Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State UniversityFaculty of Social and Political Studies

Centre for Social SciencesRegional Interdisciplinary Master’s Program in Social Sciences

Track: Transformation in the South Caucasus

Shahla Balakishiyeva

Evaluation of the South Caucasus from the perspective of functionalist theory: regionalization and deregionalization from above

Graduate program code: 00.03

Graduate thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Master’s Degree in Social Sciences

Graduate thesis supervisor: Dr. Rovshan Ibrahimov Co-supervisor: Dr. Tinatin Zurabishvili

January, 2009Tbilisi, Georgia

ABSTRACT

The thesis analyzes the regional integration and disintegration processes have emerged in the

South Caucasus since the conquest of the Transcaucasian republics-Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,

by the Soviet empire in 1920 till the present era of independence. The paper dissects regionalization

and deregionalization practices according to functionalism. It is argued that the South Caucasus

experienced regionalization and could be politically and economically regarded a region as a result of

this process, while it was within the Soviet empire. However, after gaining independence, the

deregionalization attempts succeeded, and currently it is impossible to see regional integration both in

economic and political spheres in the South Caucasus. Consequently, the main thesis suggested here is

that at present, the South Caucasus is not a region any more.

Key words: a region, regional integration, regionalization, regional disintegration, deregionalization,

functionalism, neo-functionalism, the South Caucasus, Transcaucasus, the USSR.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BSEC -the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

CPSU -the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

EU - the European Union

GUAM -the cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan. Moldova

NATO -the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SU - the Soviet Union

SSR - the Soviet Socialist Republic

TSFSR - the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

TRASECA -Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Central Asia

USSR - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

1. Introduction...................................................................................... 5

2. Theoretical framework.....................................................................11

2.1. Research pattern......................................................................19

3. Regionalization in the South Caucasus: 1920-1991........................20

3.1. Regionalization in Transcaucasus: the early Soviet and Stalinist era................23

3.1.1. The Lenin era.......................................................................................23

3.1.2. Analysis...............................................................................................26

3.1.3. The Stalin era.......................................................................................28

3.1.4. Analysis................................................................................................32

3.2. The paradox- continued regionalization and sparkling deregionalization in Transcaucasus:

the post-Stalinist era..................................................................................................34

3.2.1. The Khrushchev and Brezhnev era......................................................34

3.2.2. The Gorbachev era...............................................................................39

3.3. Analysis...............................................................................................................41

4. Deregionalization in the South Caucasus since 1991....................................................43

4.1. Daglig-Karabakh conflict and its impact on regional disintegration...................45

4.2. The political-economic relations: the broken side of triangle..............................46

4.2.1. Azerbaijan-Georgia...............................................................................46

4.2.2. Armenia-Georgia...................................................................................48

4.3. Analysis...............................................................................................................50

5. Conclusion..........................................................................................................................52

6. Bibliography......................................................................................................................55

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the era of regionalization, the South Caucasus is accepted as one region by the international

community. This fact is proved by the approaches to the South Caucasus countries by the Western

countries, like the United States and the European Union. Thus, it is frequently stated that there is a

need to increase regional cooperation and integration in the South Caucasus. It seems that these

statements are based on the argument that the South Caucasus countries are geographically contiguous

and these three countries were evaluated as regional countries in the past history. However, insufficient

research was undertaken to elaborate the South Caucasus if it really fits the definition of “a region” in

accordance to different approaches as well as geographic.

In that way, the thesis attempts to find an answer to the following question within the

functionalist theoretical framework. Thus, it tries to explicate regional integration practice in the South

Caucasus during the Soviet era and how a region emerged as a result of this practice. The thesis

endeavors to explain that regional integration in the South Caucasus was the offer from above, and this

process took place in this area, because it was a part of imperialism politics of the Soviet state during

that time. Shortly, it was not an initiative of the regional actors to launch integration process here, as

functionalists suggest, but the planned and shaped policy regulated by the centre in Moscow.

Moreover, the thesis argues that national revival as a result of decentralization politics of the

Soviet government could encourage regional disintegration in the South Caucasus. Thus,

deregionalization in this region was also a consequent of politics of the centre. As the regional

countries, namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia represent different cultures and national

identities, the national awakening in the South Caucasus has drawn them to different directions, but

not to integration. Despite the fact that, national identity could overlap with regionalization (Kacowicz

1998: 14-15), the revival of national sensibility stimulated regional disintegration in the South

Caucasus because of the definite reasons. Firstly, because, national identity could only be recognized if

it was founded on a territory and consequently, linguistic, historic and religious reasons were generally

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ignored starting from the Stalin era, it encouraged the counter-nationalism of the minorities living in

these areas. So, it resulted with self-determination claims or irredentist movements of the ethnic

minorities that worsened the relations between the core nations. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be an example. Secondly, as already mentioned, different

cultures and national identities of the regional nations pushed them apart from each other, rather than

drawing together, after the national revival. Thirdly, a difficult situation both in political and economic

sector in the Soviet Union resulted with nationalist movements of the constituent nations who wanted

to get rid of the Soviet authority, including Soviet type of regional integration in the South Caucasus.

However, the thesis does not exclude the perspective of regional integration in the South

Caucasus. Thus, it suggests that historical experience of regional integration in the South Caucasus can

be a draw roll and lead to regional integration if the impediments in a way of integration are

eliminated. Therefore, different national identities and cultures could not be a serious hindrance in a

way of regionalism in the South Caucasus, if the desire for economic and political benefits through

regional integration exceeds the national sensibility in the three countries. Thus, cultural aspects are

not decisive in regional integration according to functionalists.

This thesis is structured in five chapters. Chapter I presents the purpose of the research,

research questions, hypotheses, research methodology and limitations of the research. Chapter II gives

a theoretical framework of the thesis. As already mentioned, the chapter elaborates regional integration

approaches of neo-functionalism, and its precursor of functionalism. It defines the main criteria for a

region and sketches the research pattern that the analysis of regional integration and disintegration in

the South Caucasus are based on.

Chapter III endeavors to support the argument that the South Caucasus experienced regional

integration process, which as a result could be evaluated as political and economic region during the

Soviet period. Moreover, the following chapter detects the fact that simultaneously, both regional

integration and preliminary regional disintegration processes were witnessed in Transcaucasus after

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the death of Stalin and consequently, decentralization of power in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the

chapter argues that regionalization was centrally planned and it was not happening by voluntary

consent of the participating countries, but coming to deregionalization, it was also matured under the

conditions offered above, which was developed by the regional actors later.

Thus, Chapter IV, in its turn, elaborates deregionalization in the South Caucasus after the

second independence of the regional countries, and the main thesis is that after the revival of national

sensibility in these countries, the regional states had started to move apart from each other. As the

three countries are examples of different cultures and nations, the national revival did not stimulate

their drawing together, but stimulated regional disintegration. Moreover, this chapter states the fact

that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the means for regional integration were disordered and

the newly established states of the South Caucasus began building national infrastructure within their

territories. Besides, the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia halted regional integration in the South

Caucasus, as the trilateral relations do not exist any more. Shortly, this chapter puts the argument in a

way that the South Caucasus could not be regarded as a region, as a result of regional disintegration in

this area.

Chapter V contains conclusions part of the thesis and the issues for further research. This

chapter suggests studying an impact of the great powers on the regional integration and disintegration

of the South Caucasus. Besides, it considers important to elaborate an effect of national revival in

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on their attempts to regional integration and disintegration.

Moreover, it is also useful to dissect the other experiences and attempts to regional integration in the

South Caucasus, like the period before the Bolshevik conquest. Furthermore, the analysis of regional

integration within the theoretical framework of other approaches can be also valuable.

At the end, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement

while preparation of this paper. Besides, I highly appreciate the work of my supervisors, Dr. Ibrahimov

and Dr. Zurabishvili, for their valuable comments and criticizing. I would like also to thank my expert

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interviewees for their contribution to this thesis. Especially, Rauf Rzayev, the partner of Institute of

Economic Reforms under the Ministry of Economic Development of the Azerbaijan Republic.

1.1. Purpose and Research Question

This paper attempts to define if the South Caucasus fits the criteria of a region offered in

functionalism and neo-functionalism theory. As the following theory is regarded more comprehensive

study of regional integration, the thesis endeavors to evaluate regional integration and disintegration in

the South Caucasus, and find an answer to the question whether the South Caucasus is a region as a

result of regional integration in this area according to the mentioned theory.

With this aim, the paper puts the research questions as following:

What are the criteria to be considered a region from the perspective of functionalist/neo-

functionalist theory?

Is the South Caucasus a region for functionalists?

o if yes, what are the stimulating factors to consider the South Caucasus a region?

(regionalization)

o if not, what are the halting factors to consider the South Caucasus a region?

(deregionalization)

1.2. Hypothesis

The following hypotheses will be tested based on the research:

For the preliminary research it was found out that, for functionalists the main criteria remain

geographical proximity, transactions, and a perception of belonging to a definite community and

having a collective regional identity in order to be a region. (Russet 1967: 7; Haas 1970: 101). As

functionalists state, the process of ‘spill over’ is commenced from the initial non-disputed areas and

expands into the other areas. Thus, common features are critical in regionalization.

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Implying the mentioned assumptions, the hypothesis can be developed in a way that currently,

the South Caucasus lacks to be a region according to functionalism. Although, geographic vicinity

exists among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, but it is hard to define the trilateral transactions, and a

perception of common regional identity in the South Caucasus. Besides, there are the other factors that

hinder regionalization process in the south Caucasus like the conflict between Armenia and

Azerbaijan, which will be elaborated during the research as well.

Furthermore, as a case study it is noteworthy to stress that “Transcaucasus” in the Soviet

period could be regarded as a region in accordance to the functionalism/neo-functionalism theory, as

it possessed the features like regional transactions, regional institutions, social and political traditions,

as well as a common regional identity like “Kavkazsi”-Caucasians. However, after the break up of the

Soviet Union, the regional infrastructure was disrupted, as well as eruption of the war between

Armenia and Azerbaijan halted regional integration processes in the South Caucasus.

1.3. Research methodology

The research is based on the qualitative research method, including case studies. Thus, different

literature and works are explored in the thesis. Moreover, traditional methodology is used that takes up

different periods of the South Caucasus as a case in order to explain and analyze the different phases

from the perspective of functionalism/neo-functionalism. So, inductive methodology is used to

evaluate the concrete geographical area-the South Caucasus, from the perspective of general

functionalism/neo-functionalism theory’s specific regional approaches. Furthermore, some expert

interviews are also conducted and are elaborated and stressed in the thesis as well.

1.4. Limitations of the research

The thesis limits its theoretical approach with one single theory-functionalism and even does

not go into deep elaborating the details of the following theory, but only basing on the specific

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approaches about regional integration and the definition of a region. Furthermore, the presented

research comprehensively analyzes the economic and political interstate relations in the South

Caucasus from the conquest of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia by the USSR in 1920 till present and

explains its impact on both regional integration (in the Soviet period-the past) and disintegration

processes (the present). The paper limits its analysis with the following period, as this period witnessed

with the critical changes in the history of regional integration, as well as disintegration in the South

Caucasus.

