36
Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy * MACROECONOMICS Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 0/36 Seventh Edition N. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, adjusted for course in Macroeconomics for International Masters Program at the Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics at Xiamen University.

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy *

MACROECONOMICS

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 0/36

Seventh Edition

N. Gregory Mankiw

* Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, adjusted for course in Macroeconomics for International Masters Program at the Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics at Xiamen University.

Page 2: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Learning Objectives

This chapter introduces you to understanding:

Should policy be active or passive?

Should policy be conducted by rule or discretion?

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 1/36

Should policy be conducted by rule or discretion?

Page 3: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Growth rate of real GDP, 1970-2006Growth rate of real GDP, 1970-2006

4

6

8

10

Average growth

Percent change from 4

quarters earlier

-4

-2

0

2

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

growth rate

Page 4: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

peak troughincrease in no. of

unemployed persons (millions)

July 1953 May 1954 2.11

Aug 1957 April 1958 2.27

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� Increase in Unemployment during Recessions

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 3/36

April 1960 February 1961 1.21

December 1969 November 1970 2.01

November 1973 March 1975 3.58

January 1980 July 1980 1.68

July 1981 November 1982 4.08

July 1990 March 1991 1.67

March 2001 November 2001 1.50

Page 5: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

• Recessions cause economic hardship for millions of people.

• The Employment Act of 1946: “It is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to…promote full employment

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� Arguments for Active Policy

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 4/36

Federal Government to…promote full employment and production.”

• The model of aggregate demand and supply (Chaps. 9-13) shows how fiscal and monetary policy can respond to shocks and stabilize the economy.

Page 6: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Policies act with long & variable lags, including:

inside lag: the time between the shock and the policy response.

• takes time to recognize shock

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� Arguments against Active Policy

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 5/36

• takes time to implement policy, especially fiscal policy

outside lag: the time it takes for policy to affect economy.

If conditions change before policy’s impact is felt, the policy may destabilize the economy.

If conditions change before policy’s impact is felt, the policy may destabilize the economy.

Page 7: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

• Definition: policies that stimulate or depress the economy when necessary without any deliberate policy change.

• Designed to reduce the lags associated with

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� Automatic Stabilizers

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 6/36

• Designed to reduce the lags associated with stabilization policy.

• Examples:

– income tax

– unemployment insurance

– welfare

Page 8: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Because policies act with lags, policymakers must predict future conditions.

Two ways economists generate forecasts:

–Leading economic indicators

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� Forecasting the Macroeconomy

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 7/36

–Leading economic indicators data series that fluctuate in advance of the economy

–Macroeconometric modelsLarge-scale models with estimated parameters that can be used to forecast the response of endogenous variables to shocks and policies

Page 9: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

The Index of Leading Economic Indicatorsincludes 10

5

10

15

20

annu

al p

erce

ntag

e ch

ange

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� The LEI Index and Real GDP, 1960s

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 8/36

source of LEI data:The Conference Board

includes 10 data series

(see p.258 ).-10

-5

0

1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970

annu

al p

erce

ntag

e ch

ange

Leading Economic Indicators Real GDP

Page 10: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

0

5

10

15

20

annu

al p

erce

ntag

e ch

ange

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� The LEI Index and Real GDP, 1970s

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 9/36

source of LEI data:The Conference Board

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980

annu

al p

erce

ntag

e ch

ange

Leading Economic Indicators Real GDP

Page 11: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

0

5

10

15

20

annu

al p

erce

ntag

e ch

ange

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� The LEI Index and Real GDP, 1980s

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 10/36

source of LEI data:The Conference Board

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990

annu

al p

erce

ntag

e ch

ange

Leading Economic Indicators Real GDP

Page 12: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

0

5

10

15

annu

al p

erce

ntag

e ch

ange

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� The LEI Index and Real GDP, 1990s

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 11/36

source of LEI data:The Conference Board

-15

-10

-5

0

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

annu

al p

erce

ntag

e ch

ange

Leading Economic Indicators Real GDP

Page 13: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� Mistakes Forecasting the 1982 Recession

Un

emp

loym

ent

rate

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 12/36

Un

emp

loym

ent

rate

Page 14: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Because policies act with lags, policymakers must predict future conditions.

The preceding slides show that the

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� Forecasting the Macroeconomy

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 13/36

The preceding slides show that the forecasts are often wrong.

This is one reason why some economists oppose policy activism.

Page 15: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

• Due to Robert Lucaswho won Nobel Prize in 1995 for rational expectations.

• Forecasting the effects of policy changes has often been done using models estimated with historical

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� The Lucas Critique

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 14/36

been done using models estimated with historical data.

• Lucas pointed out that such predictions would not be valid if the policy change alters expectations in a way that changes the fundamental relationships between variables.

Page 16: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

• Prediction (based on past experience):An increase in the money growth rate will reduce unemployment.

• The Lucas critique points out that increasing the money growth rate may raise expected inflation, in

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� An Example of the Lucas Critique

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 15/36

money growth rate may raise expected inflation, in which case unemployment would not necessarily fall.

Page 17: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

• Christina Romer: Construct better “old” data and reconstruct “bad” current data. Assess volatility of unemployment and output. Finds significantly less difference in pre- and post-WWII experience.

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� A Figment of the Data?

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 16/3616

CHAPTER 15 Stabilization Policy

WWII experience.

• Question about smooth labor force participation rates versus pro-cyclical assumption.

• Question about relationship between commodity production and aggregate output during Great Depression.

