CHAP1ER - Information and Library Network Centreshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/17080/10/10...earlier in this work, the improvement in East-West relations (and the unexpected

CHAP1ER .FIVE

1988 :The Watershed in Soviet policy towards regional conflicts in the Third World.

Soviet foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Third World, seemed extremely

successful by the end of the 1970s. A new wave of revolutionary movements swept through the

Third World, and brought changes in as many as 14 different countries. It was during this period

that pro-Soviet Marxism spread to South Vietnam, i\ngola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Ethiopia,

Laos, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Although most of these regimes were by no means

all Marxist-Leninist, many of them turned to the Soviet Union for moral and material support.

By that time there was general agreement that the Soviet Union had caught up with the United

123

1988 : The Watershed in Soviet policy towards regional conflicts in the Third World.

124

States in nuclear weaponry, and that there was a parity between the two superpowers. As a

result of enhanced military strength (both nuclear and conventional), and the acquisition of new

Third World allies, Soviet leaders began to claim about the co-relation of forces moving in

favour of socialism. 1 Even the Western leaders seemed to share this assessment, and the Soviet-

Third World relations were termed as a "success story". 2

But as soon as Gorb~chev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet

Union (CPSU) in 1985, Soviet policies towards the Third World began to alter. As established

earlier in this work, the improvement in East-West relations (and the unexpected dissolution of

the Soviet bloc) went hand in hand with changes ih the Soviet Third World policy which were,

however, less dramatic and far slower. It can be safely argued that had the Soviet policy towards

the Third World not begun to change first, neither of the above-mentioned events would have

taken place. After all, Soviet activism in the Third World areas had been the main factor

responsible for deterioration of detente from the middle of the 1970s. And had the East-West

relations not improved so radically, it is unlikely that the Soviets would have abandoned the

Brezhnev Doctrine - that the socialist community had the right of intervention in the territory

of any of its members whenever forces hostile to socialism threaten its ideological alignment.

Once it was decided that ideology would be given a back-seat in Gorbachev's scheme of

things, the Soviets proceeded to liquidate their Third World commitments. Their attitude towards

1. See, for example, Mark N. Katz, "The evolution of the Brezhnev Doctrine under Gorbachev" in Kurt M. Campbell, and S. Neil MacFarlane, ed.,Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas, (London : Routledge, 1989), pp.36-65.

2. For details see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Success Story The Third World", Orbis, vol.32, no.4, Fall 198S, pp.551-565.

1988 : The Watershed in Soviet policy towards regional conflicts in the Third World •

125

. the Third World and the role of regional conflicts there, changed significantly under Gorbachev.

They started seeing the Third World as far more complex and unstable than they had previously

believed. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan under the Geneva Accord of 1988,

bore ample testimony to this. Also, the 19th Party Conference of 1988 further underscored the

idea of Third World 'abandonment'. Although Gorbachev had been pursuing the notion of

forsaking the Third World since 1986, the real desertion started only after 1988. As the Soviets

and their allies were unable to defeat the opponents of their friendly regimes in Afghanistan,

Cambodia, Ethiopia and Angola, Gorbachev, given the cost of the effort, started to think about

the utility of such a goal. Not only did he withdraw his troops from Afghanistan, he encouraged

Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia and Cuba from Angola. He curtailed the commitments to

existing Marxist regimes, and virtually ended the Soviet aid to Marxist revolutions seeking

power.3 He and his associates questioned the wisdom of an 'activist' policy in the Third World

and concluded differently from their predecessors. For example, in May 1988, in a Literatumaya

Gazeta article, a Soviet historian noted the relation between an aggressive Soviet military policy

towards the Third World and poor prospects for achieving both detente and perestroika :

Could such a severe exacerbation of tension in Soviet-Western relations in the late seventies and early eighties have been avoided? Unquestionably so. It is our conviction that the crisis was caused chiefly by the miscalculations and incompetent approach of the Brezhnev leadership toward the resolution of foreign policy tasks.

Though we were politically, militarily (via weapons supplies and advisers), and diplomatically involved in regional conflicts, we disregarded their influence on the relaxation of tension between the USSR and the West and on their entire system of relationships.

3. Mark N. Katz, "Gorbachev and revolution" in Mark N. Katz, ed., The USSR and Marxist revolutions in the Third World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.l19-20.


126

There were no clear ideas of the Soviet Union's true national state interests. These interests lay by no means in chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated with leadership coups in certain developing countries. The genuine interest lay in ensuring a favourable international· situation for profound transformations in the Soviet Union's economy and sociopolitical system. However, at that time it was believed that no transformations were needed.4

No doubt such a commentary underscored the then Soviet need for high-priority domestic

and foreign policy concerns, yet at the same time, it re-doubled G·orbachev's efforts to

deemphasize revolutions in the Third World. Prior to this, Gorbachev himself had redefined the

concept of national liberation in a way that dissociated it from the concept of Marxist revolution

with which it used to be linked :