Besides, it would be critical to analyze a role of the great powers in the regional integration and

disintegration processes of the South Caucasus, however the research takes up only interstate relations

and their effect on regional integration and disintegration. However, it should also be mentioned that

while discussing regional integration in Transcaucasia in the Soviet period, the impact of the Soviet

state on regional integration, is comprehensively discussed, as the thesis argues that it was a part of the

imperialism policy of the Soviet state and regulated from above, not by the local governments

themselves.

Moreover, as the theoretical framework of the research is based within functionalism and neo-

functionalism theory, the interstate relations are elaborated from political and economic aspects.

Thus, functionalists argue the importance of economic factors on formation of regional integration,

which lead to political integration at the end as well.

Furthermore, while researching it was found out that the nationalist movements played an

important role in regional disintegration in the South Caucasus. It would be very useful to conduct a

comprehensive research on correlations between nationalism and regional integration in the South

Caucasus, despite the thesis slightly touches upon this issue, but does not go into deep, as it is not an

object of the paper.

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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Different approaches of integration theories have been frequently discussed in international

relations since the 50s and 60s of the last century. However, it should also be mentioned that regional

integration is not a new phenomenon. There were a lot of unions, associations, federations,

confederations, leagues, councils and their like throughout history.

The first example of regional integration appeared in the nineteenth century, when Prussia

established a customs union with Hesse-Darmstadt in 1828. This model spread through almost all

Europe and new political and economic unions were created in the different parts of the Continent.

During this period even some figures emerged who advocated for the united Europe, but the ideas and

projects did not come into play. (Mattli1999:1).

Some decades later, the project of European integration re-emerged and the process of uniting

European countries through economic and political integration was launched. The corresponding

integration process in the Continent passed through different steps. The first phase was commenced

through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community between France and Germany in

1952, and later this unification was strengthened by joining of Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and the

Netherlands after signing the Treaty of Rome which founded the European Community in 1957. These

steps were expanded through the next integration processes-accession of new European countries to

the European Community in the 70s, 80s and 90s. The Community had been based on the trade, but

later, with the creation of the European Monetary System in 1979, the following integration moved to

the financial cooperation as well. The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 brought the new spirit of integration

to the Community making this system political as well, hence European Monetary and Political Union

was created. Later, in 1993 this Community was renamed as the European Union (EU), which

currently extends its members and spheres of cooperation throughout Europe and neighboring

countries. (Mattli 1999: 2).

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It is also worthwhile to stress that the rise in the integration studies in 1950s and 1960s was not

only related with regional integration in Europe, but also in a lot of parts of the globe during this

period. Establishment of the Latin American Free Trade Association, the Andean Pact, and the Central

American Common Market in American Continent in 1960s, the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) in Asian Continent in 1967, the Southern African Customs Union in 1969 in

African Continent stimulated not only further steps of integration in this regional institutions, but also

encouraged the creation of new ones with different functions. (Bhagwati1991:71; Fawcett&

Hurrell1995:14-16; Mattli1999: 3-9).

The spread of regionalism throughout the world affected its study as well. Thus, the appearance

of major studies on regional integration in the late 1950s made integration theory conspicuous among

the contemporary approaches to the study of international relations. Under integration theory different

scholars endeavored to explain the processes of regionalization happening at that time.

The father of one of the integration approaches-functionalism, David Mitrany, gives the

technical nature to integration in everyday terms, which also carries the long-term normative approach.

His thoughts about transnational economic binds, spillover, mutual cooperation, and community spirit

seemed both rational and morally inspiring. According to Jean Monnet, one of the prominent

proponents of functionalism, “the most mundane facts took on major significance”. The ordinary acts

of everyday life –of production, business, and voluntary associations-could establish the new way of

cooperation among countries. Mitrany’s Working Peace System (1966) became a bible of functionalist

theory and practice. This theory can be considered even the precursor in integration studies as Mitrany

wrote first in 1943, later improving his paper under the same name in 1966.

Classic functionalism developed by Mitrany argues that a human being is rational and will

value an opportunity of cooperation if it brings to him benefit. As a father of integration theory Karl

Deutsch, Mitrany also concentrates on human factor in cooperation. Thus, functionalism argues that

man is sufficiently rational to make a choice between important and subsidiary ends, who will choose

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the later to achieve the former. Man by evolution understands not to kill, rather prefers peace, law and

order. Moreover, this theory accuses the organization of the system as well, claiming that the crudely

organized system causes poverty, misery and despair which are the sources of war. Hence, the system

is built upon suspicion and anarchy, national sovereignty and national exclusivism. (Mitrany 1966)

However, Mitrany argues that building ‘peace by pieces’ through functional organizations will

gradually achieve global unity and make obsolete the mulish nation-states. His program of ‘peace by

pieces’ through functional organizations is built on identifying those aspects of human needs that exist

outside the realm of the political, but rather built on technical and ‘non-controversial’ functions such as

economic, social and technical. (Mitrany 1966). His program stresses experts-technocrats as key actors

and states that integration by politicians is unlikely because states do not seek to surrender their

sovereignty, but technocrats are responsible of ‘sharing sovereignity’ in less controversial areas in

technical organizations. (Mitrany1966: 30, 59). Mitrany argues that this logic is practicable because

integration here is built on non-politicalized and non-controversial functions, in contrast with

federalism or other politicalized attempts to bring integration, which threaten nation-states who are

jealous about sovereignty. (Mitrany 1966: 59).

Mitrany’s plan emphasizes not the immediate sources of national insecurity, but as he suggests,

the subsidiary ends like transnational cooperation in technical areas, especially social and economic, as

a way to promote integration at international level. He believes that cooperation in economics and

social needs will ultimately expand into politics achieving political unification by the chief dynamic

mechanism –spillover. This political unification will cause a new international society which is based

upon function rather than territory. (Mitrany 1966). As Kumar observes “Mitrany visualized a working

peace system which would be dependent not on threats, but on a web of common needs and interests

which were satisfied by mutually acceptable and highly participatory means” (Kumar 1998: 31). By

one sentence of Mitrany “functionalism in essence means just that: a direct attack on problems, mutual

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problems, as such; in the process building up, sector by sector, effective positive rules of international

government”. (Mitrany 1971: 543)

“Functional arrangements can be adapted...using every dimension-regional or local or

universal-that suits the nature of the task and the conditions of the moment.” (Mitrany1971:541). Thus,

he argues that regional cooperation is an intermediate stage which will end by coagulating into

universal union. (Mitrany 1971:534-535). Inspiring the success of President Roosevelt’s New Deal

experiments in regional co-operation, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, he saw no reason why

such domestic practices could not be adapted internationally. (Griffiths:192) However, it should also

be mentioned that he does not in depth theoretically explain regional integration, rather focusing on

international, sub-national and transnational functional institutions as observed by Groom. (Kumar

1998: 29).

Moreover, Mitrany criticizes political unification attempts both in regional and international

dimension arguing their failing. He claims that it is self-evident that political integration can be

achieved within a limited dimension; the higher is the number of units to be integrated, the more

suspicious their success. As variety of units increases, the internal hindrances and pressures intensify

against political integration. (Mitrany 1971: 535). Regional integration is studied more systematically

by neo-functionalism, what is discussed below.

Neo-functionalism, building upon the systematic critique of functionalism, does not constitute a

radical break with its precursor. Its father is considered Ernst Haas with his The Uniting of Europe

(1958). Although Haas retained much principles of functionalism, he also came apart from some main

thoughts of his predecessor. Disagreeing with Mitrany, he argues that a society is not homogenous

rather than is dominated by competition among interests. Thus, he becomes more conspicuous about

interest groups who, for him, play an important role in integration. He stresses that integration results

from an institutionalized pattern of interest politics as these groups convince to follow their interests in

the institutions. (Kumar 1998: 35)

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Moreover, in contrast with functionalism, Haas argues that psychology of elites is highly

important in integration process, than psychology of population. Thus, this makes another difference

between the two theories that while classical functionalism is favoring community model, neo-

functionalism is favoring state-model of integration-supranational community as an end-product.

(Kumar 1998: 35)

Furthermore, as it is also obvious from above, neo-functionalists are concerned about formal

institutions, where functionalists favor vise versa. Thus, in contrast with functionalists, neo-

functionalists also admire political factors in integration process. Haas argues that there is a need for

both political and non-political actors, since technical organizations can only expand in scope and in

number if they have political support. (Haas 1964, Ch. 2)

Moreover, Haas argued that spillover from one sector of economy to the other sectors can

happen even independently. He argued that “sector integration ...begets its own impetus toward

extension to the entire economy even in the absence of specific group demands and their attendant

ideologies”. (1958: 297). Furthermore, he states in his essay of International Integration: The

European and the Universal Process (1961) that functional specificity eases the progress toward

political community. He claims that “it is not enough to be concerned with the reduction of trade

barriers”, but implementing very specific tasks such as “creating a common market for narrowly

defined products, unifying railway rates...” (p. 372).

He developed a theory that explained how integration took place, as for him, economic

interdependence would be enough to produce demands for closer inter-governmental co-operation,

where Mitrany’s language was vague. (Griffiths: 181). Haas defines integration as ‘the process

whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties,

expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or

demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’. (1966: 94).

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In contrary with Mitrany, Haas concentrated on regional integration, than universal and he tried

to find out background factors for regional integration analyzing European Community as a model.

Haas describes three background factors which generates integration: the voluntarily participating

units should possess pluralistic social structures, be economically and industrially developed, and

should have common ideological patterns. (1961: 374).

Later, Haas and Schmitter tried to develop a conceptual framework or a model of regional

integration applicable not only in Europe, but also in every part of the globe. These two scholars

endeavored to develop three types of variables those are assessable in the different times of

integration: background factors, at the time of union and process factors. As it was already mentioned

Haas argued in favor of three background factors that eases integration process. In their joint analysis

Schmitter added more variables to the background factors like the size and power of units joining in

the economic union, the rate of transaction among the participants, extent of social pluralism within

the units, and elite complementarity. Furthermore, they included the other variables at the time of

union, namely degree of shared governmental purposes, and powers delegated to the union. Later they

added process conditions, such as decision-making style, post-integration rate of transactions, and

adaptability of governments in situations of disappointment and crisis. The scholars suggested

separately assessing the following variables and determining what directions integration can lead, and

what results can be expected. The higher the attained result, the more likely it is that an economic

union will be transformed into a political union. (Haas and Schmitter 1964: 274). The lower the result,

the less is the possibility for automatic spillover or the move from economic to political union.

(Hansen 1969: 244).

Another neo-functionalist Leon Lindberg affected by Haas while analyzing the EC in his The

Political Dynamics of European Integration (1963). However, he more clearly describes integration as

“1) the process whereby nations forgo their desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic

politics independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the

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decision-making process to new central organs; and 2) the process whereby political actors in several

distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center.”

(1963: 6). Lindberg developed the concept of ‘collective decision-making’ what can be considered one

of the important aspects of regional integration efforts.

Later Lindberg joined another neo-functionalist, Scheingold, in Europe’s Would-Be Polity

(1970) bringing system analysis to neo-functionalism while analyzing the Empty Chair Crisis

happened in the EC in the mid-1960. They build their analysis on David Easton’s model (1965)

studying the EC as a political system, where inputs in the form of demands, support and leadership are

transformed into outputs in the form of policies and decisions.

