by a mid-oceanic

ridge.

The Indian Ocean deep waters are thus divided into

three large troughs by the mid-Oceanic Ridge: ( 1) the i'Torth-East,

the Central Indian and other small basins around Malagasy

(i.e. the Amirante, Mascarenes, Malgasy ond Natal basins);

( 2) the Southern Trough consists of the South-\'! est Ind i<m

Ocean Basin divided by the Crezet ~nd Kergucleau Ridges from

the Indian-Antarctic Basins; ( 3) the Wharton Basin is m~ar the

Sunda Trench. Other basins in the eastern trough are the

Andaman and Cocos-Keeling Basins.

----------------~----- ---·· •· .. - --- ·-- ------45. Sharma, R.C. Oceanogr,3)Qy_ _f:;:__r Geograph('rs_jAllahabad),

1970, p. 83.

27

Approximately eighty-six per cent of the total area

of the Indian Ocean is covered with the pelagic and the remaining

fourteen per cent with the hemipelagic and the littoral marine

sediments.

The continental shelf covers nearly 4.2 per cent of the

entire area of the Indian Ocean. It is wide in the Bay of

Bene;al, the Arabian Sea and in the northwestern coast of

Australia. The Persian Gulf is a shallow arm of the Arabian

Sea extending between Iran and Arabia. Along the African Coast,

the continental shelf is moderately wide but is consi(erably !

wide near I'vlalagasy. The continental shelf narrows do'..tn in the

eastern region of the Indian Ocean along the Sumatra <md Java

coasts.. The continental shelf, an area of steep slope cxtend:Lne

just after the continental shelf, covers 6.5 per cent of tte

total area of the Indian Ocean.

The deep Sea plain begins vthere the contit1enLol sht)lf

ends. Extending over the Oceanic depths and coverine the major

portions of the Oceanic relief, the deep sea plain spreads

over 80.1 per cent of the total area of the Indian Ocean.

There are two 't'le 11-marked deep sea plains in this Ocean:

( 1 ) the Ceylon Abyssal Plain in the northeastern region; and

(2) the Somali Abyssal Plain in the northeastern region.

The mid-Oceanic Ridge and the other smaller ridges are

abruptly cut at several points presenting a really interesting

scenic attraction in the Indian Ocean as well as a beautiful mapa

The important fracture zones are: the Ower., Rodrigues, IVIozambique,

Prince Edward, Malagasy, Amsterdani anJ Diamantina fracture

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zones. The principal trenches are: the Amirante, Kenya,

Mauritius and Java tenches. All these fracture zones and

tenches pass through the different islands and island groups

where from taking their respective names.

The submarine canyons of the non-gl8cial features a

unique phenomenon in the Indian Ocean, and are located on the

shelf and slopes of the continental platforms. The tenche.s

therein also project towards the coast starting from the beach-

heads. The trenches vary in length and width, and the slopes

of the continental shelves also varied according to tteir

respective location. These canyons might have been formed due

to the sub-aerial erosion of rivers during the Pleistocene

46 or earlier age.

The physiography of the mid-Oceanic ridges, continental

sheld, and the slope and deep-sea plains of the Indian Ocean

is the key to locating the Oceanic islc=mds therein. The very

fact that these islands are by and large located on the sheJf

and the mid-Oceanic ridges, attaches strategic signific:-,r:ce to

them. The archipelago concept attaches a unique significance

to them. The northern island belt comprises of the continuous

links in a chain spread between Timor and Maldive and the

Laccadives, Minieoy islands 9 Many of them are coral islets and

alolls, reefs. Many of them are simply the summits on a sub-

marine range.

46. Ibid., pp. 57-57 (quoted from Krishnan, 1960).

30

The central Indian Ocean islands belt consists of the

Malagasy, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Reunion, Comoros and the

Chagos Archipelago. The scattered Cocos or Keeling Islands

and Christmas Island also belong here. Some of these islands

are of valcanic origino The abrupt volcanic mass gave rise

to the islands in the southern Indian Ocean, mostly covered

with algae and glaciers.