It is customary to talk of the decline of the national liberation movement, but what is going on here, obviously, is a substitution of concepts and a non-recognition of the new nature of the situation. If the liberating impulse which operated at the stage of the struggle for political independence is meant, then it is weakening, of course, and that is natural. But the impulse necessary for the new present stage of the development of the Third World is only just taking shape; and it is necessary to be clearly aware of this and not to fall into pessimism. The factors from which this impulse is formed are varied and heterogeneous. Here there is a powerful economic process which sometimes takes on paradoxical forms: for example, some countries retain features of under-development and emerge at the level of great powers in world economies and politics. There is also a growth of political energy in the course of formation of nations and consolidation of national states in the genuine sense, a considerable place among whom is occupied by countries with revolutionary regimes. There are also grapes of wrath on the soil of the glaring polarization of poverty and wealth and the contrast between possibilities and the real situation. The force of originality and independent action is working in an increasingly pronounced and active way in organizations reflecting the process of inter-state consolidation of developing countries. 5

Thus Gorbachev redefined national liberation in a broader and distinctly less

4. Vyacheslav Dashichev, as quoted in Ibid., pp.l21-22.

5. Gorbachev as cited in. Ibid., p.123.


127

revolutionary manner than his predecessors~ 6 He appeared to be convinced about the non-

viability of such movements and thought it foolish to support them. The experience in

Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola and elsewhere showed the immense resistance power of the

opposition groups and the inability of the Soviet-supported governments there to suppress them.

Seeing his resources 'drain' in non-profitable ventures, Gorbachev and his Third World analysts

began to leave the Third World on its own. Contrary to the earlier Soviet position whereby they

supported the regional conflicts as part of their internationalist duty, the Soviets, under

Gorbachev, started looking for pretexts for disengaging themselves from the Third World. As

a result, ideological support to the regional conflicts gave way to non-class factors such as

religion, tribal rivalries and ethnic nationalism as fostering conflicts in the Third World. Sergei

Sinitsyn, the then head, Department of the Non-Aligned Movement, Soviet Foreign Ministry,

in a debate on "The Soviet Union and the Third World", at a guest club forum of International

Affairs spoke about these non-class factors :

We should now define the place which policy towards Third World countries must hold in Soviet foreign policy generally. What are its peculiarities ? ... What makes our relations with Third World countries distinct from those with Western countries is evidently the fact that for certain objective reasons (great diversity, social mobility, regional, religious, ethnic conflicts, etc.) they are less predictable. This is why I think we should define our tasks in the Third World more precisely. Just' what do we expect from it ? What are our national interests there .... T

What is evident from such a commentary is that the Soviets, under Gorbachev, had lost

almost all the interest in the Third World for all practical purposes. It was sort of a lip service

6. Mark N. Katz, n.3, p.124.

7. Sergei Sinitsyn, Discussion on The USSRand ~he Third World, International Affairs Guest Club, International Affairs, no.12, December 198.8, pp.134-135.


128

that was being paid to the Third World nations and their struggles. Infact, the Soviet interests

lied somewhere else i.e. in the American and West European nations.

As part of this changed attitude towards the Third World nations, Soviet analysts further

underestimated the role of ideology in dealing with the Third World. Instead of condemning the

role of capitalism in the Third World, they began to revise their views about the role of

capitalism in the process of social transformation in the Third World states. There was a greater

recognition of the difficulties of the transformation from capitalism to socialism in the Third

World nations. Infact, in many Third World states, capitalism was seen as experiencing a

'second wind' while the majority of socialist - oriented countries were in a state of deep

stagnation. Assigning a theoretical base to the vitality gained by capitalism, and the

corresponding ~tagnation of the socialist- oriented countries, Alexei Kiva, the then head of the

Sector of the Working - Class and Communist Movement at the USSR Academy of Sciences

Institute of Oriental Studies, wrote :

Social development is marked both by numerous variants and by alter'flatives. At a certain stage in the evolution of capitalism, when the latter betrays a particular susceptibility to crisis, it is relatively easy to accomplish a socialist revolution provided the situation is ripe for it both objectively and subjectively. But as soon as capitalism has overcome this over susceptibility to crisis, it gets a second wind, so to speak, and becomes stabilized on a long term basis. The factors seen earlier as decisive for a socialist revolution- the worsening of overproduction crisis, production anarchy, an absolute and relative pauperization of the proletariat, its growing numerical strength, its increased organistion and political awareness, its exposure to scientific socialism, and so on - either stop operating in the new situation or their impact lessens and becomes modified. Also, entirely unforseen processes take place in the ranks of the proletariat itself, the "grave digger of the bourgeoisie". With the deepening of the scientific and technological revolution, the numerical strength of the proletariat steadily diminishes in relative and occasionally in absolute terms; the proletariat splits up, and we witness the formation of the core of a new working class associated with the more promising spheres of material production. I. mean primarily workers engaged in control, adjustment, regulation and other intellectual

functions.


129

What hopes can be placed on this new proletariat in the making is hard to say just yet. There is no denying that much of what our teachers visualis~d in the last century and the first quarter of this century has failed to materialise. 8

The tone and tenor of this kind of an analysis of proletariat movements in the Third

World, quite clearly indicated the shift in the official Soviet stance towards accommodation of

capitalism and abandonment of the socialist ideas and principles. Andrei Kozirev, a Foreign

Ministry Official, put his facts even more bluntly when he pointed out, "Most countries in the

Third World are suffering not so much from capitalism as its shortage" .9 The Soviet analysts

and officials became less sanguine about the prospects for the advancement of Soviet interests

in the Third World.