Among the later attempts to improve neo-functionalism J.S. Nye with his Peace in Parts (1971)

should also be mentioned. Nye discussed seven process mechanisms such as external actors, rising

transactions, functional linkages, deliberate linkages, regional group formation, elite socialization, and

identitive appeal. (1971: 64-75). These factors were not either touched upon at all or were

insufficiently analyzed before by the early neo-functionalists. The influence of external actors in

integration process can be regarded one of the critical factors that Nye opened in his research. Nye also

developed system analysis of integration initiated by Lindberg and Scheingold before, where he

mentioned the role of groups demanding or hampering integration and supply from decision-makers

responding to this demand, as well as feedback of the system. (ed.Finn Laursen 2003 :10).

Neo-functionalism stirred up further regional integration studies. The scholars like J.Galtung

(1973), who studied the EC as a superpower in the making with his structural theory; R.Hansen

(1969), who studied integration processes in the Third World Countries; Moravscik (1991), who

studied the role of national interests and domestic politics in integration processes; Sandholz and Stone

Sweet (1998), who put emphasis on supranational institutions; Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996), who

concerned with multi-level governance, as well as neo-institutionalist approaches to integration studies

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by Pollack, Pierson (1996), Schneider and Aspinwall (2001) can be listed as the later studies of

integration theory.

These studies have analyzed different aspects of regional integration. While discussing regional

integration a new and very important question arises: what is a region? Actually, there is no precise

answer to this question. If we thumb through the literature of regionalism, we will find different

approaches to and definitions of a region there.

However, while summarizing regional approaches of neo-functionalists which dissected

regional integration more comprehensively it should be briefly stated that the relative cultural,

economic, political, ideological and geographic similarities within a region lends itself to more

effective organization. Although there is no single definition of a region even according to neo-

functionalists, but from this generalization the basic definition of a region can be given like a group of

states possessing similar or the same cultural, economic, political, ideological and geographic features

and having a definite degree of mutual interdependence among each other. Thus, the main criteria in

all definitions remain geographical proximity, transactions, and a perception of belonging to a definite

community and having a collective regional identity. (Russet 1967: 7; Haas 1970: 101).

According to neo-functionalists regions can also be identified in the different configurations:

geographical criteria-grouping nation-states according to their continental location, landform etc.;

military/political criteria-grouping nation-states on the basis of their participation in alliances, ideology

and political structures; economic criteria-grouping nation-states according to their economic

development, economic transactions; language criteria, criteria of religion, culture, population density,

and climate. It is also possible to group nation-states according to two or more definitions listed above.

(Kumar 1998: 43). Van Langenhove shortly defines a region ‘as something that every area on earth

can be, given suitable historical, geographical, economic, cultural and social conditions.’ (2003: 6).

MacFarlane, in his turn, defines a region as a physical space distinct from neighbors’ space as a result

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of identity-history, culture, language, religion, transactions-exchange of people, goods, and services,

institutions-ideology, political structure, and perceptions.1

Kocawicz adds more common features to a definition like: social and cultural homogeneity;

similar political attitudes or external behavior toward third parties; common political institutions, as an

expression of political interdependence; economic interdependence; common behavioral criteria, such

as the identification of norms pertaining to conflict management and resolution. (1998: 9-10).

Moreover, it is noteworthy to stress that a region is also a regional security complex that tightens the

relations of the regional states by common security problems. (Buzan 1991: 188-189).

Regionalization in its turn, is the growth of societal integration in a given region, as well as the

undirected processes of social and economic interaction among the participating units. (Hurrel in Eds.

Hurrel & Fawcett 1995: 39). It is the inclination or process to form regions. However, Haas states

regionalization as a political process in different from regional integration. Formation of regions can

be achieved by different ways-artificial or natural. Regionalization or regional integration is one of

these processes that form regions. Thus, the thesis deals with this specific method of formation of

regions.

Similarly, regionalism is the process appeared in a given geographical region by which state

and non-state actors share definite fundamental values and norms. Besides, these actors participate in a

growing network of economic, cultural, scientific, diplomatic, political, and military and other

functional interactions. (Mace & Therien 1996: 2).

2.1. Research pattern

The thesis evaluates the South Caucasus as a regional subsystem. Furthermore, as the target of

the research is to find out if the South Caucasus a region or not, as a result of the integration and

disintegration processes happening here, so, a region is dissected as an end-product of the integration

1 The interview with Dr. Neil MacFarlane, Head of Department of IR at St. Anne’s College at Oxford University, was conducted on May 23, 2008 in Tbilisi, Georgia

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processes occurred at regional level. However, regional integration is analyzed as both an end-product

and process in the paper.

Moreover, as the thesis evaluates the following processes according to classic and neo-

functionalist approach, its theoretical evaluation is based on the generalized definitions of a region

according to the both theories, especially to neo-functionalism, which explicates regional integration

more comprehensively.

Regional integration and regionalization is used interchangeably in the thesis, as both of them

leads to the integration at regional level. Though, Haas defines regionalization as the politicalized

attempt of regional integration, it does not retains to use the term in the thesis, as it is explicated that

the processes of regional integration were highly politicalized in the South Caucasus, which will be

discussed in the next chapters. Besides, regional disintegration and deregionalization is used

equivalently in the paper, as both of them also leads to falling apart of the regional actors.

Furthermore, the thesis dissects the specific time frame covering the Soviet and post-Soviet

period and argues that the South Caucasus experienced both regional integration and disintegration

during this time. The work limits its analysis with political and economic interstate configurations of

the three countries-Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the South Caucasus, explicating them within

regional integration/disintegration approaches of functionalism and neo-functionalism theory.

3. REGIONALIZATION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

(1920-1991)

The South Caucasus is a mountainous and one of the most important geopolitical areas of

Eurasia. More precisely, the South Caucasus covers the southern part of the Caucasus Mountains

bridging between Europe and Asia. The southern portion of the Greater Caucasus Mountain range

spans from the southwestern Russia going to the south- the edge of Turkey and Armenia, the space

lying between the Black and Caspian Seas. The South Caucasus, is a part of the entire Caucasus

20

geographical region dividing the Eurasia into two parts. Caucasus is rich in natural resources, such as

coal, oil, natural gas, and the metals like iron, copper, lead, tungsten, manganese, molybdenum, and

zinc. (The World Book Encyclopedia 2001: 317). The South Caucasus covers 186.100 km2 area

containing three countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in this small space. (Shahin 2001:

33).

The South Caucasus is also referred to as Transcaucasia, or the Transcaucasus (Za Kavkazye in

Russian) as Sabanadze states “reflected the Russian geographical position and literally meant ‘beyond

or behind the Caucasus’, as the three republics were seen from the northern perspective of Russia.

Recently, the term South Caucasus has came into use in order to more accurately describe the region

and as Tishkov points out that “the historical name of the region Transcaucasus has been questioned by

the proponents of new political correctness who wish to create a mantle distance from Russia.

Consequently, the region is being renamed the South Caucasus.” (Sabanadze 2002: 3; Tishkov 1999:

4).

Azerbaijanis are mostly Shiite Muslims to the south, and Georgians and Armenians are two

different schisms of Christianity-Orthodox and Gregorian-Orthodox to the northern west and the

southern west correspondingly. Moreover, the languages of these three nations in this geographic

region differ completely, as Azerbaijani language belongs to Altay-Turk, Armenians to Indo-European

and Georgians to Indo-Caucasian language groups each having separate alphabets.(Smith, et al. 1998:

169).

Griffin calls Caucasus ‘a jagged land’ surrounded with the powerful neighbors like Iran to the

south, Russia to the north, Turkey to the west, hemmed by the Black and Caspian Seas. He stresses

that all the great conquerors like Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, Tamerlane, a caravan of Persian

kings, Peter the Great, Hitler, Stalin have claimed conquest of the Caucasus leaving their legacies

which make the history of this land very complicated. (2001:1-2). The recent conqueror of the

Caucasus was the Soviet Union that this chapter comprehensively discusses.

21

The interest of the Russian empire in the South Caucasus is very old, and the following desire

was firstly realized during the Russia-Iran war in 1804-1813, when Russian Empire occupied Kartli

and Kakheti, Southern Dagestan and Northern Azerbaijan khanates. During the second war with Iran,

in 1826-1828, Russia annexed Irevan and Nakhchivan khanates. Since that period the South Caucasus

was annexed to Russian Empire. (Ibrahimov 2008: 11-12). The South Caucasus was divided into the

following administrative units: Sukhum (Abkhazia), Kutaisi, and Zakataly territories-okrugs, Batum

and Kars regions, Tbilisi, Elizavetpol (Ganja), Erivan (Yerevan), Guba and Baku provinces-

guberniyas within the Russian empire. After the October 1917 revolution, these territories were taken

by the Transcaucasian Diet on 10 February 1918. (Avetisian in eds. Coppieters, Zverev & Trenin

1998: 75-76).

Later, as a result of the fight against the Bolshevik rule in the empire, the Diet declared its

independence under the name of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. The legislative

body of the newly founded state was the Transcaucasian Diet, and the executive body was the

Transcaucasian Commissariat. Later, the Diet began acting independently, when it did not recognize

the People Commissariat Government in Petrograd. (Ibrahimov 2008: 11-12).

Being part of the Russian empire within the single federative unit has strengthened the social,

political and economic relations among these countries, which can be considered very critical in

regional integration. Thus, formation of a region in the South Caucasus goes beyond the conquest in

1920, which had shaped the regional interactions among the three countries within the USSR.

However, the grounding regional interactions were not only established within the single federative

unit, but independently as well.

Nevertheless, later, in May 1918 the republics started to declare their independence due to the

national misunderstandings in the Federal Diet. In a short period of independence the Transcaucasian

republics achieved to build their nation-states. Even in 1920, these republics achieved the recognition

by the international community. Thus, the Entente recognized the independence of the three South

22

Caucasus states during the Paris, London and San Remo (January-April 1920) conferences. (Avetisian

in eds. Coppieters, Zverev & Trenin 1998: 90). However, this independence lasted shortly and all the

three countries were defeated by the Red Army in 1920-21.

3.1. Regionalization in Transcaucasus: the early Soviet and Stalinist era

3.1.1. The Lenin era

After the Bolshevik conquest of the Transcaucasian nations and loss of their independence

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia faced a challenge of being separate Soviet states. It was not clear

how to organize the Soviet federation at that time. Lenin decided to organize newly established

federation from the sovereign nations and autonomous units depending on their economic and political

stage of development in 1920. (Petersen in eds. Ole Hoiris & Sefa Martin Yurukel 1998: 40). As the

existing condition of the Transcaucasian republics did not allow them survive separately, it was

critically important for them to be unified. These countries would receive bread and the other food

stuff from the Soviet Russia, as well as Georgia and Armenia would import oil from Azerbaijan. This

interdependence among the Transcaucasian countries pushed them to regional integration and caused

their unification under the political unit-Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (TSFSR).

(Altstadt 1992:114).