The living and non-living resources of the Indian Ccean

are also not spread evenly all across it. The physiography of

the Ocean is primarily responsible for this situation, too.

' The realisation and exploitation of these resources al.so depend

on the technological advancement and the search for the sub-

stitute for the fast depleting resources in use. The exploration

and harnessing of these resources cause many problems and

creates conditions wherein engulf many issues pressing for

solution through the world Ocean, and the Indian Ocean is no

exception but may well prove to be even the focal point ir..

this regard.

NATURAL RESOURCES: MAGNITUDE AND PROBLEl\1S OF EXPLOITATION

Indian Ocean region is rich, both for resources on

surrounding lands and under water. Agricultural resources of

this region are diverse and dynamic. In terms of cereals this

region produces nearly one-fifth of the world's total cerEal

. LJ-7 product1on. India, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, Bangladesh,

47. U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1981 (New York: UN, 1983), pp. 489-'+98.

31

Pakistan, South Africa and Burma are the main producers of

cereals. This region's yield of what is about 18% of the

world's total and comes mainly from India, Australia, Fakistan

and Iran, while the rice produced in India, Indonesia,

Banpiadesh and Burma amounts to approximately 45% of the total

world production. The main barley growing countries of this

region are Australia, India, Iran, Ethiopia and Iraq. The

barley produced here accounts for nearly 6 per cent of the·t9tal

worl<f production. South Africa, India, Indonesia, ThaiJ.and,

Egypt, Kenya, and Malwi produce nearly 9 per cent of thE~ world's '

total maize; while Australia and South Africa make this region's

share of nearly 4 per cent of the oats productiono

Among the major cash crops of this rer,ion art> groundnuts,

coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, wool and sugar. Groundm.r: is

produced mainly in India, Indonesia, Sudan, :Surma, South Africa,

and tiJ"alawi and makes for nearly 47 per cent of the world 1 s

total groundnut yield. This re,sion's share (18 per cent)

of the world's total coffee production comes primarily from

Indonesia, Ethiopia, India, Uganda, l\1adagascar, Kenya and

Tanzania, while North Yemen is kno\vn for its super flnvour

Tv1ocha coffee. The other common beverage tea, the near-monopoly

of this region, makes for (76 per cent in 1970) 61 per cent

of the world's total. This region's share of world tobacco

production is almost 18 per cent and comes from India, Thailand,

Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma and Malawi. The cotton production

in region amounts to 24 per cent of the world total and comes

JZ

primarily from India, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan ( whc:re its yield

is dwindled), and Israe1. 48

The Indian Ocean littoral produces nee:: rly 38 per cent

of world's total wool. Australia, South Africa, IndiC:J.,

P k . t I d I 'h · 1 ' · · · lt9 a ls-an, ran an raq are~ e ~a1n woo prouuc1ng coun~r1es.

One-fifth of the world's total sugar production comes from tte

Indian counties of India, Australia, South Africa, ThaiJand,

Indonesia, Pakistan, Mauritius and Egypt.5°

The geographical location of the Indian Ocean rec;ion

gives it a set physiographic attributes v1l1ich deteiT:ine its

contribution with respect to agricul t 1Jral and forest :?roduces.

This region 1 s forests provide nP:·rly 22 p-::r cent of tb0. world r s

total roundwood, mainly from India, Indonesia, Malays~a,

Thailand, Tanzania, the Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia 2~d Burma.

Natural rubber is the monopoly of this region. Peninsular

Malaysia 9 Indonesia, Thailand, India, Sii Lanka, and Bunna

produce 87 per cent of the world's total natural rubbero 51

In tenns of livestock, the Indian Ocean has 3'-1 per cent

cattle, 33 per cent sheep, 8 pPr cont horso;; .:-·ncl 38 pc·:· cr·nt

asses in the world.5 2

48. Ibid., pp. 505-513.

49. Ibid., p .. 558.

so. Ibid., pp. 643-6'-1-4.

