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Chapter 18. Monetary PolicyChapter 18. Monetary PolicyChapter 18. Monetary PolicyChapter 18. Monetary Policy
• The market for reserves
• Open market operations
• Discount lending
• Reserve requirements
• Goals of monetary policy
• Using targets
• The market for reserves
• Open market operations
• Discount lending
• Reserve requirements
• Goals of monetary policy
• Using targets
The Market for ReservesThe Market for ReservesThe Market for ReservesThe Market for Reserves
• interbank lending market federal funds rate (FF rate)
• FOMC impacts this market which impacts other debt markets
& economy
• interbank lending market federal funds rate (FF rate)
• FOMC impacts this market which impacts other debt markets
& economy
The Fed and the FF rateThe Fed and the FF rateThe Fed and the FF rateThe Fed and the FF rate
• open market operations shift the supply of reserves
• discount loans setting discount rate affects bank
borrowing and supply of reserves
• reserve requirement affects demand for reserves
• open market operations shift the supply of reserves
• discount loans setting discount rate affects bank
borrowing and supply of reserves
• reserve requirement affects demand for reserves
Open Market Operations (OMO)Open Market Operations (OMO)Open Market Operations (OMO)Open Market Operations (OMO)
• buying & selling Treasuries large & liquid market
• open market purchase increase supply of reserves decrease FF rate
• OMO are the Fed’s main policy tool
• buying & selling Treasuries large & liquid market
• open market purchase increase supply of reserves decrease FF rate
• OMO are the Fed’s main policy tool
• FOMC votes on OMO votes on FF rate target
• FRBNY actually buys and sells Treasuries to achieve the FF rate target
• FOMC votes on OMO votes on FF rate target
• FRBNY actually buys and sells Treasuries to achieve the FF rate target
advantages of OMOadvantages of OMOadvantages of OMOadvantages of OMO
• Fed has complete control
• OMO are flexible buy/sell a little or a lot
• OMO are easily reversible sell too much? then buy some back
• OMO quickly impact reserves, FF rate
• Fed has complete control
• OMO are flexible buy/sell a little or a lot
• OMO are easily reversible sell too much? then buy some back
• OMO quickly impact reserves, FF rate
Discount LendingDiscount LendingDiscount LendingDiscount Lending
• each district bank has a discount window set discount rate set discount policy
• lower discount rate increase borrowing, reserves decrease FF rate
• each district bank has a discount window set discount rate set discount policy
• lower discount rate increase borrowing, reserves decrease FF rate
• why do banks get discount loans? short-term liquidity problem serious problems seasonal reserve fluctuations but should not ask for help too often
• discount rate is 50-100 bp. ABOVE the FF rate
• why do banks get discount loans? short-term liquidity problem serious problems seasonal reserve fluctuations but should not ask for help too often
• discount rate is 50-100 bp. ABOVE the FF rate
Discount loans & monetary policyDiscount loans & monetary policyDiscount loans & monetary policyDiscount loans & monetary policy
• discount loans not a good tool
• not completely under Fed control banks decide to borrow
• can give misleading signals if done for non-policy reasons
• not easily reversible cannot change rates on old loans
• discount loans not a good tool
• not completely under Fed control banks decide to borrow
• can give misleading signals if done for non-policy reasons
• not easily reversible cannot change rates on old loans
Reserve requirementReserve requirementReserve requirementReserve requirement
• set by the Board of Governors
• higher requirement increase demand for reserves increase FF rate
• today (since 1992) 3% on checking up to $44.3 million 10% above $44.3 million
• set by the Board of Governors
• higher requirement increase demand for reserves increase FF rate
• today (since 1992) 3% on checking up to $44.3 million 10% above $44.3 million
• reserve requirement is very powerful tool too powerful not good for small adjustments expensive to change
• reserve requirement is very powerful tool too powerful not good for small adjustments expensive to change
Goals of Monetary policyGoals of Monetary policyGoals of Monetary policyGoals of Monetary policy
• desirable goals for the economy
• Fed uses monetary policy to achieve these goals directly control tools,
to influence goals
• desirable goals for the economy
• Fed uses monetary policy to achieve these goals directly control tools,
to influence goals
High employmentHigh employmentHigh employmentHigh employment
• i.e., low unemployment
• federal government has a commitment to full employment
• goal: natural rate of unemployment about 4-5% today: 4.7% 6% in Oswego Co.
• i.e., low unemployment
• federal government has a commitment to full employment
• goal: natural rate of unemployment about 4-5% today: 4.7% 6% in Oswego Co.