The underestimation of the relevance of the Third World to the Soviet Union, was not

limited to a few academics only, but directly involved Soviet diplomats and Foreign Ministry

Officials. As earlier mentioned in this chapter, at a major conference on Soviet foreign policy

held at the Soviet Ministry of. Foreign Affairs in July 1988, for instance, Soviet policy towards

the Third World was sharply criticised for showing vestiges of traditionalism and Soviet officials

were taken to task for having failed to predi~t and properly evaluate many developments in the

Third World. Vladimir Polyakov, Chief, Directorate of Middle East and North African

countries, Soviet Foreign Ministry, for example said,

8. Alexei Kiva, "Developing Countries, Socialism, Capitalism" ,International Affairs, no.3, March 1989, pp.60-61.

9. Andrei Kozirev, 'Confidence and a Balance of Interests', International Affairs, no.3, March 1989, p.68.


130

We can build a correct foreign policy only on the basis of a correct and adequate conception of the national interests of our country and those of other countries as well as of the objective laws governing their evolution.

Yet what was often shown in this respect was voluntarism and subjectivism in choosing models of behaviour on the international scene, one-dimensional vision, inflexibility, a lack of precise, scientifically grounded criteria determining our foreign policy priorities. A situation where the system of relations took shape spontaneously, wishful thinking was the rule and policy was framed without in-depth scientific analysis.

This is true of, for instance, the concept of "non-capitalist development" as the path of countries freed from colonial rule, a concept used for artificially linking together dissimilar processes which took place in the Third World in the sixties and seventies. We had to pay for this both politically, as when a country placed in this category moved into the orbit of the West (like Egypt under Sadat or Somalia); and in the form of unjustified economic expenditures.10

Continuing in the same vein, Georgi Mirsky, chief research worker at the then USSR

Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economies and International Relations, noted,

Until recently we were in bondage to the magic formula about the national liberation movement being a powerful force in the anti-imperialist struggle. In point of fact, the very concepts of the developing world, the Third World and the national liberation movement became synonymous. Nobody qoubts the existence of a national liberation revolution today. And yet the anti-colonial struggle has long been over. The few areas, such as Southern Africa and Palestine, where it is continuing and will go on for a long time don't really alter the overall picture. As matters now stand, the anti-colonialism has long been a thing of the past; independent states replacing one time colonies have been in existence for dozen of years now, and to affirm that the revolution is continuing is to make a misstatement. 11

Thus after the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1988, and the 19~h Party Conference,

also in 1988, the Soviet official as well as academic perception of the Third World changed

dramatically. Almost all the previously gained positions by the Soviet Union were either

sacrificed or a base was prepared for the sacrifice in the near future. Thebase was used later

10. Vladimir Polyakov, no.7, p.133.

11. Georgi Mirsky, no.7, p.136.


131

as a justification by the Soviets for their abandonment of the Third World. The Asian, African

and Latin American areas were considered as the ones where the regional crises continued

unabated and not loosing their bitterness. The Soviets retrenched their foreign policy and showed

greater restraint in their support for regional clients. The new approach to international issues,

including the issue of coping with regional-conflicts in a "multipolar world", was sought to be

dovetailed with the process of perestroika in the Soviet society. This atleast gave the Soviets a

legitimate cover to curtail their commitments in the Third World which were, of course, quite

expensive and a drain on the Soviet economy. The public decision-making type of a policy in

the foreign affairs was encouraged, so as to highlight the hardships faced by the Soviet public

on account of the deficiency of resources.

Besides the economic burden on the Soviet Union on account of the Third World

engagements, another aspect which Gorbachev stressed on was the spread of terrorism as an

outcome of the Third World regional conflicts. This aspect was also used by Gorbachev and his

aides as an alibi for distancing from the Third World. Though Gorbachev had previously

mentioned the presence of terrorism in the regional conflicts as widespread, it was further used

by him and his aides as an effective 'weapon' to decry the Third World natioQS engaged in their

liberation struggles.

In various discussions and stated preferences regarding the issue of armed struggle versus

the peaceful means, the concern with and opposition to the regional conflicts gained new

importance and priority. As the armed struggles were equated with the spread of terrorism, there

was an added emphasis on peaceful solutions to the Third World regional conflicts. Specialists

airing their views~on the non'-use of force in setting -regional conflicts became more and mor-e~


132

prominent under Gorbachev. Evgenii Primakov, promoted under Gorbachev to the prestigious

position of Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and to

candidate member of the Central Committee and later elected head of a chamber of the new