On 9 April 1921 Lenin’s telegraph to Ordzhonikidze, the emissary of Central Soviet power in

the Caucasus, to create a regional (oblast’) economic organ for all Transcaucasia that would stimulate

further political unification and control, was launched by the latter in the fundamental fields as railroad

and trade. In the beginning the local governments were against of economic integration as it was a

challenge to their sovereignty. Though Armenia and Georgia agreed with Ordzhonikidze at the end,

Narimanov, the chief of Soviet People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan SSR at that time, in Azerbaijan

still opposed. The former visited Baku and tried to convince the latter that their national railroad

systems were too puny to be separately effective. Moreover, trade should also be unified in order to

23

meet the threats of competition. (Altstadt 1992: 114-115). Ordzhonikidze stressed that “The

Azerbaijan and Georgian republic must assume the task of supplying Armenia”. (Kharmandarian

1969: 129). These words did not convince Azerbaijanis as they were afraid that while feeding its

neighbors, a high portion of Azerbaijani population were starving at home. They were concerned if

this integration would benefit some and damage the other republics. (Altstadt 1992: 114-115).

However, Ordzhonikidze stated that “no republic will be offended.” (Kharmandarian 1969: 131).

Though Narimanov continued to oppose the integration plan (Narimanov 1923: 71-77),

AzCP plenum passed the resolution about the railroad and trade unification. In April trading of the

three republics were unified. On 2 May 1921 customs barriers among the following states were lifted.

In June customs tariffs with the neighboring countries were also removed. (eds. Gandilov &

Mammadov 2002: 128). Next steps toward economic integration were continued. (Altstadt 1992:115-

116). Thus, in August 1921 an Economic Bureau of Transcaucasian Republics was proposed to be

created to regulate agricultural commissariats of the republics. Thus in the same month the financial

policies of the three republics were unified and a single currency was proposed to be printed. The

currency of TSFSR was put in circulation on 10 January 1923. (Altstadt 1992:115-116). Later, the

bank systems were unified and Georgian State Bank was recognized as “a Bank for all Transcaucasia”.

(eds. Gandilov & Mammadov 2002: 128).

However, the border issues of Azerbaijan were a matter of discussion, especially Zangezur,

Nakhchivan and Karabagh that Armenia claimed to. (Altstadt 1992: 117-118). The Karabagh problem

was solved in July 1921 in the “broadened plenum” of the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian

Communist Party Central Committee (Kavbiuro), remaining in the territory of AzSSR (Kharmandarian

1969: 105-107), though it did not halt Armenian demands for an independent administration in

Karabagh region (Zverev in ed. Coppieters 1996: Ch.1.2).

Despite of the struggle for the territories of Azerbaijan by Armenia, the Soviet government

continued the integration process in Transcaucasia, even advancing to the political unification level.

2 See online: http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0102.htm. Retrieved January 29, 2009.

24

As it was stated above political unification would achieve control over economic and political

integration of Transcaucasian republics promoting their support of each other. So in 12 March 1922

the TSFSR was created. The TSFSR Soviet had jurisdiction over military, financial, foreign affairs and

trade, communication and transportation, the battle against counterrevolution, and economic policies

of indigenous republics. The representatives of the three republics were represented in the Executive

Committee of the TSFSR and they were chairing the meetings of the Soviet by turn. (Ibrahimov 2008:

14-15).

As it was stated by Ibrahimov that formation of TSFSR was a gradual process and it passed

through several stages. (2008: 14). Altstadt also stresses that the process of creation of TSFSR lasted a

long phase- from March till December 1922. (1992:120). As on 10 December 1922 the last stage of

unification was achieved in Baku officially declaring the unification of the three Transcaucasian

republics under federation and on 30 November the constitution of the USSR entitled “Basic Points of

the Constitution of the USSR” was adopted by the following three states organizing the governing

bodies of TSFSR. (Ibrahimov 2008:15). Consequently, despite of some disputes, the independent

republics of Transcaucasia lost their sovereignty. (Altstadt 1992:120). After the Lenin’s proposal of

creation of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), these three Transcaucasian republics joined

it under the newly established TSFSR, but not separately. (Ibrahimov 2008:15).

3.1.2. Analysis

Thus, integration process was completed according to Haas’s definition of integration. As the

scholar defines integration as ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings

are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger

center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’ (Haas

25

1966: 94), TSFSR republics also surrendered their sovereignty, that includes independent activity in

political, military, economic and other sectors, to the higher centre under the newly established

federation. Ibrahimov calls this integration as the EU model integration that was achieved step by step

and represents uniqueness for that period in the region as well as in the world. (2008:14).

As Ernest Haas stressed in his work that economic interdependence was enough to produce

demands for closer inter-governmental co-operation (Griffiths: 181), the Lenin plan suggested in 1920

also aimed to achieve regional integration by the economic support among the Transcaucasian

republics. Moreover, Haas argued that the sector integration spills over the entire economy even in the

absence of specific group demands and their attendant ideologies. (1958: 297). It is a fact that the

proposal made by Lenin to bring the three republics to the same level of economic development, as

well as to achieve their economic support to each other, including from Russia, and to regionally unify

trade and rails of these states in this way was spilled over (it was pushed from above, but not

voluntarily as Haas states) to the other sectors even without the will and demand of the governing

elites of the participating countries. Altstadt states that “creation of TSFSR relied on 1) a growing

degree of central control over Caucasian administration, economy and trade; 2) the supremacy of the

party over the state apparatus; and 3) the use of propaganda and “public discussion” to make central

decisions palatable.” (1992: 121).

Thus TSFSR was a centralized power that promoted Bolsheviks to control all the sectors in the

Transcaucasia, including security. Moreover, this centralization from above made the Transcaucasian

republics to regionally integrate and merge in a regional political unit. Though the strife among the

participating units, the experience of sharing power in the TSFSR bodies caused the representatives of

the three republics to come together and discuss the disputed issues, as well as support each other even

it was the order from above. The following experience opened a way for the further regionalization

and deepened the ties among the countries in the South Caucasus under Stalin rule in the future.

26

It again proves that Lenin’s model of regional integration in the South Caucasus at that time,

created a good background for future regional activities in the following region, as well as promoted

the South Caucasus to be regarded as a region according to the functionalist definitions mentioned in

the previous chapter of the thesis. However, it is another research question if this model was successful

enough or not. But it can still be stated that this model could not eliminate, but just mitigate the

struggles among the national governments under the suppression from the centre. The dispute between

Armenia and Azerbaijan over some territories still was an issue under this model of regional

integration. This proves again the non-voluntary participation of the regional countries in this

integration process that was propelled by the big fist of Moscow, of which the regional nations waited

for weakening in order to be released.

Moreover, if regional integration in the South Caucasus in Lenin period is briefly analyzed

according to Haas and Schmitter model here, it can be concluded that the background factors that this

model states either lacked or were very low to lead to the successful regional integration. Thus

economically and industrially developed participating units that Haas puts as precondition for

successful regional integration is absent in this period, as Russia materially supported the republics of

Transcaucasus, as well as the participating republics were pushed to be economically interdependent

because of the reason to bring them the same level of development.

It is hard to tell about pluralistic social structures in this period, because everything was

centrally controlled in the society. It should also be mentioned that this control even was deepened

more in the Stalin era. Elite complementarity that stressed as a criterion for successful regional

integration was also taken under control by Stalin later, as the elites were repressed during the “great

purges” of Stalin.

Shortly, the background preconditions put by Schmitter and Haas for regional integration were

not high in the South Caucasus during the Lenin era. Even though, the South Caucasus achieved to be

27

economically and politically integrated, resulting with ‘state model’ of integration-federation, and to

be regarded as a region in this period.

3.1.3. The Stalin era

Regionalization commenced by Lenin was continued by its successor, Stalin, after his death in

1924. Thus, Stalin’s suggested regionalism in the South Caucasus was a part of the regionalism plan

implemented all over the Soviet empire, but the similarities in the paths of economic development, as

well as industrialization and collectivization policies, and economic interdependence created under the

TSFSR pushed the separate three republics of Transcaucasia act regionally even under the Stalin rule.

After the solution of national border quarrels between Azerbaijan and Armenia in TSFSR, in

1936 (Zverev in ed. Coppieters 1996: Ch.1) a historical moment reached to incorporate the

Transcaucasian republics to the Soviet Union separately. According to “the Stalin constitution” in

1936 each republic as well as autonomous republics became part of the USSR. Thus the TSFSR was

dissolved in 19363. Moreover, Stalin was against the complex state structure. He was firmly convinced

that there is no way to separate the independence of Soviet Republic from autonomous national

territory. (Petersen in eds. Ole Hoiris & Sefa Martin Yurukel 1998: 40). Thus, after the dissolution of

TSFSR the three Transcaucasian republics: Azerbaijan SSR, Armenia SSR, Georgia SSR became

integral parts of the SU in 19364.

Stalin also replaced Lenin’s New Economic Policy, allowing some private activity, small

businesses to act for private profit while the state continued to control banks, foreign trade, and large

industries, by centrally controlled “Five-Year Plans” in the second half of the 1920s. (Gaynor & Esler

2007: 483). These plans aimed at the state guided industrialization and collectivization of agriculture.

Thus, the strong socio-economic ties among the Transcaucasian republics-Azerbaijan SSR,

Nakhchivan ASSR, Nagorno-Karabagh autonomous oblast, Gerogia SSR, Abkhaz and Adjaria ASSR,

3 1936: Creation of the Ethnic Republics. Retrieved January 28, 2009 from http://soviethistory.org/index.php?page=subject&SubjectID=1936ethnic&Year=19364 Ibid.

28

South Ossetian autonomous oblast and Armenia SSR had been already established during the Lenin

period, constituted the TransCaucasus economic district -Zakavkazskiy ekonomicheskiy rayon, under

the Stalin rule, one of the most powerful and important economic districts in the Soviet Union.

(Gahrton March, 2001: 2).

The district was specialized in oil and chemical industry, metallurgy, production of some

machineries, sub-tropic agriculture and food industry. The republics of Transcaucasia supported each

other with the following products. Morever, these republics were contained by the unified energy

system. This unified system was critical due to the reason that it provided the republic with energy

resources who experienced the shortage for the definite reasons. Furthermore, the natural gas demand

of these three republics was met by the other integral states of the Soviet Union. (Stroyev,

Kovalevskaya & Rom 1982: 195-198).

Industrialization increased modernization, as well as urbanization in the Soviet society, which

were very critical factors in local elite complementarity. However, it should also be mentioned that the

cultural basis of the constituent nations were created according to the rules of the centre. Thus Stalin

regulated “cultural construction” serving Bolshevik ideology, severe centralization in planning and

administration, as well as building the non-alternative and unshared authority of the Communist party

in the society. (eds. Gandilov & Mammadov 2002: 138). It proves that the regional integration

processes were not distinct from the Lenin era’s in this period and still the process was not voluntary,

but centrally planned.

Besides, the economic integration policies, the three republics were embraced by the

Transcaucasus Military District, of which formation traces its history to 1921, when the three republics

of the Transcaucasia were incorporated into the USSR. However, in 1936 the District was reorganized

and during the World War II it became the Transcaucasus Front. The existence of the district lasted till

the demise of the Soviet Union. (Lenskii 2000: 151-152). The fact proves that as in the Lenin era, also

29

during the Stalin era and later till the end of the USSR, military policy of the Transcaucasus states was

centralized and regionalized.

