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Chapter 15
Credit Derivatives
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 2
BIS Capital Requirements for Credit Derivatives
• Interest rate derivatives total $65 trillion• FX derivatives exceed $16 trillion• Equity derivatives $2 trillion• As of 6/01: credit derivatives = $1 trillion.• Insurance cos. are net suppliers of credit risk
protection. Banks and securities firms are net buyers. Figure 15.1.
• BIS II proposes harmonization of treatment of credit derivatives. “w” factor adjusts risk weight.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 3
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0Banks Securities
FirmsCorporates
Protection PurchasedProtection Sold
InsuranceCompanies
HedgeFunds
Govt/ExportCredit
Agencies
MutualFunds
PensionFunds
Figure 15.1 Breakdown of CDS market participants.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 4
Credit Spread Call Option
• Payoff increases as the credit spread (CS) on a benchmark bond increases above some exercise spread ST.
• Payoff on option = Modified duration x FV of option x (current CS – ST)
• Basis risk if CS on benchmark bond is not closely related to borrower’s nontraded credit risk.
• Figure 15.3 shows the payoff structure.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 5
Payoff
Value of PutOptions onWheat
Payoff onLoan to Farmer
Borrower Assets
B0
Figure 15.2 Hedging the risk on a loan to a wheat farmer.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 6
Payoff
Premium
Credit Spread
ST0
Figure 15.3 The payoff on a credit spread option.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 7
Default Option
• Pays a stated amount in the event of default.
• Usually specifies physical delivery in the event of default.
• Figure 15.4 shows the payoff structure.
• Variation: “barrier” option – if CS fall below some amount, then the option ceases to exist. Lowers the option premium.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 8
Premium
Par Valueof Loan
RepaymentPerformance
No DefaultDefault0
Figure 15.4 A default option.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 9
Breakdown of Credit Derivatives: Rule (2001) British Bankers Assoc Survey
• 50% of notional value are credit swaps• 23% are Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs)• 8% are baskets (credit derivatives based on a small
portfolio of loans each listed individually. A first-to-default basket credit default swap is triggered by the default of any security in the portfolio).
• 6% are credit spread options
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 10
The Total Return Swap
• Swaps fixed loan payment plus the change in the market value of the loan for a variable rate interest payment (tied to LIBOR).
• Figure 15.5 shows the structure.• Table 15.1 shows the cash flows if the fixed loan
rate=12%, LIBOR=11%, and the loan depreciates 10% in value over the year (at swap maturity). Buyer of credit protection (the bank lender) receives 11% and pays out (12% - 10%) = 2% for a net cash inflow of 9%.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 11
OtherFI(Counterparty)
BankLender
One Year LIBOR
Swap
F Loans to
ManufacturingFirm
(PT P0)P0
Figure 15.5 Cash flows on total return swap.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 12
Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
• CDS specifies:– Identity of reference loan
– Definition of credit event (default, restructuring, etc.)
– Payoff upon credit event.
– Specification of physical or cash settlement.
• July 1999: master agreement for CDS by ISDA• Swap premium = CS• Figure 15.6 shows the cash flows on the CDS.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 13
Seller ofCreditProtection
Buyer ofCreditProtection
(e.g. BankLender)
X Basis Points per Year
Credit EventPayment
ZeroNo Credit Event
Loans toCustomers
Figure 15.6 A credit default swap (CDS).
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 14
Pricing the CDS: Promoting Price Discovery in the Debt Market
• Premium on CDS = PD x LGD = CS on reference loan• Decomposition of risky debt prices to obtain PD (see
chapter 5):
• Basis in swap market (CDS premium CS) because:– Noise and embedded options in risky debt prices.– Liquidity premium in debt market.– Default risk premiums in CDS market for counterparty default
risk. Increase as correlations increase and credit ratings deteriorate. Table 15.2.
– High cost of arbitrage between CDS and debt markets.
PD = [1 – (1+RF)/(1+RF+CS)]/(LGD/100)
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 15
Table 15.2CDS Spreads for Different Counterparties
Correlation Between the
Counterparty & Reference Entity
AAA AA A BBB
0.0 194.4 194.4 194.4 194.4 0.2 191.6 190.7 189.3 186.6 0.4 188.1 186.2 182.7 176.7 0.6 184.2 180.8 174.5 163.5 0.8 181.3 176.0 164.7 145.2
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 16
Hedging Credit Risk with Credit Risk Forwards
• Credit forward hedges against an increase in default risk on a loan.• Benchmark bond CSF. MD=modified duration. • Actual CST on forward maturity date.
• Figure 15.8: Hedging loan default risk by selling a credit forward contract. Even if CSF > CST, then there is a maximum cash outflow since CST > 0
Figure 15.7 Payment Pattern on a Credit Forward Agreement Credit Spread at Credit Spread: Credit Spread: End of Forward Seller Buyer Agreement (Bank) (Counterparty) CST > CSF Receives Pays (CST – CSF) x MD x A (CST-CSF) x MD x A CSF > CST Pays Receives (CSF – CST) x MD x A (CSF – CST) x MD x A
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 17
PayoffGain
PayoffLoss
Payoff on Forward Contract
Maximum Valueof Loan
Maximum Losson Credit SpreadForward (CST 0)
Value of Loan/Payoff FromCredit Forwardat Maturity ofForward Contract
CST CSF 0 CST CSF 00
Figure 15.8 Hedging loan default risk by selling acredit forward contact.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 18
Credit SecuritiizationsCLO, CLN, CDO
Since assets remain on the balance sheet, then there is no reduction in capital requirements, except under 1/2002 regulations for securities with recourse, direct credit substitutes, and residual interests supervised by US bank regulators. Sets risk weights from 20% (for AAA and AA rated) to 200% (for BB), but no change for unrated.