Soviet parliament, attempted to elucidate the opposition to use of force in relation to the question

of armed struggle and just wars of national or social liberation. 12 According to him, conflicts

in the Third World were to be reduced to their internal causes, which should be dealt with only

by non-military means. "National reconciliation" (the term used mainly for ending rebellion

against Soviet supported regimes) were advocated for providing the peaceful solution.once the

external elements were removed from the equation. 13 Primakov also talked of the political

means to eliminate the internal causes of regional conflicts where two or several nations were

involved. 14 Thus he concluded : "In general .. ·. military means should never be used to eliminate

the causes of conflicts, whatever they may be" .15

This Soviet stance was repeated with great clarity and vehemence, and was also tied to

the criticism of the past Soviet policies and theoretical convolutions.16 Victor Kremeniuk of the

Academy of Sciences' Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, who was a pre Gorbachev

supporter of a more restrained Soviet foreign policy, told a foreign Ministry symp~ium that not

12. Evgenii Primakov as cited in Galia Golan, Gorbachev's "New Thinking" On Terrorism, (New York : Praeger, 1990), p.37.

13. Galia Golan, Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. E. Primakov, Ibid., p.38.

16. Galia Golan, Ibid.


133

a "single postwar conflict has been settled by military means even where no great powers were

involved. Nor could it have" .17 Criticizing the formula of "just and unjust wars", Kremeniuk

stated that they merely provided a basis upon which Moscow found a loophole for a positive

attitude to the use of military force and actually used it. 18

At a joint symposium conducted by the journal MezJuiunarodnia zhizn' and the Academy

of Social Sciences on the eve of the June 1988 CPSU Conference, an analyst from the party's

academy, Professor Aleksander Migolatev, offered Afghanistan as proof that, "internal conflicts

due to interclass, national, ethnic or religious causes are apt to greatly aggravate the situation,

not only in subregion or region, but throughout the world. A local conflict tends to

internationalise armed struggle, with all ensuing consequences" 19 Championing "national

reconciliation" as a means of solving "class, political and ideological problems in terms of giving

priority to the interest of peaceful development", Migolatev concluded that any struggle against

conservative, reactionary forces "should be carried on along new lines and take new, non-

military and more civilized forms" .20

5.1 Other Marxist Third World Nations

As is clear from the foregoing analysis, the Soviet conception of the Third World

regional conflicts changed dramatically after 1988 withdrawal decision of troops from

Afghanistan. The Soviet commentary on the Third World became more and more critical and

17. Victor Kremeniuk as cited in Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Aleksander Migolatev, as cited in Ibid., pp.38-39.

20. Ibid.


134

they (Third World Countries) were told to take care of "themselves by themselves". This altered

view reiterated only peaceful solution to the vexed Third World problems and the non-use of

force in every form. What did this mean for the other Third World nations than Afghanistan?

How did Gorbachev treat the various Third World nations undergoing national liberation

revolutions ? A brief attempt is made hereunder to study some of the regional conflicts in the

context of changes introduced by Gorbachev and his team who repeated again and again that the

Geneva Accords on Afghanistan could serve as a model for resolving other regional conflicts.

a) Cambodia :

Hanoi's declaration that it would withdraw all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia

by 1990, was given much publicity by the Soviets. Especially since 1987, Soviet statements

emphasized the need for national reconciliation in Cambodia. 21

In 1988, Soviet statements placed even greater emphasis on the possibility of a negotiated

settlement in Cambodia which would involve some form of power-sharing by the Heng Samrin

government as well as the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. The increasing Soviet support for

this appeared to accompany greater willingness on the part of Hanoi to extract itself from the

conflict, as showed by its announcement that 50,000 Vietnamese troops and the Vietnamese

military headquarters would be withdrawn from Phnom Penh by the end of 1988.22

21. Moscow TASS in English, 14 May 1987 in FBIS-SOV, 20 May 1987, p.El; Y. Buksin, 'We Earned the Right to Live in Peace', in Moscow News, 13 September 1987, p.lO, in FBISSOV, 24 September 1987, p.32; and Soviet Government Statement, Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 17 October 1987 in FBIS-SOV, 20 October 1987, pp.32-33.

22. FBIS-SOV, 9 March 1988, p.19; FBIS-SOV, 13 April 1988, p.9; N. Ryzkov speech, 'Strengthening Mutual Understanding and Trust' Pravda, 18 May 1988, p.4, in FBIS-SOV, 18 May 1988, p.22; Gorbachev statement, Moscow TASS in English, 18 May 1988 in FBIS-SOV,


135

As noted by A. M. Dryukov, the Soviet ambassador to Singapore, the USSR could not

compel Vietnam to settle the Cambodian issueY But Moscow's increasing encouragement of

a peaceful settlement, and praise for Vietnam's withdrawal plans demonstrated that Gorbachev

did not oppose these moves, indeed he actively supported them. Nor did the Soviet military

object to reducing the Soviet-Vietnamese commitment in Cambodia; as one Krasnaya Zvezda

article noted, "There can be no military solution". 24

b) Angola:

The Soviets also called for a peaceful solution of the Conflict in Angola. lnfact,

Angola, Cuba, and the United States signed peace accords for Angola and Namibia in December

1988 and Moscow fully agreed with them. The accords called for Namibian independence, South

African withdrawal from Angola and Namibia, and Cuban withdrawal from Angola. But,

according to these accords, the Cuban withdrawal was to occur fifteen months after the

withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia, and the South African withdrawal was to be

completed by April 1990, while the Cubans were to leave Angola by July 1991.25

c) Ethiopia :

From 1985 to 1987, the Soviet media mentioned virtually nothing about the

19 May 1988, pp.17-18; and Moscow TASS in English, 26 May 1988 in FBIS-SOV, 27 May 1988, pp.22-23.

23. Strait Times, (Singapore), 3 May 1988.

24. A. Golts, 'Along the path of a settlement', Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 May 1988, in FBIS-SOV, 3 June 1988, p.35.