As already mentioned, Stalin was very careful in “cultural construction” in the constituent

republics. Stalin in different from Lenin, who was much tolerant to the national cultures of the

participating republics and did not implement “reforms” of alphabets, languages, and education, Stalin

intolerantly “reformed” them. Lenin aimed growing up revolution in each republic by developing

economic, political and social conditions in the Transcaucasus republics. In this way he developed

cooperation of the three countries in economic function, which increased interdependence among the

Transcaucasian states bringing them to federalization or political unification that would regulate

regionalization process here. However, Stalin was also concerned with the cultural side of integration.

Latinization kept in some countries in the Lenin period was halted and replaced by Cyrillic

alphabet in 1937 during the “great purges”, as it would facilitate learning Russian. Officially Cyrillic

replaced all the alphabets in January 1940, the script slightly differing in each. This reform included

Azerbaijanis as well, as the alphabet had used to be Latin till the reform of Stalin. (Altstadt 1992:124;

Grant 1995: 97; Cornell 2002a: 76-77). Besides, ‘Russification’ policy implemented in all Soviet

republics pushed the peoples to learn Russian promoted to forget mother tongues and detach them

from their past (John DClare).

The change in the alphabets brought artificially and deliberately created differences in the

languages as well. The new words that were officially used like partiia, respublika, sovet, etc.

substituted Azerbaijani, Georgian and Armenian words. Moreover, not only new words were included,

but also the histories of the languages were changed declaring them ‘separate and distinct’, which also

in its turn changed the nations’ names like Azerbaijani instead of Turki. (Altstadt 1992: 124; ed. Suny

1996: 403). This amendment does not deeply touch the Armenians and Georgians because they were

unique and separate nations in the South Caucasus as well as in the Soviet Union, however, Turks

covered Uzbeks, Turkmens, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, etc. who organized a high portion of the

30

population (11 percent according to World Geography 1992: 375) in the Soviet empire calling threat

inside and from outside as Turkish Republic Turks were anti-Bolshevik.

Moreover, nationalist and sentimental literature was attacked in this period, especially after

1927. Besides, atheist Soviet empire prohibited any religious rituals within its territory. All these

measures by Stalin suppressed nationalist revival and merged different nations under the single Soviet

rule (John DClare).

One of the critical reforms that promoted building a “Soviet person” was educational “reforms”

that brought communist ideology, class struggle and proletarian leadership to the education sector after

January 1925, all-union conference of teachers. It had also an immense role in integration of Soviet

people, as well as in Transcaucasia. Thus teachers accepted a party leadership in “cultural

construction”, ‘strengthening the class basis of education and spreading communist values, creating

stronger ties to the village, establishing social organizations for workers, establishing the school

system on the basis of polytechnicum: every boy and girl by age seventeen should have a basic general

and polytechnic education’. (Altstadt 1992:124-125). All these “communization”, “proletarianization”,

“technicumization” established a basis of shared values in integration of nations in the Soviet Union,

as well as playing an enormous role in bringing together Transcaucasus nations from the social and

cultural perspective and opening a way for regionalization. Thus, the economically and politically

interdependent and integrated republics of the TSFSR were brought together by social and cultural

means as well in the Stalin era.

3.1.4. Analysis

Stalin completed regional integration of the South Caucasus countries launched under the Lenin

rule, not under the sub-single political unit (TSFSR) as Lenin did, but within the super political unit

(USSR). Meanwhile, the experience of regional integration persisted by Stalin in the separate

republics- Azerbaijan SSR, Armenia SSR, Georgia SSR, after the dissolution of TSFSR was highly

31

valuable in assumption of the Transcaucasia as a socio-political, economic and military region

according to functionalists in this period.

Thus, the features of the Soviet regionalization in the South Caucasus can be explained in a

way that in different from the regional integration model that functionalists and neo-functionalists

offered, the process did not stem from the desire of the regional regimes to be involved in integration

and their rational political choice (Mitrany 1966: 159), but it was a part of imperialism politics of the

Soviet Union, to keep the constituent republics interdependent from each other. This interdependence

was also expressed in economic policy of the Soviet centre that distributed manufacturing and the raw

material sources among the different countries. Thus, there was no any rational choice for the national

regimes not to integrate.

Moreover, the Soviet centrally determined and planned politics involved the cultural sector- the

process of “shaping a Soviet person”, as well in order to create homogeneity in the Soviet society

aiming at integration of the multi-peoples society of the USSR. Meanwhile, the purge of local elites,

national expression, religion and the other elements of national sensibility discouraged the national

movements in the society that could be an impediment for the Soviet regionalization, and generally,

imperialism at that time.

However, these facts do not deter us to take up the South Caucasus as a region, as a result of

the regionalization in the Stalin era as well, as the thesis is interested in a region as an end-product, but

not a process. Because, ‘the major criteria remain geographical contiguity, interaction, and a subjective

perception of belonging to a distinctive community and having a collective regional identity’

(originally refers to Kacowicz 1998: 8; generally refers to Russet 1967: 7; Haas 1970: 101), the South

Caucasus, as already mentioned, fulfilled the following criteria.

Furthermore, if regional integration in the South Caucasus is discussed from the perspective of

Haas and Schmitter model (Haas and Schmitter 1964: 274), and the background factors mentioned

there, it could be also concluded that regionalism from above under the Stalin rule, was able to shape a

32

region in the South Caucasus. Thus, the size and power of the units joining in the economic union was

almost the same high level under the rule of Stalin, as a result of his industrialization, collectivization,

urbanization-modernization policies. Moreover, political power and authority of the Soviet republics

were centrally determined by Kremlin making them equal integral parts of the USSR. Besides, the rate

of transactions among the participants was prosperous within the economic district in the South

Caucasus. However, if we go into deep to analyze the source of desire for the high economic

interactions and the size and power of the participating parties, it will seen that as already mentioned,

these high indicators were the results of the centrally planned policy, but not stemming from the

rational choice of the South Caucasus nations, which was against the functionalist passion of

integration.

Moreover, extent of social pluralism within the units, and elite complementarity was still

doubtful. Thus, it is very hard to mention about pluralism under the single control of the communist

party and in the highly terrorized society at that time. Moreover, elite complementarity policy was also

implemented under the central regulation. The following control eradicated all the impediments in its

way, for which the “great purges” of Stalin can be a good example. (Haas and Schmitter 1964: 274).

Thus, the mentioned lacks according to functionalism resulted with an unsuccessful future of regional

integration which has appeared since the fall of the Soviet Union. Even though, the South Caucasus

used to be a region as an end-product, as all the factors for regional integration as an outcome existed,

excluding process factors of regional integration those were implemented not on voluntary base.

It is worthwhile to mention that a collective regional identity that suppressed national identity

of the South Caucasus republics would wake up once, as the covering up of national identity by

regional identity (“Kavkaztsi”-Caucasians) was not a voluntary process (Hooghe & Marks 2005: 10;

Mitrany 1966: 151, 204), but it was a part of imperialism politics under regionalism. This awakening

traces to the Khrushchev era, which is discussed below.

33

3.2. The paradox- continued regionalization and sparkling deregionalization in

Transcaucasus: the post-Stalinist era

3.2.1. The Khrushchev and Brezhnev era

After the death of Stalin in 1953, the monopoly of power in all sectors was transferred into

decentralization and less-terrorized society. Khrushchev denounced the “cult of personality” and the

crimes of Stalin era in his well-known “secret speech”5. So de-Stalinization period was commenced.

Consequently, new leadership and its new policies directed to reform the Stalinist political and

economic order, as well as to create relatively more flexible and open society caused social

developments in all union republics, (Gorbachev 2007; Volkogonov 1996) including Transcaucasia.

In the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961, Khrushchev started a new national development

policy which contained three stages: flourishing of the ethnic culture of constituent nations- rassvet,

then this process will lead to drawing together -sbilzheniye of the nations, at the end of this process

compete merger-sliianie of the nations will emerge. The last stage will cause emerging of a new

Soviet people. (Suny in eds. Cohen, Rabinowitch & Sharlet 1980: 202). These changes also fostered

maintaining of national cultures in Transcaucasia in its turn. Thus, after the “great purges” of Stalin,

the new indigenization-korenizatsiya policy of Khrushchev started to nationalize local governments

which stimulated development of national cadres, gave a chance to the national political elites to enjoy

greater power in the union republics, as well as mitigated the restrictions of ethnic expression in the

Stalinist era. (Gorbachev 2007; Cornell 2002a: 84).

Rassvet and korenizatsiya policies under Khrushchev leadership affected the constituent nations

to flourish their national literatures, music, and art as well as to express the definite national taboos

those were prohibited during the Stalin period. (Rywkin 1994:178-180). The expected results of

“rassvet” did not resulted with “sblizheniye” and “sliianie”, instead, causing the nations falling apart.

5 For the full speech in English go to http://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm; or http://greatspeeches.wordpress.com/2008/09/18/nikita-khrushchev-speech-to-20th-congress-of-the-cpsu/. Retrieved January 28, 2009.

34

Despite of the fact that with aim to achieve “sliianie”-assimilation of the Soviet people, Khrushchev

implemented regressive policies to human rights like anti-religious campaigns and the restricted use of

native language with his language reform in 1958 (Ivanov 2009; Rywkin 1994: 180). The following

break up stemmed from encouragement of national and ethnic sensibility, which shoved the nations to

national egoism and self-benefiting. These last two concepts are contradictory to integration passion of

functionalists, who regards national exclusivism within territorial boundaries springs of misery and

despair in the international system and hindrances for integration. (Mitrany 1966). So national revival

starting from Khrushchev6 showed the first sparks of regional disintegration in Transcaucasia, which

later would be burnt out in the Gorbachev era, and at the same time, the centrally planned regional

integration existed.

There were also other factors that stimulated the process of deregionalization. Thus economic

decentralization resulted with control of the republics’ enterprises and economic performance by the

republics’ administration, but not by all-union ministries. Political interference in the economy was

conspicuously decreased.7 For instance, ‘in Georgia by 1958, 98 percent of industrial output was

produced by enterprises under the republic’s management.’ (Suny in eds. Cohen, Rabinowitch &

Sharlet 1980: 210).

However, the Transcaucasian republics still constituted a single regional economic district,

which remained the main centre of oil manufacturing and oil chemical industry in the USSR at that

time. Moreover, Transcaucasus was the major centre of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy in the SU.

(Каvkaz 1966, Prirodniye usloviia i estestvenniye resursi SSSR; Georgrafiya xoziaistva respublik

Zakavkazia 1966; Мints 1969a, Respubliki Zakavkazia; Mints 1969b). This sector also worked within

the economic district of Transcaucasus, e.g. an iron ore industrial complex was built in Dashkesen

6 Soviet Union: Policy towards nationalities and religious in practice. Retrieved January 29, 2009 from http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12707.html7 Soviet Union: Economic Policy. Retrieved January 29, 2009 from http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12707.html

35

(Azerbaijan SSR) in 1954, of which manufacturing was realized in Rustavi (Georgia SSR). (eds.

Gandilov & Mammadov 2002: 216).