• High spreads in ABS market makes cost of financing high for banks.
• Might need borrowers’ consent to transfer loan to a SPV.• Reputational effects: ex. In July 2001, American Express
took a $1 billion charge because default rates on its CDOs were 8% rather than the expected 2%.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 19
Synthetic SecuritizationBISTRO (Broad Index Secured Trust Offering)
• $10 billion loan portfolio backed by $850 million:
• Originating bank buys credit protection with a CDS that absorbs all credit losses after the threshold is met (eg., 1.5% so bank absorbs the first $150 million of losses).
• The BISTRO SPV is securitized with $700 million in US Treasury securities.
• So: holders of the BISTRO do not take credit losses unless the defaults exceed $850 million.
• Can use diversified portfolio (including loan commitments, letters of credit, and trade receivables) not eligible for inclusion in CLOs, CLNs or CDOs.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 20
OriginatingBank
IntermediaryBank
Fee Fee
Senior &Subordinated
Notes
Contingentpayment on lossesexceeding 1.5% ofportfolio
Contingentpayment on lossesexceeding 1.5% ofportfolio
Credit Swap on$10 billion Portfolio
(Under BIS I market risk capital rules, the intermediary bank can use VAR to determine thecapital requirement of its residual risk position.)
Credit Swap on First $700Million of Losses
$700 millionUS Treasury
securities
$700 million
BISTROSPV
Capital MarketInvestors
Figure 15.9BISTRO structure.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 21
Pricing a Credit Linked Note (CLN)
• $100 million 5 year coupon CLN guarantees payment of principal at maturity, but all coupon payments end if a default event occurs. Rf = 5% and CS = 7%
• PV of principal = $100/1.055 = $78.35 million. If selling at par, then PV of coupon payments = $100 – 78.35 = $21.65 million.
Table 15.3 Pricing a Credit-Linked Note Off The Spread Curve
Year Cumulative Probability of
Default
Expected Coupon Payment
Present Value of Coupons
1 7.22% (1-.0722)C .8837C 2 13.91 (1-.1391)C .7808C 3 20.13 (1-.2013)C .6900C 4 25.89 (1-.2589)C .6097C 5 31.24 (1-.3124)C .5388C
Notes: C is the fixed coupon payment on the CLN. The risk-free rate is assumed constant at 5 percent p.a. and the credit spread is fixed at 7 percent p.a. Source: Risk, (2000).
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 22
Appendix 15.1
• In this replication, the investor (swap risk seller):– Purchases a cash bond with a spread of T + Sc for par– Pays fixed on a swap (T + Sc) with the maturity of the cash bond and
receives LIBOR (L)– Finances the position in the repo market at a rate quoted at a spread to
LIBOR (L - x)– Pledges the bond as collateral and is charged a haircut by the repo
counterparty.
• First 2 transactions hedge the interest rate risk. The last 2 transactions reflect the cost of financing the purchase of the risky bond. Fig. 15.10
• The credit risk exposure of the swap seller = Sc – Ss + x which is the spread between the risky bond premium and the swap spread in the fixed-floating market plus the cost of setting up the arbitrage using repos.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 23
CorporateAsset
Investor
Collateral
SwapMarket
CorporateSpread
RepoMarket
$100 T
SwapSpread
Repo Rate(L x)
L
$100*(1-Haircut)
T
Source: Credit Default Swaps, Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner,and Smith, Inc., October 1998, p. 12.
Figure 15.10 Replicate default swap exposure, protectionfor the swap seller.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 24
Appendix 15.2BIS II Capital Regulations for ABS
• Assets can be removed from balance sheet only if there is a “clean break” such that the transferred assets are:– Legally separated from the bank, and– Placed into a SPV, and– Not under the direct or indirect control of the originating bank.
• If there is “implicit recourse” then the bank may not be able to remove assets from balance sheet.
• If the ABS has an early wind down provision, then the originating bank must apply a minimum 10% conversion factor.
• Banks investing in ABS have risk weights ranging from 20% (AAA and AA) to 50% (A+ to A-) to 100% (BBB+ to BBB-) to 150% (BB+ to BB-) to 1250% or a 1-for-1 capital charge if ABS is rated B+ and below
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 25
ABS Regulatory Arbitrage under BIS I and BIS II
• $100 million of BBB loans with capital charge of $8 million.
• Place loans into SPV and sell 2 tranches of ABS. – Tranche 1: $80 m rated AA since only absorb default losses up to 0.3%.
Sold to outside investors.
– Tranche 2: Residual $20m absorb all other credit losses – rated B. Retained by bank.
• Under BIS I, the bank’s capital requirement would be $20m x 8% = $1.6 m, a reduction of $6.4 million.
• Under BIS II, the capital charge on the $20 million tranche would be $20 million (1-for-1), thereby eliminating any arbitrage incentives.
Saunders & Allen Chapter 15 26
$100mBBB
Loans
SPV
Tranche 1$80m of
Loans RatedAA
Investors
Tranche 2$20m of
Loans RatedB
Purchasedby Originating
Bank
Originating Bank
Figure 15.11 Regulatory arbitrage under BIS I.