51. Ibid., pp. 553-556.

52. Ibid., pp. 514-531.

Since no nation in the world is self-sufficient in

all the natural resources so the inter-depenJence53 for them

attaches a special significance to the Indian Ocem1 for its

strategic location and the mineral wealth. The base of

modern industries is steel and one-fifth of the world's tota1

iron-ore is produced in the Indian Ocean countries of Australia,

India, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, and Nalaysia; but except

India, Australia and South Africa no other iron-ore producing

country in this region has established basic heavy industries. 54

The Indian Ocean countries of Australia, India, Indo-

nesia, Malaysia and fv!ozambique produce 35 per cent of toe world's

bauxite for aluminium industries. Zambia, Australia, South

Africa, Indonesia, India, :tvlalays_La and Dotswaua produce 1 C pc r

cent of the world 1 s copper; vihile AustraliR, Zambia, Inm '

Burma, India and Thailand account for 16 per cent of lead;

and 13 per cent zinc ore production. 42 per cent of tbe world's

total chromium ore and 4 per cent of rnagnesi te is ,Toduced in

India, South Africa, Sudan, Mada~:;ascar, Pakistan, Iran and

Australia, while South Africa, India, Australia, Botswana,

Thailand, Indonesia and Iran produce nearly 41 per cent of

manganese ore in the world.

Nearly 19 per cent or the one-fifth of world's nickel

ore comes from Australia, Indonesia, South Africa, Botswana and

Burma. The phosphate rock production in South Africa, Israel,

53. Little, Arthur D, Inc., Dependence of the United States on Essential Imported Minerals, Year 2000~ Vol. 1, Table 1, pp. 13-14 (Vlashington D.c., 1974;.

54. UN Statistical Yearbook 1981, pp. 591-601.

34 Jordon, Christmas Island, Egypt, India, and Uganda, account

for the world's 8 per cent. Like tea, natural rubber, and

gold tin concentrate is also a monopoly of this region as th2

Southeast Asian countries of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesi3,

Burma alongwi th Australia, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, a:1d

Zambia produce 71 per cent of the world's total tin concentrste.

In terms of production of the precious metals and

diamonds (both industrial and gem stores), the Indian Ocean

countries of Australia, South Africa, Zambia, Burma, India an,d

Indonesia produces one-tenth of the world's total siJver, while .

South Africa, Australia, India, Zambia, Indonesi8, Ethiopia,

Malaysia, Tanzania and Madagascar produce three-fourths of t3e

world's total gold. The production of industrial diamonds

in South Africa, Bots\·!Bna, Tanzania, India, Indonesia and

Lesotho increased from 19 per cent in 1970 to 31 per cent of

the world's total in 1980. South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania,

Lesotho, India and Indonesia produce nearly 42 per cent of t3e

world's total gem stores.55

According to the latest available fie;ures the uranium

reserves as at JanuaDr 1981 in Australia, South Africa end

India were 573000 metric tons, i.e. 32.8 per cent of the world

reserves; and its production in South Africa nnd AustraJ5a

was 21 .1 per cent of the world total. The loc2 ~,ion of this

critical strategic mineral enhances the importance of this r-;6 region and gen'erates complicated conflicts in certain areas.-

55. Ibid., p. 589.

56. Ibid., p. 590.

35

No major and significant break-through seems to have

been achieved with regard to the exploitati~n of marine(both

organic and nonorganic) resources by the littoral and island

states of the Indian Ocean. The total fish catches of the~;e

countries were 12.057 and 14.6 per cent of the world total

for the years 1972 and 1980 respectively. Perhaps, due to

growing worldwide protest against whaling activity, no figures

in this regard have been available by the leading whaling

states (by flag) of this region, namely South Africa, Australia

and Somalia for the year 1979/80. In 1970071 the total whaJ..e

catch by these three countries made up for 9 per cent of the

world total.