Therefore, Azerbaijan SSR provided Georgia and Armenia with oil and gas. It exported cotton

to Georgia. Besides, Azerbaijan SSR provided Armenia with chemicals as well. Georgia SSR, in its

place, provided Azerbaijan with cast iron, rolled metal, and pipes. Armenia SSR, in its turn, provided

Azerbaijan SSR and Georgia SSR with non-ferrous metals. Besides, Armenia provided Georgia with

tire-cover and Georgia exported coal and products for food industry to Armenia. This economic

integration and cooperation was strengthened with the unified energy and transportation system in

Transcaucasus. (Stroyev, Kovalevskaya & Rom 1982: 196).

Thus, national revival overlapped with regionalization in the South Caucasus. Despite the

awakening in national identity, it did not cause deregionalization and national movements at once, as

accusations about “nationalism” were still vital to remove the political leaders from the post.

Moreover, even the rehabilitation and admissions of the past errors were restricted. Thus, as the

constituent nations still saw a fist of Moscow over their heads, the supporters of the national leaders

were few in number.

However, Moscow was active in taking measures about the national revival. Thus, in 1961 the

party adopted a new program, which propagated internationalism and social patriotism and to struggle

against nationalism and chauvinism. This program reflected itself in the policy towards the South

Caucasus republics as well. Thus the links among the three republics tightened by the establishment of

Transcaucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as well as fostering the work of

Transcaucasian economic administration, as well as the other interrepublican organizations. Moreover,

ethnic discrimination in employment process was proclaimed “impermissible”. (Suny in eds. Cohen,

Rabinowitch & Sharlet 1980: 214).

The next Brezhnev era starting from 1964 was also remarkable with the aim to end ethnic

chauvinism in the republics as well as the fights against the corrupt political practices and underground

36

economy, including the attempts to achieve economic growth. Although, Moscow could achieve

economic growth by the mid-1970s in the Transcaucasian republics8 (ed. Suny 1996: 382-383;

McCauley 1993: 286), the paradox of Khrushchev era was an issue in the Brezhnev period. Thus,

ethnic revival was still the case in Transcaucasian republics. (Rywkin 1994: 181-183).

Brezhnev amended nationality program of Khrushchev. Thus, due to national sensibility in the

republics, he removed slianiie-assimilation term, but keeping sblizhenie in the official vocabulary.

(Cornell 2002a: 88). Later, starting from 1965, the laws of Supreme Soviet and its Presidium were

published in the national languages, which should also be regarded a critical tolerant step by the centre.

Moreover, Brezhnev recognized the right of the states to secede from the USSR in 1977 constitution

and the national languages were proclaimed the state languages of the republics in their constitutions.

(Suny in eds. Cohen, Rabinowitch & Sharlet 1980: 202).

The development of nationalism was continuing process that started from urbanization,

industrialization-modernization, as well as expansion of mass education in the Stalin era. ‘One

nationalism furthers other nationalisms’, as Suny argues. (Suny in eds. Cohen, Rabinowitch & Sharlet

1980: 219). As Stalin favored ‘titular nationality’ and recognized the nations basing on the territory,

the rights of minorities were suppressed under this rule. Thus, while the ‘core nations’ enjoyed the

development of national identity, the minorities reacted with the counter-nationalism. Furthermore,

reduction in terror in the society, as well as political and economic decentralization resulted with easier

expression of the national feelings that had been passive for decades. Moreover, korenizatsiya policy

that promoted growing up of the national elites eased the consolidation of local power in their hands.

The March, 1956 anti-de-Stalinization demonstrations in Tbilisi; the attempts by Imam Mustafayev,

the party first secretary in ASSR, to declare Azerbaijani as the official language of ASSR, and

realization of the administrative documentation works in Azerbaijani language during 1954-1959 are

some examples for that. (eds. Gandilov & Mammadov 2002: 212 ; Altstadt 1992: 164-165).

8 Soviet Union: Economic policy. Retrieved January 29, 2009 from http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12707.html

37

The tolerant approaches in education, economy, as well as self-administration of the union

republics not only highly affected revival in national identity of the constituent nations, but also the

Stalinist period claims to the national rights within the national territories exceeded the national

boundaries, steadily becoming more active and dynamic. (Saroyan in ed. Suny 1996: 409). Thus, the

anti-Azerbaijan movement in Armenia became open and “Karabagh Committee” started its open

public activity at that time; the Khankendi9 (Daglig Karabagh) fight among Armenians and

Azerbaijanis, which resulted with some people’s killing in 1967. (eds. Gandilov & Mammadov 2002:

212-213; Altstadt 1992: 164-165). Shortly, national expressions were also based on irredentist

movements.

Relaxation policy by the centre also took place in the religious expressions of the constituent

republics. For instance, a document about the religious unions in Azerbaijan SSR was adopted in 1976,

which was very surprising step for that time. The following measure was taken in order to control the

underground activity of the religious institutions. This fact proves that religious institutions were so

active at that moment that the state was obliged to take measures about that. Consequently, national

identity awakening in Transcaucasus started to strengthen nation-state formation and liberation from

the Soviet empire.

3.2.2. The Gorbachev era

When the Mikhail Gorbachev became a Soviet leader in 1985, who was in favor of a policy of

openness or "glasnost" and the architect of "perestroika" or deep political and economic reforms, the

situation in the Soviet Union severed causing growing nationalist movements that led him to propose a

loose federation of Soviet states10. (McNair 1991: 66). He became the Soviet ruler in 1985, after the

9 In 1923 it was renamed to Stepanakert, to honor Stepan Shahumyan, an Armenian communist leader from Baku. After declaring independence in 1991, the Azerbaijani government renamed it back to Khankendi. (B.S). 10 1985: Gorbachev becomes Soviet Leader. Retrieved January 27, 2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/11/newsid_2538000/2538327.stm

38

death of the Konstantin Chernenko, the old and sickly General Secretary, who with his previous

predecessor Yuri Andropov are not mentioned here, as their terms were very short and not remarkable

for the South Caucasus republics.

Gorbachev implemented very important reforms for that time. He started the organization of

business enterprises, co-operatives and partnerships with Western companies under perestroika, as

well as the 1985 alcohol reform, which aimed to fight widespread alcoholism in the Soviet Union.

Thus, prices of alcoholic beverages were raised, and their sales were restricted. Besides, people who

were caught drunk at work or in public were prosecuted. The reform did not achieve its objective, but

caused economic diseases, as a loss of about 100 billion rubles after alcohol production shifted to the

black market. (Goldman 1991:81; Brown 1996: 142). This reform negatively affected Georgian and

Azerbaijani winery and grapery sectors as well. (eds. Gandilov & Mammadov 2002: 234).

Moreover, political reforms were also an issue during this era. Thus, proposals for multi-

candidate elections and the appointment of non-Party members to the highest positions in 1987,

rehabilitation of De-Stalinization were very important in reflecting relaxation of the central power.

(Cecil Carlyle 2002: 3). Moreover, the 1988 glasnost reform gave the people greater freedom of

speech. Gorbachev acknowledged that his liberalizing policies of glasnost and perestroika gave

socialism a human face. (Gorbachev 2007).

Another very important political decision made to liberalize the central Soviet power was the

restriction of party control of the government in 1988. He divided executive power in the form of

presidential system, a legislative power under the Congress of People's Deputies. The elections to the

new legislative branch were held throughout the Soviet Union in 1989, which was the first free

election in the Soviet Union since 1917. (Coleman 1996: 241)

Although the liberalization policies of Gorbachev brought democracy and freedom to the

Soviet Union, it resulted with decline both in economic performance, as well as political stability. By

the end of the 1980s, severe shortages of basic food supplies (meat, sugar) made the government to

39

reintroduce the war-time system of distribution using food cards that limited each citizen to a certain

amount of product per month. Compared to 1985, the state deficit grew from 0 to 109 billion rubles;

gold funds decreased from 2,000 to 200 tons; and external debt grew from 0 to 120 billion dollars.11

Furthermore, the democratization of the Soviet Union, including the relaxation of censorship

and attempts to create more political openness had the unintended effect of re-awakening long-

suppressed nationalist and anti-Russian feelings in the Soviet republics. (Laquer 1990:13). Calls for

liberation from Moscow and nationalist feeling also took place in the South Caucasus republics.

As a result of high relaxation and liberalization the development of the nationalist movements

were accelerated in the South Caucasus and the Nagorno-Karabakh (Daghlig-Karabakh) war erupted

between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1988. Thus, the desire of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians to

remain within the Soviet Union and opt out of any breakaway of the Georgian from the USSR clearly

led to the conflict within Georgia as well. (Kohan 1991).

Anti-Soviet riots and demonstrations began both in Tbilisi and Baku in April and January 1990

correspondingly. (Brown 1996:265). The troops were sent to restore the order in Baku and Tbilisi,

which exhibit extreme brutality there causing a lot of people die. (Ibid:265). At the same time,

Armenia proclaimed its right to veto laws coming from the All-Union level. (Gorbachev 1996).

Steadily the monopoly of the CPSU was removed, as well as multi-party elections were held,

which caused election of pro-independence candidates. The reforms accelerated the decline of the

Soviet Union and rise of republican nationalism. Thus, Gorbachev resigned on 25 December 1991 and

the Soviet Union was formally dissolved the next day. (Miller 1993:135). However, till that day

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia had already declared their independences. (eds. Gandilov &

Mammadov 2002: 284-285).

3.3. Analysis

11 Perestroika-The Great Awakening: 1985-87 (Ch.1), Russia’s Capitalist Revolution, Peterson Institute for International Economics. Retrieved January 28, 2009 from http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapters_preview/4099/01iie4099.pdf

40

Kacowicz argues that nation-states might be against regionalization that tries to transcend the

authority of the state in a supranational direction by restricting the development of a regional identity

and supranational institutions. (Kacowicz 1998:16). Although, this assumption is not directly

applicable to the case of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics, as they were not independent to choose

their direction of regional integration or national independence, but this thought comprehensively

explains the fact that the desire to keep sovereignty of a nation-state constrains regional integration.

However, the following assumption is also true from the perspective that non-voluntary

participation in the regional integration of the South Caucasus, and relaxation of power during

Khrushchev and Brezhnev era sparked the national sensibility in these republics, which had been

suppressed for a long time. Moreover, Gorbachev’s liberalization policies both in economic and

political sphere burnt these feelings and the Soviet republics attempted to get rid of the all Soviet type

of interdependence and dependence, seeking for their own sovereignty.

On the other hand, it is also true that strengthening of national identity causes encouragement

of regionalization (James Mayall in eds. Fawcett & Hurrell 1995: 170), but it was not a case in the

Transcaucasus republics, because James Mayall talks here about the cultures and identities that were

divided by boundaries and revival in national feelings causes the identity to exceed through these

boundaries and merge (e.g. Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism). (Ibid: 170). However, as already

mentioned the South Caucasus is not a geographic area that contains the same or similar cultures and

identities to apply the last case here. Thus, as already mentioned, flourishing cultures, did not resulted

with drawing together, but falling apart in the South Caucasus. As Suny argues ‘the most linguistically

and culturally diverse is certainly Transcaucasia’ in the Soviet Union. ‘Historic attempts to link

Armenians, Azerbaijanis and Georgians politically have invariably faltered, and the cultural

orientations of the three major nationalities of the region remain focused in very different directions.