25. For details see, "Text of Pacts on Namibian Independence and a Pullout by Cuba", New York Times, 23 December 1988; and D.B. Ottaway, "Angola, S. Africa, Cuba Sign Pacts on Namibia, Troop Pullout", Washington Post, 23 December 1988.


136

regional insurgencies confronting the Marxist regime in Ethiopia. But in the first half of 1988,

however, the Soviet coverage of Ethiopia increased. The Somali-Ethiopian peace agreement in

which each side agreed to cease subversive activity against each other was seen as a fine

example of the peaceful resolution of the conflict by Moscow. 26 Additionally, it was

acknowledged that only the rebels were continuing their operations in Eritrea and Tigre, but that

they had also launched successful offensives against the Ethiopian forces. These frank

acknowledgements indicated the shift in Soviet stand on Third World affairs under Gorbachev.

This was again reflected in a commentary about Karen Brutent' s delivery of a message to

Mengitsu from Gorbachev :

A common conviction was expressed that the way to the elimination of tension in the area in the Horn of Africa lies through solution to existing problems by political means on the basis

• of the principles of territorial integrity of states, non-interference in their internal affairs on the part of external forces, and the development of good neighbourly relations.27

d) Nicaragua :

Soviets, under Gorbachev, mainly echoed the views of Sandinista leadership, and

did not oppose the peace efforts ih Central America. They aligned themselves with the

Contadora process and later with the Arias plan (which the Central American states agreed to

in Guatemala in August 1987). The particular feature of the Guatemala accords that Moscow

approved of was the ending of external assistance to opposition groups in Nicaragua.

At a February 1988 meeting between Shevardnadze and Nicaraguan Foreign Minister

Miguel D'Escoto, it appeared that Moscow was encouraging Managua to enter into talks with

26. A. Serbin, 'Sensible Step', Pravda, 9 April 1988 in FBIS-SOV, 20 April 1988, p.38.

27. Moscow TASS in English, 6 May 1988 in FBIS-SOV, 9 May 1988, p.32.


137

the Contras - which they did a few weeks later.28 As in Angola, Moscow also agreed on

amnesty as the primary concession to the opposition groups. Gorbachev himself agreed that the

USSR would stop arms shipments to Nicaragua only if the United States agreed to halt them to

other Central American states.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan thus demonstrated that Gorbachev was not

willing to defend a Third World Marxist regime even on the USSR's border just because it was

Marxist. The same applies to the other Third World nations as well. Gorbachev decided that the

Third World Marxist regimes were extremely weak and had little chances of defeating their

internal opponents even with large-scale military intervention from Moscow. This was the most

obvious reason, besides accommodating the Western (read capitalist) powers, for Soviet

withdrawal from Afghanistan under the Geneva Accord of April 1988. The Geneva package

included the following :

a bilateral Afghan-Pakistani Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations in particular

on non-interference and non-intervention;

a bilateral Afghan-Pakistani Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees;

a Soviet-American Declaration on International Guarantees;

28. In its reporting on the meeting, TASS stated, 'Note was taken, among other positive trends in settling conflict situations, of a desire for national reconciliation, the involvement of regional organizations, and the increased role of the United Nations. Shevardnadze stressed that the Soviet Union invariably follows a policy of principle directed at easing tensions in Central America and achieving an early end to the undeclared war against Nicaragua. He expressed the firm conviction that the only possibility to ensure this in a peaceful settlement of the regional conflict, just as of the other similar situations, by political means in the spirit of realism and with regard for the rightful interests of the sides concerned'. Moscow TASS in English, 26 February 1988 in FBIS-SOV, 26 February 1988, p.38.


138

a quadripartite Agreement on Interrelationships for the settlement of the Situation relating

to Afghanistan, in which the deadlines for and stages of the withdrawal of Soviet troops were

- defined;

a Memorandum of Understanding, which defined the functions of the UN control

mechanism for monitoring the sides' compliance with their commitments.

The Soviets accorded the Geneva package a very high priority and importance. They

thought of this accord as an instrument of ending nine years of confrontation and whipped-up

passions over the Afghan issue. They opined that, finally, it would be possible to close the

'bleeding-wound' and eliminate the highly volatile issue which, according to Gorbachev, was

poisoning not only the regional climate but the international one as well. The reordering of

international relations that was brought about by the Geneva Accords, was to be subsequently

used by the Soviets for imparting an impetus to the 'untying' the other 'regional knots'. The

unquestionable importance of Geneva agreements for the Soviets led them to look for

constructive search for ways to overcome strife by peace negotiations and political compromise.

These Accords were fully supported by world community, specifically in the consensus

resolution passed at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly in November 1988.