Page 18: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Looking at recent history does not clearly answer Question 1:

– It’s hard to identify shocks in the data.

14.1) Be Active or Passive?� The Jury’s out…

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 17/36

– It’s hard to tell how things would have been different had actual policies not been used.

Most economists agree, though, that the U.S. economy has become much more stable since the late 1980s…

Page 19: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Learning Objectives

This chapter introduces you to understanding:

Should policy be active or passive?

Should policy be conducted by rule or discretion?

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 18/36

Should policy be conducted by rule or discretion?

Page 20: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

• Policy conducted by rule:Policymakers announce in advance how policy will respond in various situations, and commit themselves to following through.

• Policy conducted by discretion:

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Rules and Discretion: Basic Concepts

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 19/36

• Policy conducted by discretion:As events occur and circumstances change, policymakers use their judgment and apply whatever policies seem appropriate at the time.

Page 21: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

1. Distrust of policymakers and the political process

– misinformed politicians

– politicians’ interests sometimes not the same as the interests of society

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Arguments for Rules

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 20/36

the interests of society

Page 22: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

2. The time inconsistency of discretionary policy

– def: A scenario in which policymakers have an incentive to renege on a previously announced policy once others have acted on that announcement.

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Arguments for Rules

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 21/36

acted on that announcement.

– Destroys policymakers’ credibility, thereby reducing effectiveness of their policies.

Page 23: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

1. To encourage investment, govt announces it will not tax income from capital.

But once the factories are built, govt reneges in order to raise more tax revenue.

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Examples of Time Inconsistency

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 22/36

Page 24: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

2. To reduce expected inflation, the central bank announces it will tighten monetary policy.

But faced with high unemployment, the central bank may be tempted to cut interest

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Examples of Time Inconsistency

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 23/36

the central bank may be tempted to cut interest rates.

Page 25: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

3. Aid is given to poor countries contingent on fiscal reforms.

The reforms do not occur, but aid is given anyway, because the donor countries do not want the poor countries’ citizens to starve.

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Examples of Time Inconsistency

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 24/36

countries’ citizens to starve.

Page 26: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

a. Constant money supply growth rate

– Advocated by monetarists.

– Stabilizes aggregate demand only if velocity is stable.

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Monetary Policy Rules

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 25/36

stable.

Page 27: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

b. Target growth rate of nominal GDP

– Automatically increase money growth whenever nominal GDP grows slower than targeted;

a. Constant money supply growth rate

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Monetary Policy Rules

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 26/36

nominal GDP grows slower than targeted; decrease money growth when nominal GDP growth exceeds target.

Page 28: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

c. Target the inflation rate

a. Constant money supply growth rate

b. Target growth rate of nominal GDP

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Monetary Policy Rules

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 27/36

– Automatically reduce money growth whenever inflation rises above the target rate.

– Many countries’ central banks now practice inflation targeting, but allow themselves a little discretion.

Page 29: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

c. Target the inflation rate

a. Constant money supply growth rate

b. Target growth rate of nominal GDP

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Monetary Policy Rules

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 28/36

d. The Taylor rule: Target the federal funds rate based on

� inflation rate

� gap between actual & full-employment GDP

Page 30: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

iff = ππππ + 2 + 0.5 (ππππ – 2) – 0.5 (GDP gap)

where

iff = nominal federal funds rate target

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� The Taylor Rule

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 29/36

GDP gap = 100 x

= percent by which real GDP is below its natural rate

Y Y

Y

Page 31: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

iff = ππππ + 2 + 0.5(ππππ – 2) – 0.5(GDP gap)

� If ππππ = 2 and output is at its natural rate, then fed funds rate targeted at 4 percent.

� For each one-point increase in ππππ,

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� The Taylor Rule

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 30/36

� For each one-point increase in ππππ, mon. policy is automatically tightened to raise fed funds rate by 1.5.

� For each one percentage point that GDP falls below its natural rate, mon. policy automatically eases to reduce the fed funds rate by 0.5.

Page 32: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Per

cen

t

8

10

12

Actual

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Federal Funds Rate: Actual & Suggested

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 31/36

0

2

4

6

1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005

Taylor’s Rule

Page 33: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

• A policy rule announced by central bank will work only if the announcement is credible.

• Credibility depends in part on degree of independence of central bank.

14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Central Bank Independence

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 32/36

Page 34: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

aver

age

infl

atio

n14.2) Be by Rule or Discretion?� Inflation and Central Bank Independence

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 33/36

aver

age

infl

atio

n

index of central bank independence

Page 35: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Chapter SummaryChapter Summary

1. Advocates of active policy believe:

– frequent shocks lead to unnecessary fluctuations in output and employment

– fiscal and monetary policy can stabilize the economy

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 34/36

– fiscal and monetary policy can stabilize the economy

2.Advocates of passive policy believe:

– the long & variable lags associated with monetary and fiscal policy render them ineffective and possibly destabilizing

– inept policy increases volatility in output, employment

Page 36: Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy - Marcel · PDF fileN. Gregory Mankiw * Slides based on Ron Cronovich's slides, ... Monetary Policy Rules Chapter 15: ... Advocates of policy rules

Chapter SummaryChapter Summary

3.Advocates of discretionary policy believe:

– discretion gives more flexibility to policymakers in responding to the unexpected

4.Advocates of policy rules believe:

Chapter 15: Stabilization Policy 35/36

4.Advocates of policy rules believe:

– the political process cannot be trusted: Politicians make policy mistakes or use policy for their own interests

– commitment to a fixed policy is necessary to avoid time inconsistency and maintain credibility