(Suny in ed. Suny 1996: 377).

41

Moreover, highly corrupted political system starting from Khrushchev era, and declining

economic performance reached its pick during the Gorbachev era, which encourage the Soviet

republics to emancipate from Moscow’s rule and administrative experience of the constituent republics

since Khrushchev’s korenizatsiya hastened this process under the liberalization policy of Gorbachev.

Thus, the condition of that time created under the rule of Moscow matured deregionalization process in

the South Caucasus. Moreover, this time is also remarkable with the sustained regionalization, as till

the collapse of the Soviet Union the South Caucasus republics were functioning in a regional level as

before.

Besides, Suny argues that ‘the internal cohesion of each of the local nationalities permitted

effective resistance to outside interference, and Transcaucasus continued to be one of the most

culturally and socially independent parts of the Soviet Union’ (Suny in ed. Suny 1996: 377), which

promoted the further liberalization as well. Thus, nationalist movements in the South Caucasus, as well

as irredentist claims in Karabakh demonstrated that the constituent nations saw Gorbachev’s

democracy revolution from above in its complete meaning.

In addition, the South Caucasus republics saw the rehabilitation of their sovereign nation-states

more beneficial than remaining in the regional integration within the Soviet Union. Thus, the

functionalist assumption that states’ rational choice will be economic integration, as it brings more

benefit than national exclusivism (Mitrany 1966) does not prove itself in this case. This fact could be

explained in a way that regional integration of these nations did not stem from preference over national

egoism, but colonialism policy of the Soviet Union that had unified them under socialism, proletarian

passion, brotherhood and sisterhood. However, even these ideas were unable to keep them coherent

under the ironed fist of Kremlin.

4. DEREGIONALIZATION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS SINCE 1991

42

Independence came as a surprise to the South Caucasus republics, because they were not ready

for independence, as well as these republics were not strong proponents of dissolution of the Soviet

Union, as the Baltic states and Ukraine were. Peimani argues that it does not reflect the satisfaction

with the status quo, but heavy dependence on Moscow for their survival. (2002: 8-9). The following

dependence emerged both in the political and economic spheres. The three republics experienced a

poor economic performance, which was very issue in “poor” Armenia and Georgia in comparison with

“rich” Azerbaijan, which was the most industrialized country in the South Caucasus (Peimani 2002:

13). However, still all the South Caucasus republics were experiencing challenges in all economic

sectors that made them unable to meet fully the basic needs of their country. If it is reflected in the

numbers, then the economic indicators for 1991 in the Soviet Union showed only declines like in

GNP-12%, industrial production-6.5 %, agricultural production-10%, oil production-9 %, coal

production-11 %, and foreign trade- 38%. (“Europe: The End of Empire”, Strategic Survey 1991-1992,

2000: 27). Besides of the shortages of goods and services as a result of economic decline, the public

industrial and agricultural ventures were closed, unemployment and prices were enormously rising, as

well as a three-digit inflation, a large foreign debt and low foreign exchange reserves were also an

issue. (Ibid.).

After the independence, the newly established governments of the three republics, have been

unable to address the mentioned deficiencies in their states. Thus, they established highly centralized

and undemocratic political systems, as one of the interviewees12, who serves the Azerbaijani

government and asked for confidentiality, explains the reasons of the lack of democracy in the newly

established South Caucasian countries as following: firstly, the ruling elites were either “a man of

Russia” (successor state of the USSR) or highly concerned about the loss of their status in the

independence period. Secondly, through creation of centralized and undemocratic rule, they could

control the situation and the response to the worsening political and economic situation in the

countries. These two cases are also currently applicable in all three republics of the South Caucasus

12 The interview was conducted on November 26, 2008.

43

under the M. Saakashvili’s rule, who uses nationalism and chauvinism for the sake of consolidating his

challenged power status, as well as to control the unsatisfaction from the society in Georgia. As well as

in Azerbaijan, where Ilham Aliyev, the successor of the long-term president, Haydar Aliyev, enjoys

from the highly centralized power, as well as frequently manipulates Daghlig-Karabakh conflict

through a military rhetoric. Moreover, both “a man of Russia” and highly centralized power factors

mentioned above are the cases under the S. Sarkisyan’s rule in Armenia.

Furthermore, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus has appeared as a scene

witnessing ethnonationalism, ethnopolitical conflicts, and power-political games ‘those were

encouraged and exploited by its larger neighbors’. (Jones 1995:1). It highly affected intra-regional

political and economic dynamics, as well as involvement of great powers and international

organizations. Thus, Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika resulted with the nationalist movements and

liberation of the three republics in 1991, and the minorities living (Azerbaijani, Armenians and

Georgians account 71%, 93.3%, 69% of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia correspondingly, the rest of

the population contained the minorities (Peimani 2002: 20) in the South Caucasus also attempted to

liberate or launched irredentist movements at the same time. So the South Caucasus republics faced

with the serious conflict and war problems during their state-building terms.

The three conflicts –South-Ossetia, Abkhazia13 and Daghlig-Karabakh14 (Nagorno-Karabakh)

erupted in the South Caucasus, extensively affected regional integration attempts. Especially, Daghlig-

Karabakh conflict erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia resulted with a war and the cut of all kind

of relations between these two nations.

4.1. Daglig-Karabakh conflict and its impact on regional disintegration

13 South Ossetia is a Autonomous Province within Georgia, attempting to union with North Ossetia, which is a part of the Russian Federation. However, Abkhazia claims their independence as a result of a war of liberation from Georgia, while Georgians believe that historically Abkhazia has always been part of Georgia. (B.S.) 14 Nagorno-Karabakh literally means Daghlig-Karabakh in Azerbaijani, which translated into English as Mountainous Karabakh. (B.S.)

44

Armenia was the first Transcaucasian state, where, firstly, Gorbachev’s glasnost begot an

upsurge of nationalism. Thus, in 1988, the Armenian reformists in Karabakh Committee began to

demand full independence. (Hunter 1994: 35). The administrative status of Daghlig-Karabakh

Autonomous Province in Azerbaijan, with its majority Armenian population, 76.9 percent of the total

in 1989, was changed in 1989, when the Supreme Soviet decreed that it should in future be directly

administered from Moscow, with aim to prevent the growing clash between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

However, in doing so, Moscow could not stop the clashes converted into a war between Armenia and

Azerbaijan, as by 1992 Daghlig-Karabkh had been occupied by force by Armenia, and directly

integrating it into Armenian territory. (Eds. Wright, Goldenberg & Schofield 1996: 15-16).

The following military operations lasted with break till May, 1994, when the Defense Ministers

of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and a representative from Daghlig-Karabakh signed a ceasefire

agreement, which is also in force at present. (Baev 1997: 41). Due to the stunning role of Haydar

Aliyev, the president of the Azerbaijan Republic at that time, the control over and participation in

peacekeeping operation were delivered to CSCE (currently, OSCE) Minsk Group, but not to Russia,

who seemed partial in the conflict. (Fuller 1994: 13-17). It is perceived that Russia transferred

weapons worth 1 billion USD to Armenia between 1994-96 (Cornell 2002b: 20), which is a case today

as well.

On the other hand, in 1993 in order to prove impartiality in the conflict Russia supported the

adoption of three Resolutions (Nos. 822, 853, 874, 884) in the United Nations Security Council, which

condemned the Armenian aggression and demanded the unconditional withdraw from all occupied

territories15. (Paye & Remacle in ed. Coppieters 1996: 103-136). However, the lasting Daghlig-

Karabkh conflict is a guarantee for Russian presence in the South Caucasus, who is not interested in

resolution of the conflict by backing Armenia, as all the secessionist movements in the South

Caucasus. Hence, Azerbaijan, in its turn, is confident with the support from the West, who openly

15 Moreover, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution reaffirming territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, demanding withdrawal of all Armenian forces on March 14, 2008. See web-page of the UN for the complete Resolution: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10693.doc.htm

45

supports its projects those excludes Armenia due to its aggressive activities in the Azerbaijani

territories. (Baev 1997: 42-43).

Despite of the peace attempts by the two sides, as well as international community, especially

OSCE Minsk group, the resolution of the conflict has not been achieved yet. This conflict retains both

sides to come to cooperation and mutual activity in any sphere. Thus, Azerbaijan has imposed an

energy and transportation embargo since 1989. (Tchantouridze in ed. MacFarlane 1997: 86). Besides,

the official Baku states that no activity is possible till resolution of the conflict within the territorial

integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic, as well as in conformity with the international norms. Moreover,

the eruption of the conflict made impossible to call any activity regional in the South Caucasus, as no

relation exists between Azerbaijan and Armenia till today.

4.2. The political-economic relations: the broken side of triangle

4.2.1. Armenia-Georgia

The relations with Georgia are crucially important for Armenia because, under the

economic embargo imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan due to the aggressive policy of Armenia in the

Azerbaijani territories, Georgia, the only country, that offers Armenia the direct land access to Europe

and the Black Sea ports. Besides, Armenia and Georgia solved their demarcation of borders issue on

the greater part in 200616. Nevertheless, Armenia has problematic relationship with Georgia due to

secessionist claims in Georgia’s Armenian province of Javakheti. Besides, the ethnic Armenian

guerrilla forces supported the secessionist party in the Abkhaz-Georgia war. However, the two

countries have been able to keep cordial relations because Armenia heavily depends on Georgia for

communication routes and trade. (Cornell 2002b).

The relations between the two countries traces back the tenure of Gamsakhurdia, the Georgian

president, who signed a treaty with Armenia on principles of cooperation in 1991, and Shevardnadze, 16 Armenia, Georgia Agree On Greater Part of Border Lines. Retrieved December 6, 2008 from http://www.arka.am/en/archive/n05/n1005/100510.html

46

the Georgian president after Gamsakhurdia, who signed a friendship treaty with Armenia in 1993.

(Hovannisian 1994). Today, Armenian and Georgian economic relations are also mounting. Thus,

foreign trade turnover between these two countries made 66 million dollars in 2005, in comparison

with 23.84 million dollars in 200417. This indicator was approximately 4.11 million dollars between

Georgia and Azerbaijan in 2006.18

It is also worthwhile to mention that Armenia and Georgia follow different foreign policy

strategies in the South Caucasus. Thus, Georgia heavily tends to the West, while Armenian relations

with the Northern neighbor-Russia remains in grave importance. In doing so, Armenia sees Russia as a

guarantor of its sovereignty and triumphal status quo in the Daghlig-Karabakh conflict. However, the

different directions in foreign policy do not retain Armenia and Georgia to support friendly relations.