GENEVA ACCORD(S) ON AFGHANISTAN, 198829

On 14 April 1988 at the Palace of Nations in Geneva accords on a political settlement

in· Afghanistan have been signed. The documents include a bilateral agreement between the

Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on principles of mutual relations,

29. As cited in Ram Rahul, Afghanistan The USSR And The USA, (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1992), pp.67-81.

1988: The Watershed in Soviet policy towards regional conflicts in the Third World.

139

a declaration on international guarantees, a bilateral agreement between the Republic of

Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees and an

-agreement on the interrelationship for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan.

Abdul Wakil, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, and Zain Noorani, Minister of State

for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, signed the agreements on principles of mutual relations, on the

voluntary settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan.

Eduard Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and George Shultz, the

US Secretary of States, signed the declaration on international guarantees and the agreement on

the interrelationships.

UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar and his personal envoy Diego Cordovez

were present on the occasion.

Agreement on Principles of mutual Relations

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred

to as the high contracting parties.

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and cooperation as well

as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non-intervention

in the internal and external affairs of States is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of

intemational peace and security and for the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the

Charter of the United Nations.

Reaffirming the inalienable right of States freely to determine their own political,

econ()mi_c, cultu_ral and sociaL systems in accordance with the will of their peoples, without


outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.

140

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions

adopted by the United Nations on the principles of non-interference and non-intervention, in

particular the declaration on principles of international law, concerning friendly relations and

cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October

1970 as well as the declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the

internal affairs of States of 9 December 1981 have agreed as follows :

Article 1

Relations between the high contracting parties shall be conducted in strict compliance

with the principles of non-intervention and non-interference by States in the affairs of other

states.

Article 2

For the purposes of implementing the principle of non-interference and non-intervention

each high contracting party undertakes to comply with the following obligations :

1. to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity,

security and non-alignment of the other high contracting party as well as the national identity

and cultural heritage of its people;

2. to respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other high contracting party freely

to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international

relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources in accordance with the

will of its people and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat

in any form whatso~ver;


141

3. to refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the

boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other high

-contracting party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other high contracting party

or its government, or to cause tension between the high contracting parties;

4. to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty,

political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic

and social stability of the other high contracting party;

5. to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of

intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other high contracting party, or any

act of military, political or economic interference in the internai affairs of the other high

contracting party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;

6. to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or u~der whatever pretext to

destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other high contracting party or any of its

institutions;

7. to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious

or secessionist activities against the other high contracting party, under any pretext whatsoever,

or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political

order of the other high contracting party;

8. to prevent within its t~rritory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of

mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other high

contracting party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other high

contracting party' and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training,


equipping and transit of such mercenaries;

142

9. to refrain from making any agreement or arrangements with other States designed to

intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of the other high contracting party;

10. to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the

purpose of intervening or interfering in the affairs of the other high contracting party;

11. to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of territorist groups, saboteurs or

subversive agents against the other high contracting party;

12. to prevent within its territory the presence, harbouring, m camps and bases or

otherwise,organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and

political,ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest

in the territory of the other high contracting party and accordingly also to prevent the use of

mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and

groups;

13. not to resort to or allow any other action that could be considered as interference or

intervention.

Article 3

The present agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

Article 4

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the high contracting parties to comply

with the provisions of Article 2 of this agreement shall be completed by the date on which this

agreement enters into force.

Article 5


143

This agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being

equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this Fourteenth Day of April 1988.

Declaration on International Guarantees

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of

America;

Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

have concluded a negotiated political settlement designed to normalize relations and promote

good-neighbourliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and

security in the region;

Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of

Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to

ensuring respect for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment;

Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and· intervention in the

internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to

respect the commitments contained in the bilateral agreement between the Republic of

Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, in

particular on non-interference and non-intervention;

Urge all States to Act Likewise

The present declaration shall enter into force on 15 May 1988

Done at Geneva, this Fourteenth Day of April 1988, in five original copies, each in the


English and Russian languages, both texts being authentic.

Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees

144

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred

to as the high contracting parties, desiring to normalize relations and promote good-

neighbourliness, peace and security in the region, convinced that voluntary and

unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem for

Afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that

the arrangements for the return of the Afghan refugees are satisfactory to them, have

agreed as follows :

Article 1

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with

the arrangements and conditions set out in the present agreement.

Article 2

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to

ensure the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland

(a) all refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;

(b) all returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement

within the Republic of Afghanistan;

(c) all returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living conditions and to

share in the welfare of the state;

(d) all returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal basis in the civic


145

affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall be ensured equal benefits from

the solution of the land question on the basis of the land and water reform;

-

(e) all returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of

religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens

of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination.

The Government of Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to implement these measures and

to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article 3

The Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly

and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to

provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article 4

For the purpose of organizing, coordinating and supervising the operations which should

effect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up

mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice. For the

performance of their functions the members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded

the necessary facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the high

contracting parties.

Article 5

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine

frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centers. They shall also establish all other

modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the


country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

Article 6

146

-At the request of the governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees will cooperate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of

refugees in accordance with the present agreement. Special agreement may be concluded for this

purpose between UNHRC and the high contracting parties.