Economic GrowthEconomic GrowthEconomic GrowthEconomic Growth
• annual % change in real GDP
• U.S. long run average -- 3%
• 2006 real GDP growth 1.5%
• annual % change in real GDP
• U.S. long run average -- 3%
• 2006 real GDP growth 1.5%
Price stabilityPrice stabilityPrice stabilityPrice stability
• i.e., low inflation annual % change in CPI
• primary goal of Fed since 1980s
• how high is too high? over 4% goal: 2% or less
• Oct 2007: about 3.5%
• i.e., low inflation annual % change in CPI
• primary goal of Fed since 1980s
• how high is too high? over 4% goal: 2% or less
• Oct 2007: about 3.5%
Financial Market StabilityFinancial Market StabilityFinancial Market StabilityFinancial Market Stability
• stability of financial institutions
• stability of interest rates
• stability of exchange rates
• Fed stabilized markets October 1987 Summer 1998 September 2001
• stability of financial institutions
• stability of interest rates
• stability of exchange rates
• Fed stabilized markets October 1987 Summer 1998 September 2001
Using targetsUsing targetsUsing targetsUsing targets
• Fed directly controls tools (like OMO), not goals
• it can take a year for tools to impact the goals how to gauge progress in
between?
• Fed directly controls tools (like OMO), not goals
• it can take a year for tools to impact the goals how to gauge progress in
between?
TargetsTargetsTargetsTargets
• related to tools and goals
• used by Fed to judge if they are on track
• related to tools and goals
• used by Fed to judge if they are on track
goalintermediatetarget
operatinginstrument
tool(OMO)
operating instrumentoperating instrumentoperating instrumentoperating instrument
• respond immediately to changes in the tools
• examples bank reserves FF rate Tbill rate
• respond immediately to changes in the tools
• examples bank reserves FF rate Tbill rate
intermediate targetsintermediate targetsintermediate targetsintermediate targets
• affected by operating target
• closely associated with goals
• examples M1or M2 Tnote yields
• affected by operating target
• closely associated with goals
• examples M1or M2 Tnote yields
effective instrumentseffective instrumentseffective instrumentseffective instruments
• observable by everyone
• controllable and quickly changeable by the Fed
• predictably related to goals
• observable by everyone
• controllable and quickly changeable by the Fed
• predictably related to goals
2 types of targets/instruments2 types of targets/instruments2 types of targets/instruments2 types of targets/instruments
• monetary targets reserves, MB M1 or M2
• interest rate targets FF rate other short or medium-term rates
• monetary targets reserves, MB M1 or M2
• interest rate targets FF rate other short or medium-term rates
target tradeofftarget tradeofftarget tradeofftarget tradeoff
• Fed can target money supply OR interest rates
• NOT BOTH!
• why?
• Fed can target money supply OR interest rates
• NOT BOTH!
• why?
• suppose Fed targets M* for MS:• suppose Fed targets M* for MS:
M
i MS
M*
MD’’
i’’
• but as MD fluctuates, i will change:• but as MD fluctuates, i will change:
M
i MS
M*
MD’’
i’’ MD’’’
i’’’
MD’
i’
• so if target M*, lose control of i• so if target M*, lose control of i
M
i MS
M*
MD’’
i’’ MD’’’
i’’’
MD’
i’
• suppose Fed targets i*• suppose Fed targets i*
M
i
MD’’
i*
MS
M’’
• but as MD fluctuates, Fed must shift MS to maintain i*• but as MD fluctuates, Fed must shift MS to maintain i*
M
i MS
M’’
MD’’
i* MD’’’
MD’
M’
MS’
M’’’
MS’’’
• Fed targets i*, lose control of M• Fed targets i*, lose control of M
M
i MS
M’’
MD’’
i* MD’’’
MD’
M’
MS’
M’’’
MS’’’
TargetsTargetsTargetsTargets
• If Fed targets MS, loses control of interest rates
• If Fed targets interest rates, loses control of MS
• If Fed targets MS, loses control of interest rates
• If Fed targets interest rates, loses control of MS
The Taylor RuleThe Taylor RuleThe Taylor RuleThe Taylor Rule
• How to choose the FF rate target?
• Base target on Current inflation Target inflation Current real GDP Potential real GDP
• How to choose the FF rate target?
• Base target on Current inflation Target inflation Current real GDP Potential real GDP
• FF rate target =
2.5 + current inflation
+ (1/2)(current-target inflation)
+ (1/2)(current - potential GDP)
• A guideline for the Fed
• FF rate target =
2.5 + current inflation
+ (1/2)(current-target inflation)
+ (1/2)(current - potential GDP)
• A guideline for the Fed