The Western Indian Ocean yield in terms of the pelagic

fish catch, which includes the red fishes, basses, congers,

sacks, mullets, sauries, tunas, bonitos, billfish, mackerels,

fnoeks, cutlass fish, sharks, rays, ratfish, shads, eels, salmon,

trout, sturgeon, !launders, halibuts, sole, cods, hakes,

hadocks, molluses, and crustaceans (crabs, orawns, lobrters e~tc,);

whereas the eastern Indian Ocean offers only herrings, sardines,

anchonies, and miscellaneous marine fishes. The total of

these fish landings is roughtly 4-5 per cent of the word

total, the fish catch has increased nearly 50 per cent from

1975 to 1985~ and the substantial earning from the sea fish

expert for India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Somalia, Madagascar

57. Ibid., pp. 557-562.

36 and South Africa have also increased. However, the fishery

gains have accrued Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, ,~

Burma, Bangladesh,South Africa and the French possession of

of Kerguelen islands due to the EEZ extension to 200 ncutical

miles.

The coastal physiography and the Oceanic conditions

determine the existence of the organic and inorganic marine

resources. The high potential for fish catch lies in the

shallow continental shelf of the western Indian Ocean, whereof

not even one-third is being exploited by the littoral countries,

i.e. by India, Pakistan, Oman, Sri Lanka, UAE, Tanzania,

Somalia, Iraq and Iran. These potential reserves are being

harvested to the maximum with comparatively little potential

for recuperation in yield in the temperate and sub-antarctic

waters of the Indian Ocean. The main countries carrying out

fish-catch activities in the eastern Indian Ocean are Burma,

India, Thailand, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Australia. Compared

to other countries the consumption of fish is very little

in India due to the food habits of the people. Nearly three­

fourth of Thailands' total fish catch is from beyond its own

EEZ due to the loss of traditional fishing areas and the

depletion of its coastal ·fishery by heavy pollutants. Besides

the Indian Ocean littoral nations; Japan, South Korea, USSR,

East Germany, Romania and Spain venture into the Indian Ocean

for heavy and indiscriminate fish catches very regularly in

absence of an established and detailed fishery policy of the

local countries.

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Lately due.to the increasing economic significance of

fish, complex problems of fishing area manaEement and several ~

conflicts of interests have consequently arisen between the

littoral and the non-littoral states. Serious problems of

pollution and fish conservation have also become acutre as

the renewable marine fisheries are vulnerable to the toxic

pollutants deposited in the sea-waters.

The significant developments in Ocean engineering have

made it possible to locate and exploit the mineral wealth

deposited on the seabed. The nodules containing Copper '

Cobalt, nickel, iron were discovered, examined and now, are being

exploited for industrial production. The extraction of minerals

from the sea-water (eog. saltp bromine etc.), and the mining of

sea-bottom minerals by means of bucket dredges, and the drilling

of tbe sub-bottom minerals, (e.g. petroleum, natural gas etc.)

are the activities associ~ted with the operation of multinational

companies enjoying great privileges over the national companies

several littoral countries, on account of strong commercial

and strategic reasons. Some of the well-known multination

corporations presently engaged in the exploit•ation of the

sea-bed resources of oceans are the Kennecott group; the Ocean

Mining Associates (OMA), the Ocean Management, Incorporated

(OMI); the Ocean Minerals Company (OMCO); and the Association

Francaise Pour 1' Etude et la Recherche des Nodules, all are

mainly controlled by the American, British, Japanese, W.German,

Canadian, Belgian, Italian and Dutch and French multinational

companies.