Article 7

The present agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At that time the mixed

commissions provided in Article 4 shall be established and the operations for the voluntary

return of refugees under this agreement shall commence.

The agreements set out in Article 4 and 5 above shall remain in effect for a period of

eighteen months. After that period the high contracting parties shall review the results of the

repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangement that may be called for.

Article 8

This agreement is drawn up in English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being

equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the: English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this Fourteenth Day of April 1988.

Agreement on Interrelationships

1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the

support of all governments concerned and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political

settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully brought to an end.

2. Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement designed to resolve the '


147

various issues involved and to establish a framework for good-neighbourliness and cooperation,

the government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan entered into negotiations through the intermediary of the personarrepresentative of the

Secretary-General at Geneva from 16 to 24 June 1982. Following consultations held by the

personal representaive in Islamabad, Kabul and Tehran from 21 Janurary to 7 February 1983,

the negotiations continued at Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983. The

personal representative again visited the area for high level discussions from 3 to 15 April 1984.

It was then agreed to change the format of the negotiations and, in pursuance thereof, proximity

talks through the intermediary of the personal representative were held at Geneva from 24 to 30

August 1984. Another visit to the area by the personal representative from 25 to 31 May 1985

preceded further rounds of proximity talks held at Geneva from 20 to 25 June, from 27 to 30

August and from 16 to 19 December 1985. The personal representative paid an additional visit

to the area from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The final round of negotiations, began

as proximity talks at Geneva on 5 May 1986, was suspended on 23 May 1986 and was resumed

from 31 July to 8 August 1987. The personal representative visited the area from 20 November

to 3 December 1986 for further consultations and the talks. at Geneva were resumed again from

25 February to 9 March 1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The personal representative

again visited the area from 18 Januaray to 9 February 1988 and the talks resumed at Geneva

from 2 March to 8 April 1988. The format of the negotiations was changed on 14 April 1988,

when the instruments comprising the settlement were finalized and, accordingly, direct talks

were held at that stage. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was kept informed of

the progress of the geg9tiati9ns tl1roughout the diplomatic process.


148

3. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic

Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the expressed conviction that they were

acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations

and agreed that the political settlement should be based on ~the following principles of

international law :

the principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use

of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other

manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

the principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such

a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

the duty of States to cooperate with one another in accordance with the Charter of the

United Nations;

the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people;

the principle of sovereign equality of States;

the principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Two governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their

homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.

4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as component parts of the political

settlement;


149

A bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-

intervention;

A declaration on international guarantees by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and

the United States of America;

A bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees;

The present agreement on the interrelationship for the settlement of the situation relating

to Afghanistan.

5. The bilateral agreement on the principles of mutual relation, in particular on non-

interference and non-intervention, the declaration on international guarantees, the bilateral

agreement on • the voluntary return of refugees, and the present agreement on the

interrelationships·for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan will enter into force

on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the timeframe agreed upon between the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a phased withdrawal of the

foreign troops which will start on the date of eptry into force mentioned above.One half of the

troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed

within nine months.

6. The interrelationships in paragraph 5 above have been agreed upon in order to achieve

effectively the purpose of the political settlement, namely that as from 15 May 1988. There will

be no interference and ·intervention in any from in the affairs of the parties; the international

guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary return of the refugees to their homeland will start


150

and be completed within time-frame envisaged in paragraph 5. It is, therefore, essential that all

the obligations deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts of the settlement be

-strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required to ensure compliance with all the provisions of

the instruments be completed in good faith.

7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory solutions

to questions that may arise in the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement,

representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet

whenever required.

A representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall lend his good

offices to the parties and in that context he will assist in the organiztion of the meetings and

participate in them. He may submit to the parties for their consideration and approval

suggestions and recommendations for prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions

of the instruments.

In order to enable him to fulfil his tasks, the representative shall be assisted by such

personnel under his authority as required. On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the

parties, the personnel shall inv~stigate any possible violations of any of the provisions of the

instruments and prepare a report thereon. For that purpose, the representative and his personnel

shall receive all the necessary cooperation from the parties, including all freedom of movement

within their respective territories required for effective investigation. Any report submitted by

the representative to the two governments shall be considered in a meeting of the parties no later

than 48 hours after it has been submitted.

The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the representative and the

1988 : The Watershed in Soviet policy towards regional conllicts in the Third World.

151

personnel under his authority as agreed upon with the parties are set out in the memorandum of

understanding which is annexed to and is part of this agreement.

8. The present instrument will be registered with the Secretary-General of the United

Nations. It has been examined by the representatives of the parties to the bilateral agreements

and of the States guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provisions. The

representatives of the parties, being duly authorized thereto by their respective governments,

have affixed their signatures hereunder. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was

present.

Done, at Geneva, this Fourteenth Day of April 1988, in five original copies each in the

English, Pashtu, Russian and Urdu languages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute

regarding the interpretation the English text shall prevail.