4.2.2. Azerbaijan-Georgia

After liberation from the USSR, both Azerbaijan and Georgia supported cordial relations

between each other. The diplomatic ties were established in 1992.19 However, these relations traces

even back to 1990, when Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the Georgian president at that time, signed a

cooperation agreement with Azerbaijan in the economic, scientific, technical, and cultural spheres.20

Later, in 1993, under the Shevardnadze’s rule in Georgia, these relations were more tightened also due

to a close personal relationship with Haydar Aliyev, the Azerbaijani president, resulting with a

17 Armenia-Georgia: Establishing Economic Union. Professionals Foundation. Retrieved December 6, 2008 from www.professionals.am/PDF/Armenia-Georgia_econ.union_eng.pdf18 Relations between Georgia and the Azerbaijan Republic. Retrieved December 11, 2008 from http://embassy.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=1874&lang_id=ENG19 Relations between Georgia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 26, 2008 from http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=334&lang_id=ENG20 Georgia-Relations with Neighboring Countries. Retrieved December 26, 2008 from http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/georgia/GOVERNMENT.html

47

deepened treaty of cooperation, friendship, and mutual relations with Azerbaijan, including a mutual

security arrangement and assurances that Georgia would not reexport Azerbaijani oil or natural gas to

Armenia21. In addition, the discrimination against the Azerbaijani minority22 in Georgia, which was a

serious problem during the period of Gamsakhurdia, was resolved in some measure by Shevardnadze,

but still remaining the issue in Georgia23. Moreover, in order to restore the regional economic relations,

Shevardnadze tried to mediate the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict which failed24.

Later, Saakashvili, the Georgian president also supported good relations with Azerbaijan. It is

noteworthy to mention that deteriorating relations between Russia and the new president, especially,

made it crucial support good relations with Azerbaijan. Russian Gazprom increased the price of gas for

Georgia in 2007 from 110 to 235 dollars per thousand cubic meters. At the same time, Gazprom

doubled the price of gas for Azerbaijan. Besides, the gas exports to the country intended to be reduced

from 4.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 1.5 bcm, while electricity supplies were also scheduled to be

reduced. These developments brought Baku and Tbilisi together to negotiate a possible gas supply

from Azerbaijan to Georgia. (Petersen & Ziyadov 2007; Ismailzade 2003).

Besides, Azerbaijan and Georgia are founding members of GUAM Organization for

Democracy and Economic Development since 1997, as a counterbalance to Russian hegemonic

tendencies within the CIS (Cornell 2002b). In addition, both countries broadly cooperate in regional

energy development, transportation and economic partnership projects such as Baku-Supsa, Baku-

Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway, Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum gas line, the TRACECA,

21 Ibid. 22 According to population census of Georgia 2002, 284,761 ethnic Azerbaijanis live in Georgia, which comprise 6.5% of Georgia's population (being its largest ethnic minority). For the source see http://www.statistics.ge/main.php?pform=145&plang=1 and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/gg.html. Retrieved December 5, 2008. 23 See International Crisis Group’s report. (2006, Nov.). Retrieved December 5, 2008 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4517&l=1; Ismailzade, F. (2004, June), Georgia’s Treatment of Azeri Minority raises Concerns. Eurasia Insight. Retrieved December 5, 2008 from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062304a.shtml; Georgia’s Azerbaijani Minority Again Alleges Discrimination. CACI Analyst. Retrieved December 5, 2008 from http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/440524 Georgia-Relations with Neighboring Countries. Retrieved December 26, 2008 from http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/georgia/GOVERNMENT.html

48

and the BSEC. Cooperation in the sphere of electric energy is also developing with mounting

success25.

Moreover, regional military and security alliance of Georgia and Azerbaijan tightens their

security relations within NATO's Partnership for Peace Program and the common protection of Baku-

Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline with Turkey. (de Haas 2006). In addition to the successful security

cooperation, bilateral trade relations between the two countries also have increased. In this way,

Georgia and Azerbaijan signed a free trade agreement in 1996. Georgia exports to Azerbaijan cement,

locomotives and other railway vehicles, mineral and chemical fertilizers, mineral waters, strong drinks,

glass and glass wares, and pharmaceuticals. Azerbaijan, in its turn, exports to Georgia oil and

petroleum products, natural gas, plastic wares, waste foodstuff, furniture and building constructions.26

Despite of the good cooperation between the two countries, the different directions in the

foreign policy strategy also exist. Thus, Georgia’s primary foreign policy goal has been to join

Western institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union

(EU). However, Aliyev adroitly balances its foreign policy simultaneously supporting good relations

with Russia and the West. Besides, the two countries have not come to agreement on border

demarcation. It is especially remarkable in the Georgian David Gareja monastery complex which is

divided between the two countries. After coming to power, Saakashvili supporting good relations with

Azerbaijan stated that the problem should be resolved through friendly dialogue. (Petriahsvili &

Ismailov 2006).

Azerbaijani-Georgian relations are based on common interests. Firstly, Georgian demands for

energy pushes to good relations with Azerbaijan. Thus, the Russian factor has brought these countries

together. Azerbaijan also needs to try alternative transportation routes of Russia to export its energy to

the world market, which is available only through Georgia. Secondly, these two countries support

25 Relations between Georgia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Retrieved December 26, 2008 from http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=334&lang_id=ENG26 Ibid.

49

good relations because of secessionist conflicts within their territories. Thus, both countries state the

principle of “territorial integrity” against the claims by the ethnic minorities.

4.3. Analysis

After gaining independence the three countries were very busy with state-building

process in the South Caucasus. However, the process did not make it important to support friendly

relations with each other, but seeking foreign support from the outside of the region. Besides, the

eruption of Daghlig-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan made regional transactions

impossible in its place. In addition, Armenia has also remained largely isolated from regional

transportation projects due to its conflict with Azerbaijan, as Azerbaijan is leading the initiatives and

realization of the mega projects in the South Caucasus. Thus, with this conflict all the interactions

between these two countries were cut down, which is one of the major conditions in regional

integration process as discussed above.

Moreover, the relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan have strengthened significantly since

independence, due to the fact that their security is connected. Azerbaijan cannot export its oil without

Georgia, which connects it to the world markets; while Georgia heavily relies on Azerbaijan’s oil and

gas exports for its economic and political security. However, the mentioned countries support only

bilateral relations in the South Caucasus, but not regional or trilateral relations as it is frequently and

wrongly referred. Thus, the busted relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan organize the broken side

of triangle in the South Caucasus.

It could be concluded that after the liberation from the USSR, regional integration in the South

Caucasus was halted with starting regional disintegration and the former region does not fit the

definition of a region according to functionalists due to following reasons.

Firstly, despite of the geographical vicinity of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the

transactions in the regional level was cut down. Besides, regional infrastructure created in the Soviet

50

period, was heavily damaged, decreasing to zero level after the demise of the Soviet Union. In

addition, regional transportation routes, energy circle in the South Caucasus does not exist any more.

Secondly, it is impossible to talk about the common regional identity in the South Caucasus, as

it was in the Soviet period. Three nations belong themselves to different identities and cultures now.

Georgians highly tending to the Western culture consider themselves a part of Europe. However, it is

very difficult to tell about the Muslim Azerbaijanis, despite the fact that Azerbaijan is highly

secularized country, even can not be counted a part of the Islamic region. Armenians are between

Europe and post-Soviet space as Azerbaijanis, and have not constituted the precise belonging to a

larger region yet.

Thirdly, the foreign policy strategies of the following countries do not draw them together as

well. Besides, the tending foreign powers were not able to support regional integration in the South

Caucasus, as the Soviet Union did. Furthermore, intra-regional attempts to create ‘Caucasian Home’

also failed, which was offered by Chechen Jovkhar Dudaev in 1992, to unify all the North Caucasus

and Transcaucasian peoples and states into a single family, with all of them enjoying equal rights.

(Avetisian and Aliyev in Eds. Coppieters, Zverev & Trenin 1998: 95; 100).

At the end, one should state that regional disintegration has been experiencing in the South

Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union, was a legacy of sparkling deregionalization in the

post-Stalin era, which was heavily suppressed during the early Sovietization period in the Soviet

Union.

5. CONCLUSION

The thesis concluded that regional integration caused the South Caucasus to be regarded a

region during the Soviet period, with high level of transactions, geographical proximity and common

regional identity. Thus, the three South Caucasian republics were part of the highly centralized Soviet

political and economic system. The Soviet central government in Moscow determined, designed, and

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controlled the political, economic, and social lives of these republics through central planning. They

simply implemented the economic, political and social policies as determined by the Soviet central

planners. As part of a Soviet-wide division of economic, political and military activities among the

Soviet republics, each South Caucasian republic had to perform certain predetermined tasks to ensure

the normal function of the Soviet Union. The South Caucasian political, economic, social, and military

structures were therefore developed to perform the designated duties. This made them functional as

components of a large political system. Consequently, they became unable to run most of their

republican affairs without the heavy assistance of the soviet central government. In short, all the

political, economic, and military institutions of the republics were designed to provide for the needs of

the Soviet Union without regard to their own specific local needs. To implement the centrally

designated plans, their political apparatuses were developed as branches of the Soviet central

government designed to represent and preserve Soviet interests. Thus, the Soviet state was able to

develop high interdependence in the South Caucasus republics, in order to achieve its imperialism

politics under regionalism.

As they were appointed by the Soviet government in Moscow, the leaders had only limited

powers of decision-making, who could not choose the alternative way of regional integration. Besides,

the elites were also under high control of the centre, which were under threat of repression and purge,

if they developed nationalist exclusivism and anti-Soviet policies. Thus, as branches of the Soviet

central government, the South Caucasian governments were established and run as highly centralized

political entities.

However, if we compare this historical example to the current situation, the most striking point

of resemblance has been the release of a whole set of virulent ethnic nationalisms. Despite 40 years of

effort by the communist regimes to eliminate nationalism, it has survived and revived to become the

strongest ideological current in the former Soviet Union. There is no longer an empire to enforce peace

52

and stability in the region, and to regulate the behavior of small states. It is doubtful if NATO, or the

EU, or the UN can take this place.

Besides, the intra-regional dynamics have been developed since the collapse of the Soviet

Union, did not allow regional integration in the South Caucasus. Firstly, due to the great impact of

Daghlig Karabakh problem on regional disintegration of the South Caucasus. Secondly, the South

Caucasus nations do not see regional cooperation as a priority of their foreign policy trends. Thus,

these three nations seek the support from the outside of the “region”. Armenia has followed a different

course than Azerbaijan and Georgia. The foreign policies of Armenia and Azerbaijan mainly flow

from the war on Daghlig Karabakh, and in Azerbaijan’s case from the urge to export its oil resources.

Georgia’s foreign policy is chiefly determined by its perceived Russian threat and is oil resources. Due

to the conflict-ridden regional environment, it is no exaggeration to state that the main foreign policy

priority of all three states is to preserve their sovereignty and independence.

In short, in absence of regional interactions and regional identity building attempts it is hard to

talk about the regional integration perspectives of the South Caucasus. However, as functionalists

state, it is still possible to create such as basis if the three nations see their economic benefits in the

regional integration, rather than national exclusivism.

At the end, it is noteworthy to stress that studying an impact of the great powers on the regional

integration and disintegration of the South Caucasus is valuable, which this thesis does not contain.

Besides, it is important to elaborate an effect of national revival in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia

on their attempts to regional integration and disintegration. As it was not included into the research

problem of the thesis, the comprehensive research in this field is very valuable. Moreover, it is also

useful to dissect the other experiences and attempts to regional integration in the South Caucasus, like

the period before the Bolshevik conquest. Furthermore, the analysis of regional integration within the

theoretical framework of other approaches and theories of international relations can be also valuable.

53

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