39

Due to these technological developments and the

consequent capabilities acquired by the advanced industrialized

nations to exploit the organic and inorganic oceanic resources;

there has been a great deal of interest for nearly two decades

in the economic potential of the seabed resources of the Indian

Ocean, but the cost facet hinders the efforts for exploitation

of the sea-bed minerals, while the oil and natural gas drilling

has been successful. Even then, keeping in view the distant

possibility of a cartel being imposed by the metal-producing

countries; ·the industrially advanced nations are perfecting f

their technologies and making every effort to devise a mecha-

nism to extract metals from nodules at a comparatively cheap

cost considering the requirements of large investments,

heavy and precision equipments and consultancy services on a

long-term basis.

So far the sources of energy are concerned, it seems to

coexist with other ingredients of modern industries. South

Africa, Zambia, India, Iran, Pakistan and Australia produce

hard coal while the lignite brown coal is mined and India

and Australia who are the principal producers of coke. Arabia,

Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab

Emirates, Burma, Indonesia, alongwith India, Australia,

Malaysia and Egypt produce the other very m important non-

renewable source of energy which has mattered much in inter­

national politics and security since 1973, the crude petroleum.

India, Singapbre South Africa, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, '

40

Malaysia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt

and Zambia thermal and hydro-electric power.

In general, only those countries of this region who

have the infrastructure of modern heavy industries, like raw-

material, good transport systems, and sources of energy and

skilled manpower consisting of scientists, engineers and

technocrate engaged in actual industrial production and the

research and experimental development. India, Egypt, Australia,

South Africa, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh

have a good number of scientists and engineers, some of them

working in the industrialized world, which is a serious

problem faced by a I!lajority of the developing countries. India,

Australia, South Africa and Egypt are leaders in general,

manufacturing (food, beverages~ tobacco, textiles, chemical,

coal and petroleum products, basic metals), electrical and

mining industries. South Africa has developed paper manu-

facturing industry also.

Others engaged in general industries are Israel, Iran,

Bangladesh, f-1alaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Zambia,

many of these alongwith Singapore and Malawi they have food,

beverages and textile manufacturing industries also. Basic

metals.are manufactured in Zambia and Bangladesh also. So

far the apparent consumption of crude steel (-if it is any

indicatidn of industrial growth) is concerned, South Africa,

India, Australia, I~an, a?d Egypt·are ahead of others. The

per capita consumption o.f natural rubber has been more than

doubled in India from 1970 to 1980, and there has been a

41

50 per cent increase in the consumption of synthetic rubber

during this period. Almost the same pattern is observed in

South Africa, while it has ...

been static in case of Australia. 58

Besides, the Indian Subcontinent, South Africa,

Australia, East Africa, Egypt, Thailand and Iran have good

railway network, for the movement of raw materials and good ,

to accelerate the pace of industrialization.59 An increase in

the productivity or exploitation of the natural resources

of this region has been to generate their export instead of

their use in establishing heavy and manufacturing industries ,

for nation-building development. Many countries exploit their

natural resources in collaboration with the industrialized

countries to generate export in order to service their debt.

Although, they have a great fund of knowledge and in many

sectors apply modern techniques in their productiono60

STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

Geopolitics studies space from the viewpoint of the

state and investigates the spatial-political entitity

primarily in relation to environment. It lends a systematic

framework for the study of a complex crisis area interpreting

the political development processes in relation to spatia­

temporal factors. K.M.Panikkar, writing back in 1944, observed

58. Ibid., pp. 712-714.

59. Istitute Geographico de Agostini, Grands Atlante degli Oceani (Roma: Novara, 1977). .

60. Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1967 (Stockholm: IToyal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1968), New Series I: c. 17, p. 10.

that the spatial dynamics of the Indian Ocean area are of

speical importance to the British Empire and especially to

the future of India. 61 Obviously he was pondering on a

foreseeable scenario keeping the very geographical location,

natural resources and the spatial relationship of the then

British colony of India. His views were indirectly reflected

in the writings of Bammate. It is well-known that the Soviet

descent on the warm waters had always been hampered by the

conditions given rise to in Europe by Britain.62

The very geographical local and the coastline and the

economic resources of the Indian Ocean have always determined

the course of the political and strategic events in this

theatre to a considerable extent. Even in theory, the

defense of the Indian Oce~n remained a British responsibility

after the World War II, but thedays of the British thalassocracy

were over. 63 Since then the modern more geographically favoured

maritime power, the United States took up Britain's abandoned

imperial "burden 11 in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocea,

South Asia has become the centre of a perilous global confron­

tation,6h and however, the basic facts of South Asian

61. Panikkar, K.M., The Strate ic Problems of the Indian Ocean (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 19 , p. 3.