In witness thereof, the representatives of the States-guarantors affixed their signatures

hereunder:

The USSR The USA

Eduard Shevardnadze George Shultz


ANNEX

152

Memorandum of Understanding

1. Basic Requirements

(a) The parties will provide full support and cooperation to the representatives of the

Secretary-General and to all the personnel assigned to assist him.

(b) The representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel will be accorded

every facility as well as prompt and effective assistance, including freedom of

movement and communications, accommodation, transportation and other facilities

that may be necessary for the performance of their tasks. Afghanistan and

Paldstan undertake to grant to the representative and his staff all the relevant

privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and

Immunities of the United Nations.

2. Mandate·

The mandate for the implementation-assistance arrangements envisaged in

paragraph 7 derives from the instruments comprising the settlement. All the staff

assigned to the representative of the Secretary-General will accordingly be

carefully briefed on the relevant provisions of the instruments and on the

procedures that will be used to ascertain violations thereof.

3.


Modus Operandi and Personnel Organization

153

The Secretary-General will appoint a senior military officer as deputy to the

representative, who will be stationed in the area, as head of two small

headquarters units, one in Kabul and the other in Islamabad, each

comprising five military officers, drawn from existing United Nations Operations,

and a small civilian auxiliary staff.

The deputy to the representative of the Secretary-General will act on behalf

of the representative and be in contact with the parties through the liaison officer

eac~ party will designate for this purpose.

The two headquarters units will be organized into two inspection teams to

ascertain on the ground any violation of the instruments comprising the settlement.

Whenever considered necessary by the representative of the Secretary-General or

his deputy, up to 40 additional military officers (some 10 additional inspection

-teams) will be redeployed from existing operations within the shortest possible

time (normally around 48 hours).

The nationalities of all the officers will be determined in consultation with

the parties.

Wherever necessary the representative of the Secretary-General, who will

periodically visit the area for consultations with the parties and to review the work

of his· personnel, will assign to the area members of his own office and other

civilian personnel from the United Nations Secretariat as may be needed. His

deputy will alternate between the two headquarters units and· will ·remain at all

4.

1988: The Watershed in Soviet policy towards regional conflicts in the Third World.

times in close communication with him.

Procedure

(a) Inspections Conducted at the Request of the Parties

154

(i) A complaint regarding a violation of the instruments of the settlement

lodged by any of the parties should be submitted in writing, in the

English language, to the respective headquarters units and should indicate

all relevant information and details.

(ii) Upon receipt of a complaint the deputy to the representative of the

Secretary-General will immediately inform the other party of the complaint

and undertake an investigation by making on-site inspections, gathering

testimony and using any other procedure which he may deem necessary

for the. investigation of the alleged violation. Such inspection will be

conducted using headquarters staff as referred above, unless the deputy

representative of the Secretary-General considers that additional teams are

needed. In that case, the parties will, under the principle of freedom of

: movement, allow immediate access of the additional personnel to their

· repective territories.

(iii) Reports on investigations will be prepared in English and submitted

by the deputy representative of the Secretary-General to the two

governments, on a confidential basis (A third copy of the report

will be simultaneously transmitted, on a confidential basis, to the United

- ·Nations Headquarters -in New.York~ -exciusively for the information-of the


155

Secretary-General and his representative). In accordance with paragraph

7 a report on an investigation should be considered in a meeting of the

parties not later than 48 hours after it has been submitted. The deputy

representative of the Secretary-General will, in the absence of the

. representative, lend his good offices to the parties and in that comtext he

will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in

them. In the context of those meetings the deputy representative of the

Secretary-General may submit to the parties for their consideration and

approval suggestions and recommendations for the prompt, faithful and

complete observance of the provisions of the instruments (Such suggestions

and recommendations will be, as a matter of course, consulted with, and

cleared by, the representative of the Secretary-General).

(b) Inspections Conducted on the Initiative of the Deputy Representative of the

Secretary-General

In addition to inspections requested by the parties, the deputy

representative of the Secretary-General may carry out on his own initiative

and in consultation with the representative inspections he deems appropriate

for the purpose of the implementation of paragraph 7. If it is considered

that the conclusions reached in an inspection justify a report to the parties,

the same procedure used in submitting reports in connection with

inspections carried out at the request of the parties will be followed.

5.

6.

7.

1988: The Watershed in Soviet policy towards regional conflicts in the Third World •

• Level of Participation in Meetings

156

As indicated above, the deputy representative of the Secretary-

-General will participate at meetings of the parties convened for the purpose

of considering reports on violations. Should the parties decide to meet for

the purpose outlined in paragraph 7 at a high political level, the

representative of the Secretary-General will personally attend such

meetings.

Duration

~he deputy to the representative of the Secretary-General and the

other personnel will be established in the area not later than twenty days

before the entry into force of the instruments. The arrangements will cease

to exist two months after the completion of all time-frames envisaged for

the implementation of the instruments.

Financing

The cost of all facilities and services to be provided by the parties

will be borne by the respective govenments. The s~laries and travel

expanses of the personnel to and from the area, as well as the costs of the

local personnel assigned to the headquarters units, will be defrayed by the

United Nations.

Documents

CHAP1ER - Information and Library Network Centreshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/17080/10/10...earlier in this work, the improvement in East-West relations (and the unexpected