62. Bammate, Haidar, Visages de 1' Islam (Paris: Payot, 1946), preface.

63. Toussaint, Auguste, Shifting power balance in the Indian Ocean, in: Cottrell, A.J. and Burrell, R.M., eds., The Indian Ocean: Its Political Economic and Militar Importance ew York: Praeger, 1 2 , p.

64. Wolpert, Stanley, Roots of Confrontation in Asia (New York: Oxford, 1982).

geopolitical, as well as cultural, reality appears to remain

almost as remote from modern American consciousness as the

vast subcontinent itself.

Geography has always dictated its terms with regard to

the political and strategic scenarios in the Indian Ocean as

elsewhere in the world. The locational spatial relationship

of the countries of this region and their shape, size and the

raw materials or natural resource base determined the role of

this region in world affairs. The main concern of strategic

geography are accessibility, mobility, visibility, communi­

cability, availability, and vulnerability. 65 The margins of

the Indian Ocean have enormous political and military and

economic significance, whih has resulted in more than 15

territorial problem areas of disputed boundaries. As the

geography of any given region is contingent upon the geography

of other areas - some of them far removed from the region in

question, 66 and the geopolitical mistakes and achievements

are cumulative over a period of time. The very location of

the Indian Ocean in the so-called rimland sea, which, as the

name implies, is the scene of the greatest tension and possible

conflicts and the main area of contemporary and future

militarization. 57

65. Peltier, Louis c., and Pearey, G. Etzel, Military Geography (New Delhi: Affiliated East-West Press Pvt. rta., 19s1), P· 4s.

66. Pearcy, G.E., et al, World Political Geography, Thii~ Edition (New York: 1949},pp. 412-14.

67. Pavic, Randovic, The General Geostrategic Characteris'­tics and Division of the World Seas, in: The Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. XXIII, March 5-20, 1972, p. 34.

The mineral wealth and the natural resources of the

region, comprising of the developing and developed countries,

has paved the way for the growing involvement of the big powers

in the local conflicts, generated by the imperial boundary­

makings, and the so-called co-existence of differing socio­

political systems in the region responsible for political

instability. Hence, the geopolitical considerations have led

to basic differences between the strategies of the United

States, and the Soviet navies in the Indian Ocean. 68 The fear

of the control of Oceans and the exploitation of their ' enormous and unprecedented resources poses various problems

of political, strategic, economic and legal nature, as the

advanced industrialized nations have already tempted to correct

Mahan and redefined sea power as the sum total of national uses

of the sea, 69 taking a clue from Edward \'lenk, to welf abstract

scientific and policy goals into an explicit concept designed

to interest and involve the entire domestic enterprise, to

elicit policy support from both the Democratic and Republican

Presidents, and to wash up on the shores of all coastal nations. 70

68. Hayward, Admiral Thomas, in: Military 1872 and HR 2575, Hearin before the of Representatives ommittee on Armed n.c., 1979), 96: 1 (1979), Part I, p.

69. Walsh, Don, National Organization for

H.R.

70. Wenk, Edward, Jr., The Politics of the Ocean (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 213.

4S The unique British imperial mercantilist tradition

using the area and initiating naval and commercial ship ~·

ventures through the Indian Ocean basin after her loss of the

North American colonies, bears a better testimony for using the

geopolitical and geostrategic constraints of less competent

and alert adversaries to ones' own advantages.